**On the Waterfront of Scale: Political Economy, Governance, and the Toronto
Waterfront, 1879-2005**

by

Joseph Roman

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fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctorate of Philosophy

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Abstract

This study uses waterfront redevelopment in Toronto as a lens to understand the rescaling of the Canadian state. This thesis illustrates the social and political processes contributing to the waterfront's importance in the city's overall developmental strategies, especially as related to the city's internationalization. A prevailing atmosphere of neo-liberalization that attempts to transform the legacies of the Keynesian-Fordist national state has pushed the City of Toronto to more vigorously pursue its own interests while simultaneously obtaining the participation of the governments of Canada and Ontario to accomplish this.

The French *Régulation* School, state theory, and the scale literature influence the study's historicized explanation of the Toronto waterfront's politicization. The insights provided by the *Régulation* School and state theory are combined to show how Canada's prevailing spatial relationships developed, stabilized, and broke apart in the context of Canada's changing state forms. Thus, Toronto's attempts to dislodge Montreal during the First National Policy precipitated the first rescaling of the waterfront as the creation of a federal harbour commissioner forged links between the Toronto and Canada scales. All problems that emerged on the waterfront thus became of national importance, irrespective of its local origins. The scale literature is used to show how the various institutions and levels comprising the Canadian state become reconciled through the actions of scale-specific actors. At the same time, this thesis shows how the global scale, which is constituted through the actions of national states, affects sub-national strategies. Therefore, this thesis focuses on the importance of the local scale. Here, Neil Brenner's spatialization of states is used to highlight how projects initiated by local scales are affected by the historical legacies of inter-scalar relationships.

It is shown that the importance of the waterfront to Toronto's political economy was not automatic. A series of politicizations at specific conjunctures precipitated "crises" on the waterfront, thereby creating the conditions to make it become a central component of the city's trans-scalar developmental strategies. Thus, the thesis argues that social and political actors have strategically used the waterfront as a means to situate the City of Toronto as the centrepiece of the Canadian political economy.

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Table of Contents

Introduction	1
 Chapter 1: Rescaling States	
Introduction	7
1.1 Narrating the Passive City: Acting on Globalizing Capitalism	8
1.2 Reconstituting Political Economic Places	30
1.3 Opening Up Scales: The Unevenness of Rescaling	38
1.4 Conclusion	54
 Chapter 2: The Origins of the Contentious Political Economy of the Toronto Waterfront: City Politics and the First National Policy, 1879-1940	
Introduction	57
2.1 The First National Policy: National Politics and Inter-Urban Competition	58
2.2 Ontario under the National Policy: The Rise of a Provincial Scale	67
2.3 Contesting the First National Policy on Toronto's Waterfront	74
2.4 Conclusion	89
 Chapter 3: The Making of Toronto's Keynesian-Fordist Waterfront, 1940-1970	
Introduction	92
3.1 Reterritorializing the Post-war Canadian State: New Wine in Old Bottles	93
3.2 Post-war Ontario and the New Scalar Reality	100
3.3 The Waterfront and Toronto: Entrenching the Post-War Urban System	109
3.4 Conclusion	125
 Chapter 4: A Waterfront in Crisis: The Unravelling of Keynesian-Fordism, 1970-1995	
Introduction	128
4.1 The Post-Golden Age Solution: Remaking the National State	129
4.2 Ontario Responds to the Crisis: What's Good for Canada Is (Not) Good for Ontario	138
4.3 A Waterfront in Crisis: Making, Solving, and Renewing Inter-scalar Tensions	149
4.4 Conclusion	176
 Chapter 5: Rolling Back and Rolling Out Toronto's Waterfront: The TWRC, the Re-emergence, and Neo-liberalization of the Waterfront, 1995-2005	
Introduction	180
5.1 The Roll-back and Roll-out of the Canadian State	180
5.2 Roll-backs, Two Roll-outs: Ontario's Offensive from Above and Below	188
5.3 Towards a Neo-Liberal Waterfront: Toronto Confronts Rescaling	202
5.4 Conclusion	232
 Chapter 6: Community and Neighbourhood Associations, the TWRC, and the Toronto Waterfront	
Introduction	235

6.1 Community Groups Get Involved: Toronto's Civil Society and the Waterfront	236
6.2 The Structure of Waterfront Consultations	241
6.3 Contestation on the Waterfront: The Issue of Housing	245
6.4 Conclusion	259
Chapter 7: Conclusions	260
Endnotes	292
Bibliography	332

List of Tables

Table 1.1.5.1: The "Old Economy versus the New Economy" Binary.	25
Table 2.2.2.1: Capital invested in Ontarian industry.	71
Table 2.2.2.2: Capital invested in Quebec's industry.	72
Table 4.2.2.1: Ontario's R&D agencies.	145
Table 4.3.1.1: Percent Change in Manufacturing Employment in the GTA, 1971-1991.	152
Table 4.3.1.2: Total Population and Percent Change of Population in the GTA, 1971-1991	152
Table 4.3.1.3: Number and Percent Change of Toronto Households by Income, 1981-1991.	157
Table 4.3.2.1: Built and Failed Projects on Toronto's Waterfront, 1969-1993.	164
Table 4.3.3.1: Consolidated Expenditures in the City of Toronto (% of Total), 1983-1995	169
Table 4.3.3.2: Percent Incidence of Low-Income in Toronto and the Surrounding Region, 1981-1991.	169
Table 5.1.1.1: Reduction in Expenditures by Line Item, 1995-1998.	184
Table 5.1.1.2: Line Items as a Percentage of Total Expenditures, 1995 and 1998 (Rank).	184
Table 5.1.2.1: Year Federal Programmes were Cut and Restored.	185
Table 5.2.1.1: Percent Change in Ontario Tax Revenues, 1995-2005.	191
Table 5.2.1.2: Percent Change in Ontario's Actual Expenditures, 1995-2005.	192
Table 5.2.1.3: Year Provincial Programmes were Cut and Restored.	192
Table 5.2.2.1: Provincial-Municipal Breakdown of Funding Responsibilities Before and After Downloading.	195
Table 5.3.1.1: Percent Change in the City of Toronto's Expenditures, 1995-1997.	203
Table 5.3.1.2: Major Areas of Population Growth in Downtown Toronto, 1980-1999.	206
Table 5.3.1.3: Percent Change in Households by Income in the GTA, 1991-1996	206
Table 5.3.5.1: Percent Change in Employment by Industry on the Toronto Waterfront and Toronto CMA, 1991-2001.	229
Table 6.1.1.1: Waterfront Groups in Toronto.	239
Table 6.1.1.2: Percent Change in Household by Income on the Waterfront, 1991-2001.	241

List of Figures

Figure 3.3.2.1: Toronto's Employment by Industry, 1961.	117
Figure 5.1.2.1: Federal Transfers to Local Governments, 1995-2005 (000, 000s of dollars).	187
Figure 5.2.1.1: Sources as a Total Percent of Ontario's Revenue, 1995 and 1998.	191
Figure 5.2.2.1: Ontario Transfers to Local Governments, 1995-2005.	198
Figure 6.2.1.1: Number of Immigrants by Decade on the Toronto Waterfront.	244
Figure 6.2.1.2: Ethnicity on the Toronto Waterfront, 2001.	245

List of Plates

Plate 2.3.2.1: The Esplanade Viaduct today.	81
Plate 3.3.2.1: The abandoned Victory Mills as it stood in 2008.	115
Plate 3.3.2.2: The waterfront's landmark Redpath Sugar refinery.	116
Plate 5.3.5.1: The future site of Commissioners Park.	231
Plate 6.3.2.1: Tent City today.	247

List of Maps

Map 2.3.3.1: A THC map showing the ex-Ashbridge's Bay, the area between the Ship Channel and Keating Street on the east.	84
Map 3.2.3.1: Metropolitan Toronto.	108
Map 4.3.1.1: The Greater Toronto Area.	153
Map 4.3.2.1: The City of Toronto Planning Department's waterfront precincts.	163
Map 4.3.3.1: The RCFTW's Greater Toronto Bioregion.	167
Map 4.3.4.1: Garrison Common as conceptualized by the RCFTW.	176
Map 5.3.1.1: Priority Nodes in the Places to Grow Programme.	208
Map 5.4.3.1: The TWRC's Planning Jurisdiction.	219

List of Appendices

Appendix A: Events at the Scale of the Waterfront	272
Appendix B: Events at the Scale of Toronto	277
Appendix C: Events at the Scale of Ontario	281
Appendix D: Events at the Scale of Canada	287

List of Acronyms

BILD	Board of Industrial Leadership and Development
BNA Act	British North America Act
CBD	Central business district
CPR	Canadian Pacific Railway
CSR	Common Sense Revolution
CUSFTA	Canada-US Free Trade Agreement
<i>FDT</i>	<i>The Future of Downtown Toronto</i>
GDP	Gross domestic product
GTA	Greater Toronto Area
GWNA	Gooderham and Worts Neighbourhood Association
IDEA	Innovation Development for Employment Advance Corporation
KWNS	Keynesian welfare national state
LEED	Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design
MP	Member of Parliament
MPP	Member of Provincial Parliament
MSUA	Ministry of State for Urban Affairs
MTRCA	Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NDP	New Democratic Party
ORC	Ontario Realty Corporation
R&D	Research and development
RCFTW	Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront
RGI	Rent-geared-to-income
SPWR	Schumpeterian post-national workfare regime
TBT	Toronto Board of Trade
<i>TC</i>	<i>Toronto Competes</i>
TEDCO	Toronto Economic Development Corporation
THC	Toronto Harbour Commissioners
TICA	Toronto Islands Community Association
TTC	Toronto Transit Commission
TWRC	Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation
TWRG	Toronto Waterfront Reference Group
TWRTF	Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Task Force
UDP	Urban development project
UK	United Kingdom
USA	United States of America
WDLC	West Don Lands Committee
WRT	Waterfront Regeneration Trust

Introduction

About ten or so years ago, my father, a plumber, took his usual streetcar ride to catch the subway on his way home from the downtown to the suburbs after finishing up a day's work at Toronto Western Hospital. After boarding a crowded streetcar, a woman looked at him and barked, "You're dirty! Get off the streetcar!" With his aversion for confrontation, my father disregarded her shameless show of bad manners with a dismissive smile. Another patron, however, did not do likewise. Not only did she undiplomatically invite the protagonist to exit the streetcar and take a taxi, she also pointed out to her, "He works harder than you ever will." Now, this might seem like the clichéd tale of increasing incivility in the Big Bad City and how, luckily, common decency is still around. Upon further reflection, that one individual would think nothing of asking another individual to leave her sight said quite a lot about what was and is happening in and to Toronto. Above all, it shed light on what a city wants to look like. Just who exactly belongs in a city and why? This is not simply a matter of the right to the city *à la* Henri Lefebvre where the poor become further and further marginalized as capitalism continues to expand, pushing them out of the public sphere.

For the past thirty years, there has been a concerted effort to specifically attract professionals to live and work in the city. Throughout this process, steering clear of blue-collar jobs and the people who come with them seems to be the order of the day. There seems to be a perpetual obsession with making Toronto a "world class city," which involves attracting the right people, and providing the right infrastructures, the right buildings, the right jobs, and the right amenities.¹ While blue-collar Toronto was never the majority, its presence was noticeable in the city's neighbourhoods, drinking

establishments, restaurants, and stores. Indeed, these very places were not just blue-collar enclaves, but ethnic ones too. It is not a stretch to say that these were the very people who brought prosperity to Toronto in the post-war era. They made the factories ably hum along, they built the towers that made Toronto Canada's corporate capital, and they built the infrastructures which ushered in Canada's Golden Age of Capitalism. With this expanding prosperity, Torontonians would naturally come to think that their city was the centre of the universe. There is much truth to this, though. As post-war prosperity took hold, this city had become the centrepiece for Canada's political economy.² As Toronto went, so too did the rest of the country.

Things change, however. Post-war prosperity ended and maybe the people who helped build it outlived their usefulness. Again, this goes back to the question: just who exactly belongs in a city? This is a very loaded question. Haussmannite images get conjured up, thus making the answer go a little something like this: with the blessing of key members and groups of the urban business classes, city politicians demolish and rezone entire city sections to get rid of the "dangerous classes" agitating for a better life. It is thus made more orderly and inhabitable for the not so dangerous classes to live, work, and play. (What to do with the not too dangerous classes is a concern best dealt with on a different day.) Today, though, Haussmannite projects cannot be so readily/easily accomplished. The democratization of politics does see to this and perhaps this is one reason why mass protests are fewer in comparison to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Image seems to be everything. Perhaps no place in Toronto exemplifies this attitude more than the downtown waterfront. As the twentieth century wore on, the

downtown waterfront underwent significant changes. Though care must be taken when using the term "deindustrialization," Toronto's downtown waterfront did see its heavy industrial users exit the landscape for a variety of reasons. There are still, however, considerable pockets of heavy industrial users that carry on necessary but unglamorous work. Still, the downtown waterfront with its heavily polluted lands serves as a constant reminder of the city's industrial past which needs to be forgotten if Toronto wants to move ahead. Accomplishing this, however, requires a context.

