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WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO HARAMBEE PROJECTS
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HARAMBEE AND DEVELOPMENT. PARTICIPATION
IN KENYA:

The Politics of
Peasants and Elites Interaction
With Particular Reference to Harambee Projects in
Kiambu District

by
■ Njuguna Ng'ethe

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research,
Carleton University,
in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

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The Politics of Peasants and Elites Interaction
With Particular Reference to Harambee Projects in Kiambu District"

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ABSTRACT

This study seeks to analyse the Harambee (self-help) movement in Kenya as a political phenomenon. To this end, the study seeks to describe and explain how and why Harambee and Harambee projects became the most important political linkage between the leaders and the led in Kenya. In the study, it is argued that the politics of Harambee were central to Kenyatta's chosen political technique of controlling the Kenyan state. The technique was to establish a patron-client system, the political recruitment to which was dependent on participation in Harambee and Harambee projects. For their support in maintaining the system established by Kenyatta, the national elites were allowed, and indeed had to become political entrepreneurs. The peasants for their part, obtained Harambee projects but they themselves were largely responsible for providing the resources needed to implement the projects. Therefore, in the course of the whole series of exchanges between the Government, the elites and the peasants, the peasants were the only group which did not obtain fair exchange for its part in perpetuating the patron-client system.

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TO WAMBUI
AND
TO MY PARENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
<u>Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION</u>	
1.1 Introduction.....	1
1.2 The Spirit of Harambee.....	1
1.3 Research Objectives and Methods.....	21
1.4 Summary.....	30
<u>Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW</u>	
2.1 Introduction.....	32
2.2 The Community Development Approach....	34
2.3 The Centre-Periphery Approach.....	46
2.4 A Class Hypothesis.....	58
2.5 Summary.....	65
<u>Chapter 3: TRADITIONAL AND COLONIAL ORIGINS OF HARAMBEE</u>	
3.1 Introduction.....	71
3.2 The Traditional Period.....	71
3.3 The Colonial Period: 1920 - 1950.....	89
3.4 The Colonial Period: 1950 - 1963.....	100
3.5 Summary.....	106
<u>Chapter 4: HARAMBEE AND THE PATRON-CLIENT STATE</u>	
4.1 Introduction.....	111
4.2 Kenyatta and KANU Regional Bosses....	113
4.3 Kenyatta, The Electorate and Harambee.....	127
4.4 The Patron-Client Presidentialism.....	145
4.5 The Supportive Ideology of "Working Together".....	164
4.6 Summary.....	172
<u>Chapter 5: THE HARAMBEE PARTNERSHIP IN KENYA</u>	
5.1 Introduction.....	180
5.2 Socially Oriented Expansion.....	181
5.3 The Government As A Partner.....	193
5.4 The National Elites and "The People" As Partners.....	205
5.5 Summary.....	223

Chapter 6: THE PARTNERSHIP IN KIAMBU DISTRICT

6.1	Introduction.....	230
6.2	Harambee Projects In Kiambu District	230
6.3	The People As The Major Contributors	240
6.4	Summary.....	258

Chapter 7: THE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT AND HARAMBEE IN KIAMBU

7.1	Introduction.....	260
7.2	The Members of Parliament and the Surveyed Projects.....	260
7.3	The Political Entrepreneurs.....	272
7.4	Observations on Political Entrepreneurship.....	287
7.5	Summary.....	292

Chapter 8: LOCAL LEADERSHIP, THE PEASANTRY AND HARAMBEE IN KIAMBU

8.1	Introduction.....	294
8.2	Local Leadership and the Surveyed Projects.....	294
8.3	The peasantry and the Surveyed Projects.....	312
8.4	The Search For Project Patrons and Political Clients.....	324
8.5	Summary.....	337

Chapter 9: CONCLUSION..... 339

BIBLIOGRAPHY..... 367

Appendix 377

LIST OF TABLES, DIAGRAMS AND GRAPHS

		Page
Diagram 1.1	Harambee and the Patron-Client State	24
Table 3.1	Harambee and Traditional Communal Self-Help	86
Table 4.1	Mentioned Factors Determining Receipt of Vote	134
Table 4.2	Ways of Improving Constituency	136
Table 4.3	Most Important Activities for M.P.'s	140
Table 4.4	Winners and Losers in the 1969 and 1974 Elections	143
Table 5.1	National Value and Volume of Self-Help: 1964-73	185
Graph 5.1	Self-Help Project Status: 1963-73	188
Table 5.2	Value of Contributions to Projects: 1967-73	194
Table 5.3	Contributions to Harambee Projects: 1963-73	197
Table 5.4	Donations to Self-Help Schemes	208
Table 5.5	Occupational Distribution of Leaders	213
Table 5.6	Harambee Leadership	215
Table 5.7	"Nation" Coverage of Main Harambee Stories: 1964-77	220
Table 6.1	Initiated Projects: Kiambu District: 1971-77	231
Table 6.2	Value of Self-Help Projects in Kiambu District: 1975	242
Table 6.3	Value of Self-Help Projects in Kiambu District: 1974	243
Table 6.4	Value of Self-Help Projects in Kiambu District: 1975	246

		Page
Table 6.5	Value of Self-Help Projects in Kiambu District: 1976	249
Table 6.6	Value of Self-Help Projects in Kiambu District: 1977	252
Graph 6.1	Contributions to Harambee Projects: Kiambu District: 1973-77	257
Table 7.1	Project Initiators	261
Table 7.2	Most Influential Initiators	263
Table 7.3	Reasons for Initiating	265
Table 7.4	Reasons for Contributing	266
Table 7.5	Mentioned Sources of Resources	267
Table 7.6	Most Contribution in an Area	268
Table 7.7	First Heard the Word Harambee	269
Table 8.1	Initiators' Education	295
Table 8.2	Initiators' Age	296
Table 8.3	Initiators' Status in Project	301
Table 8.4	Status in Project of Most Influential Initiators	303
Table 8.5	Project Types and Initiators Occupations	305
Table 8.6	Respondents' Positions in Project	312
Table 8.7	Respondents' Occupation	312
Table 8.8	Benefit from Project	317
Table 8.9	Specified "Other" Project	319
Table 8.10	Alternative to Contribution	321
Table 8.11	The Word Harambee	322

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

This chapter is in two sections, which, taken together, constitute the introduction to this study. The first section is a general introduction to the idea of Harambee, or the "spirit of Harambee" as it is usually referred to in Kenya. In the second section, we outline the objectives of this study and present the main argument. In addition, we describe the methods used in collecting the data for the study.

1.2 The Spirit of Harambee

The word "Harambee" is generally thought to have originated among the Bantu speaking people in Eastern Africa. Since the term Bantu refers not to a language, but is a general anthropological classification of peoples who speak similar languages it is not clear among which particular people the word originated. However, it is widely agreed that the word did not originate among the inland Bantu of East Africa. Through a process of elimination, therefore, it has been concluded by some writers¹ that the word originated among the coastal Bantus. More specifically, one writer has stated that the word was first used by Waswahili porters from the coast who then carried it to the inland peoples. In its original form it was spelt "Halambee", which roughly translated means "let us pull together".²

In its original meaning the word was used when a group of people was collectively performing a physical task. Thus, if a log or a heavy object needed to be moved the leader of the work

group would shout "Harambee!" The rest of the group would respond, "Heee!" and push or pull at the time of the response. Gradually, in independent Kenya, the word became associated with any group effort, regardless of the nature of the task to be performed. At the same time, the word also came to be associated with the idea of "self-help", organised on a group basis, regardless of the immediate beneficiaries of the group effort i.e. regardless of whether the benefits were public or individual. This meaning of Harambee as a synonym for the self-help effort, has manifested itself in thousands of self-help projects throughout Kenya.

In the political history of Kenya, the word acquired prominence at the time of internal self government in June 1963, though the history of self-help activity in the country goes back further than 1963, as we shall show in Chapter III.

In May of 1963, the Kenya African National Union political party (KANU) under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta, won the right to form the first all African government in Kenya, by defeating the sole competing party, the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). In his victory speech after the elections, Jomo Kenyatta said:

"I would suggest we use the Kiswahili word Karambee³ to express the mood we want to create. The word is used by workers when they have a joint task to perform, such as pulling a log or pushing a wagon. It means, let us all work together. Get up and go".⁴

Kenyatta's speech is generally regarded as the official ushering in of the word Harambee in a specifically political and economic context. This interpretation, however, is not entirely accurate. First, "self-help", as Harambee has come to mean in independent Kenya, had been used before, for specifically political reasons, by none other than Kenyatta himself in the 1930's. Secondly, the idea of community self-help and participation had been used in Kenya during the colonial days, and more specifically during the emergency, for very precise political reasons, as we shall also show in Chapter III.

What seems indisputable is that Kenyatta was the first to use the notion of Harambee in an official capacity as a political slogan. Even here, the emphasis must be on "official" and not "political slogan". The reason is that the word "Harambee" had been used before, precisely as a political slogan, by local African nationalists in the 1950's.

One person is specially accredited with having popularised the slogan of Harambee during the struggle against the colonial authorities. His name was Omolo Ong'iro an influential local leader from Luoland in Western Kenya. During his rallies in the late 1950's he would shout "Harambee!", the people would respond "Heee!" Then he would proceed to shout other slogans with the crowd responding "Heee!" to each one of them. Omolo Ong'iro had a meeting with Kenyatta at Kenyatta's home in Gatundu, Kiambu District, on Kenyatta's release in 1961. Soon afterwards, Kenyatta visited Luoland where he addressed a meeting attended by nearly half a million people. The meeting was first addressed by Omolo Ong'iro.⁵

Without getting into a debate as to who should be credited with the popularisation of the word Harambee in Kenya, it should perhaps be enough to say that Jomo Kenyatta, at the least, elevated the word to its present political status in Kenya, which was by no means a small achievement. Today, the word is part of the national political vocabulary. It is better known in the country than the word "Parliament". In some rural areas, people know the word "Harambee" but they are not quite sure about the word "~~Nairobi~~" the name of the capital city. This is not by accident. The word appears on the nation's currency from the smallest to the largest denominations. It also appears on the nation's coat of arms. The Voice of Kenya - the nation's only broadcasting system - and The Voice of Kenya Television both announce the news by playing a tune called "Harambee, Harambee, Let us sing together, Let us build the Government". The daily newspapers carry reports on Harambee activities, and so do the radio and television. All the Development Plans, so far produced, have had a section devoted to Harambee activities. These activities come under a Government Ministry, something which we shall discuss in later chapters. In short, Harambee has become a national slogan, a national movement, and something of a national ideology. Not a single day passes in Kenya without the word "Harambee" being mentioned in one context or another.

The irony is that, despite the wide usage of the word "Harambee", not many people in Kenya, no matter how well informed, are able to fully articulate what Harambee means. Beyond repeating the linguistic definition of the word, most people cannot go any further. They will give variations of the definition, thus for example, responding that "Harambee" means "togetherness", "working together" etc. but they cannot say much more. If pressed, they will respond that "Harambee" was Kenyatta's political slogan. During Kenyatta's presidency they would, in all probability, have invited the inquisitive person to one of Kenyatta's meetings. They might even have said, as they would say today, that Harambee was self-help projects and again invited you to attend a fund-raising meeting for one of such projects. Even today, if you accept to attend the latter kind of meeting, then you really will get much more than a philosophical idea of what "Harambee" means. You will be expected to contribute and you will be introduced in such a way that you will feel obligated to contribute.

The ordinary person's inability to articulate Harambee is understandable. It is a reflection of how the movement operates in the whole country. There seems to be an unspoken understanding that Harambee will not be verbally articulated. Rather, it will be demonstrated through action. The activities will in turn be reflected by statistics which can readily be quoted. We could, therefore, continue this introduction by quoting statistics to show the significance of Harambee in Kenya's

social economic development. This would, however, miss the point and at any rate we shall have the chance to discuss the statistics in later chapters.

The point that we think should be emphasised at the outset is that Harambee is an all pervasive activity which operates at all levels of the society in Kenya. Perhaps the best way to make this point is to proceed through illustration. This way we might capture the "spirit of Harambee". A good way to proceed with the illustration is to look at three activities at different levels of the society. The first activity is a national rally - the highest level. The second activity is a fund-raising meeting somewhere in the rural areas, and the third is a strictly private meeting by a group of rural women who, nevertheless, are a registered Harambee group. This type of group is the smallest Harambee organisation and, therefore, contrasts well with the other two levels of Harambee activities. First we shall look at the national rally.

The rally is the high point of celebrations marking any one of the three most important national holidays in Kenya. These days are June 1st the day on which Kenya attained internal self-government in 1963; Kenyatta Day which falls on October 20th, the day when Jomo Kenyatta and the other "Mau Mau Managers" were arrested in 1952, on the declaration of a state of emergency throughout Kenya; and December 12th, the day Kenya attained full political independence, in 1963.

The rally is in Uhuru⁶ park in the middle of Nairobi. Until his death in 1978, Mzee - the grand old man - would always be present. The adults called him Mzee but little children knew him as Harambee. This is all they seemed to hear his say, either on the radio, or the television.

On Jamuhuri⁷ Day in 1964 i.e. December 12th, 1964, when Kenya attained Republic status, the crowd was about half a million. But now it is Jamuhuri Day 1977, and the crowd is perhaps no more than five thousand people. The crowd has dwindled over the years perhaps as a result of having heard Mzee say the same things over and over again. The crowd might be small compared to those of the nineteen sixties but it is no less enthusiastic. Besides any crowd is good for Mzee. He loves appealing directly to the people, and when his health is good, he seems to enjoy more than anything else, this type of direct political communication. He has not given a press conference for the last ten years. He has not granted a formal interview to representatives of the press for the last ten or more years and he has not taken to the radio or the television to address the nation except in the context of a public rally or a delegation visiting him either at State House or at his home in Gatundu. He, of course, does not answer questions in Parliament. In fact, he only goes to Parliament on two occasions every year. He goes to open Parliament and again to listen to the budget speech.

If you are an academician your colleagues will tease you when you tell them you are going to the rally. "We did not know you are that interested in saying Harambee" they would say. You go to the rally nevertheless, not without some trepidation, for Mzee's temper has become unpredictable, and he can become quite abusive at times. You know, however, that there will be no trouble for people are still very fond of him. But you do not sit too near the Presidential dais, just in case.

The crowd is representative of the whole society. Those with marked seats are sitting not too far from the Presidential dais. They include members of parliament, directors of large private enterprises, high ranking civil servants, high ranking members of the armed forces, and executive chairmen of parastatal bodies, just to name a few.

Close to the Presidential dais are groups of traditional dancers. Most of the groups are comprised of women and most of the women are peasant women. The teams have been transported from different parts of the country, through the efforts of officials of the provincial administration, in conjunction with the officials of the Ministry of Housing and Social Services, under which Harambee activities fall. The teams might go under the name of "Kanu Nyakinyua"⁸ from such and such a place but you know that KANU the party has no real local organisational base to speak of, so you tend to give the member of parliament for the area, the credit of organising the traditional dancers.

The dancers are singing songs praising the struggle for independence and the achievements thereafter. Invariably all the songs that you can understand contain quite a few verses devoted to praising the "wise leadership" of Mzee and what Kenya has achieved through his leadership.

One verse captures your attention. It goes something like this.

Kenyatta atwirire ningunyita bunda rwathatha,
Nimukumiriria mateke
Harambee!
Harambee ino itu niyakwiyendera
Tiiria twahuragirwo ni mbari ya nyakeru
Harambee!

Kenyatta told us
I shall hold the donkey by the jaws
Are you going to resist the kicks
Harambee!
This Harambee of ours is voluntary
It is not the enforced version of the white colonialists
Harambee!

Mzee has heard these songs before. After all he is entertained by the same dancers almost every evening at "Thingira Wa Iregi" - the Kikuyu name for the State House. (The name has now become part of the national political vocabulary). But he still pays attention and claps occasionally. He is a great believer in "Utamaduni" - the old ways or the traditional culture. After all, his own political career began as a personal rebellion against the missionary onslaught on traditional culture.

The time arrives for Mzee to address the rally. The Vice-President makes a short introductory speech, in Kiswahili, requesting Mzee "to speak to his people". Mzee, slowly and with

tremendous dignity gets up. As usual he first clears his throat, then reads a very short statement in English. The statement is perhaps no more than five to ten minutes long. In it he touches on broad Government policies such as the Government's commitment to improve health facilities to the rural populations, the Government's commitment to defend the territorial integrity of the country, etc. He ends the speech with the familiar phrase "in the spirit of Harambee".

When he turns to address the rally in Kiswahili, the opening word is again the familiar one "Nduguzanguni" meaning literally "my brothers". He as usual exhorts the "wananchi"⁹ - the people - to work hard on their "shambas" (large farms or small holdings) and to be on the lookout for those who, he knows, will be tempted to destroy the peace and stability in the country. On the subject of the struggle for independence he uses the phrase he has always used. He talks of "Uhuru talionyakua" meaning "the independence which we snatched". The implications are obvious. First independence was not snatched by any one man or group of people. Everybody played their part. Thus, no special group will be singled out for special favours or rewards, and none should expect to be.

Obviously, Mzee is working himself and his audience around to his favourite theme; the theme of unity in order to prosper. He asks the people to work together and love one another for the peace and prosperity of the country. This is his message. It is always his message. Is this the political

meaning of Harambee? One wonders, and at the same time suspects that Mzee has no doubt that this is what Harambee means. He now wants to find out whether the people have understood and accepted his message. This is the climax of the rally.

"And now, my brothers, I would like us to say three Harambees so that the whole world, including the ex-colonialists can hear us from here. Are you ready?" asks Mzee. "Yees" roars the crowd. "O.K."

Mzee: (waving his white fly whisk)	Wananchi
Harambee!	Heee!
Harambee!	Heee!
Na wananchi wetu tukufu Harambee!	"
Na mashamba yetu Harambee!	"
Na mifugo yetu Harambee!	"
Na majeshi yetu Harambee!	"
Na watoto wetu Harambee!	"
Etc.	"
Asante sana wananchi	"
To our excellent citizens Harambee!	"
To our farms Harambee!	"
To our domestic animals Harambee!	"
To our armed forces Harambee!	"
To our children Harambee!	"
Etc.	"
Thank you very much wananchi.	

The original request was for three Harambees, but Mzee ends up saying as many Harambees as he feels like. The Harambees please him. One thing is, however, common to them all. They are all for something he considers good and an achievement. Harambees are said for something people are proud of, not for failures. They can also be said in order to express hope, but never to express dejection or admission of setbacks.

On the way from one of Kenyatta's meetings one felt that one had perhaps been manipulated into participating in something, without quite knowing what that something was. Perhaps it was simply the feeling that Mzee and the crowd had carried the day without too much room for disagreement. Was Harambee, then, political consensus?

If Harambee were simply a national political slogan, the behavioural response to which, meant attending one of the President's meetings in the national capital, quite a few of the rural population would not know much about it, except as a call through the radio or television. Quite a large number of the rural population has never been to Nairobi and even fewer make the trip for national days. Harambee is, however, brought to them through the mechanism of the local fund-raising meetings, in which they are expected to, and do indeed actively participate. This aspect of Harambee is the most important to the average Kenyan. Through Harambee contributions, the individual Kenyan makes a material commitment both to the ideology of Harambee, and most important to an improvement project in a local community somewhere in the countryside. The contribution, if one is living in town, is solicited through a number of ways which we shall not go into at this time. Suffice it to say that whatever activities go on behind the scenes, they all culminate in a fund-raising meeting, where funds are raised for a specific project. People know this aspect of Harambee all too well. It has become part of their daily life. In the rural areas, the people will discuss

very concretely and astutely the nature of Harambee contributions though most of them have never been to school. Let us therefore shift to the rural areas and take a look at a typical fund-raising meeting.

The fund-raising meetings are usually held over the weekend. If an important person is to preside over the meeting, then it is usually well publicized before hand to ensure good attendance. Repeated announcements have been made over the radio, and of late through the newspapers. The Chief or Sub-chief of the location - the lowest official of the provincial administration - has also passed the word "requesting" people to attend the meeting. After all, it is their project for which the funds are going to be raised.

Rural fund-raising meetings usually take place on Saturday or Sunday afternoons, so let us imagine one such afternoon. The people have been gathering since 12:30 p.m. They did not go home on their way from church. Instead, they headed straight for the primary school or the shopping centre where the fund-raising meeting will take place later that afternoon. Before going to church most of them made sure that whatever they were going to contribute would be at the scheduled meeting place on time. They are used to making these kinds of arrangements since this is not their first meeting. They have attended maybe five or so other meetings to raise funds for the same project. Their project is a relatively small water project. When completed, the project will serve about 250 families. But small though the project maybe it will still cost about 300,000

shillings. (1 Canadian dollar equals just over 6 Kenyan shillings). The project involves locating the water source, buying an appropriate water pump, constructing a storage tank, buying enough pipes to deliver the water to the individual homesteads of the project members, and of course, the labour that all the previous activities require.

The local community has already raised more than half of the amount needed to complete the project. A Government Ministry has donated the water tank which will serve as the reservoir. The local County Council - the District local government - has given some pipes to the project but these are not enough. The object of the meeting, then, is to raise funds to purchase the remaining pipes. The target for the afternoon is 120,000 shillings. The guest of honour is a Government Minister who has come as a guest of the local Member of Parliament. The Minister will preside over the fund-raising meeting which everybody hopes will be the last fund-raising meeting for this project.

The scene resembles a market place. One sees goats, chickens, bundles of sugar canes, bundles of bananas, basketful of beans, maize, potatoes etc. These are the people's contributions. There are, in addition, school choirs to entertain the guest of honour and a troupe of traditional dancers for the same purpose.

The meeting starts with the Chief or Sub-chief welcoming the Member of Parliament "back home" and expressing thanks to him for inviting the Honourable Minister, who in turn

has really honoured the community by agreeing to attend the meeting. The Chief then invites the chairman of the project to give a brief review of the history of the project. The review is done with considerable expertise and subtlety such that the speaker manages to convey, without actually saying so, that the community has done all it could possibly do, and now it is up to the Minister to help the community complete the project. After all "god helps those who help themselves Mr. Minister", the speaker concludes.

The local Member of Parliament then gets up and officially introduces and welcomes the Minister. Before asking to start the fund-raising he takes the opportunity to warn those who try to politicize Harambee projects. "We should all be concerned with development and the welfare of the wananchi, not politics" he concludes. We shall discuss the implications of this warning in later chapters. For the moment, we shall continue with the fund-raising. The local Member of Parliament then invites the Minister to conduct the fund-raising.

"Who is brave enough to set the ball rolling?" he asks. Pause. No one seems to be stirring. "Who wants to begin" he asks again? Eventually a brave man gets up and makes his way through the crowd. All eyes are on him. He hands 5 shillings to the Minister, who hands the money to the designated cashier and then makes the announcement "From Mr. so and so we have a donation of 5 shillings. Let us give him three loud claps". The crowd claps enthusiastically. To an experienced fund raiser, a five shillings contribution right

at the beginning is a very good beginning. The amount does not intimidate anyone, as people are encouraged to keep contributing. The fund-raising continues. "From the wife of so and so, a chicken". Clapping and cheers. "From the son of so and so, a bundle of sugar canes". Clapping and cheers. "From so and so who works as a clerk in such and such a place, 50 shillings". Prolonged clapping and cheers. "From so and so, one hundred shillings" even more prolonged clapping and cheers. "And from the son of so and so, who as you all know represents you in Nairobi as an employee at such and such a place, 200 shillings". Louder clapping, and ululations from the women. "From so and so, whom you all know for his generosity, a goat". Prolonged ululations from the women.

Now, it is time to auction some of the items contributed. It is nearly five o'clock and the meeting must end before 6:30 p.m. "And now we shall auction the items we have contributed" announces the guest of honour. "Which system shall we follow? The regular system or the kilo system". "The kilo system", someone answers. The guest of honour accepts to auction the items through the kilo system. At this point, if you were an observer trying to keep count of how much has been contributed by whom, you know immediately that you will never find out.

"I shall begin by auctioning this whole bunch of bananas for just one shilling. Any bidders?" "Here is a shilling" shouts someone, as she drops the shilling into the basket held by the cashier. "I will buy the bananas for the little baby of so and so"

shouts another person as he drops the shilling into the basket. "And I will buy the bananas for the little son of so and so" shouts a third person dropping a shilling into the basket. The last person to bid, "buys" the bunch of bananas for a shilling. Then the guest of honour announces the amount that the bananas have fetched. The goats and the chickens will be auctioned the same way. The goat for 20 shillings and the chicken for 5 shillings. Once each item is bought the guest of honour announces how much it has fetched. Invariably all the items fetch much more than their true market value. However, whoever ends up owning the item has in actual fact paid much less for it than the true market value of the item. If for example, a goat is being auctioned for 20 shillings one can be sure of owning it for 100 shillings by bidding five times at the appropriate moments. The true market value for a goat is at least 250 shillings. This then is the "kilo system". When there are no more bidders, the last person to drop the non-recoverable amount, for which the item is being sold, into the basket, owns the item being auctioned.

Finally, the auction is over and the total amount raised at the meeting is announced. The target has been reached, and one can feel the sigh of relief from the people. The last contributions, however are yet to come. At this moment the Member of Parliament gets up and finally announces his contribution. "And now from myself and my friends, I have brought you this amount". He hands the amount to the cashier. The final contribution is from the guest of honour. The

terminology is the same. "From myself and my friends I have brought you this much". We shall take up the question of the implications of this phrase in later chapters. For the moment, let us conclude our meeting.

The guest of honour then makes a short concluding statement thanking the community for inviting him and urging the people to be "development conscious" and to disregard those who try to mix politics with development projects. He sounds very much like the Member of Parliament. At this point someone gets up and announces that the community has decided to donate one of the goats to the guest of honour as a mark of appreciation for coming to conduct the fund-raising. He might or might not accept the goat, but he or his aides will certainly check the papers tomorrow and listen to the radio. Depending on what else was going on during the weekend, the meeting has a chance to make it to the newsrooms.

The third meeting is a far cry from the two described above. It takes place any day of the week in a smoky hut somewhere in the rural areas. The people attending the meeting are all women and rightly so since their group is registered as a women's self-help group. About fifteen people have attended the meeting and this number constitutes half the total membership. They are discussing how their project has done so far. They have a chairman, a treasurer, a secretary and they all make reports. So far they have managed to buy half a dozen cups and saucers per person for twenty of the thirty members. If they continue

making their weekly contributions of 5 shillings per member as originally agreed, they will manage to buy cups and saucers for the remaining ten members in a few months time. Then they hope to move on to the next phase of the project which they know will take much much longer. They want to buy corrugated roofing sheets for each of the members. On a rough calculation one concludes that this phase will take them at least five years. They have a third phase too. They want to buy a plot of land on which they can build a shop jointly owned by the whole group. This seems to be a long way off into the future, but the women talk as if it is going to happen tomorrow. They have even approached the local councillor to see whether he can assist them to get a plot.

And where do they hope to get the money to buy a plot and build a shop, let alone equip it? They are not quite so sure, but they will keep raising it from among themselves. Those with plots of land can sell any surplus crops that they might have. Those without land will try to save from their earnings as labourers on the farms of well to do neighbours. They sound optimistic about the future. Asked why they are optimistic they say that they hope that someday "someone will notice us". This is Harambee at the most basic level.

In choosing to introduce the idea of Harambee in the way we have done, we hope that we have succeeded in at least outlining some of the major issues which we shall be discussing in the chapters which will follow. Harambee is both a macro and a micro phenomenon. It has a history though this history has

not always taken place under the name of Harambee. Harambee and Harambee projects are currently the main basis of interaction between the leaders and the led, though of course, this was not always the case in the past. We therefore want to describe and explain this interaction and at the same time give it a historical perspective.

1.3 Research Objectives and Methods

The main objective of this study is to show how and why Harambee and Harambee projects became the most important political linkage between the leaders and the led in Kenya. In doing so, we also want to show that the politics of Harambee were indicative of the style and content of the whole range of Kenyan politics during the Presidency of the late Jomo Kenyatta. A study of the politics of Harambee will, therefore, yield insights on the functioning of the Kenyan state and political system during the first fifteen years of independence.

Implied in our main objective, as stated above, is the argument that there were other potentially important political linkages, but for a variety of reasons these linkages never did become important. What then were the other institutional linkages and why did they not become important? We identify the other linkages as the political party and the parliament.

An equally important matter for investigation is the notion of rule. This becomes clear if we make the rather obvious assumption that the leaders are the rulers and the led are the ruled. If this assumption is valid, then, a part of our objective

is to identify the rulers and the ruled. We, therefore, specify the rulers as the political and economic elite, and the ruled as the peasantry.

Since the identification is a collective identification, it says nothing about how much power or influence each particular ruler has over the ruled. This question is part of the style and content of the whole range of Kenyan politics, which we intend to investigate. What then is our main argument?

We want to argue that the politics of Harambee and Harambee projects were central to Kenyatta's chosen technique of controlling the Kenyan state. More specifically, we want to show that, rather than rule through public participatory institutions such as the political party and/or parliament, Kenyatta chose to rule through a personalised patron-client hierarchy the recruitment to which was dependent on participation in Harambee and Harambee projects. The reasons for this style of rule were partly historical and partly the result of Kenyatta's interpretation of politics and, in particular, his interpretation of the role of elected representatives. Furthermore, the interpretation was an accurate reflection of the views of the majority of the peasantry.

The pursuit of the research objectives raise many empirical and conceptual questions to which we shall address ourselves in subsequent chapters. For the moment, we shall limit ourselves to a few broad issues.

The first such issue is to identify the elites and the peasants. Here, we first make a distinction between national elites and local elites. This is done in the next chapter where we review the literature on Harambee. As part of identifying the local elites, we also identify quite simply the peasantry as that category of rural residents who are not local elites.

The second broad issue is to show the content and style of the patron-client hierarchy which Kenyatta established as means of ruling the Kenyan state, and to show how and why he chose to rule in that particular way.

The third issue is to show the nature of the interaction between the national elites, the local elites and the peasantry around Harambee and Harambee projects. This entails answering such questions as: who initiates Harambee projects, who implements the projects, who benefits from the projects, etc.

The fourth empirical issue is related to the third issue, and indeed stems directly from the main argument of the research. As can be seen, the main argument seeks to show why and how elites participate in Harambee. In other words, the argument is predicated on elite participation and says little about peasant participation. There is the need, therefore, to explain why peasants participate at all. The thesis will argue that peasants participate as, and because they are, clients of local patrons, who are in turn clients of national patrons.

Diagram I.I summarizes the argument of the research. In the course of making the argument, we shall also be filling in the diagram with more detailed contents.

As the diagram suggests, our approach to the study of Harambee and Harambee projects in Kenya is both national and local. We hope it will become clear, beginning with the next chapter where we review the literature, that our approach is a form of centre-periphery analysis. By this method, we seek to organize and interpret information on Harambee as a linkage mechanism between the social, political and economic centre, represented by Kenyatta and the national elites, and the periphery, represented by rural elites and the peasantry.

We have employed a number of methods for this research. The most important method has been participant observation over a period of three years in Kenya. During this period, the author, not only attended many Harambee fund-raising meetings, but also took part in planning and implementing some Harambee projects in his own home area. Participant observation, therefore, gave the author considerable knowledge of Harambee activities in Kenya and Kiambu District of Central Province, in particular, where the author comes from.

Second we have employed the method of open-ended interviews and conversations, especially in the effort to get information on how traditional self-help was organized in pre-colonial days and in the colonial period, before the idea of

DIAGRAM 1.1HARAMBEE AND THE PATRON-CLIENT STATE

community development and community self-help was introduced and formalized by the colonial Government in Kenya. This information is necessary in order to give the study a historical perspective.

Third, we have relied on newspaper reports, Government documents and published academic works, not only to obtain information on and interpretation of Harambee activities throughout Kenya, but also to get some basic facts on the Kenyan political system under Kenyatta, without which it would be impossible to make the main argument stated above. With respect to newspaper reports, we have relied mainly on three Kenyan publications: The Nation, The Standard, and the Weekly Review. Kenya has no Government owned and, therefore, Government controlled newspapers. The three publications are, consequently, sufficiently free from Government control to be reliable for our purposes.

Fourth, we have employed a field questionnaire which was administered in Kiambu District in the course of the four months between July and October of 1977. Kiambu District was chosen, partly because the author comes from the area and is, therefore, well acquainted with the politics of the District and the social/economic conditions of the peasantry residing there, and partly because of the need to study Harambee and Harambee activities at the project level in a rural area, in addition to studying the movement at the national level. A sample of the questionnaire is attached as an appendix to the thesis.

The questionnaire, though written in English, was administered in Kikuyu, the vernacular language of the people who live in the rural areas of Kiambu. The enumerators who assisted the author in administering the questionnaire were all Kikuyu speakers, in addition, of course, to being good enough English speakers to understand the questionnaire. Three of the enumerators were employees of the Institute For Development Studies, University of Nairobi, as survey research assistants. A fourth enumerator was a final year student from the Department of Government, University of Nairobi. Before going to the field, all the enumerators were asked to translate the questionnaire from English to Kikuyu, to the satisfaction of the author. Any misunderstandings were, consequently, corrected before the questionnaire was administered.

The response to the questions were sometimes in English and sometimes in Kikuyu, depending on how well the enumerators thought they had understood the responses which were, of course, invariably given in Kikuyu. In case of some doubt, the enumerators were instructed to report the responses in Kikuyu. The author would afterwards translate them into English, before coding them.

The questionnaire was administered to Harambee project leaders in each of the six administrative Divisions in Kiambu District. In each of the six Divisions, a ten percent random sample of all the Harambee projects registered between 1971 and

1977 was selected. The total number of projects registered during this period was 1,170 projects. We were able to obtain the total from the official register of Harambee projects at the District Headquarters in Kiambu.

Our sample was, therefore, 110 projects. Out of the original sample of 110 projects, we were able to get responses from 95 projects. The other 15 projects were either "unknown" by the local communities, or in the cases where they were known, nobody could be found to talk about them.

The target group of the questionnaire, as we have said, was the leaders of the projects. The enumerators were, therefore, instructed to interview at least three people about the project. They were to interview say the chairman, the treasurer, the secretary, a committee member etc. If they could not find the leaders, they were instructed to interview an administrative official such as the Chief or Sub-chief or alternatively to interview a well known local individual such as an elder, a pastor, or school teacher. Whoever was interviewed had, of course, to know about the project and its leaders.

Ideally, we should have gathered responses from 285 project leaders - three leaders for each one of the 95 projects - but we only managed to gather responses from 175 project leaders. It proved to be too time consuming and too expensive, to gather information from three leaders per project.

The first objective of the questionnaire was to gather basic information on two things. First, we wanted to obtain individual data from the leaders. This would include information on occupation, age, education, personal opinions on Harambee etc. Second, we wanted to get information on the particular Harambee projects with which the leaders were associated. This would include information on the initiators of the project - who they were, what their occupations were, what their educational backgrounds were etc. As can be seen, the interviewees were both respondents and informants. In their capacity as informants, they were able to give us information on 316 project leaders. In addition, as we shall see when we report the findings, the interviewees were indeed part of the 316 project leaders, as we had hoped they would be.

The second objective of the questionnaire, and this is in some ways more important, was to provide an opportunity to make field notes especially on the politics of the area where the projects were located. Those familiar with the political situation in Kenya, at the time of the research, will appreciate the fact that a questionnaire designed to directly tap political information, would never get off the ground. It was therefore necessary to employ somewhat indirect means.

At this point, we should say something about some of the problems of administering a questionnaire to a population composed largely, of rural peasants. One of our biggest problems

was that we could not be sure of the independence of the responses in those questions where individual opinions were required. Word passes very quickly among rural communities. In addition, among those accustomed to passing on information orally, it takes only the length of the interview to memorize a questionnaire and the responses given and then to pass on the information in the local community before the interviewers return the following day. We suspected this was the case in a number of occasions. We could not tell our interviewees not to discuss the interviews with their neighbours as this would have introduced an element of secrecy and therefore suspicion. There was already enough suspicion as things were. Not used to being interviewed, most of our respondents thought we were asking questions on behalf of the Government, or on behalf of somebody who was interested in getting elected.

The second big problem was that the rural people we interviewed had a predilection for answering questions in long conversations. Even a short, and in our opinion, straightforward question occasioned a fairly lengthy conversation, interspersed with anecdotes about the life of the community. While this added depth to the information, it proved to be a nightmare when it came to coding the information. For this reason, and for many other reasons, such as the problem we had in separating groups which insisted on having one spokesman, we decided that there was little more to be gained from subjecting our information to statistical techniques. Instead, we have simply coded the

responses into categories and calculated simple percentages. Even here, the attitudinal data from the questionnaire should be treated with some caution so as not to give too much significance to a difference of a few percentage points.

Finally, we should add that there is a real problem in getting good data on Harambee activities, and especially data on project inputs and outputs, something which will be discussed in the relevant chapters.

1.4 Summary

Harambee is both a political and an economic movement, just as it is both a national and a local movement. In this study, we shall be focussing on the politics of Harambee without, of course, ignoring the economic aspects of it, where the latter helps in explaining the former.

In order to understand both the national and the local dimensions of Harambee, we conceive the movement as a linkage mechanism between the leaders and the led. More specifically, we want to show why and how Harambee and Harambee projects became a central feature of Kenyatta's mechanisms of political control.

We have employed a number of research methods for this study in an effort to get both national and local data. Though there are problems with this data, the spirit of this research is by and large empirical. We, however, do not shy away from hypothesising an explanation in those cases where empirical evidence is not available. We hope the speculative hypotheses will form a basis for further research.

Chapter 1: Footnotes

1. Owino-Ombudo: Harambee, Its Origin and Growth.
Academic Publishers, Nairobi, 1972, p. 11
2. Ibid, p. 11
3. Kenyatta, in his first use of the word, actually got the spelling and therefore the pronunciation wrong. The way he spelled and pronounced it however, was in keeping with the way the word was being used and pronounced in Kikuyuland at that time.
4. The Daily Nation, Nairobi, May 28, 1963.
5. Ombudo, O. op cit p. 23.
6. Kiswahili word for "Independence".
7. Kiswahili word for "Republic".
8. We shall have more to say about this type of Kikuyu organization later on. For the moment we shall only say that in Kikuyu, the word "Nyakinyua" means a woman with adult children.
9. This Kiswahili word has now been absorbed into the English language as used in Kenya. Literally it means citizens. However, the original meaning has acquired new nuances so that today it means much more than citizen. It means simultaneously country folk, ordinary people of the country, the masses etc. A more subtle meaning of the word is "common folk out there" who are needy. This is to be juxtaposed with "those of us in here". It is not uncommon therefore to hear a government official castigating the big people for let us say, smuggling goods out of the country while the "Wananchi" are suffering from shortages. The singular for the word is "Mwananchi".

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

2.1 Introduction

The spirit of Harambee as we suggested in the last chapter pervades the Kenyan society from the highest levels of Government to the smallest communities in the rural areas. However, unlike other developmental and participatory movements such as villagisation in Tanzania, Harambee has not attracted much attention from academicians. It is for this reason that some of us have been tempted to think of Harambee as an "elusive ideology". It is perhaps a testimony of just how elusive academicians have found Harambee to be that such highly regarded and highly interpretative writers on Kenya as Colin Leys completely ignored this aspect of Kenyan politics. In order to emphasize this irony, it should be noted that Harambee activities are no longer strictly secondary in Kenya's rural development. The activities constitute approximately 30% of all capital formation in the rural areas of Kenya.¹

Despite the relative neglect of the Harambee movement, some few scholars have carried out some studies, thereby facilitating the emergence of what could become contending approaches in the future. The best known of these scholars are Mbithi, Rasmusson, Mutiso, Godfrey, Anderson, Holmquist, Wallis, Lamb and Reynolds. The works of these writers will provide the material for this review.

At a very general level, two preliminary observations are in order. First, despite what could be emerging as approaches to the study of Harambee, most of the writers, as a quick glance at the titles of their works will suggest, have not consciously attempted to construct a general framework for future studies of Harambee.² Rather they have confined themselves either to a particular discipline or to one type of Harambee projects such as the schools and institutes of Science and Technology. Thus it is not always easy to integrate one study with another study. The second observation is that there are very few researchers who can be identified with Harambee in the scholarly tradition of a specialist who has pursued the subject over many years.³ The result is that very few explanatory concepts or even hypotheses have so far emerged, in the sense that one would normally associate a body of concepts and or hypotheses with a group of scholars or a school of thought.

The above observation notwithstanding, it is possible to organise the literature on Harambee along three broad approaches. These are the community development approach, the centre-periphery approach and the class approach. We use the word "possible" deliberately and for two reasons. First, very few writers on Harambee neatly fall into any of these categories. Thus one has to more or less try to detect in which broad category the writers "sympathies" fall without expecting too much consistency in one piece of research, let alone two or three pieces of research.⁴

Second, the word "possible" is used in the empirical sense that the approaches are detectable in actual writings on Harambee. In other words, one is not thinking here of the "theoretically possible" number of approaches that could be applied to Harambee, but of those that have actually been applied to Harambee. We begin with the community development approach.

2.2 The Community Development Approach

The community development approach to Harambee is sometimes difficult to identify, especially when considered in relation to the centre-periphery approach, which we discuss next. It is, however, easy to identify as the official Kenyan Government explanation of Harambee. In addition to the Kenyan Government, Mbithi, Wallis, Reynolds, Anderson, and, to a lesser extent, Lamb, have at one or another, though not always exclusively, adopted this approach.

Three main ideas emerge from the community development approach. These are 1. That for effective development to occur the peasantry has to be involved in development participation at the grass-roots level. 2. That the peasants will get involved out of their own local needs and 3. That modified traditional structures will be a key institutional mechanism for peasant participation as the peasants seek ways and means of responding to the local needs. (The implication of the idea is that participation will take place through small collective groups. This implication is sometimes openly stated⁵).

Put differently, those who fall under the general classification of the community development approach view Harambee as a means whereby local people, using local resources and modified traditional social mechanisms, can and do combine for the purpose of improving their social and economic welfare. In other words, the emphasis here is on what Harambee accomplishes at the local level as opposed to those who interpret Harambee's central importance in linkage terms, regardless of whether they emphasise political or economic linkages. The important distinction, therefore, is whether the emphasis is on the local aspects of Harambee or on the links between local and national aspects of the movement.

According to the Kenyan Government, self-help is the basis of community development, and "community development is a process involving the people in planning and working for their own development".⁶ In the Development Plan, 1966-70, it was stated that:

"Self-help projects were always part of the traditional way of life in Kenya but in recent decades the tradition has tended to wane. It is now being revived in a new form and is giving added impact to the pace of development. The community development programme aims at encouraging people to become involved in development by preparing them for changes, helping them to understand their roles as citizens, assisting them to acquire the knowledge and skills necessary to carry out their responsibilities and stimulating and assisting them in taking action to meet their needs through voluntary self-help organizations".⁷

The ideas expressed in the Development Plan: 1966-70 were repeated in the Development Plan: 1970-74 and again in the Development Plan: 1974-78 without too much variation. In the Development Plan: 1970-74 community development activities were described as reflecting "the concerns of the Government for the betterment of the people by helping them to help themselves".⁸ Furthermore the activities were seen as an attempt by the Government to "encourage the enormous capacity of the people to develop the nation through self-help".⁹

In the Development Plan: 1974-78, the objective of community development was described as being "to mobilize people to co-operate in nation-building for the benefit of individuals within the community and the nation as a whole".¹⁰ Except for the change in the wording, the forthcoming Development Plan: 1978-82 will view Harambee activities in Kenya within the framework of community development except that the activities will be described as a "joint venture between the Government and the rural populations".¹¹

The community development approach to Harambee as reflected in Kenya Government documents is also to be found in scholarly writings on the subject. P.M. Mbithi, in one of his earlier writings on the subject argued that the traditional community development approach inherited from the colonial administration was fraught with difficulties and often sowed its own seeds of failure. The reason was that "rural change programmes

tended to be imposed upon the rural communities irrespective of their expressed needs or abilities".¹² Thus a "disharmony" developed between centralized planning on the one hand and "imposed" implementation on the other hand. The disharmony isolated the two principal participants, namely, the government official and the local progressive on the one hand, and the rural household heads, clan leaders, village notables and ritual experts on the other. From this initial argument Mbithi analysed Harambee in terms of a mechanism for harnessing traditionally legitimate modes of compliance and discipline, in mobilizing rural people for effective involvement in development.¹³

More specifically, he analysed the role of age groups, kinship groups, clans etc. in relation to peasant participation. The conclusion, or one of the implied conclusions, was that Harambee is superior to the colonial community development approach to participation, because it utilises traditional structures of co-operation and legitimization, thereby correcting the faults of the old and colonial approaches to community development. It is also a solidarity movement at the local level where it serves the purpose of providing groups and individuals with a reference point. Mbithi thus views Harambee as a local movement almost in isolation from the centre, except in the sense of technical and administrative co-operation between Government officials and the local communities. The thrust of Mbithi's criticism of community development is therefore, not on the approach,

as such, since his analysis stems from the same approach, but on the colonial application of the approach.

Malcom Wallis organises his research on self-help in Kenya around the premise that "not enough attention has yet been paid to the promotion and guidance of participation in self-help activities. In particular more effort is needed for training leaders for these activities".¹⁴ He therefore orients his research towards "evaluating what at present is being done in the field of training at different levels, with specific reference to the Community Development Assistants, Chiefs and local project committee leaders".¹⁵ His specific concentration however, is on the training programme of the Community Development Division of the Department of Social Services in Kenya. His focus is therefore primarily organisational as he himself admits, and therefore of peripheral interest for our present purposes. We should note, however that he regards Community Development Assistants as the "front line actors" in the administration of Harambee activities in Kenya. His conclusion in this respect is that "a stronger commitment to training local leaders could have a very great pay-off in the long run. If the spirit of Harambee is to be sustained and at the same time become a productive force in the future, it seems critical that such a step be taken".¹⁶ In focussing on the Community Development Assistant, Wallis broadly identifies himself with the community development approach to the explanation of Harambee, at least in the sense that the movement is seen as basically a local phenomenon in need of

better trained local leaders. Like Mbithi, his notion of participation is, therefore, predicated on local conditions, and particularly the quality of local leadership.

A colleague of Wallis, with whom he has co-authored a paper at the Institute For Development Studies,¹⁷ also identifies himself with the community development approach. J. Reynold's work is still in progress at the Institute For Development Studies, University of Nairobi. The conclusions are, therefore, yet to come but the general approach has been explicitly stated in a preliminary paper.¹⁸

Reynold's research premise is that "The (Harambee) movement has developed in a context where various traditional forms of community maintenance and improvement activities are also present and it represents a fusion of traditional social forms with the organization of society generated by a national Government. Most Harambee activity, indeed has a local and intra-ethnic, as distinct from, a national and inter-ethnic orientation"¹⁹ He therefore proposes to investigate the association between ethnic identity and rural self-help activity, with the former as a "determinate" in self-help activity. He points out that the Luo-occupied districts of Nyanza province and the Kikuyu occupied Central Province, display the highest rates of self-help projects per capita in the country. Both the Luo and the Kikuyu are characterised by a relatively high degree of cultural and social-political solidarity and therefore this

suggests "a positive relation between the degree of cultural homogeneity and ethnic solidarity on the one hand and the degree of involvement in the Harambee movement"²⁰ on the other hand.

Reynolds hypothesis is, to say the least provocative, though not much can be said until the results are out. It will be interesting, however, to see how Reynolds explains intra-ethnic Harambee activities, within the framework of what he terms as "anthropological approach" but which we view as a slight variation of the community development approach albeit, this time, focussing on a very specific local cultural variable among many local variables which, hypothetically, could also be adduced as explanations of Harambee if one chose to analyse it as a local phenomenon.

J. Anderson,²¹ in several pioneering papers on the Harambee movement, focusses on the Harambee schools. It is therefore difficult for one to argue that Anderson has an approach that is generalisable to the Harambee movement as a whole. However, to the extent that Anderson's various writings have a common theme, it seems to be the theme of community competition. He sees the muchrooming of Harambee schools as a consequence of intense intra and inter ethnic competition. Thus he says that in Kenya people sense an overwhelming pressure as individuals, as neighbours, as clans, and as tribal communities to compete both for Government educational provision and the opportunities that lie ahead. Anderson's approach to Harambee schools as a

community phenomenon is supported by other writers on Harambee schools in Kenya. Thus G. Cowan views the schools as a result of educational development gone out of control as a result of community competition.²² Aspects of intra-community competition are also discussed by G. Lamb²³ in the context of Harambee schools in Muranga District.

It is true that writers on the Harambee schools are aware of the social economic conditions, generated at the centre of the political system, which have an effect on the nature and style of community competition in the periphery of the political system. The linkages, and particularly the political linkages, between the centre and the periphery are however not usually systematically explored. The thrust of their argument, therefore, focuses on local communities, and the competitive forces in the periphery.

The community development approach, both as a method of analysis and as a policy for facilitating peasant participation in social change and development has attracted wide criticism.²⁴ Some of the criticisms are immediately relevant.

One of the major criticisms made against the community development approach is that it has a tendency to draw a false dichotomy between the small local communities and the territorial or national community or its government.²⁵ This criticism is applicable to some of the writers of Harambee, and especially those, who try to analyse the movement in terms of local traditional

associations, or simply in terms of the administrative functions of the community development officers. In different ways, this is true of Mbithi in his earlier writings and also of Reynolds and Wallis. It is true that in personal conversations one is convinced that these writers are aware of the larger implications of Harambee activities, but the community-centred approach does not allow an articulation of this awareness.

In political terms, the real significance of the above criticism lies in its recognition of the fact that community and social problems cannot be understood "outside the central question of the existence of unequal access to the foci of political power and the decision-making institutions of the nation by different groups of which society is composed"²⁶ Expressed in political terms, the criticism becomes even more applicable to most of the writers discussed. Those like Anderson and Lamb who are sensitive to the political dimensions, unfortunately limit the discussion to community politics or inter-community competition. No doubt intra community and inter-community competition would be expected to play some role in the decisions to participate in Harambee, but then the nature of political processes at the national level must be taken into account in order to understand the politics at the community levels.

