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Chapter 1 - Introduction

The Roman Catholic Church is the most unique international actor both from an international law and from an international relations perspective. Despite its territorial insignificance it holds great power status in the realm of diplomacy and influence around the world. Audiences with the Pope are sought by those who seek credibility with the world community. Media coverage of these meetings and the periodic Vatican pronouncements is an implicit recognition of the Church's importance not just in matters of faith but also politically. The Catholic Church, as an international actor has not received the academic attention however, concomitant to its long diplomatic history and its institutional resources. This paper will draw from the available literature an understanding of the sources of authority and influence which the Church enjoys, many of them unique to that institution. It is through this exploration that the Church's mediating assets and liabilities will be made evident. The objective of this study is to determine the type(s) of dispute which can be resolved by papal mediation as well as determining which countries are likely to agree to this type of intervention. It is clear that the question of acceptability is crucial to this study. The mission of the Church, to proselytize and point to what it believes to be injustice, impacts on its acceptability as a mediator. An institution such as the Church faces this tension when attempting to promote peace: in fulfilling its mandate it can actually dissuade nations from turning to it when international disputes develop. By examining the Roman Catholic Church in this manner its uniqueness will become evident: a combination of state and non-state actor. This characteristic encompasses both the assets and liabilities of the Church as a mediator and determines where it is effective. The hybrid

**The Catholic Church as a Mediator:
a struggle of ability and acceptability**

by

Paul E Bernard, B A

**A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of
the requirements for the degree of**

Master of Arts

The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs

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The undersigned hereby recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research acceptance of this thesis, submitted by PAUL EMERICK BERNARD, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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Abstract

Limited attention has been paid to the contributions of the Roman Catholic Church in the field of dispute settlement. Its status as a transnational actor with full diplomatic rights is unique and largely unexplored, especially in mediation literature. This study explores the assets and liabilities of the Vatican as they relate to mediation theory. Through an examination of papal intervention to end the dispute between Chile and Argentina over the Beagle Channel and in separating the superpowers during the Cuban Missile Crisis, these assets and liabilities are laid bare. This empirical data is then evaluated in the light of mediation theory, allowing the Catholic Church to be appropriately placed in relation to other mediators

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

The Roman Catholic Church is the most unique international actor both from an international law and from an international relations perspective. Despite its territorial insignificance it holds great power status in the realm of diplomacy and influence around the world. Audiences with the Pope are sought by those who seek credibility with the world community. Media coverage of these meetings and the periodic Vatican pronouncements is an implicit recognition of the Church's importance not just in matters of faith but also politically. The Catholic Church, as an international actor has not received the academic attention however, concomitant to its long diplomatic history and its institutional resources. This paper will draw from the available literature an understanding of the sources of authority and influence which the Church enjoys, many of them unique to that institution. It is through this exploration that the Church's mediating assets and liabilities will be made evident. The objective of this study is to determine the type(s) of dispute which can be resolved by papal mediation as well as determining which countries are likely to agree to this type of intervention. It is clear that the question of acceptability is crucial to this study. The mission of the Church, to proselytize and point to what it believes to be injustice, impacts on its acceptability as a mediator. An institution such as the Church faces this tension when attempting to promote peace in fulfilling its mandate it can actually dissuade nations from turning to it when international disputes develop. By examining the Roman Catholic Church in this manner its uniqueness will become evident a combination of state and non-state actor. This characteristic encompasses both the assets and liabilities of the Church as a mediator and determines where it is effective. The hybrid

nature of the Church will allow, in the course of this study, an evaluation of three categories of mediators: individuals, states and transnational organizations. The Pope as a sovereign brings a strong personal component to any negotiation the Vatican enters. The blend of state and transnational actor that is the Vatican is omnipresent when it interacts with the international system. As this paper moves to fulfil its mandate, the three aforementioned aspects which arise from the dual nature of the Vatican will be seen to vary in intensity depending on the nature of the mediation effort. The personal rank of the Pope is a separate category of analysis but its origin and source of legitimacy comes from the Church and its transnational character. Thus the "dual nature" of the Church will be referred to in this paper with the understanding that three categories of mediators are bound up within this duality.

This paper will, by analyzing this dual nature, test the following hypothesis: the Catholic Church is likely to be successful in settling disputes in regional theatres between largely catholic nations. To achieve this goal the paper will begin with an examination of the history of the Catholic Church as a diplomatic actor. By looking at this history it will be possible to identify the international norms which have and continue to preserve the Catholic Church's position globally. This historic interaction with nation-states reveals the strengths and weaknesses, the assets and liabilities of the Church as a mediator as it has progressed from the supreme political and spiritual arbiter during the Middle Ages to its present form and position. The first chapter will also introduce the analytical framework which will inform the subsequent chapters.

Two case studies will also be presented. The Beagle Channel mediation and Pope

John's effort to mediate an end to the Cold War in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis will provide insights into the Vatican's mediation prowess. The Beagle Channel mediation is important as it shows the diplomatic skill the Church has developed over the centuries as a state actor. It also exposes the success which is possible when a negotiation is led by an organization whose *raison d'être* is compatible with the culture of the disputing states. The mediation attempt of Pope John is interesting in that it shows the inability of the Church to affect an ideological conflict such as that which existed between the superpowers. Its own "ideology" was incompatible with the cultures of both nations. What the cases will seek to establish is the tension between the two "personalities" which comprise the Church as an international actor. Its diplomatic skill which is born of its status as a state actor and its global influence which is a product of the Church's transnational nature creates a dynamic appropriately described by the title of this study.

The nature of the disputes will also be examined to see how they affect the efforts of the Vatican. Using the research of Brecher and Wilkenfeld, the type of dispute as well as the type of actors agreeable to Vatican mediation will be identified. Their extensive empirical research relates to crisis management and those actors which make good crisis managers. Brecher and Wilkenfeld define an international crisis as

...a situational change characterized by i) change in type or increase in intensity of disruptive interactions between two or more adversaries with a high probability of military hostilities or during a war, an adverse change in the military balance; 2) the higher than normal conflictive interactions destabilizing the existing relationship and posing a challenge to the structure of an international system - global, dominant and/or subsystem.¹

The case studies will provide an example of one crisis (Beagle Channel Dispute) and one non-crisis (Pope John's superpower mediation effort) which will help show how the type of

dispute as well as the parties involved affect mediation techniques and success. The Cuban missile crisis provided a point of entry for Pope John but the subsequent deescalation saw him operating in a non-crisis environment. Without the urgency which a crisis provides the largely personal mediation attempt by John was further handicapped.

The second important component of their analysis which will inform the conclusion of this paper is whether or not the crisis takes place within a "protracted conflict". Brecher and Wilkenfeld define a protracted conflict as a hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time. The stakes are high (usually something which defines national identity, sometimes the conflict itself) and the conflict has moved beyond a disagreement between governments and has become societal.² The case studies employed in this paper are examples of protracted conflicts under this definition. This research will be helpful in categorizing the conflicts, allowing conclusions to be drawn as to the prerequisites for successful Vatican intervention. Is the Church effective in abating disputes within protracted conflicts or outside protracted conflicts? Can it act effectively within subsystems and dominant systems? Once this analysis is complete we will be able to revisit the paper's hypothesis.

The Church as an International Actor

The great changes in Catholic theology over the last 100 years are important to understanding the Church's present posture with respect to international conciliation. The loss of the Papal States in 1870 saw the Church exercising its spiritual sovereignty with renewed vigour and becoming an agent for social justice throughout the world once it was

free of the constraints which came with temporal sovereignty. This freedom (even in the light of the Lateran Treaty of 1929 granting Vatican City to the Church) has become an important factor when considering the Church's potential as a mediator. As this is not a theology paper, this study will deal only with major doctrinal shifts in the context of the paper as a whole. That is, those which have impacted on the Roman Church's external, political posture.

Completion of this study will allow us to identify specific types of disputes which lend themselves to Vatican conciliation and why these disputes can be resolved in this manner. This chapter, then, serves to illuminate aspects of the Roman Catholic Church as they have evolved in the international system and how these contribute to and/or hamper its potential as a mediator. The words of Christ and others in the bible refer often to the dual loyalties of man. When asked by The Pharisees to clarify man's duty to the state and his God, Jesus replied, saying, "pay Caesar what belongs to Caesar and God what belongs to God".⁴ St. Paul in his Letter to the Romans was even more emphatic in his views on Christians' duty to civil authorities. In the oft quoted passage he states

Everyone is to obey the governing authorities, because there is no authority except from God and so whatever authorities exist have been appointed by God.⁴

It is because of the dichotomy Catholicism endorsed from the very beginning (Christ's words) which separates political life from spiritual life that the Church has been able to not only survive for 2000 years but has affected Western civilization so significantly. This dualism between the temporal (political) and the spiritual was designed by Christ to Christians in order to protect His Church from persecution and distraction. It was an attempt to lessen the perceived threat an institutional structure such as the Roman Catholic

Church was to constitute to civil authorities. This distinction was also designed to protect Christians from Church authorities who might otherwise become too preoccupied with temporal affairs. In no way, however, does this axiom condone the complete neglect of the temporal condition of men and women but demands that Christians always keep the "City of God" above the "City of Man". The balance between the temporal and spiritual obligations of the Church has always been and remains a central debate among theologians and Church leaders. The Church is united in the opinion that the Church does indeed have a role in the temporal condition of all men and women. It is precisely because of this nexus as well as the institutional and historical assets it possesses (which shall be identified as this paper proceeds) that one can refer to Vatican mediation.

It should be stated that this paper is not proposing a new mission for the Church but seeking a better understanding of a function which the Church itself has identified as paramount among its temporal obligations. Pope Leo XIII (1878-1903) stated that the Church's highest possible secular mission is that of a mediator for peace.⁵ At this point something must be said of the source of the Church's capability as a mediator. The uniqueness of the Church alluded to in the introduction to this paper stems from its status in the diplomatic corps of the international system. This status is the result of centuries of recognition as a state actor. The Church's right of legation was established, as Pope Pius VI (1775-1799) stated,

[by] the intrinsic power and nature of the primacy, the rights and prerogatives flowing therefrom and the constant practice of the Church since the earliest centuries."

Ecclesiastical diplomacy (that between a state and the Church) existed long before diplomacy between nations began during the Renaissance in Europe. The ascendancy of the Roman Catholic Church began with the official toleration of the faith by Emperor Constantine. Shortly after this historic reversal, representatives of the Pope began arriving in Constantinople at the courts of the Emperor. Gradually this practice spread to the courts of European princes as Catholicism spread and consolidated. The growth in the number and importance of Papal Legates followed the growth in the territorial responsibilities of the Pope and his claim of supremacy over the rulers of Europe. The power of the Pope reached its apex during the pontificate of Innocent III (1198-1216). It was stated that there were "two swords" by which the world was ruled, the temporal and the spiritual and both were in the hands of the Pope.⁷ The threat of excommunication and the loss of a king's "divine right" lay in the hands of the Pope and served to make these princes his vassals.

The first and most fundamental challenge to the Pope's authority was the rise of protestantism. Martin Luther's criticism of Church excesses led to the development of a new faith which repudiated a sacramental hierarchy such as the Catholic Church. In essence every protestant was his or her own pope; empowered to interpret the bible for themselves. The current bureaucratic structure of the Vatican is a legacy of the Church's response to protestantism's doctrinal and evangelical challenge. The congregational structure of the Curia was developed to guard and articulate the Catholic faith in a more coherent manner in order to limit the advance of protestant missionaries.⁸

As the absolutism of the Ancien Regime declined and resentment of the power of

Rome grew, the Pope was increasingly seen as an anachronism and no longer in possession of the "two swords". The most striking example of this loss in respect for the Pope among European rulers came in 1809 when Napoleon over-ran the Papal States left to the Popes when the Imperial City moved to Byzantium, and carried Pope Pius VII to imprisonment in France. Pope Pius, it appeared, was made to suffer for the Church's preoccupation over the centuries with temporal matters. Upon the release of the Pope in 1813, a new era began in the history of the Church with respect to that balance of the temporal and spiritual mission of the Church. Pius VII's secretary of state, Cardinal Pacca, urged the Pope not to relinquish his territory and become a vassal of the French empire in order to maintain his spiritual sovereignty. It is his thoughts on the nature of Papal sovereignty which begin this analysis of the unique qualities of the Catholic Church in world affairs.

While interred, Cardinal Pacca reconsidered the necessity of temporal power. The thesis formulated 100 years earlier by Bishop Boussuet, that in order to exercise his spiritual office the Pope must have territory under his control so as to remain above the conflicting interests citizenship in a state could cause, began to falter in the Cardinal's mind.⁹ Perhaps Napoleon, by divine providence, was to be a new Constantine who would reinstate European unity and further the spread of Catholicism through a Pope tied to an Emperor. The loss of the temporal power of the Pope would end the animosity exhibited by many toward the Church. Within the Church more attention could be paid to its principle, spiritual mission and the perception of a Church blinded by political influence would cease to hold any validity.¹⁰ The defeat of Napoleon removed any doubt in the truth of Boussuet's arguments. The temporary, equivocal nature of temporal regimes made it

imprudent for a spiritual sovereign to tie the Church to the fortunes of such an entity. The persistence of this doctrine requiring the Pope to be a temporal sovereign was soon tempered at the Congress of Vienna.

Pius VII's representative at the congress was Cardinal Consalvi who was charged with securing the return of the Papal States and achieving diplomatic precedence for nuncios in deference to the spiritual position of the Pope. Only by formally acknowledging the new reality of Europe in the wake of Napoleon was he able to succeed in his mission ¹¹ The Pope no longer claimed temporal primacy but instead rested on his position as a religious monarch in seeking to secure a measure of dignity for the Church among the nations of Europe.

The importance of this recognition of the Pope's religious sovereignty among nation-states is the foundation of its influence historically and remains so today. The most striking example of this recognition came in 1870 when the Kingdom of Italy annexed the Papal States, wresting the temporal "sword" from the pontiff. This action can be seen as the culmination of the prevailing mood among statesmen with regard to the papal states and the Church's formal renunciation of the Pope's temporal sovereignty over nations. Most important to this paper however is the fact that nation-states did not cease their diplomatic interaction with the Church despite its lack of a sovereign territory. Foreign governments implicitly recognized the Pope's status as a sovereign by virtue of his religious office. It is this recognition that affords the Church unique assets in its dealings with nation-states.

By 1929 the Italian government had concluded that it would benefit both itself and

the Church if the Pope possessed some measure of territory from which to exercise his office. This office which, in matters relating to its salvific mission, is universal and is constrained if subject to civil authority. No civil authority could contain a spiritual sovereign with a history of diplomatic freedom such as the Pope without casting itself in a most unfavourable light among the global community who recognize his sovereignty. Moreover, the Church's usually general criticisms of prevailing phenomena would be turned directly upon the state interring the Church, dividing the loyalties of its citizens and threatening the stability of the state.