Waterfronts have no magical powers to turn cities around overnight. So, the question that this study asks is: why do Toronto's social and political actors insist on redoing the downtown waterfront? A politics exists behind why some places get redeveloped over others. Moreover, a politics exists over what a city should *and* should not look like. The thesis of this dissertation is thus straightforward. It argues that the Toronto waterfront has been employed by a variety of political and social actors in order to situate the city as a centrepiece of the Canadian political economy. A key part of this strategy has been to shift the boundaries constituting "the waterfront." These boundary shifts lay claim to an in-progress crisis requiring immediate resolution of the city's importance to Canada's spatial economy. The first chapter of this study develops its theoretical argument using theories of scale. With its origins in human geography, scale examines the particular spatial (re)configurations brought on by politicized and successive reterritorializations. Considered then are the sorts of inter-scalar tensions emanating out of these reterritorializing exercises. Chapter one thus seeks to unravel the theoretical logic behind place-based targeting. Some places are more important than other places. Given the politics surrounding place, a case has to be made for targeting

one place over another. Rescaling processes may proceed more unevenly than the scale literature assumes.

Chapter two seeks to locate historically the political genesis of the Toronto waterfront's political economic importance. It argues that the material effects produced by Ottawa's First National Policy occurred through spatially privileging Toronto's historic "rival" city, Montréal. Given that Montréal-owned railroads saturated Toronto's shoreline, often courtesy of the deals Toronto aldermen provided, a political crisis brewed and opened the door for Toronto businessmen to mount a challenge to Montréal's primacy in the Canadian political economy via the waterfront. In part, Toronto's eagerness to challenge Montréal stemmed from being a provincial capital and the province-building measures that Ontario undertook to not only attract American capital, but also to combat Sir John A. Macdonald's vision of Canadian federalism. This favoured Toronto as a location for international, i.e. American, capital to headquarter its Canadian operations, making the city an important business hub. Indeed, Ontario's relationship with Toronto and the impact of provincial politics on city politics will be a constant theme throughout this thesis. Not only are the political economies of Toronto and Ontario mutually locked, but Ontario has often remained invisible in analyses concerned with the broader changes in Canada's political economy. Nevertheless, through their main organization, the Toronto Board of Trade, Toronto businessmen sought a scalar reconstruction of Canada's space economy through a representational strategy which attempted to harness the displeasure exhibited at extra-Montréal scales.

Following the Board of Trade's political successes from its waterfront launch pad, chapter three turns to the matter of what happened to the waterfront during the period

1940 to 1970. This period marked (1) the rise of Canadian Keynesian-Fordism that (2) clearly understood Toronto as the motor of the country's post-war order. Despite dashed economic hopes and relative social stability, the waterfront unexpectedly came to serve an important extra-economic role. Lending a considerable contribution to sustaining Canada's unique Keynesian-Fordist synthesis, it helped to sustain an already privileged Toronto. Specifically, a range of important infrastructures were erected to massage Fordist-styles of consumption.

The fourth chapter moves on to look at the onset of crisis with Canadian Keynesian-Fordism. Frequent local experiments emerged between 1970 and 1995 to preempt the anticipated territorial unravelling of Keynesian-Fordist Canada. This experimentation will be seen in two ways. First, ambiguity arose over what constituted "the waterfront." Second, with multiple scales of the state operating in the area, largely owing to "the waterfront's" ambiguous bounding, each had its own visions and purposes. Chapter four suggests that the main reason for such disconnected scalar experimentation rested in the uncertainty of an effective multi-scalar administrative capacity and thus each operated in isolation of the others.

Chapter five examines the process of the neo-liberalization of Toronto's waterfront. Here, the waterfront gains clear administrative borders in which the waterfront was used as a city-building process to address the transformed scalar architecture within the Canadian political economy. Yet the unevenness in rescaling required revisiting the way the sections waiting for redevelopment could fit into a probable rescaled Canadian polity.

Chapter six completes the study; it examines grassroots support for waterfront

redevelopment. A rescaled neo-liberalization of the Toronto waterfront is regularly described as a top-down process. Using interviews with neighbourhood associations, community organizations, trade union organizations, businesses, and state agencies directly involved in the daily life of its surrounding communities, this chapter looks at how grassroots support has lent credence and, therefore, much needed political support to the "creative" waterfront imperative through its emphasis on "quality of life" issues.

Chapter 1: Rescaling States

Introduction

Since the demise of the Keynesian-Fordist compromise in the 1970s, numerous experiments have occurred within the industrial democracies to regenerate their national economies. As the twentieth century came to a close, projects focusing on cities to (re)generate economic growth became increasingly prevalent, with urban development projects (UDP) as the preferred path. Policymakers, political entrepreneurs, land developers, and a range of other actors in the public and private sectors sought to apply grand schemes to impressive parcels of urban land, with the hope of motivating a new era of economic growth. Such UDP policies usually, *but not always*, depend on identifying a city's prospects as a "winner" in what is axiomatically seen as a globalized world. Some cities – and the "right" places within them – were perceived to be intrinsically "global" and, by extension, essential for national economic success.

Yet the kinds of projects taking place within "global" cities may not be seen as global. Where one is situated can affect the way one seeks to shape or respond to the various demands surrounding UDP politics. This chapter sets out an argument for an inter-scalar approach to the politics of UDPs. The first section critically examines traditional accounts in political science which privilege the national scale of the state, to the neglect of sub-national scales. A critical exploration of such arguments offers an appreciation of the contributions that localities can make to globalizing capitalism, showing how processes believed to be beyond their control are, in fact, very much shaped by them. Yet it also seeks to show that local actions do not take place in a vacuum but rather depend on a constellation of interactions with the state at higher scales.

The second section then turns to the contributions made by a political economy of scale, with particular emphasis on the works of Bob Jessop and Neil Brenner. Both explore (1) how global and local processes interact to formulate novel forms of urban governance and (2) the processual inclusion and exclusion of actors interested in a local UDP. In particular, Bob Jessop's notion of the transition from the "Keynesian welfare national state" to a "Schumpeterian post-national workfare regime" brings to light how "creative destruction," a concept developed and popularized by the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, has been shaping (1) a logic of "innovation" and (2) what is needed to win the battle for "competitiveness." The third section focuses on the institutional messiness associated with the rescaling of states. Specifically, rescaling processes may proceed in a piecemeal fashion rather than as a result of a coherent plan. Emerging governance regimes have to deal with a range of contingencies requiring the rethinking of strategies. That they operate at multiple scales affords an opportunity to explore theoretically the potential unevenness that may become manifested through scalar disconnects.

1.1 Narrating the Passive City: Acting on Globalizing Capitalism

1.1.1 Bringing the Local Back into Political Science

The discipline of political science tends to undervalue the study of localities, with urban politics largely seen as a minor field within the discipline. Thus, municipal actors are assumed simply to act within the parameters set by higher authorities. Political science thus continues to neglect localities as worthy arenas of study. Two related explanations may account for this. First, as a discipline, political science is prone to grand theorizing. That is to say, events are always part of a larger chain of events that

constrict actions and channel them in a particular direction. There is little room for what William Sewell calls an "eventful temporality" where "the course of history is determined by a succession of largely contingent events."³ Political science has not been keen to admit that events could stand alone, develop out of different logics, and are able to interact to produce unpredictable outcomes.

Following Doreen Massey's arguments of locality studies and the social sciences, grand theorizing discounts the way local studies contribute to larger processes.⁴ That political science's tradition of grand theorizing precludes assigning actors at a local scale explanatory power is misplaced. For example, Barrington Moore's classic *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* is grand theorizing *par excellence*, yet a closer reading of this work reveals that it is, in fact, possible to bring to light the contributions made by localities to broader social and political processes. While there is inadequate space here to do justice to Moore's rich study of developmental possibilities for democratic government, suffice it to say that he convincingly shows how the relationships between central authorities and *local* élites affected national trajectories towards dictatorship or democracy.⁵

Second, the impact of globalization on the national state has further marginalized the study of localities in the discipline of political science. This is bound up with political science's tradition of grand theorizing as it tries to grapple with the implications of a new political layer that policymakers must now consider. As a result, the 1990s witnessed an explosion on literature on the continued relevance of national states. Studies emerged to save what Peter Hall sees as standardizing principles of modern development and a belief in persistent progress.⁶ Thus, only the national state is seen to

have the wherewithal to (1) adapt to change and (2) protect/enhance the territory it presides over. Krasner presents the strongest form of this argument by positing globalization's ability to erode the national, *sovereign* state "could only be the case if shedding authority in some area – a reformulation of domestic sovereignty – led to conditions that were so problematic that significant political and economic actors would begin to search for new structures that might be inconsistent with the rules of sovereignty."⁷ For Krasner, then, national states continue to matter because they continue to be the only acceptable political actors in international affairs.

Unlike Krasner, Biersteker attempts to take globalization more seriously by recognizing the elision of the domestic and international spheres: the histories *between* states shape the international sphere.⁸ Weiss engages with a global layer of policymaking to demonstrate the resilience of national policy capacities,⁹ while Mann goes one step further and explores how globalization enhances and entrenches national states.¹⁰ Although these arguments differ epistemologically, none take seriously the role that sub-national actors play – and, indeed, have played – in shaping not only globalization, but also state responses to globalization. These viewpoints are problematic because they assume that national compositions are uniform and, therefore, the national polity experiences a single form of adjustment. Mann makes provisions for sub-national difference, but he argues "that (despite some postmodernists), as the world becomes more integrated, it is *local* interaction networks that continue to decline – though the fragmentation of some presently existing state into smaller ethnically defined states would be something of a counter-trend, i.e. the reduction of the nation-state to a more local level."¹¹

In the tradition of grand theorizing, then, today's major theme is globalization and the narrative is the way national states adjust to it. While this position recognizes that established understandings of the relationship between the national and the global changes, giving rise to new regulatory sites,¹² it fails to consider its implications for sub-national levels. Often, what happens sub-nationally is read off from what happens nationally. Paul's work represents a corrective to this as it examines sub-national responses to globalization, but the persistent concern of globalization's impact on national states leads him to portray sub-national responses as reflections of national government directives.¹³ This interpretation does not accord adequate agency to sub-national units: national interests will prevail and the potential for contradictions and conflicts within national territories are assumed away, lending to ahistorical interpretations of national responses to globalization.

If new regulatory sites do emerge under globalization, then the relationships that hold *within* national states may transform the territories composing them. In so doing, an avenue is opened up that takes more seriously the multiple logics contained within national states, examining the way they relate to one another, and how (awkwardly) they may cohere. Indeed, the state is a messy, complex political organization that often lacks logical coherence. Using Jessop's definition, the state here is understood as an ensemble of institutions shaping and shaped by social forces. The state is complex not only in the sense of having multiple centres of power – i.e. agencies – and levels with competing and sometimes contradictory logics, but also because societies themselves have multiple, competing, *and changing* interests that are not always easily managed. Forms of state

matter too for where liberal democratic conditions prevail, complexities of interests need to be accounted for in relation to available forms of representation.¹⁴

The multiple agencies and levels comprising states are what present opportunities for the articulation of interests. While political science has paid much attention to how interests form, it tends to overlook *where* interests are articulated. Here, the concept of scale may present political science with a means not only to better illuminate the processes behind interest formation, but also to see why interests develop where they do. Scale is defined as the political economic terrain that state actors (i.e. agents from institutions legally created by the state) and non-state actors (i.e. agents which do not require the legal consent of the state to act) construct to further or prevent a range of projects that can be social, political, or economic in nature.¹⁵ Scales can be pre-established – national and sub-national units have definite borders and responsibilities – but there is a sociality to them. In other words, scales do not act and their explanatory power is derived from the strategic actions of actors who seek to use a scale as a platform to advance particular interests. Indeed, this is what gives rise to particular inter-scalar relations and, as Herod and Wright point out, this shapes the significance of events at a scale.¹⁶

Yet, there is a distinct materiality involved in scale processes that is derived from the *politics* of place. Place is the material manifestation of how people (might) live, work, and play. Place means visibility because of the buildings, roads, sidewalks, etc. making social interaction possible. Of course, the stuff that place is made of can also inhibit or constrain social interaction. Nonetheless, place is the material manifestation of social relations. What is ultimately critical about place is that it never stands still.

Following Arturo Escobar, the effects that a place has are crucial because "[p]lace continues to be important in the lives of most people, if by place we mean the engagement with and experience of a particular location with the same measure of groundedness (however unstable), boundaries (however permeable), and connection to everyday life, even if its identity is constructed and never fixed."¹⁷ Moreover, this fluidity of place can link many localized events and facilitate larger scale socio-political formations. In turn, the practices that emerge "in place" can generate interest from actors at other political scales who may want to act *on* a place.¹⁸ The connections between places are what create space. According to Henri Lefebvre, such connections engender social relations, providing for a constellation of scripts prescribing and proscribing appropriate action within particular social settings. Of course, scripts can be contested as actors develop a desire to overcome, replace, or change them.¹⁹ To what ends this may be for is another matter altogether, but being aware of one's location can open up possibilities for action.²⁰

The possibilities for action below the state at the national scale can provide political science with novel perspectives about political change and states. Actions taken at the local scale can interact with actions at extra-local scales to forge novel territorial architectures. As we shall see with the unique historical circumstances that elevated the Toronto waterfront from a local to a national matter subsequently led to new institutions tying together the Canadian state at different scales. Certain initiatives may be the product of local regimes, avoiding a simplistic reading off of extra-local priorities. Indeed, an initiative can be launched locally and generate interest from the state at senior scales for reasons that may differ from the original intent of the state at the local scale.