Another criticism that can be made against the community development approach has to do with the very notion of community. Is a community a whole tribe, a clan, or simply a group of people organised around a development project? Furthermore, what is the socio-economic composition of the community, once it has been decided what constitutes the community? Though this criticism might not be directly applicable to the writers we have mentioned, it is an important empirical point to keep in mind even when one is analysing just the local communities. We intend to deal with this empirical point in this study and show that our chosen local communities viz groups organised around specific Harambee projects, are quite heterogeneous. They are composed of businessmen, teachers, progressive farmers, politicians, civil servants and ordinary peasant farmers. The political implications of the heterogeneous nature of local communities is, once again, that the members have unequal power and, therefore, unequal access, to the resources at the political centre.

An appreciation of the heterogeneous nature of local communities leads to the question of the process by which the community needs are determined. More specifically for our purposes, the process by which a decision is made to initiate a Harambee project. From the community development approach, we have two contending answers.

On the one hand are some scholars like Wallis who argue the case for improved local leadership in identifying local problems, and consequently in designing appropriate responses. The Government of Kenya goes even further in arguing that local communities must be assisted in their efforts to identify their "real needs" and makes this the justification for the community development programme. Other students of community development have made the argument. For example, Manghezi, summarizing this argument says:

"A distinction is often made by community development theorists and practitioners between what they term "felt-needs" and "real-needs". The implication of this distinction becomes clearer when community development exponents proceed to claim and try to show that the villager is often not in a position to know his "real-needs" which he should legitimately try to satisfy, from his "felt-needs" which are said to be unrealistic or even utopian. This being the case, the argument continues, it becomes the responsibility of the social worker or community development worker to help the villagers become aware of their so-called real problems or needs".²⁷

On the other hand are scholars like Mbithi, and to a certain extent Lamb and Anderson, who argue that the so-called villagers know their real-needs and they initiate relevant projects to meet these needs. When projects are initiated by "outsiders" it is because the villagers do not have the capability to do so. Otherwise the projects do serve the villagers real-needs. Mbithi's approach to this issue is largely empirical and he is therefore on firmer ground. However, there is a question which he does not fully answer in his earlier research. Why would

"outsiders" initiate projects, even if they do so only in exceptional cases? This question cannot be answered fully, without analysing the linkages between the local communities and the so-called outside world, something which Mbithi attempts to do in his most recent research on Harambee.

Our last point in respect to the community development approach to Harambee has to do with the participatory institutions which are usually associated with Harambee. It seems to be just a logical extension of the approach to proceed to argue that traditional institutions such as the clan, the neighbourhood, the tribe etc. are the main participatory institutions for the Harambee movement. This may indeed be the case if one confines oneself to an examination of rural communities. The danger however is that there is a great temptation to "over-anthropologize" the participatory institutions without attempting any explanation. Two points are relevant here.

First, even if it were the case that traditional institutions and modes of co-operation dominate the Harambee movement on the local level, it can be argued that this is the case because the majority of projects are small projects.

Where a project is large enough, it is likely to involve a whole administrative unit such as a Location or a Division. This in turn, has political implications as we shall see in the ensuing chapters. Second, Harambee activities do take place in the

urban areas and at the national level where the reasons for co-operation might be entirely different from simply ethnicity and tradition.

It should be pointed out, however, that there might be an ideological function, especially on the part of both local and national elites, in emphasizing the traditional elements. Even if the traditional institutions were dominant, as is constantly emphasized, this does not automatically render the present day Harambee the same as traditional co-operation. We shall pick up this issue in the next chapter where we present the traditional and colonial backgrounds of Harambee.

The community development approach, as can be seen raises many important questions without providing satisfactory answers. Would a centre-periphery approach provide some of the answers. We shall next discuss this approach as it has been applied to Harambee.

2.3 The Centre-Periphery Approach

The centre-periphery approach to the study of Harambee takes off from the premise that it is difficult, if not impossible to understand Harambee without seriously considering the linkages between the grass roots movement and other factors at the centre. The relevant factors at the centre could be political, symbolic, cultural, economic or simply technical knowledge. Scholars who have at one time or another discussed Harambee within this framework are Mutiso, Godfrey, Holmquist,

and Mbithi, to a lesser extent. The approach, however, is normally associated with Mutiso, Godfrey and Holmquist.

In a series of papers written between 1971 and 1973, G. Mutiso pioneered the centre-periphery interpretation of Harambee.²⁸ His key concepts in this respect are leadership, alienation and resource reallocation. He is primarily interested in explaining the emergence of Harambee leadership though it is not clear what aspects of Harambee leadership he intends to explain. He argues that:

"The dynamics of Harambee leadership are traceable to the dynamics of Kenya's changing social structures. The polarization of western defined social values, social mobility patterns and sociometric interaction against equally well defined indigenous and neo-indigenous value interaction patterns represents a cleavage which makes the latter the periphery and the former the centre. The high degree of participation in Harambee by the periphery is a re-affirmation of the periphery's alienation and its desire to co-opt leadership into or from the centre. This is essential, if the periphery is, in the long run, going to be able to re-channel the allocation of resources and access to opportunity to the periphery".²⁹

Though some of the language used above is somewhat confusing, it seems clear that Mutiso conceives the centre and the periphery as cultural systems which somehow have produced competing leadership over resources.

In a later paper, co-authored with M. Godfrey,³⁰ Mutiso seems to have modified the above hypothesis in order to redefine the centre and the periphery in much more concrete and political terms. Focussing their attention on the Harambee

Institutes of Technology, they concluded that the political function of the Institutes is that they are being used as a means of forcing accountability to the politicians. (The Institutes are large and expensive technical schools intended to train school leavers for self-employment and also to provide middle level manpower. They started appearing in 1973.)

According to Mutiso and Godfrey, the Kenyan political system has become "increasingly depoliticised".³¹ The result is that the Government has tended to rely more and more on the legitimising role of the President and on control via the provincial administration and less and less on politics. The consequence of this is that "political processes have devolved from the national centre to the periphery and local Harambee activity has become an important arena within which political leadership at the local level is determined".³² In other words, Harambee as it applies to the Institutes, is both an economic process of re-allocating resources between the centre and the periphery, and even more important a political arena linking the centre and the periphery. The centre and the periphery are here understood in political and economic terms.

Political and economic linkages are just two of the many linkages that could be forged between the centre and the periphery. Other linkages have been attributed to Harambee. One of the arguments that has been put forward, both by students of Harambee from the community perspective and the centre periphery

perspective is that Harambee is a symbolic mechanism through which the periphery identifies itself with the national development effort as defined by the centre.³³ Mbithi makes this argument in one of his earlier papers though he does not elaborate on it. However, in a later paper co-authored with Rasmus Rasmusson and later extended into a book,³⁴ Mbithi makes a conscious attempt to explore the linkages between the centre and the periphery though his concerns are more empirical than conceptual. Thus, he explores the roles played by both national and local elites in Harambee, and the local communities themselves.

He discovers that Government officials such as District Commissioners, District Officers, Agricultural Officers, and Community Development Officers, are all named as initiators of projects. This study is one of the few systematically empirical works on Harambee to date. The conclusions of this study are, however, not very different from Mbithi's earlier empirical studies.

He concludes that the critical features of Harambee include: local initiative, use of locally mobilized resources, local leadership and indigenous legitimizing principles. It is also suggested that Harambee has affinities to indigenous reciprocal work arrangements. This study shows empirical relations between the centre and the periphery and for this reason we have put it under this category. However, the intention of the study

is explicitly stated as to test the hypothesis that "community leadership patterns to an extent determine programme action styles which, in turn, to an extent determine programme outcome".³⁵ Its conception is, therefore, closer to the community development approach than the centre-periphery approach.

Frank Holmquist on the other hand focusses on the local communities but at the same time tries to examine the relationship between these communities and the political/economic centre. To begin with, he, like Mbithi views Harambee in terms of a symbolic relationship between the centre and the periphery. Reflecting on his work in Kisii District, Nyanza province he says:

"The impact of the central government's symbols linking centre and locality in the realm of rural development is very hard to document but speculation may be warranted. Rural populations in Africa are open to symbolic identification with the centre. In the early stages of my research in Kenya I was properly sceptical when group leaders said they initiated their projects partially as a response to President Kenyatta's call for self-help activity. Later, however, after several such instances and warnings from other observers to take some of these responses seriously, I 'revised my opinion'.³⁶

Even more important, as far as Holmquist's work on Harambee is concerned, is his concept of pre-emptive development which he developed while working in Kisii District.³⁷ According to Holmquist Harambee is characterised by an ever present confrontation between Government programmes and local peoples popular needs. The initiators of this confrontation are local communities who dramatize their felt local needs by resorting to "pre-emptive development". Pre-emption has several characteristics.

First, it is characterised by the tendency to choose a project unlikely to be initiated by the Government but likely to be taken over. Second, groups try to pre-empt the field of contestants by convincing the Government that it is politically and economically unwise to deny support to a superior local effort. Thus, self-help groups purposely go beyond the plan because they probably would not receive aid without pre-emptive local effort. Thirdly, there is a tendency to initiate projects before defining the goals and strategies, thus sharply contrasting community needs with the priorities defined by policy-makers. Clearly, the notion of politics is imbedded in the concept of "pre-emptive development" and Holmquist elaborates on this elsewhere, though in a different framework, as we shall see shortly. Suffice it to say that the concept of pre-emptive development is clearly a centre-periphery concept.

Unlike Mutiso, Godfrey and Mbithi, Holmquist has gone a little bit further in the attempt to conceptualize Harambee in terms of the relations between the centre and the periphery. In doing so he has also narrowed down the centre-periphery relations to a very specific kind of relation viz the patron-client relation. What follows is a summary of Holmquist's main trend of thought as applied to Harambee and to rural self-help groups in general.³⁸ Holmquist's outline is supplemented by our own general observations on how Harambee activities take place in Kenya.

The basic premise of the patron-client approach, as applied to Harambee, is that the movement is a peasant strategy for meeting their needs. Peasant groups perceive themselves to be in serious competition with each other over access to very scarce resources and therefore they proceed to initiate projects regardless of their viability. The first casualty of the peasant's behaviour is, therefore, the Government's call "to stay within the plan", since the peasant groups have no intention of staying within the plan, and they cannot afford to wait as the communities that build the best projects first are most likely to receive aid. This is the "pre-emptive development" strategy that we outlined earlier. What then is the politics of this strategy? One choice would be direct confrontation with the Government, for indeed this is a strategy of confrontation. This choice would be unwise for it might result in the withdrawal of resources which the peasants ~~are trying~~ to claim.

The political strategy of the peasantry then is to mobilize influence and bring it to bear on "outside aid allocation processes". They, therefore co-opt the most powerful individuals in sight and particularly the elected officials. These individuals usually have historic roots in the area or are, in one way or another, obligated to other individuals from the peasant community. The communities and their leaders "search for patrons and offer themselves as clients". As political activities increase, a large number of specialized political

patron-client ties emerge between the more and the less powerful. On occasion, one or two local men develop a fairly stable client status to one or more powerful politician patrons, and peasant communities invariably activate these ties in time of need. Quite often, though, the peasant communities have no clear cut patron and nobody in the community is a firm client of an outside patron.³⁹ What members of the peasant communities are likely to be most active as "community lobbyists"? Obviously, not the poorest members but, the fairly well to do.

The "community lobbyists" who in a sense are the patrons at the grass-roots level would include politicians out of office, or those in office, district councillors, party leaders, community development officers, and especially those who work in their home areas, teachers, urban civil servants, churchmen, prominent traders, chiefs, progressive farmers and so on. These are the local elites. The community spokesmen turn to the local elites because they feel they are too poor and too low in status to bridge the political gap between the community and the "outside authorities". They, know the needs of the community. But they themselves are not in a position to invite influential men, who may donate money, to visit the project. They therefore turn to those who can invite these men and on occasion remind them of the project at informal and maybe chance occasions. Who then are the "influential" men who are the target of the community lobbyists?

In our opinion, the "influential men" are likely to be national politicians such as Assistant Ministers and Cabinet Ministers, high ranking civil servants such as permanent secretaries, heads of parastatal bodies, leading businessmen, members of the provincial administration such as the District Commissioner, and on occasion, the Vice-President or the President himself. These are the national elites, or the patrons of the "community lobbyists".

We should emphasise, here, that the national elites or the patrons of the community lobbyists need not necessarily be just those individuals who either hold elective offices or are seeking elective offices. Though we would expect the majority of national patrons to be elected politicians or those seeking elective offices, there is nothing to stop, for example, members of the administrative elite and the business elite from becoming patrons. In this case, one has to explain their patronage in other than electoral politics. We should also add that, depending on the individual's research interest, one can focus on either those national elites who are seeking elective offices, or one can focus, in addition, on those elites who are not seeking elective offices. We want to focuss on both types of elites, though, as our research argument implies, we shall be emphasising those elites who are seeking elective offices. This will become clear in chapter IV where we elaborate the research argument.

Holmquist too focusses on those national patrons, or would-be national patrons who are seeking elective political positions. This becomes clear when we raise the question: why would the influential men respond to the invitation of the community lobbyists? Holmquist's answer to this question is that the influential men would respond because the structure of leadership accountability demands that they respond. What then are the structures of leadership accountability?

To begin with, there are few, if any, "naturally" or traditionally legitimate leaders left in Kenya, so the question arises of how popularly elected leaders are going to be responsive; i.e. what they are going to deliver in order to safeguard their positions. They could try to deliver "coercion", but few of them, except perhaps Cabinet Ministers control the main institutions of coercion, namely, the administration, the police and the army. In any case, coercion is hardly a popular response. They could try to "buy off" constituents with cash, and although this is occasionally done, it is the exception. They could try to be responsive by advocating certain policies in deliberative bodies such as Parliament and the Party, provided of course, that "policy politics" is allowed, something which cannot be taken for granted as we shall show in chapter IV. They could try to deliver symbolic regards, and they do. Eventually, however, they must deliver "development", meaning contributing to development projects, if they are to stay in competition. They are aware that elections force them into

an exchange relationship with the peasantry and they are also aware that the peasantry knows this. The exchange is, at least partially, popular support for development funds for self-help amenities.⁴⁰ All this, on condition of course, that there are regular and fairly competitive elections as is the case in Kenya.

For those interested in the politics of Harambee, as we are, the centre-periphery approach has a rather obvious advantage over the community development approach. The advantage lies in the fact that it is very unlikely that one can fully understand the politics of the movement without investigating the political linkages between Harambee groups as organised at the project level, and central institutions such as the Party, the Parliament and the President. The investigation is only possible within a centre-periphery conception of Harambee, unless, of course, one chooses to analyse the politics of Harambee from a class perspective, something which we have chosen not to do, for reasons given below.

However, before a centre-periphery approach can become useful for empirical purposes, it is necessary to define both the centre and the periphery, something which the authors reviewed above are not always in agreement. To Mutiso, the centre is sometimes a cultural centre, and ^{at} other times a political/economic centre. It is not clear what constitutes the periphery. To Holmquist, the centre is clearly a political/economic centre, and

the periphery is, equally clearly, Harambee groups in the rural areas. This too is our conception of the centre and the periphery.

But even with a clear conception of the centre and the periphery, it is still necessary to describe in some detail, those factors, both at the centre and at the periphery, which have made Harambee an important linkage between the two. None of the authors reviewed above describes the factors in sufficient detail. By narrowing his conception of the centre-periphery relations into a patron-client one and by emphasising the importance of electoral politics in the patron-client relations, Holmquist suggests one way of filling in the details. However, by his own admission, he concentrates on the dynamics at the periphery even as he implies possible ways of filling in the political/economic details at the centre. Mutiso and Godfrey, suggest an interesting way of filling in the details at the centre through their concepts of depoliticization, and the legitimizing role of the President. Mbithi, on his part, makes an important conceptual contribution through his notion of elites as a linkage between the centre and the periphery. However, he does not elaborate on the political importance of Harambee to the elites. Consequently, he does not elaborate on the political importance of Harambee to the rural communities. As a rural sociologist, he is more interested in the sociological aspects of Harambee than in its political aspects.

From those, then, who have at one time or another conceived Harambee in centre-periphery relations, we get the concepts of patron-client, electoral politics, depoliticization, role of the President and elites. None of the authors has attempted to integrate all the concepts and at the same time give the concepts empirical content. We shall attempt to do this in chapter IV where we elaborate our research argument, and where we present a political explanation of Harambee which takes into account both the macro and the micro aspects of the movement.

First, however, let us look at the class approach as a possible alternative. What we shall be looking at next is basically a hypothesis for the author is not aware of any empirical work which has been based on the class approach.

1.3 A Class Hypothesis

The only writer that the author is aware of who has attempted a class-based analysis of the Harambee movement is again none other than Holmquist.⁴¹ He begins by criticising other writers on Harambee for failure to offer full explanations of the movement. He takes issue with the Government which "would probably credit itself with the rational foresight to announce such a policy because an explanation based on such a view of the process of governing wrongly assumes a high degree of Government leverage, through ideas, on a process based on peasant initiative".⁴² Furthermore, the explanation would beg the question "why" since "it naively assumes that abstract rationality determines policy choice ... regardless of the political interests of people making the policy".⁴³ He also

criticises his earlier attempts to explain Harambee in terms of intense community organization and competition oriented to extracting resources from Governmental and/or various private agencies, at a crucial time after independence. The reason for the self-criticism is that community culture, social organizations, and local economics did not radically change at independence, but ruling structures beyond the community level did. Therefore, changes removed from the village level set off the very real dynamics of the movement.

These changes were moreover, largely political in nature, and since political structures ultimately reflects class relations and the fortunes of the competitive segments of each class, then, a full explanation of Harambee phenomenon would have to take into account class relations. What then does Holmquist propose?

Holmquist's major premise is that the "real movers" of self-help, in Kenya, at independence and to the present day are a segment of a particular class - namely the rural petty bourgeoisie. His thesis is that

"the character and rates of self-help in Kenya - ultimately depend upon the balance of power in the rural areas, and the social base of the regime at the centre, that is, between two segments of the petty bourgeois - a rural segment (wealthy peasants, african trading and commercial elements, and local immobile civil servants) and a bureaucratic segment that was transferable through the country and was largely recruited on a basis of educational attainment" 44

How then do these fractions of the petty bourgeois influence the rates and character of self-help? The main argument here is that the locally based rural wing of the petty bourgeois generally "needed" self-help to preserve and advance their political and economic positions, while the bureaucratic segment did not need it, and in fact, tended to see it as a threat. Holmquist then elaborates the argument along the following lines:

Independence time in Kenya was, in part, the culmination of a protracted struggle waged by an alliance between a rural petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry. The success of the struggle meant loss of power by the central Government bureaucracy, vis-a-vis the alliance. This loss of power was evidenced in extreme form by the radical decentralization embodied in the Majimbo Constitution. The result was that the rural petty bourgeoisie were now the patrons and brokers of rural politics. Therefore, the bureaucracy and the party would have to deal with and through this petty bourgeoisie in most relations with the peasant majority.

The strategy of self-help, was consequently, not accidental but an accurate reflection of the structure of power in the countryside and the base of support at the centre. The strategy in effect acknowledged that the rural petty bourgeoisie was best situated to mobilize the peasantry to help themselves in lieu of powerful and resource rich bureaucracies. Therefore,

the strategy was not a "policy by default" but a logical outcome of the structure of power at that time, not to mention that it would facilitate development "on the cheap".

The result was intense community competition as reflected by Harambee groups. The competition was necessary because the resources were scarce and furthermore it was necessary to organise into groups because the nature of desired projects was such that they were public rather than private family farm goods, thus requiring organization. In the process, the communities searched for patrons and offered themselves as clients. The petty bourgeoisie became willing patrons. But why were they willing to become patrons?

The reason for their willingness to become patrons was that the rural petty bourgeoisie was competing for scarce political roles, which could be used to ones economic and prestige advantage. In fact it might even be said that the rural petty bourgeoisie "needed" self-help since the bureaucracy reserved most of the functions of programmatic policy - making for itself. Assistance for self-help was, therefore, one of the most important arenas within which the petty bourgeoisie could play a visible and useful role. The petty bourgeoisie could afford to play the role of patrons since it did not threaten their economic and political clout. On the contrary, patronage enhanced their economic and political clout. This was because the role of patrons was compatible with

inequality. In other words, in order to qualify to be a patron, one had to be economically better off than his would-be clients, otherwise he would not be of much use to the clients. In addition to all this, the petty bourgeoisie became willing local patrons because they had a personal interest in local amenity development i.e. far more interest than their centrally recruited class counterparts in the bureaucracy. How did the latter fraction then react?

The bureaucratic fraction reacted by arguing that self-help was "out of control". Besides, self-help investment was frequently not directly productive, a complaint that had an element of truth. The solution, therefore, was to channel self-help through formal centralized planning structures. In terms of power relations, this would erode the peasant initiative and augment the power of the bureaucratic petty bourgeois class fraction. The result of the power struggle between the two fractions of the same class was a "half-way style" of self-help which was neither controlled by the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie nor by the peasantry/rural petty bourgeois alliance. In other words, the power to control Harambee was shared between the bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the peasantry/rural petty bourgeois alliance, on the other hand.

The "half-way style" was also convenient for the rural petty bourgeoisie because it went far enough to need their assistance without going far enough to render their brokerage

function unnecessary. Thus the style was dictated by the interests of the petty bourgeoisie as both bureaucrats and local notables. The bureaucratic fraction made inroads but could not fully win because the rural petty bourgeoisie was a key source of support for the regime, and therefore had to be allowed a certain measure of leeway by the regime. Part of the leeway was the freedom to accept the role of patrons even though this meant unplanned and uncoordinated projects.

The brief paraphrase of Holmquist's hypothesis is perhaps enough to demonstrate his main line of thinking. It is an attractive hypothesis, but in order to be useful it would have to be modified and extended, something which the author has attempted elsewhere.⁴⁵ However, even after the modifications, serious empirical problems still remain. A few comments will illustrate some of the problems.

First, the hypothesis is silent on the emerging bourgeoisie in Kenya and their role in the Harambee movement. This bourgeoisie consists of company directors, leading civil servants, leading politicians such as Government Ministers, etc. This group is rich, highly visible and its Harambee activities are highly publicised by the mass media. It therefore cannot be ignored especially when one considers the ideological functions of Harambee at a macro-level.

Second, the bourgeoisie has access to international capital through political positions, directorships of multinationals etc. Therefore, the role of this capital has to be considered in a full class analysis of the Harambee movement.

Such questions as to whether this capital is in competition with domestic petty bourgeois capital have to be raised and answered. If such competition were present, would it threaten the peasant/rural petty bourgeoisie alliance and the system of patronage, with the bourgeoisie tending to by-pass the rural petty bourgeoisie or would it perhaps result in an urban oriented Harambee, parallel with the current one which is basically rural oriented?

Third, the bourgeoisie does not need Harambee either for accumulation or for political competition. But it does actively participate and this has to be explained. Does it possibly participate out of its own need to express class solidarity?

Fourth, Holmquist describes the function of the rural petty bourgeoisie as if it was composed entirely of politicians. Is it not possible that the rural petty bourgeoisie does participate for non-political reasons such as personal accumulation? Of course, it is possible to argue, here, that access to political power yields economic results such as land.

Fifth, not all the peasant Harambee projects have patrons and this perhaps testifies to the differentiation among the peasantry itself. Therefore, a class analysis of Harambee, even if it were to base itself solely in the rural areas, would have to first analyse the emerging class structures in the rural areas, paying particular attention to the differentiation among the peasantry.

Six, and finally, Holmquist is silent on the role of the urban petty bourgeoisie or the urban salariat which play an important part in the Harambee movement.

As we can see, a full class analysis of Harambee would be a tall order. It is our opinion, however, that such an analysis is desirable in the near future. Present proponents of such an analysis should therefore not be dismissed. The major obstacles in the way of such an analysis are mainly empirical and especially in trying to locate and specify the petty bourgeoisie in the rural areas. One has to study a very small locality indeed, before one is sure that the petty bourgeoisie has been located. The problem of occupation and therefore relationship to the means of production in the rural areas is a complicated problem as we shall see in later chapters. It would require a great deal of participant observation and micro household data before one is sure that the emerging rural classes have been adequately located. Then the issue of class action would arise, which is an even more slippery problem. Moreover, a full study of one small area, while suggestive and important, would not necessarily explain system wide events.

2.4 Summary

By virtue of the fact that the community development approach is largely community-centred, it does not seek to take into account the larger environment of the Harambee movement. In the very few cases where the larger environment of Harambee

is taken into account by those who approach the movement from a community perspective, the environment is largely implied rather than systematically explored.

The centre-periphery approach seeks to explain Harambee as a linkage mechanism between the centre and the periphery. The approach, therefore, takes into account the larger environment of the movement. However, in order to be empirically useful, the centre-periphery approach must be given more focuss so that it is clear what constitutes the centre and what constitutes the periphery. Furthermore, if one is interested in the politics of Harambee as we are, the institutional linkages between the centre and the periphery assume a great deal of importance. The patron-client approach is a variation of the centre-periphery approach which suggests specifically political institutions as the linkages between the centre and the periphery.

The class hypothesis was partly suggested as an answer to the patron-client approach, though it incorporates many concepts borrowed from the former approach as a result, one suspects, of the same person having developed the two approaches. Like all class approaches however, it is not meant to address itself to all the issues raised by the former approaches. One suspects that when it is fully developed, it will address itself mostly to different issues from those raised by the other approaches. For the moment, however, the problems of a class analysis of Harambee are largely empirical, even though one does not underestimate the conceptual problems of defining classes especially in the rural areas.

In this study, as we have already pointed out, we want to develop and give empirical content to some of the concepts suggested by the various analysts of Harambee movement and especially those analysts who have sought to explain Harambee in linkage terms which are also politically relevant. At the same time, we shall also introduce our own concepts where this is useful and necessary. We begin, in the next chapter, with a discussion of the pre-independence background of Harambee in Kenya.

CHAPTER 2: FOOTNOTES

1. Republic of Kenya. Minister for Housing and Social Services.
The Nation, Nairobi, August 10, 1978.
2. The only exception to this rule is F. Holmquist, and to a lesser extent P.M. Mbithi, R. Rasmusson and G.C.M. Mutiso.
3. The nearest one can come to a sustained and systematic work on Harambee, in the tradition of a specialist, is Philip Mbithi and Frank Holmquist who have pursued their studies over a number of years.
4. The writers on Harambee are peculiarly resistant to being categorized. The author has had many discussions with most of them at the University of Nairobi, and they think it is too soon to even discuss Harambee in terms of "perspectives" let alone identifiable schools of thought.
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CHAPTER 3

TRADITIONAL AND COLONIAL ORIGINS OF HARAMBEE

3.1 Introduction

We noted in the introductory chapter that the concept of community self-help is not peculiar to post-colonial Kenya nor is the word "Harambee", as a political rallying call. We now want to pursue this theme a little bit further in this chapter. In particular we shall be looking at the various phases through which self-help or community group work has gone through, though not under the name of Harambee. In looking at the phases, we are not simply seeking to reproduce the history of self-help in Kenya. Rather, we want to look at the phases in order to be able to evaluate the validity of some of the claims made for Harambee in Kenya today. That way, we will be in a better position, in later chapters, to analyse the ideology of self-help and working together, as it functions in its present social and political circumstances in Kenya. We shall begin by examining traditional self-help and then move on to the colonial period. Our emphasis will be on the period when communal self-help was practised traditionally since this is the period which is often taken as a reference point, particularly by the Government of Kenya and the political elites in Kenya.

3.2 Traditional Communal Self-help

It has been argued by the Kenyan Government that Harambee activities, or the practice of communal self-help, to be more specific, has always been part of the African tradition in Kenya.

Consequently, the tradition needs simply to be revived and encouraged so that the rural peasants can play an active part in national development. Kenyatta himself set the stage for this argument in June 1963. Two days after giving the new nation the rallying call of "Harambee", he elaborated on what the call would entail in practical terms. In the course of a public broadcast to the nation, he said, inter alia:

"We must bring all the communities of Kenya together, to build a unified nation. In this task, we shall make use of those attitudes of self-help, good neighbourliness and communal assistance which are such an important feature of our traditional societies".¹

As we saw in chapter I, the theme was picked up in Government publications, such as the Development Plans. In a more analytical vein, some researchers, again as we have seen, have argued that Harambee makes it possible to harness traditional modes of compliance and discipline in mobilizing rural people for participation in national development.

It is true that neither the Government of Kenya, nor any academic researcher has fully equated Harambee with community self-help as traditionally practised among the peasantry. However, the association of Harambee with traditional community work has been taken a step further especially by the political elites in Kenya. Thus, it is quite common to hear politicians at Harambee meetings start by reminding their audience that working together, for a particular project, has always been part of the African way

of life and they should therefore uphold the tradition by contributing generously. An even more sweeping argument has been made to the effect that participating in development through Harambee activities is the same as upholding the whole array of traditional customs. A good illustration of this argument is a statement made by two senior politicians at a fund-raising meeting during which they also defended the role of tribal associations in Kenya. They said:

"Tribal welfare associations have a duty to uphold traditional customs. It is our traditional custom to work together on a particular project so that we can help one another. If we do not supplement Government efforts in nation-building we shall have failed as tribal associations in upholding our customs. In taking part in Harambee activities, we are simply being realistic and emulating the enviable status of the Father of the Nation, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta in preaching love, unity, peace, and the maintenance of our traditional customs".²

The above statement may not be a good example of perfect logic, but it is of interest because it makes the important point that the traditional and cultural sentiments among the peasantry are being actively politicized and incorporated into the present ideology of working together. It is true to say that communal self-help has roots among the peasantry. However, it is less than accurate to fully associate traditional communal activities, let alone the whole array of traditional customs, with Harambee activities as they are practised in Kenya today. But rather than simply assert this point, we shall now look at traditional communal self-help among the Kikuyu.

In focussing on the Kikuyu of central Kenya we are not implying that communal self-help did not exist among other groups in traditional times. It did. A term for working together is found in the languages of many groups in Kenya. The Luo call it "konyir kende", the Luhya call it "obwasio", the Kamba call it "Mwethia", the masai call it "Ematonyok" etc.³ We are focussing on the Kikuyu, first, in order to anticipate the valid objection that, culturally, Kenya is/was too plural for communal activities to be analysed in general terms, without first analysing each group separately. Secondly, our field work was carried out in the Kikuyu language and in a homogeneously Kikuyu District.

One aspect, and some would say, the most important aspect of Jomo Kenyatta's Facing Mt. Kenya, is the place Kenyatta accords to the individual in traditional Kikuyu society.⁴ Throughout the book, the individual is down-graded in the interests of group loyalties. The selfish or self-regarding man has no name or reputation. An individualist is looked upon with suspicion and is likely to end-up as a wizard while everything good comes from the collective life of the community.⁵ Louis Leakey, a well known authority on traditional Kikuyu society, fought the now famous classroom battles with Kenyatta on what Leakey saw as Kenyatta's exaggerations for political reasons. But they agreed on at least one thing. In traditional Kikuyu society, communal work was wholly accepted. Furthermore, though communal work was practised in most spheres of activity, the most celebrated and

important of these activities were, first farm-oriented, and secondly building oriented. Says Leakey:

"Every member had to be willing to assist other members if called upon to do so, - in bush clearing, in cultivation, and in hut building. These obligations were mutual and therefore of great benefit to everyone concerned. Any man could count upon sufficient assistance to build a hut in a day, or to clear a large area for cultivation in a few days, without having to pay for the labour (except that he supplied a feast), provided that he always initiated the work himself, as proof that he was not calling in help because he was lazy or incompetent".⁶

Just how exactly was the group labour organized?

We shall describe the farm-related work group activities, in order to draw out the underlying principles which governed the concept of working together. The work group, whether it was for bush clearing or for cultivation could be organized in one of two ways.

The first way was for "four or five persons or more to form a group for team-work".⁷ They would work on one man's field and work for a day. This system would continue until the team had worked on all the farms of the team members. Thus, each team member would get one days worth of work from the team. If the team failed to finish the work in one day, it would normally move on until each member had received one days worth of work before deciding on what to do about the remaining work. Depending on how much was left undone, the individual member of the team would either decide to finish it with his own household labour, or he would decide to join another team, or maintain the same team in order to finish what the team had left unfinished.

The second type of farm-oriented group work was rather different and in many ways less humble. When, for example, the time for cultivating the fields had arrived, an individual would invite "a group of friends, ten or more, and provide them with a feast of beer or gruel and other edibles".⁸ After the individual had informed his friends about the work he wanted them to help in, a day was fixed, usually three days ahead.

Kenyatta describes this type of group work with great exuberance, a touch of romanticism, and an element of bitterness directed at the white man for destroying Kikuyu culture. This is how he describes it.

"On the day appointed, the friends meet in the garden or field early in the morning and start to work enthusiastically, singing cultivation songs. Sometimes they will challenge cultivators in the next field and compete with them in work and songs. About mid-day, when the sun becomes hot, they have finished clearing the field. At this juncture they retire and start feasting joyously for having completed the work of helping their friend. If a stranger passes by at this time of enjoyment after labour, he will have no idea that these people who are now singing, dancing, and laughing merrily have completed their day's work. For after they have cleaned off the dust, they look, in all respects, as though they have been enjoying themselves the whole day. This is why most of the Europeans have erred by making general remarks that the African is a lazy being and likes to bask in the sun ..."⁹

Other types of group work, such as building a hut, followed either one or the other of the two patterns described above. An individual initiated the work, then invited friends

to come and help for one day without having to pay for the labour (except that he supplied a feast) and without having to guarantee immediate reciprocity. Alternatively he asked his friends to join him and form a team which would help every member of the team, thus providing immediate reciprocity. Obviously, some types of work were more amenable to one approach than the other.

It should be pointed out here, that although group activities aimed at helping an individual were the most common in traditional Kikuyu society, there were other communal activities that did not directly benefit an individual, but benefitted the community as a whole. Such activities would, for example, include clearing the bush in order to make paths, building bridges, fortifying a village etc. Any individual could initiate any of these activities and organize his neighbours to carry out the tasks. The community expected everybody to take part, unless one had compelling reasons, such as family illness, to prevent him from taking part. The principle governing these "public projects" was, however, the same as that governing private-oriented projects. The individual had free access to them, though there were social sanctions, as we shall see shortly, to discourage "free riders".

A number of points can now be made in connection with the traditional Kikuyu methods of working in groups. First, the organizational unit was often quite small. In most cases, it involved just the "Itura" or the people of the neighbourhood.

An "Itura" would normally consist of ten to fifteen "Micii" or households. Thus, when a person needed help to clear new land or to harvest his crops, he would seek the help of only members of the "Itura". The members of the "Itura" would normally be related because of the Kikuyu custom of members of the same sub-clan or "Mbari" living together on a unit of land which was understood to be "owned" collectively by the "Mbari". Blood relationship was, however, not a prerequisite for joining the work groups unless the specific task demanded it. An example of such a task was the ceremonies involving the drawing up of marriage contracts and the paying of dowry. This would involve only family members and close relatives. Strictly speaking, though, this type of working together did not constitute a work group. It was part of the much wider sense of communalism.

Secondly, although the "Itura" was the most common unit of organization, there was nothing to stop members of the "Itura" from organizing themselves along the lines of age-grades, or along sex divisions if they saw fit. Any restrictions in this respect would be simply practical. For example, it might have been difficult for a man or woman to find enough men in the neighbourhood who belonged to his own age-grade. The system was otherwise, quite flexible.

It should be noted in this respect that, although the unit of organization was flexible, the Kikuyus never worked together as a whole, not even in defense, except on one occasion.

every 25 to 30 years. This was the occasion for the "Ituika" ceremonies which marked the handing over of power from one generation to another.¹⁰

Thirdly, in most cases, the individual stood to benefit directly and immediately from the efforts of the work group. In other words, the individual was borrowing and being loaned labour by members of the "Itura". Thus, the Kikuyu word for traditional group work is "Ngwatio" which is derived from "Kugwatia" meaning "to lend". The understanding was that one was lending oneself in expectation of reciprocity, either immediately or sometime in the near future.

The fourth point is somewhat related to the above point. The onus to arrange for reciprocity was on the individual. If an individual did not ask for help, he, of course, did not receive it. On the other hand, if he asked for it, and some members of the "Itura" refused to give it to him, the defaulting members could find themselves under moral and economic sanctions by the "Itura". The most common sanction was called "kohinguo" which literally meant "to be shut out" or to be ostracised. If a man was ostracised, he had to pay a fine of one sheep or a he-goat to his neighbours for his bad behaviour. The animal was slaughtered for a feast and a ceremony of re-union. After the ceremony of reunion the man's status as a good and helpful neighbour was re-acknowledged.¹¹

The fifth and final point is that in the traditional society, the interaction was between people who were more or less equal in terms of what they could exchange between themselves. This is not to say that everybody had the same amount of land, the same number of cows and goats or the same number of wives. Obviously not. Some individuals had more than others and there were, no doubt, inequalities in terms of the physical assets owned by different individuals. These differences in turn meant unequal social status. The important point, however, is that what each individual needed, viz labour, could only be obtained through a mutual agreement to supply the same commodity when requested. Thus, the social and economic elites, where they existed, were not in a position to exchange their superior status for the labour of others. This seems to be the point that Kenyatta was trying to make in choosing to describe mutual help among the Kikuyu in the context of the Kikuyu economic system.

Obviously, it is difficult to capture the spirit of communalism in traditional Kikuyu society by abstracting a number of points from what was undoubtedly a fairly complicated social system. That is why we have chosen to focus specifically on the work groups, or the "Ngwatio". In order to capture the whole spirit of communalism, we could not do better than reproduce that famous passage by Kenyatta, in which he seeks to destroy the place of the individual in traditional Kikuyu life. He writes:

"House-building, cultivation, harvesting, digging trap-pits, putting up fences around cultivated fields, etc. are usually done by the group; hence the Kikuyu saying 'kamoinge koyaga ndere', which means collective activities make work easier. In the old days, sacrifices were offered and wars were waged by the tribe as a whole or by the clan. Marriage contracts and ceremonies are the affairs of families and not of individuals. Children learn this habit of communal work like others, not by verbal exhortation so much as by joining with older people in such social services. All help given in this way is voluntary, and kinsfolk are proud to help one another. There is no payment or expectation of payment. They are well feasted, of course. This is not regarded as payment, but as hospitality. The whole thing rests on the principle of reciprocal obligations. It is taken for granted that the neighbour whom you assist in difficulty or whose house you help to build will do the same for you when in similar need. An individualist is looked upon with suspicion and is given a nickname of "mwebongia", one who works only for himself and is likely to end up as a wizard. He may lack assistance when he needs it. The labour of the hands, the begetting of children, the amassing of wealth in the form of land, cattle, sheep and goats are, just as much as religious ceremonies, matters of family and clan sentiment. The habit of corporate effort is but the other side of corporate ownership."¹²

No doubt, Louis Leakey would have called the above passage "extreme exaggeration", for political purposes. It might be exaggeration but it makes Kenyatta's point. Even as far back as 1939, he regarded working together for production purposes the same thing as working for social unity. Perhaps this gives us one more clue to the ideology of Harambee.

What, then, can be said about the relationship between traditional group work among the Kikuyu and Harambee as practised in Kenya today, and more specifically, as practised among the peasantry in Kiambu? A full answer to this question will, obviously, have to await the analysis of Harambee activities in Kenya and Kiambu in particular. But a few preliminary observations are in order.

The team work system as practised traditionally is still in operation among the "small" women Harambee groups in Kiambu District. Altogether, the women's Harambee groups constitute 47.2 per cent of the total population of Harambee projects registered in Kiambu between 1971 and 1977, the period covered by our research. If our sample is fairly representative nearly half of the womens' projects have less than 30 members and, therefore, are classified as small. Although we shall be saying more about this type of Harambee group in later chapters, we can point out now that their type of Harambee is very much farm-oriented with one major qualification. After cultivating each others plot, they sometimes devote one day to working together on a "rich-man's" farm. The money earned is then handed over to the treasurer. When a certain decided amount has been collected, it is then handed over to one member of the team to do what she wishes with it. Alternatively, the recipient is under obligation to use it for a designated purpose such as buying cups and saucers or corrugated roofing sheets. There are

other variations on how the money can be used but we will not go into these now. The point we wish to make here is that the type of traditional group labour described above was most equalitarian, and grass-roots Harambee groups have adopted it, albeit in a monetary economy. No individual gains more than the others, and no one loses more than the others, in terms of labour allocated to each member of the team.

It is difficult to find any exact parallels between the second kind of group work, so enthusiastically described by Kenyatta, whereby an individual invited his friends to help him and he entertained them with a feast. However, loose parallels do exist, again, among the women's groups. First, among some of these groups, if a neighbouring women's project is in financial trouble, the women will arrange "to go to their Harambee", which normally means that they send some money. There is no assured reciprocity though it is expected in case of need. Secondly, and much closer to the traditional work group idea, the women always go to the assistance of one of their members, or a member of a different neighbouring group if such a member should encounter personal tragedy. Naturally, they do not expect reciprocity in such circumstances.

In organizational terms, most of the women's groups are neighbourhood groups though, this time, a geographical neighbour is not automatically a member of the group. Neighbours sometimes belong to different groups mainly due to religious

differences. The traditionalists sometimes have their own groups, whereas the "modern" - meaning more educated - have their own groups.

The larger women's groups, and the majority of the other kinds of Harambee projects such as schools, churches, water projects etc. are, in our opinion, a far cry from traditional self-help. They are much more capital intensive than traditional self-help. They also involve interaction between people who are unequal in status and wealth. The most important difference, however, is that the individual can be excluded from the benefits of a project he has contributed to. This, of course, applies to those projects like schools, and hospitals, that are "public", but one or another of the differences mentioned above applies to some or all of the projects.

On a cultural note, Kenyatta's description of the work group scene is reminiscent of the many Harambee meetings that the author has attended. After the serious business of fund-raising has taken place, the guest of honour and his hosts settle down to a session of "entertainment" by traditional dancers and feasting on goat meat. The "entertainment expenses" are taken out of the money raised. Not surprisingly a few politicians in Kenya have raised strong objections to this aspect of Harambee meetings. What is worth noting, however, is that only big Harambee groups such as groups engaged in water or school projects can afford the luxury. The small women's groups, certainly, cannot afford the luxury.

It is evident that despite the parallels that can be drawn between traditional self-help among the Kikuyu and some categories of Harambee groups in Kiambu, on the whole, there are more differences than similarities. There are no doubt diffuse elements of cultural continuity, but the discontinuities seem to be more outstanding. We have not gone into the details of these differences because we preferred the leaders of the Harambee projects in Kiambu to speak for themselves. We asked them the question:

In your opinion, are there any differences between Harambee (self-help) and the old traditional idea of communal help? If yes, what are the differences?

Of the 175 respondents, 116 or 67.4% thought there were differences, 30.8% thought there were no differences, and the remaining 2.8% gave answers that did not fall into either of the two major categories. The responses are interesting if only because such a large percentage of the local leaders hold an opinion which an observer would arrive at independently, namely, that Harambee and the old communal help are different, despite the attempt by leading members of the national elite in Kenya to portray Harambee as a continuation of a good peasant tradition. Perhaps in a rather diffuse sense, Harambee and the old communal tradition of working together are similar. After all 30.8% of leaders think so and they cannot be ignored. We have tried to point out some of the similarities with reference to some of the women's groups. But even here, the differences pointed out by the project leaders apply to the women groups as the following responses indicate.

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TABLE 3.1

HARAMBEE AND TRADITIONAL COMMUNAL SELF-HELP

<u>*Differences Mentioned</u>	<u>No. of Respondents</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1. Money involved today	38	32.7%
2. Work/projects more complex today	24	20.6%
3. Communal help was voluntary	19	16.3%
4. Everybody/more people involved today	14	12.6%
5. Communal help benefitted a particular individual	14	12.6%
6. Today Government/Politicians involved	4	3.4%
7. Others	3	2.5%
<u>TOTAL (N)</u>	116	100.7 (due to rounding)

*NOTE: In the very few cases where a respondent gave more than one reason, we asked him/her to indicate the most important reason so that only one reason per respondent was coded.

The responses were anticipated by the preceding discussion so we shall confine ourselves to a few observations. The most surprising response, in our opinion, was that traditional communal help was voluntary considering the fact that there were communal sanctions for non-participation. This response suggests that the pressure to participate is perceived to be much more today than it was in the traditional context. On the other hand, the respondents could be romanticising communal self-help. Our own observations suggest that there is intense community pressure

and sometimes pressure from local officials to take part in the Harambee projects. Once a meeting has been held and a project is decided upon, very few individuals, if anyone at all, can stay out of the project. In the cases where it is possible to exclude someone from the benefits of a project, for example, a cattle dip or a water project, they are usually excluded if they do not take part.

The second point, which is even more important, is that the responses show that the respondents are clear that today's self-help takes place in different economic and social context. Thus, money is involved, more people are involved and self-help is no longer organized around the social unit of "Itura". Thus, even the small Harambee groups see themselves as participants in a larger social movement, which is different from the traditional communal help. For example, the women's groups, constituted 49% of those projects from which we received information (47.2% of the population from which the sample was drawn as pointed out earlier). Of the 49%, nearly 47% were classified as small women's projects, meaning that they had under 30 members. Like the respondents from the total sample from which they were drawn, an overwhelming 71% of the leaders of the small women groups thought that there were differences between Harambee and communal self-help. They gave pretty much the same reasons as the total sample.

The third point has to do with category response number six. On the surface it comes as a surprise that only such a small percentage of project leaders contrasts Harambee and communal help in terms of the involvement of Government officials

and politicians in Harambee activities. On reflection, however, the small percentage is perhaps not surprising. To begin with, our experience was that the project leaders were very reluctant to discuss anything that could be construed as political unless they were asked leading questions, which we did not do. This possible explanation is, however, not completely satisfactory. A more satisfactory explanation, in our opinion, can be deduced from the rest of the responses.

All the responses suggest an awareness on the part of the respondents that Harambee is an activity that is much too elaborate to involve simply themselves and the local peasants. Where, for example, would the necessary money come from, or the skills to organize "more people" to take part in a "more complex" project? On the occasions where the project leaders were pushed "outside the record" to answer some of these side questions, it became clear that what they were saying all along was that unlike traditional communal help, Harambee is a national movement. As such, it involves much more than simply the activities of the peasants and their project leaders. This, of course does not mean that the project leaders were suggesting that the Government and the politicians were actually involved in most or any particular projects. This is an entirely different issue. All we are saying is that the project leaders were aware of the possibility that the Government, the politicians, or any other members of the non-peasant community, are likely to be involved

in the now more "modern" - the actual word used by some leaders - form of communal help. This leads us to our concluding point. What then is the political implication of contrasting Harambee with communal self-help?

The politics of the contrast lies precisely in the contrast. It is evident that there are enormous real and perceived differences between Harambee and communal self-help. In order, therefore, to understand the "modern" form of communal self-help one has to analyse it in the context of present institutions, a point which the project leaders lucidly make. This point is sometimes alluded to at Harambee fund-raising meetings, but on the whole, the general tendency is to emphasize the linkages between traditional communal help and Harambee, thus evoking traditional sentiments in support of a different form of community activity. The evocation of the traditional sentiments is, no doubt, partly in deference to the architect of Harambee in Kenya, who was a great advocate of traditional culture. On the other hand, it is clearly calculated to solicit good response. Either way, whenever it takes place, it amounts to the "selling" of either the fund-raiser, or the Government.

3.3 The Colonial Period - 1920-1950

If the similarities between traditional work groups and Harambee are somewhat elusive, the reason for the apparent lack of continuity might be easier to find. The actual predecessor of Harambee, or something resembling Harambee as a

movement, is to be found in the colonial period and not in the traditional society. For our purposes, the most important phase of the colonial transitional period was the period of the three decades between 1920 and 1950, though we shall be saying something about the last decade of colonialism in Kenya.

The three decades between 1920 and 1950 saw the formalization of the colonial penetration in Kenya beginning with the establishment of the first Local Native Council - the predecessors of today's Local Governments - in 1925. The penetration was preceded by the arrival of the missionaries and the establishment of missionary schools at the turn of the century. In Kikuyuland, the resistance to colonial penetration began almost simultaneously with the establishment of colonial institutions, such as the Local Native Councils, which were designed to facilitate control of the countryside. The resistance took two forms, though it is sometimes difficult to separate the two. The first form of resistance was the formation of Associations, the earliest of which was called the Kikuyu Association. It was first mentioned sometime towards the end of 1920. The names and the personalities running the Associations kept changing until the appearance of the Kikuyu Central Association sometime in 1924. This Association became Kenyatta's platform in Kenya politics until the declaration of the State of Emergency in 1952.

The history of the early Kikuyu Associations is fascinating but not of central importance for our present purposes.¹³ The most important point, for our purposes, is that for the first time in Kenya, local Kikuyu communities, organized more or less along the lines of the traditional unit of "Itura", began to raise money, either for the legal defense of some of their jailed leaders, as happened in 1922, or for the establishment of Independent schools designed to counter what was seen as the colonial and missionary onslaught on traditional Kikuyu culture. The latter aspect became the second form of resistance to colonial penetration, and in our opinion, the predecessor of Harambee in the Kikuyu countryside.¹⁴

The movement for the Independent schools in Kikuyuland was closely linked with the activities of the Kikuyu Central Association, though the links were concealed as far as possible in order to prevent Government action being taken against the schools on political grounds.¹⁵ It is not surprising, therefore, that the first Independent school in Kikuyuland was opened in 1925, just a year after the surfacing of the Kikuyu Central Association in 1924. The momentum to establish the schools gathered over a period of years until the crisis was reached in 1929 when the whole of Kikuyuland was swept by the controversy over female circumcision. In that year, the missionaries gave the African congregations an ultimatum to denounce the custom of female circumcision. Large sections of the congregations refused to accept the missionaries.

ultimatum, and began to organize their own schools as part and parcel of the political activities which the Kikuyu Central Association was carrying out. The controversy over female circumcision was, therefore, the occasion for, though by no means the cause of, the establishment of Independent schools in large numbers. Kenyatta, as secretary of the Association from 1928 onwards, sided with the mainstream and supported female circumcision.

A period of confusion followed the 1929 missionary ultimatum, but the Independent schools movement picked up again in the early thirties and continued to grow. In 1935, the Educational Department of Kenya began including Independent schools in the Annual statistics. In 1934, it was estimated that there were 34 Kikuyu Independent schools with a total enrollment of 2,510 pupils. By 1938, the figures had increased to 41 schools with a total enrollment of 6,491 pupils.¹⁶ The high point of the Independent schools movement was the opening of Githunguri Teachers College, in the heartland of Kiambu District, in 1939. The school was opened by Mr. Mbiyu Koinange, who was the Minister of State in Kenyatta's last cabinet. During the opening, the school "was blessed by a Kikuyu elder in the presence of a very embarrassed and irritated Acting Chief Native Commissioner and Director of Education".¹⁷ This school became the political operating base for Kenyatta, as Vice-Principal of the school, when he returned from his 15 years' stay overseas in 1946. Together with all other Independent schools, Githunguri was closed on the declaration of the State of Emergency in Kenya, in 1952.