The annexation of the Papal States freed the Church from the vicissitudes of administering large territories and redirected its energies toward social justice. With the promulgation of *Rerum Novarum* by Pope Leo XIII (1878-1903) a new era of papal encyclicals seeking to apply the gospel to issues of social justice was born. This document and the encyclicals which followed were shadows of what was to come at Vatican II. By observing events/behaviour occurring in the world and seeking to address them in a relevant way the evolution from deductive theology to inductive theology began.¹² This methodology was enshrined in the Church's new constitution at Vatican II and thereby formally recognized the values of modern temporal society which had been so scorned in the past. The Church for the last century, and particularly since Vatican II, has sought to establish a new balance between its obligations in the temporal world and its obligations as the legacy of Christ on earth. Since the early 1960s the Church has occupied itself with internal reform more than any activity save its sacramental charges. Increased integration through enhanced communication between the Holy See and its prelates and laity around

the world has become a priority with the Roman Catholic organization.¹³ In addition to the organizational measures taken to strengthen the Church the call for evangelization by the current pontiff is aimed at those within the Catholic faith as well as expanding its base. This, coupled with a greater role for laity in the working of the Church, shifts the focus from numerical and territorial expansion as the goal to consolidation and competence in the operations of the Church.¹⁴

One must not be led to think that because the Church has been focusing on its own renewal that it is ignoring the world around it. On the contrary, as was stated before, the Church has learned the value of the social sciences and other fields which had been viewed with unease. Moreover, the Church now speaks of the "integral" salvation of man. Modern catholic theology demands that man's temporal condition must be an area of concern for the Church since, unlike periodic suffering, prolonged misery has no virtue. It is this new immediacy which now presses the Church to ensure some measure of comfort to its followers in this world as well as the next. Thus, the catholic leadership has involved itself in world affairs and attempted, through its moral and spiritual guidance, to provide that peace and security for all. The Church, being free from the pressures which came from governing large territories, can now champion the cause of all peoples without fear of losing political support or offending allies as it had feared in the past.

Intervention - Motivations

The Church's full juridical status as a spiritual sovereign, its exceptional diplomatic competence developed over the centuries, its freedom from the security concerns of other

prominent sovereigns and its primary mission to provide the conditions conducive for salvation yield unique qualifications for mediation. This conclusion marks the point of departure for the remainder of this chapter which will examine in a specific way the strengths and weaknesses of these qualities in the light of mediation theory. By using Touval and Zartman's framework for evaluating a mediator one can begin to attach some relative value to the qualities and position of the Church as presented to this point.¹⁵

The motivations which lay behind Vatican mediation efforts have been alluded to thus far but not addressed directly. Touval and Zartman in addressing these motivations state that an actor's willingness to mediate a dispute must be evaluated in the light of power politics. While it would be easy to dismiss this consideration with respect to the Church, its history is that of a great power. Even though this is no longer true, its past allegiances (colonialism, crusades) may affect its acceptability to some parties. In this century, the Church has been the sworn enemy of communism and suffered grievously at its hands. Clearly, this has limited the opportunities for Vatican sponsored conciliation involving super-power disputes. In its doctrinal war with communism, however, the Church has not given its unqualified endorsement of capitalism and it is by this continued scepticism that the Church sought to remain detached from temporally based doctrines. After the Cuban missile crisis the Church has consistently balanced its criticism of the super-powers.¹⁶ The criticism of the Church against those aspects of capitalism and the market which it finds malicious continue despite the end of the Cold War and its greatest enemy, the Soviet Union. This continued detachment has broadened the potential scope and opportunity for papal mediation.

The question of motivation with respect to the Church and its mediation activities raises a paradox which underlines the uniqueness of its role in the world. Touval and Zartman conclude that because of the cost and risk of mediation to the third party, this activity is not usually humanitarian in nature. The Church is motivated by self interest and yet that self interest is humanitarian in nature. The Pope has no global political agenda but he does have a religious agenda as a spiritual sovereign and that agenda is best served by an atmosphere of peace. Unlike religions such as Judaism which do not actively seek converts, the Catholic Church is a missionary church and it is during times of peace that the Church is best able to extend its influence and membership. The nationalism and social cleavages which accompany war hinders the evangelical work of the Church not to mention the violence that threatens its members and leaders

Related to the above motivation are what Touval and Zartman term the "defensive" reasons for mediation. As a spiritual sovereign the Pope seeks to defend not territory but the hearts and minds of his Church as well as maintaining the freedom of Catholics to preach/practice their faith. Civil wars such as those which have persisted in Latin America have been quite damaging to the Church. In Nicaragua, El Salvador and other countries with a history in recent years of civil strife, rifts in these societies have extended to the Church. "Popular churches" have been formed by "progressive" members of the Church in reaction to the "orthodox" leadership who are seen to lack solidarity with the people. These conflicts have also often resulted in the murder of priests and bishops who call for justice. These intense conflicts threaten the unity and confidence of the Church in these

countries and the safety of its followers. In this sense mediation by the Church in these conflicts can be seen as defensive in nature.

The last motivation identified by Touval and Zartman is that of influence. Once again this motivation applies to the Church in the context of its primary mission. By facilitating solutions to disputes within or between nations, the Church is seen as a positive force and not a divisive one. It is easy to identify the advantages accruing to the Church from this scenario as its twin goals of consolidation and expansion would be advanced by this new influence. It is also clear with regard to this motivation that the dangers involved in mediation are many. Failure may result in animosity between the third party and one or both of the protagonists. It is for this reason that offers of mediation are first carefully considered.

Intervention - Dangers

The dangers to the Church, like its motivations, are of a different hue than that of nation-states. The Church's mission of salvation requires a freedom within these nation-states which is guaranteed only through positive relations between the Vatican and the host country. Pope St. Pius X underscores the importance of these relations and thus the risk of mediation when he stated:

...the Supreme Pontiff cannot separate politics from the authority which he exercises in faith and in morals. In addition, since he is the head and director of a perfect society, the Church, the Pope must wish to maintain good relations with the rulers of states...to assure for Catholics, always and everywhere their security and liberty.¹⁷

This quotation summarizes much of what has been discussed to this point. The fact that Pius X considered abolishing the Vatican diplomatic corps as an unnecessary distraction

and later was convinced of its importance further testifies to the inseparable nature of politics and the state of the Church. Pope Pius also alluded to his sovereignty in matters involving faith and morals but ultimately coupled effective exercise of his office with congenial Church-state relations to ensure temporal as well as spiritual salvation for all Catholics. It is obvious then that the old tools of excommunication and anathematizing are not only anachronistic but also dangerous today.¹⁸

Fewer leaders are Catholic and efforts by the Church to isolate countries endanger its existence in those countries. Thus, like the motives, the dangers of mediation directly involve the primary mission of the Church. One can see then the tension that exists regarding the Church's obligations. The salvific mission of the Church requires it to act in such a way that it puts at risk its ability to carry out this mission. This is the double-edged sword identified earlier in the context of the motive of increasing one's influence through mediation.

In addition to the danger of causing friction between the Church and nation-states, mediation can damage prestige. With regard to the Church this not only involves a loss of influence but may damage its moral authority. Entering into a mediation situation with, for example, a dictatorship with a well documented record of human rights abuses may diminish its attractiveness to potential converts and thus affect the mission of the Church. Significant loss of moral authority at the centre may even affect the cohesiveness of the Church. Any action by the leadership in Rome which is seen to legitimize such a leader would cause disaffection among those within that country who oppose the regime as well as those opponents outside the country working for change. The sacramental nature of the

Church means that the authority of this institution rests on its followers' belief in the validity of its origin and the faithfulness of its leaders to the doctrines of Christ. Such a mandate is not conducive to mediation in situations where principles are often compromised. As this paper progresses through the case material, this tension between the Church as peacemaker and its role as prophet calling on leaders of government to adhere to a high moral criteria will become abundantly clear.

Intervention - Assets

The Church's organizing principle and basis of authority does pose difficulties in dealing within the international system but many of the qualities uncovered earlier in this paper provide advantages other third parties do not possess. The moral authority of the Church places it in the mind of most people (particularly if the Pope is personally involved) above other sovereigns. The rank of the interlocutor, according to Touval and Zartman, is a requisite for mediation success. Thus, the Church does possess some advantage over other parties in terms of integrity and rank. It must be stated that rank is a subjective distinction when used in this manner. The kind of dispute and the parties involved will determine the relative rank of an interlocutor. The specific cases used in this paper will further clarify this point with regard to the Church.

The Church possesses another requisite for success which derives from its position as spiritual sovereign. Citizens and leaders of this "spiritual nation" are scattered throughout the secular nations of the world in varying concentrations. The Church can call upon its followers within these countries and bring pressure to bear on a recalcitrant

government. Its many conferences and organizations throughout the world provide strong transnational links to public opinion.¹⁹ Moreover, the moral authority of these organizations (episcopal conferences etc.) and the documents issued by them are powerful tools in focusing public opinion. This is the most valuable asset the Church has in moving nation-states in a desired direction and it underscores its unique position among nations. No other sovereign has such a well developed governing structure within other states which is tolerated by those states. This allegiance on the part of citizens within a state, the moral authority of the Church and the position and personality of the Pope as the Vicar of Christ constitute the primary sources of leverage in the Vatican's mediation efforts.

Touval and Zartman identify three kinds of leverage: the parties' need for a solution (ie. hurting stalemate), the parties' susceptibility to shifting weight and the use of side-payments by the third party. Of these three, the use of side-payments is the least suited to the assets of the Church. Financially, the Church cannot afford to promise funding for mega-projects in return for an accommodating attitude on the part of the party(s). The Church may change its attitude toward one or both of the parties in return for accommodation. It may extend diplomatic relations or increase the number of appointments to bishop and cardinal thereby elevating the importance of that country to the Vatican.

Conversely, the Church can withdraw its diplomatic contacts and mobilize its members, in the manner described above, to oppose the actions or proposed actions and in this way achieve a measure of leverage as a mediator. These important, seemingly subtle skills of timing and pressure are in fact the essence of effective negotiation. The question

then becomes, does the Church possess these sophisticated skills in sufficiency (no third party possesses these in perfect balance) to be considered a possible mediator in a variety of situations or only in a restricted sense

The Catholic Church vs Transnational Actors

It is necessary before moving to the case studies to clarify the mandate of the paper. Thus far, terms such as "the Pope", "Church", "Vatican" and "Holy See" have been used interchangeably. This paper is an examination of papal mediation. Analysis of interventions by prelates, Bishops Conferences or individual clerics do not fall within the purview of this study. It is because of the nature of his position that we can use those different terms when referring to papal mediation. The Pope is a monarch and as such moves, in the ordinary exercise of his office, with the full weight of the Curia behind him. The cases will reveal the Vatican as less monolithic than the preceding statement indicates but the fact remains that when the Pope chooses to exercise the full extent of his office, the Church is irresistibly affected. A senate is not required to ratify an agreement entered into by a Pope. He has the authority to bind the "corporation" that is the Church. This, then, begs the question: is the Church a transnational actor like a multinational corporation?

The Church does possess the attributes of a transnational actor as outlined in mediation theory. It certainly penetrates state boundaries and effects the decision-making of the individuals and governments of the countries in which it operates.²⁰ The subtle methods by which the Church exerts its influence are also those of a transnational actor. Members of a transnational organization share with members of the Catholic Church the

problem of dual loyalties.²¹ Catholics have a greater allegiance to their organization and have much more demanding membership rules. The other distinguishing characteristic separating the Church from other transnational organizations is its status as a state with full rights of legation. Papal emissaries and Vatican diplomats enjoy all the rights accorded to all other ambassadors. The Church is thus a nexus of nation-state and transnational actor.

In the cases to follow, examples of the Church's assets and liabilities as a mediator will be made evident and then an overall assessment of the scope of the Church's mediation capability can be made. The characteristics of the Church as an international actor which have evolved over centuries and been described in the preceding pages, truly manifest themselves in transnational contacts between the Church and one or more countries. The cases not only illustrate the way in which other countries interact with the Church but help to answer the questions posed by this introduction as to whether the Church can be considered a mediator in the broad sense or only in very limited situations. In either case, the variables which make a dispute sensitive to Vatican conciliation will be identified and a greater understanding of the Church as a player in the international arena, specifically in the area of dispute settlement, will be gained.

Chapter 2 - The Beagle Channel Dispute

Introduction

On Nov 29, 1984 representatives from Chile and Argentina signed The Treaty of Peace and Friendship in Vatican City after five years of Vatican sponsored talks. The treaty ended the century long dispute over rights to land and water south of Tierra del Fuego. The dispute was rooted in the geopolitical aspirations of the countries as well as their great power aspirations. The existence of military governments in both countries in the 1970s coincided with the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) which was moving to endorse the principle of exclusive economic zones greatly increasing the value of off-shore territories. These factors led to a situation where, by the end of 1978, war between Chile and Argentina seemed imminent. What follows is an examination of the key historical moments leading up to the seemingly intractable stance of both countries so as to set the scene for the Vatican's subsequent mediation. In this way an evaluation of the Roman Church's problem-solving ability can be made. Thus, the task of establishing the Church's specific aptitude within the context of mediation can be initiated.

Emancipation from the Spanish Crown in the early 19th century and the failure of a politically unified South America meant territorial boundaries became increasingly important. In 1881, Chile and Argentina signed a boundary treaty which sought to end ambiguity over their southern territories. This treaty divided Tierra del Fuego, *grante* Staten Island and any other islands east of Tierra del Fuego to Argentina and contained the phrase which was to cause 100 years of tension:

CHILEAN AND ARGENTINE BOUNDARIES IN THE CHANNEL

Figure 1

"...to Chile shall belong all the islands south of Beagle Channel..."²² The source of tension lay in a lack of geographical data on that area and therefore the extent of the channel differed in the mind of each party. The territorial implications of these differing interpretations are illustrated in figure 1. If the channel travels east to the tip of Navarino Island and then proceeds south along its coast then the Picton, Lennox and Nueva (PLN) Island Group belong to Argentina. Conversely, the Chileans believed that the channel flowed past Navarino along the southern tip of Argentina and terminated at Nueva Island. These convictions developed slowly as the nation-building process in each country evolved. The massive coastline and numerous islands held by both countries meant that their nationalist philosophies would possess a strong geopolitical component. As these philosophies matured the relative importance of the southern archipelago rose markedly.