Indeed, whenever inter-scalar relationships are transformed, the potential exists for local initiatives to take on greater importance. As Erie argues in his discussion of Los Angeles's rise as a key trading hub for the USA, "Although the received account holds that globalization can "hollow out" the national state, it actually may strengthen urban governance arrangements. Growing evidence indicates that what local governments do to provide trade infrastructure fundamentally matters to their global competitiveness."²¹

1.1.2 Swinging the Pendulum the Other Way: Towards a "Post-National" Future

The analytical dominance of the national state can be attributed to what was an exceptional period in its long history: the post-war era and its associated paradigm of Keynesian-Fordism. Keynesian-Fordism and the central role it assigned to the national state, however, came under scrutiny in the 1980s. In the 1990s, the revival of countries' fortunes by shrinking the spatial focus from national economies to urban scale economies became a common theme. Two general approaches to the new post-national era of economic management can be discerned. First, Kenichi Ohmae typifies the *laissez-faire* approach. For Ohmae, national states got in the way of prosperity. Organizing economies along national lines, Ohmae argued, was "the irrelevant result of historical accident."²² National states were inflexible and this was problematic in light of the emerging imperative of global capitalism. For Ohmae, a return to the more "natural" regional unit was the solution as regions were thought to be more flexible than national states. Whereas national states take a winner-takes-all approach in the race for scarce resources, regions are "open to the global economy" and offer the possibility of "'plus sum" as prosperity is brought in from without."²³ For Ohmae, the strength of regions lies in clusters which give regions the capacities to take full advantage of the economic flows

associated with globalizing capitalism. Ohmae's regions do not wait for help because they *react* to global changes. The four I's that Ohmae argues drive global capitalism – information technology, industry, investment, and individual consumers – are there for the taking if regions so want it; regions take these rather than make these.²⁴

A more sophisticated *laissez-faire* approach was put forward by Michael Porter. Like Ohmae, Porter insisted on the importance that clusters play in leveraging economic fortunes. Although not as focused on regions as Ohmae, Porter nonetheless applied the insights he developed in his *The Competitive Advantage of Nations* to matters of place. Above all, Porter provided greater geographical precision than Ohmae. Porter called for cities to use existing clusters to position themselves on a range of geographical stages.²⁵

What was novel about Porter's insights was his insistence on pursuing *competitive* rather than *comparative* advantage.²⁶ Realizing competitive advantage meant pushing for and distinguishing between a range of hard and soft infrastructures. Hard infrastructures are the very things powering and sustaining economic activities on a daily basis, e.g. transportation routes and power plants. Soft infrastructures are cultural amenities and cultural infrastructures, e.g. education. Investing in hard and soft infrastructures could, Porter believes, establish a virtuous circle, developing locational capacity.²⁷ Making such investments could create and/or consolidate urban nodes of specialization and unleash innovative capacities. Such competitive advantage became ever more pressing due to physical and price barriers coming down since the 1970s to assist a more global flow of capital.²⁸

A second approach theorizing the post-national transition in the 1990s was attempted by more socially-minded political economists. The general theme running

through this rich literature had been to discover new ways to harness the energies of global capitalism in order to make it work for people. Similar to *laissez-faire* approaches, scholars like Hirst, Amin and Thrift, Wolfe, and Cooke and Morgan broadly agreed on the improbability of recapturing the Keynesian-Fordist heyday.²⁹ National economic management was neither possible nor desirable in the face of globalizing capitalism. Instead, a bottom-up approach was required, recognizing cities' indigenous vitality. Hirst's preferred term of "associative economy" nicely sums up this approach. Eager to find the middle ground between market and state, Hirst insists, "An associative economy embedded in strong local institutions is likely to prove both innovative and tenacious. It will, moreover, permit a more even regional distribution of economic activity, by stemming the tide of deindustrialization and by permitting locally-directed processes of reversing industrial decline."³⁰ More people-centred than its *laissez-faire* counterpart, Hirst's associative economy sees an intensely localized economic revival as a means to an end rather than as an end in itself.

At the risk of oversimplifying Hirst's rich theoretical account, he accepts a reality of globalized capitalism and the greater uncertainty facing internationalized economies. Going over the Keynesian-Fordist collapse and the productive and consumptive transformations it engendered, Hirst concludes that shorter turnover times and highly discriminating, and even more highly fleeting, consumer tastes make sustaining a competitive advantage difficult. It is for this reason that Hirst sees small- and medium-sized firms holding out the most hope for dealing with an internationalized economy. Small- and medium-sized firms offer the flexibility needed to shift production at a moment's notice. As a result, the focus should shrink from national macroeconomic

management to highly regionalized styles of economic governing. The advantage lying in spatially shrinking economic targets accrues from knowing the precise, local environmental details that national governments cannot understand.³¹ Hirst, however, refrains from elaborating on why national governments cannot understand this. For Hirst, regions are more able to arrive at a consensus and make the charge towards higher quality economic and social outcomes, transcending “the ideological goals that national governments or major-interest organizations pursue.”³²

1.1.3 The Rise of Post-national Centres of Power

Whatever the normative commitments of the *laissez-faire* and social-minded camps, both agreed that sub-national spaces in the form of regions had superseded national spaces as targets for economic management. An uncritical acceptance of an overriding global capitalism guided these theoretical insights. Whether by fortune or by design, sub-national economic spaces were becoming increasingly de-linked from their wider spatio-political economic fabric. As we shall see in chapter four, the onset of the crisis of the post-war compact in Canada triggered the state at both the Ontario and Toronto scales to begin a first cut at competitiveness in response to the perceived inadequacies of the state at the national scale. National economies had the misfortune of experiencing the Gulliver effect: too big to micro-manage their constituent economic spaces, national states were simultaneously too small to effectively manage globalizing capitalism’s pressures. Sub-national spaces were thus escaping national confines.

The most cogently argued version of this position came from Manuel Castells. For Castells, information technologies were at the heart of this process. In his earliest statement on this, he points out that capital relies on locating activities more intensely

(than most would like to admit) in central business districts. Communications build-ups occur precisely because infrastructures exist at particular nodes. So too does the labour needed to keep it going around the clock.³³

This new world of informationalized capitalism presented challenges for national states. A political double movement of sorts leads to reconfigured national state power. On the one hand, national states had to devolve political power in order to reassert national control while simultaneously bringing about a gap between citizens and capitols. On the other hand, he contends that national states' supranational institution building, which aims to get a handle on global forces, nonetheless ends up stripping them of their own sovereignty.³⁴ National states cannot maintain their claims to sovereign authority, so they try to cope by allowing regional and local initiatives to flourish, thereby countering processes of national de-legitimation stemming from globalizing capitalism's Gulliver effects on national states. This, Castells argues, leads to local sites actively beginning to use the global system to attract various forms of capital *for themselves* rather than for the wider, national space economy typically associated with a Keynesian-Fordist-type economy.³⁵

Once this process commences, localized developmental strategies that harness globalizing capitalism's energies foster the emergence of localized identities. Local identities can capitalize on the structures that national states bequeathed to them to at once heighten their political position globally and de-link themselves from national economic spaces.³⁶ As already mentioned, Castells contends that information lies at the heart of the process of globalizing capitalism. Information and the knowledge that goes with it effortlessly bypass the old bordered order of national state space. Fragmentation

follows from this. National spaces splinter into mini-centres of power, chipping away at national forms of sovereignty.³⁷ A key component of weakening national sovereignty is the dematerializing of the economy. In Castells's view, informational capitalism makes material production epiphenomenal. Material production begins to "become subordinate to the handling of information in the system of production and the organization of society."³⁸ In light of the history of national states, control over physical endowments has been identified as but one enabling factor in the exercise of administrative power over a large territorial expanse.³⁹ When the basis of the economy shifts to something less tangible like information flows, national states can no longer control the flow of resources they draw on. Local scales of the state take on more and more informationally specialized tasks within global networks. This specialization within global networks contributes to the de-linking of national state spaces as local actors seek to take advantage of the political powers devolved to them, thereby engaging in developmental strategies of their own.⁴⁰

1.1.4 A Trip to Florida

While the literature from the 1990s sought to explain why and how the economic stars were now aligned the way that they were, a key problem was that it remained far too spatially vague. The political economic shift towards sub-national spaces had occurred; that much was agreed on. Politically, however, this did not lend itself to programmatic possibilities. What is meant by "regions"? What is meant by "cities"? What counts as "local"? Though these questions may seem inconsequential, the terminological looseness is problematic.⁴¹ For example, when one talks about cities, does one talk about the downtown or the general urban fabric? How one thinks about cities can affect what

policy prescriptions get adopted.

Richard Florida's work on creative cities can be thought of as a turning point for urban political economies. To a considerable extent, Florida was an intellectual child of the 1990s and that decade's search for a new economic paradigm that did not rest on macro-economic management. His works from the 1990s, however, are often overlooked. Writing with Martin Kenney in 1990 during the highpoint of American pessimism over the USA's future economic prospects, Florida postulated Fordist America was unable and unwilling to revolutionize its production processes. Taking inspiration from Japanese and German examples, he and Kenney had contended that workers' creative energies had been disregarded. In effect, this was Florida and Kenney's indictment of America's Fordist productivity model that other countries had long since discarded.⁴² In 1995, Florida supplemented his earlier criticisms of Fordist America by taking aim at its supporting infrastructure. He insisted on taking a less material approach to the economy as governments should focus on flows of knowledge rather than goods. This was made ever more urgent given marketplace competition from the national to the global scale.⁴³

Florida's earlier works culminated in a spatially specific and highly place-based account of economic success. This gave a distinctly micro-economic flavour to his policy prescriptions, predicated on fostering specific urban environments. City infrastructures had to be made attractive to what he calls the "creative class." He states, "Most members of the Creative Class do not own and control any significant property in the physical sense. Their property – which stems from their creative capacity – is intangible because it is literally in their heads."⁴⁴ Proclaiming that the materiality

associated with the old Fordist order has rusted away, Florida argues that the new, knowledge-intensive economy now relies on attracting individuals with knowledge to local scales through place-enhancing measures.⁴⁵

Invoking Jane Jacobs, Florida sees cities as the crucibles for national economic wealth: national economies are only as vibrant and dynamic as their cities are. Winning the global game of competition means achieving competitiveness by attracting those members of the creative class who make their living working in high-technology industries.⁴⁶ Cities should thus focus on providing urban amenities. Public places, cafés, parks, and non-automobile-based modes of transportation would provide the lubrication needed to make easy face-to-face interactions to exchange, diffuse, and cross-pollinate the wealth, i.e. knowledge, residing in the heads of the creative class.⁴⁷ Quality of life issues figure prominently in Florida's equation. Contrasting his "creative capital theory" with human capital theory, he states that "regional economic growth is driven by the location choices of creative people – the holders of creative capital – who prefer places that are diverse, tolerant and open to new ideas. It thus differs from the human capital theory in two respects: (1) It identifies a type of human capital, creative people, as being key to economic growth; and (2) it identifies the underlying factors that shape the location decisions of these people, instead of merely saying that regions are blessed with certain endowments of them."⁴⁸

By arguing the necessity of attracting the creative class through city amenities, Florida attempts to counter the "geography is dead" thesis.⁴⁹ His new industrial order is shown through shifting geographies of prosperity. Place becomes the reason why people move. Industrial cities lose ground to creative cities: the former lack the amenities that

the latter always provide.⁵⁰ Florida calls this process the "great class sorting," whereby geography will remake occupational structures and their associated income lines.⁵¹

Florida lists the essential features a city needs to generate creativity. Generally, a creative city provides an assortment of live, work, and play arrangements that will respond to the non-standard, i.e. un-Fordist, forms of work that are characteristically creative. Offering such a spectrum will entice the creative classes to flock to a city, enabling them to realize their personal autonomy by expressing their identities.⁵²

An inherent contradiction in Florida's creative class thesis is: if place does matter so much and if cities actively foster their own success, by offering a recipe for attracting the creative class, then the only possible conclusion is that place matters very little. It is precisely tactics such as listing what entails a creative city and then admonishing policymakers for not taking a particular course of action – in this case, "creativity" – that results in the multiple application of an urban blueprint. A heightened sense of urgency takes hold, fermenting an administrative culture that can best be described as panicked policymaking. Local scales of the state are seen to be at a competitive disadvantage if they are not developing "creative" policies. The irony behind this, however, is that a competitive advantage is rarely obtained. The basic strategy is to repeat what has already been done elsewhere. An atmosphere of uncertainty may perversely serve to limit innovations while the costs of doing so may wrongly be seen as outweighing the benefits.⁵³

Cities may also be more passive in dealing with globalization pressures than Florida admits. For him, there are only two relevant scales: the local and the global. Recalling that his scholarship was a product of the 1990s, his creative class thesis refines

(1) the acceptance of globalization as an uncontested reality and (2) the way local scales of the state need to act on their capacities to deal with it. He does, however, take the second part further by talking about consciously crafting capacities through urban amenities. Nonetheless, the global-local binary misses the in-between scalar specificities that have led some cities to flourish and others to languish under new spatial architectures.⁵⁴ Bunnell and Coe underline the dangers of giving primacy to a single scale of action, warning this assumes knowledge occurs in an "anarchic, placeless space of flows," that only *one* scale could capture it.⁵⁵ More specifically, Florida follows Castells in asserting that creativity simply cannot reside in blue-collar urbanity. The immateriality of the new knowledge economy has dislodged the materialism of the preceding Fordist age which rested more on manual labour than on mental labour, however false this dichotomy may be.⁵⁶

That blue-collar cities are unable or unwilling to be creative dooms them in economic terms. Unless materialist ways of thinking are abandoned, they will simply be unable to keep up with cities that realize that the new economic reality entails accepting globalization and its pressures. To be sure, this leads to a very supply-side oriented version of urbanism that erodes the spatial solidarities built up during the Fordist-Keynesian heyday. If economic success is highly dependent on providing a correct complex of amenities and infrastructures catering to highly prized knowledge workers, regardless of whether or not prizing them is warranted, then what can only be is a series of highly disconnected islands of booming and permanently busting places.