Since our purpose is not to analyse the educational aspects of these schools but rather to look at the organizational aspects, we shall skip the debate on the nature and value of the curriculum which evolved around these schools, and instead take a look at the methods and strategies utilized in the establishment of the schools.

During the early 1930's a group of neighbours, usually led by someone who had had some education at the missionary schools, would get together and constitute themselves into a school committee. They would then "organize self-help groups to provide the labour, and various forms of financial collections to cover the costs. At first there was little formal co-ordination between the committees. Concerns focussed locally rather than nationally."¹⁸

In some cases, the schools were no more than an outdoor meeting place where pupils met under the guidance of a teacher who had defected from the mission schools. The earliest of the schools did not charge fees. This was certainly the case during the early phases of Githunguri Teachers College. The schools were wholly supported by donations of various kinds from those who could afford the donations. Thus, Githunguri was built on land donated by one Wilson Gathuru who was also the one and only trained teacher at the school. The finances to run the school were provided by one Musa Ndirangu - a prosperous local trader.

As the schools passed the early phase and the Kikuyu Central Association became more organized, the latter was able to develop links between the multitude of autonomous school committees. Thus, the Association would sponsor joint meetings on a District basis to which local school committees would send representatives.

This led to the establishment of Kikuyu Independent Schools Association (KISA) late in 1934. The Association had representatives from Muranga, Kiambu, Nyeri and Embu District or virtually the whole of Kikuyuland. The unity created by the formation of KISA did not last long. In a move which is not surprising to someone who knows something about divisions among the Kikuyu in Kenya today, the Kiambu contingent broke away from KISA to form the Kikuyu Karinga Education Association. The word "Karinga" is Kikuyu for "pure". This group was under the chairmanship of Musa Ndirangu, the patron of Githunguri College. It was opposed to any contacts with the missionaries even for the purposes of training teachers. The mainstream of KISA advocated contacts with the missionaries for purposes of training teachers.

— Some kind of unity - at least in the ultimate goals of the Independent schools movement - was re-established in 1939 when Mbiyu Koinange opened the second phase of Githunguri college. The unity of purpose was pushed by Kenyatta when he returned to Kenya in 1946 and became the Vice-Principal of Githunguri college and the President of Kenya African Union (KAU) which was the

successor to the Kikuyu Central Association. The former had been formed in 1944 and the latter had been banned in 1939.

As Vice-Principal of Githunguri college, Kenyatta sought to make the school the focus of the whole Independent schools movement, which he regarded as a convenient network for political activity. At the time of his arrival at Githunguri, it is estimated that there were 150 Independent schools in Kikuyuland with a total enrollment of around 20,000 pupils. By the end of 1952, when the schools were all closed, it is estimated that their number had risen to about 300 schools with a total enrollment of around 30,000 pupils. Not all schools, however, accepted Kenyatta's leadership and nationalist ideology. The author was able to talk to some people who were committee members of some of these schools and they claimed that, even as leaders of the schools, they upheld strong Christian standards, and rejected Kenyatta's equation of nationalism with re-assertion of Kikuyu customs, and traditions.¹⁹

The high point of the Independent schools movement was Kenyatta's fund-raising campaigns for Githunguri College, an occasion which Kenyatta used to try and unite the Kikuyu under the traditional banner. In order to raise money for Githunguri and, some would say, for the nationalist struggle at that time, Kenyatta went around the countryside organizing fund-raising meetings. Auctions would be conducted at these fund-raising meetings and as one person pointed out to the author, it was not unusual for one egg or one piece of sugar cane to be auctioned for 50 to 100 shillings, which was a great deal of money in those days.

The peak of the fund-raising campaign was a master plan by Kenyatta to get every age-group in Kikuyuland - a traditional Kikuyu institution if ever there was one - to contribute in whatever way they could towards the completion and the running expenses of the college. Thus, Kenyatta was trying to adapt a traditional institution to serve non-traditional purposes. His manifesto, for this purpose, was accordingly addressed to all the members of the House of Mumbi and was aimed to traditionalists. Mumbi is the mythical mother of all Kikuyus. The manifesto read in part:

"To all the members of the House of Mumbi, wherever they may be. I would like to inform you that the African people throughout the continent are awakening and beginning to trust with mutual confidence in each other determined to work hard for the benefit of their countries. Therefore arise all of you and let us be united as we set about working hard to do some creative work of lasting value for the whole children of Mumbi. One of the first objects which I want with all my heart is to see how we could build one beautiful school where Mumbi's children could be educated. What I have in mind is that, before we start doing anything else, we ought to complete the school building which you started at Githunguri so that it may be like a great gift or memorial to our father Gikuyu and our mother Mumbi etc."20

Not unexpectedly, the funds campaign attracted the attention of the colonial administration. This led the District Commissioner to observe in his annual report for 1947 that:

"Jomo is the most accomplished agitator of them all. He has been very clever in his organization for collecting money from Age Grades for the Githunguri college. He has collected various political elements around him and is probably financing much of the quasi-political activities

that are focussed on Githunguri. Results may not be commensurate with funds collected (possibly over £ 40,000) and they may well fall out financially. If Jomo wishes to appear as a moderating influence for his own ends, I believe he is even more destructive in his subtle way".21

From the above brief summary of the Independent schools movement it is possible to see what was taking place. First, the Independent schools movement went hand in hand with the development of political consciousness among the Kikuyu, as reflected in the formation of political organizations in the early 1920's. In a sense, the schools were the educational and cultural wing of the political organizations. The movement was challenging, not only the authority of missionaries on what constituted relevant education and culture, but also the authority of the colonial administration on the same issues. As time went on, it became impossible to separate the activities of the Independent schools from the mainstream of the nationalists struggle.

Secondly, unlike communal co-operation in the traditional society, the movement was led by an emergent elite, which was the product of the colonial school system. True enough, this elite had received very little education from the missionary and the Government school systems, but enough of it to increase cultural and political consciousness, and to decide that the education was irrelevant as it was part and parcel of colonial penetration. The emergent elite had to seize the occasion of a cultural controversy - female circumcision - to break away from colonial education, in order to attract the majority of the

population, but the issues at stake were much deeper and more political in nature.

Third, unlike traditional communal co-operation, the Independent schools movement was organized on a much wider scale and required co-ordination either by individuals or by an organization. The smallest unit of organization, however, was very much similar to the traditional neighbourhood groups. In the early days of the movement, the nature of contributions was very much in the form of labour and materials to construct a school. The Githunguri fund-raising campaign substantially altered this aspect of the movement as Kenyatta sought to go beyond the traditional neighbourhood groups, while still making use of another traditional institution - the Age Groups.

Fourth, unlike most aspects of traditional communal co-operation, the product of the communal labour and other contributions did not necessarily benefit the individual contributors. As we have observed, some of the leaders of the Independent schools were aware of this. In order, therefore, to make sure that all individual contributors benefitted, they waived school fees and instead searched for a local patron to finance the running of the schools. Unfortunately there is not enough data to make it possible to decide how widespread the practice was. On the contrary, our interviews suggest that some kind of fees had to be paid either in money or in kind and that the practice of searching for patrons took place in the very early

days of the Independent schools movement when the majority of the population did not want to go to any school anyway.

The differences between the Independent schools movement and traditional communal self-help are in most respects the similarities between the movement and Harambee, with one major exception. The movement was aimed against the colonial government of Kenya whereas Harambee is in response to a call made by the post-colonial Government of Kenya. Thus, literally the same elites who led the Independent schools movement, took a lead in the Harambee movement, albeit this time in a position of authority and not that of opposition.

One other point should be made on this period of community activity in Kenya's political history. Unlike the earlier period of traditional communal cooperation this period is rarely referred to in Kenya. Despite the period being the obvious predecessor of Harambee, it is rarely mentioned by the Kenyan political elites, and the leaders of Harambee projects are obviously uneasy when one introduces a discussion of this period. The Kenyan Government does not refer to this period in any of the Development Plans, though the same documents refer to traditional communal cooperation as the basis for Harambee. And when traditional communal cooperation and Harambee are referred to in the Development Plans, it is in the context of community development something which did not appear in Kenya until the period following the declaration of the Emergency in 1952. The reason for choosing "to forget" the period of the Independent schools movement seems

to be that this period was a divisive period. Not everyone took part in the movement, just as not everyone took part in the struggle for independence. Therefore, the period must be forgotten as it might resurrect old divisions between the nationalists and the loyalists, just as any mention of the struggle for Independence must always be prefaced with the phrase "everyone struggled for Independence". The choice to relegate the period under discussion to the background gives us a clue to the political meaning of Harambee as conceived both by the Government and the various strata of leadership in Kenya. In political terms, Harambee is conceived both as an ideology of unity and as such an ideology of support to the Government in its attempt to foster unity. We alluded to this observation in the introduction to the first chapter.

Finally, since Harambee is portrayed in the context of community development, in addition, of course, to the context of traditional culture, we shall now take a brief look at the work and philosophy of community development in colonial Kenya.

3.4 The Colonial Period: 1950 - 1963

In 1950, a Department of Community Development was established for the first time in the then Kenya colony, and accordingly, a Commissioner for Community Development was appointed. The main aim of the Department was to revive the old tradition of self-help among the Africans and "show what people can achieve through their own efforts to improve their standards of living".²²

Right from the beginning then, the Department saw its work as oriented towards group work in a manner that was not new to the African way of life. In other words, traditional self-help was to be formalized. Thus, Community Development was defined to fit in with the old tradition of self-help. According to the last colonial Commissioner of the Department:

"Community Development is not something new in Africa, though it has tended to die with the introduction of western ideas. Nowadays, it is even ~~more~~ difficult for Africans to build houses or develop their own land. Why? The husband is away working in towns ... and there are many more tasks to be undertaken than there were in the old days. Today's work would take one family many months or years to complete and in many cases, they would not be able to undertake it. If however, the husband asks his neighbours to help him and agrees to help them in turn, he can finish the work quickly".²³

Like most other activities that took place in Kenya during the Emergency period, not a great deal is known about the work of the Community Development Department. But, similar to most other Government Departments between 1950 and 1960, it appears that the work of this Department soon became subordinated to the general effort to suppress and contain the Mau Mau revolt. The Department did manage, however, to establish a number of schemes throughout the colony. The philosophy behind these schemes was to persuade and convince small neighbourhood groups to work together in small projects such as terracing and construction of cattle dips. Hitherto, these projects had been pushed and forced on the population by the agents of the

administration. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Department sought to distance itself from the work of administrative agents such as Chiefs. Thus says the Commissioner:

"Government officers and their staff have always thought that the best way to get people to accept improved methods of health, agriculture etc. was by making it an offence if they failed to adopt certain measures. This has certainly produced excellent results in many cases but the results have been short lived, for as soon as pressure is removed, people have gone back to their previous ways".²⁴

In order, therefore, to counter what it called the "over-enthusiasm" of Government agents such as Chiefs, the Department sought to create almost autonomous local organizations whose leadership was supposed to be chosen by the local people themselves. The Chiefs could exercise a leadership role in these organizations. They were, however, expected to help and not to direct since too much direction by administrative officials could have a dampening effect on what was supposed to be a voluntary movement.²⁵

The campaign by the Department of Community Development led to the establishment of seven schemes between 1951 and 1960. The first of these schemes was established in Central Nyanza, Western Kenya in 1951. The aim of the scheme was to persuade the people to improve their agriculture by digging bench terraces, to take measures against sleeping sickness, and generally to improve their health standards. Other, more or less similar, schemes aimed at general improvement of rural life were established in North Nyanza, and Central Nyanza, both in Western Kenya, Machakos and Kitui in

Ukambani part of Eastern Kenya, Nandi, also in Western Kenya, and Kiambu in Central Kenya. The aims of these schemes were very much the same - to persuade people to take farm-improvement measures, dig up latrines, construct cattle dips, improve homes, repair roads etc.

However, despite the similarities of the Community Development schemes in those areas where they were established, the Department's motivation appears to have been largely political, at least in some areas. Thus, commenting on the work of the Department in Ukambani, the Commissioner says:

"During the Emergency, it was thought extremely probable at one time that the tribe would join with Mau Mau. The fact that this did not occur was undoubtedly due to good administration but it should not be forgotten that one of the prophylactic measures taken was a considerable increase in community development work. In the event, the tribe as a whole remained loyal to the Government. What is more important still, the people are cheerful, contented and fully behind the Government's development schemes whereas previously they had fallen sullen and distrustful" ²⁶

The work of the Department had equally political motives in Kiambu District. This again is clear from the Commissioner's comments. He argues that the Departments work in Kiambu, as well as making possible the physical development of the area "helped in the social rehabilitation of the inhabitants who were previously heavily indoctrinated with Mau Mau. They are now co-operative, cheerful and progressive". ²⁷

Though it is possible that not all the schemes of the Department were motivated by political considerations, it should not come as a surprise that it was the politics of the Department which attracted the attention of the nationalists. To begin with, it was very difficult, at least during the State of Emergency in Kenya, to distinguish between voluntary community activities and the generalized system of forcing rural communities to work together on such activities as road construction, which were designed to control the spread of Mau Mau. Even in those areas where the Mau Mau was not active, nationalist politicians looked with suspicion at an organization whose aim was to persuade local groups to work together so that in the process they would not only achieve some development, but would also become "cheerful and contented". It is not surprising, therefore, that officers of the Community Development Department became targets of attack by nationalist politicians.

A good illustration of how the work of the Community Development Department ran counter to the mainstream of nationalist politics was in Nyanza, Western Kenya. In 1957, the Department established one of its schemes in Central Nyanza. The aim of the scheme was to persuade the local population to accept farm-improvement methods, including land consolidation. Actually, acceptance of land consolidation was the primary purpose of the scheme. The same year that the scheme was established, nationalist politicians began a campaign against it. One of these politicians

was Omolo Ongiro, an influential local elder, from Kisumu District in Nyanza. He would organize large anti-consolidation rallies, and begin the rallies with the phrase "Harambee". He would then proceed to enumerate the grievances against the colonial Government. Invariably, the grievances would include the Government's attempt to consolidate the land, and the detention of Jomo Kenyatta. At the end of the rallies, he would shout "Harambee", and the audience would respond "Heee!". Thus Harambee as a political slogan was born. As we pointed out in Chapter I, Omolo and Kenyatta met after the latter's release from detention.²⁸

The slogan was, therefore, born in the context of oppositionist politics, and more specifically, in opposition to the activities of the Community Development Department in at least Nyanza. Like the political community activities of the era just prior to the establishment of the Department of Community Development, the activities surrounding the birth of Harambee have been quietly forgotten in the statements of both the colonial Community Development Department, and its post-colonial successor under which Harambee activities fall. Both prefer to remember its traditional roots. What, then, can we conclude?

It is difficult to arrive at any definite conclusions on community self-help during this period. However, from the little that we know, it would appear that first and foremost, the colonial Government sought to turn traditional self-help sentiments

to its own advantage in its overall attempt to combat the rising nationalism. Thus, the Department became part of the overall pacification campaign. Under the guises of "voluntarism" and the choice to elect local leaders, the Department could spread the message of working together as "in the old days"²⁹ in an atmosphere of harmony. The pacification ideology was not lost on the nationalists. The politics of Omolo Ongiro show that the nationalists viewed community development as an attempt to isolate groups of local communities and shield them from the bigger national issues such as the release of Jomo Kenyatta. Thus, they countered by linking local community issues with the bigger nationalist issues, that were being fought out, or ignored, at the centre of political power. In their counter offensive, nationalists like Omolo Ongira made use of the traditional sentiments of working together and staying united, but this time for a different purpose.

3.5 Summary

The Kikuyu people, like most other groups in Kenya traditionally practised community self-help, as part of their culture and their peasant production system. When their traditional culture was challenged, primarily by the teachings of the colonial and missionary education, they seized on the occasion to express general grievances against the colonial regime and particularly against the educational system. Thus, the general nationalist struggle and the revolt against cultural

encroachment went hand in hand right from the beginning. The struggle against cultural encroachment as symbolised by the teachings of the missionary and colonial educational system took the form of Independent schools though there was more to the schools than simply re-assertion of traditional culture. In establishing the schools, the Kikuyu made use of the traditional ideology of communal self-help, and in most cases traditional institutions. This time, though, they were led by local educated elites and the aims of communal self-help were largely different from those of communal self-help in the traditional society. Thus there were elements of both continuity and discontinuity.

The current Kenyan Government, and the new elites appeal to the traditional sentiments of working together in harmony. So did the Department of Community Development in the late colonial days. The motivation for appealing to the traditional sentiments are much more than simply the strengthening of a traditional idea. Peasant leaders and the majority of the peasants in Kiambu accept the idea of working together in small communities, though they know that traditional communal self-help and the current communal self-help are different. Why they buy the idea and why the Government and the elites sell it is the subject of forthcoming chapters.

The appeal to the past practices of self-help is done selectively by both the colonial Government and the post-colonial Government. The periods which are least compatible with the concept of everybody working together is relegated to the background, if not all together forgotten.

In summary, the practice of self-help has always taken place under specific social and political circumstances. Different groups have either pushed it as an idea, or actually taken part in it, but under specific circumstances. Even under the same circumstances, the motivations might be different and therefore the choice of what is to be emphasized. In the next chapter, we shall analyse the social and political circumstances which form the context of Harambee in post-colonial Kenya, and in particular, the first fifteen years of independence under the Presidency of the late Jomo Kenyatta. In doing so, we shall be elaborating the main argument as stated in the introductory chapter and thereby advancing a political explanation of Harambee.

CHAPTER 3: FOOTNOTES

- 1.. Kenyatta, J. Harambee: The Prime Minister of Kenya's Speeches 1963 - 1964, Oxford University Press, Nairobi; 1964.p.8
2. Daily Nation: Nairobi, Monday June 26, 1978.p.5
The statement was made jointly by the Chairman of the Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru Association (GEMA) and the Chairman of the New Akamba Union (NAU) at a joint fund-raising meeting by the two associations in Kiambu town.
3. Mbithi, P.M. and R. Rasmusson, Self-Reliance in Kenya: The Case of Harambee, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala; 1977.p.13
4. Brown, J.M., Kenyatta, George Allen and Unwin Ltd. London:1972.p.193
5. Kenyatta, J. Facing Mt. Kenya, Vintage Books, New York; 1939. especially pp. 95-124.
6. Leakey, L., The Southern Kikuyu Before 1903, Vol. I Academic Press, London; New York, San Francisco, 1977, p.7
7. Kenyatta, J., Facing Mt. Kenya, op cit pp. 113-120.
8. Ibid, p.58 .
9. Ibid, p.58
10. Leakey, L., op cit, p.9
11. Kenyatta, J., Facing Mt. Kenya, op cit, p.76
12. Ibid, p.115
13. The history of the emergence of Kikuyu Associations in the early 1920's is covered extremely well in Jeremy Murray Brown's Kenyatta, op cit.
14. It should be mentioned that though the Kikuyu Independent schools movement became the most famous in this period of Kenya's history, there were similar movements elsewhere and in particular in Nyanza, western Kenya. The main reason why the activities in Kikuyuland have received more attention might be that they went hand in hand with the development of political activities and especially the formation of Kikuyu Associations designed to resist colonial penetration. We dwell on the Kikuyu Independent

schools movement for the same reasons that we dwelt on Kikuyu traditional communal self-help, i.e. for purposes of illustration and because our field work was carried out in a Kikuyu area. The movement for Independent schools in Nyanza is covered among others by John Anderson in A Struggle For The School, Longman, London.1970, pp. 113-115.

15. Anderson, J.A., Ibid, p. 117.
16. Ibid, p.127
17. Ibid, p.123
18. Ibid, p.118
19. This point is also noted by, among others Jeremy Murray Brown, who is cited above. Not unexpectedly, the surviving leaders of these schools were not too willing to discuss this aspect of Kenya's political history.
20. Brown, J.M., op cit, p.231
21. Ibid, p.238
22. Askwith, J.G., Progress Through Self-help: Principles and Practice in Community Development, East Africa Publishing House, 1960, p.1
23. Ibid, p.1
24. Ibid, p.4
25. Ibid, p.8
26. Ibid, p.22
27. Ibid, p.3
28. For details, see the "Introduction" to Chapter I.
29. Askwith, J.G., op cit, p.9: The commissioner for Community Development argues here that the people must always be reminded of the old days, otherwise they will not accept the ideas of the Department.

CHAPTER 4

HARAMBEE AND THE PATRON CLIENT STATE

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we shall address ourselves to the political circumstances that led to the establishment and sustaining of the Harambee movement in Kenya after Independence. In doing this, we hope to take a step further the argument that the Harambee movement cannot be fully understood if the analysis is confined to the past practices of communal self-help, though the past practices offer some useful clues to an understanding of the movement. One of the clues is the fact that, in the colonial period, community self-help was politicised under the leadership of a political elite and sometimes under the ideological justification that it was part of the traditional African way of life. Sometimes the justification was explicitly stated as happened with the Department of Community Development. At other times, the justification was implied through the utilization of traditional institutions as happened with the Independent schools movement. In both cases the fundamental issue was struggle for political control.

The post-colonial Government of Kenya and the political elites carried on similar justifications as we have pointed out, but once again the main aim was political control, at least in the long run. We say "at least in the long run" because we want to give some credit to the traditional beliefs of the architect of the Harambee movement in post-colonial Kenya. It is quite possible, though there is no way of conclusively establishing this, that

Kenyatta did sincerely believe that traditional African institutions, such as communal self-help, could be incorporated into a modern state. He said so, as we have seen, and he passionately argued for the revival of the African cultural heritage, and especially the communal way of life. Throughout his life, he remained a staunch advocate of African culture, but he was also President of a modern state and as such his priority was how and with whom to govern. The establishment of the Harambee movement was part of the answer to the problem of how and with whom to govern.

In the following sections, we shall elaborate on the thesis that, partly for historical reasons that were part of Kenya's colonial heritage, and partly because of Kenyatta's own political temperament and interpretation of politics he decided to control the politics of the Kenyan state through patron-client structures that excluded both the party and the parliament. The result was that the political elites on all levels realised that taking part in Harambee was the only way to be recruited into, or to maintain a position within, the patron-client structure. As part of his search for a control formula, Kenyatta sought to depoliticize the political centre and to relegate debate to the constituency level where an individual would be judged on his/her success at "delivering development" - meaning getting involved in Harambee projects. Kenyatta actively campaigned for this and, in this respect, he was an authentic spokesman of the peasantry. Once an individual had

demonstrated ability to win peasant support, then he was eligible for a place in the political patron-client hierarchy. But this support could only be obtained by actively taking part in the officially sponsored policy. Therefore, by implication, it meant supporting Kenyatta and the Government.

We begin by describing what Kenyatta inherited from the colonial government by way of a political party - or more accurately, by way of regional bosses. We then examine the role of Harambee in determining parliamentary electoral success, and the part Kenyatta played in defining the criteria for electoral success. Though we concentrate on parliamentary elections, the arguments are applicable to elections at other levels. Finally we examine the patron-client ruling formula which finally emerged. It should be pointed out, here, that although the analysis might give the impression of events historically leading into one another, quite a lot of what we say was taking place almost simultaneously. In this sense, what we discuss is not really a historical chronology but rather an abstraction from historical events for purposes of explanation.

4.2 Kenyatta and KANU Regional Bosses

On the declaration of the State of Emergency in 1952, the Kenyan colonial Government banned all African political organizations. In effect, the ban was aimed expressly at the Kenya African Union (KAU), since this was the only active African organization. At the time of the ban, KAU was already engaged in

organizing political activity beyond Kikuyu land and some of its Executive Committee members were non-Kikuyu. Kau branches had already been established as far afield as Luoland in western Kenya.

In 1955 the Kenyan colonial Government relaxed the Emergency ban on all African political organizations. The Government, however, did not immediately allow the Africans in Kenya to form a colony wide political organization in the tradition of nationalist mass parties then in vogue in other African countries. Instead, the colonial Government ordered political associations to confine themselves to Districts in order "to encourage a simple and orderly development of African political life and the growth of responsible opinion".¹

The colonial Government hoped that at a later stage, a colony wide convention of Associations would be formed, but only after constituency conventions had matured "and learned to solve some of their own local problems".² In other words:

"With the authority of Emergency powers, the Government hoped to shape the development of African politics after a pattern of their own making. In place of the militancy of KAU, they pictured sensible and stable men working up from the local level and gradually assuming greater responsibility in the affairs of the country at a pace controlled by the Government".³

Though the colonial Government was not too successful in controlling the pace of African politics, it certainly succeeded in laying the organizational foundations of Kenyan politics. The foundations were to haunt Kenyatta for many years to come. Thus, when the African nationalist leaders met in 1960 to form the

anticipated colony-wide political party, they discovered, perhaps to their surprise, that there was no less than thirty African political organizations represented. Each organization was, of course, headed by its own leader. The majority of the leaders were not willing to be absorbed into a larger political organization without getting something in return.

In the event, no national political parties really emerged from the leaders conference of 1960. Instead, two groups of political alliances emerged. The first group became the Kenya African National Union (KANU) which was an alliance of district leaders from the larger ethnic groups in Kenya and particularly the Kikuyu and the Luo ethnic groups. The second group of alliances became known as the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). This was formed just three months after the formulation of KANU. KADU was an alliance of district leaders from the smaller ethnic groups. They feared that if they joined KANU, they would eventually be dominated by the Kikuyu and the Luo, who, for this purpose, would push for a one party state.

The emergence of the two coalitions did not mean that national political parties had finally arrived in Kenya. On the contrary, the two coalitions, and especially KANU, remained faction-ridden, and operated as no more than convenient electoral alliances for purposes of winning the crucial elections prior to Independence in 1963. Thus, the colonial formula of emphasising local organizations proved crucial in dictating the patterns of

political leadership and organization into which the fast growing nationalist movement settled in the late 1950's and early 1960's.⁴ Each district had a spokesman and he naturally relied on the district as the basis of political support.⁵ When, therefore, the African elected members went to Parliament, or the Legislative Council as it was then called, they went there as individuals committed to political reform, not subject to any common policy or discipline, but to the demands of a local base. Each of them sought to build up constituency support by translating nationalist demands for reforms at the centre into local terms. This meant relating the demands to local issues.⁶

It might be argued that the association of nationalist demands with local issues was not peculiar to Kenya and that it was widespread in most African countries during the nationalist struggle. Accurate as this argument might generally be, "the difference in Kenya lay in the Members' limited opportunities to speak across district and tribal boundaries, and to counter-balance the local emphasis with a common nationalist front".⁷ By the time it became legally possible to create a common nationalist front, it was too late. Nationalist politicians had developed too high an attachment to their local bases to let the latter be absorbed into a bigger organization, without a quid pro quo. This was true of both KANU and KADU, though the latter was forced to exercise a little more discipline on its members because of its fear of domination by the larger ethnic groups in Kenya. The discipline, later took the form of a united demand for a regional constitution in order to safeguard and legitimize the leadership positions of the local bosses. As for

KANU, it was so faction-ridden and indisciplined that it barely managed to go through the crucial 1961 "Kenya Elections" under one name. Even then, as Bennett and Rosberg point out in their study of the 1961 elections, KANU lost some seats it should have won due to the proliferation of KANU independent candidates whom the party could neither control nor discipline.⁸

When Kenyatta was released from detention in 1961, he found that he was the only uniting factor in the country. Both KANU and KADU had made his release from detention the key issue of the 1961 elections - hence the name "The Kenya Elections". Kenyatta's problem was, to put it quite simply, whom to rule with. During the last few months of his detention, he had attempted to get both KANU and KADU to unite into one party, which he, no doubt, hoped he would lead to independence. Although the attempt had proved unsuccessful he had remained committed to the idea of a one party state, as events proved a few years later.

On his release from detention, Kenyatta once again, tried to unite KANU and KADU and, once again, he was unsuccessful. He therefore, gave up the attempt and joined KANU as its President. This, however, did not solve Kenyatta's problem. He soon found out that KANU was still dominated by regional bosses. None of them had been able to exert enough control to create a coherent organization. Between the formation of the party in 1960 and the time Kenyatta became its President in late 1961, any regional leader who gave the impression of trying to organize and strengthen the

party was immediately accused by the others of trying to usurp Kenyatta's place. Thus, in a very real sense, Kenyatta in detention had, like a ghost, continued to haunt KANU between the time of its formation and the time Kenyatta took over its leadership.⁹

It would be expected that Kenyatta, now as President of KANU, would exert his authority and create a mass party that would be free of domination by regional bosses. He attempted to do this, but once again he ran into leaders who regarded their areas as personal fiefs.¹⁰ The struggle between Kenyatta and the regional leaders was exemplified by the conflict between him and Tom Mboya - the then Secretary General of KANU - over who should control the politics of Nairobi and in particular the trade union movement which was Mboya's power base. The lowest point in the conflict was reached in August 1962 when Kenyatta held a KANU meeting in Nairobi without prior permission from Mboya. Mboya was at that time the Chairman of Nairobi KANU branch. After the KANU meeting, which was held in his absence, Mboya threatened to resign from KANU and form his own Kenya Labour Party.¹¹

Confronted with the power of regional leaders, Kenyatta concentrated his efforts in trying to hold the party together for purposes of winning the decisive 1963 elections which would decide which party would take over from the colonial Government. In effect, Kenyatta was trying to hold together district based electoral machines rather than a political party. The 1963

elections resulted in a KANU victory, but even more important, in a decentralized form of political power as a result of the nature of the nationalist political movement.¹² Kenyatta and KANU had refused to sanction the fact of decentralization. They had opposed the regional constitution which KADU had advocated. Now Kenyatta gave a personal sanctioning of decentralization by appointing a cabinet which was representative of regional aspirations, even as he campaigned against KADU and the regional constitution under which Kenya had achieved independence. Could Kenyatta now rule with Parliament as opposed to ruling with the fragmented party?

In the first year of independence, Kenyatta attempted to rule the country through Parliament and more specifically through the cabinet. The cabinet members were regional leaders who had been rewarded for their support of KANU by being appointed cabinet ministers. But there were not enough rewards for every KANU parliamentarian and it soon became clear that, while a fragmented party could be ignored or kept quiet by the expedient of delaying its meetings, a fragmented Parliament could not. Thus, the arena for political conflict shifted from the party to Parliament. The antagonists were the cabinet on the one hand, and the KANU backbenchers on the other hand. The backbencher group was greatly enlarged when KADU crossed the floor and joined KANU in 1964. But even as the backbenchers defeated the Government on several important motions,¹³ they always made it clear that they

were loyal to Kenyatta and that they were only fighting for the right to be consulted.¹⁴

On his part, Kenyatta sought to diffuse the conflict in Parliament through personal intervention. If the criticism in Parliament indicated a possible deadlock between the Government and the backbenchers, discussion would be withdrawn to the KANU parliamentary group where the issues would be resolved through Kenyatta's personal intervention, as the chairman of the KANU parliamentary group. Thus, even as far back as 1965 - the year that the KANU backbenchers group was dissolved on the orders of Kenyatta - the role of the President as the presumably neutral arbitrator had started to emerge. This was later to become a central feature of Kenyatta's ruling style. The style involved, among others, the emergence of Kenyatta as the chief patron in Kenya, and the decline of the party and parliament as participatory institutions.

Kenyatta's early experience with parliamentary rule seems to have convinced him that Parliament was not a viable alternative to the party as an instrument for making Government policies. It soon became evident that the divisions within the party were simply being reproduced within Parliament, as Ministers started squabbling among themselves and enlisted support from the backbenchers. After the dissolution of the KANU backbenchers group in 1965, the nature of cleavages within Parliament changed. Now the cleavages were no longer between front and backbenchers over the right to latter to

be consulted. Rather, the cleavages, now, cut across the whole Parliament over policy issues, and particularly over the policies of resource allocation.¹⁵ Thus even the cabinet itself was divided over policy issues and in effect collective responsibility ceased to exist.¹⁶ The divisions over policy issues were exacerbated by personal rivalries within the cabinet and especially the rivalry between Tom Mboya and Oginga Odinga. Mboya led the conservative faction and Odinga the so-called radical faction. The new line of cleavages led to a number of developments.

The immediate result of policy divisions within KANU and Parliament was the now famous Sessional Paper Number 10 on African Socialism. Produced in a hurry in 1965, the paper was Kenyatta's answer to the radical critics of the Government. The paper aligned Kenyatta with the conservative faction led by Tom Mboya, who was the principal author. The paper, in spite of its title, committed the Government to the principles of a private enterprise economy and expressly denied the validity of the marxian concept of classes as "irrelevant to Kenya". Even more important for our purposes, the Government, for the first time in a major policy document, stated its intentions to pursue self-help as a means of development.¹⁷ Before then, statements on self-help had been confined to speeches by the President. While not terribly significant, it is worth noting, that the policy of self-help was first officially documented as part of a major Government response to political divisions occasioned by disagreements over policy

issues. It was thus part of an ideologically conservative response that denied cleavages along class lines. In this sense, the policy of self-help was at least consistent with an overall political strategy that sought to accept distribution of power along personal and regional lines, under the leadership of regional leaders.

The second result of parliamentary divisions within KANU is related to the above discussion. Kenyatta aligned himself with those regional leaders who were willing to accept his conservative economic philosophy, even as he publicly portrayed an image of one who was above ideological debates. In order to do this, Kenyatta exploited the intense personal rivalries within KANU, and especially the rivalry between Oginga Odinga - then Vice-President, and Tom Mboya - then the Minister for Planning and KANU's Secretary General. Mboya became Kenyatta's instrument for forcing Odinga out of KANU in 1966. Thus, the ideological differences between those who grouped themselves around Odinga, and the so-called "Corner-Bar" group of Mboya, were portrayed as part of the old rivalries between KANU regional leaders. The issue was, however, much more fundamental, in terms of the emerging formula for political control. The formula demanded among others that ideological differences be portrayed as personal or regional differences thus making it easier for Kenyatta to exert his personal authority, in the name of "working together".

The third result of the divisions within KANU was consistent with the emerging ruling formula. On Odinga being ejected from KANU, the party elections resulted in a re-affirmation of the positions of regional bosses. Odinga's old position of Party Vice-President was abolished and eight KANU Vice-Presidents were chosen instead, each representing a major ethnic region.

By sanctioning the appointment of eight party Vice-Presidents Kenyatta harmonized the Party and the Government since all Vice-Presidents were cabinet ministers. This distribution of KANU Vice-Presidencies to eight regional leaders had the same effect as that achieved by Kenyatta's role in Parliament as an arbitrator. Within the party, he was now the only national leader, the others being de facto and de jure regional leaders. The only possible exception to the rule was Tom Mboya, who, as Secretary General of KANU, made some effort to speak on behalf of KANU as a whole in the face of the challenge from Odinga's Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) formed in 1966.

But even Mboya's role as a KANU spokesman was largely ceremonial. The "little General Elections" of 1966, which resulted from a constitutional amendment requiring all Parliamentarians who crossed the floor (to join KPU) to seek a fresh mandate from the voters, established that KANU never existed in an institutional form. The party was not prepared, at the constituency level, for elections. Consequently, the campaigning was done by the regional leaders, each in his own region.¹⁸ In keeping with the emerging

style of governing, KANU leaders and KANU candidates refused to discuss any policy issues during the elections. Instead, the KPU was represented as a challenge to Kenyatta. Kenyatta in turn "was equated with the Government, which is legitimate and strong, while the KPU was portrayed as illegitimate and weak".¹⁹ Its legitimacy was denied because it had challenged Kenyatta, not KANU, and "destroyed the unity necessary for development".²⁰ Its members had themselves to blame for slow development in their own areas since "they had failed to take any interest in local development or taken time to explain Government plans and policies to the people, but had engaged only in political activity".²¹

The result of the campaign was that KANU's regional leaders used the occasion to enhance their own positions, now that there was a threat, even as they enhanced Kenyatta's position by portraying the challenge as a personal affront to the Father of the Nation." This was achieved in every part of the country except Nyanza, where the KPU was particularly strong. Eventually the KPU was banned in 1969, the same year Mboya was assassinated.

One other factor is worth mentioning in the emergence of a ruling formula which put Kenyatta at the centre as a "maximum leader"²² to use Henry Bienen's term. Even though Kenyatta accepted the existence of political regional leaders as a political fact, and was counting on them to mobilize the peasants in support of the Government, he did not completely rely on them, as a means of governmental penetration into the countryside. For this

purpose, he created administrative regional leaders, and in this respect he went against the wishes of the regional political leaders.

During the 1961 and 1963 elections, KANU had campaigned for the reduction of the powers of the provincial administration and especially the Provincial Commissioners. KANU had correctly argued that great powers had devolved on the Provincial Commissioners during the state of emergency as a result of the need to control the spread of Mau Mau. During the short-lived regional constitution, the powers of the Provincial Commissioners were indeed reduced as they assumed the title of "Civil Secretaries" answerable to the regional assemblies. On the abolition of the regional constitution, in 1965, Kenyatta now restored and indeed increased the powers of the old Provincial Administration.

The restored powers included collection of some taxes such as the Graduated Personal Tax, Chairmanship of the Provincial and District Agricultural Boards, Chairmanship of Divisional Land Boards, Chairmanship of Self-help Co-ordinating Committees at various administrative levels, and Chairmanship of Security Committees.²³ As Chairman of Security Committees, members of the Provincial Administration had the power to refuse permission, even to cabinet Ministers, to hold political rallies. The Provincial Commissioners were not answerable to any Minister, but to the President himself. Accordingly, the responsibilities for the Provincial Administration were transferred from the Ministry of Home

Affairs to the President's office. As would be expected, this was not received well by the Parliamentarians. Soon after, questions were being raised in Parliament on the growing powers of the Provincial Administration, and especially their powers to cancel meetings on "security grounds". Kenyatta ignored the questions.²⁴ Instead, the powers of the Provincial Administration were actually informally increased as the Government sought to use the administration to curb the influence of KPU. At one point, Kenyatta clearly identified the Provincial Administration with KANU when he chaired a joint meeting between the Provincial and District Commissioners, and KANU Branch chairmen. At the meeting he urged the Provincial Administration to work together with the KANU government.²⁵ The attempt to fuse KANU and the Provincial Administration continued. Soon, Provincial Commissioners were being asked to mediate between KANU factional squabbles and were actually attending meetings chaired by Kenyatta for purposes of such mediation.²⁶

The powers of the Provincial Administration were not reduced even after the banning of KPU in 1969. The Provincial Commissioners in particular, continued to be Kenyatta's representatives in the regions, and in some cases, they had more access to him than Cabinet Ministers.²⁷ From the politicians point of view, the strength of the Provincial Administration in the countryside constituted a reduction of their influence in these areas, not to mention a reduction in potential sources of patronage.

The President was the only one who was not sharing powers with anyone. He now stationed himself above the civil service, the Government and the Party, as the only non-regional leader.

To summarize, the emerging political formula emphasised:

1. The importance of personal and regional leadership. 2. Tendency to personalize policy issues. 3. A strong executive President at the political centre and 4. Lack of importance of party and Parliament as participatory institutions. How could any minor political representative speak for the peasantry within such a ruling formula? As it turned out, the President had an answer. The answer was the final ingredient towards the establishment of a patron-client ruling structure, with its own supportive ideology of "working together".

In the following sections we shall show that Harambee and the politics of Harambee were deeply enmeshed in the entire political process of Kenya as reflected by what we have described so far. First we shall analyse Kenyatta's conception of parliamentary representation and, ipso facto, his conception of the role of Parliament and Parliamentarians. In doing so, we shall also be seeking to establish the role of Harambee in the emerging formula for political control.

4.3 Kenyatta, The Electorate and Harambee

One of the most important trade marks of Kenyatta's rule was that, despite his reliance on political regional leaders and the Provincial Administration as the immediate instruments of control, he continued to regard the peasantry as the source of his

authority to govern.²⁸ Consequently, he was never at home with party and parliamentary politics.²⁹ Instead, he preferred to appeal directly to the peasantry - sometimes to the discomfort of even his own Ministers - where he could use his very powerful rhetorical technique of banter, sternness and local aphorism with devastating effect.

Kenyatta's perception of his major source of legitimacy no doubt played a part in the continued importance of elections in Kenya, no matter how imperfect the electoral exercise. This seems to be the only explanation why he allowed the first post-independence elections to take place, especially in a year (1969) which distinguished itself with crises more than anything else. The record of the first Parliament - 1963 to 1969 - shows a Parliament that was virtually at war with the Government, as backbenchers sought to have their voices heard especially on policies of resource distribution. This was Kenyatta's parliamentary dilemma. If he desired to continue holding elections in a ~~virtually non-party state~~, he had to live with the consequences of such elections, namely, a critical group of backbenchers without a parliamentary organization which could effectively discipline them. As we have noted, Kenyatta had abolished the KANU Parliamentary Group in 1965 and henceforth rarely went to Parliament. Kenyatta's solution to the problem of parliamentary criticism is a matter of debate. A case can, for example, be made to show that he resorted to detentions in order to curb parliamentary criticism.

However, it can also be argued that he did not resort to detentions until much later. For example, when he detained Oginga and his colleagues in 1969, the immediate cause was not parliamentary dissension but a public confrontation in the countryside which supposedly threatened law and order. Though detention assumed increased importance in later years, it was not, at least initially, the most important means of dealing with parliamentary politics and dissent, whether these took the form of backbencher criticism or the actual existence of an opposition party. In our opinion, Kenyatta's primary solution to parliamentary dissent was again along personal lines. He distanced himself from Parliament, and put his faith in his own ability to appeal directly to the peasantry. Thus, even as he privately tried to convince KADU Parliamentarians to cross the floor and join KANU, he publicly campaigned for the idea of a one party state. He repeated the exercise with the Oginga's KPU though this time the circumstances demanded a variation of the technique. This time he could not demand the KPU rejoin KANU. Therefore, a constitutional amendment was passed requiring that all Parliamentarians who crossed the floor to join another party (KPU) stand for re-election under the banner of the party they had joined.

In the sense that KADU members had not been required to seek a fresh mandate under KANU's banner, the amendment was a political trick. The important point however, is that the amendment was perfectly consistent with Kenyatta's faith in his own

ability to appeal to the peasantry, either as voters or simply as a source of support in a time of crisis.. This is the technique he used in dealing with parliamentary dissent. He separated himself from Parliament and appealed to the electorate for a particular kind of elected official. Kenyatta's style of staying aloof from institutions and appealing directly to the peasantry was nowhere more successful than in his "back-to-the-land" campaign during which he sought to define for the electorate, the kind of representative they should elect. It was as if Kenyatta was trying to strike a bargain with the voters and those seeking the votes. Elections were going to continue to be held so long as the voters did not elect just anybody. Kenyatta of course would rarely say directly what he wanted. Rather, his style was to adopt a fatherly posture giving advice to the family. This was most effective. What kind of elected leaders, then, did Kenyatta want?

He made this clear by way of "advice to the voters" in the middle of the KPU crisis and the continued criticism from KANU backbenchers. Though Kenyatta's campaign did not reach a crescendo until after the 1969 elections when he blasted the Parliamentarians by way of "I told you so", and in effect told them they were wasting their time criticising Government policy, the message was clear as far back as 1967. On Madaraka Day 1967 - Internal Self Government Day - he had made this appeal to the voters:

"When you are electing representatives, try to elect somebody who will be able to represent you properly, somebody who understands and appreciates your problems. Do not pick a person just because he speaks English. The English language is nothing, and cannot do anything for you. What matters is trust worthiness and helping the citizens. I am telling you that if an MP, or a Minister does not work for you properly, tell him: "We elected you to work for us, and not just to live in Nairobi". ... I myself work in Nairobi, and I have a nice house called "State House" to work in. You gave me this house, but I have never slept in that house even for a single night, because it is full of colonial ghosts. ... If you elect somebody who spends all his time in Nairobi doing nothing, what good is that? What does such a person - whether an M.P. or a City Councillor or a KANU official - show us he is doing back at his home and in his shamba, where his parents are? Of what use is it roaming about in Nairobi in bars hotels?" 30

This was Kenyatta at his populist best appealing directly to the peasantry and, one might add, undermining the importance of such institutions as the party and Parliament by seeking to localize politics and to send political competitors to the countryside where each individual would have to fight for himself, relying entirely on his personal record of service to the people. But what could politicians do in the countryside? They could work on their "shambas" - Kiswahili for large farms and small holdings - as Kenyatta suggested, but this would not amount to "helping the citizens". They could spend time, as some did, in organizing party branches in the countryside, but this is not what Kenyatta had in mind. They could spend their time in the countryside explaining Government policies and preaching Kenyatta's favourite

messages of working hard and staying united. This would certainly be compatible with Kenyatta's call of "back to the land". Empty talk, however would amount to slogans, and Kenyatta was not going to have this either. One of his favourite statements, which he first publicly made in 1965 was that in Kenya, there was no place for leaders who hoped to build a nation of slogans. The statement was made in the context of explaining the "Harambee" call to the public. He said:

"On this day in 1963, we all responded to the call of Harambee. By this call, we said to the world that we would build a new Kenya through co-operation and hard work. We knew and accepted that the aspirations of our people would be realized only through hard work and discipline. There is no room here for the lazy and idle. There is no room for those who wait for things to be given for nothing. There is no place for leaders who hope to build a nation of slogans".³¹

Kenyatta's attempt to link constituency service with electoral success was necessitated by the immediate need to curb policy debate within parliament. However, it should be remembered that the Government was already committed to the policy of self-help. Who could better mobilize the peasants for this purpose than elected representatives? The Provincial Administration could try but its members were subject to constant transfers and hence ill-equipped to take on the task. In any case, their primary duty was to collect tax and maintain law and order. The important point, however, is that Kenyatta's attempts to link electoral politics with his call of back to the land, and more

specifically with the notion of service to the constituency, was successful. Put differently, his interpretation of the role of elected representatives was an accurate interpretation of what the peasantry expected.

Studies carried out in Kenya during the 1960's support the view that the Kenyan peasant electorate expected their representative to put local issues, and problems, before national issues. Furthermore, the elected representatives were likely to survive longer if they devoted their time to local development efforts, rather than trying to cash in on any other quality such as education, age, parental background etc.³²

This was Kenyatta's message to the peasants. One such study³³ was conducted during the 1966 "Little General Elections" which were occasioned by the formation of Odinga's Kenya Peoples Union and the subsequent passing of the constitutional amendment which we have referred to.

A sample of the probable voters was asked the following question, among others:

People make up their minds in many different ways to vote for a particular candidate to represent them. Here are some of the characteristics of political candidates in general. Which two of these in order of importance, first and second, would you say are the most important factors for a candidate to receive your vote?
The responses were as follows:

TABLE 4.1

MENTIONED FACTORS DETERMINING RECEIPT OF VOTEFIRST CHOICE

<u>Mentioned Factor</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1. His Age	18%
2. His Personal Views	17%
3. His Political Party	21%
4. His Tribe	1%
5. His Record and Experience	7%
6. His Performance as Campaign Speaker	6%
7. His Religion	2%
8. His Superior Ability To Get Things Done	24%
9. His Traditional Status	2%
10. Refused To Answer	1%
11. Don't Know	1%
TOTAL	100%
N	451

SECOND CHOICE

<u>Mentioned Factor</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1. His Age	1%
2. His Personal Views	9%
3. His Political Party	10%
4. His Tribe	3%
5. His Record and Experience	16%
6. His Performance As Campaign Speaker	22%
7. His Religion	2%
8. His Superior Ability To Get Things Done	29%
9. His Traditional Status	6%
10. Refused To Answer	1%
11. Don't Know	1%
TOTAL	100%
N	451

This particular study was carried out by a commercial organization.³⁴ Hence, the methodological details are not available to the author. But on the whole, the survey, the earliest in Independent Kenya, seems to have accurately recorded what other researchers were to find later. Without giving undue emphasis on the importance of the survey, it nonetheless captured what had already become an important factor in Kenya's electoral politics. Even at the height of the competition between KANU and KPU, the electorate was inclined to evaluate a candidate largely on the basis of his ability to get things done. In a one party system, which Kenya became in 1969, this criteria was to become even more important. We have already raised the question: what are the "things" that a representative was supposed to "get done"?

Kenyatta himself set the example in this respect by starting a self-help hospital in his own Gatundu constituency in 1965. This was the earliest major self-help project in Kenya. But even as Kenyatta was setting the example at Gatundu, he continued with his campaign to equate time spent in Nairobi - particularly time spent by a representative in Parliament debating Government policies - with "roaming about in Nairobi". He particularly came down heavily on those who criticised the Government's policies on resource allocation. In the early days he had not coined a word for the critics. Later on, he came up with words, some of which are unprintable, for describing the Government critics. The most popular of these words was "Kupayuka" - a typical Kenyatta

word meaning "to make noise without any particular aim".

If an elected representative was not supposed to "Payuka" in Nairobi but to help his constituents instead, what exactly, then, was he supposed to do? If he went back to the constituency and simply talked to the people, it was not good enough according to Kenyatta for then he was "waiting for manna to fall from heaven" - a favourite Kenyatta phrase. This would amount to laziness and disservice to the voters.

As it was, the peasant electorate was quite clear about what a representative was supposed to do in order to improve the conditions in the constituency. The survey which we have quoted above also asked the question: Can you suggest specific ways in which your Parliamentary Representative and/or your Senate Representative (Kenya then had a bi-cameral legislature) could improve the conditions in your constituency?³⁵ The responses were as follows:

TABLE 4.2

WAYS OF IMPROVING CONSTITUENCY

<u>Mentioned Way</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1. They should learn to live with people/not isolate themselves/learn what people want and think/keep election promises	19%
2. Jobs should be created for the jobless	5%
3. Improve roads/communications	8%
4. Help to build more schools/hospitals	23%
5. Help to build more factories/industries	5%

<u>Mentioned Way</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
6. Press the Government for more and better housing.	7%
7. Encourage self-help/hard work/improve conditions/improve water supply	10%
8. Land for landless/loans for farmers	13%
9. Improve co-operatives/marketing	3%
10. Others	11%
11. Don't Know	3%
12. No response	12%
	<hr/>
TOTAL *	117%
N	535

* For an unknown reason the figures do not add up to 100%

Again, despite the unclear methods employed in the survey, the general idea seems to be clear. Although there was little that an elected representative could do to distribute land for example, or even to create jobs, he could certainly help to build more schools, access roads, and improve water supply, through community efforts. In fact these were precisely the type of self-help activities that were taking place at the time the survey was conducted in 1966. Up to the end of 1965, more than 6,000 miles of access roads and 1,000 bridges had been constructed in Kenya through self-help activities. In addition, fifty dams and 500 protected springs had also been constructed in an effort to provide water supply. In other activities, 2,500 community facilities such as schools, health centres, dispensaries and clinics were also constructed.³⁶

The actual figures on the output of self-help activities in the early days might not be terribly significant in themselves. What is interesting is the fact that the types of activities were a fairly accurate reflection of activities the electorate expected an elected representative to engage in as part of the service to the constituency.