The overriding philosophy which permeated this historical dispute and the one the Vatican had to overcome was Argentina's ideology of *bioceanismo*.²³ This concept was enshrined in the 1881 Treaty of Limits in an accompanying protocol. Simply stated it is a declaration of Argentina's absolute sovereignty over the southern Atlantic. The Argentines assumed the treaty of 1881 had accomplished the task of limiting Chile to the Pacific particularly with the attachment of its bioceanic protocol. The lack of clarity with regard to the Beagle Channel meant Chile had a legal window to the Atlantic. As a former European colony its trade was oriented toward Europe and an opening to the Atlantic would facilitate easier access to that market. If *bioceanismo* was in question legally, as a philosophy among Argentina's ruling elite it had become part of the national mythology.

The linkage of this concept with Argentina's aspirations to regional hegemony saw

bioceanismo become a core value among the leadership. Moreover, Argentina's claims in the Antarctic were based on its presence south of Tierra del Fuego. In addition to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 other world events contributed to southern South America's value. The vulnerability of the Panama Canal especially during the Cold War meant the waters south of Chile and Argentina became of increasing value. The ongoing discussions of UNCLOS indicated that possession of the PLN group would allow that country to draw its territorial baselines to include these islands and extend its territorial waters and EEZ from that line. The value of these southern waters would accrue to the country possessing the PLN islands. Efforts to end the dispute and finally determine possession are numerous over the past 100 years but for the purposes of this paper the "Laudo" of 1977, the events leading up to it and reaction to it set the stage for the Vatican's efforts.

Bilateral talks in the mid to late 1960s yielded little in the way of progress toward a resolution so Chile asked the Queen of England to exercise her right as permanent arbitrator between the countries as established by the General Treaty of Arbitration of 1902. In July, 1971 the parties signed an agreement for arbitration and Her Majesty asked the International Court of Justice to set up an Arbitration Court to hear evidence and advise her. Over five years of discussions followed before a decision was reached and promulgated in May 1977. The decision left Chile with ownership of the PLN islands and, ostensibly, maritime jurisdiction south and west of the islands (fig 2). However, on Jan. 25, 1978, one month before Argentina would violate the Queen's time limit on the implementation of the "Laudo", Argentina declared the decision void and refused to abide by its provisions.

TERRITORY IMPLICATIONS OF THE "LAUDO"

Figure 2

Argentina's nullity declaration raised tension between itself and Chile to new heights. The presence of military leaders in Santiago and Buenos Aires made for the kind of rhetoric and intransigence which lead directly to war. Military pride in Argentina weaved together with an ideology like *biocceanismo* lead to messianic declarations assuring destinies of greatness impeded only by the surrendering of the southern archipelago. For their part, Chilean leaders saw the Laudo as an opportunity to expand its domains and take its place among the hemisphere's maritime powers. The Act of Puerto Montt in Feb. 1978 extended talks but given the seemingly intractable attitude behind the preceding statements little hope existed for any breakthrough.

The Argentine junta, over the course of 1978 waged a media campaign in that country which specifically linked this dispute with the prestige of the regime and thus put the country on the road to mobilization and war.²⁴ The Chilean government felt itself being bullied by the rhetoric of the Argentines and began posturing in response. Chile's ambassador to Argentina made public, in a speech, his country's desire for Atlantic waters and its determination to preserve its legal rights in the south in spite of Argentine threats.²⁵ According to the provisions of Puerto Montt both countries had until Nov. 2 to reach an agreement or for the first time face the prospect of managing this conflict without an agreed upon framework. With Argentina wanting to discuss the ownership of the islands and Chile only willing to consider ocean space, both prepared their populations for war.

The expiration of Puerto Montt meant no normative structure governed the actions of the countries. Argentina and Chile, throughout the 100 year history of this dispute always agreed to disagree and maintain a diplomatic vehicle to prevent what was

happening now as 1978 came to a close. As mentioned earlier, the presence of military governments in both capitals heightened national sensitivities about sovereignty and compromise. At the diplomatic level however, efforts by the ambassadors and foreign ministers continued with intensity. It seemed that the posturing at one level gave way to a reticence on both sides about abandoning conciliation. It was this hesitancy that made the last minute offer by the Pope to mediate acceptable.

The proposal of the Vatican as a mediator was discussed by both countries in the second week of Dec. 1978. Chile was amenable to the idea but the fractious junta in Buenos Aires continued to stumble toward war. Months earlier, U.S. representatives in Rome raised the possibility of papal intervention in talks with Vatican diplomats. The U.S. knew it had no leverage or credibility in Chile or Argentina. The Carter Administration had already denounced both governments as part of its emphasis on human rights. The nuncio in Argentina, Archbishop Pio Laghi continued after the Dec. 12 failure of the parties to agree on a third party mediator to move for unilateral Vatican action. Two days after the failed meeting, the Archbishop met with President Videla of Argentina and was informed that the islands would be invaded on Dec. 21 or 22.²⁶ Videla indicated that hardliners in his junta required that he move forcefully but if the Pope could reestablish communications between the countries' leaders the situation might improve.²⁷ The nuncio communicated this to Rome and on Dec. 23 the Pope announced his intention to offer his good offices and immediately dispatch a personal envoy to the region. The invasion had been set for the 22nd but bad weather delayed it 24 hours. The Pope's announcement

brought all military activities to a halt. The combatants warships withdrew to their ports. The Pope dispatched Antonio Cardinal Samore to the region Christmas Day, 1978

Cardinal Samore's Prenegotiation

Cardinal Samore typifies the professionalism and expertise of the Catholic Church's diplomatic corps. At the time of his appointment as special envoy in 1978 he was chief librarian and archivist of the Vatican Apostolic Library. His previous postings included Vatican Ambassador to Columbia, Secretary for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs (where he carried out Pope Pius XII's Latin American policies), he was a member of the preparatory commission for the first conference of Latin American Bishops (CELAM I) and both Vice-President and President of the Pontifical Commission for Latin America.²⁸ The Pope undoubtedly chose Samore because of his impeccable diplomatic credentials and familiarity with the region but the Cardinal's conservative theology made the choice a pragmatic one. The activism of the clergy in the South Cone and its more politicized theology of liberation was seen by the governments of Chile and Argentina as a threat. The more conservative European theology of Samore would remove that obstacle of mistrust on the part of both regimes.

The centuries of diplomatic experience on the part of the Church, the power of its conviction that its head is the apostolic successor of St. Peter and its vast repository of knowledge has created a mystique around members of its hierarchy. This is particularly true of members of the College of Cardinals. Wherever a cardinal travels he carries with him a timeless image and imparts this mystique upon those with whom he comes in

contact. Cardinal Samore's presence had such an effect on officials from Chile and Argentina. Foreign Minister Hernan Cubillos describes the effect a Vatican envoy has on the dynamics of the prenegotiation process:

He was a prince of the Church, cardinals are princes of the Church. There is a sense of royalty in the way they conduct themselves. They can appear to be very humble, but they have a very clear understanding of their authority, their rank, and all that goes with that. Samore was even more than that; he was very strong and he had a sense that he could impose himself on people very easily ... Bernstein, [Chile's chief negotiator at the mission in Rome,] said that he watched carefully and never once did Samore allow him to walk through the door before him.²⁹

In this prenegotiation phase Samore would employ his prestige to achieve a return to the status quo before the mobilization and develop an agreeable new framework for a solution to the dispute. At this point the Cardinal's mission was still one of dialogue and an effort to end hostilities it is therefore labelled **prenegotiation**. On Dec. 30, 1978 Samore confirmed this characterization by stating that, "my presence stops war", and denied that his was a mission of mediation but rather a search for understanding and perhaps a new framework.³⁰ As his mission progressed he realized that left on their own Chile and Argentina would never reach an agreement. Mediation by the Vatican would be necessary to, in Samore's words, "force" the situation.³¹ Samore now worked on achieving agreement between the two countries on papal mediation. Once the Chileans and the fractious Argentines had agreed to sign an agreement to allow the dispute to be mediated by the Pope, Samore used the opportunity to capture his first objective - the pre-1978 status quo. At Montevideo, where the agreement of mediation was to be signed the Cardinal added a second part to the accord. This addendum to the agreement stated that both countries vowed to renounce the use of force and return their forces to their 1977

positions. Cardinal Samore knew that to raise this issue during his shuttles would have jeopardized his mission and any further interventions by the Holy See.⁴² By presenting both parties with a *fait accompli* in Montevideo he achieved his objectives and set the stage for the historic mediation which followed.

Vatican Mediation: Obstacles and Assets

The difficulties of this specific case have been outlined in the previous section, and before examining the techniques employed to overcome these positions an enumeration of the Vatican's mediation assets in this situation is necessary. The obstacles upon which those assets are to be applied will also be identified explicitly before moving toward an evaluation of the Church's performance in this case.

The presence and prestige of the Church in Chile and Argentina was a major factor in reestablishing the dialogue and framework between the two countries. The Chilean negotiator's reaction to the presence of Cardinal Samore is an example of this somewhat disarming, intimidating sense of inferiority on another level. The religious commonality existing between the countries meant both parties were relating in the same way to the mediator. The Church had always worked for peace in these countries on behalf of the people and thus the populations looked favourably on its efforts in this crisis. In this sense the Church was seen as more than a neutral third party. A nation-state acting as a third party inevitably induces a certain amount distrust from one or both parties. As explained earlier, the Church stands above territorially based power and therefore no thoughts of hidden motive need hinder the mediation process. All the participants in this dispute are

also members of the Catholic community and are addressed with equal sympathy and generosity.

At the time that the Church initiated its efforts in this dispute it had just conducted a series of papal elections which had enormously increased the exposure of the papacy. The result was an dramatic increase in its popularity.³³ The prestige of John Paul II at this time meant that his offers of assistance had much greater import than would normally be the case. The heightened coverage of the Church in the media especially such a dramatic, historic and regal an event as a conclave intensified the mystique of the Catholic hierarchy. Thus, with its popularity and presence enhanced the disputants looked to their Church with optimism and hope in attempting to meet the challenges ahead.

In May, 1979 representatives from Chile and Argentina met in Rome. The participants in this case quickly encountered obstacles which were endemic and persistent. The nature of the governments in each country meant that military honour and the accompanying intransigence could cause the talks to grind to a halt and allow frustration and condemnation to set in. The problem of inconsistency further contributed to the stasis which characterized the first 19 months of negotiations. The Argentine junta was in constant flux with different individuals shaping policy at different times. Any progress in Rome was subject to this indecision in Buenos Aires which threatened to destroy any optimism which existed in May of 1979. The Secretary of State, Cardinal Casaroli and the Vatican team of negotiators had to also address the divergent approaches to the dispute by the parties. Chile, given its success in the courts maintained an international law approach to the problem while Argentina held to its geopolitical ideology. A political solution was

needed; one that involved compromise and was sensitive to the perspectives of each disputant. In Dec. 1980 after almost two years of no progress, and sensing the disintegration of its mediation, the Pope himself took the initiative. Timely intervention is the key to successful mediation and beginning in Dec. 1980 we can now examine and evaluate the efforts of the Vatican to overcome the obstacles listed and utilize its assets presented thus far.

Vatican Initiatives

The papal proposal of Dec. 10, 1980 was a complex compromise and gave the first indication of the approach the Vatican was employing in ending decades of mistrust between these neighbours. The Pope saw this mediation as an opportunity to go beyond merely ending **present** tension and strive for future cooperation. As this case progresses more evidence of this strategy will be made apparent. The Papal Proposal called for a great amount of cooperation and generosity in the hope of fostering the kind of relationship which would preclude future conflicts. The initiative proposed Chilean sovereignty of the PLN group and a 12 mile limit from the ensuing baseline. Beyond the Chilean 12 mile jurisdiction, Argentina would exercise sovereignty to a distance of 200 miles **into the Atlantic**. Within the Argentine jurisdiction, a wedge-shaped (see fig. 3) "Zone of Common and Concerted Activities" (ZACC) would be established in perpetuity.⁴⁴ The ZACC would involve a sharing of resource extraction and revenue within its boundary. The sophistication and complexity of this proposal dramatically demonstrates the resourcefulness and competence of the Church in grasping issues and the dynamics of a

THE PADAL PROPOSAL

negotiation. The Pope waited until an impasse developed and then moved to pull the parties forward. Given the nature of the governments involved neither side was willing to make such a dramatic proposal for fear of it being rejected. The rejection of an intricate proposal such as this would be interpreted as intransigence on the part of the opposing party and would threaten further talks. By taking the initiative, the Pope forced the parties to reconceptualize the problem and possible solutions. Moreover, because it was the Pope's initiative, the parties were forced to commit one way or the other to a definitive proposal. This effort to move the negotiations forward was not without risk but turned out to be the turning point in the five year mediation effort.

The Pope's proposal was in fact never accepted or rejected by Argentina and although it was not a Chilean proposal, Argentina's reluctance to commit in favour of more talks tainted the negotiations.³⁶ The Montevideo accords included a provision for ICJ arbitration in the event the Vatican's efforts failed.³⁷ In the wake of Argentina's rejection of ZACC, Chilean officials considered scuttling the talks in favour of the ICJ arbitration. This legalistic solution would no doubt benefit Chile but it would also move both nations toward aggression. The Vatican, aware of Chilean intentions as well as the need for a **political** solution in the South Cone, moved to regain its position in the negotiations. In Nov. 1982 the Accord of Vatican City was signed. This renewed the parties' commitment to the mediation and agreed to give the Vatican the power to interpret and implement the decision of the ICJ if the negotiations ceased. Thus, the Vatican regained its position in the mediation dynamic and held the parties together in spite of centrifugal pressures within the process.

Pressures within the mediation process were not the only forces acting on those involved. Events in the parties' respective countries at this time influenced the pace of the talks in Vatican City. It is necessary therefore to examine, briefly, these variables and assess their impact on the mediation in order to accurately measure the Vatican's role in the ultimately successful mediation.

Domestic Changes which Impacted the Talks

Many events took place outside the talks which aided the Vatican in its task to settle this dispute. In Dec. 1981 Gen. Galtieri took power in Argentina and moved to secure a place for that country among the world's great powers. The invasion of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands in April of 1982 meant that in order to avoid a two-front war talks with Chile had to be maintained. In the aftermath of Argentina's defeat and the ensuing political convulsions, a conciliatory approach in Vatican City was necessary to avoid an unpopular, potentially disastrous war with Chile.

The 1983 elections in Argentina brought civilian Raul Alfonsin to power. His platform was one of peace and renewal which further improved the chances of success in Rome. Alfonsin inherited enormous economic difficulties specifically a \$45-billion (US) foreign debt. Clearly, what was needed was a long period of peace in order to solve their problems at home. Thus, the obstacles of military honour and inconsistency which were characteristic of the junta were replaced by a longing to put the channel dispute to rest in the face of the domestic economic crisis.