1.1.5 Naturalizing the After-Fordist City as a Creative City

Richard Florida has played a central role in defining cities' economic roles as they

have entered the new millennium. He has, however problematically, provided a template of what successful cities do to reap the benefits of changed economic circumstances: they are creative in the sense that they disregard manufacturing and focus on promoting sectors in the knowledge economy. Therefore, cities are producers, discoverers, and disseminators of knowledge and the collapse of the post-war compromise tenders a chance for cities to play these roles.

Defining this role for cities depends on discursively constructing clear breaks in political economies. These breaks are argued to have automatically created highly novel economic geographies which pre-determine territorialized roles. In the process, urban political economies become de-historicized and extracted out of their wider spatial context, thus rationalizing cities' "new" political economic role and how they came about. Moreover, it attributes the rise of some cities and the fall of other cities to their ability to take advantage of the production, discovery, and dissemination of knowledge. The noted British urbanist Peter Hall, however, has shown that throughout the history of world cities, a rise or a fall has less to do with a city's ambitiousness and more to do with the course of economic events.⁵⁷ Examples abound of once important cities that have become or are in the process of becoming shadows of their selves. Additionally, Heßler traces the long relationship between cities and knowledge by contrasting socially directed and politically directed creativity. Calling them "science cities," Heßler shows how social interactions in cities gave birth to new ideas that were eventually put into practice. At the same time, she uses the case of Germany to illustrate that, throughout the 1960s and 1970s, science cities were political creations. These were not cities in an urban sense for they were purposely placed in the countryside to avoid distractions associated with an

urban setting.⁵⁸

Yet the breaks that Florida presents erect an artificial but nonetheless useful dichotomy between economic periods. Florida's creative cities are part of the "New Economy." They create, they innovate, and they are disinterested in reaching back to the "Old Economy." Cities trying to make the Old Economy return will waste scarce resources on unwilling participants in the New Economy. For Florida, everybody can participate in the New Economy because humans are essentially creative creatures. To unlock this creativity, cities are expected to respond to the New Economy's features.

Table 1.1.5.1: The "Old Economy versus the New Economy" Binary.

Features of the Old Economy	Features of the New Economy
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stable employment • Long-term investment • Mass production • Mass consumption • Many national economies • Manufacturing jobs • Manual labour • States • Separation of work and home • Permanent stasis • Labour-intensive • Low-technology 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unstable employment • Short-term investment • Short-run production • Niche markets • One global economy • Knowledge jobs • Mental labour • Cities • Integration of work and home • Permanent change • Capital-intensive • High-technology

Hübner has argued that the New Economy "should not be taken literally but as a preliminary name for a growth regime that will or will not ultimately establish a comparative regime of accumulation and mode of regulation with the potential for a renewed *golden age of capitalism*."⁵⁹ The analysis presented here agrees with Hübner's critical assessment of the New Economy as questions about it remain unanswered: What is "knowledge" in the New Economy? How does knowledge replace manufacturing as a source of wealth? What is "creative" about the New Economy anyway?

Separating the New Economy from the Old Economy and then situating it in the city is

far more difficult than Richard Florida suggests. Florida's creative class members may be more numerous than in the past, but they are not as new as he insists.⁶⁰ Engineers, university professors, artists, and architects, to name a few creative class professions, have been around longer than the New Economy and perform many of the same functions today as they did in the past. In any case, the notion that creative workers transcend the Old Economy's mental and manual labour divide ignores a feature that is endemic to capitalist political economies.⁶¹ Still, Florida deftly made his "creativity" prescription attractive by presenting it in broad terms which make every action creative. This enables Florida to wrap the term around anything and declare a clear example of "creativity."⁶² Indeed, the "New" in "New Economy" is relative. The Old Economy – in this case, Fordism – was once the New Economy too. In fact, as Gordon points out by periodizing inventions, many of the sectors associated with the New Economy first appeared in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He goes on to underline how proclamations of a great urban transformation in the twenty-first century are overblown. Gordon states, "Perhaps the most tangible improvement in the everyday standard of living, besides electric light, came through the rapid spread after 1880 of running water, indoor plumbing, and urban sanitation infrastructure."⁶³

This is not to deny the changes that have occurred in production and consumption. As Cohen and Zysman, however, warned more than twenty years ago when high-technology was believed to be eclipsing manufacturing, so-called knowledge industries *complement* manufacturing precisely because economies have to produce goods. If anything, what high-technology did was to "alter the choices open to firms and the very nature and definition of markets."⁶⁴ Changing production processes, reorganizing work,

consumer fickleness, and responding to new demands: these threads are always present in any narration of the history of capitalist political economies.

To return to Hübner, then, a struggle is going on and just as there are changes in political economies, so too are there continuities. How to reconcile the two in the short- and medium-term is never an easy task. *Yet*, Florida's influence on policymakers has had an impact on all levels of government, leading to an all too ready acceptance of the New Economy. We shall see more fully see that this is the case in chapter six where the "Old Economy" came to be seen as a drain on Toronto's political economic future, requiring "New Economy" solutions. Since wealth is believed to derive from knowledge and not from manufacturing, policymakers pursue location-sensitive programmes that respond to globalization by encouraging "creativity." Allen Scott has touched on the globalizing aspects of products affiliated with a city that opens up an explanation of this logic. Citing Hollywood films and Parisian luxury goods, he suggests that a city's association with a product can bring it global attention.⁶⁵ This speaks to the features of the New Economy because a city's ability to claim specialization on a very specific product is heightened. As global pathways increase in number, greater opportunities now exist for place-defined products to gain a reputation. Thus, cities gain a niche in a globalizing marketplace which they may potentially monopolize.

A tacit acceptance of economic instability, however, is connected to this. Concerns arise when cities allegedly lack the environments that a creative/knowledge/information economy requires. City policymakers are then persuaded to rework localized institutional capacities to accommodate the New Economy. This has the potential to upset urban economies, diverting resources to

schemes which may be inappropriate to a city's setting.⁶⁶ Also, it supposes urban decay when a city is not in the process of crossing over into the New Economy from the Old Economy or has an economic base consistent with the Old Economy. While nothing may be wrong with a city if the signs of the New Economy are absent, the discourse that has emerged presumes a state of affairs does, in fact, exist. Therefore, to put a twist on Leo and Brown's argument that cities are presupposed to be in a permanent state of rapid growth, cities not taking steps to induce the New Economy are characterized as fated to stagnation and decline.⁶⁷

As Soja has pointed out, sunrise sectors, especially those with a global success, gained considerable attention. Meanwhile, the loss of good Fordist jobs was relegated to the background, if not altogether rendered invisible.⁶⁸ The local scales of accumulation at which sunrise sectors developed are regularly held up as shining examples of what can happen when institutional capacities respond to the realities of the New Economy. *Local* initiatives were responsible for gaining a foothold in the global marketplace, reinforcing the marriage between cities and creativity. In other words, successful cities operating in the New Economy do not bank on attracting factories and churning out goods as they did in the Old Economy. The focus is now on developing the ideas and the know-how to change the way things are done. Florida's thesis thus leads to an elaborated version of neo-liberal urbanism whereby the institutional underpinnings of political economies become wiped away, leaving explanations of place-based success to the presence or absence of certain city components. Such an analysis is blind to the processes governing how political economies gel politically and socially.

The fact of the matter remains that city spaces are reconstituted in relation to a

wider spatial political economy, which leads to reformulating the possibilities and purposes of urban development. In turn, this necessitates the need for a multi-scalar analysis to illuminate not only why, but how this comes about. Much like national-centric analyses which limit relationships to the national and global scales, analyses like Florida's posit a simple global-local relationship, leaving little to say about the role played by the state at scales in between. A Florida-style analysis overlooks how previous political economic phases have socially and politically contributed to developing and organizing city capacities. As such, cities' inter-scalar relationships are overlooked yet cities are nested within a political form, the territorially hierarchized state. As we will see in chapter two, in the nineteenth century, the activities and responsibilities at the Ontario scale contributed to Toronto's rise as Canada's premier city while Montréal's decline resulted from an exhausted nation-building scheme instigated by the state at the federal scale. Throughout this thesis, we will see how old and new institutional arrangements enabled this process, highlighting the deficiencies in Florida's local-centric arguments that the rise of a global scale is what helps release cities' energies. As well, we will see in the second, fourth, and fifth chapters how actors residing at the Toronto scale prompted national action on the waterfront by bringing, what were for all intents and purposes, local concerns to the attention of the state at extra-local scales.

Bringing local concerns to the attention of the state at extra-local scales highlights another deficiency in Florida's analysis, namely the need for a more sophisticated conception of the political economy of local action. As already stated, cities do not exist in isolation from other political units that are part of the national state. The relationship between cities and the jurisdictions above are complicated and vary over time. Why are

cities more actively involved in self-promotion – or indeed, being promoted by senior levels of government – as sites of investment today while their scope of action was much more restricted in the middle of the twentieth century? Why were the reigns of economic management firmly in the hands of national governments a half century ago whereas they are less so today? Such questions point to historicizing the complex relationship between cities and senior levels of government to arrive at a fuller understanding of cities' contemporary position. Indeed, such an approach will aid in understanding how the appropriate roles and responsibilities of the different levels of the state were arrived at in different political economic phases and why the relations held as they did and now do.

1.2 Reconstituting Political Economic Spaces

1.2.1 Defining a Regime of Accumulation

In order to provide a conception of political economic change as it involves the rise of cities, this section will examine how frameworks for action emerge by first looking at the concept of "regime of accumulation" and the role that the state plays in making a regime of accumulation come together. This includes recognizing the complexity of states and the competing, overlapping, and contradictory logics that need (but may fail) to be reconciled.

Following the lead of Alain Lipietz, a regime of accumulation here is defined as an economic logic, underpinned by a particular set of relations (mode of regulation) that permit a prolonged period of stable economic growth. Such regimes do not appear overnight as a regime of accumulation involves determining the appropriate time horizons to valorize capital. A series of seemingly never-ending trial-and-error exercises are undertaken in order to arrive at a mode of regulation that can come together to

underpin a regime of accumulation. These social relationships will differ across time and from country to country.⁶⁹

Irrespective of how a time horizon is discovered, rhythms take root which regularize the modes of regulation and social regulation connected to a regime of accumulation.⁷⁰ As Aglietta showed in his foundational *Régulation* work, the relationship between wages and the length of the workday in any regime of accumulation correlates to expected rates of profitability.⁷¹ At the same time, a regime of accumulation *within* a country will be the result of differing modes of regulation coming together to engender stability.⁷² We will see how this was the case in chapters two and three of this thesis as the actions taken at the Canada, Ontario, Toronto, and waterfront scales came together, not without friction, to precipitate a stable framework for political economic action lasting for three to four decades.

Periods of stability do not last forever and crises set in, unleashing a search for a new regime of accumulation. Here, a distinction can be made between a crisis *in* and a crisis *of*. A crisis *in* suggests fine-tuning may be required in order to (1) maintain a regime of accumulation's stability or (2) stave off a collapse. Fine-tuning may or may not succeed, however, because, as Painter and Goodwin argue, the elements comprising a stable regime of accumulation may be more prominent at one point in time than another.⁷³ Therefore, "success" may be understood as the extent to which disequilibrium is contained. Disequilibrium may be managed during a crisis *of*, yet this ultimately leads to what Boyer calls a "final crisis" which witnesses "the *collapse of the specific set of social relations* that characterizes a mode of production."⁷⁴ Such moments of deep crisis open up possibilities for new forms of state action which may, over time, become

regularized through the institutionalization of a new mode of regulation.

1.2.2 The Role of the State and Temporal Rhythms

One of the key contributions made by the *Régulation* School towards political economy has been its recognition of the political aspects of a regime of accumulation. The dislocating effects arising out of a crumbling regime of accumulation give rise to political antagonisms which states seek to manage, contain, or put down. This is what unleashes experimentation by state actors. The *Régulation* School has focused on the regime of accumulation associated with the post-war era – what Jessop calls the Keynesian welfare national state (KWNS). Little is said about the role of the state in pre-Keynesian regimes of accumulation. Nevertheless, the latter are important to understanding the post-war state as its steering role had its roots in the role it developed throughout the nineteenth century. With the possible exception of *laissez-faire* Britain, most national states were involved in organizing spaces for investment. With regard to Canada, Fowke's case study of Canada illustrates how the state used its powers to develop national capacities. For Canada, this meant resorting to tariffs in order to protect domestic industries. At the same time, these tariffs were also an important revenue source for the Canadian state which could be used for national developmental projects.⁷⁵ It was only when the project of national development was exhausted that the Canadian state of the National Policy era lost its *raison d'être*.⁷⁶

Among other things, pre-Keynesian national state capacities were developed to maximize booms, providing the physical and social infrastructure required to stimulate manufacturing. Kindleberger is particularly insightful on this point because he locates the late nineteenth century German state's motivation to develop in response to

deteriorating international conditions.⁷⁷ Indeed, it was the bust of the 1870s that had led the German state to turn away from *laissez-faire* principles, in large part because *laissez-faire* (1) inhibited an escape from the UK's economic orbit and (2) hurt the organization of a national political economic space.⁷⁸ Fowke has shown how this was also the case in Canada for national development was pursued not only to adjust to changes in the international economy, but also to take advantage of new international trading opportunities.⁷⁹ We shall see how this transpired in chapter two and the effects it had on the Toronto waterfront. The drive for national economic development involved reconciling short- with long-term investment by ensuring the conditions to capitalize on booms, and even to maintain corporate survival when economic conditions eventually soured. Thus, pre-Keynesian national state capacities were developed with international sources of demand in mind. It was only when these sources of demand dried up that panic set in.⁸⁰

The turn to protectionism was not an unusual response in light of the incredible application of national state power to developing national capacities. As Hobsbawm shows, the state-as-protector role arrived in the second decade of the twentieth century: "Each state now did its best to protect its economy against threats from outside, that is to say against a world economy that was visibly in major trouble."⁸¹ To some extent, this was to re-establish the temporal horizons associated with pre-Keynesian regimes of accumulation. Rather than looking to international sources of demand to maintain boom-bust cycles, domestic sources of demand would play that role. As we shall see in chapter two, developing capacities at the Canada and Ontario scales were oriented to benefiting from international sources of demand, *but* the rise of the First National Policy tariffs set

the stage for domestic sources of demand as well. Thus both contributed to Toronto's rise and the establishment of a contentious waterfront scale.