But were the elected representatives actually engaging in these activities? It is one thing for voters to express what they would like their representatives to do at the constituency level, but quite another thing for the representative to accurately interpret the wishes of the electorate.

The answer to the above question was provided when the Government published the Development Plans for 1970-74 and 1974-78. According to the Government, during the immediate post independence period, "emphasis was placed on the stimulation of the self-help spirit among the people. The resulting responses and enthusiasm of the people throughout the country in some cases defied orderly planning and, unfortunately, led to wasteful use of resources".³⁷ Three main reasons had contributed to the self-help movement's defiance of orderly planning. One: in some cases, a lack of community development or technical personnel to give proper advice to both the planning and execution stages had allowed projects to drift. Two: many self-help groups had acquired a degree of autonomy so great that they had gone forward with projects, even when it was doubtful that recurrent costs of operation could be ensured.

Three: political and personal considerations had influenced the initiation and location of projects, often to the detriment of good overall planning.³⁸ Though it is difficult to weigh the relative importance of the three reasons, it is at least clear, that politicians were involved in self-help activities to a degree that surprised even the Government. What is surprising is the fact that the Government should be surprised, considering Kenyatta's exhortations to the peasantry and his candid definition of the role of a representative as a local servant.

The Government was not alone in its conclusions that Harambee projects had become a focus of political activity. Independent researchers had arrived at the same conclusion. Geoffrey Lamb, for example, concluded that during the mid and late 1960's Harambee schools in Muranga District "were started at least partly for political reasons as indeed were many other self-help projects and communal groups".³⁹ He further adds that the pressure to take part in Harambee activities, stemming, as they did from deeply felt and powerfully articulated communal needs, imposed considerable obligations on politicians to be seen to deliver the goods.⁴⁰ Like Kenyatta, other politicians were interpreting the peasant sentiments correctly.

It could be argued that the voters attitudes were partly a reflection of the expectations occasioned by the immediate post-independence period. While this might be true, we should note that their attitudes and expectations remained very much the same

over the years. Ten years after the first survey was conducted, another more academically oriented survey⁴¹ was carried out which solicited the same type of information from the voters as the earlier survey. The author is much more familiar with the latter survey which was carried out in 1975. A sample of adult population from thirteen rural constituencies were asked, among other questions, to state which of seven activities they felt were most important for Kenyan M.P.'s to engage in. The responses were as follows:

TABLE 4.3

MOST IMPORTANT ACTIVITIES FOR M.P.'S

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Explain government policies to constituents	7%
Tell government what people in district want	29%
Obtain projects and benefits for the district	25%
Visit district frequently	11%
Take active part in National Assembly debates and pass bills	5%
Help constituents with their personal problems	6%
Help solve conflicts in the community	2%
No Answer/Don't Know	16%

N =

(3,828)

Given the persistence of voter attitudes which are basically parochial it is not surprising that the two elections held in Kenya since independence - one in 1969 and another in 1974 - have been "referendums on the adequacy of constituency service by incumbent politicians".⁴² Thus, "many incumbents who preferred legislative debate to constituency service lost".⁴³

At the constituency level, the elections were usually contests between rival local figures who spent most of their time organizing at constituency level with the assistance of local elites. Political debate focussed entirely on local issues, particularly on the question of which candidate would be most effective at fostering economic and social development in the area. According to Joel Barkan, whose survey we have quoted above:

"The parochial focus of political debate was also compounded by the President's emphasis on self-help. Given the organizational weakness of KANU on the one hand, and the absence of opposition parties on the other, discussion of alternative government programs for the nation as a whole rarely occurred. The President's policy of self-help or Harambee as it is commonly known in Kiswahili, specifically called on local leaders, particularly MPs to play active roles in organizing such community development projects as the building of schools, health clinics etc. Indeed, participation in self-help efforts was to become the main activity in which MPs should engage in. Instead of concentrating their efforts on debating government policy in the National Assembly, the legislators were to spend more time directly serving their constituencies, and be judged by their constituents in these terms".⁴⁴

Given what we have said so far, we might conclude that the elections showed that Kenyatta had been successful in defining the role of the representatives on behalf of himself and the peasant electorate. Not surprisingly, Kenyatta's policy of emphasising self-help, rather than discussion of policy, seemed to favour the incumbents. They were in a position to use their official positions and personal connections to attract self-help funds. The results of the two elections, which are summarised below⁴⁵ show that although losses among the incumbents were quite substantial, which prompted Kenyatta to step up his "I told you so" speeches, "their rate of success was at least double that of the challengers".⁴⁶ Another important point, whose implications we shall discuss in the next section, "is that the rate of electoral success rises with one's proximity to the political centre. Thus, Assistant Ministers had a higher rate of success than backbenchers, while the Ministers had the highest rate of success".⁴⁷ Kenyatta himself and a few cabinet Ministers who were particularly close to him stood unopposed. Even more interesting, in marked contrast to the Government's treatment of Odinga's KPU, Kenyatta adopted a "hands-off" policy. The President was not going to get involved in politics, except of course, on behalf of the small number of contestants who were particularly close to him and who faced serious challenge. Some of their opponents were detained for the duration of the elections, while Kenyatta's close associates were free to display photographs

of themselves with Mzee, thus evoking the Presidential name for electoral purposes, something that the Government had warned all contestants against.

TABLE 4.4

WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE 1969 AND 1974 ELECTIONS

	<u>Non- Incumbents</u>	<u>Back- benchers</u>	<u>Assistant Ministers</u>	<u>Ministers</u>	<u>All Incumbents</u>
<u>1969</u>					
Winners	20%	37%	63%	74%	46%
Losers	80%	63%	37%	26%	54%
N	(468)	(86)	(38)	(19)	(143)
<u>1974</u>					
Winners	15%	35%	64%	79%	49%
Losers	85%	65%	36%	21%	51%
N	(496)	(78)	(36)	(19)	(133)

Source: Daily Nation and East African Standard Dec. 8, 1969 and Oct. 19, 1974 as summarized by Joel Barkan.⁴⁸

In addition to the points mentioned above, two other points are worth emphasising. Apart from the fact that the results of the two elections are virtually identical, KANU as an organization played no role in the elections. True, the party "certified prospective candidates" but as the number of contestants show, the elections were open to virtually anyone except some ex-members of the banned KPU. Hence the large number of contestants, for the 158 seats in the Kenyan Parliament.

What then can we conclude on the relationship between Kenyatta, the electorate and the politics of Harambee? Looking at the issue from the point of view of competing political elites in Kenya, the most obvious conclusion is that the political significance of Harambee lies in its importance as a determinant of electoral success. However, this cannot be understood in isolation from other factors.

The most important factor, in our opinion, was Kenyatta's chosen formula for ruling the country. The first step in choosing the formula was the decision to rule with the regional leaders and the Provincial Administration. This took care of the non-existence of a political party. Kenyatta emerged out of this step as the confirmed "national leader" as everybody else was either a regional leader in the Government and the party or a direct representative of the President; in the case of the Provincial Administration. Thus, the first foundations for the highly personalised ruling style were laid. The second step was to curb discussion on Government policies - some of which reflected the old factionalism and the lack of a party to impose discipline - by depoliticising the political centre. Since the party was largely ineffectual, the only important institution to depoliticise was Parliament. The campaign to depoliticize Parliament was begun after Kenyatta's earlier attempts at parliamentary arbitration. He emerged out of these attempts as the "apolitical arbitrator" who was largely above "political debates". In reality, of course,

he was simply powerful and respected enough to impose his own brand of politics on the Kenyan political system.

Kenyatta attempted to depoliticize Parliament by deliberately seeking to link electoral success to "Harambee" which was a Government policy. In this sense, he was trying to co-opt Parliamentarians into supporting the Government rather than criticising the Government. As it was, he was correctly interpreting the voters' sentiments though he had his own reasons for doing it.

The politicians responded for a number of reasons. First, this is what the peasant voters seemed to want. Second, the institutional forums for articulating peasant grievances such as the party and Parliament, were in their weakness, and because of the very weakness, instruments of the Executive and particularly the President. Thus, if a politician wanted to create any following, he had to seek it in the countryside by taking part in Harambee. Thus politics was relegated to the periphery, or more concretely to the countryside. This was the second major step in the search for a ruling formula, which we shall discuss in the next section. The ruling formula was the establishment of a patron-client state.

4.4 The Patron-Client Presidentialism

As a background to this section, we shall begin with a brief discussion of clientelism. Political analysts have long recognized the importance of clientelism in Kenyatta's Kenya, though few have elaborated on the concept. Colin Leys, for example, simply mentions that client-patron ties mediate between the

peasantry and the emerging urban-based classes, as the two classes try to develop a symbiosis. He further adds that the pyramidal character of clientelist political structures consist essentially of unequal exchange relationships which are reproduced again and again from the village to the national level.⁴⁹ Richard Sandbrook confines his discussions of the concept of clientelism in relation to the Kenya Labour Movement, to the statement that "patron-client relationships are constructed on the reciprocal exchange of material benefits and/or services of different types".⁵⁰ In all fairness, though, it must be pointed out, that neither Leys nor Sandbrook was discussing the general politics of Kenya in the articles cited. However, even Henry Bienen who did write on the general politics of Kenya, and recognised the central importance of clientelism, did not discuss, in detail, the concept. Rather he simply introduced the discussion with the statement that "the Kenya setting is one in which the politics of patron-client networks cuts across both occupational and ethnic groups".⁵¹

In pointing out that some of the best known writers on Kenyan politics do not discuss the concept of clientelism we do not mean to be merely critical. Rather, we want to make the point that the concept of clientelism, as borrowed from anthropology and then applied in political science, is so problematic that one might be tempted to assume that the conceptual basis of what one is discussing is understood and then proceed with the description. As one leading authority on the concept says

"there are unfortunately almost as many definitions of patron-client relationships as there are writers on the subject".⁵²

The major problem with the concept of clientelism is that it was originally developed by anthropologists to help them in the analysis of informal, small group interactions. While this makes it useful, in political science, as a tool for analysing peasant politics, it makes it difficult to apply, with any precision, to the macro aspects of a political system.

Cognisant of the anthropological origins of the concept of clientelism, where it was developed to describe face-to-face interactions among small groups, leading political scientists have tried to liberate the concept from its small group origins, so that it can be applied to analyse large scale political systems. Among the leading theorists of political clientelism are James C. Scott⁵³ and John Duncan Powell,⁵⁴ though there is a host of political scientists who, at one time or another, have tried to conceptualise clientelism in order to make the concept applicable to macro systems.⁵⁵

How then can clientelism be liberated from its original small group focus? The theorists begin with the basic patron-client link between two individuals. This is the dyadic interaction between a single patron on the one hand and a single client on the other hand. If the dyadic interactions is enlarged to include more people, then we get a patron-client cluster. The cluster refers to structures in which many clients attach

themselves to one leader. Now, if the cluster is enlarged, but still focussing on one person and his vertical links, a patron-client pyramid is said to be formed. Thus,, a pyramid is formed when leaders of various patron-client clusters, themselves, establish clientage bonds with still higher status political actors.⁵⁶

If one agrees with the logical derivation of patron-client pyramids from the basic patron-client dyad, there is still the problem of the kind of interaction that occurs between the patrons and the clients. Again, despite variations, three main ideas emerge from the literature.

First, the patron-client linkage develops between two unequal parties. The inequality could be based on wealth, political influence or another factor. This has led one theorist of clientelism to describe it as "lopsided friendship".⁵⁷ Second, the formation and maintenance of the relationship depends on reciprocity. Such mutual exchange, however, might and often does involve noncomparable goods and services. It might involve votes for contribution to development project, or might involve a cabinet post for political support. The point being that the goods being exchanged are not always exactly comparable. Third, the development and maintenance of a patron-client relationship rests heavily on face-to-face contact between two parties.⁵⁸

The structural characteristics of a patron-client system, which we have briefly summarized, do not actually tell us the political importance of clientelism, at least not explicitly. In

discussing clientelism as a central feature of peasant societies, Powell is quite explicit on the features of what he calls the "clientelist state".⁵⁹ One of the key features of the clientelist state is that the patron-client relations are of central importance in the electoral process. The existence of elections is, in turn, necessary for the system. The reason is that votes are the only thing of value which poor clients can exchange with wealthier patrons. At the village level there is intense competition as brokers and potential brokers compete for peasant votes which can then be delivered to a particular patron or potential patron.

"Such competition, which has been described as factionalism, is an essential ingredient in the process of aggregating clienteles and linking them to vertical patronage structures in the political system. National or regional political leaders recruit local political leaders from among the competing local patrons and brokers".⁶⁰

The other key political feature of the clientelist state has to do with the use of peasant clients for non-electoral purposes. Powell argues that outside the electoral system, the nature of the "contract" between the ruling elites and the peasantry clients, is usually concerned with the flow of a rather mundane range of pay-offs - small amounts of land, credit, technological marketing assistance etc. There is little or no ideological content in the contract which might entangle a political elite with dissidents.⁶¹ The result is that a clientelist state enjoys a large degree of flexibility in questions

of policy, doctrine and dogma. The freedom from policy dogma, however, tends to erode the coherence of leaders, thus putting serious limitations on the emergence of a coherent ideology.⁶²

The third important feature of a patron-client state is factionalism. Though factionalism and clientelism are not exactly the same, they often go hand in hand, as a result of the lack of ideological coherence described above. Thus, many factions are simply loose alliances among patron-client networks. The reasons for the alliances might be unique to each political system, but factional conflicts are often exacerbated by the lack of a coherent ideology. Thus, each faction is at liberty to forge a coalition, and one might add by any means, for purposes of attracting more peasant clients.

Finally, and this is perhaps the central point, clientelist structures often primarily serve the purpose of representing interests of the peasants on the periphery of the political system, at the political centre. In other words, argues one analyst, in situations where, for example, there is no party organization, and well organized interest groups are concentrated in the urban areas, "clientelist structures are frequently the sole mechanisms through which the residents on the periphery can penetrate the centre, not only for the purpose of making demands on central government institutions, but for providing support to those institutions as well".⁶³ The implication of this point is that administrative structures, such as the

Provincial Administration in Kenya, might reflect elements of clientelism, even though the recruitment of the administrative elites is not, strictly speaking, based on the latter's participation in Harambee and, ipso facto, electoral politics. This is even more so when we consider the fact that leading members of the Provincial Administration such as the Provincial Commissioners were recruited on the basis of their personal relationship with Kenyatta.

What then do we mean when we say that Kenyatta established a patron-client state? Before we describe what we understand by the patron-client state in Kenyatta's Kenya, it is important to point out that we are still looking at the political system from the top down rather than the bottom up. In other words, rather than beginning with the dyads at the village, we are looking at the system from the tip of the pyramid. When we look at the system from the constituency level, we shall then be in a position to see whether the patron-client interactions actually do extend to the village level. By characterising the state as a patron-client state, we are obviously arguing that clientelism does extend to the village level.

By the time Kenya held her first post-independence elections, the main outlines of Kenyatta's style of governing had emerged. As noted above, the foundations for Kenyatta's political style had been laid in the intervening years. Kenyatta relied on two parallel linkage structures - one bureaucratic; the other

political - to govern the country and maintain his authority among the peasantry. For our immediate purposes, we are concerned with the political linkage which was allowed to develop as ^apatron-client system, the recruitment to which was dependent on participation in Harambee.

As a first step in the development of the clientelist system, Kenyatta stopped making an attempt to control the plethora of district electoral machines that had emerged during the late fifties and early sixties. He also stopped going to parliament except on special occasions such as the reading of the budget. Instead, he positioned himself above party and parliamentary politics as "Mzee" - the wise elder or patriarch. In this role, Kenyatta sought to establish what Henry Bienen has described as "court politics".⁶⁴ With Kenyatta as the acknowledged "father of the nation" and in control of the central Government, elected representatives were given free rein to organize at the constituency and, sometimes at district levels, campaign for elections and then pay homage to the President, and appeal to "his" Government for assistance to their home areas.⁶⁵ The appeal could either be made in Parliament, or more often than not, during organized visits "to greet" the President and pledge loyalty to him. The visits would usually follow him depending on whether he was at any of the three State Houses or at his suburban home in Gatundu, some twenty miles or so from Nairobi. During these visits, a cash donation would normally be made to the President for some on-going Harambee

project. The idea was to let the President know that the visitors were committed to furthering the spirit of Harambee

"By virtue of his unchallengeable position, Kenyatta thus installed himself as the premier patron in a clientelist network consisting of roughly four tiers".⁶⁶ At the apex was the President who had chosen to rule partly through the cabinet composed almost entirely of regional leaders, or regional leaders of long standing reputation. The cabinet members all had two major qualifications. First, despite the fissiparous proliferation of constituency electoral machines, they had enough political reputation to influence electoral outcomes in other constituencies - usually in neighbouring districts. The influence was, no doubt, derived partly from their perceived closeness to the President and partly from their ability to use the governmental resources at their disposal to influence the voters. These resources would include not only the regular government projects, but also the irregular "matching" funds for Harambee projects which a Minister could "donate" at any Harambee meeting of his own choosing. It is most unlikely that a Minister would agree to "donate" the matching funds for a project in a constituency represented by a person not considered a friend. As we have already seen, their rate of electoral success was higher than that of any other group of competitors. This leads to the next point.

The other qualification for cabinet Ministers was that nearly all had demonstrated their ability at election time to "bring in their ethnic base in support of the Government",⁶⁷ and to demonstrate to the President that they were in complete control of their respective ethnic regions. Thus, the ability to get themselves elected "unopposed" was always an added advantage, if not an assurance that they would continue to hold Ministerial positions. Rarely, however, did they succeed in getting themselves elected unopposed unless they were particularly close to the President. Even then, only one or two could count on Presidential intervention on their behalf.

The regional leaders were simultaneously clients of the President, though not necessarily personal friends of the President, and patrons of aspiring younger politicians.⁶⁸ If elected, the younger politicians became backbenchers in Parliament, and in turn patrons of local notables and local politicians in their own constituencies.⁶⁹ Some of the notables might hold elective offices as members of local Government. In that capacity, they in turn become patrons to small segments of the public,⁷⁰ usually organized around Harambee projects, though not necessarily always so. Thus, there were four tiers in the clientelist system. These were the President, the Cabinet, newly elected and usually younger politicians, and the local notables and politicians.

It should be emphasised here that the four tiers pyramid of political linkages between the centre and the periphery is something of an abstracted model which might not fit exactly in any given locality in Kenya. As Joel Barkan points out:

"While a four-tiered system of linkages between the centre and the periphery has become the model for political development in Kenya, it does not exist on a uniform basis in all areas of the country, and in some areas scarcely exists at all. On the one hand, these linkage chains are based on the series of informal personal relationships which periodically break down or fail to develop at one or more of the four levels. On the other hand, some chains consist of less than four tiers as when a minister appeals directly to the local notables in his own constituency rather than via an MP or when a backbencher by-passes the local notables to make direct contact with the people at the grass-roots".⁷¹

In this respect, the position of Assistant Ministers deserves special mention because it was a significant variation of the model. At any one time, roughly thirty-five Members of Parliament were Assistant Ministers. This was almost a quarter of Parliament. This group consisted mainly of young energetic organizers, usually elected with substantial majorities and/or easily re-elected to a second term.⁷² Their position in the linkage system was ambiguous. They were frequently not clients of Ministers, and most of them, if not nearly all of them, were not close to Kenyatta. But they were effective organizers of their constituencies and as such they were simultaneously regarded as potential regional leaders and therefore cabinet Ministers, and a possible source of opposition to the centre.⁷³ Their appointment as Assistant Ministers "may thus be construed, as both a promotion acknowledging their performance to date, and as an attempt to coopt them into the clientelist network".⁷⁴

We might also add here that Kenyatta violated this system when he chose, as he did often, to address himself directly to the peasantry, as in his campaign for Harambee. But then, he would be speaking as the "Father of the Nation" and not as a politician seeking peasant support for a particular project. When he did this, he was, at least in theory, closer to direct personal rule. But his interventions were rarely directed against a particular individual, especially during the election times (the single exception is the 1966 "Little General Elections" when he personally campaigned against Mr. Kaggia - a detainee colleague of his - in Muranga District where the KPU had made some inroads through Kaggia's personal efforts) and in this sense, the clientele clusters were not greatly affected by Kenyatta's role, as the presumably "apolitical" patron.

Before going further, we should briefly mention the role played by ethnic associations in this system, and, particularly the most powerful of these, the Gikuyu, Embu, and Meru Association (GEMA).

While parliamentary or electoral clientelism evolved along fairly informal lines over a period of time which also saw an informal clarification of political rules, ethnic associations were highly organized and often complemented electoral clientelism. Going back to colonial days, Kenya always had numerous ethnic welfare associations, some of which became the basis for District Associations mentioned earlier. The best known of the colonial

ethnic associations was the Luo Thrift and Trading Corporation which Oginga Odinga had founded in 1947 to improve the economic welfare of the Luo people. Hand in hand with the Luo Thrift and Trading Company went the Luo Union which had been formed at around the same time and functioned as the social and cultural platform of the Luo people. Odinga later effectively used these two ethnic associations for purposes of mobilizing the Luo people in the anti-colonial struggle. Other nationalist leaders did the same in other locales, though their ethnic associations were more deliberately political and were intended, right from the outset, to serve as district based political parties, as we have already pointed out.

In post independence Kenya, two welfare associations assumed increased importance and consequently their leaders were nominated to Parliament by Kenyatta no doubt as a recognition of their leadership positions in their respective ethnic welfare associations. The two associations were the New Akamba Union (NAU) and the Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association (GEMA). As their names imply, the associations catered for the Akamba people of the Eastern Province of Kenya, and the Gikuyu, Embu and Meru people respectively. The latter three groups are all linguistically related and they are the groups who were heavily involved in Mau Mau.

The two associations operated along similar lines. Their respective chairmen were personally very wealthy and they played a highly visible role in Harambee fund-raising. Of the two associations, GEMA increasingly became the most important and so we shall describe it in some detail as an illustration of ethnic clientelism.⁷⁵

GEMA was formed in 1971 as a direct consequence of what the GEMA members perceived as a threat, particularly from the Luo of Western Kenya following the aftermath of the events of 1969. It will be recalled that in 1969, Tom Mboya was assassinated, and Odinga's KPU was banned following Kenyatta's visit to Kisumu in Luoland during which his life was supposedly threatened and a number of people killed by the Presidential escort. (Numbers of those killed range all the way from the official estimate of 11 people, to unofficial estimates of over 100). The Kisumu shootings were followed by widespread oathing among the Kikuyu, during which they swore, among other things, that the flag - meaning the Presidency - would never leave the House of Mumbi - the mythical mother of the Kikuyu as was pointed out in the previous chapter. It will be recalled that oathing had played a very significant part in the Mau Mau struggle and was therefore a highly charged political action. Soon after the oathing, there was an attempted coup in 1971 which increased the fears of the leadership that the Presidency would go to someone outside the Kikuyu group. All these events culminated in the hasty registration of GEMA in 1971.

Right from the outset, GEMA's leaders claimed that it was a welfare association and as such had no political intentions. This despite the fact that the office holders of GEMA continued to be politically powerful individuals in their own right. In addition to the wealthy chairman, the office holders included Ministers, the Governor of the Central Bank, and Assistant Ministers, to name a few. The official patron of the Association was Kenyatta himself. In 1973, GEMA formed a mass investment company called GEMA Holdings with an original issued capital of 1 million Kenya pounds. (1 Kenya pound = 3 Canadian dollars). The company continued to grow at what some people considered an alarming rate so that by mid 1978 it was worth over 30 million Kenya pounds. Shares in the company were open to members of GEMA. Any individual from the Gikuyu, Embu or Meru groups could become a member of GEMA after paying a small membership yearly fee of 2 Kenyan shillings which most people could easily afford.

The political significance of GEMA was not simply that the President was its patron and the office bearers were politically powerful and wealthy. The point was that GEMA increasingly obtained access to the President to the point where it was replacing KANU as the only well organized body in the country. It held regular elections every two years, and its branches extended to the village level, where it regularly collected money from the peasants and purchased large farms which were then distributed to the members. Of even more importance is GEMA's role in the politics

of Harambee and electoral politics in particular. GEMA leaders became the most sought after guests of honour at Harambee meetings and for good reason. Due to its solid financial backing, GEMA leaders could easily raise one million shillings at one Harambee session, though it rarely raised Harambee money as an organization. Rather, its leadership went to Harambee meetings as individuals. As usual, they carried donations from themselves and "their friends". What then developed was a situation whereby GEMA could influence electoral outcome in those parts of the country where it had substantial membership. An aspiring politician would make sure he had the blessing of GEMA and if there was a local GEMA branch, he would seek to control it even as he sought the patronage of the national office bearers, who were in turn clients of the President.

GEMA fund raising activities across the country came to be viewed by some politicians, as part of the succession struggle. There was plenty of evidence for this. Not unexpectedly, the most powerful of these politicians called for the abolition of all ethnic welfare associations in the name of unity, even as the group itself stepped up its Harambee activities. GEMA continued to deny that it had any political intentions and survived, at least due partly to the power of its patron, and partly ^{to} the "goods" it could deliver to its members as a result of its protected and privileged position in the Kenyan political system.

Though not all ethnic welfare associations had GEMA's power and access to the head of state, most of them played a complementary role to electoral clientelism as regional leaders sought to control them, for electoral purposes. Thus, the control of Luo Union became the main issue of Luo politics as rival groups sought to convince the President that they were the legitimate leaders of the Union. But whatever the internal politics of ethnic associations, they were allowed to exist for one main reason. In the President's mind, they were seen as serving the purpose of uniting an ethnic group, and then delivering the group in support of the Government. The same function was expected of cabinet Ministers as regional leaders and the President's clients.

In summary, the patron-client state established by Kenyatta sought to control the political system through ethnic and geographical - "non-class" - components. The aim was to persuade the people that the only way to political success was through the hierarchy of ethnic and regional patrons, with only the President above the fray. Within this state, political and economic issues would be framed and discussed along personal and/or regional lines. Anybody who attempted to portray the issues in the language of social-economic classes was immediately portrayed as a dissident. Worse fate awaited him if he violated the rules of the patron-client state and attempted, for example, to appeal to the peasantry across ethnic and regional boundaries in support of fundamental structural changes. Then he was portrayed

by the regime as challenging the personal position of the President. The truth of the matter is that such a person would be challenging the collective interests of the social-political elites, something whose implications would be too politically radical to discuss openly. Hence the easy solution of portraying such a person as personally challenging the President, rather than the collective interests which he safeguarded within the patron-client state.

The unique feature in the establishment of the clientelist system was the non-existence of any central institutions which could be used for articulating peasant grievances as a group. This was partly historical and partly due to Kenyatta's choice. It should be pointed out here that the emphasis is on "articulating peasant grievances as a group", rather than on the actual existence and functioning of central institutions. While for example, the existence of an active political party might make it easier for peasant grievances to be articulated, this would not be sufficient in itself to ensure an articulation of the collective grievances of the peasantry. The party itself could be a patron-client party, and indications are that this is the type of party an active KANU would have been. The sufficient condition of "articulating peasant grievances as a group" would probably never have been met by KANU even if it had been active. This is probably what Kenyatta recognized in choosing to ignore the party. But even without a party, it is possible to argue

that a clientelist system would not have developed had Parliament and the party existed as institutions for leadership recruitment and policy debate.

What then is the significance of Harambee in the system which Kenyatta established? We have already argued that the significance of Harambee lay in its electoral importance. All we should add here is that the politics of Harambee were part of the process of establishing the patron-client system. Once the system was established, Harambee continued to play a supportive role, both as a determinant of electoral success, and as an ideology. We shall now summarize this argument by trying to link electoral, and in general political success with the ideology of Harambee.

Before we do so, however, it is necessary to make a rather fundamental observation. Earlier in this section, we pointed out that one of the features of a patron-client state is that the patron-client structures put serious limitations on the emergence of a coherent ideology. How then can we argue that there was an ideology within what we have characterised as a patron-client state? In order to make the argument, we must first make two preliminary qualifications. First, when we talk of a Harambee ideology we are not talking of a coherent body of political philosophy, in the conventional meaning of a political ideology. Rather, we are talking of recurring themes and concepts in the course of political discourse and activity and in the course of providing

political support. In this case, the themes and concepts are barely coherent and in this respect they betray their origins in the patron-client state. Secondly, it can be argued that precisely because Kenyatta and the Kenyan political elites realised that a patron-client state limits the development of a coherent ideology, they encouraged the propagation of the themes and concepts outlined below. In this sense, the ideology of Harambee and working together was a politically expedient, but, quasi-ideology, which nonetheless served the intended purpose of supporting the patron-client state.

4.5 The Supportive Ideology of "Working Together"

The foundations of the Harambee ideology were laid in the mid and late sixties. Consequently the ideology did not take shape until the last four or five years of Kenyatta's rule.

The first step in the development of the ideology was reached when the party and Parliament ceased to be meaningful platforms for political competition and recruitment and the President emerged as the legitimising symbol of the regime. As the President rose above politics, the political elites realised that what had been established was a clientelist system, and that recruitment into the system was dependent on a number of factors.

First, it was dependent on a denial of politics even when the motives for action were outrightly political. To put it more bluntly, the word "politics" acquired negative connotations in the Kenyan context. Thus, when a politician went to a fund-raising meeting, his speech would almost always include a statement

to the effect that people - it does not matter who the word "people" refers to - should forget politics and instead concentrate on serving the "wananchi". Consequently, they should not mix development projects with politics. This was, of course, an extremely accurate political interpretation of the system. As part of the patron-client state, Kenyatta increasingly sought to depoliticise the system by equating any would be disagreement, no matter how genuine, with "politics" - defined, not even as struggle for power, but quite simply as any disagreement with those in power, and especially disagreement with government policies and actions. Disagreement was disunity. He coined a word for such disagreement - "Kupayuka" - as we have already pointed out. Those who "payukared" fell out of favour and in some cases were detained or "legally" jailed. They were preaching disunity.

The concept of denying the existence of politics was by and large an elitist concept. In other words, the message not to indulge in politics was almost always directed at actual or potential competitors. Obviously an ordinary peasant was in no position to be an actual or a potential competitor. Consequently the message to him was different and this constituted the second ideological component of Harambee. To the peasantry, the message was that Harambee was a partnership between the people and the Government. In other words, the Government will help those who organise themselves into Harambee groups rather than spending

their time listening to idle talk from those members of the elite who would rather complain that the Government has done nothing for the people.

The third ideological component of Harambee was hard work. As we have already pointed out, Kenyatta equated time spent in Nairobi, presumably including time spent in Parliament debating Government policies, with "idleness" and "pakukaring". This to him was politics, and the opposite of politics was hard work. To a politician then, avoidance of politics came to mean taking part in development activities in the constituency. To Kenyatta, this was work and the politicians were again extremely accurate in their interpretation.

The fourth factor and perhaps the most celebrated component of Harambee was political unity. Although it has never been clear to the author how one makes the jump from "working together" on development projects to "political unity", Kenyatta always made the association in his speeches and the politicians were again quick to emulate him. One of his favourite Kiswahili phrases which he rarely left out when addressing any group of people, was "tufanye kazi pamoja, tuwe kitu kimoja" - meaning literally, "as we work together, we become one thing". Despite the problems of finding an appealing and perfectly logical way of linking the concept of "political unity" with the concept of "working together", it is not difficult to see what Kenyatta had in mind, if one takes into account the other three factors mentioned above.

Having equated politics with disunity and then sought to define their opposite as "hard work", and "partnership" it was easy to argue that hard work and particularly working together - the conventional meaning of Harambee - would result in the opposite of politics and disunity viz an apolitical and united system characterised by a partnership between the Government and the people and between the elites and the people.

It should be added, here, that at least at the national level, the political elite did give the impression that working together would result in unity. For example, two ethnic associations such as GEMA and NAU would hold joint Harambee meetings alternating between each others areas. These occasions would be used to preach national unity. Also in line with this practice, leading members of the political elite such as cabinet Ministers, would accept Harambee invitations from all over the country. But then, it is possible to argue that the joint Harambee exercises, and especially those of the cabinet Ministers, were largely designed to give political support to colleagues. The main reason in support of this argument is that as an informal rule, an "outsider" could not hold a fund-raising meeting in a constituency unless he was invited by the incumbent. As with all informal rules, this one could, of course, be broken.

The fifth factor was the need to emphasis the positive elements of the political system. As we mentioned in Chapter I, Kenyatta never offered to say any "Harambees" to negative elements

of the system. "Harambees" were only said in order to underline successful Government policies or planned programs. It is in this sense, more than any other, that Harambee was an ideology of support to the political system. Consequently, it became a fashion for the political elite to use Harambee meetings to "mention" what the Government had already done or was planning to do, "under the wise leadership of our beloved President, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta".

Perhaps the most controversial idea associated with Harambee was the notion of self-improvement, as distinct from simply working hard. In the next chapters, we shall see how and why the peasantry gave a practical meaning to the idea of self-improvement. What about the political elite? One of the standing jokes in Kenya is that Harambee does not mean Self-help but rather "help-self". Those who coined the idea of "help-self" had in mind the widely reported misappropriation of Harambee funds. While this might be the obvious and rather cynical meaning of helping the self, there is a much more serious political meaning which is a direct consequence of Kenyatta's clientelist system, viz political help-self or political entrepreneurship.

Political entrepreneurship developed as the political elite and would-be political elite realised that to become eligible for recruitment into the patron positions of the clientelist system, they not only had to show success at the constituency level, but that, in addition, the success was entirely

dependent on their own efforts. It, therefore, became important to calculate carefully which projects one got involved in at what time. This was necessary since the proliferation of projects made it impossible for anyone, no matter how wealthy and well organized, to get involved in all of them. As a complement to political entrepreneurship, political elites also turned into economic entrepreneurs as it, again, became obvious that a token contribution of a few shillings would no longer be enough to head off possible opposition.

Some analysts have argued that economic entrepreneurship as a complement of political entrepreneurship was officially sanctioned and that a representative was expected to use his access to the state for purposes of personal accumulation.⁷⁶ The example which is often cited to support the argument is the now famous confrontation between Kenyatta and Bildad Kaggia in 1966. (Kaggia was Kenyatta's colleague in detention as we have noted and later a critic of the regime). During the confrontation, Kenyatta asked Kaggia what he had done for himself and cited other leaders of the nationalist movement, who had acquired farms and businesses, as examples to be emulated. While this might be a dramatic example of the official sanctioning of accumulation, it was probably not necessary for accumulation to be politically sanctioned in this dramatic manner. It had already been sanctioned as part of the economic philosophy. What the politics of Harambee did was to make it absolutely necessary to accumulate if one were going to be

successful at the political entrepreneurship dictated by the clientelist system. Kenyatta for his part tolerated the use of state power for purposes of personal accumulation, even when the power was sometimes outrightly abused. In this respect, it should be recalled that the Ndegwa Commission of 1971 officially sanctioned the continued involvement of civil servants in private businesses, something which did not sit too well with the politicians.

The point that deserves emphasis is that personal accumulation was not only necessary for success at the politics of Harambee and the continued existence of patron-client relations of unequal partners, but also that the accumulation was in a sense partly legitimised by the politics of Harambee. This comes through when one is discussing the politics of inequality with project leaders in the countryside. Though keenly aware of the existence of economic inequalities, and particularly the privileged position of the elites, they are quick to point out that some members of the privileged elites have done a marvellous job of contributing to Harambee projects. Among the Kikuyu peasantry, for example, one often encountered the saying that people cannot be equal, but it is the duty of those who are well off to assist the less fortunate. The elites are, of course, aware of the legitimisation accorded to accumulation by a philosophy that requires the rich to patronise the poor. Anybody who has listened to a conversation between members of the elite, and particularly at social gatherings, will attest to the fact of the awareness.

Individualism, both political and economic, poses something of a contradiction, when looking at Harambee as a philosophy. The philosophy is portrayed as one of collective action. Structurally, however, the collective action is partly dependent on the existence of a high degree of individualism. Perhaps this is only possible within a patron-client society.

It should be evident from the sketch of the ideology which developed around Kenyatta's patron-client system, that the ideology was heavily oriented towards the maintenance of the status quo. To put it differently the ideology came very close to providing a justification for blaming any victim or critic of the system for the problems they might be having. Thus, as happened with members of the KPU, they could be blamed for failure to help themselves and their clients. If they retorted that they were not interested in helping themselves but rather in a radical re-structuring of the political economy, they were accused of laziness and engaging in mere politics. Either way the ruling elite could not lose.

The above point (on the conservative nature of the ideology) leads us to our final issue. Put simply, participation in Harambee became a symbol of political acceptance by and of Kenyatta's government. This worked in two ways. First, the ultimate political ex-communication, in Kenya, became the denial of permission to take part in Harambee. Thus those who had fallen

out of favour with the regime were not only denied permission to hold Harambee meetings but in addition, they were not even allowed to send donations. The most extreme case of this was the political treatment of the populist critic of the Government, Josiah Mwangi Kariuki, who was first an Assistant Minister and then a backbencher. (He was assassinated in March 1975). Prior to his mysterious assassination, he could neither hold Harambee meetings nor send donations to such meetings. (He was extremely wealthy.) The second use of Harambee as a symbol of political acceptance was the reverse of the situation just described.

In other words, the way to show extreme rejection of the regime was to publicly denounce the idea of Harambee, and thus commit the ultimate political heresy. This took place after the assassination of Kariuki. Some members of the political elite showed their anger at the assassination by publicly announcing that they were not going to take part in any more "Harambees". Their call became "no more Harambees".

4.6 Summary

Seizing on the fluid and divided nature of the Kenyan political system at the close of the colonial period, Kenyatta decided to control political centrifugal forces by establishing a patron-client state. By doing so, he turned a historical weakness into political strength. As we pointed out in Chapter II, some kind of elections are necessary for continuation of a patron-client political system. Elections continued to be held in Kenya, but

electoral success was deliberately linked to participation in Harambee activities. In linking electoral success to Harambee, politics, as wide and critical involvement in policy making, was rejected at the political centre and hence it shifted to the countryside under the guise of delivering development projects. Harambee activities thus became the principal arena of interaction between the elites and the peasants. The peasants expected and accepted this. The political elites accepted it since it was the principal means of recruitment into the patron-client system.

Since Harambee was an officially sanctioned policy, the participants, by their very participation provided support to the system. Furthermore, the system gave rise to a supportive ideology. Though not all of the tenets of the ideology were directly attributable to the politics of Harambee, the latter accommodated the ideology almost perfectly.

In conclusion, we can say that, though Harambee can be analysed from more than one perspective, a political perspective must take into account relevant macro aspects of the political system as the latter evolved under Kenyatta. This is what we have attempted to do. In subsequent chapters, we shall be looking at the extent to which the macro aspects were reproduced at the project level. More specifically, we shall be looking at the precise nature of the interaction between the elites and the peasants around a Harambee project. Before we do so, however, we shall first summarise Harambee activities at the national level.

CHAPTER 4: FOOTNOTES

1. Bennett, G. and C. Rosberg, The Kenyatta Election: Kenya, 1960-61. Oxford Univeristy Press, London; 1961, p.33
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3. Ibid, p.33
4. Gertzel, C., The Politics of Independent Kenya, East African Publishing House, Nairobi; 1970, p.8
5. Bennett, G. and C. Rosberg, op cit, p.354
6. Gertzel, C., op cit, p.9
7. Ibid, p.9
8. Bennett, G. and C. Rosberg, op cit, pp. 126-174
9. Ibid, p.42
10. Sandbrook, R., "Patrons, Clients and Unions: The Labour Movement and Political Conflict in Kenya" Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. 10, 1972, p.9
11. Ibid, p.10
12. Gertzel, C., op cit, p.31
13. Ibid, p.40
14. See for example the statement by Mr. Henry Wariithi, the then Chairman of the backbenchers group in which he went to great lengths to show that the backbenchers were loyal to Kenyatta. Official Reports: House of Representatives: First Parliament: Second Session Vol. 111: Part 111: June 1964, Col. 481.
15. Gertzel, C. op cit, p.42
16. Ibid, p.140
17. Republic of Kenya: Sessional Paper No. 10 on African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya: Government Printers, Nairobi; 1965
18. Okumu, J., "The Little General Elections in Nyanza" in Cherry Gertzel, op cit, p.120

19. Ibid, p.121
20. Ibid, p.122
21. Ibid, p.123
22. Bienen, H., Kenya, The Politics of Participation and Control. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 1974, p.3
23. Gertzel, C. op cit, p.36
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26. East African Standard, Nairobi; August 15, 1968
27. This was especially true in Kenyatta's last few years when some Provincial Commissioners, for example the P.C.'s from the Rift Valley and the Coast seemed to have more powers than any Government Minister. They could even speak on foreign policy issues and especially on relations between Kenya and her immediate neighbours.
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29. Brown, J.M., Kenyatta, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London; 1972, p.308
30. Kenyatta, J., Suffering Without Bitterness, East African Publishing House, 1968, p.347
31. Ibid, p.277
32. The most important studies on this issue are: Raymond Hopkins "The Kenya Legislature: Political Functions and Citizen Perceptions": University of Iowa: Mimeo November 1971; Ronald Stockton: "Aspects of Leadership in Nyeri" Institute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi. Staff Paper 107, 1970: Marco-Surveys Public Opinion Poll No. 15, Nairobi, 1967.
33. Marco Surveys Ltd: Public Opinion Poll No. 15, Nairobi, 1966

34. A subsequent report in the Daily Nation, Nairobi, Thursday June 1, 1967, claimed that the survey had been suppressed by the Kenyan Government because it "showed steady and growing support for the KPU". Marco Surveys denies in the publication that the survey was ever suppressed.
35. Marco Surveys, op cit, p.10
36. Republic of Kenya, Development Plan: 1966-70. Government Printers Nairobi, 1966, p.325
37. Republic of Kenya, Development Plan: 1974-78. Government Printers Nairobi, 1974, p.482.
38. Republic of Kenya: Development Plan: 1970-74. Government Printers Nairobi, 1970, p.524
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41. The survey was carried out primarily by Joel Barkan, of the University of Iowa as part of a comparative study on Legislative Behaviour and Rural Development. A follow up to this study is in planning stages and will focus on political conditions for effective small scale rural assistance projects. The author is involved in the follow-up study, which will be partly based at the University/Nairobi, Institute For Development Studies.
42. Barkan, J.D., "Semi-Competitive Elections Clientelism and Political Recruitment in Kenya". Paper prepared for Table-ronde sur les elections, non-concurrentielles, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, France; Mimeo, 1976, p.24
43. Ibid, p.24
44. Ibid, p.23
45. See Hyden, G. and Colin Leys. "Elections and Politics in Single-Party Systems". British Journal of Political Science, Oct. 1972 p. 369-399 for a summary of the 1969 elections. The 1974 elections are also discussed by Gatheru, Wanjohi, in "Going to Elections in Kenya: Notes of 1974 General Elections in Central Province" University of Nairobi: Department of Government. Working Paper No. 1, May 1978.

46. Barkan, J. op cit p.24
47. Ibid, p.24
48. Ibid, p.25
49. Leys, C., "Politics in Kenya. The Development of Peasant Society" op cit, pp. 333-334
50. Sandbrook, R., "Patrons-Clients and Unions: The Labour Movement and Political Conflict in Kenya", op cit, p.4
51. Ienen, H. op cit, p.109
52. Kaufman, R.R., "The Patron-Client Concept and Macropolitics: Prospects and Problems" Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 16, 1974, p.285
53. See for example, Scott, J.C., "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in South East Asia", American Political Science Review, Vol. 70, March 1972.
54. See for example: Powell, J.D., "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics", American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, 1970.
55. It seems that the major effort to conceptualize clientelism went on in the late 1960's and early 1970's as part of the then overall attempt to develop a theory of political development. Hence, these days, one rarely finds any conscious attempt to conceptualize clientelism. Instead, readers are beginning to come out, pulling together all the earlier attempts to conceptualize and apply clientelism. One such reader, which includes contributions by virtually everybody who has written on political clientelism is: Friends, Followers and Factions: A Reader in Political Clientelism, Eds. S.W. Schmidt, et al, University of California Press, Berkley, 1977. The Bibliographical Essay by James C. Scott is particularly useful.
56. The best discussions of patron-client clusters and pyramids are to be found, among others, in James C. Scott op cit p.96; R. Lemarchand and K. Legg. "Political Clientelism and Development" Comparative Politics Vol. 4(2) 1972, p.160; S.F. Silverman "Patronage and Community-Nation Relationships in Central Italy" Ethnology Vol. 4(2) April 1965, p. 172-190; A. Weingrod "Patrons, Patronage and Political Parties" Comparative Studies in Society and History Vol. 10(4) 1968, p. 376-400.

57. Rivers, J.P.H., The People of the Sierra, Criterion Books, N.Y., 1954, p.140
58. For an elaboration of the three characteristics of clientelism, See: Powell, J.D. in Schmidt, S.W. et al (Eds.) op cit pp. 147-150.
59. Ibid, p.148
60. Ibid, pp. 148-156
61. Ibid, p.151
62. Ibid, p.155
63. Ibid, p.156
64. Barkan, J., "Semi-Competitive Elections, Clientelism and Political Recruitment in Kenya" op cit p.15 . For the original discussion of Kenyatta's "court politics", see: Henry Bienen op cit p.75. There is also a very good description of the court politics in Colin Leys' Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism. University of California, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1975, pp. 243-251.
65. Barkan, J. "Semi-Competitive Elections, Clientelism and Political Recruitment in Kenya" op cit p.16
66. Ibid, p.16 The ensuing discussion on electoral clientelism owes a great deal to a number of papers by Joel Barkan and also to personal conversations with Professor Barkan.
67. Ibid, p.16
68. Ibid, p.16
69. Ibid, p.16
70. Ibid, p.16
71. Ibid, p.16-18
72. Ibid, p.18
73. Ibid, p.18
74. Ibid, p.18

75. A brief sketch of GEMA as an instrument of the Bourgeoisie in Kenya can be found in Colin Leys' "Capital Accumulation, Class Formation and Dependence. The Significance of the Kenyan Case". Queens University, Kingston, Mimeo, 1978, pp. 30-31.

76. For this argument see, for example, Leys, C. "Politics in Kenya: The Development of Peasant Society" op cit, p.334

CHAPTER 5

THE HARAMBEE PARTNERSHIP IN KENYA

5.1. Introduction

This chapter is largely descriptive, and is intended to give an overview of Harambee activities in Kenya. Such an overview is necessary at this stage in order to give the reader a national picture of the movement, and even more important, in order to begin to answer some of the questions raised in previous chapters and especially the last chapter. An overview of this nature can be organized in more than one way depending on the research priorities of the investigator. Thus, it is possible to describe Harambee activities from the perspective of regional inequalities or even from the perspective of the movement's contribution to overall economic growth, to name two alternatives.

We have chosen to describe Harambee activities from the perspective of the political actors involved in the movement. We identify the actors as the Kenyan Government, the national and the local elites, and "the people". This way we shall be able to analyse Harambee as a dynamic political activity and account for the political importance of the movement by looking at the activities of the political actors.

We begin by showing that the movement has grown over the years, and that it has been heavily oriented towards social projects such as schools. We then raise the question of who has been responsible for the growth of the movement in terms of various contributions to the inputs. In order to answer the question, we

first describe the contribution of the Government as a partner. This is followed by a description of the elites and "the people" as partners.

We rely heavily on official data and data gathered by Philip Mbithi and Rasmus Rasmusson. These are the only two sources of national data on Harambee. Unfortunately the official data, some of which Mbithi and Rasmusson use, has serious shortcomings as we shall shortly show. There is, therefore, a limit to the conclusions one can derive from that data.

5.2 Socially Oriented Expansion

The single most important feature of the Harambee movement has been its constant growth from a modest beginning in the early 1960's, to a level where, as we pointed out in Chapter I, it was estimated to constitute approximately 30 percent of all capital formation in the rural areas by the end of 1977.¹ While the total value of projects completed in 1964, the first year the Government started collecting information on self-help projects, was a mere K pounds 600,000, it has been reported that during the 1976/77 financial year alone, a total of K pounds 8.8 million was collected through Harambee contributions.² If we accept the last figure, then it is worth noting by way of comparison that the amount was slightly more than the recurrent expenditures, in that same year, of the Ministries of Agriculture and Health together.³

Before proceeding further we must make a few cautionary observations on the nature of Harambee information as reported in Government publications. To put it quite simply, information on Harambee projects, and especially information on contributions and value of projects is unreliable. To begin with, the information which reaches Nairobi from the field includes not only amounts actually collected, but also amounts pledged at Harambee fund-raising meetings. Not everything pledged is actually delivered. Our field observations showed that in some extreme cases, the rate of default was as high as 20 percent. Second, up to now, there is no central mechanism for auditing funds collected at Harambee meetings. Though some leading political figures in Kenya⁴ have in the past called for the establishment of formal auditing procedures for Harambee funds, the procedures have not yet been seriously discussed, let alone instituted. The result is that not everything that is reported collected actually goes into the projects, though all the amounts collected and pledged are reflected in the reports submitted to the Headquarters in Nairobi. In some cases, the issue of outright misuse of Harambee funds has come into the open, and Government officials have been forced to react.⁵ In most cases, however, the discussion has been limited to the occasional letter to the editors of the newspapers.

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The third cautionary observation is that there still is no systematic way of collecting Harambee data and this is reflected in the published information. In some years, Districts will report on completed and ongoing projects. In other years, they will simply report on projects initiated. In other years still, they will report only on amounts collected, and the value of projects. The result is that it takes years for the statisticians in Nairobi to make sense out of the information received from the field. Currently, the information is five years behind, the latest complete report having been issued in 1973. In addition to the chaotic nature of the data coming from the field, it should be pointed out that the statistics section which deals with self-help statistics is terribly understaffed. When the author last visited the section last year to enquire about the next report, there was only one qualified statistician on staff. He was on loan from the Ministry of Finance and Planning.