For its part, Chile was also experiencing economic difficulties. An economic downturn during this period made the prospect of war with Argentina exceedingly unattractive. Chile was, during the reign of Pinochet, expanding the size of its military so that in the event of a dispute it would not be in a position of weakness. At the time of these negotiations, Chile was in a position of inferiority relative to Argentina with respect to armaments even after the Falklands/Malvinas War. The significant drop in economic growth at this time meant Chile could not spend what it wanted to spend on the military and thus it was necessary to show goodwill at the negotiation table.³⁷

The Agreement

On Oct 18, 1984 after 400 meetings in Vatican City an accord was reached ending the seemingly intractable Beagle Channel dispute. The accord granted Chile sovereignty over the PLN group and established a six-point border which preserved the concept of bioceanismo (fig. 4). The accord was signed on Nov 29 1984 as The Treaty of Peace and Friendship. Despite the failure of ZACC, the treaty called for the formation of a Permanent Conciliation Commission and a Permanent Binational Commission for Economic Cooperation and Integration. The Holy See therefore succeeded in their desire to go beyond this one dispute and instead foster permanent cooperation.

Observations and Conclusions

Territorial disputes are zero-sum and are therefore given to intractability. When arbitration is used to determine territorial rights, tensions may actually, as in the Beagle

Channel dispute, increase. By definition, a zero-sum scenario means that one party's gain comes at the expense of the other. If that other party has staked their honour on a judgement favourable to them, then arbitration can destabilize the situation further. Cardinal Samore established early in the Church's intervention that a political solution was required which would attempt to change a zero-sum dispute into a positive-sum settlement.

There can be little doubt after this particular mediation that the Holy See possesses the diplomatic sophistication to control complex negotiations and achieve positive outcomes. Disputes involving territory, particularly ocean-space, are among the most complex. Not only did the Vatican **facilitate** negotiations on such a legally complex area of international relations, it offered its own proposals in order to **control** the dynamics of the process. The maps which are part of this case study coupled with the history behind this dispute are a testament to the difficult legal and cultural obstacles which the Holy See overcame and, unlike arbiters, sought to end forever. At this point the conditions within which a settlement was achieved must be enumerated so that later their importance can be measured.

In this case study both countries were Catholic and shared a similar colonial heritage. The respect which individuals showed for Vatican representatives is a product of this common heritage. This respect was tempered however by the tension between the two governments and the clerics **within** those countries³⁶. The presence and moral authority of the Pope and his emissary moved the parties beyond these tensions. No matter the problems which existed between the local Church and the governments, the

Pope remains well respected and cannot be ignored. It also made an agreement easier to sell to the population because of the people's trust in the Church and the lack of suspicions about the motives of the Church. Another factor which perhaps calls into question the importance of the Church's role in the success of this mediation is the change of government which occurred in Argentina following its defeat in the Falkland/Malvinas. Argentina was not interested in another conflict and strenuously renewed its efforts at Vatican City. The Alfonsín government had inherited an economy in ruins and needed peace with its neighbour to focus on the economy. The final agreement differed little from the papal proposal of 1980 but a change in attitude (government) was required by Argentina. The junta in Buenos Aires was too weak to compromise but strong enough to remain in power.³⁹

The question becomes in this case, as in any mediation exercise, was the success of this mediation attributable to the mediator or events outside the talks? Richard Haass has termed this slow movement toward agreement **ripening**. He has identified four prerequisites for mediation success: i) there must be a shared perception of the desirability of an accord, ii) leaders must possess the political currency to reach an accord on behalf of their people, iii) the agreement must contain sufficient compromise to be sellable, iv) and the approach taken to reach a settlement must be mutually acceptable.⁴⁰ Within this conceptual framework the role of the Church in the success of this mediation becomes apparent. Its efforts to transform the dispute into a positive-sum solution (broadening the scope of the mediation so that the Beagle Channel became one issue in the economic integration of the South Cone) and its early realization that a political solution via

mediation instead of arbitration was necessary, fulfilled the third and fourth prerequisites in Haass' model. The first and second prerequisites came with the Alfonsín government and its popular support and economic priorities. However, without the five year effort by the Vatican the foundation for these prerequisites would not have existed. Its success in preserving the negotiations and its appeals for support within both countries meant that an accord could be achieved at the moment of "ripeness".

The nature of the papacy and the Holy See, its constancy, contributed a great deal to the Beagle Channel settlement. If another country had mediated this dispute the possibility of a change in government would most certainly have affected the negotiations. A five-year mediation would have been a great burden for an elected government to maintain. Moreover, the Falkland/ Malvinas War would have made ongoing talks with Argentina difficult for any Western nation. Thus, the stability of the hierarchy of the Church, its diplomatic sophistication and its ability to generate support for a settlement among the population through its ecclesiastic structure were responsible for the solution of this 100 year dispute. This case demonstrates how successful the Church can be given the proper scenario. By employing its diplomatic skill as a centuries old state actor and its moral influence as a transnational institution the Church was able to hold the negotiations together until settlement was possible. The key to this mediation as well as this paper is that the cultural ideologies and moralities were compatible among the three parties. The conflict was born of competing geopolitical ideologies, however all the parties shared the same philosophy with respect to the nature of good and evil and mankind's place in creation.

As this paper approaches the next case of Vatican conciliation one must keep in mind the tools the Church possesses which make it different than other mediators. Moreover, these differences mean that the Church may be equipped for particular disputes and specific situations. It is therefore necessary to look at another example of its peacemaking efforts in order to identify those areas in international relations that lend themselves to such efforts by the Vatican state.

Chapter 3 - Pope John XXII's Superpower Mediation

Introduction

The next case-study in this examination of Vatican mediation is that of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. More specifically, this chapter will examine the Church's efforts in the aftermath of the October Crisis to promote long-term peace and co-existence between the superpowers through its "good offices". The failure at this attempt to broker a framework for co-existence between the U.S and U.S.S.R reveals the limitations of Vatican mediation. The good offices of Pope John did succeed in averting war during October, 1962. His persistence helped in the signing of the Limited Test-Ban Treaty of 1963. The failure which this chapter explores is the inability of the Vatican to move beyond this limited role. Despite the Pope's desire to broker a framework for co-existence between the U.S. and U.S.S.R and the willingness of at least one of the superpowers, his role did not change from that of "go-between".

To achieve the purpose of this paper and establish those conditions which are favourable to Vatican negotiations we must first look at the nature of this case study in the light of the Beagle Channel case. That is, who were the actors and what was the dynamic within their respective governments as well as amongst each other leading up to the negotiations? The obstacles and opportunities born of this examination of the actors will, in the end, provide insight as to why the ambitious efforts of the Vatican failed.

By studying the negotiations themselves we will be able to identify the obstacles which were overcome as well as those that could not be and the opportunities which propelled the process. Through this distillation we will be left with a greater understanding

of the Vatican as a mediator. This will allow us to make some general conclusions and lead us into the final chapter of this work

The most obvious difference between the parties involved in the first case and this case is their relative position in the world system. In the first case, the Vatican was mediating a dispute between middle powers. In this case, instead of dealing with middle powers and their regional security concerns, the Vatican was involving itself in the mediation of an ideological struggle between states with global interests and concerns. As we shall see, the causes of superpower conflict were less tangible than that of the Chilean-Argentine dispute. The quest for legitimacy on the part of the U.S.S.R and the U.S.'s determination to preserve democratic capitalism were at the heart of the super-power conflict in the 1950's and 1960's. This struggle involved two competing visions of mankind. When the Church attempted to involve itself it introduced a third vision or ideology. This case is an example of how the Church's nature as a composite of a state actor and a transnational actor made stable negotiations impossible. The Soviet government did want the legitimacy which comes from diplomatic recognition by the Vatican. The Soviets, owing to the control of their citizenry were able to overlook the obvious inconsistency this relationship represented to Marxism. The U.S. did not have this luxury. The characteristics of the Church as transnational actor could not be reconciled with the moral culture of the U.S. This incompatibility was exacerbated by the presence of a catholic in the White House.

The way in which the Pope carried out the negotiations was also very different from the first case study. His efforts with the superpowers were conducted in a much

more personal and informal manner. Although the goal of long-term peace was the same in both cases, the manner in which the two Popes went about it was dramatically different. The decision to conduct superpower talks as Pope John did was, as we shall see, a function of the non-catholic nature of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. In examining these points thoroughly we will be able to accomplish the task of identifying the critical factors which contributed to the outcome of this effort by the Pope. We will start with the internal reforms of Pope John XXIII which positioned the Church by the early 1960s as a force for peace in the world.

The Church had, until the pontificate of John, been consistent in its resolute condemnation of communism as an ideology and the U.S.S.R. as the incarnation of this ideology. John's immediate predecessor was thunderous in his criticism of communism. He ordered all clerics, on pain of excommunication, to have no dealings with communists and in his encyclical, "On Atheistic Communism" labelled communism as a "satanic scourge".⁴¹ Accommodation on both sides of this evangelical struggle was neither desired nor possible. Both Pius XII and Stalin led their respective governments in very personal ways. Their dogmatic and diametrically opposed views shaped the institutions they led and, as will be seen, created a huge gulf which those who would succeed them would have to overcome. We will deal with the U.S.'s place in this triad later but for now the dramatic and simultaneous changes within the Vatican and Soviet union is our focus.

On the day that the 1958 Conclave began, October 25, the Sacred College of Cardinals addressed the public before sequestering themselves in the Vatican apartments. *De eligendo pontifice*, describing the type of Pope the cardinals were seeking, was

delivered by the latinist Cardinal Bacci. It was an expression of the Church's desire to change direction and reconcile itself to the world. The cardinals asked:

May the new Vicar of Christ form a bridge between all levels of society, between all nations - even those that reject and persecute the Christian religion. Rather than someone who has explored and experienced the subtle principles belonging to the art and discipline of diplomacy, we need a pope who is above all holy, so that he may obtain from God what lies beyond natural gifts...⁴²

This description is a clear desire to prevent another Pius XII from ascending to the Throne of Peter. Pius, who preferred martyrs to bridge-builders and denunciations to detente had taken with him to the grave the defensive attitude which had characterized the papacy since the abolition of the Papal States. The election of Angelo Roncalli as Pope John XXIII was a manifestation of the desire for change within the Vatican. At the age of 76, Roncalli was chosen to begin the desired process of accommodation and reconciliation with those who had been previously marginalized and even treated as threats to the Church. Once Pope, Roncalli moved with vigour to secure a place in the modern world for the Church so that by the time of his death, four and half years after his election, the institutional structure and outlook of the Church was changed irrevocably.

Preparation and Positioning

This evolution is important to our examination of Vatican mediation because it was a concerted effort by the Church and more accurately by the Pope himself to position the Church as a viable mediator of superpower relations. The old ways of playing power politics and siding with the West would not be used anymore. The Church now desired accommodation and a Pope who could obtain that which lies beyond diplomacy. A sense

of good faith and trust would have to be nurtured between the Vatican and the U S S R. The Pope would have to move the Church to the middle and away from the West in order to bridge the gap and establish itself as a third party relative to the superpowers. Examining this "opening to the left" exposes some of the miscalculations by the Pope which thwarted his dream of a face-to-face mediation with the super-powers.

Although there were miscalculations, the Church demonstrated its ability to overcome institutional inertia and be a flexible potential third party to disputants. The radical transformation which took place within the Church in the short pontificate of John XXIII is dramatic proof of the Pope's power to adjust the position of the Church, particularly in foreign policy, to the demands of the times. Pope John XXIII sent his first signal to the world as to what direction the Church would take in his pontificate and in what direction the Ecumenical Council, announced a year earlier, would move when his encyclical *Mater et Magistra* was promulgated in July 1961. Of this treatise, protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr wrote

the reaction of non-catholics - secular and protestant has been generally one of amazement that a Church which they considered "reactionary" should come out clearly for such modern, "liberal" policies.⁴³

The Vatican was no longer afraid of endorsing government intervention on behalf of the marginalized. The encyclical was a significant step in moving the Church from an apologist of capitalism to the "Church of the Poor" which Vatican II would confirm years later. In moving the Church toward the centre John exposed the disagreement within the Curia to his policies. Cardinals Ottaviani, head of the Holy Office (formerly the Holy Office of the Inquisition), Siri, Patriarch of Genoa and president of the episcopal

conference and its Catholic Action Committee and Tardini, the Secretary of State firmly opposed the "opening to the left". They sought to undermine the Pope's efforts to the extent their offices allowed them. This powerful opposition would greatly influence John's approach in brokering a framework for constructive negotiations between the superpowers and as we shall see, greatly affected the outcome. The cohesiveness within an organization conducting a mediation is an important factor determining its acceptability and its success.

The Pope, firmly convinced that the Church could be a force for peace only if it became disentangled from the byzantine diplomatic manouvering of the past, continued to drag the Church toward the middle of the political spectrum. He directed the clergy, especially the Italian bishops and cardinals to disengage themselves from national politics. He desired a less political, confrontation facade and a more spiritual, peacemaker image for his Church. In denying the exiled Polish and Lithuanian governments formal accreditation to the Holy See a gesture of good will was extended to the Soviet Union and its reformist leader Nikita Khrushchev.⁴¹ These gestures were recognized by the Soviets in Nov of 1961 when Khrushchev sent official greetings to the Pope on his 80th birthday.

The U.S. Presidential election of 1960 turned in large measure on the issue of the U.S.-Vatican relationship. John Kennedy's religion was as significant an issue on the election as the debate over the "missile gap". Americans' apprehensions about the Catholic Church has always been a politically sensitive area of their psyche. Truman had made a serious attempt to formalize relations with the Vatican but backed down when his base of support in the South turned against him. Relations with the Catholic Church seem to be anathema to the protestant, American idea of personal salvation free of the externally

imposed dogma characteristic of catholicism. The prospect of electing a catholic president clearly could not be considered by the U.S. electorate without assurances that American foreign and domestic policy would not be conducted from Rome. Kennedy gave these assurances and his term in office depended on him abiding by these assurances. During the presidential campaign, Nixon had forced Kennedy to the right on foreign policy. In speeches warning of a "missile-gap" in the favour of the Soviets, Kennedy campaigned on a platform of increased defense spending and containment of communism throughout the world. By the end of the campaign anti-Soviet sentiment was as vibrant as it had ever been. It was this wrinkle in the American political culture that was the most troublesome obstacle for Pope John to overcome in his quest to establish a lasting framework for peaceful coexistence. Obviously the Vatican's relations with the U.S. were not nearly as grave as those with the Soviets but the Pope was making progress with Khrushchev and could see the fruits of his labours. The U.S. however, continued to act in an almost paranoid manner as will be shown as this case develops. This then is the setting as October 1962 approached.

October 1962, as well as being famous for the Missile Crisis, was the month in which Vatican II opened. On Oct. 11, the most ambitious Ecumenical Council in 400 years brought together the world's bishops to lay the spiritual and theological foundation for the next millennium. Two years in the making, this coming together of the Magisterium of the Church was to be the culmination of Pope John's vision of the Church. Almost every government sent a delegate to the opening ceremony, even the most protestant nations in Europe. The U.S., however, despite the pleading of the American

prelates did not send a representative. Curialists in the Holy See were puzzled by Kennedy's unwillingness to join with the rest of the world and set aside his apprehensions at this historical occasion. The Vatican would soon discover Kennedy's consistency in this matter.