The crisis of the pre-Keynesian regime of accumulation opened the way for the rise of the KWNS in the post-war era – an era unlike any other in the long history of capitalism given its impressive growth rates, high levels of employment, and increased standard of living for the working classes. Some of the problems associated with the pre-Keynesian regime of accumulation as it began breaking down were poor aggregate demand, overinvestment, the constant threat of the developments at the international scale throwing national economies into turmoil, and the dogmatism of *laissez-faire*. Indeed, John Maynard Keynes himself believed that *laissez-faire* had run its course because conditions had so changed that it could not longer continue as the source of inspiration for public policy.⁸²

It may not be a stretch to argue that the turn towards the national state as a stabilizer had already been in the making when pre-Keynesian regimes of accumulation began to experience their own crises *in* and *of*. To return to Fowke's discussion of Canada, the switch to the KWNS may have been part of the long history of the state as it made the transition from the development of capacities to the exercise thereof. It was through the exercise of state capacities, then, that a new regime of accumulation based on Keynesian principles (i.e. the full use of state monetary and fiscal policies to avoid a return to boom-bust conditions) was established to complement the Fordist regime of accumulation that replaced batch production with mass production and expanded the working classes' consumptive abilities, i.e. mass consumption.

The new regime of accumulation associated with the KWNS has come to be known

as Keynesian-Fordism. Jessop identifies five features of the KWNS:

1. Relatively full employment.
2. Relatively closed national economies supported by international frameworks.
3. The national state claims responsibility for guiding national development while allowing sub-national scales to pursue their own agendas within the established policy post-war policy paradigms.
4. Politics utilized markets to compensate for the shortcomings featured in market-based societies.⁸³

As we will see in chapter three, these had been an integral part of the Canadian version of the KWNS as the national state assisted developments at the Ontario, Toronto, and waterfront scales.

No regime of accumulation or mode of regulation can last forever, however. The regime associated with the KWNS became exhausted in the 1970s, throwing off the rhythms of the Keynesian-Fordist regime of accumulation and setting off searches for new inter-scalar relations to stabilize Keynesian-Fordism. Jessop's concept of the Schumpeterian post-national workfare regime (SPWR) illuminates the contours of the emergent mode of regulation. The SPWR is oriented to the supply- rather than the demand-side of the overall political economic equation, with emphasis on the flexibilization of public and private life. This turn to flexibility is predicated on becoming competitive. As we will see in chapter four and five when Canada's version of Keynesian-Fordism began its descent and as policymakers tried to find its successor, being "competitive" came to be taken to involve a search for cutting-edge innovations in sunrise industries whilst leaving behind sunset industries. Sunrise industries, which are

closely correlated with a so-called post-industrial economy, are typically understood as knowledge-based, highly specialized firms that can react quickly to changing market conditions.⁸⁴ In contrast, sunset industries are understood as mass production industries synonymous with a Fordist-style economy, i.e. manufacturing.

Alongside this shift from the demand- to the supply-side, the three decades long internationalization of domestic policies has involved remaking the territorial matrix of national states, resulting in increasingly formulating micro-regulatory measures advertising urban sites potentially capable of advancing national interests in the global marketplace.⁸⁵ Such state strategies attempt to accomplish more rapid policy development in order to maintain competitiveness. Above all, the SPWR seeks to support and sustain entrepreneurialism in high growth, i.e. sunrise, sectors, which is extremely difficult given the rapidity of innovation.⁸⁶ An emerging SPWR, however, takes time to develop and not all scales of the state will develop competitiveness strategies at the same time or in the same way.

The SPWR is seen as part and parcel of a process of neo-liberalism, or as Peck and Tickell argue as an unfolding process of neo-liberalization. Insofar as the state at local scales of action is concerned, the far-reaching transformations initiated at senior scales in the national state's territorial hierarchy undermined existing inter-scalar arrangements. According to Peck and Tickell, this meant "inducing localities to compete by cutting social and environmental regulatory standards."⁸⁷ In turn, "regulatory dumping" became a reality for the roll-back phase of neo-liberalism and meant forcing the state at the locale scale to partake in heightening urban entrepreneurialism.⁸⁸

The concept of neo-liberalization highlights the uncertain processes that lead Peck

and Tickell to posit a roll-out phase follows a roll-back phase. The logic of the former primarily rests on addressing the institutional deficiencies germinated by the latter's lapses in (re-)regulation. A more intense politicization of public policies takes root as the logic guiding roll-back neo-liberalism reaches its limits, making effective political coordination within and between policy areas problematic. Yet these limits do "provide a positive spur to regulatory intervention" for neo-liberalization tenaciously stays the supply-side course and demonstrates a dynamic ability to turn failures into successes via institutional re-regulation, reworked frameworks, and administrative practices.⁸⁹ To some extent, this tempers the politicization of policy areas. This is especially important given the rediscovery of the local scale as an important site of political economic regulation in a potentially emerging SPWR mode of regulation. This, however, entails a greater reliance on expert-driven policymaking with the hope of steering policies away from direct political contestation. How successful this may be is an empirical question. Nevertheless, a depoliticizing strategy becomes attached to re-regulatory measures even while new scalar logics emerge.

Following David Harvey's classic argument concerning the transition from urban managerialism to urban entrepreneurialism,⁹⁰ Peck and Tickell posit this involves the engagement of actors at local scales in supply-side strategies that reaffirm the capital mobility associated with globalizing capitalism.⁹¹ Such strategies create the aggregate action needed to enable the rise of inter-scalar rule regimes, or what Peck has called "fast policy." Discursively, this involves the creation of an out-there-imperative, necessitating action "in here." In other words, the global scale of competition requires the construction of competitiveness at the local scale. One consequence of fast policy is the way it de-

contextualizes "best practice," giving little weight to historical legacies, social formations, and political structures. What ultimately matters is whether a specific programme will be implemented.⁹² Such de-contextualization forms a crucial component of a post-national regime because the rapid development and deployment of policy reflects the limitations in state capacities to react to and control events as they appear in their jurisdictions. As Jessop argues, "This commitment to 'fast policy' is reflected in the shortening of policy development cycles, fast-tracking decision-making, rapid programme rollout, continuing policy experimentation, institutional and policy Darwinism, and relentless revision of guidelines and benchmarks."⁹³ As we shall see in chapter five and six, the strategic use of the Toronto's waterfront can be seen as an example of fast policy and as part of an effort to neo-liberalize politics at the Toronto scale.

The preceding discussion shows the politically-oriented nature of neo-liberalization. The inter-scalar understandings established during the post-war era confined cities in many jurisdictions to a largely social reproduction role while actors operating at senior scales of the state, in turn, focused on the business of business. Changing these relations required destabilizing tacitly understood roles. Peck and Tickell's analysis, however, understates why states at the local scale (1) were compelled to act entrepreneurially in the roll-back phase and then (2) adopted a more aggressive entrepreneurial stance in the roll-out phase.⁹⁴

1.3 Opening Up Scales: The Unevenness of Rescaling

1.3.1 Looking Inside State Space

While much attention has been paid to the reterritorializing tendencies of national

state spaces via rescaling, less attention has been paid to the construction of particular scaled political economies, the social complexion of scales, and the state architecture that structures socio-political interactions. This is not intended to suggest a *Matryoshka* doll model found in more mainstream accounts of multi-level governance.⁹⁵ Nor is it to suggest that we should isolate a particular scale from its wider spatio-scalar context. This is especially the case given the shaping mechanism that the state-society interplay displays to affect rescaling outcomes.⁹⁶ Rather, it is simply meant to argue for greater appreciation of embedded scalar particularities.

Ultimately, scalar reconfigurations may open up new possibilities at some scales while deliberately curtailing them at other scales.⁹⁷ Neil Brenner's contribution to scalar theory lies in articulating how, in the aftermath of the crisis of Keynesian-Fordism, territorialized political economies are combined in new ways through rescaling, evoking new forms of spatially-based forms of governance. Building on Jessop's state theoretical works, Neil Brenner excavates the processes and relationships informing rescaling and its guiding logics. Brenner's key contribution is his spatialization of statehood. Going beyond orthodox conceptions of the state which compartmentalize state capacities and powers, Brenner examines how states mobilize administrative capacities to produce a particular territorial matrix. Highly specific forms of spatial targeting are involved, linking them to a regime of accumulation. Given the differential impacts of spatially-led policies, the management of uneven development is an element of state space.⁹⁸

Existing territorialized institutional ensembles serve as the building blocks for successive rounds of capitalist accumulation,⁹⁹ but the difficulty of rescaling involves the development of new interfaces between institutional ensembles. How should they relate

to one another? What role should each one play? Which institutions should be included? When should this inclusion occur? As we will see in chapters five and six, scale-specific interests develop strategies to advance their causes. This is especially pertinent in light of the hierarchical structuring informing sovereign state space. An ordered structure of inter-scalar authority exists within sovereign states' borders, but such arrangements can be altered. Edward Soja's concept of mutable nested hierarchies calls attention to this possibility. In other words, the relationships between territories enveloped in a national formation need to be examined relationally: the positions between territorialities are influenced by how they relate to each other.¹⁰⁰ In turn, social actors come to see themselves in certain ways, which informs the rise and fall of the sorts of thoughts, actions, and beliefs guiding a particular scale.¹⁰¹

Peck and Tickell's exploration of Fordism's dissolution shows how the appearance of a global economic space undermined the spatial configurations that had underwritten the post-war Keynesian compromise. The resulting destabilization set off a search for an "institutional fix" to re-establish spatial coherence.¹⁰² Nevertheless, the social legacies contained within national spaces affect the search for a new regime of accumulation. Here, the notions of territorialization and reterritorialization become important. Territorialization refers to the way the territories comprising a national state relate to one another through the allocation of appropriate roles and responsibilities. In turn, the disintegration of a regime of accumulation triggers a process of reterritorialization. This involves reconfiguring (1) the relationship between the territories comprising a national state, (2) each territory's roles and responsibilities, and (3) what these should be accomplishing.

As we will see in chapters two through five, national spaces are always composed of sub-national spaces and these may have diverging interests. More specifically, sub-national spaces are marked by historical circumstances specific to them¹⁰³ while simultaneously being dependent on national spaces (and vice-versa) for two reasons. First, a regime of accumulation relies on inter-scalar arrangements that can force competing modes of regulation and social regulation to reconcile otherwise competing projects. This is not to say that tensions will not arise but that it is through such interactions that spatially-specific institutions exhibit complementarities, facilitate co-operation, and provide inter-spatial stability.¹⁰⁴ Inside a national space, then, several regimes of accumulation co-exist and come together.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, the spatialization of a regime of accumulation can prove to be beneficial to its general functioning. Problems originating within one space, which could cascade into other spaces and upset the general regime of accumulation, can be spatially contained, avoiding overloading any single space with the responsibility of resolving episodic flare-ups.¹⁰⁶

Second, a regime of accumulation will be shaped by the international political economy by virtue of the fact that international arrangements are primarily the product of inter(national)-state negotiations. At the same time, the national relationship to an international space has bearing on the intra-national complexion of prevailing regimes of accumulation. This intra-national complexion structures national considerations about the appropriate national-international interface.¹⁰⁷ As economies change, so too do the resource and capabilities within, between, and among the state at various scales, affecting the temporal predictability needed to maintain regulation within given spaces.¹⁰⁸ Ultimately, however, it is how key sub-national spaces and their institutional capacities

are joined together that enables a more general regime of accumulation to prevail.¹⁰⁹

While explanations on inter-scalar arrangements are insightful, this focus on the rearticulated state architectures neglects the transformations that go on within each scale and the effects these have on the construction of state space. As Andrew Sayer has pointed out, analysing connections alone misses the social relations occurring within the necessary spaces needing to sustain them.¹¹⁰ The importance of developments within each scale of the state, as well as the construction of new inter-scalar relations, will be a constant theme appearing in chapters two through five when this thesis examines how the decomposition and recomposition of regimes of accumulation are shaped by the social forces operating at various scales. Above all, understanding the way the state at a particular scale develops new capacities may serve to shed new light on emerging inter-scalar relations.

Institutional ligatures can cause divergence to occur, enflaming a crisis, and setting off searches for best practices.¹¹¹ Such searches involve rethinking inter-scalar relations to discover new possibilities for action. As Bayırbağ illustrates in his case study of local entrepreneurialism in Turkey, the state at different scales can take a reactive *as well as proactive* stance under such conditions. Above all, actors grapple with the widened *and constricted* possibilities for action due to the changing institutional forms governing spaces.¹¹² Under current crisis conditions, it is the state at the local scale that has been identified as holding the most potential to set the pace for a new regime of accumulation. Urban political economies are encouraged to build on their existing capacities and capture global flows of capital in response to pressures to provide the "right" environment for constant innovations.