The point, then, about self-help data is that it is so unreliable that when it appears to contradict one's field observations, one does not automatically dismiss the observations as wrong. Keeping the above observations in mind, we will now return to the main issue of the growth of the self-help movement over the years.

The growth of the self-help movement can be illustrated in a number of ways. One way would be to use the amounts of money collected each year. Unfortunately, this information is not

available in any systematic form. Another way would be to use the volume of projects initiated. While this data is useful for some purposes, it exaggerates the growth of the movement because it includes projects that are initiated and then later abandoned. A third way, and one which has been adopted by Government statisticians, is to use the monetary value of projects completed each year, and the number of projects completed each year. Table 5.1 summarizes the growth of the self-help movement over a number of years for which the data is available.

Table 5.1 shows that over a period of ten years, the value of completed Harambee projects increased by roughly seven times from K pounds 600,000 in 1964 to K pounds 4,346,000 in 1973. Despite the data problems discussed above, there is little doubt that the growth, as illustrated by the value of projects, has been remarkable. Though there are no systematic data from 1973 onwards, there is good reason to believe that the value of the projects has continued to rise, as reflected by the amount of contributions for the 1967/77 financial year which we have already quoted.

The table also shows that the growth in the value of the projects has not been accompanied by a growth in volume. From a high of just over 26,000 projects in 1967, the volume of projects completed started to decline, particularly in 1969. This represents a problem of interpretation. One interpretation which has been put forward by Mbithi and Rasmusson is that self-help

TABLE 5.1

NATIONAL VALUE AND VOLUME OF SELF-HELP 1964 - 1973

	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1974</u>
Value of Projects Completed, '000 KSh	600	800	1,200	1,956	2,677	2,115	2,311	2,584	3,116	4,346	15,934
Number of Projects Completed a	8,735	13,394	9,657	26,267	20,521	1,600	1,400	1,841	1,800	1,400	---

SOURCES: Self-Help Schemes - 1968: A Statistical Analysis. Ministry of Cooperatives and Social Services, Nairobi, n.d.; A Statistical Analysis on Self-Help Projects 1973. Nairobi Ministry of Cooperatives and Social Services, Nairobi, n.d.; Economic Survey 1971. Nairobi, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. 1971. Table 12.10 p. 220: Various pieces of data collected by the author from official statements.

a - Figures prior to 1969 do not include North Eastern Province.

activity grew slowly at first. It, therefore, "did not take root firmly until 1967, when the infection of grassroots disillusionment with the promise of independence became a reality".⁶ In other words, by 1967 it had become clear to the rural people that their economic circumstances were not improving, that jobs and land remained scarce, and that they were ill-equipped to compete for jobs by virtue of insufficient education.⁷ Therefore, they increasingly turned to Harambee educational projects as the panacea.

The major problem with this interpretation is that it not only understates self-help activity from 1964 to 1967,⁸ but also cannot explain the decline in volume after 1967. Another interpretation is that since the drop in volume was accompanied by a rise in value of projects, people simply turned to fewer but more expensive projects. This interpretation would be accurate, if it is applied to the early 1970's when the large Institutes of Science and Technology made their appearance, and tended to attract resources from secondary schools and other projects. But the Institutes did not start having an impact until 1973.

Graph 5.1 suggests the interpretation that there really is little to explain about the large number of completed projects in 1967. In other words, completed projects, as a measure of the growth of Harambee movement can be a misleading index. Depending on the size of the projects and the nature of the project, completion can simply happen at any time and this does not necessarily call for an explanation. If a project is not completed, it is simply carried

over to the following year. In other words, a full picture of the nature of the projects would have to include, not only completed projects, but also initiated and abandoned projects, as well.

In this sense, Graph 5.1, gives a much better picture of Harambee activities up to 1973. The graph also raises even more interesting questions. While there is an element of forward momentum between 1967 and 1968, the picture changes drastically in 1969. If we can believe this graph, there were nearly 28,000 projects started in 1968 and just over 20,000 projects completed in the same year. The impressive record in 1968 was followed by a near disappearance of Harambee in 1969. Every category of Harambee projects went down dramatically, and even the value of completed projects went down. One of course does not want to read too much into data which by all accounts is unreliable. However, a political interpretation of the 1969 decline is tempting. It is possible that the high rates of Harambee activities in 1967 and 1968 were in anticipation of the general elections in 1969.

It will be recalled from the last chapter that Kenyatta's campaign for development oriented Members of Parliament was taking place around this time and continued right up to the 1969 general elections. It seems that the campaign might have had an effect on rates of self-help activity in the two years preceding the elections. Why then the decline in 1969? Again, a political explanation suggests itself. First, a politician would not want to start new projects

Self-Help Project Status (1963-1973)

37,400

27,000

21,600

16,200

10,800

5,400

0

(KnpH 5)

Key: A- Abandoned projects
C- Completed projects
S- Newly started projects
U- Projects under way

--- Number of projects not available

Source: Ministry of Housing and Social Services. Department of Social Services: Community Development Division: A Statistical Analysis of Self-Help Projects, Nairobi, nd

during an election year. { Rather, he would prefer to have completed projects which he can then quote to the voters. Whether this was true of the 1969 General Elections is difficult to judge, but it is certainly true today. Second, and even more important, the administration has an unwritten rule of applying more strict discipline during an election year. According to one official at Nairobi, the administration normally tries to withhold permission to start new projects during an election year in order to protect the voters from unscrupulous candidates who will start all sorts of projects without the means or the intention to see them through. Thirdly, and this is speculation more than anything else, 1969 was the year of political troubles in Kenya as we pointed out in the last chapter. It is quite possible that the troubles had an effect on participation in self-help activity. This is suggested by the fact that even after the elections, the rate of self-help activity did not pick up in any dramatic way. The number of completed projects actually continued to decline in 1970, though the value of completed projects started to pick up again after 1969. As we suggested earlier, the pattern of declining volume and increasing value as a phenomenon of the 1970's can be explained by the appearance of the Institutes of Science and Technology in 1971, the campaign for which gobbled up most available funds. According to officials in Nairobi, this pattern is expected to continue into the 1980's though they are quick to point out the data they have might not be representative of what

is actually taking place in the countryside. For example, the statistician in Nairobi agreed with the author when it was pointed out to him that the data they have in Nairobi does not capture the plethora of women's Harambee groups which, by their very nature, never get completed. They move from one thing to another and most of them do not bother to register as continuing projects.

A second important feature of Harambee activities throughout the years has been the temporal and spatial stability of the Project Mix;

"Roughly half the value of all project activity in the 1960's and early 1970's was education related, while an additional twenty percent was in health and social facilities. Thus, more than 70 percent of self-help falls into a narrow range of social projects and there is very little variance in the mix of projects from Province to Province".⁹

Table 5.2 summarizes contributions on different types of projects from 1967 - 1973. Unfortunately, the official statistics do not tell us exactly what is included in each statistical category. Thus, "education" would include secondary schools, primary schools, village polytechnics etc. This problem notwithstanding, it is still quite clear that educational projects have continued to dominate Harambee activities. Two points can be made in this respect:

First, concentration on education can be interpreted as an expression of peasants' desire for self-improvement or for their children in order to be able to take advantage of the promises of political independence. This, as we have seen, is

the interpretation that Mbithi and Rasmusson give to the high educational content of Harambee activities. While we agree with this general interpretation, it is worth adding that construction of educational facilities on a self-help basis is something which is not new to the members of the peasantry. It was part of the nationalist partnership between the peasantry and the educated elites as we have seen, and consequently one would expect ready response for it. This is one of the points implied by Anderson in his evaluation of the self-help factor in the development of education in Kenya.¹⁰

The second point is that an educational project is a rather ideal project for partnership between the peasants and members of the elites. To begin with, as we have said, there is a historical precedent for the partnership. Furthermore, unlike some other types of Harambee projects such as electricity projects and water projects which by definition "belong" to those who can initially contribute the large amounts of capital required to get the project off the ground, a Harambee school could be constructed rather inexpensively especially in the 1960's. As many Kenyan educationists have observed, the tendency was to worry only about the physical structure, and hope that somehow the school would continue running. In other words, a school was a good project for pre-emptive development.

The Government has been aware of the strategy of pre-emptive development especially in the provision of social facilities

such as schools and health centres, which tend to generate a high demand from the Government for recurrent costs. The Government, has not been successful in controlling the trend. It has however, succeeded in encouraging "economically oriented" projects as reflected in the category "Agriculture" in Table 5.2. A large component of this category consists of cattle dips. The standard practice is for the local community to raise 50% of the amount required for a cattle dip. The Government then "matches" the 50% with an equal grant. This way, construction of cattle dips is encouraged. As one observer has concluded, "agricultural self-help is thus seen as one means of channelling development in a direction which can help to sustain growth in the economy as a whole".¹¹

The issue of economic versus social orientation of Harambee is of central concern to economists and planners. From the point of view of the interaction between the elites and the peasants, it is perhaps enough to simply take note of the pattern of the growth and the fact that the peasants seem to favour this pattern as we saw in Chapter IV. The detailed questions of why particular types of projects have been started will be explored in the next few chapters where we look at Harambee from the project level. For the moment, the immediate question from the point of view of the interaction between the centre and the periphery is: who has borne the burden of growth? To answer this question, we shall first look at the role of the Government in the growth of the Harambee movement.

5.3 The Government As A Partner

Harambee was right from the beginning an officially sanctioned policy as we have seen. Nonetheless, it was also clear from the beginning that the major financial burden was not going to be borne by the Government. In other words, the Government was going to be a very junior financial partner even as it strived to encourage the movement through small grants intended "to maintain the momentum of a project".¹²

For example, if we take the year 1967, the first year when the Government broke down the inputs which went into Harambee projects, the Government's contribution was only 4% of the total value of projects completed in that year. The people's contribution in that year amounted to approximately K Pounds 2 million.¹³

During the five year period covered by the first Development Plan: 1966-1970, the Government expected to spend no more than K pounds 500,000.¹⁴ A quick look at table 5.2 shows that the value of completed self-help project during that period was just over K pounds 10 million. During the period of the second Development Plan: 1970-1974, the Government expected to spend a total of K pounds 444,000.¹⁵ This amount was increased to K pounds 815,000 for the period covered by the third Development Plan: 1974-1978. It was estimated that the total value of self-help projects during the period 1974-78 would be K pounds 11.5 million.¹⁶ Though we still do not know how much the Government intends to spend on Harambee projects during the current plan period, the Minister

TABLE 5.2
VALUE OF TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS, IN K£, TO THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF PROJECTS 1967 - 1973

Types of Projects	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	Totals	Ranking
1 A. Social Projects									
1. Education	982,600	1,290,600	1,094,000	1,168,500	1,248,00	1,530,900	1,946,348	9,261,548	1
2. Nurseries	143,200	191,200	126,000	139,300	112,600	155,500	407,738	1,273,538	5
3. Health	222,400	286,600	233,000	193,900	167,000	189,900	184,691	1,477,491	4
4. Social Welfare & Recreation	123,900	109,800	33,000	34,700	75,000	272,500	1,104,035	1,752,935	3
B. Domestic Projects									
1. Latrines	24,100	61,200	8,000	5,500	8,000	8,400	10,633	125,833	10
2. Kitchens	19,700	26,100	3,000	2,500	32,000	1,300	1,018	85,618	11
3. Other Domestic Projects	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	343,300	56,400	37,678	437,378	8
11 A. Economic Projects									
1. Water Supplies	76,700	124,000	104,000	135,400	233,100	204,500	259,463	1,137,163	7
2. Transport & Communication	57,600	88,700	44,000	39,600	29,500	40,600	30,518	330,518	9
3. Agriculture	159,200	290,200	177,000	279,300	304,200	500,300	350,523	2,060,723	2
4. Fish Ponds	6,000	4,500					225	10,726	12
B. Miscellaneous									
	140,000	204,100	304,000	319,200	30,700	155,500	112,770	1,266,270	6
Total	1,955,400	2,677,200	2,124,000	2,315,900	2,584,000	3,115,800	4,345,640	19,117,940	

Source: Compiled from:

Ministry of Housing and Social Services Department of Social Services, Community Development Division
A. Statistical Analysis of Self-Help Projects, Nairobi 1974, various pages

responsible has stated that the Government intends to increase matching funds for Harambee projects.¹⁷ We, however, do not expect the increase to be dramatic.

Table 5.3 summarizes the pattern of contributions to Harambee projects up to 1973 when the last report was published. Throughout the years, the contribution from the people has averaged around 90% of the total input. For the sake of clarification, it should be pointed out that the category "Other Donors" refers mainly to members of the elite, voluntary agencies such as CARE, business firms etc.¹⁸

Table 5.3 clearly shows that the people's contribution to self-help projects far outweighs the contributions from all other contributors put together. The highest percentage contribution by "other donors" was in 1971, when approximately 15% of the total value came from this source. It should be pointed out that the pattern depicted by Table 5.3 was altered by the appearance of the large Institutes of Technology in the early 1970's. The effect of the Institutes was that they tended to attract large donations from sources other than the people. As Mutiso and Godfrey point out, fund-raising targets for each Institute varied between 10 and 30 million shillings and foreign firms made a point of contributing to the Institutes.²⁰ Lonhro, for example gave the equivalent of 320,000 shillings to the Kiambu Institute of Science and Technology.²¹ Large contributions to the Institutes have continued and we believe this is the main reason

why the ratio of "other donors" to "peoples contributions" went up in the years following the emergence of the Institutes. In 1974, the percentage contribution from "other donors" went up from 8.5% in 1973, to an average of around 12% for the years 1974-76.²²

Though Table 5.3 shows that the Government's financial contribution to Harambee projects has been a small percentage of the total value of the projects, the information depicted needs to be slightly qualified in order to give a fuller picture of the Government's financial contribution to Harambee projects.

The most important qualification is that the Government has often responded favourably to requests for financial assistance once a Harambee project has been completed. The response might take the form of aiding secondary schools with trained teachers, providing trained personnel for health centres, or sometimes an outright taking over of some facilities once they have been completed. In this respect, the Government's financial contribution to Harambee projects has been more than the figures shown in Table 5.3. Unfortunately, the Government does not commit itself in advance as to how much it intends to spend to aid Harambee facilities. Consequently, the information is not available in any of the Development Plans. The Government simply states its intentions to continue with the process of aiding Harambee facilities once they are completed. The exception to the rule is the Government's explicit commitment to the Institutes of Science and Technology.

TABLE 5.3

CONTRIBUTORS TO HARAMBEE PROJECTS IN KE: 1967-73

Year	Peoples Contribution			Central Government	Local Authorities	Other Donors	Total/	Grand Total
	Labour	Material	Cash					
1967	585,600	587,700	658,500	1,831,800/93.7	64,000	29,400	30,200	123,600/6.3
1968	619,700	1,073,100	829,500	2,522,300/93.4	90,200	28,200	36,500	154,900/6.6
1969	501,000	596,000	907,000	2,005,000/94.2	89,000	31,000	89,000	120,000/5.8
1970	693,000	493,700	836,700	2,023,400/87.4	169,000	33,500	90,000	292,500/12.6
1971	652,000	480,900	1,059,800	2,192,700/84.9	253,700	21,100	116,500	391,300/15.1
1972	855,200	531,700	1,320,100	2,707,000/86.6	234,000	25,200	149,600	408,800/13.2
1973	1,012,109	491,383	2,472,692	3,976,184/91.5	234,433	19,863	115,160	369,456/8.5
Total	4,918,609	4,254,483	8,084,292	17,212,384	1,045,333	188,263	626,960	1,860,556
Ranking	2	3	1	4	6	5		19,117,940

Source: Compiled from:

Ministry of Housing and Social Services Department of Social Services, Community Development Division
 A Statistic Analysis of Self-Help Projects. Nairobi: 1974 various pages

During the 1974-78 Plan, the Government committed itself to aid the Institutes through "a block grant of K pounds 600,000 and other tangible measures".²³ One of the "tangible measures" was a commitment to appoint a co-ordinating committee for the Institutes. The Committee would look after the allocation of the block grant.

The second qualifying factor is that the Government has always viewed Harambee projects in the context of the total effort at community development. In this respect too, the Government's contribution to Harambee has been slightly more than the figures shown in Table 5.3. Central to community development as a whole has been the effort to train Community Development Officers who would be "available to stimulate and guide self-help in the field and to serve the self-help committees".²⁴ By 1970, the Government expected to spend K pounds 50,000 on community development staff training. In 1966, the total spent on training was K pounds 43,000.²⁵ It is interesting that during the five year period of the 1970-74 Plan, the Government did not commit itself on the amount it intended to spend on training Community Development Officers. It simply noted that "in certain Districts, the present work load exceeds 200 self-help projects per Community Development Assistant, often spread over very large areas, (and that) this ratio will be greatly improved during the plan period".²⁶ Training of Community Development Officers as part of Governmental assistance to self-help was not mentioned in the 1974-78 Plan. What seems to emerge, then, is decreased Governmental attention to the training

aspects of its contribution to Harambee. In this respect, a survey carried out in 1974 showed that in some Districts, for example Machakos and Kiambu, well over half of the Community Development Assistants had not received any professional training.²⁷

This raises the next issue with reference to the Governmental contribution to Harambee, viz the planning of Harambee projects, or more specifically the lack of planning of most Harambee projects.

Lack of planning of most Harambee projects has been noticed by virtually every student of the movement. Projects are started without financial estimates of capital costs, let alone estimates and sources of recurrent expenditures. In agreement with independent observers, the Government admits that lack of planning of Harambee projects is a major problem.²⁸ We would argue here that the problem of unplanned Harambee projects should not surprise the Government, for it is a logical consequence of the nature of ^{the} Harambee movement in general. In other words, proliferation of Harambee projects is part of the structures of support and the ideology of support discussed in the last chapter. For the Government to plan, and ipso facto control, the projects would be tantamount to putting limits on the degree to which it wants to be supported. Put differently, if it were possible to treat Harambee projects purely as development projects, there would be room for the Government to institute more stringent planning procedures. As it is, the choice seems to be between

uncontrolled projects which are part of the general structures of regime maintenance, and controlled projects which would endanger the "spirit of Harambee", and the supportive social philosophy. A political/ideological interpretation of Harambee more or less predicts the unplanned nature of the projects. In this sense, the Government's contribution towards the planning of Harambee projects has been expectedly minimal. The way Harambee projects are administered testifies to the point about minimal planning and administration.

Administratively, Harambee activities fall under the Ministry of Housing and Social Services, which is a relatively junior Ministry compared to other Ministries such as Foreign Affairs, Education, Defense and Finance. Within the Ministry, Harambee activities fall under the Department of Social Services which is headed by a Commissioner of Social Services. Under the Commissioner are Divisional heads. One of the Divisions is a self-help Division, which in theory, is supposed to co-ordinate all the self-help activities throughout the country. In practise, however, the Division of self-help activities is no more than a final destination of raw self-help data from the field. As of mid 1978, the Division was five years behind in terms of tabulating the data for the whole country. Its latest report was issued in 1973, as we have pointed out.

In the field, Harambee activities come under Community Development Officers. There is a Community Development Officer for

each and every administrative level in the country. Thus, at the Provincial level, there is a Provincial Director of Social Services. At the District, Divisional and Locational levels, there are Community Development Officers. The Locational Officer reports to the Divisional Community Development Officer, who in turn reports to the District Community Development Officer, who in turn reports to the Provincial Community Development Officer. There is nothing unusual in this procedure. All the other Government ministries follow the same procedure.

When a local community decides to start a Harambee project, it is supposed to consult with the local Community Development Assistant before going ahead on the project. The procedure is outlined as part of the job description drawn up for Community Development Assistants. The Assistant is supposed to help in such project aspects as utilization of local resources, obtaining of technical assistance, general evaluation of project viability etc.²⁹

Once the local Community Development Officer has given his advice and approval, the project is then registered with the Divisional Headquarters. The act of registration also constitutes permission to start raising the money for the project. Before actual registration, however, the Harambee group must fill in an application form, which, inter alia, solicits information on the membership of the project, the committee members of the project, the financial plans of the project etc. This information, according

to the District Community Development Officer in Kiambu is supposed to facilitate better planning of Harambee projects and to make sure that resources are not being wasted through duplication of projects, and unnecessary competition. Once a project is registered, the community has a free hand to raise the money the best way it sees fit. Its only "obligation" is to submit occasional reports to the local Community Development Officer, who then forwards the reports to the District Headquarters for eventual transmission to Nairobi. There is no standard reporting procedure. In most cases, the "reports" are either oral or simply field observations by the Community Development Assistant. The reports normally constitute no more than information on the type of project, when the project was started, whether the project is continuing or has been abandoned, how much has been contributed by the people, etc. This is the kind of information that one finds in aggregate form in Nairobi.

The point that we would like to make is that, despite the existence of administrative structures whose formal function is to co-ordinate Harambee activities at the community level, and one would assume, all the way to the national level, very little co-ordination actually exists. The Government admits this as we have seen. For example, there is very little that a local Community Development Assistant can do to stop a community from starting a Harambee project. Once a decision has been made to start a project, the Community Development Assistant functions as no more than a

conduit for eventually registering the project with the administrative Headquarters, and if possible, attracting some funding for the project.

Lack of both administrative control and co-ordination of Harambee projects is not entirely unexpected as we have argued. It is in a sense one of the contradictions of the Harambee movement. According to some of the Assistants whom we interviewed, a field officer often finds himself in an ambiguous position of having to play two contradictory roles. On the one hand, he is expected to stimulate and encourage "the spirit of self-help". On the other hand, he is expected to help in the planning and co-ordination of self-help efforts, which means trying to control the pace of the movement. Faced with this dilemma, most field officers we observed made a political choice. In other words, they chose to accept Harambee as a politically sanctioned policy and therefore made no attempt to control it. We deliberately use the phrase "political choice" for the reason that no field officer would risk being seen as a hindrance to the people's efforts to improve themselves, not even in the name of proper planning. Part of the people/Government partnership, therefore, is the free rein that the Government has given to the Harambee movement. Thus, even as the civil servants who are stationed in Nairobi constantly decry the mushrooming of unplanned Harambee projects, leading members of the ruling political elite tour the country urging the people to start even more Harambee projects. This is part

of the contradiction referred to above. The civil servants in Nairobi, like their counterparts in the field, cannot politically afford to appear to be against "the spirit of self-help". They therefore resort to technocratic language which at the same time is very low keyed.

As part of the free rein that the Kenyatta Government allowed to the Harambee movement, there has been no central auditing of funds raised at Harambee meetings. Each project was allowed to raise and audit its own funds, as we have already pointed out. Considering the large amounts of money involved in Harambee activities, it might not even be too much to expect a Ministry of Harambee activities. This idea has never been raised in Kenya, and one can see the reason why. Every time somebody comes up with an idea that implies more administrative control of Harambee activities, there is an outcry that this would kill the voluntary spirit of Harambee. As we have argued, even without invoking the "voluntary argument" it is possible to politically explain the uncontrolled nature of the Harambee movement.

What we have said so far suggests the conclusion that the Government's contribution to Harambee has been mainly in the form of providing the necessary political conditions for the movement to flourish. It is possible to argue that this is to be expected otherwise the movement would cease to be a self-help movement. Who then has carried the major burden?

5.4 The National Elites And "The People" As Partners

Table 5.3 shows that the major financial burden for the success of the Harambee movement has been borne by "the people". On the face of it, this seems to run counter to the case which we built in the last chapter on the political importance of Harambee, as the basis of interaction between the elites and the peasants. The case, however, cannot be decided on the evidence of aggregate national data. The aggregate macro information needs to be supplemented with project level information before the issue of the political importance of Harambee can be settled. We shall be doing this in the next three chapters.

Still, at the macro level, there is the need to get an idea of the contribution of elites to the Harambee movement, and at the same time try to find out who exactly are the members of the elites. We shall begin with the question of financial contributions.

Donations from members of the national elites are officially classified under the category of "other donors". It is, therefore, safe to say that at the macro level, these donations form a very small percentage of the total inputs into Harambee projects.

Unfortunately, there are very serious problems when it comes to trying to look at the elites' financial contribution to Harambee projects. One way of doing it would be to go through the Kenyan newspapers and add up all the reported financial

contributions to Harambee projects. This has been done by Dmitras Conostas and John Nellis,³⁰ whose information was made available to Phillip Mbithi and Rasmus Rasmussen.³¹ The main problem with newspaper reports of Harambee contributions is actually not a problem of biased coverage, but rather a problem which is inherent to the way Harambee contributions are made and announced. Thus, as we mentioned in Chapter I, contributions can be made by way of participation in a "kilo system" of auction whose effect is to hide actual personal contributions. Furthermore, the announced contributions are sometimes from the guest of honour "and his friends", and as such, there is no way of knowing who "the friends" are. The effect of the above observation is that any information on financial contributions to Harambee projects should be treated as "qualitative information which is useful only in pinpointing significant contrasts and peculiarities of conspicuous national level Harambee".³³

Table 5.4 is a summary of the original Conostas/Nellis data as derived from The Standard newspaper for the period 1971-73. Keeping the shortcomings of newspaper reports in mind, it is evident that even within the category of "other donors", contributions from members of the elites might still constitute less than a major fraction of the total. This observation, however, needs to be qualified in two ways.

First, as we have seen, the monetary value of Harambee projects has grown since the initiation of the movement. This means that while contributions from members of the elite as a group might be a small percentage of the total value, the contributions from individuals could still be fairly large amounts. Second, and this is the major point, the importance of the Harambee movement to members of the elites has always been in raising money, rather than on the actual personal contributions. In other words, while personal contributions might be important especially in one's home area, the credit comes from raising as much as possible at a Harambee meeting. The examples below illustrate these points.

Example I: A Regional Leader: Fund-raising for an Expensive School
Minister boosts school fund. The Standard, April 18, 1978.

The Minister of X on Sunday helped to raise about a million shillings at a fund-raising meeting at X Girls High School in X Division X District. The Minister emphasized the importance of education, saying that parents should educate all their children, regardless of sex so as to provide the future manpower for the country. The Minister called on the people in the area to show spirit of self-help by action and not to mix politics with Harambee projects.

The M.P. for X, Mr. X welcomed the Minister. The Member for the area and patron of the school Mr. X paid tribute to the Minister for accepting the invitation. The chairman of the school Mr. X said construction work would be completed by June this year.

TABLE 5.4.

DONATIONS TO SELF-HELP SCHEMES IN K&: 1971-73
AS REPORTED IN 'THE STANDARD'

Month	Political Persons*	KENYAN Businessmen, Enterprises Unions, Clubs, Churches and Clergymen**	FOREIGN			Others ****	TOTAL
			Individual Agencies, Companies etc. ***	Kenyan Charity Sweepstake			
January	2.773	17.253	2.479	4.685	775	27.965	
February	1.632	6.479	12.400	7.300	100	27.911	
March	1.863	13.805	9.029	4.379	250	29.326	
April	4.787	7.904	10.914	1.800	215	25.620	
May	2.273	7.542	4.507	1.950	325	16.597	
June	5.329	26.087	2.035	2.745	-	36.196	
July	1.960	5.862	2.447	2.205	1.025	13.499	
August	484	16.160	17.745	4.300	450	39.139	
September	2.749	2.154	2.807	2.000	10	9.720	
October	3.596	2.845	8.008	3.203	200	18.212	
November	2.618	11.350	41.247	2.105	205	57.570	
December	4.956	15.832	10.800	3.414	50	35.052	
TOTAL	35.380	133.273	124.418	40.131	3.605	336.807	

* The President, members of the Cabinet and the Parliament, high-ranking administration officers, members or supporters of KANU, former ministers and MPs as well as members of the family of those belonging to these categories.

** East African companies are included.

*** Aga Khan and his agencies in Kenya are included. The same donations of foreign governments provided they constitute a direct contribution to a self-help project and are not part of a foreign aid program.

**** Persons that may not be classified according to other three categories or are not properly identified in "African Standard".

Compiled by: DMITRAS Conostas and,
John Nellis.
Ottawa, 1974.

By then the school would have cost more than shillings 1.7 million. President Kenyatta sent his personal donation of shillings 12,000; the Vice-President Mr. Daniel arap Moi shillings 5,000, the Minister of State Mr. Mbiyu Koinange shillings 1,000 and GEMA chairman, Mr. Njenga Karume Shillings 10,000. The Minister and the Member for the area gave a total of shillings 116,200, being their personal donations and from friends.

This example shows the large amounts that can sometimes be raised at one meeting. It also shows how expensive some projects can be. Consequently, even if the Minister and the Member make a fairly large donation, it will still be a very tiny percentage of the total value of the project. We should also add that the itemized amounts are typical contributions from the individuals mentioned. Considering that these individuals are invited to Harambee meetings three or four times a month, if not more, then the personal contributions could add up to quite a large sum albeit remaining a small percentage of the total value of the projects. The political message is also very clear.

Example II: A Group of Leaders for an even more expensive project
Record Shillings 2.6 million collected for Institute. The Nation
 June 5, 1978.

A record shillings 2,622,831 was raised yesterday at X in aid of X Institute of Technology. President Kenyatta sent his personal donation of shillings 30,000 which was handed over by

the guest of honour Mr. X, who is head of X organization. Mr. X gave shillings 234,000 from himself and friends; Mr. XY (a very high ranking civil servant), donated shillings 350,000 and Minister for X, Mr. XZ gave shillings 141,000. The Institute was started in 1973. That year construction of Phase I "A" was completed at a cost of shillings 2.7 million.

Though the large amounts collected at this meeting is not typical of most Harambee meetings, the magnitude of it and especially the personal donations are striking. Example III below is typical of most rural Harambee meetings. The reporting is brief, and the emphasis is on the amount raised.

Example III: A Member of Parliament: Water Project

M.P. Raises shillings 8,000 for Water Project. The Standard,
December 10, 1976.

The M.P. for X, Mr. X has raised shillings 8,000 in aid of X water project. Mr. X gave shillings 1,000. Mr. XY, M.P., and leader of X organization gave shillings 700.

Though the three examples give us an indication of the amounts of money raised in large and small fund-raising meetings, there is still the issue of whether an overall pattern of the elites financial contributions to Harambee projects exist. Using the Constat/Nellis Standard clippings and their own Nation clippings for 1973-74 Mbithi and Rasmusson reach a tentative conclusion on this issue. They conclude that V.I.P. donors, as they call

national elites, had a tendency to concentrate on large projects, "thus indicating the existence of a conspicuous concentration tendency among V.I.P. donor".³⁴ For example, among those projects reported as having received K pounds 1,000 or more, a total of K pounds 336,807 was reported as donated over the three year period. Out of the total amount donated, almost two thirds went to 41 projects only. The projects included Institutes of Technology which received almost one third of the sum of large donations, followed by a large high school donation, seven secondary school donations, Ufanisi House, Gatundu Self-Help Hospital and the University of Nairobi. Small projects such as primary schools hardly figure among those projects receiving V.I.P. contributions of over K pounds 1,000 or more.³⁵ Mbithi and Rasmusson also conclude that contributions from politicians, although modest, appear to go to primary and secondary schools. Churches and Institutes of Technology also attract attention from politicians.

The amounts contributed by politicians and other political elite might appear to be small compared to the amounts contributed by "the people" and other agencies normally included in the "other donor" category. However, it is important to emphasise yet again that the aggregate data might not give a very good idea of the role played by members of the Kenya's political elites in the Harambee movement, both at the project level and at a political/ideological level. The role played by the elites is much more important than the reported donations would indicate. To begin

with, there is obviously more to Harambee activities than simply making a donation to a Harambee project. These other activities involve initiating projects, planning projects, selecting project leadership, mobilizing the peasants in favour of a particular kind of project etc. Secondly, it must be re-emphasized that most fund-raising meetings tend to go unreported by the national newspapers. This, as we have said, means that newspaper reports must be taken as qualitative information.

We shall now take up the question of the other aspects of Harambee. One of the main contributions of the Mbithi and Rasmusson study is that it gives an aggregate picture of the kind of activities, other than donating money, which are likely to be the basis of interaction between the national elites and the peasants. Table 5.5 shows the aggregate picture as it emerged from the Mbithi and Rasmusson study which was completed in 1974. The study covered the period 1967 to 1973.

The leadership categories shown in Table 5.5 are the same categories that we would expect to find in our detailed study of Kiambu, with one possible exception, which might have something to do with the coding scheme used by Mbithi and Rasmusson. The "house wives" category seems to be peculiarly small in size, notwithstanding the large number of women's groups in the rural areas of Kiambu. Either Mbithi and Rasmusson coded initiators of womens' groups as farmers - as some of them describe themselves - or Kiambu District is peculiar in the respect of the large number

TABLE 5.5

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF LEADERS (PERCENTAGE)

LEADERSHIP CATEGORY	Politi- cians	clergy- men	Business- men	Tea- chers	Clerks	Arti- sans	Farm -ers	House- wives	Government Officee's							Vague /Sample /Size		
									Office of the Presid.	Minis- try of Social Services	Minis- try of Agric.	Minis- try of Educa- tion	Other					
									D	L/C	D	L/C	D					
Initiators	7.2	7.7	10.6	12.5	1.2	4.6	21.7	0.6	4.6	14.8	1.5	0.7	1.0	0.3	0.4	0.3	639	
Comm. Members	4.4	6.2	12.0	10.8	2.4	1.0	36.4	0.7	1.0	10.7	0.7	1.4	1.0	0	0	7.5	949	
Work Group Leaders	2.5	5.3	5.3	13.0	1.9	3.6	36.8	1.1	1.3	17.1	0.2	0.8	0.4	0	0	9.3	1.4	475
Total	4.8	6.3	9.9	11.8	2.0	2.4	34.7	0.8	2.0	13.4	0.6	1.1	1.1	0	0.2	6.9	2.0	2063

NOTES: D - District and Divisional Level

NOTES: D - District and Divisional Level
L/C - Locational and Sublocational level

The other government officers category is, e.g. Ministry of Health officers

SOURCE: Philip Mbiti & Rasmus Rasmussen
Self Reliance in Kenya: The Case of Harambee
Scandinavian Institute of African Studies
Uppsala: 1977 P. 57

of women's groups initiated between 1971 and 1977. Alternatively, one could argue that the nature of Harambee changed drastically between the time Mbithi and Rasmusson completed their study in 1973, and the time covered by our own field work, viz between 1971 and 1977. We shall pick up this point when we analyse our own data from Kiambu District.

Apart from the problematic category of "house wives", Table 5.5 shows clearly that politicians, businessmen, and civil servants, all interact with peasants and peasant leaders such as teachers, clerks, artisans, farmers, locational and sub-locational civil servants in various phases of Harambee projects. Though Mbithi and Rasmusson do not actually discuss their results in terms of the interaction between national elites, local elites and the peasants, they seem to have these concepts in mind when they summarize their results in terms of two major categories of leadership. Category I includes politicians, clergymen, businessmen, and District and Divisional level Government officers. Category II includes teachers, clerks, artisans, farmers, house wives, and locational/sub-locational level government officers. Table 5.6 below is a summary of Table 5.5 using the two major categories described above. Mbithi and Rasmusson make the following observations on the two tables.

TABLE 5.6

HARAMBEE LEADERSHIPMajor Occupational Groups (Percentage)

Leadership Category	I. Politicians Clergymen, Business- men, District and Divisional Level Government Officers	II. Teachers, Clerks, Artisans, Farmers, House wives, Locational and Sub-locational Level Government Officers	III. Vague or unknown	Total
Initiators	34.2	65.5	0.3	100.0
Committee Members	29.6	66.9	3.5	100.0
Work Group Leaders	19.7	78.9	1.4	100.0
Total	28.9	69.1	2.0	100.0

Source: Philip Mbithi and Rasmus Rasmusson:
op cit p.56

Taken together the two tables show that leadership category I initiates projects about one third of the time, is likely to be involved in committee membership about 30 percent of the time and is likely to be involved as group leaders about 20% of the time. In other words, this group recedes in importance from initiation to work group leadership. This holds true of everybody in this leadership category except businessmen whose importance increases from initiation (10.6%) to committee membership (12.0%) then recedes in pattern with the others to 5.3% in work group leadership. Leadership category II shows mixed tendencies, though the overall pattern is

the opposite of leadership category I. In other words, leaders in this category increase from 65.5% in initiation, to 66.9% and 78.9% in committee membership and work group leadership respectively. Mbithi and Rasmusson interpret the broad trends to mean that members of leadership category Group I whom they call "conspicuous leaders" have a tendency "to initiate but then withdraw and leave the floor to grass-roots leaders".³⁶ Their position is then taken by farmers who constitute more than one-third in both committee membership and work-group leadership but little more than one-fifth of initiatorship.³⁷

Is there a relationship between leadership categories and particular kinds of projects? At the national level, there seems to be a relationship. Using the concept of "over-representation" - meaning that the occupational leadership group such as farmers is over-represented in one function as compared to average representation Mbithi and Rasmusson³⁸ make the following observations on the relationship between leadership groups and particular types of projects.

First, there is a five-fold over-representation of artisans as initiators of water projects. In other words, whereas on the average artisans initiate projects about 5% of the time, they initiate water projects more than 25% of the time, thus showing their apparent preference for initiating this type of project.

Next comes the five-fold over-representation of clergymen as work-group leaders for high schools and village polytechnics. Mbithi and Rasmusson interpret this to reflect the particular involvement of the National Christian Council of Kenya (NCCCK) in village polytechnic construction. Clergymen are also over-represented in all leadership categories of church projects and they are also over-represented in initiating secondary schools. Government officers show a more than four-fold over-representation in one case. District Commissioners and District Officers are over-represented in the initiation of churches and mosques as a result of a large proportion of churches and mosques initiated in North Eastern province where District Commissioners and District Officers tend to provide the leadership. Businessmen tend to be over-represented in committees of large and costly projects such as high schools, village polytechnics and health projects. Teachers are found to play an important role in all leadership categories for secondary schools, as well as playing a "prominent" role as work group leaders of high schools and village polytechnics. Farmers are found to be over-represented in all aspects of nursery school, primary schools, cattle dips, and roads leadership. This shows "the farmers preference for small projects of immediate relevance".³⁹ Chiefs and Sub-chiefs are found not to have any pattern of over-representation. In other words, they remain advocates of general development, though they feature above average as work group leaders for such projects as health projects, water projects, secondary schools, cattle dips etc. which demand special labour organization, and technical expertise.

The role of politicians is of particular interest to us. The above tables show that politicians constitute only 7.2% of the initiators and then recede in importance to 2.5% of the work group leaders. This is in keeping with the general pattern displayed by the leadership category of "conspicuous leaders". As far as preference for particular types of projects is concerned, politicians seem to prefer high schools and village polytechnics. While they make up 7 percent of all initiators, they constitute 20% of all high school and village polytechnic initiators. They are also over-represented in high school and village polytechnic committees and health projects "but scarce in work group leadership".⁴⁰ That politicians should show a keener interest in these types of projects seems to be compatible with the survey quoted in the last chapter which showed a large percentage of peasants naming schools and health facilities as important projects for a politician to engage in.

Of even more importance is the fact that politicians initiate projects less times than one would expect, given the political importance of Harambee. On reflection, however, this fact is not incompatible with the politician as a political entrepreneur. As we argued in the last chapter, we would expect the politician, as an entrepreneur, to invest his energies where he expects to reap maximum political benefits. This means concentrating on a few projects and avoiding the grave mistake

of initiating many projects since the political price for failure to complete a project can be very high. A good political strategy therefore, would call for the politician to let others initiate a project and then accept "invitations" to conduct a fund-raising meeting - normally no more than one per project. The fund-raising meeting would bring political exposure and credit, without running the risk of being blamed for failure of the project, if it fails. The strategy is compatible with the relatively small amounts of money contributed by the elite who of course, include the politicians.⁴¹

The importance of fund-raising meetings as a means of political exposure and as a platform for creating political solidarity need to be emphasized. This is especially true of high ranking politicians who are either regional leaders or aspiring regional leaders. This group attracts more newspaper coverage than any other group and as such its ideological importance to the Harambee movement is important, if not more important than the funds raised at any one Harambee function.

The amount of newspaper coverage given to conspicuous political donors is illustrated below. We took a 5 percent sample of the Nation newspaper from 1964 to 1977. Of the 5 percent sample, roughly 30% contained one or more items on Harambee fund-raising meetings. We then selected the major items i.e. the item given the most newspaper space and we looked for the "Big Man" involved at the Harambee function. The results were as follows:

TABLE 5.7

"NATION" COVERAGE OF MAIN HARAMBEE STORIES: 1964-1977

<u>Leadership Category</u>	<u>Percentage Coverage</u>
The President/Ministers/Assistant Ministers	44%
Members of Parliament	13%
Provincial Administration (PCs, DCs, DOs)	28%
Local Government Officials	4%
Businessmen	6%
Others	6%
	<hr/>
TOTAL (N 87)	101%

Given the shortcomings of newspaper coverage which we have already pointed out, it is still worth noting that the group which is normally invited as the "guest of honour" also gets the most newspaper coverage. When a guest of honour has accepted the invitation, an announcement is made over the Voice of Kenya to the effect that there will be a fund-raising meeting, for such and such a project on such and such a day, and the "guest of honour" will be so and so. Everybody is then requested to attend and to contribute generously. On his part, the "guest of honour" passes the word around that he has been invited to officiate at a fund-raising meeting and he would appreciate some financial assistance from his friends. Some would-be guests of honour will solicit assistance through the telephone and the informal social

network. The more formal ones will print cards which are then mailed to friends. The cards are invitations to the Harambee fund-raising meeting and, ipso facto, solicitation of financial contribution. When sent to one's juniors in the same organization, the cards sometimes appear to be more than simple requests for assistance. At the fund-raising meeting the guest of honour would then announce the contribution "from himself and his friends", and take the opportunity to urge people to forget politics and to concentrate instead, on development.

Though our primary interest is in the role played by the political elite in the Harambee movement, it is evident from the Mbithi and Rasmusson study that other kinds of elites also play a significant part in the movement. The participation of non-political elites cannot be fully explained within the framework of recruitment into a national patron-client structure. However, two observations might help explain the participation of non-political elites. First, even if some of the members of non-political elites might be designated as "non-political" their participation could be considered political. They could be participating as allies of some political persons, as individuals seeking political careers or as individuals trying to remain in good standing with the "political powers". Secondly, though political elites would be expected to attempt to recruit peasants as clients, the peasants have a freedom to choose their patrons from non-political elites.

What the non-political elites get in exchange for their patronage is the unanswered question. It might be that the non-political elites participate out of the desire to further what they see as a Government policy of self-help or as Holmquist suggests, because they consider themselves members of a particular community.

Whatever explanation might be offered for the participation of non-political elites, it is an explanation which is unlikely to fit very well within the concept of political recruitment and political clientelism. What then can we conclude on the partnership between the elites and "the people"?

It is difficult to arrive at a definitive conclusion on the partnership. On the basis of financial contribution from the elites, the partnership appears to be an example of the "lopsided friendship" described in the last chapter, only this time the would-be clients are bearing the major part of the burden. However, it must be re-emphasised that the elites financial contribution to Harambee is much more than individual financial contributions or even financial contributions as a group. The major burden of their financial "contribution" is in raising the finances or, put differently, in mobilizing the resources. Furthermore, as would-be patrons, some use their access to state finances in such a manner as to enhance their own positions. This is especially true of high ranking political persons who use a Harambee fund-raising meeting as an occasion to deliver Government matching grants to a project.

Turning specifically to politicians, the Mbithi/Rasmusson data suggests the conclusion that politicians are not heavily involved at the project level. This we argue is in keeping with the rôle of a political entrepreneur. However, what might appear to be a low level of involvement could still entail considerable financial and organizational contribution from a politician, especially when he chooses two or three major projects as showpieces in his own constituency. Furthermore, high ranking political persons get the most mass media coverage. As Mbithi and Rasmusson point out, "reported Harambee" is to most people the only reality of Harambee. In other words, it is "reported Harambee" which is important in maintaining the momentum of the movement and the ideology of working together. In this sense, the role of the political elite is much more important than its involvement at the project level, necessary as the latter is for electoral purposes.

5.5 Summary

The Harambee movement has been characterized by expansion from a modest beginning in the early 1960's to its current levels. The expansion has taken two forms. First, there has been a stable concentration on social projects which we interpret as a reflection of what the peasant electorate wanted. On its part, the Government has attempted to, and succeeded in, encouraging economic projects such as cattle dips. Second, beginning in the middle 1960's the volume of the projects started to decline even as the value of the projects continued to go up. We argue that this might be a

problem of data collection, and even if it were not, there can be more than one interpretation for this trend.

In keeping with what one might expect from the logic of self-help, the Government has continued to play a relatively minor role in the Harambee movement, a role which was intended right from the beginning to be more inspirational than anything else. The Government's financial contributions confirm it as a junior partner, though we argue that the figures might not fully reflect the Government's contribution. But even where the Government has stated its intentions to play a more active role in the Harambee movement e.g. in training field personnel and in facilitating better planning of the projects, the intentions have not been fully met. We suggest therefore, that the major Governmental contribution to Harambee has been in providing the political structures within which the movement can flourish. The structures as we argued in the last chapter are patron-client structures, with their own ideology of support.

The relatively minor role played by the Government suggests the argument that the expansion of the movement has been the result of a partnership between national elites, local elites and the peasantry. The Mbithi/Rasmusson data show the pattern of participation by both local and national elites, albeit in a static way. Taken together with the official data, the Mbithi/Rasmusson data suggest the conclusion that the national elites have not been as important partners with the peasants as our argument in the

last chapter would lead one to expect. This conclusion must, however, be suspended until we have analysed Harambee activities at the District level. But even at the macro level, we suggest that the importance of the national elites to the Harambee movement is much more than their financial contributions would indicate. In some cases their financial contributions could be quite considerable though still a small percentage of the total project value. They contribute in other ways too. Furthermore, attracting newspaper attention as they do, they have become, to many people, the roving ambassadors of Harambee. In this capacity, their primary function is to mobilize resources, or more specifically, to raise money. In addition, of course, they spread the Harambee ideology. In Chapters VI and VII, we shall analyse the participation of national elites in Harambee activities in Kiambu District. In doing so, we shall concentrate on the political elite which is our primary interest.

CHAPTER 5: FOOTNOTES

1. Republic of Kenya: Voice of Kenya Radio, January 20, 1977.
2. Republic of Kenya: Minister of Housing and Social Services. Statement in the National Assembly: Tuesday Sept. 26, 1978.
3. Voice of Kenya Radio, op cit, January 20, 1977.
4. Daily Nation, May 9, 1978. In a speech made at a fund-raising meeting, Mr. Moi, then Vice-President, called for a nation-wide accounting system for Harambee money "in order to instil the confidence in the wananchi that their money was properly used". Mr. Moi also "appealed to the District Commissioners to form committees of honest people to ensure that Harambee funds were spent on the projects for which they were intended".
5. The Standard: May 30, 1977. In a dramatic reaction to misuse of Harambee funds, the Provincial Commissioner for Central Province issued a directive to the effect that no more fund-raising licences would be issued until "balance sheets are produced". Nothing much seems to have come of this directive.
6. Mbithi, P.M. and Rasmus Rasmusson. Self-Reliance in Kenya: The Case of Harambee. Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1977, p.43.
7. Winans, E.V. and Angelique Haugerud "Rural Self-Help in Kenya: The Harambee Movement" Nairobi. Mimeo, 1976, p.7
8. Ibid, p.7
9. Ibid, p.21
10. Anderson, J.E. The Struggle for the School, Longman, Nairobi, 1970, p.117
11. Winans, E.V. and A. Haugerud. op cit, p.22
12. Republic of Kenya: Development Plan 1970-74. Government Printers, Nairobi, p.523
13. Ibid, p.523
14. Republic of Kenya: Development Plan 1966-70. Government Printers, Nairobi, p.327

15. Republic of Kenya: Development Plan 1970-74. Government Printers, Nairobi, p.523
16. Republic of Kenya: Development Plan 1974-78. Government Printers, Nairobi, p.482
17. Republic of Kenya: Minister of Housing and Social Services: Statement in the National Assembly. Tuesday, Sept. 26, 1978.
18. There is serious dispute as to who is actually included in the category "other donors", and consequently the category "the people". According to the Government documents, "other sources" include contributions from Central Government, overseas agencies such as CARE, business firms, charitable organizations, private clubs, or private individuals. The issue, therefore is whether "private individuals" include the contributions of national elites at Harambee fund-raising meetings. Mbithi and Rasmusson include what they call the "conspicuous donors" - i.e. national elites, business firms, foreign agencies etc. in the "other donor" category. This means that politicians and other political persons are not part of the "peoples contributions". We suggest that excluding politicians and other "political persons" such as civil servants from the category of "the people" is conceptually impossible and counter intuitive. For example, when an M.P. purchases 10 goats through the "kilo system" is he part of "the people" or is he making a contribution as a private individual? As it is, national statisticians would classify the goats as cash contributions from "the people". Fair enough. But when the same politician contributes say 10,000 shillings from "himself and his friends" this is included in the category "other donors". The "friends" as the author well knows often includes individuals from the politicians constituency often residing in the urban areas. Part of the donation, therefore, is from "the people". To complicate matters even more, the Ministry Statisticians in Nairobi are not sure whether an M.P. for example, is to be classified as one of "the people" when he raises funds in his constituency, or whether he is to be classified as "an individual". With very serious misgivings, we shall accept the conventional interpretation that "other donors" also includes contributions from national elites.
19. Republic of Kenya: Ministry of Housing and Social Services: Department of Social Services: Community Development Division. A Statistical Analysis of Self-Help Projects. Nairobi, Government Printers, 1974, p.iii

20. Mutiso, G.C.M. and M. Godfrey. "The Political Economy of Self-help: Kenya's Harambee Institutes of Technology". University of Nairobi, I.D.S. WP 107, 1973, p.18
21. Mbithi, P.M. and Rasmus Rasmusson. Self-Reliance in Kenya: The Case of Harambee, op cit, p.87.
22. Republic of Kenya: Ministry of Housing and Social Services. Department of Social Services: Community Development Division. Personal communication to the author, September 1978.
23. Republic of Kenya: Development Plan: 1974-78. op cit, p.427
24. Republic of Kenya: Ministry of Housing and Social Services: Community Development Division. Appointment Requirements and Job Descriptions, Nairobi, n.d. p.4
25. Republic of Kenya: Development Plan 1966-70. op cit, p.326
26. Republic of Kenya: Development Plan 1970-74. op cit, p.524
27. UNICEF and Republic of Kenya: Ministry of Housing and Social Services: A Report on Community Development Assistants: Their Training and Working Conditions. Nairobi. Mimeo, 1975, p.7
28. Republic of Kenya: Development Plan 1970-74. op cit p.524
29. The issue for the near future is how the newly appointed District Planning Officers will handle the problem of unplanned Harambee projects. The Government is, on paper, committed to the District as the future planning unit and District plans have already appeared. Most of the plans are no more than a catalogue of demands on the Government. As part of facilitating District Planning, District Planning Officers have now been appointed for most of the Districts. They are seconded to the Districts by the Ministry of Planning. The officers are mostly technocrats and they might succeed in bringing a semblance of order to Harambee projects if they get political support.
30. Constat, D. and J. Nellis. "Contributions to Self-Help Schemes as Reported in the East African Standard: 1971-73" Mimeo, Carleton University, 1974.