Indirect Mediation

The Darmouth Conferences in Andover, Massachusetts opened on Oct. 21, 1962, bringing academics and writers from the U.S. and U.S.S.R. together. Attending the conference was Norman Cousins, editor of *The Saturday Review* and his long-time friend, Father Felix Morlion, President of Pro Deo University in Rome. As the tension between the super-powers grew and the threat of nuclear war appeared real, the conference participants tried to formulate a proposal to offer Kennedy and Khrushchev which would save face for both sides. Father Morlion asked the conference if papal intervention might help. The proposal was adopted by those at the conference and Father Morlion contacted the Vatican. The Pope agreed to intervene but only if both sides approved; for if one side subsequently disapproved he would appear to be taking sides and future efforts by the Vatican would be impossible. Cousins contacted Kennedy's special advisor Theodore Sorenson and gained permission for a general statement asking for calm. The Soviet academics gained Khrushchev's support for papal intervention without any preconditions. On Oct. 25, 1962 the Pope broadcast his message on Vatican Radio:

I beg heads of state not to remain insensitive to the cry of humanity, peace, peace. Let them do all that is in their power to save peace; in this way they will avoid the horrors of a war, the appalling consequences of which no one could predict. Let them continue to negotiate. History will see this loyal

and open attitude as a witness to conscience. To promote, encourage and accept negotiations, always and on every level is a rule of wisdom that draws down both heavenly and earthly blessings ⁴⁵

The next day Pravda's headline read: "We beg all rulers not to be deaf to the cry of humanity". Khrushchev was preparing to retreat and he would later tell Cousins, "The Pope's message was the only gleam of hope".⁴⁶ Upon hearing of the Soviet Union's intention of withdrawing the missiles from Cuba the Pope said to his advisors, "It is now said that when the Pope speaks of peace, men listen" ⁴⁷

The Pope was convinced, now more than ever, of the role the Church could play in achieving peace. His earlier efforts in moving the Church in a direction which would allow dialogue between the Soviets and the Vatican had finally borne fruit. Pope John began to work to maintain the three-way dialogue. He wanted to prevent inertia from setting in and reestablishing the status quo. The missile crisis had a palpable impact on people throughout the world as well as the nature of the cold war conflict between the superpowers. World opinion clearly favoured greater efforts by the superpowers in the field of arms control. The Pope was convinced of the need for regular relations with the U.S. if his efforts were to succeed. John dispatched Ettore Bernabei of government radio in Italy to meet with Arthur Schlesinger Jr.⁴⁸ It was hoped that one of President Kennedy's most trusted advisors could convince him of the efficacy of closer contact at a more personal level with the Holy See. Despite American knowledge of Khrushchev's openness to Papal contacts, Kennedy refused to alter his position on U S -Vatican relations. This decision in the face of Soviet willingness to negotiate via the Pope is crucial to this case.

The three actors were forced to work around Kennedy's fear of public outcry at Vatican sponsored talks involving their own national security

Father Morlion had continued to explore further communication between the three parties in the wake of the Dartmouth Conference. By late November hopes for a test-ban treaty or, for that matter, any treaty had begun to fade. Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin approved a visit by Norman Cousins to Moscow on behalf of the Vatican in the hopes that this intervention would prevent a slow reversion to the pre-October status quo.⁴⁹ On Dec 1, 1962 Cousins left for Rome for consultations with the Vatican before travelling on to Moscow

Once in Rome, Cousins met with Msgr Igino Cardinale, Chief of Protocol in the Vatican Department of State. Cardinale left the duty of providing Cousins with explicit instructions to Archbishop Dell'Acqua, the Pope's confidant at the Secretariat of State. Msgr Cardinale stressed the Vatican's desire to see Khrushchev's reforms succeed leading ultimately to some level of Vatican representation in Moscow.⁵⁰ Cardinale was careful to point out the importance of keeping his mission a secret since all three governments were circumventing established channels in conducting these talks. Dell'Acqua encouraged Cousins to remind Khrushchev of the Pope's message during the missile crisis. The Pope, Dell'Acqua told Cousins, would go out of his way to praise any man in government willing to spare mankind the holocaust of a nuclear war. Khrushchev was also to be assured that although the Church desired more freedom in the U S S R, they were not interested in restoring the Church as it was before the revolution. Finally, the seriousness of Soviet commitment to better relations with the Church would be tested by Cousins requesting the

release of Archbishop Josyk Slipyi of Ukraine from the gulag where he had been serving a sentence for "collaborating with the Nazis". This would be requested with the assurance that his release would not be exploited for propaganda purposes. Cousins, by the end of his consultations, began to realize the extent to which this was a secret and very personal mission he was carrying out for the Pope. He did not meet with Cardinal Cicognani, the Secretary of State (Tardini had died July 30, 1961) which would have been proper. No one in the Curia was aware of this mission except those closest to the Pope: Dell'Acqua, Cardinale, Cardinal Bea (an advisor on ecumenical matters) and Cardinal Testa of the Secretariat for Christian Unity.⁵¹ Thus, the importance of secrecy was indeed crucial for the pope for not only would discovery eliminate the U.S. in future talks but Pope John would appear to be reckless and a lot less collegial than he wished to appear.

When Cousins finally met Khrushchev, the Premier was eager to state his willingness to agree to a ban on weapons in space as well as a test-ban.⁵² The question of on-site inspections could be negotiated. Khrushchev expressed his gratitude for the Pope's remarks of Oct. 25 and conveyed a sense of shared life experience with the Pope's peasant roots.⁵³ As Dell'Acqua predicted, Khrushchev was concerned that the Church was seeking to restore its pre-revolutionary position. Cousins assured him that the Church was aware of the abuses that occurred and their desire to work within the system. Cousins also assured Khrushchev that if Slipyi were released as a sign of good faith this act would not then be used to expose the "brutality" of the Soviet regime. The Vatican envoy was careful to point out the sincerity of the Pope's efforts and the commitment of the Kennedy administration to bettering relations with the Soviets. The message to Khrushchev was

that the short-term gain he could realize by using the credibility he had achieved through his rapprochement with the Vatican for propaganda purposes must be subjugated to long-term efforts toward detente. Cousins returned to Rome with a memorandum of understanding which stated:

- i) The Soviet Union desires the Pope's ongoing mediation.
- ii) The Soviet Union desires open lines of communication with the Vatican.
- iii) The Soviet Union acknowledges that the Church respects separation of Church and State.
- iv) The Soviet Union recognizes that the Church serves all mankind.
- v) The Soviet Union appreciates the courage of the Pope.⁴⁴

In contrast to Khrushchev's openness to Vatican mediation, President Kennedy remained cool toward this undertaking. At this point Kennedy's concerns had moved beyond domestic political considerations. The Pope's entire approach was a concern for Kennedy. Pope John's preference for trusted friends instead of experts, his personal approach to diplomatic matters and his liking for secrecy made him unpredictable to the eyes of the American President.⁴⁵ The CIA, in a report to the President during Dec. 1962, questioned the very logic driving the Vatican's "opening to the left". They concluded that the Vatican saw Khrushchev as a force for real change in the U.S.S.R. while the CIA remained sceptical and advised the White House to do the same.⁴⁶ Thus the Pope's response to the American Administration's unwillingness to provide formal representation had the effect of further distancing the Americans from the process. Kennedy expressed no desire in the

wake of these apprehensions to meet with Cousins upon his return from Rome and the Soviet Union.

In January Cousins met with Dobrynin at the Soviet embassy in Washington and confirmed the release of Slipyi.⁵⁷ Despite these behind the scenes events, East-West tensions were again on the rise. The test-ban treaty desired by both sides in the aftermath of the missile crisis was stalled on the question of on-site inspections. The U.S. administration wanted eight inspections per year or it felt passage through Congress was impossible. The U.S.S.R. stated that both sides had earlier agreed to three and that was all the U.S. was going to get from the Soviet Union. In the U.S. calls for a resumption in testing were building. Meanwhile, the Chinese had increased its propaganda about Moscow's continued weakness in the face of the capitalist West.⁵⁸ Both governments were under pressure and there was a clear loss of momentum in efforts to settle these outstanding issues.

The Vatican, still trying to fulfil its chosen role in keeping the two sides on track, stepped up efforts and increased its exposure. The Vatican newspaper, *L'Osservatore Romano*, reprinted a speech made by then Archbishop Montini (Cardinal Montini in 1963 and later Pope Paul VI) in 1951 to Pontificia Accademia Ecclesiastica on its 250th anniversary. Montini's speech and the message Pope John wanted to convey was, "Ecclesiastical diplomacy is a model for civil diplomacy as it starts from and tends toward universal brotherhood".⁵⁹ Work on the pope's next encyclical had already begun in earnest. The genesis of what would become John's greatest legacy next to the Ecumenical Council was according to Cardinal Bea, the Cuban missile crisis. *Pacem in Terris* (Peace of Earth)

was to be Pope John's theological justification for his opening to the left. *Pacem in Terris* not only moved the Church away from its earlier commitment to never engage in talks with communists but declared such talks as fundamental to the Church's mission as peacemaker. It is worthwhile at this point to look briefly at this encyclical as it was fundamental in positioning the Church as a perceived neutral third-party then and today. It is important to remember that during all these events the Ecumenical Council was proceeding to radically change the theology of the Church. The Pope was 81 and this event alone would have been enough to occupy his energies. John wanted, however, to provide his successors with a theological basis to continue his peacemaking efforts.

The very first page of this encyclical was different than any previous. It was addressed to "all men of good will" and not just to Catholics and the Magisterium.⁶⁰ This was not designed to be a document to be read only in Church on Sunday but was to be a message to the world that the Church wanted to embrace all peoples in its struggle for justice and peace. The Pope went on to state that it is the duty of the Vicar of Christ to beseech those in government to follow a course in keeping with man's destiny and dignity.⁶¹ The Pope was to be an advocate for the oppressed and remain as vigilant in protecting humanity as he was in protecting the doctrine of the Church. We can see in this the beginnings of the theology of liberation action not just doctrine on the part of the Church in protecting the dignity of persons.

The beginnings of this new theology can be seen more clearly in a passage found later in the encyclical. The hand of Cardinal Bea, the Pope's advisor on ecumenical matters, can be seen in this passage. This excerpt would turn out to be the first indication

to all catholics, especially the prelates at the Council, that a new spirit of co-operation and co-existence was alive in the Vatican

Never confuse error and the person who errs... God will never fail to act on his interior being with the result that a person who at a given moment of his life lacked the clarity of faith or even adheres to erroneous doctrines, can at a future date be enlightened and believe the truth. For catholics, if for the sake of promoting the temporal welfare they co-operate with men who either do not believe in Christ or whose belief is faulty because they are involved in error, can provide them either the occasion or the inducement to turn to truth.⁶²

The temporal welfare of mankind was so important to the Pope that even talking with the enemy - atheistic communism - was now sanctioned. There was a distinction between doctrine and the individual. Since persons, governments and organizations exist in a dynamic world, their doctrine is susceptible to change. As long as this chance exists dialogue for the sake of mankind's destiny and dignity must continue. The encyclical expands on this by stating that the Church has an obligation to intervene to safeguard ethics, religion and "the application of those principles to concrete cases in the temporal world".⁶³ Pope John clearly desired the Church in its third millennium to be an articulate and active force for peace and justice. This was a message to the world and his own Church leaders that this was not the desire of one man which would die with him but a pledge by the Catholic Church which would be carried on by his successors. *Pacem in Terris* was not promulgated until April 11, 1963 but advance copies were available in time for Cousins next trip to the Soviet Union in March of 1963.

Cardinal Bea instigated the second visit by Cousins to the U S S R.⁶⁴ This time the U.S. showed more interest as a test-ban treaty was in real danger of disappearing. Kennedy needed more than the three inspections proposed by Khrushchev or the treaty

would not pass the senate for ratification. Khrushchev on the other hand was already seen by the Chinese and those in his own communist party as weak in the face of American demands. Dean Rusk, in his meeting with Cousins before he left for Rome and then the Soviet Union asked Cousins to clarify the U.S. position on the inspection issue. Rusk told Cousins that the U.S., despite Soviet assertions, did not earlier agree to only three annual inspections. He asked Cousins to convince the Soviet Premier to agree to move forward on other issues and have the inspection question settled via a personal meeting between the countries' leaders.⁶⁶

Once in Rome, the Vatican envoy met with the Pope who gave him a Russian version of *Pacem in Terris* and a papal medal to convey to the Premier. The goodwill gesture of this meeting was to be the release of Cardinal Beran, Archbishop of Prague. On April 12, 1963 Cousins met with Khrushchev, this time at his Black Sea retreat. This meeting with the Soviet leader was much more tense than the previous one. Khrushchev vented his frustration with the U.S. and its apparent change in position on the matter of on-site inspections.⁶⁷ In reply, Cousins told him that the discussion between Ambassador Kuzanetsov and Ambassador Dean had resulted in a misunderstanding which the U.S. regretted and wanted to rectify by starting anew.⁶⁸ Khrushchev argued that more inspections would humiliate him in front of the Council of Ministers and he was already being pressed by scientists and the military to resume testing.⁶⁹ The U.S., he felt, had misled him and any trust which resulted from this process of treaty negotiation was gone. Cousins boldly reminded the Soviet Premier that in the summer of 1962 they had denied the existence of missiles in Cuba and had therefore mislead the U.S. Cousins argued that

keep some of his dealings with Khrushchev hidden so as not to raise alarm in the U.S. When events such as Capovilla's talks with the Soviet Ambassador in Rome and Khrushchev's son-in-law's audience with the Pope were discovered, American uneasiness only grew. It was only with treaty talks breaking down that the U.S. Administration found use for the line of communication between the Vatican and the Soviets.