1.3.2 Towards Competitive Scales

The SPWR's micro-regulatory strategies serve an important purpose for re-imagining spaces, involving intense interventions at local scales to stimulate the creation of sunrise industries. Indeed, the unravelling of the post-war compromise at both the national and international scales has precipitated what Jessop calls a "space of competition" whereby states now jockey to win market share at the expense of others, giving rise to a zero sum game. The emergence of such a space of competition in turn generates the need for developing spaces of competitiveness and it is here where the local scale comes into play within the SPWR. Encouraging "spaces of competitiveness" can be identified as a way to transform spaces and create new scales of action.

Local scales of action provide the platform to construct "spaces of competitiveness" through the identification of place-specific capacities that can be used to generate conditions amenable to sunrise industries. The spaces of competition and competitiveness mutually shape each other because the winner-takes-all logic inscribed in the space of competition promotes the reorganization of political economies, letting new models of governance emerge at the state's sub-national scales to capitalize on capacities unavailable elsewhere.¹¹³ We will see how this process transpires in the fourth chapter where the Canadian state at the national scale fashioned a space of competition that informed competitiveness strategies at the Ontario and Toronto scales of the state as an incipient SPWR started to take shape and then, as chapter five will show, takes hold. At the same time, however, in earlier chapters we will see how re-imagining spaces is not limited to a SPWR for both the pre-Keynesian and Keynesian Canadian state conceptualized what actions were appropriate at a variety of scales.

Locally scaled capacities are utilized to generate sunrise industries because "being first" can often mean securing substantial market share. The pressures emanating from a space of competition, however, compel continual innovation, (prematurely) devaluing innovations. Even though legal measures in the form of globally regulated intellectual property rights and national systems of patenting are used to monopolize market share, an underlying economic insecurity remains because firms in other state jurisdictions, operating at the local scale, are likely to be undertaking similar searches to replace the monopolized product, technique, idea, etc.¹¹⁴ A virtuous circle of insecurity thus emerges, causing the state at the local scale to rework institutional capacities to deepen the potential for innovation.

While significant attention has been paid to the discursive struggles surrounding rescaling activities,¹¹⁵ the physical expression of rescaling, realized in the construction of hard infrastructures, has not. Terming it a "scalar fix," Brenner notes that physical infrastructures stitch together in particular configurations. As such, "scalar fixes for capital position each geographical scale within determinate patterns of interdependence and thereby constitute relatively fixed and immobile infrastructures of territorial organization for each historical round of capitalist overaccumulation."¹¹⁶ While creative destruction may involve the demolition and reconstruction of governing institutions to create the institutional fix needed to stabilize a territoriality, physical infrastructures are reworked to sustain capitalist dynamism within a territoriality. Whether this is accomplished through ingenious manipulation or through levelling and starting all over again, the material flows giving (renewed) life to capitalist processes are facilitated and may substantially change the complexion of built environments. After all, infrastructures

aid in underwriting and permitting material flows. As we shall see in chapter two, the age of the railroad in Canada had accomplished this, but not without particular consequences. Chapter three will also show how the era of Keynesian-Fordism triggered a succession of infrastructures which not only brought scales together, but also helped sustain the creation of new sub-provincial scales.

Reorganizing urban political economies and their built environments can mean establishing novel institutional fits. Agencies which are not necessarily thought of as important may suddenly enjoy primacy and the same can be said about non-state actors. In other words, there is what Martin Jones calls a "spatial selectivity" to this process. The constant search for a scalar fix reformats state-society and inter-institutional relationships which are (1) geographically specific and (2) centred on a particular place to galvanize political support for a project.¹¹⁷ The potential outcome, however, may alter attachments to built environments and their underlying support systems, i.e. physical infrastructures, inviting the renegotiation of roles to be played by state and non-state actors at various scales.

As we will see in the fifth chapter, the mobilization of various territorially-specific state agencies involved in rescaling processes can involve the rethinking of the governance/government relationship. This entails examining (1) how state agencies come to relate to each other and (2) how the discourse of local solutions for local problems motivates non-state actors to submit their ideas to the agency or agencies charged with implementing project plans. The mobilization of territorially-specific state agencies in rescaling processes contributes to new scales of action, forging new connections between scales. When these connections are made, actors at specific scales

can move more fluidly between scales, especially when the status of a scale changes.

Neil Smith's concepts of "jumping scale" and "scale bending" illuminate this process. Smith initially theorized jumping scale to show the way actors (and events) can move across scales. Certainly, actors' identities and strategic initiatives are shaped by circumstances prevailing in their "normal" scale of action. Yet jumping scale is a strategy designed "to dissolve spatial boundaries that are largely imposed from above and that contain rather than facilitate their production and reproduction of everyday life."¹¹⁸ Jumping scale thus excites a refusal to be locked into relationships established at each scale. This is due, in part, to the gestalt of scale: one's scalar location informs observations about already existing hierarchies and the sorts of engendering patterns notwithstanding dictations from above.¹¹⁹

We will see an example of such scale jumping in the second chapter where actors at the Toronto scale were concerned about the state of Toronto's waterfront, turning a local matter into a national matter by appealing to authorities at a higher scale. In chapter six, we will also see how actors at the neighbourhood scale were actively dissolving spatial boundaries by making new connections between the federal and city scales in order to obtain services which were wanting at the neighbourhood scale. Moreover, we will see how the motivation for this partly came about as a result of Ontario's rescaling exercises, explored in chapter five, which transformed the provincial-municipal relationship in the late 1990s. Nonetheless, it is important to note that no one set of actors are more prone than another set of actors to jump scale.

Once spatial boundaries are dissolved, Smith's concept of scale bending becomes helpful. As we will see in chapters two and five, which examine the local actions taken

to make Toronto's waterfront a national issue, if social actors jump scale to break out of imposed spatial boundaries, then their actions are capable of redefining the sorts of activities deemed appropriate and inappropriate at particular spatial scales. This can involve politically constructing new institutions to address spatial "problems." To a considerable extent, then, Smith's scale bending connotes scalar fixes to stabilize the shifting social relations accompanying those scales that are gaining a new prominence within the inter-scalar hierarchy.¹²⁰ As we shall see in chapter six, the legacy of rescaling in the 1990s led actors at the neighbourhood scales within Toronto to begin to use the waterfront's designation as a global project to press the national scale for local services.

Yet scalar fixes are not always amicably discovered and selected. Competing demands between, within, and across actors at various scales have to be reconciled. That interests are scaled can lead to interests rarely being on the same page. Scalar disconnects can be symptomatic of this, frustrating the sorts of institution-building required to establish the scalar fix that Smith discusses. Scalar disconnects emerge from the reterritorializing processes that ensue under rescaling conditions as the intended outcomes of a rescaling exercise may not match what was originally intended. In particular, Byron Miller argues that scalar disconnects occur because of the national state's hollowing out. As a result, devolution gives sub-national scales greater responsibilities without the tools to meet them. Miller posits that this might lead to "expanding the potential for responsive democratic decision making" as the distance between citizens and decision-makers decreases. He goes on to suggest, however, that "where substantial incongruities between formal decision-making processes and required resources exist, local politics may come to be seen as meaningless, to be avoided

whenever possible."¹²¹ While insightful, Miller's analysis neglects the logic guiding the hollowing out of the national state and the effects of extant scalar architectures coming undone, sometimes in unexpected ways, and then being remade. As we will see in chapters five and six, the effects that the rescaling of the Canadian state during the 1990s had on the governance of the Toronto waterfront was a result of scalar disconnects, but remedying them depended on local actors (inadvertently) supporting neo-liberal measures. What might explain this? Peck and Tickell's notion of roll-back and roll-out neo-liberalism provides important insights.

Although Peck and Tickell suggest that space becomes neo-liberalized, they do not elaborate on how this process of neo-liberalizing space comes about. This question become ever more pressing given the ways in which neo-liberalism operates at specific spatial scales. If space becomes neo-liberalized, then how the roll-out phase rises at specific spatial scales to precipitate neo-liberalization requires further investigation.¹²² Otherwise, a too mechanical relationship between cities' acceptance of urban entrepreneurialism may be accepted. Of course, this is not to deny that such cases can occur. What is being suggested, though, is that cities do not necessarily take a preordained path by scalar *fiat*, even if politics more than economics can sometimes guide urban entrepreneurialism.

If cities become important sites of political economic regulation, then the restructuring of inter-scalar relations under the roll-back phase of neo-liberalization may lead to a process of de-scaling where the ties that bound inter-scalar obligations under a previous regime of accumulation are eroded, leading to transformations *within* scales involving the development of isolated policies. It is here where the transition from the

KWNS to the SPWR illustrates how neo-liberalization occurs: the hollowing out of the national state, in its Keynesian-Fordist form, relieves the national state's obligations to sub-national scales. As we will see in chapters four and five where waterfront uses mutated in response to the instability of a decaying Keynesian-Fordist, actors at sub-national scales responded by developing their own capacities to shore themselves up in the face of decomposing inter-scalar ties. Responses, however, will vary and will develop over the medium- and long-term. At the same time, this offers an opportunity to recompose state forms as obligations of the state at the national scale to the state at sub-national scales occur through administrative programmes designed to enhance sub-national competitiveness. Appropriate development is no longer defined nationally, then, but sub-nationally which deepens the strategies that actors at sub-national scales pursued in response to the hollowing out of the national state.

In developing scale-specific agendas, scale-specific regimes of accumulation may emerge. It is not so much that "junior" scales, such as the urban, are used as a kind of Petri dish for "senior" scales eager to generate a new regime of accumulation. Forces at urban scales may certainly be capable of establishing their own sites of experimentation through the creation of industrial parks, sector-specific districts, and themed neighbourhoods. Thus, it is important to uncover what strategies *or* strategic actors might become imagined for a particular scale of action,¹²³ as well as to examine the kinds of activities these entail and the social relations in which they are embedded. What may be significant for an actor at one scale may be insignificant for an actor at another scale.¹²⁴ As Sewell has put this, "Social life is located in the double sense that it takes place in specific locales ... and that these locales stand in specific relation to other locales

and to social, economic, and political processes that operate at wider scales."¹²⁵

A new sense of state space can be uncovered through the discovery of the sorts of strategies or strategic actors that act as important components of a potential new regime of accumulation. Material realities do matter and can signal the extent to which a regime of accumulation may be created, deepened, and/or exhausted. Ultimately, these show up in changed built environments. Indeed, the case may very well be that the local scale is where it is possible to first see the emergence *or* exhaustion of a regime of accumulation. However much analysis has been given over to discursive constructions of cities, it may be impossible to divorce discourses from the materialism giving form to actually existing political economic realities.¹²⁶ Haila's work on the political economy of building "global" cities highlights how urban visions have to culminate in a specific form of bricks-and-mortar for it to be taken seriously.¹²⁷

It is necessary to remember that any regime of accumulation is dependent on cultural underpinnings that manifest themselves in particular ways of life. For instance, Harvey has drawn attention to the "post-modern" cultural shifts associated with the end of Keynesian-Fordism. Thus he suggests, "To begin with, the more flexible motion of capital emphasizes the new, the fleeting, the ephemeral, the fugitive, and the contingent in modern life, rather than the more solid values implanted under Fordism. To the degree that collective action was thereby made more difficult ... so rampant individualism fits into place as a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for the transition from Fordism to flexible accumulation."¹²⁸ This is not to suggest that such cultural shifts may be read off of political economic change. Instead, a crisis in a regime of accumulation is likely to give rise to debates over what ought to be done about a particular scale *given the*

*influences exerted by political economic change.*¹²⁹

There is, as Swyngedouw has argued, a shift towards new forms of governance, indicating a conscious reconstitution of social relations at the urban scale in order to motivate a new social order based on image-making.¹³⁰ Insofar as the city scale is concerned, Jessop points out that these debates may be located within a disabling narrative of national states as unable to respond to the Keynesian-Fordist collapse. Interest in the narrative must be generated as it is dependent on a constellation of factors buttressed by moments of strategic selectivity in the institutional and discursive sense. Through processes which may only become apparent in the medium- to long-term, social groups become privileged over time given their personal and group experiences that had been built up during a preceding regime of accumulation.¹³¹ A de-coupling of an inter-scalar regime of accumulation may be sparked, potentially revealing new sets of inter-scalar relationships as actors at each scale labour to find their own scale-specific regime of accumulation. In part – and Lipietz's tome on the development of regimes of accumulation is particularly instructive here given his emphasis on never supposing that there is an overarching need for anything to occur – this can be related to a changing mode of regulation. Behaviours sustaining a regime of accumulation need to be accounted for institutionally.¹³² This, however, can be extended to undermining a regime of accumulation. Governing institutions, for whatever reason, may fail to incorporate key social actors into their decision-making processes by ignoring important sets of scale-specific changes. It is at this moment, then, that questions are raised about what a scale is for and how the spaces within it should be structured.

To be successful, the manner in which a political economy of intra-scalar

reorganization emerges will have to include the needs, desires, and situations of social formations. It is not enough to blame "capital" for restructuring built environments at local scales.¹³³ Legitimation requirements are important, particularly where liberal democratic conditions hold. Greater attention needs to be paid to the reasons why particular forms of intra-scale restructuring are supported over others. To be sure, this can also affect which types of capital become interested in a scale's political economic changes.¹³⁴ Very real geometries of class power exist just as much locally as they do extra-locally. Avenues for representation at the local level can have powerful structuring effects on which voices get heard.¹³⁵ As we will see in chapter six, the nature of Toronto's civic activism has class biases affecting the scale politics of the Toronto waterfront. Which issues were brought up by civic activists in public consultations and how they were picked up on by waterfront authorities will be shown.