31. Mbithi, P. and Rasmus Rasmusson. Self-Reliance in Kenya: The Case of Harambee. op cit, p.84
32. Ibid, p.84
33. Ibid, p.86
34. Ibid, p.86
35. Ibid, p.86
36. Ibid, p.58
37. Ibid, p.58
38. Ibid, pp. 60-61
39. Ibid, p.61
40. Ibid, p.61
41. It is worth noting that even for the Institutes of Science and Technology "the people" were the largest contributors. However, all the cabinet members, except two, were involved in one way or another with the affairs of the Institutes. They were involved, either as committee members or as fund-raisers for the Institutes. For details see Mbithi and Rasmusson Ibid, p.72, and E.M. Godfrey and G.C.M. Mutiso "The Political Economy of Self-Help: Kenya's Harambee Institutes of Technology" op cit, p.22.

CHAPTER 6

THE PARTNERSHIP IN KIAMBU DISTRICT

6.1 Introduction

This chapter constitutes a description of Harambee projects in Kiambu District. We concentrate on the period covered in our field research, that is from 1971-77. We begin by describing the different categories of Harambee projects initiated in Kiambu District through this period. We then raise similar questions to those raised in the last chapter, with a view to showing that, as in the rest of the country, Harambee in Kiambu District has been largely a "people's" responsibility.

6.2 Harambee Projects in Kiambu District

Harambee activities in Kiambu District reflect most of the overall national patterns described in the last chapter. Thus, for example, in the years 1971-77 the data show that by far the majority of projects initiated in this period were social projects, a fact which is in keeping with the national trend for the 1960's and early 1970's. Also, in keeping with the national trend, the growth in value has not been accompanied by a commensurate growth in volume.

Table 6.1 is a summary of all the projects initiated in Kiambu District between 1971-77. This is the project population from which we drew our sample. We have classified the projects in a different way from the official system of classification in order to bring out more details about the types of Harambee projects initiated over the years under discussion. Before proceeding any

TABLE 6.1 INITIATED PROJECTS - KIAMBU DISTRICT: 1971-77

TYPE OF PROJECT	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	TOTAL	8
1. Women's Groups	84	78	156	77	45	39	74	553	47.22
2. Cattle Dips	33	26	13	19	4	15	5	115	9.82
3. Nurseries	10	8	21	24	11	16	6	97	8.28
4. Water	14	13	7	24	11	22	6	97	8.28
5. Sports Clubs	3	2	3	4	22	34	9	77	6.58
6. Church	24	8	4	6	7	16	3	68	5.81
7. Youth Centres/ Village Poly.	4	3	2	1	3	4	3	20	1.71
8. Adult Education	2	4	9	1	1	2	1	20	1.71
9. Development/ Contribution	2	2	1	2	3	7	3	20	1.71
10. Primary Schools	4	3	4	1	1	5	1	19	1.62
11. Health/Hospitals	1	5	1	2	4	2	2	17	1.45
12. Roads	6	3	3	1	1	0	0	14	1.19
13. Others	1	2	5	1	1	0	4	14	1.20
14. Men's Groups	1	1	3	3	1	2	0	11	0.94
15. High Schools	0	2	0	1	3	3	1	9	0.77
16. Electricity	1	0	0	1	3	1	3	9	0.77
17. Offices	1	2	0	0	0	1	2	6	0.51
18. Trade	0	2	0	0	0	3	0	5	0.43
TOTAL	191	164	232	168	121	172	123	1171	100

SOURCE: Compiled from the Register of Harambee Projects. Kiambu District Office
of the District Community Development Officer.

further, we should point out that by the time all the information for 1977 had been received at the District Headquarters in Kiambu the total number of projects initiated in that year had risen to a total of 446 projects.

Most of the project types listed in Table 6.1 are self-explanatory. A few of them, however, need some explanation. We shall begin with the women's groups, which we have constantly referred to in the previous chapters.

Women's groups are multipurpose Harambee organizations, and they vary greatly in size and political importance. As we have already pointed out, the women's groups constituted 49% of those projects about which we obtained information. In terms of actual numbers, this came to 47 projects out of 95 projects surveyed. Of the 47 projects, 12 had one hundred members or more, 13 had between 30 and 100 members, and the remaining 32 had under 30 members. The groups, therefore, displayed quite a variety in terms of size. The largest we came across had over 2,000 members and the smallest had 9 members.

The goals of the women's groups are so varied as to defy a systematic categorization. The small groups are, however, much easier to understand if only because they are quite humble in terms of what they are trying to achieve, and also because their leaders are much more willing to discuss their projects. This is not the case with the very large women's groups, and especially those which have become patronized by leading politicians.

Most of the women's groups start with very little capital and a very straightforward pattern of contribution. Once registered as a Harambee group, the women would start by making small monthly contributions of 5 shillings to a community fund. Normally, the amount would come either from the sale of domestic surplus for those with plots of land, or from working as labourers in the shambas of the well-to-do farmers. In addition to making the monetary contribution to the group, members also assist each other in such matters as weeding the shambas of the members-for those who have shambas.

At the end of a specified period, the total amount which has been collected is handed over to one member, and she can do whatever she wants with the money. Alternatively, the group might decide what use the money should be put into. Sometimes a group's name even implies what the group intends to achieve for its members. Thus, if for example, a group calls itself "Nyakinyua Ya Ikombe", it implies, and usually means, that the group's aim is to purchase domestic cups for its members. "Ikombe" is the Kikuyu word for cups. Another group might call itself "Nyakinyua Ya Mabati", meaning that it intends to purchase corrugated metal roofing sheets for its members. "Mabati" is the Kikuyu word for such sheets.¹ In general, however, the groups combine domestic functions such as cultivating for each other with commercial and economic functions such as weaving baskets for sale, running small shops at the nearest centre once they have accumulated enough capital to set up such a shop,

buying group shares in such public and ethnic companies as GEMA Holdings, etc.

The more ambitious ones, ultimately, intend to accumulate enough capital to buy land for their members. Though this fact is not obvious from the formal description of what they were constituted for, it comes out quite clearly in the discussion with the leaders of the groups. This is especially true of the large groups.

Some of the large groups are a combination of smaller groups scattered over a number of sub-locations. (The smallest administrative unit in Kenya). One group we encountered had branches throughout the entire District of Kiambu. All the large groups had one thing in common. They had either purchased some land as a group, or they had raised huge amounts of money for such a purpose. One group which we shall describe in the next chapter, had accumulated close to a million shillings for the purpose of buying land. In addition, most of the large groups combined economic activities with cultural activities such as traditional dancing. Thus the "Nyakinyua" traditional dancers, often seen dancing for or with Kenyatta and other politicians at Harambee and other public meetings, were not isolated dancers. They were part and parcel of organized women Harambee groups.

The men's groups listed in Table 6.1 are very similar to the women's groups except that they are less numerous. They too have traditional dancers, and they have similar goals to the

women's groups. They do such things as buying grade cattle for their members, making and selling wood items, constructing houses for each other, running small shops, helping each other acquire plots of land etc. Sometimes the men and women groups will combine together explicitly for the purpose of forming a trading group. Hence the project type "trade". They either contribute the items to be traded, or alternatively, they contribute cash to purchase for example, a "Matatu". The word "Matatu" is the name for the small passenger vehicles which are renowned throughout Kenya for their overloading, dangerous speeds, bad mechanical conditions and efficient quick transportation.

The other types of projects are standard Harambee projects and as such they do not need much description, with the possible exception of "Offices" and "Development Contribution". The category "Offices" refers invariably to Offices constructed for some members of the Provincial Administration, especially the Chiefs and Sub-chiefs. "Development Contribution" refers to all purpose funds mostly established on a constituency basis. All willing individuals, organizations, etc. can contribute to the fund, and any Harambee group can apply for assistance from the fund. According to one rather unhappy District Officer, the funds have more often than not been established at the suggestion of politicians who would like to have some place to send people to, when the latter send a delegation to the politician asking for some assistance for a project. Not surprisingly, the people are

not willing to contribute to a general development fund when they know that the benefits from such a fund might go elsewhere. The establishment of the funds has, therefore, not been very successful. Those which exist survive on grants from wealthy individuals. Of the three "Development Contributions" which were in our sample, two had ceased to exist, and the third one was barely surviving the innumerable claims that local Harambee groups were making on the "few thousand shillings" in the fund.

Though, as we have said, the conventional Harambee projects do not need much description, a few observations might be in order with reference to the overall picture presented in Table 6.1. First, as in the national statistics, nurseries, water projects and cattle dips are the most popular types of projects next to the women's groups. Like women's groups, the importance of nurseries and cattle dips will not be reflected in statistics showing the capital value of Harambee projects. The reason is quite simple. Most of the women's groups start with very small amounts of capital, and though the large ones manage to raise quite a lot of money, they somehow are not included as a separate category when it comes to computing the value of Harambee projects. At best, they are included in the category of "Domestic Projects" which are invariably undervalued. At worst, they are left out altogether. Cattle dips, and nurseries too, have continued to be popular projects in terms of numbers but their capital value will not match that of secondary schools or primary schools because

they are relatively less costly projects. An average cattle dip serving 20 or so farmers, will cost 20,000 shillings. An average nursery school serving fifty or so families will cost around 100,000 shillings. This should be compared to an average secondary school the construction costs of which will run anywhere between 250,000 shillings and half a million shillings. Some of the more fashionable schools, as we saw in the last chapter, will cost close to two million shillings. Water projects on the other hand, are terribly expensive. A quite small water project i.e. one serving about 100 families will cost close to half a million shillings. Thus, a few water projects will reflect very high capital values. Despite their high cost, water projects are currently the most popular projects in Kenya, and their popularity is on the rise. Kiambu is no exception in this respect. What is true of water projects is also true of hospitals and health centres, with one exception. Though both are expensive types of projects, health centres and hospitals are considerably less popular in terms of numbers, than water projects. The reason might have something to do with the fact that hospital treatment is free in all Government hospitals in Kenya. Thus, unless there is no Government hospital or dispensary within reasonable distance, the rural population is unlikely to be interested in starting a hospital or a health centre. Lack of water, on the other hand, has come to be seen as one of the major developmental problems in the rural areas. A Ministry of Water Development was created in 1974. This Ministry

seems to be more generous than the others in terms of giving "grants" to Harambee water projects, partly in response to the increasing popularity of water projects and partly, it seems, due to the political temperament of the current Minister for Water Development.

In addition to nurseries, water projects and cattle dips, churches are also very popular with the rural populations. They seem to be among the favourite projects for which politicians conduct fund-raising meetings, though few politicians, if any, will get involved in the initiation of church projects. The popularity of churches can be easily explained by the fact that most of the rural population in Kiambu is quite religious. Most of our interviews began with long prayers. We prayed, among other things, for the Government, and invariably for the long life of President Kenyatta. This was particularly the case with women's groups.

Over the six full years under review (if we leave out 1977 for which we only obtained data for only part of the year) the number of Harambee projects does not seem to have altered a great deal except for the years 1973 and 1975. In 1973 there was a sharp rise especially of women's projects and nurseries. 1975 was the reverse of 1973. In 1975, there was a sharp decline in all of the most popular project types such as the women groups, the nurseries, the water projects, and cattle dips. While it is difficult to explain these changes, one cannot help but be struck

by the parallels between these changes and the national data presented in the last chapter. In the national data, there was an increase in Harambee activities in 1968, the year before the 1969 elections, followed by a near disappearance of Harambee in 1969, the year of the elections and the political troubles in Kenya. 1974 was the year of the second general elections, and 1975 was the year of the crisis popularly referred to as the "J.M. crisis", which occasioned the call of "no more Harambee" as we mentioned in the last chapter. The major difference between the District pattern and the national pattern is that at the District level, Harambee maintained a fairly healthy pace throughout the elections of 1974. This suggests that the near disappearance of Harambee in 1969 was largely on account of the political crisis, rather than the restrictions placed on initiation of Harambee activities during an election year. The similarities in the District and national pattern might be purely coincidental but a political interpretation, albeit at a speculative level, seems to make some sense. During the year previous to general elections, the politicians and aspiring candidates would urge the rural populations to initiate Harambee projects. During a year of crisis, the politicians and aspiring politicians would tend to stay away from the rural populations and the general dissatisfaction with the Government would be reflected in the declining volume of Harambee activities.

So far we have concentrated on describing simply the types and the numbers of Harambee projects initiated in Kiambu District since 1971. We have said that the types of projects are similar to the national pattern with the possible exception of women's groups. This, as we pointed out in the last chapter, might be on account of problems of data aggregation in Nairobi or simply on account of different classifications of the project types. The different classifications, in particular, make it impossible for us to compare, in any exact terms, the numbers and different types of projects initiated at the national level, with numbers and types of projects initiated at the District level. The problem of exact comparisons is exacerbated by the fact that national figures are available only up to 1973.

Keeping the above observations in mind, we may now raise the question which we raised in the last chapter with reference to national Harambee activities: Who has borne the major burden for Harambee activities in Kiambu District?

6.3 The People As The Major Contributors

The pattern of contributions to Harambee projects shows that Kiambu District is not different from the general pattern described in the last chapter. Even within Central Province, where Kiambu is one of the five Districts, the pattern still holds. If, for example, we take the year 1973 as the basis for comparing Kiambu with other Districts, the information available shows that the people contributed, on the average, nearly 91% of the total

Harambee resources except in the North Eastern province where the people contributed only 47% of the total Harambee resources.²

In Central Province, the people contributed 94% of the total contributions to Harambee projects. Within the five Districts of Central Province, the people contributed 92%, 94%, 94%, 92% and 99% in Kiambu, Kirinyaga, Muranga, Nyandarua, and Nyeri Districts respectively.³

Tables 6.2 - 6.4 summarize the pattern of contributions for Harambee projects in Kiambu District for the years 1973 - 1977.⁴ Taken together, the tables show the following patterns.

First, the total contributions remained stable or continued to rise over the five year period except for 1975 which registered an absolute decline in the contributions. (This is also reflected in the total number of projects initiated in that year as Table 6.1 above shows). Thus, from a total amount of just over K pounds 270,000 contributed in 1973, the total amounts remained roughly the same for 1974, then went down to approximately K pounds 240,000 in 1975. The amounts shot up dramatically to approximately K pounds 680,000 and K pounds 890,000 for 1976 and 1977 respectively. As we suggested earlier, the huge number of projects initiated in 1973 do not show up in the contributions since most of them were women's projects whose initial capital is usually very low.

TABLE 6.2

VALUE OF SELF-HELP PROJECTS (K£) IN KIambu DISTRICT - 1973

TYPE OF PROJECT	CONTRIBUTION BY THE PEOPLE			ASSISTANCE RECEIVED FROM OTHER SOURCES				GRAND TOTAL
	LABOUR	MATERIAL	CASH	TOTAL	CENTRAL GOVERN.	LOCAL AUTHORITY	OTHER DONORS	
I A. Social Projects								
1. Education	12,043	25,676	47,790	80,509	1,840	---	5,698	88,047
2. Nurseries	3,086	1,337	6,680	11,103	---	240	62	11,405
3. Health	315	583	2,565	3,463	200	---	10	3,673
4. Social Welfare & Recreation	5,019	8,703	29,379	43,101	---	58	1,722	44,881
B. Domestic Projects								
1. Latrines	---	---	10	10	---	---	---	10
2. Kitchens	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
3. Others	28	16	438	482	---	---	---	482
II Economy Developing Projects								
1. Water Supplies	3,553	2,891	37,590	44,034	7,100	1,040	1,139	53,313
2. Transport & Communications	384	51	874	1,309	---	---	39	1,348
3. Agriculture	5,749	2,684	56,409	64,842	1,639	154	15	66,650
4. Miscellaneous	704	220	2,086	3,010	---	---	18	3,028
Total Social & Economy Developing Projects	30,881	42,161	78,821	251,863	10,779	1,492	8,703	272,837

NOTE: 1. Others - Other residential houses

2. Miscellaneous - Other buildings and contructions

TABLE 6.3

VALUE OF SELF-HELP PROJECTS (K£) IN KIambu DISTRICT - 1974

TYPE OF PROJECT	CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE PEOPLE			CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES				TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL
	LABOUR	MATERIAL	CASH	TOTAL	CENTRAL GOVT.	LOCAL AUTHORITY	OTHER DONORS		
SOCIAL AND DOMESTIC PROJECTS									
A. Social Projects									
1. Education									
Secondary Schools	3,523	2,699	12,845	19,076	220	115	15	350	19,426
Primary Schools	13,424	16,503	48,394	78,321	1,116	691	3,161	4,968	83,289
Teachers' Houses	571	698	4,058	5,326	---	---	692	692	6,018
TOTAL EDUCATION	17,526	19,900	65,297	102,723	1,336	802	3,868	6,010	108,733
2. Nurseries	4,121	3,677	11,898	19,696	15	687	751	1,453	21,149
3. Health Projects	564	1,190	10,063	11,817	---	236	2,780	3,016	14,833
4. Social Welfare & Recreation Projects									
Community Halls	297	140	137	574	---	---	---	---	574
Women's Club Bldgs.	1,664	1,080	12,199	14,923	---	---	---	---	14,923
Youth Centres	330	424	895	1,649	344	---	280	624	2,273
Sports Grounds	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Churches and Mosques	6,626	4,465	13,599	24,690	---	---	3,534	3,534	28,224
TOTAL SOCIAL WELFARE & RECREATION PROJECTS	8,917	6,109	26,810	41,836	344	---	3,814	4,158	45,994
TOTAL SOCIAL PROJECTS	31,128	30,876	144,068	176,072	1,695	1,729	11,213	14,637	190,709
B. Domestic Projects									
Separate Kitchens	52	13	22	87	---	---	---	---	87
Latrines	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Other Residential Houses	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL DOMESTIC PROJECTS	52	13	22	87	---	---	---	---	87
TOTAL SOCIAL AND DOMESTIC PROJECTS	31,180	30,889	114,090	176,159	1,695	1,729	11,213	14,637	190,796

TABLE 6.3 (Cont'd)

VALUE OF SELF-HELP PROJECTS (K£) IN KIAMBU DISTRICT - 1974

TYPE OF PROJECT	CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE PEOPLE			CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES				TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL
	LABOUR	MATERIAL	CASH	TOTAL	CENTRAL GOVT.	LOCAL AUTHORITY	OTHER DONORS		
II. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS									
A. Water Supply Projects									
Piped Water Supplies	2,566	5,161	20,759	28,486	5,095	1,756	737	7,588	36,074
Wells	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Spring Protections	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Dams, Water Catchment	---	---	945	945	---	---	---	---	945
TOTAL WATER SUPPLY PROJEC PROJECTS	2,566	5,161	21,704	29,431	5,095	1,756	737	7,588	37,019
B. Transport and Commun- ication Projects									
Roads	73	20	156	249	---	---	---	---	249
Bridges	18	6	10	34	---	---	---	---	34
Road Culverts, Drifts	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Others	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL TRANSPORT & COMMUN- ICATION PROJECTS	91	26	166	283	---	---	---	---	283
C. Fish Ponds									
D. Agricultural Projects									
Irrigation	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Cattle Dips & Crushes	4,877	4,613	9,130	18,620	4,150	---	612	4,762	23,382
Bush Cleared	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Terracing	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Tree Planting	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Hedging & Fencing	---	---	533	533	---	---	---	---	533
Cultivation & Weeding	1,283	585	15,462	17,330	---	---	---	---	17,330
Land Consolidation	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS	5,460	5,198	25,125	36,483	4,150	---	612	4,762	41,245

TABLE 6.3 (Cont'd)

VALUE OF SELF-HELP PROJECTS (K£) IN KIambu DISTRICT - 1974

TYPE OF PROJECT	CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE PEOPLE			CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES				GRAND TOTAL
	LABOUR	MATERIAL	CASH	TOTAL	CENTRAL GOVT.	LOCAL AUTHORITY	OTHER DONORS	
E. Other Buildings	117	70	917	1,104	---	---	---	1,104
F. Other Constructions	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
G. Other Projects	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS	8,934	10,455	47,912	67,301	9,245	1,756	1,349	79,651
GRAND TOTAL ALL PROJECTS	40,114	41,344	162,002	243,460	10,940	3,485	12,562	270,447

TABLE C.4

VALUE OF SELF-HELP PROJECTS (K£) IN KIambu DISTRICT - 1975

TYPE OF PROJECT	CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE PEOPLE				CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES			
	LABOUR	MATERIAL	CASH	TOTAL	CENTRAL GOVT.	LOCAL AUTHORITY	OTHER DONORS	TOTAL
I SOCIAL AND DOMESTIC PROJECTS								
A. Social Projects								
1. Education								
Secondary Schools	2,596	2,840	12,787	18,223	110	58	1,343	1,511
Primary Schools	11,729	19,542	39,108	70,379	1,453	346	3,094	4,893
Teachers' Houses	460	407	2,149	3,016	25	---	346	371
TOTAL EDUCATION	14,785	22,789	54,044	91,618	1,588	404	4,783	6,775
2. Nurseries	3,604	2,507	9,289	15,400	8	464	407	879
3. Health Projects	440	887	6,314	7,641	100	118	1,395	1,613
4. Social Welfare & Recreation Projects								
Community Halls	212	70	150	432	---	---	---	---
Women's Club Bldgs.	1,221	906	11,683	13,810	---	---	158	158
Youth Centres	413	510	720	1,643	172	---	140	312
Sports Grounds	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Churches and Mosques	5,123	5,921	15,553	26,597	---	29	2,471	2,500
TOTAL SOCIAL WELFARE & RECREATION PROJECTS	6,969	7,407	28,106	42,284	172	29	2,769	2,970
TOTAL SOCIAL PROJECTS	25,798	33,590	97,753	157,141	1,868	1,015	9,354	12,237
B. Domestic Projects								
Separate Kitchens	26	6	11	43	---	---	---	---
Latrines	---	---	5	5	---	---	---	---
Other Residential Houses	14	8	219	241	---	---	---	---
TOTAL DOMESTIC PROJECTS	40	04	235	289	---	---	---	---
TOTAL SOCIAL AND DOMESTIC PROJECTS	25,838	33,604	97,988	157,430	1,868	1,015	9,354	12,237
								169,667

TABLE .6.4 (Cont'd)

VALUE OF SELF-HELP PROJECTS (K£) IN KIambu DISTRICT - 1975

TYPE OF PROJECT	LABOUR	CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE PEOPLE			CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES				GRAND TOTAL
		MATERIAL	CASH	TOTAL	CENTRAL GOVT.	LOCAL AUTHORITY	OTHER DONORS	TOTAL	
III ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS									
A. Water Supply Projects									
Piped Water Supplies	3,055	3,956	29,128	36,139	6,098	1,398	936	8,423	44,571
Wells	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Spring Protections	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Dams, Water Catchment	---	70	519	589	---	---	2	2	597
TOTAL WATER SUPPLY PROJECTS	3,055	4,026	29,647	36,728	6,098	1,398	938	8,434	45,162
B. Transport & Commun- ication Projects									
Roads	211	36	481	728	---	---	---	---	728
Bridges	27	3	36	66	---	---	20	20	86
Road Culverts, Drifts	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Others	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL TRANSPORT & COMMUN- ICATION PROJECTS	238	39	517	794	---	---	20	20	814
C. Fish Ponds									
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
D. Agricultural Projects									
Irrigation	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Cattle Dips & Crushes	4,425	3,328	7,284	15,040	2,895	77	309	3,281	18,321
Bush Cleared	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Terracing	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Tree Planting	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Hedging and Fencing	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Cultivation & Weeding	1,530	613	367	2,510	---	---	5	5	2,515
Land Consolidation	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS	5,955	3,941	7,654	17,550	2,895	77	314	3,286	20,836

TABLE 6.4(Cont'd)

VALUE OF SELF-HELP PROJECTS (Kb) IN KIAMBU DISTRICT - 1975

TYPE OF PROJECT	CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE PEOPLE				CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES			
	LABOUR	MATERIAL	CASH	TOTAL	CENTRAL GOVT.	LOCAL AUTHORITY	OTHER DONORS	TOTAL
E. Other Buildings	371	48	995	1,414	---	---	8	8
F. Other Constructions	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
G. Other Projects	40	98	507	645	---	---	2	2
TOTAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS	9,659	8,152	39,320	57,131	8,993	1,475	1,282	11,750
GRAND TOTAL ALL PROJECTS	35,497	41,756	137,308	214,561	10,861	2,490	10,636	23,987
								68,881
								238,548

TABLE 6.5

VALUE OF SELF-HELP PROJECTS (K£) IN KIAMBU DISTRICT - 1976

TYPE OF PROJECT	CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE PEOPLE				CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES				
	LABOUR	MATERIAL	CASH	TOTAL	CENTRAL GOVT.	LOCAL AUTHORITY	OTHER DONORS	TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL
I SOCIAL AND DOMESTIC PROJECTS									
A. Social Projects									
1. Education									
Secondary Schools	11,037	4,854	25,526	41,417	---	1,250	548	1,798	43,215
Primary Schools	81,112	29,464	148,737	259,313	950	---	11,912	12,862	272,175
Teachers' Houses	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL EDUCATION	92,149	34,318	174,263	300,730	950	1,250	12,460	14,660	315,390
2. Nurseries	21,266	9,029	9,408	39,703	132	208	200	540	40,243
3. Health Projects	3,877	9,413	6,649	19,939	---	---	2,693	2,693	22,632
4. Social Welfare & Recreation Projects	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Community Halls	2,885	1,407	5,566	9,858	---	---	---	---	9,858
Women's Club Bldgs.	4,494	3,755	10,753	19,002	1,507	310	---	1,817	20,819
Youth Centres	4,181	2,182	8,402	14,765	---	1,500	77	1,577	16,342
Sports Grounds	---	100	40	140	---	---	---	---	140
Churches & Mosques	13,144	22,382	43,846	79,372	---	---	13,994	13,994	93,366
TOTAL SOCIAL WELFARE & RECREATION PROJECTS	24,704	29,826	68,607	123,137	1,507	1,810	14,071	17,388	140,525
TOTAL SOCIAL PROJECTS	141,996	82,586	258,927	483,509	2,589	3,268	29,424	35,281	518,790
B. Domestic Projects									
Separate Kitchens	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Latrines	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Other Residential Houses	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL DOMESTIC PROJECTS	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL SOCIAL AND DOMESTIC PROJECTS	141,996	82,586	258,927	483,509	2,589	3,268	29,424	35,281	518,790

TABLE 6.5 (Cont'd)

VALUE OF SELF-HELP PROJECTS (KSh) IN KIAMBU DISTRICT - 1976

TYPE OF PROJECT	CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE PEOPLE			CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES			GRAND TOTAL
	LABOUR	MATERIAL	CASH	TOTAL	CENTRAL GOVT.	LOCAL AUTHORITY	OTHER DONORS
II ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS							
A. Water Supply Projects							
Piped Water Supplies	11,916	18,869	11,090	42,875	4,161	6,950	56,246
Wells	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Spring Protections	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Dams, Water Catchment	35,804	7,209	14,804	57,817	---	---	57,848
TOTAL WATER SUPPLY PROJECTS	47,720	27,078	25,894	100,692	4,161	6,950	114,094
B. Transport & Communication Projects							
Roads	31	30	49	110	---	90	200
Bridges	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Road Culverts, Drifts	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Others	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL TRANSPORT & COMMUNICATION PROJECTS	31	30	49	110	---	90	200
C. Fish Ponds							
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
D. Agricultural Projects							
Irrigation	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Cattle Dips & Crushes	4,696	442	7,137	12,275	1,800	---	14,436
Bush Cleared	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Terracing	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Tree Planting	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Hedging & Fencing	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Cultivation & Weeding	4,829	4,907	13,486	23,222	---	---	23,222
Land Consolidation	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS	9,525	5,349	20,623	35,497	1,800	---	37,658

250

TABLE C.6

VALUE OF SELF-HELP PROJECTS (K£) IN KIambu DISTRICT - 1977

TYPE OF PROJECT	CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE PEOPLE			CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES			
	LABOUR	MATERIAL	CASH	TOTAL	CENTRAL GOVT.	LOCAL AUTHORITY	OTHER DONORS
I SOCIAL AND DOMESTIC PROJECTS							
A. Social Projects							
1. Education							
Secondary Schools	12,695	6,781	55,486	74,962	83	1,338	---
Primary Schools	223,190	27,423	78,111	328,724	---	5,160	---
Teachers' Houses	35	100	780	915	---	---	17,635
							22,795

TOTAL EDUCATION	235,920	34,304	134,377	404,601	83	6,498	17,635
							24,216
							428,817
2. Nurseries	2,659	1,922	4,534	9,115	---	---	---
3. Health Projects	2,385	1,396	11,482	15,263	1,000	---	---
4. Social Welfare & Recreation Projects							4,000
Community Halls	63	61	55	179	---	---	---
Women's Club Bldgs.	33,123	4,538	106,097	143,758	75	1,500	---
Youth Centres	928	3,030	6,510	10,468	1,171	16,448	---
Sports Grounds	---	---	479	479	---	---	---
Churches & Mosques	30,217	25,883	47,505	103,605	500	4,110	30,381
							34,991
TOTAL SOCIAL WELFARE & RECREATION PROJECTS	64,331	33,512	160,646	258,489	1,746	22,058	30,381
							54,185
TOTAL SOCIAL PROJECTS	305,295	71,134	311,039	687,468	2,829	28,556	52,016
							83,401
							770,869
B. Domestic Projects							
Separate Kitchens	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Latrines	---	---	75	75	---	---	---
Other Residential Houses	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TOTAL DOMESTIC PROJECTS	---	---	75	75	---	---	---
							75
TOTAL SOCIAL AND DOMESTIC PROJECTS	305,295	71,134	311,114	687,543	2,829	28,556	52,016
							83,401
							770,944

252

TABLE 6.6 (Cont'd) VALUE OF SELF-HELP PROJECTS (KES) IN KIAMDU DISTRICT 1977

253

TYPE OF PROJECT	CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE PEOPLE			CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES			TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL	
	LABOUR	MATERIAL	CASH	TOTAL	CENTRAL GOVT.	LOCAL AUTHORITY	OTHER DONORS		
II ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS									
A. Water Supply Projects									
Piped Water Supplies	11,889	11,987	41,388	65,264	16,800	11,250	2,500	95,814	
Wells	---	---	675	675	---	---	---	675	
Spring Protections	15	450	600	1,065	---	---	---	1,065	
Dams, Water Catchment	4,485	242	8,498	13,225	---	4,944	500	18,669	
TOTAL WATER SUPPLY PROJECTS	16,389	12,679	51,161	80,229	16,800	16,194	3,000	116,223	
B. Transport & Communication Projects									
Roads	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
Bridges	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
Road Culverts, Drifts	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
Others	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
TOTAL TRANSPORT & COMMUNICATION PROJECTS	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
C. Fish Ponds									
Fish Ponds	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
D. Agricultural Projects									
Irrigation	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
Cattle Dips & Crushes	5,512	1,142	2,494	9,148	---	---	---	9,148	
Bush Cleared	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
Terracing	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
Tree Planting	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
Hedging & Fencing	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
Cultivation & Weeding	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
Land Consolidation	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	
TOTAL AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS	5,512	1,142	2,484	9,148	---	---	---	9,148	

TABLE 6.6 (Cont'd)

VALUE OF SELF-HELP PROJECTS (K£) IN KIambu DISTRICT - 1977

TYPE OF PROJECT	CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE PEOPLE				CONTRIBUTIONS FROM OTHER SOURCES			
	LABOUR	MATERIAL	CASH	TOTAL	CENTRAL GOVT.	LOCAL AUTHORITY	OTHER DONORS	GRAND TOTAL
E. Other Buildings	---	---	19	19	---	---	---	19
F. Other Constructions	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
G. Other Projects	105	10	343	458	---	---	---	458
TOTAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS	22,006	13,831	54,017	89,854	16,800	16,194	3,000	125,848
GRAND TOTAL ALL PROJECTS	327,301	84,965	365,131	777,397	19,629	44,750	55,016	896,792

Secondly, in keeping with the national pattern for the years where data is available, educational projects continued to attract more contributions than any other type of projects, though as Table 6.1 shows they were not as numerous as other types of projects. In 1973, educational projects attracted 37% of the total contributions. This percentage went up to 48%, 48% and 53% for 1974, 1975 and 1976 respectively, before dropping slightly to 49% for 1977. Nursery schools and primary schools accounted for a large share of the contributions. This is anticipated by their large numbers in Table 6.1.

Thirdly, cattle dips and water projects attracted fairly large amounts of contributions. Again this was anticipated by Table 6.1. We feel, however, that very large amounts of contributions for water projects go unrecorded. Some of the amounts recorded, for example the 36,074 Ksh reported for 1974 is barely enough for two small water projects. In that year alone, Table 6.1 shows that 24 water projects were initiated.

Fourthly, for the first time, women's projects began to be recorded in 1974 though they were split into different categories such as "women's clubs buildings" and "cultivation and weeding". As the figures for 1977 show, their contribution has been increasing over the years. According to the Kiambu District Community Development Officer, the contribution from women groups for 1977 was expected to be nearly 6 million shillings, out of a total Harambee contribution of 17 million shillings.⁵

Finally, over the five year period, the people continued to be the major source of resources for Harambee projects in Kiambu District. This is summarized in Graph 6.1. The pattern depicted in the graph is very similar to the national trend described in the last chapter. What then can we conclude about Harambee activities in Kiambu District?

We could pursue the analysis further, along the lines of the last chapter, and show that, with respect to other aspects of Governmental participation in Harambee, Kiambu does not show significant differences. However, since most of our observations, and some of the data in the last chapter, referred to Kiambu District (for example the data on the poor training of Community Development Assistants) this is no longer necessary. Suffice it to say then, that, as in the rest of the country, the Government has continued to play a relatively minor role in Harambee activities in Kiambu District. Government participation, however, is likely to be "undervalued" if one looks at financial contributions alone, a point that we made in the last chapter. We shall leave the question of contributions from the national elites and especially the politicians for the next chapter. All we can say here is that if we accept the rather problematic inclusion of elites in the "other donor" category, then their financial contribution to Harambee projects in Kiambu District is low, just as their national contribution is low.

-GRAPH 6.1

CONTRIBUTIONS TO HARAMBEE PROJECTS: KIAMBU DISTRICT: 1973-77

A - People

E - Others

Source: Compiled from information obtained
at Kiambu District Department of
Social Services

6.4 Summary

As in the rest of the country, social projects dominate Harambee activities in Kiambu District. Following the explanation which we offered in the last chapter, we interpret this to mean that these are the kinds of projects which have been preferred by the local communities in Kiambu.

The communities, which are officially classified as "the people" have, by far, made the largest contribution to Harambee projects, if we accept the validity of the official data for the years where the data is available. Again, this pattern of contribution is consistent with the overall national pattern. In the next chapter, we shall analyse how the politicians from Kiambu have participated in Harambee activities in that District. In doing so, we shall be relying primarily on the information gathered during our field research.

1. The names the women groups give to themselves are fascinating. Some are borrowed from the names of indigeneous trees known for certain characteristics such as hardness or ability to burn well even when wet, others are borrowed from the names of animals also known to have certain qualities such as bravery etc. They all have one thing in common. They express the hopes of the group. Most of the groups prefix their names with the "Nyakinyua". As pointed out in Chapter 1, "Nyakinyua" is the traditional title for that category of women who are old enough to have circumcised, and sometimes married, children. This means they occupy an honoured place in the community.
2. Republic of Kenya: Calculated from Ministry of Housing and Social Services. Department of Social Services: A Statistical Analysis of Self-Help Projects, Nairobi, 1974 p.34.
3. Ibid, pp. 46-51
4. The data for 1974-1977 was compiled from the files at the District Headquarters in Kiambu District. The classification format used for 1974-1977 is the new government format which shows more details than the format used before 1974.
5. Personal communication. June 1978. It was subsequently announced over the Voice of Kenya that the total Harambee contributions in Kiambu for 1977 was 33 million shillings or twice the amount shown in Table 6.6. Of this amount, 6 million was generated by women groups who raised "the money from working on farms on contract". Voice of Kenya, August 17, 1978.

CHAPTER 7

THE MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT AND HARAMBEE IN KIAMBU

7.1 Introduction

In this chapter we describe and analyse the various ways in which Kiambu Members of Parliament have participated in Harambee activities in that District. We begin by looking at their participation in the projects which were in our sample. In this respect, we concentrate mainly on initiation and contribution of resources to projects with a view to assessing whether politicians have played a significant part in these aspects. We then describe, in a less static way, the Harambee activities of each Member of Parliament from Kiambu. This is intended to illustrate their roles as political entrepreneurs. Where applicable, we describe, as case studies, some of the "key" and "personal" projects in which they are involved. Finally we make general observations on Harambee participation of Kiambu politicians.

Before proceeding any further, we should point out that in the next section we shall be concentrating on the Members of Parliament though the data presented covers much more than simply information on Members of Parliament. The rest of the information will be discussed in the next chapter.

7.2 The Members of Parliament and the Surveyed Projects

One of the most interesting finding to emerge from our field work was that Members of Parliament, ex-Members of Parliament and their families initiated Harambee projects less frequently than

we would have expected. We asked the question: "Who initiated this project?" The respondents then named as many people as they considered the initiators of the projects. The results were as follows:

TABLE 7.1 PROJECT INITIATORS

<u>Category</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1. M.P./Ex M.P./Family	3	1.0
2. Community Development Officer	1	0.30
3. Chief-Sub-chief	9	2.80
4. Councillor	4	1.30
5. Local Businessman	19	6.00
6. Local Farmer	201	63.6
7. Housewife	10	3.2
8. Clergy	8	2.5
9. Local Teachers	21	6.6
10. Clerks	13	4.0
11. Other employees (e.g. watchmen, family planning)	13	4.0
12. Don't Know/No Response	14	4.4
TOTAL	316	99.7

Although our results are not exactly comparable to the national results obtained by Mbithi and Rasmusson, since they used

a slightly different system for classifying the initiators, it is still worth noting that even if we were to combine MPs and Councillors, as Mbithi and Rasmusson seem to have done, the total percentage would still be much lower than the 7.2% obtained by Mbithi and Rasmusson.

We thought that the low percentage of politicians as initiators was due to the large number of women's projects in our sample; projects which were unlikely to be initiated by politicians. But even if we controlled for the women's projects, Members of Parliament constituted only 1.3 per cent of initiators. The Councillors constituted about 2% of initiators for a total of 3.3%, which was still far below the Mbithi and Rasmusson findings.

Whereas the Members of Parliament did not initiate projects that often, they did slightly better when it came to exerting influence in the few projects that they did initiate. We asked the question: "Among those who initiated this project who (one person) was the most influential?" The results were as follows:

TABLE 7.2

MOST INFLUENTIAL INITIATORS

<u>Category of Initiators</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1. MP/Ex MP/Family	3	3.2
2. Community Development Officer	1	1.0
3. Chief/Sub-chief	6	6.3
4. Councillor	3	3.2
5. Local Businessman	10	10.5
6. Local Farmer	47	49.8
7. Housewife	3	3.2
8. Clergy	2	2.1
9. Local Teachers	4	4.2
10. Clerks	3	3.2
11. Other employees	1	1.0
12. Don't Know/No Response	12	12.6
TOTAL	95	100.3

It is to be expected that if a Member of Parliament initiated a project, he would do everything he could to make sure that the project was "his own". We were, therefore, not surprised to find that the Members of Parliament were named as the most influential initiators in all the projects which they had initiated. Thus, although Members of Parliament still constituted a small percentage of the most influential initiators, this was on account of their having initiated projects very few times rather than on

account of letting their project be overly influenced by somebody else. We shall take up this issue below.

If the Members of Parliament stayed away from initiating large numbers of projects and instead concentrated on a few, what types did they concentrate on and did they influence project initiation in other ways, for example, by suggesting to others that they initiate projects?

The first question is difficult to answer from our survey data since the Members of Parliament were named as initiators only three times out of 316 responses. Of the three times, once was related to a women's project, when a Member persuaded some women to constitute themselves into a traditional dancing troupe and at the same time raise money so that he could help them buy a large farm. The other two times referred to water projects. The question will, therefore, be raised again in the next section, when we describe our observations outside the survey data. With reference to the second question, we asked the respondents: "Why did you initiate this project?"

TABLE 7.3

REASONS FOR INITIATING

<u>Reason Categories</u>	<u>Total Times Given</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1. Perceived members' social benefits	124	38.8
2. Perceived members' economic benefit	132	41.3
3. Perceived personal benefit	17	5.3
4. Attract external/ Government help	21	6.7
5. Influence from MP/Ex MP/ Family	5	1.7
6. Influence from Councillor	6	1.9
7. Challenge from neighbouring community	9	2.8
8. Others/No Response	6	1.9
<u>TOTAL TIMES</u>	<u>320</u>	<u>100.4</u>

The results were most surprising. We expected that even if politicians did not initiate projects, most projects would be initiated at their suggestion. As it turned out, this was not the case. The results were, however, compatible with those of the previous two questions. Politicians chose generally to stay away from the preliminary stages of Harambee projects. Did they, then, come in later, for example, to raise money for projects, and thereby persuade the people to contribute to the projects? We asked the question: "Why did you contribute for this project?" In asking the question, we were looking for influence from politicians.

TABLE 7.4 REASONS FOR CONTRIBUTING

<u>Reason Categories</u>	<u>Total Reasons</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1. Perceived members, social benefits	34	18.2
2. Perceived members' economic benefits	9	4.8
3. Perceived personal benefit	118	63.0
4. Attract external help	4	2.0
5. Influence from MP/ Ex MP/Family	12	6.4
6. Influence from Chiefs/ Sub-chiefs	4	2.0
7. Perceived challenge from neighbouring groups	4	2.0
8. Don't Know/No Response	2	1.0
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>187</u>	<u>99.4</u>

In keeping with the pattern already observed, M.P.s did not influence contributions to Harambee projects a great deal. However, they had more influence in this aspect of Harambee projects than in the initiation of the projects. The improved performance of the M.P.s in this aspect of Harambee projects might be a reflection of fund-raising meetings the psychology of which is geared towards reckless excitement, leading to more contributions than would otherwise be the case without a fund-raising meeting. Originally we had intended to find out how much had been contributed

and by whom at fund-raising meetings for the projects surveyed, but this proved impossible. First, very few people would show us the books. Secondly, most people "could not remember" whether a fund-raising meeting chaired by a politician had been held, let alone how much had been contributed and by whom. But a substitute question gave us an idea of the source of resources for the projects. We asked the question: "What are the projects sources of?" then we listed: ideas, labour, materials, cash and land.

TABLE 7.5 MENTIONED SOURCES OF RESOURCES

<u>Type of Source</u>	<u>Number of Times Mentioned</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1. The people	146	49.8
2. Local Government	27	9.2
3. The local MP/Ex MP/Family	20	6.8
4. Foreign Agencies/Governments	19	6.5
5. Central Government/Ministries	18	6.1
6. Department of Community Develop.	16	5.5
7. Local Councillor	17	5.8
8. Chief/Sub-chief	15	5.1
9. Prominent Businessman	13	4.4
10. Others/No Response	2	0.7
<u>TOTAL TIMES MENTIONED</u>	<u>293</u>	<u>99.9</u>

The results for this question were almost identical with the results for the question above. Members of Parliament, though named more often this time as sources of resources, were still not regarded as overwhelmingly generous in terms of spreading their resources. They were mentioned only 20 times out of a total of 293 responses. Is it possible that the reason why the M.P.s were not so prominent in initiation and providing resources to Harambee projects was that the questions asked were too project specific? In other words, would they do better if a question was directed at an area, rather than at a project? In this respect, we asked the question: "Of the following people, who, in your opinion has contributed the most in furthering Harambee projects in this area?" We did not define "area" but we explained that we were not simply asking about that particular project. The results were as follows:

TABLE 7.6. MOST CONTRIBUTION IN AN AREA

<u>Categories Mentioned.</u>	<u>No. of Respondent</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1. The M.P./Ex M.P./Family	20	11.4
2. The District Officer	16	9.1
3. The Community Development Assistant	45	25.7
4. The Chief/Sub-chief	34	19.4
5. The Local Councillor	21	12.0
6. Everybody/all	9	5.1
7. The People	8	4.6
8. Refused to answer	22	12.6
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>175</u>	<u>99.9</u>

Although the Members of Parliament did slightly better when the respondents were steered away from their own particular projects, the former were still mentioned by no more than 20 people out of 175 respondents. These were probably the same people who had mentioned the M.P.s twenty times as sources of resources. This suggested that although the percentage went up to just over 11.4% this was on account of a much smaller "N" rather than increased participation by Members of Parliament.

If Kiambu M.P.s did not score very highly in initiation, contribution and other areas of Harambee projects mentioned above, how did they do in terms of spreading the idea of Harambee in general? We asked the question: "From whom did you first hear the word Harambee?"

TABLE 7.7

FIRST HEARD THE WORD HARAMBEE

<u>Source</u>	<u>No. of Respondents</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1. President Kenyatta	82	46.9
2. The local M.P./Ex M.P.	10	5.70
3. The local people	46	26.3
4. The Chiefs/Sub-chiefs	8	4.8
5. Don't Know/Can't Remember	29	16.6
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>175</u>	<u>99.3</u>

Not surprisingly, the most famous Member of Parliament from Kiambu emerged as the man from whom nearly half the respondents had first heard the word "Harambee". The low performance of the other categories was to be expected, given the dominance of Kenyatta in this aspect of Harambee.

What we have presented so far, seems to picture the Members of Parliament as political entrepreneurs, who choose very carefully, where they invest their resources. We looked for other areas of influence by politicians and the results were much the same as those shown above. The participation of politicians was simply not that overwhelming. For example, results show that politicians were hardly represented in the formal decision-making organizations of the projects. This follows from the fact that the initiators of the projects were also the same people who occupied decision-making positions within project organizations. Since politicians were low initiators, it should and did follow, that they did not feature prominently as project decision makers. They constituted only 2.8% of those who had some formal status in the projects, and even here they were not named as chairmen, or treasurer etc. Rather, they were named as "advisors" or simply as "patrons".

Asked the procedure for obtaining positions in the project committees, all the respondents replied that the procedure was to elect committee members in a public meeting. Furthermore, over 90 percent of the respondents replied that the voting system was not through secret ballot. Instead, as one woman leader pointed out "the voting was by raising hands. That way, it is open for everybody to see". What actually happens is that the initiators of a project would almost invariably be unanimously elected to positions of decision-making. After all, argued one respondent "the initiators had already shown that they deserved leadership by the very act of initiating the project and organizing the people".

What then can we conclude? The survey results indicate much lower levels of Harambee participation by elected central level politicians than we would have anticipated. Given our view of the importance of Harambee projects to politicians, one would have expected that the MPs would initiate more projects, thereby paving the way for more participation, on their part, in the other aspects of projects. We suggest that the results are illustrative of one of the internal contradictions of Harambee discussed in Chapter IV. As a collective ideology, Harambee demanded a generalized support to the system. However, as we argued in Chapter IV, one of the tenets of the collective ideology (and herein lies the contradiction) was political entrepreneurship. At the project level, the generalized commitment turns into entrepreneurship which demands selective participation. We shall now look at the politicians as entrepreneurs.

What follows is as complete information as we could get on the Harambee activities of M.P.s from Kiambu. While we do not claim that it is exhaustive, it is, at least, illustrative of the role of politicians as political entrepreneurs. Where appropriate, case histories of "key" and sometimes "personal" projects are presented.

7.3 The Political Entrepreneurs.

M.P. No.1:

This Member of Parliament is well educated and in many ways is a model representative in the context of Kenyan politics. He says little in Parliament and he rarely engages in any controversial issues. He has no interest at all in the party and unlike most Members of Parliament who sought party posts in the 1977 party elections, he has stayed aloof from the party. Instead, he has concentrated on Harambee projects in his own constituency. He has no credentials from the past nationalist struggle. Political competition in his constituency has, therefore, been open and sometimes difficult. When he was first elected, he won by a few hundred votes. The second time round, he won by a huge majority, and for that, he was appointed an Assistant Minister.

Within our sample he was involved in five water projects, scattered throughout the constituency. They were all large water projects. The smallest was estimated to cost half a million shillings and the largest was estimated to cost 3 million shillings.

He was the initiator of two of the five water projects, and he was the treasurer of a third one. He was named as the "Patron" for a fourth one. Unlike his predecessor, he does not rely on the traditionalist vote, but even so, he has raised money for at least one women's group in the sample. The group comes from near his home area.

In addition to water projects, some of which were included in our sample, the M.P. has planned a string of expensive girls' technical secondary schools throughout the constituency. A fund-raising for one of the schools was described in the last chapter. (It will be recalled that the cost of the school was quoted as 1.7 million shillings). He is particularly close to two ministers, both of whom have at one or another time conducted fund-raising meetings in the constituency. One project, in particular, was a personal project for the M.P. This was a dispensary.

Case 1 - The Dispensary

This project was actually started in 1964 by three men who were at that time the local Councillors. One of the three is now the Sub-chief of the area. The second one is now a prosperous local businessman, and the third one is described as a "progressive farmer". At the time of the interview, the three men described themselves as ordinary members of the project.