John's decision to maintain secrecy throughout the process as we have seen was in large measure a function of internal politics. Many Curial officials were unable to join the Pope on his mission to move the Church toward neutral ground. Many of the most powerful prelates who headed key congregations within the Holy See saw the Pope's policy regarding the Soviets as close to heretical or at the very least disrespectful of Pius XII, the patron of so many of John's foes in the Vatican. The fact that Casaroli, who owed his rapid rise in the Secretariat of State to John, and not Cicognani, the Secretary himself, was sent to meet with East European leaders, shows the extent to which John circumvented those who might sabotage his plans. As with the American Administration, Curial officials' fears grew as communication between John's household staff and the congregations slowed to a trickle. The Ecumenical Council helped the Pope in this regard as these same cardinals (Ottaviani, Siri, Confalonieri) were kept busy defending Church dogma from reformist elements in the Council. The Pope in securing the release of Slipyi and Beran was trying to illustrate the benefits of engagement with the Soviets. The bottom line, however, was that the lack of openness bred distrust in the Vatican and precluded the development of a mediation framework which would survive John's pontificate.

with the Soviets. The Pope's secretary, Msgr Capovilla, was at that time speaking discretely with the Soviet Ambassador in Rome.⁷⁶ Msgr Casaroli, who would later become Cardinal Casaroli and Secretary of State under Pope John Paul II, was beginning his tour of Eastern Europe as a further effort to shore up the presence of the Church in these countries. Moscow told its satellites on the eve of this mission to cooperate with the Holy See.⁷⁶ The director of the CIA, John McCone himself met with the Pope and asked him to curtail his provocative drift to the left. The Pope's response recalled his words quoted earlier from *Pacem in Terris* as he told McCone that he had a responsibility to Catholics everywhere and he had a commitment to world peace on behalf of all mankind.⁷⁷ McCone was the highest ranking official in the Kennedy Administration to visit the pontiff. McCone's visit triggered rumors of a summit in Rome involving the superpowers and the Pope.⁷⁸

Another emissary of the U.S. administration, Averell Harriman travelled to Moscow in early June 1963 and confirmed the "fresh start" negotiated by Cousins.⁷⁹ A Chinese delegation was also in Moscow at this time. This delegation submitted an open-letter addressed to the Soviet population which in its tone and content expressed the euphoria of the Chinese communists in the perceived breakdown of treaty negotiation with the U.S. The Chinese went on to express their hope that in the face of this a Sino-Soviet alliance would now be possible.⁸⁰ Despite the pressure within his own party and the prospect of closer ties with China, Khrushchev ordered *Izvestia* to publish the text of Kennedy's speech of June 10 given at American University (using Norman Cousins notes).⁸¹ The President, in the speech, spoke of the common desire for peace among

Soviet and American citizens and resisted the temptation to enumerate the areas that divided them. The decision by Khrushchev to ignore the pressures around him and print this speech paved the way for a return visit by Harriman on July 15, 1963. Harriman returned to the U.S. on July 26 with a treaty banning atmospheric testing.⁸² Pope John never saw the signing of this treaty as he died June 3, 1963. Despite his work to ensure the continuation of Vatican mediation of the superpower conflict, the process died with him. Pope Paul would ascend to the head of the Catholic Church in the midst of one of the greatest theological debates in the Church's history. The Vatican Council preoccupied the entire hierarchy of the Church for another two years. Khrushchev would soon be overthrown by hardliners in the Communist Party effectively ending his quest to gain acceptance for the Soviet Union in the world community. In the U.S., the Vietnam War was beginning to consume more and more resources. Of course the assassination of President Kennedy removed the U.S.'s link to these negotiations. With no framework in place, centrifugal forces were destined to leave this process undone.

Observations and Conclusions

The first and second chapters of this paper have demonstrated the theoretical and practical competency of the Vatican as a mediator. This case has expanded on that conclusion. The Church was shown to be an incredibly dynamic institution in this case. The ability of a Pope such as John XXIII to reinvent his Church and government is a feat few could duplicate. Another crucial ability on the part of the Vatican, which this case confirmed, was discretion. By not capitalizing on the release of Slipyi and Beran and

respecting the constraints underwhich the leaders of the two sides were operating, the pope eliminated some of the distrust which the superpowers felt toward the Catholic Church. The Vatican also showed a capacity to anticipate concerns and requisite frameworks to ensure that the mediation process did not get bogged down or lead ultimately to mediation failure. Being able to anticipate problems, however, as we shall see, is not enough.

At the outset of this chapter it was stated that the Church faced many obstacles in its attempt to mediate the ideological conflict between the superpowers. We can also judge the competency of the Vatican as a mediator by the obstacles that were overcome during the mediation. To begin with, the Pope succeeded in the difficult task of overcoming the historic enmity which characterized Vatican-Soviet relations. The culmination of the Pope's labours in this area was the memorandum delivered by Cousins to the Pope in which Khrushchev recognized John's courage in pursuing the mediation. Substantial progress was also made in removing some of the distrust between American and Soviet leaders. Kennedy's statement to Cousins that he had gained a better appreciation for Khrushchev's position and his feeling that the Soviet assertions regarding on-site were the result of a genuine misunderstanding and not malice show the progress the Vatican was making. As a corollary to this last area of progress, the Pope had stemmed the tide of propaganda and posturing characteristic of this ideological struggle. The Pope, through Cousins, told Khrushchev that talks between the parties were more important than the short-term gain which could be had by using Soviet-Vatican relations as a propaganda tool to isolate the U.S. Khrushchev dramatically demonstrated his

willingness to keep his word on this score by resisting pressure from China to scuttle treaty talks with the U.S. over the inspection question and thereby endear himself to the Chinese and communists all over the world. For his part, Kennedy's speech at American University was devoid of the ideological verbiage which was usually employed when addressing the Soviet Union. The fact that in the face of many other difficulties, some measure of understanding was achieved is a testament to the Pope and the competency of those around him. Before analyzing the difficulties that led to the cessation of this mediation, a brief explanation as to why this is labelled a failure is necessary.

The Limited Test-Ban Treaty, though a result in part, of the Pope's intervention via his envoy Norman Cousins was clearly not the aim of John's efforts. Pope John had laid the groundwork for protracted mediation and was continuing this work until his death. These preparations beginning with *Mater et Magistra* and continuing with *Pacem in Terris* and Vatican II were not designed to culminate in a limited test-ban but to position the Church in the middle of the bi-polar ideological struggle of the day. The Pope's longing to convince the U.S. numerous times of the efficacy of regular diplomatic relations with the Holy See was an outgrowth of his intention to provide ongoing mediation. Casaroli's tour of Eastern Europe was also borne of the Vatican's ambition to maintain the goodwill between the U.S.S.R. and the Vatican. The memorandum from Khrushchev explicitly states his desire for the Pope's ongoing mediation and it is only at the request of Dean Rusk that Cousins becomes involved in test-ban treaty negotiations. Thus, we are left to conclude that this undertaking never progressed beyond the prenegotiation stage. Given that the Church has demonstrated itself to be a competent mediator, why was it not able

to push the negotiations further? It is by answering this question that our knowledge regarding the limitations and strengths of the Church as a mediator is advanced.

Causes of Failure

Earlier it was stated that the Vatican had anticipated what would be required for a successful mediation effort but was still unable to maintain talks after the treaty was signed. The Vatican was able to get the Soviets involved in discussions but the U.S. could not be convinced to make the concessions necessary to ensure the stability of the negotiation efforts. Specifically, the U S would not agree to diplomatic contacts with the Vatican or even allow communication at a more elevated level than had existed since the turn of the century. This was the core problem of which all other difficulties were a symptom. Kennedy's susceptibility to CIA reports warning of the danger of the Vatican's "opening to the left" was due to the lack of communication between the Vatican and the U.S. If high level contacts had been established by the Holy See with the American Administration, Kennedy may have been reassured as to the Pope's intentions. As it was, this lack of communication between Rome and Washington had a cascading effect on the Pope's efforts. When the Pope realized that Kennedy's continued refusals to raise the level of communication between the two governments contained no malice but was a political necessity given the mood of America his strategy became one of secrecy. By trying to meet the restrictions of the American political culture the Pope only pushed the U.S. away from his attempt to sponsor talks with the Soviets. Washington became wary of the secrecy John was employing and with no way to reassure the Americans, the Pope tried to

keep some of his dealings with Khrushchev hidden so as not to raise alarm in the U.S. When events such as Capovilla's talks with the Soviet Ambassador in Rome and Khrushchev's son-in-law's audience with the Pope were discovered, American uneasiness only grew. It was only with treaty talks breaking down that the U.S. Administration found use for the line of communication between the Vatican and the Soviets.

John's decision to maintain secrecy throughout the process as we have seen was in large measure a function of internal politics. Many Curial officials were unable to join the Pope on his mission to move the Church toward neutral ground. Many of the most powerful prelates who headed key congregations within the Holy See saw the Pope's policy regarding the Soviets as close to heretical or at the very least disrespectful of Pius XII, the patron of so many of John's foes in the Vatican. The fact that Casaroli, who owed his rapid rise in the Secretariat of State to John, and not Cicognani, the Secretary himself, was sent to meet with East European leaders, shows the extent to which John circumvented those who might sabotage his plans. As with the American Administration, Curial officials' fears grew as communication between John's household staff and the congregations slowed to a trickle. The Ecumenical Council helped the Pope in this regard as these same cardinals (Ottaviani, Siri, Confalonieri) were kept busy defending Church dogma from reformist elements in the Council. The Pope in securing the release of Slipyi and Beran was trying to illustrate the benefits of engagement with the Soviets. The bottom line, however, was that the lack of openness bred distrust in the Vatican and precluded the development of a mediation framework which would survive John's pontificate.

The failure of this mediation effort, therefore, can be traced to the fact that this was a secret, personal attempt by the Pope to bring the superpowers together and broker an end to the distrust which drove the foreign policies of both countries. Unlike the Beagle Channel mediation no structure existed in this case which would endure no matter who was Pope, President or General Secretary. It is not enough to say that the effort failed because the Pope died or Kennedy was assassinated or Khrushchev was deposed since in the last case leadership within the Argentine junta was very fluid and negotiations continued for five years. We must conclude then that despite Pope John's best efforts there existed obstacles which owing to the nature of the Vatican as a mediator and the superpower struggle, could not be overcome. In trying to mediate an ideological struggle, the Church brought its own, competing ideology to the table, however unstated.

In this paper we have witnessed the power of the papacy as well as its limitations; within the Vatican itself and given the political culture of those with whom it is interacting. In the next chapter our agenda will be to draw conclusions regarding the parameters within which the Vatican can conduct a mediation with the greatest possibility of success.

Chapter 4 - Conclusion

At the outset of this paper it was stated, that the Vatican holds a position quite disproportionate to its geographic size. In fact, this paper has confirmed that in terms of its diplomatic prowess and moral influence, the Church is an international actor of great potential and importance. What now needs to be established and what will be the focus of this final chapter is: given the characteristics of the Church as a state/transnational actor, is it likely to be successful in mediating disputes other than those between catholic nations within a subsystem as our hypothesis suggests?

Analytical Framework

To accomplish this task, a return to the success parameters as outlined by Touval and Zartman's mediation requisites will point to those circumstances which best lend themselves to Vatican mediation. Using this framework, one can also be made aware of similarities and differences between the Vatican and other states with regard to their mediation capabilities. This analytical tool is useful in establishing areas of the world and types of conflict amicable to Vatican intervention which were not possible before or are not yet possible. Thus, by the end of this chapter, not only will the type of conflict susceptible to papal mediation be evident but trends for the future of Church involvement in dispute settlement will coalesce.

The empirical data of the cases necessitates a reexamination of the observations made about the Catholic Church as a mediator in the first chapter of this paper. At the beginning of this study some hypothesis' were posed using Touval and Zartman's

framework for evaluating a potential mediator. With the benefit of the opening overview of the history of the Church as an international actor some observations were made using that framework regarding the Church's ability and desire to mediate. In the light of the cases examined, these earlier observations can be clarified, refuted and/or expanded.

With regard to the motivation behind offers to mediate by any international actor, so called "defensive reasons" rank high. In the first chapter it was stated that seeking an end to civil strife and war, particularly in traditionally catholic regions, is a powerful inducement for Vatican intervention. In regions such as Latin America, many catholics have felt abandoned by what they see as a Euro-centric hierarchy allied more with the local elites than the poor it is supposed to shepherd. "Wars of liberation" have acted as a catalyst in countries like Nicaragua and El Salvador spawning popular churches and accompanying radical theology. The seeds of this scenario were in evidence during the Beagle Channel Dispute. Two catholic nations stood poised to go to war over geopolitical concerns. The Church in Chile had been radicalized by the actions of the Pinochet regime. War with Argentina would only exacerbate the harshness of life in Chile and demonstrated quite vividly the inability of catholicism, as practised up until then, to influence national leaders. Two countries sharing the same belief in peace and brotherhood were about to go to war. By intervening at the behest of its representative in Argentina, the Vatican averted a war which to the rest of the world as well as catholics and leaders within the South Cone would seem to signal an inability on the part of traditional catholicism to make a difference. By intervening successfully, the Pope proved that there were still positive, tangible benefits Rome could supply.

In addition to protecting the integrity of his Church, the Pope can also offer to mediate with the object of extending the influence of the Church in the process. Touval and Zartman point out that a state or organization offer to mediate so as to increase its influence with one party; particularly if the third party was closer to one of the parties at the outset.⁸³ Clearly, this was a consideration in the mediation attempt by Pope John in the aftermath of the missile crisis. There were, certainly, defensive reasons for the pope's efforts but the revitalization of the church in Eastern Europe in the ensuing years testifies to gains derived by the rapprochement with the Soviets. The Pope, from the date of his ascension to Oct. 1962, sought to end the doctrinal war with the Soviet Union. Pius XII's war-by-invective was devastating to Catholics inside the Iron Curtain. His preference for martyrs over conciliation nearly decimated the Church in Eastern Europe. John's opening to the left eased the pressure on prelates and followers in Poland, Czechoslovakia and the Baltics. The warm reception with which his intervention in the October Crisis was met by Khrushchev encouraged him to try to reclaim what had been lost in the east. Casaroli was able to get guarantees from Soviet controlled governments in 1963 as to the number of bishop and priests to be allowed to practise openly as well as the reopening of many Churches. Pope John had capitalized on the new relationship with the Soviets even as his mediation efforts continued.

Potential mediators must not only concern themselves with the dangers of not acting but also the dangers inherent in the mediation process. This fact, outlined in the first chapter, is certainly applicable to the Vatican in the light of case material. The Vatican's main source of influence, its moral authority, would be diminished if it involved

itself' with a despised regime. Followers would become disillusioned with the Church and its cohesiveness would be affected. The U.S. - U.S.S.R. mediation attempt proved that cohesiveness at the centre can also be affected during mediation. Key members of the Curia opposed the Pope as he attempted to do what a mediator must: cultivate a working relationship with those involved. The idea of the Roman Pontiff exchanging pleasantries with the "godless" leader of the Soviet Union was too much for many cardinals who openly opposed John in their Sunday sermons. After reviewing the case, then, the Pope must not only consider the effect of a mediation effort on the Church's followers but also those around him who can influence the catholic membership.