As Jessop suggests, through grassroots movements, local actors' appeals for solving localized/localizing problems at the local scale "also helped, often unwittingly, to create the conditions for the emergence of the 'entrepreneurial' city or region."¹³⁶ The scalar fix tied to the national scale increasingly became contested precisely in those spaces exhibiting an emergent mode of social regulation centring on lifestyles. It is for this reason that Swyngedouw emphasises place and its appropriation in scale-making and insists that the ability to capture a place at a scale is important to controlling space.¹³⁷ Place can come and act to define a scale. As Eisenschitz and Gough point out, the emergence of new local scales can be symptomatic of a wider inter-scalar crisis as scales are recomposed to manage the associated stresses of scalar undoing.¹³⁸ The recomposition of scales means pursuing the development of institutions sensitive to

scale-specific modes of regulation. Once this transpires, a focus on what local scales should look like could proceed. Such processes of contestation will be explored in the third and fourth chapters which look at developments addociated with the exhaustion of the Keynesian-Fordist regime of accumulation and identify when changes first appeared at the Toronto scale.

Conversations about what local scales should look like involve a focus on particular places that are perceived as (1) being symptomatic of a dying regime of accumulation *and/or* (2) slowing the movement towards a new regime of accumulation. Particular places come to be looked at as a problem in search of a solution at the local scale. However this gets carried out, it nonetheless represents the political engagement needed to depict a scale.¹³⁹ As we will see in chapter six, the politicization of the Toronto waterfront by actors at the local scale led social and political actors at the local scale to articulate what needs to be spatially targeted, what strategies should be proscribed and prescribed, and why, in the context of a crumbling or crumbled regime of accumulation, the process of institutional realignment inside a scale can begin. Such attempts to transform possibilities at the local scale could then be linked to developments at other scales. A political challenge can be mounted too to existing inter-scalar relations as new intra-scalar relations materialize.¹⁴⁰ To return to Neil Smith's notion of scale bending, actors can bend a scale, giving rise to uncertainty as a result of the absence of a *stable* regime of accumulation. In the same instance, jumping scale can be precipitated as repeated attempts are made to discover inter-scalar fits through the newfound sense of scalar appropriateness.

Not knowing how to achieve a new regime of accumulation may result in a series

of re-bending on the part of actors at the local scale. Hence, scalar re-bending can lead to cycles of scale jumping until a perceivably suitable scalar fit occurs. This speaks to the possible disconnects during rescaling exercises, frustrating successful institution-building *within* scales that can engender the co-operation needed *between* actors at various scales. This does not imply that actors at local scales necessarily capitulate to strategies followed by state actors at senior scales. As Jessop points out, numerous strategies that at first glance seem highly contradictory can be pursued within an overarching scalar framework. The difficulty lies in resolving the tensions between multiple strategies.¹⁴¹ Jumping and bending scales are symptomatic of this. Finding out how seemingly contradictory strategies might crystallize can stoke much strategic tinkering.

1.4 Conclusion

This chapter has sought to set establish why the local needs to be considered and what strategies may facilitate this. The approach developed here is based on the premise that traditional political science approaches have tended to privilege national states at the expense of sub-national state, leading to an impoverished understanding of the complexity of states. This is particularly important in the case to be examined in this thesis – efforts to reshape the Toronto waterfront – because there is nothing intrinsically national about an issue originating in Toronto. In order to understand how such seemingly local matters become elevated, we turn to the concept of scale, demonstrating how actors operating at different scales of the state pursue their own interests and how they develop strategies to make new connections between scales.

Regimes of accumulation help to frame the political economy of Toronto's waterfront odyssey. Regimes of accumulation engender specific territorial forms through

a series of trial-and-error exercises. Above all, these territorial forms come about through inter-scalar struggles, indicating the relative incoherence of states because the interests of actors located at particular scales overlap or conflict with those at other scales of the state. Only when a regime of accumulation stabilizes are such conflicts muted. Yet regimes of accumulation do not last forever. They become exhausted due the contradictions contained within them and this generates a crisis calling into question the territorial matrix that had prevailed for a period of time.

The debates of the 1990s represented a theoretical attempt to come to terms with the fall of Keynesian-Fordism. That this paradigm had been predicated on institutions that were national in scope left it vulnerable to assaults from the Left and the Right as it lost the capacity to deliver growth and the positive sum game associated therewith. These assaults from the Left and the Right also indicate that there are multiple pathways away from Keynesian-Fordism. Yet while Left and Right critics may disagree on the alternative to the previous regime in which the national state was assigned a central role, they broadly agreed on the enhanced importance of the urban scale. As we shall see in the chapters that will follow, the crisis of Canada's Fordist regime of accumulation, and the Keynesian welfare national state that underpinned it, opened up rescaling opportunities that put a new emphasis on urban development projects like the Toronto waterfront.

In the case study that follows, a new layer of global space had made national systems of management problematic. As the 1990s dragged on, the efforts to enhance sub-national scales became refined as the synergies between local and global political economies were more fully appreciated. By introducing a multi-scalar perspective, the

analysis reveals the complexity of the global-local dynamic, avoiding a zero sum approach to rescaling that assumes a fixed sum of power exists whenever roles and responsibilities are rescaled. How inter-scalar relationships are articulated and prevail under a set of circumstances is what ultimately matters, especially given the territorial hierarchy associated with national states and the necessity for historical analyses to understand the circumstances leading to how connections between the global and the local are made. No scale of the state will exit the political stage anytime soon but we can expect the scales of the state to relate to one another *differently*. Jessop's Schumpeterian post-national workfare regime provides the analytic tools to understand this as the politically-driven response to the crisis of the Fordist regime of accumulation. Reworking inter-scalar relations is necessary to resolve this crisis but gaining a fuller appreciation of the local also requires getting a better sense of what, if anything, rescaling will mean for local scales themselves.

Rescaling is not only a discursive matter as scales are also dependent on material realities. As mentioned in the third section of this chapter, place is where material realities settle, thus enabling a sense of what sorts of social relations occur within spatial political economies. Place, as Swyngedouw reminds readers, is often the prize in rescaling exercises. What a place ought to look like gives shape to the battles taking place over spatial scales. Contending visions come into sight that occasion scale-specific strategies responding to a decaying regime of accumulation. As a better sense of what a scale is for develops, place provides the platform to redefine a sense of scalar appropriateness for local scales. The thorny question of how to make scales fit will always remain until some form of inter-scalar stability is uncovered.

Chapter 2: The Origins of the Contentious Political Economy of the Toronto Waterfront: City Politics and the First National Policy, 1879-1940

Introduction

Urban development projects (UDPs) need to be situated in their specific historical contexts. Thinking about scales historically may assist in appreciating how social struggles came to generate the form and content of inter-scalar relationships. It also affords an opportunity to investigate the origins of actually existing neo-liberalism. What caused Toronto to become preoccupied with the waterfront as a political economy of place? This chapter uncovers the historic roots of this preoccupation in the context of the First National Policy and the pre-Keynesian form of the Canadian state. Lasting from 1879 to 1940, the First National Policy represented a crucial moment in the development of a Canadian regime of accumulation. Examining the particularities of this era, this chapter argues that the pre-Keynesian National Policy provided a key moment for politicizing Toronto's waterfront during the transition between regimes of accumulation, when it became the platform for Toronto to position itself as the Canadian political economy's centrepiece.

The first section will explore the way the First National Policy privileged Montréal *vis à vis* Toronto under a regime of accumulation informed by commercial capitalism. The consolidation of a national space economy crucially depended on railroad infrastructure dominated by interests residing in Montréal. The second section goes on to situate the National Policy's effects on Ontario, focusing on how Ontario sought to counter it through province-building measures centrally implicating Toronto. The final section will examine how social actors in Toronto became aware of the repercussions of a Montréal-dominated national space economy and how the subsequent

construction of a budding regime of accumulation came to focus on Toronto's waterfront as a site of inter-scalar transformations.

2.1 The First National Policy: National Politics and Inter-Urban Competition

2.1.1 The First National Policy: Railways and Canada's Spatio-Scalar Political Economy

The aim of the First National Policy under the leadership of Canada's first Prime Minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, was to consolidate post-confederation Canada and maintain Canada's status as a British dominion. A narrative that was one part anti-American and one part pro-Britain buoyed the National Policy's political logic.¹⁴² Canadian business historian Michael Bliss has shown how the developing railway linkages between the province of Manitoba and the US state of Minnesota led to fears that the west would be lost. Throughout the nineteenth century, railways had become the *sine qua non* infrastructure. If anything, railways classically represented a capitalistic smashing of space and time to expand and deepen accumulation. Indeed, the only Canadian transcontinental railway at the time of Confederation, the Grand Trunk Railway, was more interested in connecting with the USA than in nobly effecting east-west linkages,¹⁴³ which could reorient the Canadian political economy away from Imperial Britain towards an ascendant America. Year-round transcontinental transportation meant forging stronger connections between territories.

Prior to the National Policy, no railway stretched from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. Canada's largest railway at that time was the Montréal-based Grand Trunk Railway. Preoccupied with its indebtedness and the need to update its physical infrastructure in an age where steel and coal were replacing iron and wood, the Grand Trunk had little appetite for western expansion.¹⁴⁴ Grand Trunk lines were focused on

eastern Canada and the USA's eastern seaboard, arguably the easy lines as far as guaranteed freight traffic was concerned given the regions' industrial capacities.

The politics generated over railroads in the context of the First National Policy is far beyond the scope of this thesis. It is simply important to note that a decision was made to charter the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) to construct a railroad across Canada. Typical of an industrial laggard's pre-Keynesian initiative, the railroad served to organize Canada's economic space. As Vernon Fowke insightfully noted on First National Policy, "The basic intention [in Ottawa] was to unite these areas politically and economically in order that they might more effectively cope with alterations which had taken place in imperial and continental relationships and which rendered existing arrangements obsolete if not wholly inadequate."¹⁴⁵ Yet, the National Policy would not alter existing economic geographies, enabling old patterns of command-and-control to persist. Like the Grand Trunk, the Canadian Pacific was also based in Montréal. The next section will expand on why this was significant. For now, it will suffice to say that the political economic levers consolidating Canada as a national state were concentrated in a city with the largest portion of Canada's merchant class. The latter were interested in the benefits coming from a gateway role in a still Anglocentric international political economy now dedicated to free trade.

Developments across the Atlantic Ocean also caused concern for the pre-Keynesian Canadian state. Easterbrook and Aitken's landmark historiography of the Canadian economy points to the impact of the end of the preferential terms of trade with Britain's colonies. Starting with the repeal of the 1846 Corn Laws, Canadian merchants, based largely in Montréal, saw the privilege that accrued to them under the British

Empire potentially evaporate as the liberal orthodoxy of free trade took hold. Slowly, old transatlantic inter-scalar seams were coming apart as a predominantly mercantilist political economy dependent on close links to the British Empire increasingly faced a bleak future.¹⁴⁶

The task was to find a *reterritorializing* solution. Although politically united on paper, nothing held together the former British colonies comprising Canada. American pressures from the south and an increasingly uninterested imperium across the Atlantic Ocean made the establishment of a new centre that would maintain the dominance of Montréal merchants. Trade expert Michael Hart elaborates on what can ostensibly be called a double reterritorialization of the Canadian political economy: the Fathers of Confederation "sought to find a solution that would give the various colonies composing British North America greater political and economic cohesion, while firmly within the British Empire."¹⁴⁷

2.1.2 Internationalizing National Interests

Territorializing strategies involve suturing areas contained within defined national borders and discourses can help to accomplish this. Political economic projects, however, require substantial material inputs. As pointed out in the first chapter, sustaining flows of people, goods, and services requires the establishment of the necessary infrastructural supports. The problem facing Canada in the run-up to Macdonald's National Policy had been how to consolidate an east-west economy that remained oriented towards Great Britain. The central component in the National Policy was the railways. Throughout the nineteenth century, railways were a technological advancement which compressed time and space, enabling finished goods to move more

quickly into previously remote areas and facilitate access to resources.

Lands west of Ontario were to be opened up and settled – hence the nation-building exercise involved a transcontinental railway. This made much sense considering the international political economic environment the National Policy aimed to offset was American protectionism, which had become increasingly pronounced after 1870 and Britain again became Canada's principal market.¹⁴⁸ The National Policy could take credit for (1) fending off the Americanization of Canada's West and (2) maintaining the traditional ties to an imperial centre, therefore saving Canadian Britishness.¹⁴⁹

Indeed, the National Policy's intention of creating a national space did not entail a challenge to British hegemony but rather sought to place it on a stronger footing. British hegemony depended on international capital flows.¹⁵⁰ Raw materials pulled out of the lands west of Ontario fed not only central Canada's burgeoning manufactories, but also the appetites of British consumers. Of course, the railways facilitating such trade were supported by London financiers who furnished the capital for their construction. As Davis and Huttenback's study on British financial flows during the heyday of the British Empire states, "Of the Empire total, almost all [finance from Britain] went to what is now Canada. The increase in the Empire's share during the late 1880s and again in the last decade was largely associated with increased investment in Canadian railroads."¹⁵¹

Yet these flows were not going to be limited to Empire as big profits could be made. For London financiers, American railroads were an opportunity too good to pass up as the USA's western frontier was forced open. In effect, London financiers underwrote the economic expansion of post-Civil War America by connecting it through infrastructure building.¹⁵² An after-effect of the American Civil War was to turn the

USA inward, focusing on its own development in the changed social and political environment. As Mike Davis states, the Civil War can be seen "as a continuing revolution against an informal British imperialism that had incorporated the cotton export economy of the [American] South in an alliance of neocolonial [*sic*] dependency" and that a Union victory meant "an alliance of fledgling industrial capital and Western farmers created the preconditions for national economic integration."¹⁵³ In this sense, British support for American economic development set the stage for the eventual penetration of American industry into Canada under the First National Policy. Vital infrastructure heightened the rapid pace of America's industrial development.