When the hospital was first built, it was just a mud-walled dispensary served by the mobile medical services. The three initiators approached the then M.P. for assistance but he did not show much interest. He was an ex Mau Mau detainee; that is why he had been elected in the first place. The dispensary, therefore, continued as a mud-walled building until 1970 when the newly elected M.P. took over, and started organizing fund-raising meetings for it. Over a period of years, the M.P. organized "more than ten" fund-raising meetings for the dispensary. One of the meetings was conducted by President Kenyatta himself. At this meeting 120,000 shillings were raised. Among those who have contributed at one time or another, have been the Provincial Commissioner for Central Province (5,000 shillings), and the Kenya Charity Sweepstake (7,000 shillings). Each committee member had to contribute 500 shillings.

After taking over in 1970, the M.P. made the project his own and dissolved the old committee. According to two of our respondents "he began working on it alone, but he eventually appointed his own committee. I understand he has spent about 500,000 shillings from his pocket". Some of this money went into a small water project to service the dispensary.

Asked whether they expected any help from the Government when they initiated the project, the respondents answered that they did. According to one respondent "we knew that if we contributed and constructed a hospital, the Government would come in and assist

and also provide us with doctors". Thanks to the M.P., he added, "the dispensary was taken over by the Ministry of Health in 1977". As a postscript, we should add that this particular M.P. is one of the wealthiest men in Kenya.

M.P. No. 2:

Unlike M.P. No. 1, our second M.P. is not a "Harambee man". He is a Cabinet Minister who can be described as a one project man. Unlike other Ministers, he rarely tours the country officiating at Harambee fund-raising meetings. He has very impressive credentials from the nationalist struggle, and he has always maintained an active interest in the party. He was close to President Kenyatta and he could always count on some help from the President in case of political trouble at election time. To his credit, though, he has always allowed political competition at election times. He is a traditionalist and relies heavily on votes from the older generation, and especially the women. His Harambee activities are very limited in his constituency. The reason seems to be that he has a reliable body of supporters who have known and worked with him since independence. The most reliable of his supporters are the women's groups. Below is a case history of the largest group in his constituency which also happened to be in our sample. The story was told by the leader of the group.

Case 2 - The Ndumo Women's Group

Some years after the leader of this group was released from detention for Mau Mau activities, she attended a public meeting

at a nearby shopping centre where a KANU Youth Group selected her to lead other women in traditional singing. On being selected, she told the other women that "we are not only going to be engaged in singing traditional songs but we are also going to inform the leaders and other authorities about what we want, through the songs".

Soon after, she and 37 other women organized themselves as a "Ngwatio" group who began by cultivating other peoples farms to get some money.

They kept the money until each had 600 shillings and the total was used for building each member a two-roomed house with a roof of corrugated iron sheets. Some members of the group used their money to pay for the children's school fees.

The group ensured that each member used the money, so raised, for the intended purposes. After the group had successfully raised 600 shillings for each member, other women became interested in the group and joined it. The membership grew to 80. The women then decided that each member would now contribute 5 shillings, every Saturday, and that the money would be used to buy a farm, as so many of them were "landless". (One suspects most of them have a small plot of land, but they have to work as labourers on richer peoples farms in order to earn the 5 shillings).

After some time, the "Ngwatio" group found they were going to take a long time to buy the farm they needed because they were contributing only a total of 400 shillings a week. The group therefore, decided to increase each members contribution to 50

shillings a month, thus bringing the total to 4,000 shillings a month.

At this juncture, the group decided to organize themselves differently. They, therefore, approached some people, like Councillors, and other local leaders for advice; and they were told that they should each contribute 550 shillings rather than the smallish amounts they were contributing before, so that they could eventually buy a farm. The suggestion was made by the wife of the M.P. and it was readily accepted, on condition that she would look for the farm.

After a while, it was realised that the amount the women had contributed was still too small and another suggestion was made that each member should now contribute 1,050 shillings towards the purchase of the farm. It was also suggested by the M.P.'s wife that the group should be enlarged. In order to enlarge the group, the women were organized into four branches covering the whole constituency. This resulted in the membership increasing to over 2,000 members.

The members who were best known to the political leaders were elected to lead each branch. The M.P.'s wife was elected Chairman and advisor of all the branches and our respondent was elected the Vice-Chairman and composer of the traditional style songs. Eight women, including the M.P.'s wife were elected to collect money for the farm, two being elected from each branch. These women took their collections to the Chief's office once a fortnight, from where it was sent to the bank.

At the time of the interview the group had contributed over a million shillings without organizing a Harambee meeting.

According to our interviewee "the M.P. has told us that when we have raised half of the purchase price of the farm, he will help us to get a loan to meet the other half which we can repay afterwards". When they remind the M.P. of this promise they are told that "he has already seen higher authorities about the purchase of the farm but there is too much competition for farms". Needless to say the women are terribly disappointed, though they continue to be the staunchest supporters of the M.P., partly because of his nationalist credentials and perceived closeness to Kenyatta, and partly, one suspects, due to the involvement of the M.P.'s wife with the group.

M.P. No. 3

Like M.P. No. 2, M.P. No. 3 is not a "Harambee man", though he too has a few personal projects in his own constituency. He is a Cabinet Minister but this is on account of his impressive credentials in the nationalist struggle. Unlike other Cabinet Ministers, he never toured the country conducting fund-raising meetings. He was particularly close to President Kenyatta and he could always count on their friendship at election times. During the last general elections, he was elected unopposed. His constituency had the lowest number of projects in the whole District.

Though this M.P. did not need Harambee for electoral purposes, he nonetheless made the occasional contribution to traditional men and women's groups and he took the occasions to urge them to maintain the spirit of Harambee. Within our sample, he had made such a contribution to two groups. According to the respondent, the M.P. "has helped us a lot. He told us the good news about the help we will get from the Government, especially if we continue raising money". The respondent added, "the M.P. has promised us that when the Government gets money, we shall be able to buy cows cheaply from the Government". At the time of the interview, the group as a whole had contributed a grand total of 300 shillings. The other group which the M.P. had helped was also a small women's group which was involved in building a community social hall. According to our respondent, "he gave us 4 lorries of building stones. The stones were brought by Government vehicles from the Ministry of Housing and Social Services". Not surprisingly, one is tempted to wonder who the real contributor was.

Despite the public misgivings which we encountered in this M.P.'s constituency he was involved in two other major projects which were not in our sample. One was a water project for which he was "the patron". By the end of 1977, the project had raised a total of just over 1 million shillings and was still raising more money. This was a constituency wide project which was estimated to cost 50 million shillings. The other project was a girls High School.

4

Case 3 - The Girls' High School

The high school was conceived and started in 1974 as a memorial to the M.P.'s father, after whom the school was named. The father was a well known nationalist. The initiators of the project were the M.P. and his brother. They were assisted by a very high ranking civil servant from the area, and also by the extremely wealthy national chairman of GEMA.

The foundation stone for the school was laid by President Kenyatta. On this occasion, Kenyatta conducted a fund-raising meeting and 350,000 shillings was collected. Further contributions "were made by well-wishers from all over the country" including a fund-raising meeting conducted by the First Lady, Mama Ngina Kenyatta.

At the time of our visit to the school in mid 1977, the school had 32 classrooms, two physical science laboratories and a host of other auxiliary buildings. When completed, the school was expected to take a maximum of 1,500 pupils. At the end of 1976, the school had already admitted 700 girls and 300 boys. As part of the school, a water project was already underway. It was estimated to cost 80,000 shillings of which the Ministry of Water Development was going to donate 60,000 shillings".²

The school is obviously not a typical Harambee school but rather a political showpiece. During the 19th General Conference of UNESCO held in Nairobi in November 1976, delegates were given a

group tour of the school "to see Harambee at work, and to enlighten the visitors on how Kenyans live and the spirit of Harambee".³

It was during this tour that the First Lady conducted a fund-raising meeting for the school. The newspaper report on that occasion also emphasized that the group which had initiated the school, had also met at the House of the Minister (the M.P.) and hatched the idea of the first operational Harambee Institute of Science and Technology at Kiambu".⁴ The Institutes, adds the report "are now part of a national system of vocational training and technical education which will create new means for individuals to acquire the skills and abilities necessary to improve their social and economic status, (especially) through self-employment in the rural areas."⁵ The point, then, is that the girls high school is a "key" project for a group of people who were extremely powerful, politically and economically, during Kenyatta's rule.

M.P. No. 4

This M.P. is a Harambee M.P. though he himself is not extraordinarily wealthy. He has no credentials from the nationalist struggle. He was first elected in 1974, partly as a backlash against the Minister patron of the then M.P. The Minister was defeated by a coalition of very powerful individuals. During the campaign, the M.P. made typical Kenyan electoral promises. He promised among other things, that if elected, he would "bring piped water and other projects"⁶ to the constituency. Going by the number of water projects which have been initiated since his election, it seems that

he has kept his promise. Between 1971-1973, the constituency initiated 22 water projects, more than in any other constituency. Because he does not have "much money" he does not have his "own" projects as such. Instead, he "advises" the water groups and gives each one of them the modest amount of 2,000 shillings. There were 2 water projects in our sample and he had given each 2,000 shillings. He also receives some help from the very individuals who helped defeat the ex-M.P. One of the individuals helped raise over one million shillings in one afternoon for the water projects in this constituency.

The M.P. has also benefitted from the mistakes of the man he defeated. The ex-M.P. relied heavily on traditional men and women's groups. He initiated one of the groups which was in our sample. According to the chairman of the group, the ex-M.P. "came to us and told us that he had been sent by the President to ask us to start a group for singing traditional songs. Two hundred of us got together and formed such a group. We enjoyed the singing, but the primary motivation for our singing was that we wanted to get land. Eventually, we started contributing money for this purpose and the M.P. was our advisor in this respect. He told us to aim at having 3 million shillings and that once we had collected 200,000 shillings, he would seek Government aid for the remaining amount. I personally have contributed 600 shillings and the whole group has achieved the target of 200,000 shillings. We want the land which we were promised".

The chairman of the group told the above story in response to the question "what reasons led you to initiate the project?" Not surprisingly, when asked what he understood by the word Harambee, he replied "Getting together in order to get help from the Government". This group turned against the ex-M.P. in 1974 and it now hopes to get help from the present M.P. In our sample, there were two other such groups organized by the ex-M.P.. Each had a membership of over 200 men and women.

M.P. No. 5

This Member of Parliament was first elected in 1974. Soon after, he was made an Assistant Minister. He is very wealthy and has used his wealth in many Harambee projects. He travels widely overseas, and he has also toured Kenya extensively as a guest of honour at numerous Harambee meetings. In his own constituency he has worked very closely with the women's groups. He is not only the advisor to most of them, but according to the secretary of one of the groups in our sample "he has given most of the women's groups a plot each, on which to build small shops". He was involved in all the women's groups in our sample. During our interviewing, he "ran into us" in the constituency, no doubt as word got around that there were some people asking questions about Harambee. The women are thankful to him, though the thanks might be somewhat misplaced. Part of the constituency is in a new settlement scheme, and they all say that "he has given them the land they live on", which is not really the case.

The M.P. had two projects of his own. One was a secondary school in the constituency. Unfortunately, though the school was in our sample, nobody would say anything about it. We were told that if we wanted to obtain information about the school, we could only get the information "from the M.P. or the District Officer" from the area. The reluctance to talk on the part of some of his local supporters was understandable. He had won the elections by exactly 260 votes, and, therefore, any outsiders had to be scrutinized carefully. The other project was a constituency development fund.

Case No. 4 - The Constituency Development Fund

The M.P. called a meeting at a nearby shopping centre. During the meeting, he presented the idea of starting a constituency development fund. The people immediately accepted the idea and the fund was established at the meeting. The M.P. then made the following proposals which were accepted. First, he was to be in charge of the fund. Second, he was to be assisted by the District Officer and the other administrative officers such as Chiefs, in the administration of the fund. Third, he would contribute 1,000 shillings per month to the fund, if everybody else agreed to contribute 1 shilling per month to the fund. Fourth, the fund would be used primarily for educational purposes such as paying school fees and helping students from the constituency to go for further studies abroad. The proposals were all accepted.

The fund did not get off the ground. First, those who were supposed to collect the money never did it. According to the Sub-chief from the area "we made the mistake of waiting in our offices for people to bring the money, and, of course, they did not bring the money. We should have gone from door to door collecting the 1 shilling". Thirdly, quite a few of the people from the area are temporary workers who cannot be sure whether they will be employed tomorrow. They, therefore, on second thought apparently, refused to contribute the 1 shilling.

No one would admit that the fund was a disaster. The people we interviewed all insisted that the fund was still alive and that they were working hard to solve the problems enumerated by the Sub-chief. However, despite the apparent failure of the fund at the public level, the M.P. kept up the ideas embodied in the fund: According to a recent report:

"He has been donating generously within his own constituency and is paying schools fees for several children of his constituents in secondary schools. He has also sponsored a number of students from his constituency to overseas for further studies. Such tactics have been known to win immense support for several politicians in Kenya. They are bound to do the same for him".⁷

M.P. No. 6

This M.P. is the least known one in Kiambu District. He was first elected in 1974. He is not a wealthy man and this shows on his Harambee record. As far as we could find out, he was involved in only two projects. One was a women's group to which he had "given advice" and the other was a primary school to which he had contributed 300 shillings. By way of contrast, the local Councillor had contributed 3,120 shillings to the same school. The school was expected to cost 250,000 shillings. Currently, the M.P. has entered into an alliance with M.P. number 1, no doubt on account of the forthcoming elections and the factional upheavals which are currently taking place in Kiambu following Kenyatta's death.

M.P. No. 7

This Member of Parliament was a national figure. As the President of Kenya he initiated the whole Harambee movement, beginning with a hospital in his own constituency. He, of course, did not face any political competition in his own constituency. In later years, he rarely conducted any fund-raising meetings, either in his own constituency or anywhere else. In the constituency, members of his own family were often the guests of honour at fund-raising meetings. Not surprisingly, one of them was recently elected to fill the seat when it became vacant on account of the President's death. In order to be elected, however, he still had to spend literally millions of shillings. This was in

spite of the national publicity which he had enjoyed prior to Kenyatta's death as a constant companion of the late President. According to the campaign reports: "Candidates were called upon to donate large sums of money to various projects in the area if they wanted to be listened to. Of the seven candidates running, only two had this kind of money. Observers reckon the two have put millions of shillings into the campaign".⁸

Before Kenyatta died, the current M.P. had been chairman and co-ordinator of a large Agricultural Training School which the Japanese Government was planning to build in Kenya. The school was to be built in the late President's constituency. One estimate has it that, in addition to the chairmanship of the prestigious school, the current M.P. "has developed not less than 16 projects worth more than 5.4 million shillings".⁹

7.4 Observations on Political Entrepreneurship

The foregoing description of Harambee activities by Kiambu Members of Parliament has illustrated a number of points.

One, even though the formal data tends to show a low degree of Harambee involvement by M.P.'s, one must not underestimate the political importance of Harambee to the politicians, and vice versa.

The reason for the apparent low level of formal involvement, and this is our second point, is that politicians prefer to participate through involvement in "key", and sometimes almost "personal" projects which involve enough people to make

them politically profitable. Such projects as water projects, technical high schools, and mass land purchasing groups are "key" projects to a politician. In some extreme cases, the key projects can easily be turned into obvious political showpieces, especially when the patron of the project is a high ranking Cabinet Minister who also happens to be very close to the President.

Thirdly, even one key project can sometimes be financially expensive to a politician, especially when he stakes his political reputation on the success of the project. As soon as he does this, the local community immediately senses the personal commitment, and they take advantage of the commitment. M.P. number one made the hospital an issue in his first bid for Parliament. He was held accountable after the elections, and he ended up spending half a million shillings of his own money in order to keep the promise.

Four, political and sometimes economic exploitation of large Harambee groups made up of illiterate peasants is not uncommon. If pre-emptive development is instinctive to the peasants, it is also encouraged in other ways by some politicians who make unrealistic promises of Government aid to the peasant groups. The politicians know that the peasants are not in a position to check the validity of the promises. But the peasants sometimes remember the promises at election times and they vote accordingly.

Five, a powerful Cabinet Minister can easily commandeer Government resources and deliver them as personal Harambee contributions to unsophisticated peasants. Sometimes though, this can be done quite legally. For example, in the 1976/77 financial year, the Government allocated 22.8 million pounds for water development. Of this amount 140,000 pounds was meant for assistance to Harambee water projects.¹⁰ There was nothing to stop the Minister for Water Development from delivering some of the 140,000 pounds personally. To the peasants, this was a gift from the Minister. Whether he explained that the gift was Government money or not was irrelevant to an illiterate peasant.

Six, the patronizing attitude of the politicians is sometimes unmistakable even when "patronage" is taken in its ordinary language usage. M.P. number 5 illustrates this point. The attitude is especially true in the cases where an M.P. happens to be extremely wealthy, as is true in this case, and also happens to have direct access to the President, as was also true in this case. We should add here that patronage in its ordinary language usage was very much part of Kenyatta's social style. Thus, if a school choir entertained him and especially pleased him, he would donate school uniforms to the school. Similarly, if a troupe of traditional dancers entertained him often enough so that he got to know the troupe, he would donate land to members of the troupe. The dancers were aware of the patronizing style. They, therefore, chose their lyrics accordingly.

Seven, the biographical sketches show that most Kiambu M.P.'s were no ordinary M.P.'s. Of the seven M.P.'s, one was the President, two were Cabinet Ministers, two were Assistant Ministers. Only two, therefore, were ordinary M.P.'s. Despite their positions, only the two Cabinet Ministers could rely on Kenyatta to intervene on their behalf in case of electoral trouble. One did not take this option. The other one did, and managed to get himself elected "unopposed" in the 1974 general elections. This means that the M.P.'s, like their colleagues from other parts of the country, had to participate in Harambee in order to get themselves elected.

The eighth point is that elections in Kenya have become largely a rich man's exercise. Though this might not be true of all the M.P.'s we have described, it is now generally assumed, in Kenya, that one has to be wealthy before attempting to run for Parliament. Of course there are cases where, for various reasons, not so wealthy individuals have been elected, (M.P. No. 4) but soon after being elected, they have either to ally themselves with wealthier patrons, (M.P. No. 6) or start accumulating in order to meet the economic demands of their political office.

To repeat, data from the questionnaire suggests low involvement on the part of Members of Parliament. However, it was our observation that Members of Parliament tend to avoid being formally involved in a project, unless they have made it one of their personal projects. Though they do have personal projects, this tactic is politically risky because it entails direct

accountability to the peasantry, something which most politicians would like to avoid. The general pattern, therefore, is to participate in certain key projects, even as they "drop in" on Harambee groups. They usually "drop in" especially when a project involves a local notable who is or may become a viable contender for the Parliamentary seat. Only personal projects, and some key projects are likely to be reflected in the formal aspects of Harambee projects. These projects do not add up to a large percentage of the total. However, even if they amount to no more than four or five, they can sometimes entail a considerable financial commitment. When they do not entail actual commitment, they alternatively entail considerable promises. Finally, politicians normally wait until they are approached by a local group before they decide how they are going to be involved in a project. We shall take up this point in the next chapter when we look at local leadership of Harambee groups. The technique of waiting until they are approached minimizes the political risks involved, for then the project becomes a community project and the politician cannot be directly accused of its failure, if it fails. The failure rate of projects, and therefore, the degree of risk to politicians can be quite high. For example in 1973 232 projects were newly registered in Kiambu District. In the same year, 81 projects were abandoned and only 69 projects were completed.¹¹

7.5 Summary

Data which was gathered formally through a questionnaire shows that Members of Parliament in Kiambu initiated projects very few times between 1971 and 1977. However, they were without exception, the most influential initiators for the few projects which they initiated. In addition to a low initiation rate, the M.P.'s also showed low influence in other areas of project activities for which information was sought.

We interpret the pattern depicted by the data to mean that the M.P.'s behaved like political entrepreneurs who chose carefully which projects to be involved in. The projects they chose varied from Member to Member. The ones chosen as case studies illustrate the different facets of political entrepreneurship at the project level.

CHAPTER 7: FOOTNOTES

1. The Nation, Nairobi, November 13, 1976
2. Ibid
3. Ibid
4. Ibid
5. Ibid
6. The Nation, Nairobi, October 30, 1974.
7. The Weekly Review, Nairobi, November 24, 1978, p.6
8. The Weekly Review, Nairobi, January 19, 1979, p.4
9. The Weekly Review, Nairobi, February 9, 1979, p.3
10. The Nation, Nairobi, Wednesday, July 7, 1976
11. Republic of Kenya. Ministry of Housing and Social Services:
Department of Community Development. Self-Help Division.
A Statistical Analysis of Self-Help. Nairobi,
Government Printers, p.53. It should be added that
figures on project failures and project completion are
not terribly useful as statistics. For one thing nobody
really knows when a project has finally failed. People
in the field keep on insisting that the project is still
in the books. For another thing, as we have pointed
out all along, some projects like those of women's
groups, by their very nature never get completed.

CHAPTER 8

LOCAL LEADERSHIP, THE PEASANTRY AND HARAMBEE IN KIAMBU

8.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we focus on three aspects of Harambee at the project level. First, we discuss the question of local leadership of Harambee groups as revealed by our survey. The aim is to identify local leaders and the part they play at the project level. In doing so, we also analyse some of the data presented but not discussed in the last chapter. Second, we raise the issue of peasant participation as revealed by our survey. The aim is to analyse why peasants participate in Harambee. Again, in doing so, we go back to some of the data presented in the last chapter. Finally, we discuss the process by which Harambee groups go about looking for project aid and project patrons.

8.2 Local Leadership and the Surveyed Projects

In discussing the question of local leadership of Harambee projects in Kiambu District, we want to begin with the rather obvious questions: Who are the local leaders of Harambee projects and what part do they play in Harambee activities? As the two questions are interrelated, we shall in most cases be answering both at the same time.

Portions of the answers to these questions were presented in the last chapter albeit without much discussion. We shall be interpreting the answers in a short while. Before we do so however,

we want to give a bit of descriptive information on the social characteristics of the local leaders. We begin with the educational background of the leaders who were mentioned in our survey as project initiators. Table 8.1, summarises the educational background of project initiators.

TABLE 8.1

INITIATORS' EDUCATION

<u>Years of Education</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1. None	99	31.3
2. 1 - 4 yrs.	49	15.5
3. 5 - 8 yrs.	56	17.7
4. 9 - 11 yrs	30	9.5
5. Over 11 yrs.	17	5.4
6. Some Adult Education	23	7.3
7. No Response/Don't Know	42	13.3
TOTAL (N)	316	100

Table 8.1 shows most project initiators have had a certain amount of education, and in this respect they are not representative of the general peasantry most of whom are still illiterate. This is, no doubt, one of the reasons why they are leaders. Still, nearly one third of the 316 individuals named as initiators have not had any education at all.

As far as initiators' sex is concerned, the results were not surprising in that we expected to find the breakdown just about even. Some men initiate some of the womens' projects and

some women initiate other than womens' projects. As it turned out women constituted 52 percent of initiators and men constituted 46 percent. The remaining two percent did not respond.

An age breakdown shows that leaders of Harambee projects in Kiambu are mostly old people by Kenyan standards where life expectancy is about 50 years. This is what one would expect from a rural population with a high respect for age. Table 8.2 shows the age breakdown of project initiators.

TABLE 8.2

INITIATORS' AGE

<u>Age</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1. Up to 21 yrs	4	1.3
2. 22 - 35 yrs.	56	17.7
3. 36 - 50 yrs	128	40.5
4. 51 - 65	83	26.3
5. Over 65	32	10.1
6. Don't Know/No Response	13	4.1
TOTAL (N)	316	100

Though most of the people in the rural areas do not actually know when they were born, and though most of the ages given are really rough approximations, we can still conclude that Harambee leadership is certainly not in the hands of people under thirty five. If we now go on to look at the occupational background of project initiators (Table 7.1), it is quite obvious that nearly all the projects in our sample had been initiated by

the local people. Furthermore, the initiators came from fairly varied occupational backgrounds. Nonetheless, most of the initiators (63.3%) were local farmers.

They very high percentage of farmer initiators should be explained. It should not come as a surprise that such a high percentage of initiators should be described as farmers. There are a number of reasons for this. First, residents of the rural areas have a tendency to describe themselves as farmers, even when, as in some cases, their principal source of income is not from farming. What the word "farmer" means, in their context, is that somebody resides in the area and that he has a piece of land in the area. Whether he makes his living from tilling his piece of land or from some other activity, such as being employed locally, is mostly immaterial to rural residents. If one owns a piece of land, one describes oneself as a farmer. In this sense, the real and pleasant surprise in the data is that other occupational categories are included as initiators of projects. In other words, without a long and sometimes belaboured explanation from enumerators, nearly all the initiators could very easily have been described/or described themselves as farmers. This is certainly true of such occupational categories as Community Development Assistants, Chiefs/ Sub-chiefs, Housewives, Councillors, and Businessmen. In nearly all the cases, we discovered that, in addition, they were "farmers". What this means is that the occupational categories of initiators,

committee members etc. should be interpreted very cautiously,¹ rather than be taken literally as stated by the respondents. At a maximum, the categories indicate whether the people involved are local residents or not. Thus, Chiefs/Sub-chiefs, Councillors, local businessmen, local farmers, housewives, clergy, teachers, Community Development Assistants, and clerks are all local residents, regardless of what else they do for a living. This is obviously not the case with District Commissioners and District Officers who are subject to quick transfers to any part of the country.

The second point about farmers as initiators of projects is that the women's groups had a tendency to be initiated, not by one or two people, but by five or six people who almost invariably described themselves as farmers. This tended to swell the category "farmers". We shall shortly come back to this point when we raise the issue of who initiated what type of project.

With almost two thirds of initiators as farmers, this obviously leaves little room for other occupational categories to initiate projects. Four categories are, nonetheless, worth emphasizing. The first of the four categories is teachers. Teachers constitute nearly seven percent of those named as initiators. This is a fairly high representation and is the next largest category after the farmers. This is not surprising considering the high respect accorded to teachers in the rural areas.

The second of the four categories is local businessmen, who constituted six percent of initiators. This is a politically important category for, in most cases, local businessmen tend to be more "worldly wise" than local farmers. They often go to urban areas in pursuit of their business and this exposes them to different ideas and attitudes which are important in shaping local opinions. More than any other group, the businessmen are potentially the most important challengers or allies of incumbent politicians. In addition to business, they are also local farmers and their average incomes are likely to be much higher than the average income for the communities in which they live.

The third important category is that of Chiefs and Sub-chiefs. Though they constitute only 3 percent of initiators, their importance as local leaders is much more significant than the figures would lead one to expect. To begin with, no local meeting can be held without the permission of either a Chief or a Sub-chief. For example, if one wanted to consult his local community on starting a project, one must inform the local Sub-chief who will then convene a meeting for such consultation. Needless to say, the Sub-chief can be uncooperative if he wishes. Secondly, the 3 percent figure would obviously be higher but for one fact. According to those Chiefs and Sub-chiefs whom we interviewed, they purposely stay away from initiating projects because they are administrative officers. As one Sub-chief put it "if I initiate a project, people might think that the project is a Government project."

This would kill the spirit of Harambee which is voluntary". However, once a project has been initiated, Chiefs and Sub-chiefs play an important part or one might even say an overzealous part in mobilizing local finances. This has been the subject of letters to the newspapers in Kenya, in which the authors complain of being forced by the Chiefs and Sub-chiefs to contribute to Harambee projects. The practice of forced contribution by Chiefs and Sub-chiefs did not seem too common, though, in Kiambu District.

Finally, we should emphasize the role of Councillors in initiating Harambee projects. Councillors are elected representatives of local Government. We, therefore, expected to find them initiating projects more times than the 1.3% reported. As it turned out, they too are political entrepreneurs. They prefer to let others initiate projects and then be approached for help. Though most of them are unlikely to have access to the kind and amounts of resources which would allow them to have "personal" projects, they, nonetheless, play a more important part than the figure on project initiation would suggest. We shall pick up this point below.

Now, it is possible for someone, or a group of people, to initiate a project and then hand over the leadership of the project to someone else. This would suggest a carefully thought out strategy whereby people initiate projects and then pass over the burden of implementation to well placed people, thus escaping the responsibility of seeing the project through. To a politician

seeking an elective office, the strategy would be suicidal. However, to a local farmer who simply wants water for his cows, this type of strategy would not be entirely out of the question. As it turned out, most of the project initiators stayed on to continue playing a prominent part in implementing the project. This comes out clearly in Table 8.3 which shows, among other things, that a large number of initiators had some type of status in the projects they had initiated.

TABLE 8.3 INITIATORS' STATUS IN PROJECT

<u>Position</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1. Chairman/Vice	84	26.6
2. Treasurer/Assistant	56	17.7
3. Secretary/Assistant	56	17.7
4. Committee Member	36	11.4
5. Ordinary Member	58	18.4
6. Work Leader	8	2.5
7. Advisor	9	2.8
8. Don't Know/No Response	9	2.8
TOTAL (N)	316	99.9

Two observations can be made on the results shown in Table 8.3. The first one is on the category "ordinary member". As can be seen nearly one fifth of all initiators are in this category. This rather large fraction of initiators does not mean

that the initiators are trying to escape their responsibility. Rather, it reflects the fact that some of the projects are initiated by five or six people who simply cannot all be included in the executive.

The second observation has to do with the fact that just over 80 percent of all initiators have some responsibility in the project. This fact makes it possible, for purposes of analysis, to equate project initiators with local project leadership. This leads us to our next point. Who are the most influential initiators of projects and what leadership positions are they likely to hold within the project hierarchy?

Table 7.2 showed the occupation of the most influential project initiators. The table showed that, farmers constitute nearly 50 percent of the most influential project initiators (leaders). The farmers are followed by local businessmen who constitute about 11 percent. The local businessmen are in turn followed by Chiefs/Sub-chiefs who make up just over 6 percent of the most influential initiators. The point, therefore, is that just as Harambee projects are overwhelmingly initiated by farmers, the same occupational group is named as the most influential in making the decision to initiate the projects. In other words, influence in making the decision to initiate the project, actual initiation of the project, and actual occupancy of a leadership position within the project go hand in hand. This becomes clear when we

look at the data in a different way. In addition to tabulating information on the occupation of the most influential initiators, we also tabulated information on the position of the most influential initiators within the hierarchy of the project organization. Again, perhaps not surprisingly, the most influential initiators held positions within the project organizational hierarchy. It will be recalled that we asked the question: "Among the people who initiated this project, who in your opinion was the most influential in making the decision to initiate the project?" From the answer to this question, we were able to find out what leadership positions the named individuals held within the projects. Out of the 95 projects which we surveyed, the results were as follows.

TABLE 8.4 MOST INFLUENTIAL INITIATORS

<u>Status in Project</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1. Chairman/Vice	47	49.5
2. Treasurer/Assistant	5	5.3
3. Secretary/Assistant	6	6.3
4. Committee	6	6.3
5. Member	10	10.5
6. Work Leader	2	2.1
7. Advisor	8	8.4
8. Other/Don't Know/ No Response	11	11.6
 TOTAL (N)	 95	 100

It is quite evident from the above results that a large number of the individuals named as the most influential initiators or projects are also project leaders in one capacity or the other.

From what we have said so far on project initiation as a key indicator of project leadership, we can now raise the question: Do particular types of projects tend to attract particular occupational groups? Table 8.5 summarises the results for the projects surveyed.

We have deliberately presented the figures in Table 8.5 in raw numbers, rather than in percentages, in order to avoid giving a misleading impression with percentages, especially where the number of cases is very small. But even working with raw numbers, we can make a number of observations, on the largest three occupational groups named as initiators.

First, farmers are represented as initiators in nearly all project types, though they show a marked concentration on women's groups, cattle dips, nursery schools and water projects. Second, the next largest category of initiators - teachers - are also represented in nearly all the projects though almost one third of teacher initiators have initiated women's groups. Third, the local businessmen, though again represented in most of the projects, show a marked preference for initiating water projects. Just over one third of all businessmen initiators have initiated water projects.

TABLE 8.5

PROJECT TYPES AND INITIATORS OCCUPATIONS

PROJECT TYPE	M.P.	Commun. Devel. Assis.	Chief Sub-Chief	Council-ors	Local Busi-ness-men	Farmers	House wife	Clery	Teach-ers	Clerk	Other Employ-ees	Others/Don't Know Not Clear	Total
1. Women Groups	1	1	1	-	2	120	10	-	6	-	2	2	145
2. Nursery Schools	-	-	2	2	2	17	-	-	4	1	2	1	31
3. Electricity	-	-	-	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
4. Water	2	-	2	1	7	16	-	1	2	4	2	1	38
5. Church	-	-	-	-	-	11	-	2	4	2	2	1	22
6. Cattle Dips	-	-	2	-	2	29	-	2	1	-	1	3	40
7. Sports Clubs	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	4	2	4	12
8. Primary Schools	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	3
9. Youth/Village Poly.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	1	3
10. Adult Education	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
11. Man Groups	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	1	-	1	1	6
12. Health/Hospitals	-	-	2	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	1	-	7
13. Others.	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	3	-	-	-	-	4
Times Named	3	1	9	4	19	201	10	8	21	13	13	14	316

305

Looking at the table from left to right, we can again make a few cautious observations. Women's groups, not surprisingly have overwhelmingly been initiated by farmers. This is also true of water projects, churches and of course cattle dips.

Beyond these few observations, it would be fair to say that no clear pattern emerges except the dominance of farmers wherever they are named as initiators, and the tendency of other major groups of initiators such as local businessmen, teachers, and clerks to be spread over a number of project types. The only large group of initiators that shows unequivocal preference is the "housewives". All ten female initiators have initiated women's projects. Otherwise most of the local leaders seem to be interested in general development which means initiating projects without showing too much preference for any particular type of project. How about other aspects of leadership raised in Chapter VII? Two aspects in particular are worth commenting on. These are the sources of resources for the projects, and the general promotion of Harambee projects in an area.

Table 7.5 enumerated the mentioned sources of resources for those projects which we surveyed. Although the results show, as expected, that "the people" have by far been the major source of resources - having been mentioned as such nearly 50% of the time - the importance of local leaders in this aspect is also highlighted in the responses. Local Councillors are mentioned nearly six percent of the time. Chiefs and Sub-chiefs are

mentioned five percent of the time. Community Development Assistants are mentioned nearly six percent of the time. Local businessmen are mentioned over four percent of the time whereas Local Government - which essentially means the efforts of the local Councillor - is mentioned over nine percent of the time. Taken together, therefore, local leaders are mentioned over 30 percent of the time as sources of resources for the projects. As one index of involvement in Harambee projects, the provision of resources such as ideas, organizational know-how, general encouragement, funds etc. shows that local leaders are involved in no small way. This became even more evident when the respondents were asked to name one person whom they thought had done the most to further Harambee projects in their area. The responses were enumerated in Table 7.6.

The table showed that the Community Development Assistant was named as the person who had done the most by nearly 26 percent of the respondents. Nearly 20% named the Chiefs and Sub-chiefs. Twelve percent named the local Councillor. In all, therefore, local leaders were named by just over 57 percent of the respondents as the people who had done the most to further Harambee projects in their own area. If we add the nearly ten percent who named the District Officer, then the perceived importance of local leadership in Harambee activities becomes quite evident.

At this point, we should make one rather fundamental observation, which was initially raised during the review of Harambee

literature, and which should be kept in mind in interpreting the information presented in Chapter VII and so far in this chapter. The point to be emphasised is that not everyone of those whom we have, so far, called local Harambee leaders is a member of the local elite. While taking part in such project activities as initiation, influencing the initiation, committee membership, provision of resources such as ideas, finances and organizational know-how, or even having the reputation of the most helpful person in Harambee projects, makes one a leader, it does not thereby make one a member of the local elite. Most of the farmer leaders are, in this respect, just ordinary members of the peasantry. So are the housewives. Some of the other groups are, however, much closer to what one understands by a local elite.

Community Development Assistants, Chiefs and Sub-chiefs are members of the local administrative elite. They are particularly effective in providing leadership to small groups such as women's groups, though they are not usually named as initiators. The first person such a group will contact is either the local Community Development Assistant or the Sub-chief. He or she will give the group ideas on how to register itself, how to keep its books etc. Most of the groups we interviewed mentioned that they had either made an effort to see the local Community Development Assistant or the Sub-chief. Their rate of success in getting help from these individuals, of course, varied tremendously.

The clergy, teachers, and clerks are members of the local educated and salaried élites. They are holders of white-collar jobs in the rural areas and this, in the eyes of the peasantry, and to a large extent in an objective sense, separates them from the peasantry. They can read and write whereas the majority of the people are illiterate. They can articulate local problems to an outsider, and what is even more important to the peasantry, they can do it in other than the vernacular language if the need arises. They also have some knowledge on how to keep books and this makes them particularly useful.

The local businessmen are obviously members of the local economic elite. This becomes obvious when we keep in mind the fact that they are also mostly local farmers. In addition, as we indicated earlier, they are likely to be in constant contact with the urban areas and this makes them that much more "cosmopolitan". This group is also at the vanguard of economic accumulation in the rural areas and especially with respect to the purchasing of land from the poorest peasants. They can afford to purchase land from the surplus accumulated from business. Small wonder, then, that they show such keen interest in initiating water projects. A water project requires a fair degree of sophistication, which they have, and in addition, availability of water, land, and cash surplus leads to accelerated accumulation, which is their main interest.

The farmers on the other hand present a problem because of the ambiguity of the term as used in the rural areas. In our

sample, by far the majority of those who described themselves or were described as "farmers" were undoubtedly ordinary peasants. However, there is a group, often referred to as "progressive farmers" in Kenya, whose characteristics are little different from those of the businessmen-farmer. They grow at least one cash crop e.g. coffee or tea, they have got "grade cattle", and they have caught on to the idea of sending their small children to nursery schools, something which was unheard of barely fifteen years ago. This group of farmers receives most of the Government extension services, and like the businessmen cum farmers, they are really rural capitalist farmers rather than peasants. At a minimum they hire seasonal labour for such farming activities as coffee and tea-picking. At a maximum, they have permanent hired labour the whole year round. Either way, they rely on more than household labour for farming, and this distinguishes them from the ordinary peasants. This is the group which would ordinarily be interested in initiating electricity projects, water projects, and nursery schools.

Finally, the local Government Councillors are members of the local economic and political elite. In keeping with the macro-aspects of the Kenyan political system discussed in Chapter IV. Councillors have to be prepared to donate to Harambee projects or to persuade the local Government to donate, if they want to continue getting themselves elected as representatives to local authorities. They too normally combine their political activities with farming and business. Though they do not have to be very wealthy to get

themselves elected, they must have more resources than ordinary peasants. For example, the Chairman of Kiambu County Council, before its recent dissolution by the Government, was by every standard a very wealthy man. Together with local businessmen and progressive farmers, Councillors are usually the local patrons of Harambee projects. For electoral purposes, they can be very useful to a Member of Parliament seeking to aggregate clients either at election time or in the process of creating potential supporters at Harambee meetings.

What then can we conclude about local leadership and Harambee projects in Kiambu? One of the obvious conclusions is that the leadership is a mixture of ordinary peasants and local elites. By far, most of the leaders are ordinary peasants. This reflects the nature, type and numbers of projects initiated during the period covered in the survey. Second, though members of the local elites do not figure prominently in initiation of projects their importance increases when other aspects of Harambee are taken into account. Compared to members of the national elite such as District Commissioners and Members of Parliament, the local elites, undoubtedly, participate a great deal more in Harambee activities at the project level. They are members of the local communities and they stand to benefit from the projects. In all, however, fairly ordinary peasant farmers and housewives provide the majority of project leaders and project resources just as their small types of projects are in the majority. We shall now pick up the question of peasant participation in Harambee.

8.3 The Peasantry and the Surveyed Projects

The main question with respect to peasant participation in Harambee is: Why do peasants bother to participate at all? All along we have argued that they have carried the major resource burden for the expansion of the movement, and furthermore, unlike the Government and the elites, they have little to gain, politically, by participating in Harambee. We shall now take up this question.

Since we are relying, to a large extent, on what our respondents told us, we shall begin by establishing the credentials of those who were, hopefully, speaking on behalf of the peasantry. Most of the people we interviewed were peasant leaders, though by no means members of the local elite - a distinction which we have already made. Our aim was to interview primarily the leaders, and in this respect we were successful. Table 8.6 shows the respondents' positions in the projects for which they were interviewed.

TABLE 8.6 **RESPONDENTS' POSITIONS IN PROJECTS**

<u>Position</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1. Chairman	61	34.9
2. Treasurer	27	15.4
3. Secretary	32	18.3
4. Committee	14	8.0
5. Member	24	13.7
6. Work Leader	3	1.7
7. Advisor	5	2.9
8. Don't Know/No Response	9	5.1
TOTAL (N)	175	100

In addition to being peasant leaders, the respondents were also, to a large extent, representative of both ordinary peasant farmers and what we consider to be local elites. Table 8.7 shows the occupational breakdown of the respondents.

TABLE 8.7

RESPONDENTS' OCCUPATION

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1. Farmer	91	52.0
2. Housewife	13	7.4
3. Teacher	19	10.9
4. Chief/Sub-chief	15	8.6
5. Businessmen	13	7.4
6. Councillor	8	4.6
7. Clerks	5	2.9
8. Community Development Assistant	7	4.0
9. Clergy	2	1.1
10. Others/No Response	2	1.1
TOTAL (N)	175	100

The respondents' education, age and sex is very similar to the data on the project initiators which we have already presented. This, of course, is not surprising considering the great overlap between the initiators, the leaders of the projects and the respondents, a point which is clear from the data presented so far. Assuming then, as we have good reason to assume from Table 8.7

that the respondents were by and large expressing the views of the participating peasantry, we can now return to our main questions of how and why peasants participate in Harambee.

From the list of project initiators (Table 7.1) it is more than evident that most of them are ordinary members of the peasantry. These members then move on to become leaders of the projects as chairmen, secretary etc. (Table 8.3). It is also evident, both from the official data presented in Chapters V and VI and also from the responses to our questions (Table 7.5) that the peasants have carried the major responsibility of providing resources for Harambee projects. We shall, therefore, not dwell any more on these aspects of peasant participation. Rather, we shall now move on to the issue of why the peasants participate in Harambee.

If there is one unequivocal answer to come out of our study of Harambee at District level, it is that peasants take part in Harambee because they perceive tangible social and economic benefits from their participation. This might not come out too clearly in coded responses which lose a great many of the nuances, but even from the coded responses, the answer is perfectly clear.

Let us begin with the reasons given for initiating projects. (Table 7.3). An overwhelming 92 percent of the reasons for initiating projects have to do with the perceived benefits, rather than any kind of external pressure either from Government officials or

from local and national leaders. To give a flavour of some of the uncoded reasons for initiating projects, here is a sample from the uncoded responses.

1. To keep the youth active, rather than idle (Youth Club)
2. We earn money when we lend cups during weddings (Women's Groups)
3. Government easily reaches people who are in groups (Women's Groups)
4. Ability to buy land collectively (Women's Groups)
5. People need water because they are all farmers (Water Projects)
6. Women are getting weak from carrying water on their backs (Water Projects)
7. Other people are having water in their areas. How about us? (Water Projects)
8. Distance to other dispensaries (Health Centre)
9. The sub-location is too big and we had only one cattle dip. (Dip)
10. Wanted to improve our cattle (Dip)
11. We wanted the children to be ready for primary school. (Nursery)
12. We were having conflict with the P.C.E.A. - Presbyterian Church of East Africa - (Independent Church)
13. Personal domestic and farm needs (Electricity)
14. We were told by the M.P. to organize ourselves, then he would help us (Women's Groups)
15. The Councillor told us he would get us a plot from the Kiambu County Council (Nursery School).

The responses, not only suggest a philosophy of self-interest, but what may be surprising, they clearly demonstrate that perceived group benefits far outweigh the perceived personal benefits. Only five percent of the reasons pointed to personal

benefits as the reason for initiating projects. We suspected that the reason for not mentioning personal benefits was tactical more than anything else. The respondents obviously saw themselves as speaking on behalf of their groups and as such it would have been imprudent to emphasize the personal benefits.

Our suspicion was somewhat confirmed when we asked the question: "Why did you contribute?" (Table 7.4). Though nearly a quarter of the reasons, again, pointed to perceived group's economic and social benefit, an overwhelming 63 percent of the reasons pointed to perceived personal benefits as the reason for contributing. The responses to the two different questions are, of course, not incompatible if we assume that the respondents saw themselves as speaking on behalf of the group for the first question, and on behalf of themselves for the second question. This is especially true if we keep in mind that project initiation is usually done by a group of people whereas contribution is by and large a personal activity. Either way, though, the perceived social and economic benefits are much more important, in determining participation, than any external influences.

The pattern for the perceived benefits was sustained when we asked the question: "Who/What group/What organization/ do you think benefits/will benefit most from the project?" The responses were as follows:

TABLE 8.8BENEFIT FROM PROJECT

<u>Perceived Beneficiaries</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1. Members of the project only	32	18.3
2. All people from the area	43	24.6
3. Those in the area who can/ are able to/benefit	77	44.0
4. I personally	10	5.7
5. The Government	3	1.8
6. The Country	3	1.8
7. Nobody	3	1.8
8. Don't Know/No Response	4	2.3
TOTAL	175	100.3

Though we pointed out that the pattern of perceived benefits holds for this question, we should add a few qualifying observations. First, it is true that by far the majority of the respondents still conceive Harambee projects in parochial terms. Thus, very few of them see any benefit for the Government or the country from their particular project. The conception of project benefits is therefore, primarily non-political which is quite compatible with the other responses discussed above. This, however, does not mean that the peasants are unaware of Harambee as political activity, something which we shall be discussing shortly.

The second qualifying observation is that for the first time we begin to see a contradiction in the responses, albeit a subtle one. On the one hand, we are told that projects are initiated mainly because of the perceived social and economic benefits to the members of the project. We are also told that contributions are made primarily because of perceived personal benefits. But when confronted with the question of who will actually benefit or does benefit from the project the emphasis shifts. Now the emphasis is not on personal or ~~members~~ benefits, but on those in the area who can or are able to benefit from the project. Forty four percent of the respondents gave this answer. The answers coded in this category were something like: 1. Those with "grade cows" (cattle dip) 2. Those with small children (nursery school) 3. Those who can afford fees (primary/secondary schools) 4. Those with good stone houses (electricity) 5. Those who believe in God and go to church (churches) 6. Those who can afford to keep up their monthly contributions (women's project) etc.

Without making too much out of the potential contradiction, it would be fair to say that the response to the question of who will benefit from the project shows a high degree of realism and understanding of Harambee on the part of the respondents. It is one thing to initiate a project and contribute towards its implementation because of the perceived benefits. It is quite another thing to be able to take advantage of the project, and this can create doubts in the participant's minds about the wisdom

of having supported that particular project in the first place.

The creeping doubts became evident when we asked the question:

"Now that you think back on this project, what other project, if any, would you consider useful to have done before this one?"

Fifty seven percent of the respondents answered that there was no other project they would have preferred. Much to our surprise, though, forty percent answered that they would have preferred another project. Not surprisingly, a majority of them specified projects which would benefit them personally. Table 8.9 shows the results.

TABLE 8.9 SPECIFIED "OTHER" PROJECT

<u>Project Type</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1. Buy land/land shares	24	34.3
2. Water project	20	28.6
3. Business (e.g. shop)	12	17.2
4. School	5	7.2
5. Land improvement/ land equipment	4	5.7
6. Hospital	3	4.3
7. Electricity	1	1.4
8. No Response	1	1.4
TOTAL	70	100.1

As we can see, public projects such as schools and hospitals are very low on the list of those projects which, on retrospect, should have been initiated before the current ones. Obviously the respondents would have preferred to take care of "private projects" before public ones. In all fairness though, we must quickly add that those who preferred another project were not really objecting to the current one as such, though they had some doubts about their ability to take advantage of it. Rather, they were regretting the fact that they did not have enough money to get into the kind of project which they have always wanted to initiate but did not have the capital to do so. In this sense, we got the impression that they were really thinking in terms of "in addition to" rather than "in place of". They were, therefore expressing hope more than anything else.

Although the peasants participate in Harambee primarily because they hope to be able to take advantage of the project and benefit either personally or as a group, the politics of Harambee is not lost on them and especially the prospects of the Government coming to their assistance once they are organized. This is one of the key messages of politicians at Harambee meetings, and also of Government officials such as Chiefs and Sub-chiefs. We therefore asked the question, "do you remember the estimated cost of the project? Did you expect aid from the Government?" Out of the 175 respondents, 45 percent responded that they expected aid from the Government, while 23 percent responded that they did not

expect aid from the Government. Nearly 23 percent refused to answer the question, and nine percent gave some other answers such as "we haven't thought about it". The rather large percentage of those who refused to answer or gave hedged responses was the result of the feeling among the respondents that the question was a bit too sensitive. This was obvious from the way they handled the question.

If the expected benefit is the major factor why peasants and peasant leaders participate in Harambee, a contributing factor might be that personal contributions to Harambee projects are often viewed as a small sacrifice by those who contribute. In other words, the contribution is seen as being too small for anything else but personal or domestic consumption. This was certainly the view of the majority of our respondents, when we asked: "Suppose you had not contributed, like you now say you did, what else could you have done with these resources?"

TABLE 8.10 ALTERNATIVE TO CONTRIBUTION

<u>Alternative</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1. Family/Personal Consumption/Contribution small	107	61.1
2. Invest the money e.g. school fees, business, shares etc.	32	18.3
3. Invest on the farm e.g. buy fertilizer, buy cows	13	7.4
4. Don't Know/No Response	15	8.6
5. Vague/Other	8	4.6
TOTAL	175	100

We should add, however, that not every contribution to Harambee projects is so small that it cannot be meaningfully invested elsewhere. This is certainly reflected by the nearly 26 percent who said they would invest their contribution. A water project, for example, will normally require a contribution of anything from 500 shillings to 1,000 shillings from the members of the project. This is no small amount.

What then can we conclude about peasant participation in Harambee? The most obvious conclusion is that peasants participate because they understand Harambee to be a way of bringing concrete social and economic benefit, rather than an ideology of control in the name of working together and unity. This again was clear from the responses when we asked what they understood by the word Harambee.

TABLE 8.11

THE WORD HARAMBEE

<u>Meaning</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1. Working/Contributing something for a project	78	44.6
2. Helping each other to improve ourselves	55	31.4
3. Togetherness/Unity	34	19.4
4. Nation Building/Development	7	4.0
5. Vague	1	0.6
TOTAL	175	100

It is quite evident from the responses that the majority of the respondents did not conceive Harambee as an abstract phenomenon. True, nearly one fifth of the respondents had a somewhat abstract conception of Harambee but all the others had a very practical conception which included work, contributing, the notions of project and mutual help, all for purposes of social and economic improvement.