The outline of Touval and Zartman's analytical framework in the opening chapter postulated that the Church's past allegiances and position could affect its acceptability as a mediator. The two cases have demonstrated the validity of this hypothesis. The Pope, in his office as head of the Uniate Church (Eastern-Rite Catholics) was seen by communists in the U.S.S.R. as one of the instruments of their repression under the Czar. Khrushchev made a point of stating to Cousins that he would not get far if the Catholic Church was seeking a return to its pre-revolution position. Pope John was very much aware of the Church's position in the mind of Soviet leaders and many citizens and anticipated the Premier's concern. Indeed, John had to make significant changes to the Vatican's policy with regard to the Soviets. It took Pope John nearly a decade to overcome the apprehensions of the Soviets. Clearly, it is not reasonable to expect this kind of pre-negotiation by the Vatican in other situations just to make itself acceptable to a formerly hostile party especially given the costs. The Church's past position relative to a

party in the mediation triangle can, therefore, be an impediment to papal mediation. An impediment which can be costly to remove. The Soviet-U.S. case demonstrated the stress John caused within the hierarchy and between the Vatican and the U.S. as he sought to gain Khrushchev's trust. The Beagle Channel case, on the other hand, demonstrated that with regard to many countries, the past position of the Church makes it an obvious choice as mediator. The traditional respect shown to members of the catholic hierarchy by Chileans and Argentines aided Cardinal Samore in getting the parties to the table. Further on, this chapter will examine the question of acceptability and rank in depth. For now, it suffices to state that the Church's past status, whether as crusader or holder of The Papal States, affects its motivations as they relate to present mediations.

The Vatican vs The Nation-State

In order to achieve the goal of this paper it is necessary to gauge the Vatican against other mediators. The first and most obvious factor which the Vatican shares with other mediators is the motivation of self-interest. That is to say, it is susceptible to the benefits and costs of mediation. It has been established that the Vatican is not immune to the lure of the opportunities bound up in a mediation effort but the small number of these efforts make it clear that it also recognizes the dangers.

The Beagle Channel case demonstrated that, like other nation-states, the Vatican possesses the resources to mediate complex disputes which involve core values. Indeed, its expertise combined with the patience that comes from a mandate like the Pope's means that it could conceivably out-perform many nation-states in quieting such disputes.

Although it does possess unique qualities, which will be outlined forthwith, the Vatican does employ the same basic methods that Touval and Zartman identify as common to mediation processes.

The cases have shown papal mediation to be adept at playing the role of communicator, formulator, manipulator and transforming a dyadic relationship into a triangular relationship. In both scenarios, the Vatican exhibited the mix of tact and expertise which allows a mediator to shape communication between the parties, formulate proposals to combat stagnation and ultimately induce a settlement. The Church demonstrated great ability in maintaining the triangular relationship among itself, Chile and Argentina through the Accord of Vatican City which renewed the parties commitment to the process and avoided arbitration. It was Pope John's inability to develop a stable triangular relationship with the U S and the U S S R which was at the heart of his failure to mediate the superpower conflict. The secrecy with which the mediation effort was conducted constrained the Pope's attempt to diminish the East-West animosities. The full weight of the Church's resources were not and could not be utilized because of the secrecy of the talks. John could only draw on the expertise of those closest to him which did not even include the Secretary of State. Furthermore, perhaps the greatest resource of the Church could not be marshalled: its international "citizenry".

The most unique feature of the Vatican that is germane to this examination is the fact that its "citizens" are scattered throughout the nations of the world. The loyalty of these citizens and the culture within which they live will of course determine the effect they will have on a mediation. The case of the superpower mediation demonstrates both

variables - a President who is a "citizen" of this other sovereignty and who also holds office in a protestant culture The Beagle Channel case was an example of how this dual citizenship can be beneficial to a mediation

The Vatican is also differentiated from other mediators and nation-states by virtue of its well-articulated, normative values. The Holy See does not deal in relativistic terms with issues that affect its followers and the world in general. The recent Cairo Conference on Population and Development dramatically illustrated what the Vatican believes its overriding mission to be: take stands on moral issues that are consistent with its dogma no matter the costs involved. The costs can indeed be high. This view of morality as being objective, is the single largest factor determining the acceptability of the Pope as a mediator. Unlike other nation-states, it is not the foreign policy of the Vatican which taints its image with many in the world community but the perception that it is anachronistic in its view of society. Permissive societies, predominantly in the West, are outraged and threatened by the Church's stand on women's issues, birth control, abortion and euthanasia. It is not principally due to security concerns that a nation might reject the Vatican in a mediation scenario but because of a perceived threat closer relations would pose to freedom of choice in that nation. This normative view of morality on the part of the Catholic Church's hierarchy is critical to understanding its unique qualities and how it is perceived. The Church cannot detach itself from its institutional mandate. This characteristic will inform the conclusion of this paper and in large part determines the scenarios best suited to papal mediation

The last two unique characteristics exhibited by the Church and relevant to this

study are its continuity and rank. The Catholic Church possesses a continuity of knowledge and outlook unlike any transnational actor. Popes do not repudiate the actions of their predecessors but slowly and subtly move the Church in whatever direction they believe to be required. This continuity from one Pope to the next, depending on the perception of the Church by a beholder may be a positive or a negative feature. The difficulties Pope John experienced in moving the Church in a new direction is an example of the mind-set this characteristic breeds both within the church and outside. The Curia viewed John's efforts as a threat to the linear development of Church dogma. The Soviets and others took a long time before acknowledging John as someone different than his predecessors because of the expectation that the status-quo would be maintained; altered slightly but generally maintained. It is this continuity, borne of the supremacy and indeterminate position of the Pope, which enables the Church to articulate its values in an objective manner. It also links the present Vatican state with a past which to many is seen as corrupt and oppressive. Continuity is thus a factor affecting the performance and acceptability of the Vatican in a perspective mediation.

Mediation theorists speak of the rank of an interlocutor determining acceptability and success in many third party interventions. That is, the mediator has the authority to bind his/her country to an agreement and the stature to help the disputants bind their nations to an agreement. For all the reasons discussed to this point, the Pope occupies a position on another plane than other leaders. He is not preoccupied with mundane security concerns like other state actors. He carries with him a combination of history and urgency that commands attention disproportionate to his political power. His messages, encyclicals

and statements are covered and discussed at length in the media and within world organizations and forums. The objective moral perspective of the pope is an integral part of his ranking among world leaders and perspective mediators. For parties such as the Soviet Union, and in particular Nikita Khrushchev, which seek legitimacy and integration into the world community, the Pope's relative ranking is quite high. Among leaders of the U.S. and many in Western Europe, the Pope's ranking as a mediator is in decline. The relative rank of the Vatican depends not on its attributes but how societies react to these attributes. Embracing the Pope is to many leaders like embracing Europe's past: religious, paternal, missionary and hierarchical. All these attributes have been criticized in the media and popular culture of the West. Most Western governments seek to distance themselves from such traits. Thus, it is a reaction to these qualities which determines rank and acceptability not specifically the catholic religion. The point here is that it is not a matter of a rejection of the Catholic Church per se but a rejection of the objectivication of good and evil by the Church. Thus, it is still possible for the Vatican to be a highly ranked mediator if catholic citizens comprise a large percentage of the population. This subtle but important difference lies at the heart of the reality facing the Roman Catholic Church today. Its followers continue to hold the Pope in high regard and honour the traditions of the Church but ignore many of its moral pronouncements. Therefore, the "catholicity" of a nation will determine the rank of the Vatican. Acceptance of the Church's moral positions or a loyalty to the Church based on tradition by a country's citizens will directly affect the efficacy of papal mediation. The cases bear out this hypothesis - secrecy and hesitation decreases in proportion to the presence of the Church within a country.

The final mediation requisite which must be revisited is that of leverage. The statements at the beginning of this study regarding the leverage possessed by the Vatican in mediation situations were validated by the case studies. Pope John realized that Khrushchev was seeking legitimacy through his dealings with the Church. John exploited this need and moved the Soviets toward the U.S. perspective in key areas. The Pope had little in the way of leverage vis-a-vis the U.S. The harder he tried to befriend Kennedy, the more nervous the President became and the more tenuous became Vatican-U.S. links. The only leverage the Pope possessed relative to the U.S. was the threat of closer ties with the Soviet Union. The U.S. would have known, however, that the Vatican's own ideology limited just how close the two could become.

In the Beagle Channel case, the parties' need for a solution was the Church's leverage. Argentina needed a political solution as legal ownership had been, more than once, given to Chile. Chile knew they would suffer greatly in an armed conflict with Argentina. The case study demonstrated the competence of the Vatican in settling this dispute but if the Pope could have offered security agreements and financial inducements as the U.S. did during the Camp David Accord talks then the five year mediation may not have been so arduous. Once again the Vatican's weakness in one area is a product of its strength in another. That is, its lack of financial and military assets are what have forced the Church to become such an adept and resourceful diplomatic player.

The analytical framework provided by Touval and Zartman has provided us with a clear picture of the type of parties most suited to Vatican mediation. The mandate of the paper, as stated in the introduction also included the type of conflict best suited to Vatican

mediation. To achieve the final goal of this paper, the analytical framework of Brecher and Wilkenfeld will be employed. The basic units of analysis employed by Brecher and Wilkenfeld are: crisis, non-crisis, protracted conflict, subsystem and dominant system. This study will use these categories to locate the cases within them and evaluate the Church's effectiveness given a certain type of dispute. That is: how does the nature of a dispute affect mediation techniques and mediation results?

Brecher and Wilkenfeld have found in their extensive empirical research that nations locked in a crisis within a protracted conflict see violence as a likely option by their opponent and they see the value threat as basic to their integrity.⁸⁴ This is not surprising given the definitions of these two terms. The important conclusion by this team is that in this scenario, global organization involvement will be higher and therefore more effective.⁸⁵ Brecher and Wilkenfeld have also found that the greater the involvement of a global organization in the crisis management efforts the more effective it will be relative to superpower involvement.⁸⁶ The table below organizes this data and categorizes it between dominant system (superpower and allies) and subsystem (regional powers). By categorizing crises into dominant system and subsystem, the suitability of an international organization such as the Catholic Church involving itself in crisis management and dispute settlement can be evaluated. Table 1 effectively demonstrates the findings of these authors' research. A crisis taking place within a subsystem can be ameliorated effectively by an international organization. These organizations, however, are less effective when acting on a crisis in a dominant system. In drawing these two analytical frameworks together the

	Dominant System	Subsystem
Crisis Triggers	Non-violent	Violent
Perception of opponent's behavior	Non-violent responses and pacific crisis management techniques	Military response and violent crisis management techniques
Superpower effectiveness	Positive	Less positive
International organizational role	less active	more active
International organizational effectiveness	less effective	more effective

Table 1. Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 151

crucial factor of "acceptability" comes to the fore. Brecher and Wilkenfeld concluded that the more involved an organization like the Church is in crisis management the more effective it will be. This presupposes that the Church is allowed to be highly involved. The other supposition in looking at table 1 is that the Church can be classified as an international organization within the classifications of Brecher and Wilkenfeld. This study of the Vatican has shown it to be as capable as any international organization. Its long history as a diplomatic actor, its status as a nation-state, its membership stretching to the most remote areas of the world and its adherence to an objective set of rules or charter does allow it to be placed within the preceding matrix. Given its ability to lobby within other nations and its relatively small bureaucracy it is more flexible and could out-perform other international actors in the proper scenerio. It will be the task of the final part of this study to bring together all the analyses up to this point and establish just what are those proper scenerios.

Conclusion

In order to summarize the findings thus far, table 2 has been designed. Included in the table are the variables this paper has found to be the most important for predicting Vatican involvement and success. The first determining variable is, whether or not a dispute can be classified as a crisis. Given the extreme reluctance of the Vatican to involve itself in a dispute, it is likely the dispute would have to reach a crisis level before Church intervention would occur. It was only at the last moment in the Beagle Channel crisis that the Pope intervened. In fact if the weather had been better on December 22, 1978, the Pope's offer on December 23 would have been too late. Pope John's actions in October 1962 also indicated reluctance to act before a crisis develops. Despite his efforts to

	Crisis	Acceptability and basis	Type of conflict	System
Beagle Channel Mediation	Yes	High acceptability Catholicity as basis	Protracted	Subsystem
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Mediation	No	High acceptability (USSR) Legitimacy as basis Low level of acceptability in US	Protracted	Dominant System

Table 2.

position the Church for a more constructive relationship with both superpowers, he did not act until requested to by both disputants. It was stated at the outset of this paper that the superpower case study was not an example of crisis management. The missile crisis allowed for the invitation by both parties for the Pope to become involved. Without this

crisis the U S would certainly not have given the Pope any means of beginning a dialogue. The superpower mediation is important for exposing the inability of the Vatican to affect a dominant system, ideological conflict. Crisis or not, the Church will be ineffective with this level of conflict.

The second variable in the table is "acceptability" and the basis of acceptability. Of course the most important factor is whether or not papal mediation is acceptable. If it is not then the Church will not involve itself and if it does the negotiations are likely to fail. If the Vatican is found to be acceptable by the disputants, the basis for that acceptability is also important. This will be touched on in the final pages of this study but it suffices to say that the basis must provide some leverage for the Church in the talks. If acceptability is based on a country's government alone and the citizenry is not of the same mind, the talks will breakuown, the results will not be ratified or only a "good offices" arrangement will be possible. That is, the Pope as an individual mediator will be emphasized.

The type of conflict is not as important as the other variables in the matrix. Brecher and Wilkenfield found that international organizations were marginally more effective when addressing a crisis within a protracted conflict than those in non-protracted conflicts.⁸⁷ The Vatican proved itself adept at broadening the parameters of a protracted conflict and keeping the players at the table until either conditions allowed settlement or new paradigms were achieved. Most importantly a crisis which is not within a protracted conflict is less likely to be perceived as a threat to international stabilitiy and therefore international organization involvement is less likely.⁸⁸

Finally, the matrix must include something about the system within which the

dispute is taking place. The Church like other international organizations is most effective in a subsystem or regional environment. Territorial and security concerns dominate subsystem crises. These are more easily abated than the amorphous and less tangible superpower concerns of prestige, ideology and influence. Clearly, the collapse of the Soviet Union has changed the international system but Russia remains a nuclear power with traditional interests which pre-date communism.

From the opening chapter through the case studies and in this final chapter, the peculiarities, similarities, assets and liabilities of the Vatican have been fleshed out in the context of mediation theory. This study can now move to fulfil its mandate and bring the actor (the Vatican) and the theory together and identify practical, concrete mediation situations suited to the talents of the Vatican. It is the contention of this study that at present the ability of the Vatican to mediate remains confined to those areas conforming to the hypothesis of chapter 1. The available evidence shows that when a largely catholic nation interacts with the Vatican secrecy and apprehension are not issues. Parties whose citizenry is markedly catholic know what to expect from the Church and the Church has a means of leverage in its followers living within the disputants borders. It can act as a state or transnational actor and enter into formal talks and establish concrete results. Without this leverage and/or compatibility, the "individual mediator" aspect of the Church's hybrid nature will come to the fore. This means emphasis on communicator/facilitator techniques to the detriment of formulation and manipulation. Unresolved is the level of catholicity necessary for such an optimal situation. Clearly, it would require a greater percentage that

exists in the U.S. The absence of a variety of mediation efforts by the Church precludes a definitive answer to this question.