In concluding this section, therefore, we can say that Harambee groups are, to a very large extent, initially motivated by some immediate need in their environment. The local leaders play a crucial role in defining the needs and consequently initiating the projects. Having initiated the projects, the leaders continue to play a dominant role in project implementation as witnessed by the fact that the initiators are also by and large the project leaders. The leaders are aware of the larger environment of Harambee, a point which we argued in Chapter III in respect of the distinctions they made between Harambee and traditional communal self-help (Table 3.1). Once the need has been identified and a project has been agreed upon, the leaders start looking for patrons. The immediately available patrons are members of the local elite who are also members of the community and therefore, stand to benefit from the projects. We shall next discuss the process of looking for patrons.

8.4 The Search For Project Patrons and Political Clients

Let us begin this section by asking the questions: what is it that Harambee groups want from their would-be patrons, and what are the sources of patronage for the would-be patrons? In answering these two questions, we shall also be able to see what groups of elites are likely to be approached by peasant leaders. In order to be able to answer the questions, we have to put the questions in the context of different project categories.

We begin with that category of projects which does not normally require a Harambee fund-raising meeting. This category of projects can, in many respects, be regarded as private projects. All the womens' groups fall in this category. A further distinction can be made between small private projects and large private projects. We have already made this distinction in earlier chapters with respect to the women's groups.

A small womens' group, consisting of around 30 members, normally requires two basic things. These are, first, registration as a Harambee group, which all Harambee projects require, and second, administrative skills such as bookkeeping and general ideas. These basic requirements are easily met by the local Community Development Assistant with the help of the Sub-chief. We found that all the small womens' groups in our sample had tried to see the local Community Development Assistant, as indeed they had tried to enlist the help of the Sub-chief. Their degree of success varied depending on how

far away the Community Development Assistant lived and of course, how dedicated he or she was to the job. This was also true of their attempts to enlist the help of the Sub-chiefs.

Once registered, and in operation for a few years, their ambitions grow with success. It will be recalled that ultimately these groups want either to purchase land, or to get into commerce by opening a small shop where they can sell such items as hand woven baskets. Obviously, the Community Development Assistant and the Sub-chief are not going to be terribly useful for purposes of obtaining a plot and the license to operate a commercial venture. For this purpose, the local Councillor is a much more useful official. He is an elected official and so he is not likely to be unsympathetic to requests for assistance. We found that normally, the sympathy is no more than a promise to request the local County Council to give a plot to the women, and a licence to operate a shop. In addition to the Councillor, the local M.P. (as we showed in the last chapter) is likely to be in touch with a number of womens' groups. In most cases, however, the groups are too numerous for all of them to get some attention from the M.P. He would, therefore, concentrate on the larger ones within the constituency. These are what we call large private projects.

We described some of the large womens' groups in the last chapter and so we shall not dwell on them here, except to add a few comments. First, because of their size, and therefore political

importance, they normally have more success with the local Councillors and the local M.P. But, as we also saw, they can be victims of unfulfilled promises. Second, again by virtue of their size, they normally have a relatively large amount of capital to operate with. When, therefore, they approach the local Councillor or the local M.P., they are not seeking to be given something minor. Rather, they do so in the hope that either the local County Council or the central Government would supplement the relatively large capital which they already have, either by offering loans, or in the case of land purchase, by making land available at a below market price rather than the exorbitant prices of private land dealers.

The second category of projects is the public projects. Most types of Harambee projects fall into this category. Schools, hospitals and water projects all fall into this category. All public projects, at one time or another, conduct fund-raising meetings. The nature and size of the fund-raising meeting will, of course, depend on the nature and type of project. In order to make this clearer, we need to draw a distinction between small public projects such as cattle dips, road repairs, sports clubs, etc. and large public projects such as primary and secondary schools, health centres and hospitals, water projects, churches, electricity projects etc. We will begin with the small projects.

When a group makes the decision to build a cattle dip or a nursery school, to take two typical examples of small projects,

they require, first and foremost a plot of land on which to build the structure. (This is, of course, also true of large public projects). The first person to approach would, therefore, be the Councillor to see whether he can assist in getting the plot from the local County Council, either as a donation or at a reduced price. We found that most groups in our sample had tried to seek this kind of patronage. Two things can then happen, once the plot has been obtained or even before the plot has been obtained. One, with the permission of the Chief or the Sub-chief, the project committee will call a public meeting during which a date for a fund-raising meeting will be set. Or, during the public meeting a fixed amount of contribution will be set for those who want to become members of the project. The two are, of course, not mutually exclusive. A fixed amount can be set, and at the same time a fund-raising meeting can be held. If a fund-raising meeting is decided upon, a local member of the elite such as a wealthy businessman or a "progressive farmer" will normally be asked to be the guest of honour. Not unexpectedly, local Councillors, who are also likely to be businessmen and farmers are often approached to be guests of honour.

This is where the project politics enter the scene. The project is probably not big enough for the Member of Parliament to be the guest of honour unless the member happens to be new or insecure, in which case he would be willing to conduct a fund-raising meeting even for a small project. What then happens is that the

local guest of honour will approach the member for a contribution. When it comes to announcing the contributions, the local fundraiser will then announce that the M.P. could not be present but he has sent a personal donation of such and such an amount.

Whereas small public projects such as cattle dips and nursery schools need no more than the patronage of local elites, the large projects almost invariably need large fund-raising meetings. Once again, the preliminary stages will be taken care of by the local elites and the project leaders. Let us, for example, take a water project.

A small group of people meets informally and decides that there is need for a water project. The group - the initiators - then approaches the Sub-chief with the request to call a public meeting during which the idea will be formally put to the community. If the idea is formally accepted, as it usually is, then the next stage is to elect project officials. In most cases, as we have shown, these individuals who had the idea originally will be elected as project officials. What then?

The first thing, of course, is to look for water. If there is anybody from the community who works for the Ministry of Water Development, he is automatically nominated to contact Ministry officials with a request for assistance in looking for a suitable source of water. When water has been located, the next important requirement is a plot on which to erect the tank. So, the local

Councillor is approached with the request to assist. He might not be successful, in which case, the plot will have to be bought at an inflated market price since the owner knows the community must get that particular plot because of its location. When the plot has been obtained, other very expensive items such as the water tank will have to be bought. A 20,000 gallon tank will cost on the average 60,000 shillings. A pump to go with the tank will cost on the average 50,000 shillings. Then there are the pipes etc. If there is a likelihood, and there usually is, of some of these items being obtained from the local council, the Councillor will be requested to help. Ultimately, however, the majority of the needed items will have to be bought by contributions from the people.

What then happens is that a series of local fund-raising meetings take place. The guests of honour for these meetings can range all the way from a well known local farmer, a local businessman, the local Councillor etc to a high-ranking Government civil servant originally from the area but who have not resided there for a long time. A delegation of project leaders would be sent to such a man, and unless he wants to completely ruin his local reputation, he cannot turn down the request to be the guest of honour. In addition, of course, his parents and other members of his family are almost certainly likely to be living in the community, and, therefore, stand to benefit from the water project.

The important point, however, is that for every fund-raising meeting, the political persons such as Councillors and M.P.'s are likely to be approached for a donation, no matter how small in comparison to the total amount raised at any one particular meeting. For the local M.P., it is not enough to send donations for each of the fund-raising meeting. Chances are that once the project is about half way through a delegation will be sent to him with a request to give the project its final push by conducting the fund-raising meeting. If the project is not politically important to him, he will probably turn down the request, and, instead, send a donation with whoever accepts to be the guest of honour. If the project is one of his key projects, and therefore, politically important, he will not only agree to conduct the fund-raising meeting but will, in addition, bring a guest with him. For an ordinary Member of Parliament, the guest would normally be a colleague, an Assistant Minister, or a Cabinet Minister. For Assistant Ministers and Ministers, the guests are likely to be colleagues.

The point, then, is that a large public Harambee project normally puts a great deal of pressure on elected officials, be they local officials such as Councillors or national officials such as M.P.'s. In contrast, then, to the all pervasive presence of Harambee as an ideology, these officials cannot always be "present". They, therefore, have to be political entrepreneurs which means making sure that they reap maximum political benefits

from any appearance either in the form of a donation or in person.

How then do the elected officials go about making sure they get the benefit at election time? Before we answer this question, we should make two important points. The first point, which needs some emphasis, is that rural Harambee groups are not political machines in the traditional sense of political machines. Except for a very few women's groups, some of which we described in the last chapter, Harambee groups do not have a permanent commitment to a particular politician, local or national. Rather, Harambee groups are overwhelmingly political opportunists. They will vote for anyone who has been willing to assist their projects. In other words, Harambee groups are political bargainers, rather than cogs in a political machine. Their loyalty can change as fast as somebody else is willing to spend time and money in assisting their projects. The loyalty can, therefore, only be assured through constant interaction either by way of occasional donations in absentia, or through actual personal presence. Even then, all that a politician gets are "promisory notes", rather than guaranteed loyalty. They will keep their promises, though, so long as help keeps coming. This leads us to the other point.

This is that Harambee groups almost always approach the incumbent for help even though they are prepared to accept help from would-be challengers. Thus, they are likely to approach

the Councillor and the M.P. for help before approaching anybody else. The reasoning is quite simply. The incumbent "is a member of the Government". Therefore, he knows all those "big people". Therefore, he is more likely to succeed in bringing in money. To a large extent this line of reasoning is valid. Evidently this reasoning gives a strong advantage to the incumbent, something which is borne out by the electoral data presented in Chapter IV. The incumbent has the advantage because he can easily pre-empt any would-be challengers by responding favourably and playing the role of the political entrepreneur. Furthermore, he can easily take advantage of the peasants conception of him as "a member of the Government".

In order, therefore, to get the benefit at election time, an M.P. will ally himself with those members of the community who are likely candidates for guests of honour at Harambee meetings, even as he concentrates on his own key projects. The Harambee groups know this, and they, therefore, do not hesitate to request such individuals to approach the M.P. for assistance. A key person in this alliance is the Councillor.

As we have tried to suggest in this section, a Councillor is usually approached by all types and categories of Harambee groups. For his part, he is normally all too happy to ally himself with an incumbent Member of Parliament, even as he himself tries to take advantage of his own incumbency.

In Kiambu we discovered that most Councillors were, not only likely to be allied to the incumbent M.P.s, but were also likely to be resistant to accepting the patronage of would-be challengers. This, we admit might have something to do with the politics of Kiambu during Kenyatta's Government. Unlike other Kikuyu Districts such as Muranga where local factionalism is the norm, Kiambu politics was dominated by M.P.'s, (some of whom almost had tenure) most of whom had extraordinary access to the political centre, either directly or indirectly. In this sense, rural politics in Kiambu was typical in that incumbency would mean that much more.

Unfortunately, unlike the Members of Parliament whom we were able to describe, local project patrons who form the link between the project and the Member of Parliament are too many to describe one by one. We have, therefore, chosen a typical case of a local politician who is near the bottom in a patron-client chain which stretched all the way to the political centre. His name is Mr. Njau.

Mr. Njau described himself as a farmer and a businessman. He was also the local Councillor. He had had 8 years of education and he was about fifty years old. He has a beautiful stone house which he said had cost him 150,000 shillings. He also had a refrigerator waiting for the day when electricity would come to the area. His credentials in Harambee activities were very

impressive. Just around his home area, he was listed as "Advisor" to an electricity project for which he was trying to rally the support of the people but without much success. Somehow, though, he had managed to get 20,000 shillings for the project from the Divisional Development Fund. He was using this amount as a basis for persuading the local community to take a keener interest in the project. In addition, Mr. Njau was listed as chairman of five other Harambee projects. These were, three cattle dips, one water project and one nursery school. He had personally contributed 7,000 shillings for one cattle dip. According to Mr. Njau "politics should be removed from projects because we are all interested in development and not in politics." This of course, is not surprising coming, as it did, from an incumbent.

Mr. Njau's views of leadership are in perfect harmony with what one would expect from a patron. According to him "a leader has to be richer than those whom he is leading. This is the only way you can expect him to be honest with public funds.

(Furthermore) a leader is expected to make many personal sacrifices such as travelling long distances to contact Government officials. Besides if one is wealthy, it shows that he is not stupid, otherwise, how could he have managed to become wealthy?"

Mr. Njau always campaigned for M.P. No. 1 whom in the last chapter we described as a model M.P. and he told us he got the 20,000 shillings through the M.P.'s influence. It will be

recalled that the M.P. was an Assistant Minister who had managed to get at least two Cabinet Ministers to conduct very successful Harambee fund-raising meetings in his own constituency. The Cabinet Ministers were regional leaders as would be expected following our discussion in Chapter IV. One could quote numerous examples of rural patrons like Mr. Njau who in turn are clients of national patrons like the M.P., who in turn, are the clients of regional leaders like Cabinet Ministers.

Suffice it to say that most Harambee groups try to look for patrons as soon as a decision to initiate a project has been accepted by the community, or by the interested individuals in the case of "private projects". Where they look for patrons, and how high up in the political system the groups are likely to go, depends on the type of the project and, therefore, the political importance of the project. In order to take advantage of incumbency and maintain some presence in the electoral area, politicians will almost always respond to requests for assistance, even though not always in person. In order to take advantage of their contributions, they will send them with local leaders like Mr. Njau, who are also local project patrons. In their turn, leaders like Mr. Njau identify themselves with the successful incumbent thereby deriving political benefits for themselves. Alternatively national political leaders will maintain their presence by sending donations through other types of project leaders and local elites such as local businessmen and "progressive farmers".

What then can we conclude on Harambee participation by local leaders and the peasantry? The most obvious conclusion is that, by far, the majority of ordinary Harambee projects, such as the ones we surveyed, are under the leadership of local people who not only initiate the projects but also play a dominant part in project activities.

The second major conclusion is that the local leaders are by no means all peasant farmers. Some are clearly identifiable as members of the local elite while others, such as "progressive farmers" are arguably members of the local elite, even though our data does not capture this category.

The third conclusion is that local elites and the ordinary peasants participate in Harambee primarily as members of local communities who perceive social and economic benefits from the projects. In most cases, however, this perception should be interpreted carefully taking into account such factors as the actual ability of the individual to benefit from particular projects.

The fourth and final conclusion is that though Harambee groups are also motivated to take part in Harambee by local developmental problems, this does not mean that local Harambee groups, thereby, strive to be self-sufficient in terms of resources required as inputs to the projects. Rather, they expect, and do try to get, resources from outside the particular Harambee group. Depending on the size and the type of project, they can get the

extra resources either from local patrons, the national patrons, or from both. In this respect, large public and private projects are more successful in obtaining patronage from national leaders. Regardless of whether they eventually succeed in getting patronage from national elites all groups almost invariably try to enlist the services of local elites as initial project patrons.

8.5 Summary

Using the information gathered through a questionnaire administered to Harambee project leaders in Kiambu District, we have identified the social and, to some extent, the economic characteristics of Harambee participants at the project level. We have also shown why and how they participate. In the final chapter, which follows, we shall attempt, among other things, to integrate the results presented in this chapter and the previous two chapters, with the macro aspects of Harambee discussed in earlier chapters.

CHAPTER 8: FOOTNOTE

1. The issue of multiple professions is one of the thorniest methodological problems for anyone attempting to find out occupational information of people living in the rural areas. It is the rule, rather than the exception, that an individual will have a number of occupations and even he or she is not quite certain which of the many occupations is the main occupation. Thus, for example, it is not unusual for an individual to be a farmer, a teacher, and a businessman at the same time. Alternatively, an individual can be a farmer, a businessman and a councillor at the same time. In other words, almost everyone is a farmer plus something else. In our field work we, therefore, probed for the "other occupations" and especially those which had political significance such as Councillors, Chiefs/Sub-chiefs, etc. before accepting "farmer" as the stated occupation. To a large extent, we were successful in discovering the politically significant "other occupations". However, the exercise got a little confusing when it came to the category of "housewives". Here we were faced with the reverse problem. Why would a woman from the rural areas insist that she is not a farmer but simply a housewife? As it turned out, this category meant one or two things. Either the family was landless and it was living as "Ahoi" - a Kikuyu word which literally means "borrowers" - non literally, the landless who live on land they do not own, courtesy of the owner - or the respondents considered their husbands as the farmers, in the cases where the family owned some land.

Going back to the issue of multiple professions, we should point out that this problem proved to be a major one for Anthony Somerset, a colleague of the author at the Institute for Development Studies, when he and his co-author, Peter Marris, were conducting research for the book African Businessman, (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969).

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

We set out in this study to analyse Harambee as a political phenomenon. More specifically, we set out to show that the Harambee movement was central to the techniques of political control and political management in Kenya under Kenyatta. It is therefore, fitting to begin the concluding chapter to the study by evaluating the original argument in the light of what has been covered in the study. We shall begin by summarising those conclusions from the study which have served as our premises in arriving at the main conclusion.

The first conclusion is that the Harambee movement, as a whole, here and still bears little resemblance to community-centered traditional self-help even though some of the smallest Harambee groups look similar to traditional, communal self-help groups. The aims of most Harambee groups are different and the means for achieving the aims are equally different. Harambee group leaders in Kiambu made this point rather eloquently.

The second conclusion is that the origins of Harambee as practised in Kenya today are to be found in the colonial period and particularly the era of the Independent Schools Movement. During this period, communal self-help expanded beyond the confines of local communities and became part of the nationalist movement, under the leadership of an emergent political elite. Furthermore, the word "Harambee" as a political rallying call was also born during the colonial period as part of the nationalist struggle.

The third conclusion, partially implied in the two conclusions above, is that Harambee is not merely an activity which is restricted to local communities. Rather, it is a national activity which at the same time links local communities with the national centre. The nature and strength of this linkage, not its existence, is the contentious issue.

The fourth summary conclusion, which in a sense is an elaboration of the third conclusion, is that Kenyatta did politicize Harambee as a linkage between the local communities and the political centre when he sought to predicate electoral success on participation in Harambee, and when he sought to replace political debate over policy issues with constituency service and the ideology of Harambee. We have seen how this was done.

Now, it might be argued that linking electoral success to constituency service and to the acceptance of a specific ideology does not necessarily amount to political control from the centre. After all, constituency service and subscription to some kind of ideology are important criteria for electoral success even in industrialised liberal democracies. True as this argument might generally be, two specifically Kenyan factors make it inapplicable to the issue under discussion.

The first factor, and this constitutes the fifth summary conclusion, is that constituency service and acceptance of the ideology of Harambee as determinants of electoral success were not tempered, as they would normally be in liberal democracies, by the existence of liberal democratic participatory institutions such as political parties and strong parliaments. Rather, in

the Kenyan case, constituency service and the Harambee ideology were part of a highly personalized patron-client system as we have shown. Furthermore, the type of constituency service demanded; viz, taking part in Harambee projects, was pretty much pre-determined. In other words, the individual political competitor had no choice in the matter if he wanted to succeed. This leads us to the next factor.

Our sixth summary conclusion is that, again unlike the practice in liberal democracies, the parameters of the dominant political ideology were pretty much fixed. In other words, there was little room for ideological manoeuvring for electoral purposes. As we have argued, the ideology was one of regime support and left little room for individual interpretations. In some very few cases though, individuals did manage to get themselves elected by stretching the ideological limits as far as they could but then they found themselves in trouble soon afterwards.

What then can we conclude from the above summaries of the arguments advanced in the study? We can conclude that, analysed from a political perspective and from the point of view of a President primarily concerned with political order, Harambee did serve the function of facilitating political control. Indeed it was part of an elaborate patron-client system designed precisely for that purpose.

A patron-client model is an exchange model. So, the interesting question becomes: who exchanged what for what? In trying to answer this question, we should keep a rather fundamental point in mind. The point which needs to be re-emphasised is that in an exchange model, the goods being exchanged are not always comparable. The implication of this point is that it is not always easy to tell who is being exploited in the course of the exchange. Furthermore, from an observer's position, it becomes difficult to evaluate the character of the exchange when so much obviously depends on the perceptions of the parties to the exchange. With this caveat, we shall begin by looking at the exchange between Kenyatta and the national elites.

From what we have said in this study, especially in Chapter IV, and from the background knowledge available on the Kenyan political system under Kenyatta, it is easy to see what Kenyatta got out of the political elites. He wanted political order and he got it. He managed to obtain political order by curbing political discussion at the national level and by restricting political activity to the constituency level. Even at the constituency level, political activity was restricted to participation in Harambee projects. This way it became impossible for the political elites to raise serious political and development issues in other than a local or at best a regional context. Thus, such potentially destabilizing issues as the emerging class structures in Kenya were rarely discussed with those who were likely victims of the increasing inequalities. The reason is that the system did

not allow the development of a system wide organizational platform from which such issues could be discussed.

In exchange for political order and participation in Harambee, Kenyatta allowed the political elites an amazingly large degree of individual manoeuvring so long as the manoeuvring was within the established rules. Thus, there was no limit, for example, to the number of candidates who could stand for elections in any one constituency, so long as the candidates were members of KANU. KANU, as we have seen, played no meaningful part in the elections. Furthermore, once elected, some of the individuals would be recruited into powerful political positions. Regardless of whether they were so recruited or not, they were all given a very broadly defined freedom to accumulate - a sort of quid pro quo for their acceptance of the political rules. In short, the elites got a type of highly personalized political participation but participation all the same, and the opportunities to use access to state power and the capitalist system for accumulation.

The elites on their part accepted the political and ideological restrictions in exchange for the freedom to manoeuvre as individuals. Furthermore, they assisted Kenyatta in preaching the virtues of political stability and working together. (The word "preaching" is used here in a literal sense. Kenyatta often used the Kiswahili word "Kuhubiri" - meaning literally "to preach" - to describe his way of talking to the people). As individuals or even as a group, the elites had little to lose.

On the contrary, they had a lot to gain from the exchange so long as they stayed within the rules. All except a handful stayed within the rules. Those few who refused to personally benefit from the arrangement were regarded as ridiculous or stupid.

In all, therefore, it would be difficult not to conclude, at least from an observer's position, that the exchange between Kenyatta and the elites was a fair exchange. The relationship amounted to a system of mutual exploitation or reciprocity, a key feature of patron-client relations everywhere. The elites took economic advantage of the system but they had to give up some political freedoms. Kenyatta, for his part got and presided over a system which was politically, heavily oriented towards the maintenance of the status quo, which was what he wanted.

What about the relationship between the elites and the peasants? Was it also a fair exchange? In evaluating this relationship, it is important to recall some of the other conclusions we arrived at in this study, and particularly those conclusions which are relevant to the question we are trying to answer. The conclusions can be summarised as follows:

1. The peasants took part in Harambee primarily because they believed they stood to benefit from the projects, and they also had a very good idea of the type of projects they wanted.
2. The peasants were aware of the importance of constituency service - meaning taking part in Harambee projects - in determining elite electoral success.

3. Peasant leaders, therefore, tried to co-opt elected officials, or for that matter anybody else who was willing to become a patron, into assisting them in implementing the projects.
4. By far the majority of Harambee projects were so small that they did not attract patrons. This was true of both "private" and "public" projects.
5. For both small and large projects, the burden for implementation usually fell on the local communities. This included not only finances but also provision of other resources such as leadership.
6. The elites took part in Harambee usually as political entrepreneurs who calculated carefully where they should get involved for maximum political effect. Consequently they were not involved in the majority of the projects.
7. Even in those projects where the elites were involved, a major part of the resources was normally generated locally. Thus, the major function of the elites was to mobilize the local communities to generate resources from within themselves. Put simply, the elites raised money from the communities.
8. Even though the major function of the elites was to raise money, some of the projects they were involved in entailed considerable personal donations no matter how little these were in relation to the total cost of the project.

Looking at the above summaries from this study, it is difficult not to conclude that the patron-client system worked to the disadvantage of the peasantry. However, we should make

a few more observations before arriving at a firm conclusion.

Since we have no reason to assume that Kenyatta was a cynical man, it follows that he was sincere in believing that the peasants would benefit socially and economically from the active participation of the national elites in Harambee projects. In other words, in seeking an alternative to policy debate, he was interpreting accurately and sincerely what the majority of the peasants wanted and believed in. We have shown this in the study. However, it is one thing to want and believe in something, and quite another thing to get what one wants or believes in. It is in this light that the exchange between rural Harambee groups and members of the national elite must be interpreted. What then did the peasants get?

From what we have shown in the study, the majority of Harambee groups in Kiambu District got no more than the registration of their small group and the occasional attention from the Sub-chief or the Community Development Assistant. In addition, of course, they got the hope that through organising themselves into small groups they would eventually attract assistance from "someone". Short of that, they would at least help each other to further the members' economic well being.

Now, it might be argued that Harambee is not really the small womens' groups which are the majority of Harambee projects, but rather the schools, dispensaries, water projects, cattle dips etc. and all the other large projects which normally attract

fund-raising meetings. If this is the interpretation of Harambee, then the problem of project benefits is even more serious. For the majority of these types of projects, only the comparatively well to do rural residents are able to take advantage. For instance a primary or secondary school caters to those who can afford the school fees, a cattle dip caters to those who have cows, a nursery school is normally of use to those who are already enlightened enough to see the benefits of nursery education or alternatively are fully employed elsewhere so that they have no time to look after the children in the peasant tradition. In other words, apart from a few project types such as dispensaries which are almost always taken over by the Government as part of the free medical project, and of course churches, there is a case to be made that the majority of the projects really benefit those rural residents who are already fairly well off economically. Rural elites are, of course, comparatively well off. They are also the brokers of political power in the countryside. This is the group which is likely to benefit most from the types of large projects which attract the attention of national elites as political entrepreneurs.

Even if we leave the question of benefits aside, i.e. even if we assume that every rural resident, including the ordinary peasant, benefits from Harambee projects, which was no doubt Kenyatta's intention and the intentions of the Government, there is still cause for uneasiness when the relationship between the peasants and the national elites is analysed in exchange terms.

Let us look at the exchange this way. The local project leaders we interviewed told us that they initiated projects and made contributions to them because they hoped that they and other project members would benefit from the projects. Fair enough. Let us then assume that they did indeed benefit from the projects. But, and this is the big "but", the resources for implementing the projects (accepting the validity of the data presented in this study) were largely generated from "the people". (We have seen that "the people" excludes the elites). So, in a rather literal sense, the whole effort by the people was one of self-help. Now it might be argued that there is nothing wrong with literal self-help and we would agree with the argument. The only problem is that this reasoning overlooks the perception of the majority of the leaders we talked to that Harambee was a partnership between them, and "somebody else". That is why they looked for patrons, expected assistance from the Government and always expressed the hope that "somebody will notice us". True, in those projects which we characterised as "key projects", somebody did indeed take notice, and sometimes at considerable personal financial cost, but these types of projects were a minority as we have shown.

It seems, therefore, that Harambee groups exchanged individual-political support, and as we shall see shortly, general regime support for social and economic development for which they themselves were largely responsible. Hardly a fair exchange, from an observer's position.

If we look at the issue from the point of view of benefits from the projects, it seems as noted that the economically better off strata of the rural population stood to benefit more from the projects which normally would attract the attention of the elites. It is quite possible, though we have no data to establish this, that this was the strata which also contributed more, (in absolute terms) as individuals, towards the cost of implementing the projects. If this should turn out to be the case in later studies, then there will be room to argue that this strata too was developing itself though in a much better partnership with the elites. It should be remembered, though, that even if it were the case that the fairly well to do rural strata contributed more as individuals, the strata was and is still a minority. The implication of this is that it is quite possible, though again we have not established this, that the poor strata which is by far the majority ended up contributing the largest share of resources, even for the larger projects. The implications of this probable state of affairs are too obvious to warrant elaboration, given what we have said so far.

What then can we conclude on the exchange between the national elites and Harambee groups as a whole? Keeping in mind the shortcomings of the available data, it would be fair to conclude that, on the whole, the local groups were largely responsible for their own social-economic development as far as the Harambee effort was concerned. From the national elites, they sometimes got

leadership and they always got the ideological exhortation to mobilize themselves into Harambee groups. If the provision of leadership and ideological motivation were the key premises of Harambee, as the Government says, then the exchange would be a fair one. If on the other hand, one were interested in redistribution of resources from the political-economic elites to the rural poor, then the exchange was not a fair one, since the elites as a group contributed only a small percentage of the total cost of the project.

Let us now look at the terms of the exchange between the Government and Harambee groups. As we have shown in the study, the Government was a junior Harambee partner and this was by choice. Given the stated intentions of the Government, it is only fair to evaluate the terms of the exchange with the Government's intentions in mind. In this respect, the Government by and large kept its part of the bargain by providing the few "motivating" resources to Harambee groups. The crucial question, therefore, becomes: what did the Government receive in return? In trying to answer this question, we must keep in mind the fact that Harambee was, and is not, the Government's only tactic for rural development. Rather, it was and is only part of a much larger strategy, which we have not looked at in this study. The point is that it is difficult to separate those political benefits to the Government which were the results of the Harambee movement from those benefits which were the results of the general effort at rural development. With this

in mind, we can now go back to the question posed above.

We have argued that participation in Harambee facilitated the political control of the elites by the top leadership. Did it also facilitate the control of the peasants? One possible answer to this question is that Harambee did not facilitate the political control of the peasantry because, as we have shown, the peasants were not always successful in getting political patrons for their projects. Thus, they failed to become part of the patron-client system of political control. This would be an accurate answer if we restricted the issue to specific projects. However, if we look at Harambee as a movement and as an ideology, then it is easy to argue that it did facilitate political control of the peasantry as well.

First, as we have argued, Harambee was an ideology of self improvement within the status quo. Though project leaders did not point this out in abstract terms, it was quite evident from the responses that they did believe in the philosophy of trying to help themselves, even as they hoped for help from somebody else. Put differently, by trying to meet their own socio-economic needs at the local level, Harambee groups decentralised and thereby diffused what were, potentially at least, concerted national demands on the political centre. Given the large magnitude of resources involved in the Harambee movement, and the scarcity of the resources at the Government's disposal, one would have to

argue that the Government could not meet such concerted demands if indeed they were made. The political implications of this will be clear when we discuss the next point.

The second point is that in the process of linking politics to personal and local issues and by reducing the criteria for political success to participation in Harambee, Kenyatta succeeded, as we have argued, in undermining the possible development of institutions and platforms capable of mobilizing demands across regional and local boundaries. The presence of such demands and the inability of the Government to respond immediately because of scarcity of resources would make an explosive political mixture. This is the political implication of the point above.

The third point is that Harambee groups always identified the Harambee movement with the Government. The political importance of this is not immediately obvious. However, it must be remembered that, to most peasants, Harambee is the concrete (no pun intended) school or dispensary which was not there before the community got together and built one. True, the project leaders were sometimes able to articulate who benefited from the project, and to go even further and say that they did not personally benefit. But even if they did not personally benefit, they still gave the credit to the Government for initiating the whole movement and they would contribute again if called upon. Inexplicable as this might be, it is an attitude which we constantly came across.

The three points discussed above lead one to conclude that

Harambee yielded substantial political pay-offs for the Government. We have seen that the nature of the politics was one of instilling a conservative orientation aimed at maintaining the patron-client system directed from the political centre. In this sense, whether individual Harambee groups managed to get political patrons for their projects was irrelevant, so long as the general features of the system, as determined by the centre, remained intact. The system remained intact, and in this sense, Harambee, as a central feature of the system, played a large part in co-opting and neutralising the peasants. What then did the peasants get in return?

The most obvious benefit to the peasants was that they got projects which they would not have got. But, we have shown that most of the resources for the projects were generated from within the Harambee groups. They did, however, get small amounts of resources from the Government which were intended to be a motivating factor. In addition, of course, the Government contributed in other ways as we have shown in the study. Furthermore, thanks to the rules of the established system, the elites were obligated to help, which was no small issue in terms of legitimising the system and diffusing potential discontent. Did Harambee groups get political participation the same way the elites did? We have argued that some kind of elections are necessary as the exchange system which motivates the type of patron-client system which we have described.

We have also shown that national elections were held regularly in Kenya. In this sense, the peasants did participate in the political process. But, as in the case of the elites the crucial question is: what kind of participation? The peasants used their voting power to elect those who promised to "deliver development" to their areas or had actually already done so. But, it should be remembered that according to the rules of the system, the peasants were not given a chance to listen to and discuss alternative strategies for "delivering development" or alternative organizational methods for articulating their demands. These were not on the agenda either at election times or in Parliament. In this sense, the peasants' political participation, like that of the elites, was quite limited as it did not envision structural changes and alternatives for development.

What then can we conclude on the terms of exchange between the Government and the peasantry? Here, we must emphasize yet again, that Harambee was not the main Government strategy for rural development, though it was and remains the main tactic for facilitating peasant participation in rural development. With this in mind, it would be fair to conclude that if Harambee were the main strategy for rural development, the exchange would not be a fair exchange since the rural groups were largely responsible for that development in their own areas which took place through Harambee. We must reiterate, here, that we have analysed Harambee, not simply as development projects but also as an ideology of regime

support and maintenance. Looking at Harambee strictly in the latter perspective it would be difficult not to conclude that the Government obtained the better part of the deal. The ideology was widespread as part and parcel of the projects, and the Government got credit for it as the initiator of the Harambee movement, which to most ordinary peasants means the physical presence of projects.

Having looked at the exchange relations between the various Harambee "partners" and arrived at some conclusion, no matter how hedged, we can now attempt a summary statement of the major findings. We have concluded that Harambee did facilitate political control by the top leadership of both the elites and the peasants. In exchange for the control and limitations on political participation, the elites got the freedom to politically manoeuvre as individuals and to economically accumulate. The peasants on their part exchanged the limitations on political participation for Harambee projects. They, however, were themselves largely responsible for generating the resources to implement the projects. In the whole range of interactions, therefore, the peasants were the only "partner" which, by the look of it, did not get fair exchange for their support of the system and the political limitations imposed on it by the system.

It now remains to discuss briefly one question which might already have occurred to the reader. The question is: why has the study revolved so much around Kenyatta? In one sense,

the answer to the question is an obvious one. Kenyatta might not have been the sole inventor of the concept of Harambee as a political slogan. However, he was the architect of Harambee as a movement for mobilizing the people to help themselves, and throughout his presidency, Kenyatta and Harambee were inseparable in people's minds. Now, it could be argued that the obviousness of Kenyatta's central position in guiding the Harambee movement does not necessarily mean that the movement could not be analysed without according him a central position, and there would be some validity to this argument. For example, the movement could be analysed simply as an aspect of constituency politics without raising questions on the relationship between the local politics and the national politics. The point, however, is that that kind of analysis would largely miss the crucial explanatory political factor for the Harambee movement. This factor can be summarised in this way. Kenyatta took a traditional participatory practice, turned it into a modern participatory concept, wrapped it in institutions and an ideology designed to support and maintain the political system and then presided over the system. Thus Kenyatta's role in Harambee was central and no political explanation of the movement would be complete without taking into account this role. At the risk of sounding too speculative, one is tempted to argue that only a person with Kenyatta's unique history and personal qualities could have succeeded in turning tradition to modern political

advantages even when it was clear that the issues at stake had little to do with tradition.

What of the future of the Harambee movement in Kenya. The answer is not obvious. Clearly, we have not attempted to present a political theory of Harambee. Rather we have, by and large, described the movement and where possible we have offered some explanations. A theory of Harambee is a matter for the future hopefully after more empirical research has generated more data and concepts. If such a theory were currently available, then the future of the Harambee movement would be a matter of extrapolating from the theory. But, by according such a central place to Kenyatta, we may already have offered some kind of an individualistic interpretation of Harambee.. The implication of this interpretation is that Harambee will not continue, in the form we have described, in the absence of its prime architect. But, then, it might be a question of where we want to place the emphasis. If we place the emphasis on the institutions which Kenyatta established and left behind, rather than on any unique qualities he might have had, then there is every reason to believe that the movement will continue, albeit without its premier patron.

The issue of the future of Harambee gives rise to the next point, namely, the question of future research on Harambee. Clearly, some of the issues we have raised in the study cry out

for more empirical data before they can be settled. The first of these issues is the whole question of Harambee as a mechanism for transferring resources from the centre of the political system to the periphery of the system. We have shown that Harambee does facilitate transfer of some resources. However, throughout the study, we have leaned towards the view that the resources transferred, both by the elites and the Government, are quite limited and therefore not commensurate with the political benefits derived from the movement by both the elites and the Government. We feel, however, that in order to test this "lopsided friendship" hypothesis a great deal more empirical work needs to be done, in order to obtain better data than that which we have utilized in this study.

One way of obtaining better data in this respect would be to select a number of representative Harambee projects and to study them as case histories right from their initiation, through their implementation stages to the time they start delivering benefits. A case history approach would make it possible for a researcher to keep a very close watch on the selected projects and this would undoubtedly yield better quality data from which one can then estimate the degree of transfer of resources for the whole Harambee movement. Our approach to the issue was through asking questions to the project leaders and seeking to see the financial records. We were completely unsuccessful in the effort to see the financial records. We were somewhat more successful in our effort to get answers on the sources of resources for the

projects but we did not get quantifiable answers to the crucial question of "how much". What we obtained were the perceptions of project leaders on the sources of resources for their projects, rather than hard data on how much and from whom. We believe the hard data could be obtained through a case history approach, over a number of years.

The second issue for future research is the question of who benefits from particular Harambee projects. Again this question can only be answered conclusively through a tracer study of representative projects. We approached the question through asking project leaders to tell us who benefits from the projects. While we do not doubt the sincerity of the responses, they are still perceptions nonetheless. Furthermore, they are perceptions of a strata of the population which is usually loathe to discuss controversial issues with an inquisitive outsider. In order to settle the issue of benefits from Harambee projects, a detailed and preferably interdisciplinary analysis is necessary. Such an analysis would obviously have to rely a great deal on a case study approach. In addition to analysing the projects, the local population would also have to be analysed in order to see who among the local people was in a position to benefit from what kind of projects.

After analysing in detail, the sources of project resources and the recipients of project benefits, then it would be possible to assess whether and in what sense Harambee is exploitative of certain sections of the population, something which will have to be done before the movement is fully explained. In this study, we have only offered a political explanation of the movement which is by no means the full explanation.

A full explanation of Harambee would also have to face the question of the kind of conceptual framework within which such an explanation can be developed. In this study, we have analysed Harambee as a function of political competition and political control. As such, we have placed the emphasis on individual political competitors, viz, the President and the elites, their interactions with each other, and their interactions with other relevant political actors such as the voters and the Government. The major problem with a primarily political framework, and especially when it is predicated on political competition among individuals, is that it mutes an investigation of other issues which must be investigated before a complete explanation of Harambee can be offered.

One such issue is the degree to which elite solidarity exists, if it exists, and the degree to which the peasant solidarity exists, if it exists. We have, on numerous occasions in the study, implied that elite solidarity did exist primarily

because the system we have described offered the opportunities for the elites to accumulate as individuals, and to compete as individuals. However, we have not elaborated on this argument, and neither have we analysed the nature of the accumulation and its effect on elite solidarity. In other words, there is room in future research to argue that one of the limits to individual political competition is the need to create and maintain elite solidarity in the face of a peasant majority, presumably capable of being persuaded to think of radical structural changes.

This argument can, however, only be developed in conjunction with an analysis of peasant attitudes which seeks to find out whether they are indeed capable of being persuaded to think of radical alternatives, and even more important, what economic strata of rural residents is capable of thinking of such alternatives as a group and capable of working towards the achievement of the envisioned changes in the system. After analysing the above issues then it would be desirable to analyse the economic and political relations of these groups to each other and their relations to the state and the control of state power.

As can be seen from the above paragraph, a complete explanation of Harambee would have to take into account not only political relations, but also economic relations among the different strata of the population and how these relations affect the attitudes towards the state and state power. Such an explanation

would have to take into account the issue of classes and class relations and the position of the classes vis-à-vis the state. We believe that if Harambee were explored within a class framework, it would be possible to show that the movement is a form of mystification. We hope to do this in the not too distant future.

Finally, what is the future of the Kenyan political relations which we have portrayed in this study? Self evidently, an analysis of the future is a speculative matter at best. We shall, therefore, confine ourselves to a few brief comments, beginning with a recapitulation of some major points.

At a very broad level we have portrayed a dual society even as we have attempted to explore the institutional linkages between the two major segments of the society. At one end, we have portrayed a modern political and economic elite, largely willing to accommodate each other, and quite ready to be charitable to the peasantry if that is what it takes to gain access to political power. At the other end, we have portrayed a somewhat optimistic peasantry, unwilling to confront the political system because somehow the system manages to promise upward mobility for all. Within the dual society Harambee not only serves as a linkage between the two ends, but also serves as the main expression of hope by the majority of the peasantry.

At another level, we have tried to capture at least some of the political dynamics in a rural area, and particularly those dynamics originating with the peasantry and aimed at extracting some resources from the political centre. True, the attempts by the peasantry to get the resources have not always been successful. But the important point is that the peasantry has been portrayed as an active political participant which is not shielded from the political and economic processes taking place at the centre of the political system.

One of the potential dangers of portraying a political society as a dual one is that it is all too tempting to concentrate on that segment of the society which controls political power, thereby assuming, at least implicitly, that the other segment is simply inactive if not downright passive. The kind of interpretation which we have employed in this study has enabled us, to avoid the danger of assuming an inactive peasantry. Instead, we have tried to portray a politically conscious peasantry. (This, of course, is not out of step with the recent political history of the peasantry in Kenya).

The third and perhaps the most important point which we feel needs some emphasis is that the approach which we have employed has also enabled us to sketch one model of political stability regardless of the normative position which one would like to take on the issue of political stability. The main elements of the

model are: One; the existence of an elite which has a personal economic stake in the existence of the system, and is therefore largely willing to accommodate each other. Two; the existence of political awareness among the peasants which translates itself into hope that somehow their socio-economic position can improve partly through self-initiative because all around them they can see "winners" who, yesterday, were members of the peasantry. Three; the existence of dialogue and some kind of linkage mechanism between the elites and the peasants whose dual functions are to localize demands and precisely to transmit the hope that upward mobility within the status quo is possible for everyone. Four; tactical but minimal use of coercion by those who control state power because excessive use of coercion might destroy the delicate balance on which the survival of the system depends. Five; existence of a certain amount of respect for authority, something which Kenyatta masterfully inculcated into everyone in Kenya. Six and finally, it should be noted that the model functioned rather well, at least for Kenyatta, in the absence of conventional liberal democratic institutions such as a political party and an authoritative legislative body. Indeed, the very absence of these "political institutions" facilitated the functioning of the model.

What then of the future? The most obvious answer to this question is that the future of the political relations portrayed in this study depends on how able and willing the current regime is to perpetuate the above model. Clearly, there

are some aspects of the model which the regime is unwilling to perpetuate and there are some others which it cannot maintain even if it were willing to do so. For example, there are indications that the regime is somewhat unwilling to continue with the same kind of unbridled elite accumulation which took place under the previous regime. This does not mean that the regime will dismantle the "capitalist" system established over the first fifteen years of Independence. Rather, the regime is likely to enforce some adherence to the rules of capitalism. How far it can go in this direction depends, of course, on the political price it can afford to pay.

With respect to the other elements of the model, it is becoming evident, for example, that the new regime puts high priority on maintaining some kind of dialogue between the centre and the peasantry. But, as we have pointed out, the success of the previous regime in this respect depended not only in maintaining the dialogue as such, but even more important on instilling hope among the peasantry. Furthermore, the success of the dialogue very much depended on the cooperation of the elites.

Assuming that elite cooperation will be forthcoming, then the regime should be able and is obviously willing to maintain the other elements of the model with one exception. The exception is the current re-organisation of KANU, the only political party in Kenya. Whether the re-organisation will have an effect on

the electoral system, the role of Parliament in the political process and, consequently, on the patron-client system of political recruitment and participation established under the previous regime, is a matter for conjecture at this time. We hope that by this study we have laid some ground on which the "conjecture" can take place as we watch the socio-political scene in Kenya under the new regime.

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OF/DE

APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE

Project No. GI

KINENGE NYAKINYUA

Projects Name & Type: _____ Division: GITHUNGURI Location: GATHURU

Sub-location NYANDUMA Informants _____ Sex: _____

Approx. age: _____ Occupation: _____ Years of education: _____

Status (in self-help): _____ Interviewer: Mbarahi

Date: 28-8-77

1. WHAT DO YOU UNDERSTAND BY THE WORD HARAMBEE (SELF-HELP)? (Probe)

2. HOW DID YOU FIRST HEAR OF THE WORD HARAMBEE? FROM A RADIO,
NEWSPAPER, BARAZA? _____

3. WHERE DID YOU FIRST HEAR OF THE WORD HARAMBEE? _____

FROM WHOM DID YOU HEAR IT? (status) _____

4. WHAT ASPECTS, IN YOUR OPINION, DISTINGUISHES A HARAMBEE PROJECT FROM A NON-HARAMBEE PROJECT? (List) (1) _____

(2) _____

(3) _____

(4) _____

(5) _____

(6) _____

(by aspects is meant
organisational methods, resource
origin)

5. IN YOUR OPINION, ARE THERE ANY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN SELF-HELP AND THE OLD TRADITIONAL IDEA OF COMMUNAL HELP? IF YES, WHAT ARE THOSE DIFFERENCES? _____

6. WHO INITIATED THIS HARAMBEE PROJECT?

Name	Occupation	Education	Age	Sex	Status in project (e.g. chairman member of committee)
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

7. AMONG THE PEOPLE WHO INITIATED THIS PROJECT, WHO IN YOUR OPINION WAS THE MOST INFLUENTIAL IN MAKING THE DECISION TO INITIATE THIS PROJECT? _____

11. WHO IS THE PERSON(S) THAT LEAD(S) OR ACTUALLY LED THE WORK ON THE SPOT? (note that any one project may have many activities led by different individuals).

Activity	Name	Occupation	Education	Age	Sex	Other Remarks
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

12. DID YOU/DO YOU CONTRIBUTE? YES/NO

13. IF YES (a) WHAT REASON MAKE/MADE YOU CONTRIBUTE?

(1) _____ (2) _____

(3) _____ (4) _____

(5) _____

- (b) WITH WHAT DID/DO YOU CONTRIBUTE?

Money How Much? _____

Ideas What kind? _____

Work What Kind? _____

Materials: What kind? _____ How much? _____ Value _____

Crops, animals, What kind? _____ How much? _____ Value? _____

House, land What kind? _____ How much? _____ Value? _____

14. IF NO, WHAT REASONS LEAD YOU NOT TO CONTRIBUTE (1) _____

(2) _____ (3) _____

(4) _____ (5) _____

15. SUPPOSE YOU HAD NOT CONTRIBUTED LIKE YOU NOW SAY YOU DID, WHAT ELSE COULD YOU HAVE DONE WITH THESE RESOURCES? _____

16. WHO/WHAT GROUP/s/WHAT ORGANISATION/s/ DO YOU THINK BENEFIT/WILL BENEFIT MOST FROM THE PROJECT? (Specify) (1) _____

(2) _____ (3) _____

(4) _____ (5) _____

17. WHY DO YOU THINK HE/SHE/THEY/THAT THOSE ORGANISATIONS BENEFIT/WILL BENEFIT MOST FROM THE PROJECT? (Respectively)

(1) _____

(2) _____

(3) _____

(4) _____

(5) _____

18. HOW DO YOU THINK HE/SHE/THEY/~~THAT~~ THOSE ORGANISATIONS BENEFIT
/WILL BENEFIT? (Respectively)

- (1) _____
 (2) _____
 (3) _____
 (4) _____
 (5) _____

19. WHO ARE THE MEMBERS OF THIS SELF-HELP GROUP FOR THIS PROJECT?

(men, women, farmers, boys, etc.)

20. WHAT ARE THE GROUP'S SOURCES OF:

	Name of Source (collective)	Size of Contribution
Finances/MONEY		
Ideas		
Work		
Materials		
Crops/Animals		
House/Land		

21. DO YOU REMEMBER THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE PROJECT?

YES/NO/DON'T KNOW

IF YES, HOW MUCH? _____

DID YOU EXPECT SUPPORT FROM THE GOVERNMENT OR EXTERNAL AGENCY?

22. WAS THIS INCLUDED IN YOUR COSTS? YES/NO

IF NO, WHY?

IF YES, HOW?

23. WHAT BECAME THE ACTUAL COST OF THIS PROJECT?

24. IF WE NOW SEPARATE THESE COSTS, HOW MUCH HAS BEEN SPENT ON
DIFFERENT ITEMS/PARTS?

(1) Labour

(2) Land

(2) Materials

(4) Transportation

(3) Any Others (Specify)

25. HOW IS THE GROUP ORGANISED - MENTION KEY POSITIONS?

(1) _____

(2) _____

(3) _____

(4) _____

(5) _____

26. HOW DOES ONE GAIN THESE POSITIONS (Respectively)

(1) _____

(2) _____

(3) _____

(4) _____

(5) _____

27. DO YOU/THE GROUP HAVE ANY COOPERATION WITH OUTSIDE GROUPS,
PEOPLE, BODIES, ORGANISATIONS? Yes/No.

28. IF YES, WHICH ONES (Specify) (1) _____
(2) _____ (3) _____
(4) _____ (5) _____

29. IF NO, WHY NOT _____

30. WHY WAS THIS PROJECT INITIATED AND NOT ANY OTHER?

31. NOW THAT YOU THINK BACK ON THIS PROJECT, WHAT OTHER PROJECT,
IF ANY, WOULD YOU CONSIDER USEFUL TO HAVE DONE BEFORE
THIS ONE?

32. IS THIS PROJECT COMPLETED? Yes/No

33. IF NOT, WHY? _____

21

34. IS THIS PROJECT BEING USED? Yes/No _____

35. IF NOT, WHY? _____

36. HAS THIS PROJECT FAILED? Yes/No _____

37. IF YES, HOW IS IT A FAILURE (Specify)

(1). _____

(2). _____

(3). _____

38. OF THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE, WHO-IN YOUR OPINION HAS CONTRIBUTED THE MOST IN FURTHERING HARAMBEE PROJECTS IN THIS AREA? IF NONE, WHAT OTHER PEOPLE? (THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANT, THE M.P./EX M.P. OR MEMBER OF THEIR FAMILY, THE DISTRICT OFFICER, THE DISTRICT COMMISSIONER, THE CHIEF, THE SUB-CHIEF, THE LOCAL COUNCILLOR, THE LOCAL KANU OFFICIAL.)

END

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FIN