The superpower mediation as well as exposing the problems involved in a Vatican mediation with a non-catholic country exposed the peculiarity of an atheistic country accepting papal mediation. The Soviet Union was clearly seeking a way to end its status as a pariah state. The Vatican, as a member of the community of nations, by interacting with the Soviets helped them diminish this reputation. Thus mediation with a non-catholic even atheistic nation is possible if i) that government requires the kind of legitimacy the Church can provide; and ii) the desire of this benefit among the citizenry outweighs its misgiving about the Church or the government controls the population to the extent that this is not an issue.

The potential exists for another mediation scenario which was alluded to in the discussion of the rank. It was stated that even if a country's catholic population rejected many of the Church's moral pronouncements as long as the traditional respect of the Pope and the hierarchy existed among them (and catholicity was of a high proportion) the efficacy of Vatican mediation remained high. It is possible however that the opposite may be true. A large majority of a country and its leaders may not be catholic but share many of the moral positions of the Church. Therein lies an area of great potential for the Church to increase the scope of its acceptability as an international actor in general and thereby its acceptability as a mediator.

Since the Second Vatican Council, the Vatican's policy of ecumenism, which was written into the Pastoral Constitution of the Church has broadened the horizon of

mediation possibilities for the Vatican. The long process of reconciliation with Jews culminated in 1994 with the Vatican's official recognition of Israel. The Vatican's efforts at reunification with Anglican and Orthodox Churches have resulted in a more positive image of the Church in many areas of the world. The increased number of non-European Cardinals has broadened the perspective of the Curia and the Sacred College to the point where the prospect of a non-European pontiff does not seem so remote. Indeed, the entire focus of the Vatican and, in particular, the current Pope appears to be moving away from East-West issues and toward North-South issues. In the first chapter of this paper the competing and often mutually exclusive roles of the Church as prophet and peacemaker and how it impacts on the acceptability of the Vatican as a mediator was mentioned. The recent Conference on Population and Development in Cairo was a dramatic demonstration of the Church as prophet or agitator. The Vatican alienated itself from many at this conference but provided insights as to its focus in the future.

Observers, including many Catholics were shocked at the Vatican's decision to ally itself with Islamic states, some radical in belief, in order to block certain proposals at the Cairo conference. This action was a symptom of a point made earlier in this chapter. The Vatican can no longer count on the governments of the West to uphold the normative values which it vows to champion. The Vatican has much in common with the governments and people of many Islamic states, in terms of seeing truth as objective and unchanging. In general terms, the South has resisted the secularizing influence of Western culture. What this means in terms of this study is as acceptability for Vatican mediation

wanes among Western societies, it is on the rise in those areas of the world that appreciate the courage of its conviction

To be sure, the Pope himself remains immensely popular in the West by virtue of his charisma and gentle manner. In the exercising of his office, however, he and the Church hierarchy are seen as rigid and archaic. Many priests and bishops in Europe, North America and Latin America (where western influence has taken root in the last twenty-five years) are in open conflict with Rome. Contentious issues in the West such as birth control, abortion and women's vocations carry much less urgency in the South. Issues of social justice and human dignity rank highest among the less developed nations of the South. It is in this area that the Vatican has made significant in-roads and created opportunities for increased involvement in these regions. The current pontiff's social justice credentials are well known in less developed countries. In his 1987 encyclical letter Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (Concern for the Social Order), Pope John Paul II made clear the Church's solidarity with the South stating

Interdependence must be transformed into solidarity based upon the principle that the goods of creation are meant for all⁸⁹

His many visits to African nations and other countries with seemingly little importance to the Church as a whole are in fact an effort to build an alternative base of support and growth in the face of the secularization of the North. What this means in terms of this paper is that many more opportunities will exist for Vatican mediation. The Catholic Church is building the kind of credibility in the South which will increase its acceptability as a third-party conciliator

The end of the Cold War has changed the outlook of disputants in terms of potential mediators. The U.N. and in particular, the "good offices" of the General Secretary is now a viable alternative actor on behalf of peace and reconciliation. No longer thwarted by a world order incompatible with its charter (ideology), the U.N. is taking a more activist approach to the promotion of peace. As a consequence, it is becoming a popular third-party option for disputants. Conflicts have been disengaged from the bi-polar struggle of the Cold War. Dominant system conflicts have become subsystem. What lies underneath in many cases are nationalistic animosities which were held in check by the overriding concerns of the Cold War. Now that the regimes which held these states together by brute force have lost their superpower funding a grave need for conciliators exists throughout the world. Civil strife and territorial disputes between newly formed nations have created scores of opportunities for mediation. The U.N. has stepped in to try to separate combatants and induce mediation. Regional organizations have also made their attempts at peace. One would think that given the abilities of the Church which seem to give it an advantage in such struggles (patience and its ability to turn zero-sum scenarios into positive sum as in the Beagle Channel Dispute) it would be more active than it is in getting nations to talk to one another.

The Church appears to be in a transitional period. It has been shoring up its support in the South but is not yet a major player anywhere but South America. At the same time its traditional strongholds in the North continue to become more and more secularized. Thirty years of ecumenism cannot break-down the walls which have been

built and reinforced for centuries. The current Pope has made great strides in seeking to end these enmities. He has met with leaders long considered anathema to the Church, expanded diplomatic contacts with Arab nations and taken part in religious ceremonies with Muslim, Hindu and Jewish clerics. Gaining trust with elites helps but winning reconciliation with the masses is key to acceptability as a mediator. Unless the image of the Church is positive, secrecy becomes a necessity for the parties involved and the mediation is doomed to fail. Disclosure of such a mediation attempt with the Church can enflame radical factions within a country, creating a more intractable situation.

In attempting to generalize from the evidence gathered and discussed in this study and speak to mediation theory, the singular nature of the Church again comes to the fore. When looking at mediation theory for a similar actor, the U.N is the closest. It has a worldwide membership and a charter setting out the principles of the organization. The difference is that it is a community of nations, not persons and that these nations have signed a charter. Therefore, in a mediation among signatories there is a some commonality. This would be applicable to a mediation by the Vatican in far fewer circumstances as its ideology encompasses the very nature of mankind whereas the U.N. charter only outlines basic rights and obligations of states. Both are adept at providing the benefits of "good offices" even when acceptability as a mediator is quite low due to an accountability structure which allows for effective secrecy. Through its network of diplomatic agents the Church is able to act as a conduit of discreet communication between countries as the superpower case study illustrated. In locating the Church within the spectrum of mediation theory one must conclude that it behaves much like a global

organization such as the U.N. The nature of its mandate and membership however, more severely constrain its viability as a mediator. The assets of the Church as a mediator are checked by its ideology and position in the global system. It is not involved enough in the international system for countries to overlook its ideology. That is, many countries have ideologies which are of a metaphysical nature but they are overlooked by disputants because systemic stability concerns neutralizes fears of bias and ideology (Soviet mediation at Tashkent). The Church as a state actor maintains a position in the international system but not one that links it in sufficiency to dampen its consistency in communicating its vision. The U.N. as a community of nations is inexorably linked to the international system and therefore finds itself able to move more overtly in its efforts to promote peace. With respect to placing the Church within mediation theory we must see the Church as analogous to the U.N. in its global structure and resources but its missionary personality subverts its abilities as a formal conciliator.

The conclusion of this paper then is somewhat tragic. The Vatican is an expert diplomatic actor with demonstrated assets uniquely qualified to affect the brutal, protracted conflicts so prevalent in the late 20th century. Its past political allegiances and actions coupled with its current moral pronouncements have severely constrained its acceptability among disputants. The regions of Latin America, the Baltics and Eastern Europe exist within the parameters set out in this chapter as areas likely to be agreeable and responsive to Vatican mediation. Hope remains that the Church, by continuing to recognize its past mistakes and seeking to make amends by acknowledging the positive contributions of non-christian and non-catholic societies, its image among peoples will

change and the Vatican will be able to put its mediation skills to wider use

At the outset, it was stated that this paper was not proposing a new role for the Church but exploring one it had chosen for itself. The intent was not to give the impression that Church actions are taken with thought of how they may improve its position as a mediator. The paper sought to show the great potential of the Vatican as a mediator and how its international standing affects its acceptability and effectiveness. Given the glaring lack of academic attention to this subject, it is hoped that this paper will be followed by others whose insight might further illuminate this important aspect of conflict management

¹ Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, *Crisis, Conflict and Instability*, (Toronto: Pergamon Press, 1989), 209

² Ibid, 167.

³ Matthew 22:21

⁴ Romans 13:1

⁵ Weldemar Gurian and M A Fitzsimons, eds., *The Catholic Church in World Affairs*, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1954), 49

⁶ Ibid, 38.

⁷ Robert Graham S.J., *Vatican Diplomacy: A Study of Church and State on the International Plane*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 158

⁸ Thomas Princen, "Mediation by a Transnational Organization: The Case of the Vatican" in *Mediation in International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management*, Jacob Bercoitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., (New York: St. Martin's Press), 1992, 151

⁹ Ibid, 176-178.

¹⁰ Ibid, 179-180

¹¹ Ibid, 166-167.

¹² The traditional teaching method of the Church had been – scriptural reflection first, then looking to the world and finally pastoral application – After Vatican II the theology method change to: looking to conditions in the world to hear God's voice and then turning to scripture for reflection and application

¹³ Ivan Vallier, "The Roman Catholic Church: A Transnational Actor," in *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, Robert O Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, eds., (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 147

¹⁴ Ibid, 149.

¹⁵ Jaadia Touval and I. William Zartman, eds., *International Mediation in Theory and Practice*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985)

¹⁶ Eric Hansen, *The Catholic Church in World Politics*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

¹⁷ Graham, 246. A perfect society is that which possesses all the necessary requisites to fulfil the needs of its citizens. In this case, the Catholic Church states that it is the

⁵⁴ Flamini, 66-67

⁵⁵ Ibid, 74

⁵⁶ Ibid, 74-76

⁵⁷ Cousins, 67

⁵⁸ Ibid, 76-77

⁵⁹ Flamini, 76-77

⁶⁰ Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris. (New York: Paulist Press, 1963), 1

⁶¹ Ibid., 42.

⁶² Ibid, 53-54

⁶³ Ibid, 55

⁶⁴ Cousins, 78

⁶⁵ Ibid, 79.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 93.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 98-99.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 99

⁷⁰ Ibid, 114

⁷¹ Ibid, 119.

⁷² Ibid, 120-121

⁷³ Ibid, 121.

⁷⁴ Ibid, 123.

⁷⁵ Flamini, 96

⁷⁶ Ibid.

repository of divine truth and confers the grace of God through the sacraments allowing its followers to achieve their goal as citizens of this society - eternal life with God

¹⁸ In expressing distaste for an individual or group, the Pope can use his power of excommunication. If an individual or group is not catholic, the Pope can "anathematize" the individual or group. This means that it is a sin for a catholic to have any dealings with such people.

¹⁹ Hansen, 252

²⁰ Princen, "Mediation by a Transnational Organization", 149-150

²¹ Ibid, 150

²² Thomas Princen, *The Beagle Channel Negotiations*, (Pittsburgh: Pew Charitable Trusts, 1987), 1-2.

²³ Lisa Lindsley, "The Beagle Channel Settlement: Vatican Mediation Resolves a Century-Old Dispute", *Journal of Church and State*, Vol. 29, no. 3 (Autumn 1987), 436

²⁴ Lindsley, 440

²⁵ Princen, 5

²⁶ Princen, 13

²⁷ Ibid, 13-14

²⁸ Hansen, 70

²⁹ Princen, Part (B), 2

³⁰ Ibid, 5

³¹ Ibid

³² Ibid, 7-8.

³³ Lindsley, 443.

³⁴ *International Legal Materials*, "Papal Proposal, Dec. 1980" (Washington: American Society of International Law), Vol. 24, no. 1, 1985, 7-10

³⁵ Thomas Princen, *Intermediaries in International Conflict*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), 155

³⁶ Lindsley, 446

³⁷ Ibid, 447

³⁸ Cf. Princen, 3. The Church had made enemies in its fight for human rights in these countries. During his initial contacts with the foreign ministers in Dec. 1978, Cardinal Samore tested Chilean foreign minister Cubillos who responded by saying: "...you got a divided Church here in Chile, you got a lousy Church here in Chile. It is very difficult for us to accept the relations with the Church."

³⁹ Richard Haass, Conflicts Unending: The United States and Regional Disputes (New Haven: Yale University Press), 28.

⁴⁰ Ibid, 27-28

⁴¹ Pope Pius XII, On Atheistic Communism, (Washington: National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1937), 6.

⁴² Peter Hebblethwaite, Pope John XXIII: Shepard of the Modern World, (New York: Doubleday and Co. Inc., 1987), 281.

⁴³ Reinhold Niebuhr, "Mater et Magistra", Christianity and Crisis, 21, (Aug 7, 1961), 143.

⁴⁴ Vittoria Gorresion, The New Mission of Pope John XXIII, (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970), 182-183.

⁴⁵ Hebblethwaite, 446-447.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 447.

⁴⁷ Roland Flamini, Pope, Premier, President: The Cold War Summit that Never Was, (New York: MacMillan, 1980), 58.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 59-60.

⁴⁹ Norman Cousins, The Improbable Triumvirate, (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1972), 21.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 26.

⁵¹ Flamini, 65-66.

⁵² Cousins, 32-33.

⁵³ Ibid, 44-45.

⁵⁴ Flamini, 66-67

⁵⁵ Ibid, 74.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 74-76

⁵⁷ Cousins, 67.

⁵⁸ Ibid, 76-77

⁵⁹ Flamini, 76-77

⁶⁰ Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris. (New York: Paulist Press, 1963), 1

⁶¹ Ibid., 42.

⁶² Ibid, 53-54

⁶³ Ibid, 55

⁶⁴ Cousins, 78

⁶⁵ Ibid, 79.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 93.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 98-99

⁶⁹ Ibid, 99

⁷⁰ Ibid, 114

⁷¹ Ibid, 119

⁷² Ibid, 120-121

⁷³ Ibid, 121

⁷⁴ Ibid, 123.

⁷⁵ Flamini, 96

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid, 98-99

⁷⁸ Ibid, 99

⁷⁹ Cousins, 124

⁸⁰ Ibid

⁸¹ Ibid, 125

⁸² Ibid, 126

⁸³ Touval and Zartman, 7

⁸⁴ Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 127

⁸⁵ Ibid

⁸⁶ Ibid, 63

⁸⁷ Ibid, 138

⁸⁸ Ibid, 137-138

⁸⁹ Pope John Paul II, Concern for the Social Order, (Sherbrook Pauline Press, 1988), 84.

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