The railroads were not the only vital ingredient in the political economy of Canadian nation-building. So too was the National Policy tariff. Although established in part in retaliation for the American decision to abort continentalization in the 1870s, the National Policy tariff was also intended to build up domestic industry. Bliss sees it as a conscious decision: "In Canada, the desire to create a great industrial country like the United States was overwhelming. The Canadians believed protection for manufacturers was the best way to avoid becoming or remaining a nation of hewers of wood and drawers of water, of farmers, fishermen, and fur traders."¹⁵⁴ Although the National Policy tariff attempted to limit imports, *American* imports were the specific target, not American investment and know-how. So long as industry was being established, it mattered little who owned industry. If more efficient American firms squeezed out less efficient Canadian firms in the domestic market, then so be it. The main point had always been to catalyze an industrial Canada.¹⁵⁵

Much blame is heaped on the National Policy for limiting Canada's industrial

development, obstructing the development of an indigenous capitalist class, and for firmly placing Canada in an American orbit.¹⁵⁶ Such views are problematic for three reasons. First, as Williams points out, the claim that American industry eliminated Canadian industry is exaggerated: "By 1914, thirty-five years after the 1879 tariffs, US branch plants were worth only 9 to 11 per cent (approximately) of the total capital invested in Canadian industry."¹⁵⁷ Americanization of a different kind did occur, however, as Canadian manufacturers obtained licenses from American companies for their machinery and techniques. Changes which liberalized Canada's patent laws in 1872 proved more crucial for this type of Americanization than the 1879 National Policy tariffs.¹⁵⁸

Second, American ownership of Canadian manufacturing concentrated on industries associated with the Second Industrial Revolution: electrical products, petrochemicals, and automobiles.¹⁵⁹ While the immediate post-Confederation Canadian economy was in the British Empire's embrace, it was less an American success and more a British failure that led to this situation. Britain lacked the sort of state-led, co-ordinating interventions witnessed in the late nineteenth century among later industrializers, such as Germany and Japan, that propelled their industries to leadership positions during the Second Industrial Revolution.¹⁶⁰ Even if it now enjoyed (partial) sovereign statehood, Canada continued to see itself as but a part of the British Empire which informed its view of the right kind of state.¹⁶¹ Third, there was never a desire to be an industrial appendage of the USA or any other country. Although the National Policy tariff encouraged Canadian industrialization, the process was to be controlled out of duty to the British Empire. Williams captures the guiding yet awkward logic: given British

inertia during the Second Industrial Revolution, Canada's importation of American techniques and branch plants via the tariff meant the Empire now had a source for cutting-edge industries' goods.¹⁶²

2.1.3 The First National Policy and Montréal: Dominating through Empire

The First National Policy's combination of the railroads and tariffs then deliberately aimed to maintain Canada's position within the British Empire. The railroads achieved this by increasing the rate of extraction and movement of goods from Western Canada to Atlantic ports. The National Policy tariffs not only promoted industrial development, but also channelled American capital flows into the Empire through Canada. Yet, it is impossible to escape the issue of uneven development in any regime of accumulation. Accrued benefits, politically and economically, hierarchically position spaces, places, and scales.¹⁶³

Simmons and McCann's exploration of the historical geography of Canada's urban system shows the ways in which "[t]he growth and well-being of any particular city, whether located in a heartland or hinterland region, depends on its relationships with other cities in other parts of its regional or national urban system, and increasingly with competitors and markets in the global system at large."¹⁶⁴ In this sense, it is necessary to take more seriously (1) the nationally mediated organization of spaces and (2) relations between scales.¹⁶⁵ One effect of the National Policy had been to territorialize Canada into a nationally sovereign entity while entrenching Montréal's primacy within it. The Montréal-based CPR had beaten a competing Toronto-based syndicate to win the charter.¹⁶⁶ Montréal's victory is significant for two reasons. First, the advent of the railroads had seen the rise of intense inter-urban competition as cities across Canada

engaged in bonusing exercises to entice railroad companies to build lines within their municipal boundaries. City politicians expected such a policy's benefits to outweigh any cost because of the traffic generated by the prized Great Lakes trade route.¹⁶⁷ Such aggregate action encouraged numerous railroad companies to rise and often become financially distressed, priming them for a takeover by the Grand Trunk, which prior to the CPR was Canada's largest railroad company.¹⁶⁸

If a Montréal-based giant enjoyed a virtual monopoly on the Great Lakes trade, then another, federally backed giant, the CPR, would monopolize the east-west axis. Moreover, much of the Canadian economy became oriented towards the construction of the CPR.¹⁶⁹ Nowhere was this more visible than in Western Canada's cities where, much like the first era of bonusing in and east of Ontario, inter-city competition was strong. Municipalities like Vancouver, Regina, and Winnipeg expressly planned their cities to accommodate incoming CPR freight,¹⁷⁰ but the bonusing that occurred before and after the CPR's rise indicates that the entire spatial organization of the Canadian economy proceeded along rail lines, creating vast networks of metropolises and hinterlands. New relationships were formed as a number of command-and-control centres tied to the terminuses in Montréal materialized to expand the scope of resource exploitation in its hinterland. These actions by municipal officials created a new inter-scalar connections, for as Careless points out in his history of pre-1914 urban Canada: "A metropolitan place could relate to more than one sphere, and the regional did lie within the national."¹⁷¹ All in all, Canada's space economy under the National Policy saw most (rail)roads leading to Montréal.

Second, the odd nationalism guiding the logic of the National Policy, i.e. keeping

Canadians British and inhibiting American incursions into the Canadian West, reflected a pre-Keynesian strategy to adjust to changing international circumstances. Yet the sheer cost of realizing the project engendered an enormous financial commitment to making the east-west railroad work. Throughout the nineteenth century, London financiers were typically the source for funding large-scale infrastructure projects in Canada.¹⁷² The CPR was no different.

Initially, the CPR was an Ottawa-backed Canadian-American venture. Yet, Macdonald's parliamentary opponents spoiled it "less by patriotic concerns than by partisan considerations."¹⁷³ Getting the funds to finance it meant turning to London financiers, just as the Grand Trunk had always done. In this way, the CPR tied together Canada, while at the same time deepening existing links to London. This is not to suggest that London financiers were not interested in other railway projects,¹⁷⁴ but given (1) the sheer size of the two Montréal railroad companies and (2) the substantial debt financing instruments required to keep them afloat, the National Policy meant Montréal remained even more deeply beholden to the imperial capital.

Montréal's links to London not only kept the dream of creating a national economy alive, but it also kept the Canadian economy afloat until the mid-1890s. As Urquhart points out, "Had it not been for this building of the CPR in the 1880s, the period from the late 1870s to the mid-1890s would have been one of continuously low investment and bleak prospects. As it was, the railway building of the 1880s ameliorated the sad export performance of the decade."¹⁷⁵ Though the National Policy's tariff walls are viewed as the determining variable in Canada's industrialization, the industrializing effects of national railway construction are regularly understated. The materials required

for building railroads and trains before and after the National Policy were enormous.¹⁷⁶ Therefore, much of Canada's manufacturing energies were focused on serving Montréal railways. New links and relationships between Montréal and the rest of the country were therefore formed to keep Canada inside the British orbit.

2.2 Ontario under the National Policy: The Rise of a Provincial Scale

2.2.1 Defensive Provincialism: The Emergence of Ontario under the National Policy

While Ottawa had been busy using railway building to create a national territory, Ontario was busy shoring up its own provincial political economy. Even as Upper Canada, Ontario had held antipathies towards the central governing executive. The province's unique relationship to the wider politics of eighteenth century North America fed into this. The Empire Loyalists to the British Empire, who had fled the American Revolution, colonized Ontario and expressed an Upper Canadian identity that was British *but nonetheless different*, which in turn gave rise to a sense of provincial identity.¹⁷⁷

Feeling different was not limited to the sphere of identities. Economically, Ontario was the leader and as it entered Confederation, it was already highly urbanized for that period and enjoyed a diverse economic base.¹⁷⁸ What is ultimately important here is the direction of Ontario's geo-economic compass relative to Canada's. Whereas the First National Policy forged ahead with an east-west vision, Ontario's economy was patterned along north-south lines, especially where the development of provincial resources and trade were concerned. The inter-scalar orientations of Canada and Ontario were thus seemingly at odds with each other. To some extent, Ontario was far more internationalized than Canada as a whole during the National Policy's reign. Though the National Policy's vision of internationalization rested on a British identity, Ontario's

vision did so within the wider context of English-speaking markets, which included the USA.¹⁷⁹

Most analyses of the Canadian state are critical of the fragmentation that became the legacy of Confederation. Howlett and Ramesh, for example, focus on the negative effects of the division of powers on federalism's developmental possibilities.¹⁸⁰ Earlier, Watkins and Acheson had articulated a similar point.¹⁸¹ However critical their assessment, these perspectives begin from neo-classical economic theory's assumptions about capitalism's tendency towards spatial equilibrium. Evenness is assumed to be the norm and politics interfere with a just allocation of resources. Unevenness, however, is typical, not exceptional of capitalist development. Moreover, blaming politics for uneven development overlooks the legacy of territorialization. No nation-building exercise is *tabula rasa*. There is a territorial stickiness that enables already territorialized identities to persist. Indeed, Donald Smiley noted these territorial legacies in Canada some thirty years ago.¹⁸²

Thus, Ontario's path during the National Policy led to a series of disputes as it sought to reassert itself in the context of a new round of territorialization. It may not be a stretch to argue that an Ontarian society had been in place before a Canadian society. Ontario had already been territorialized whereas it took Canada several years after Confederation to unify its national territory and national imaginary.¹⁸³

2.2.2 *Developing Ontario, Developing Canada*

Part of Ontario's interest in entering Confederation had been to work through the alienation it had felt under colonial arrangements. Garth Stevenson recounted how Ontario felt it unduly lost out politically and economically. He writes, "Demands for "rep

by pop" and for freedom from Montréal domination struck a responsive chord in Canada West and undermined the legitimacy of the Province of Canada and its unitary constitution. When that constitution finally became unworkable, Confederation appeared as the best way out of the impasse."¹⁸⁴ That Ontario was the most capitalistic province emboldened its territorial assertiveness. McCallum's comparative study on agriculture in Quebec and Ontario shows how the latter ended up ahead of the former.¹⁸⁵

When the National Policy was developed, it proved most propitious to Ontario as Ontario could speak with a single voice. The political groundwork had been set under Oliver Mowat in 1872 who fiercely opposed John A. Macdonald's vision of Canada. Ontario led the way for asserting the rights allotted to it under the terms of Confederation in the British North America (BNA) Act of 1867. Confederation's fiscal terms intended to leave the provinces bereft of funds, enabling Ottawa to dominate.¹⁸⁶ Ontario's ability to challenge this depended on the assertion of existing provincial powers and Mowat's Ontario was prepared to do so. On the one hand, to assert the province's view of the proper role of the provinces and the federal government meant turning to the highest court of the land at that time, Britain's Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which constantly adjudicated in the provinces' favour. Of particular importance was the Council's expansive interpretation of property rights, giving provinces an important regulatory power.¹⁸⁷ On the other hand – and perhaps of even greater importance – Ontario used the powers bequeathed to it under the 1867 constitution to engage a project of province-building.¹⁸⁸

Province-building was helped by the fact that the necessary bureaucratic infrastructure to accomplish it existed. The Crown Lands Department of Ontario proved

particularly important because it provided the pace and framework for exploiting the hinterlands. Hodgetts describes the Crown Lands Department as Ontario's most professionalized bureaucracy.¹⁸⁹ Administrative willingness and competence to take advantage of the control of natural resources that the BNA Act furnished the provinces would prove decisive in Ontario. Moreover, no constitutional provisions barred provinces from improving their infrastructure.¹⁹⁰

The impetus for taking advantage of the hinterlands came from the exhaustion of Crown lands in southern Ontario, the province's richest region. If the west was Canada's frontier, then Ontario's borders dictated the north was its frontier.¹⁹¹ Northward expansion generated excitement because of the limitless possibilities it seemed to afford the province. Predictions of "Empire Ontario" abounded. Unlike Canada's vision for the West which saw it as a space for resource extraction and a market for central Canadian goods, Ontario's northern vision was to use the newfound bounty in raw materials for industrialization. Uncovering the extent of the resource wealth locked in Ontario's northern grounds, the provincial government aggressively marketed itself to the world. Under Mowat, northern Ontario was to become like Western Canada in one way as railroads provided the means by which minerals, timber, and other such staples would be moved.¹⁹² Much as the railroads had done nationally, they organized Ontario's urban system, but this time, the lines were vertical, snaking into the political and economic seat of the province: Toronto.¹⁹³ Toronto's centrality inside Ontario also deepened as a result of the industrial reorganizations during the 1870s. Pushed ahead by the recessionary 1870s and productive innovations, firms outside of Toronto floundered while those closer to or in Toronto expanded.¹⁹⁴ Southern Ontario had emerged as an *industrial* region with

Toronto at its centre.

Toronto was very much tied into the province's wider fortunes. Unlike Montréal financiers, Toronto financiers gladly funded their home province's development. Many firms foraying into northern Ontario were headquartered in Toronto. So strong had they become that by the twentieth century's turn, Montréal's absence from Quebec's hinterlands left Toronto to freely dominate there as well. Toronto's business community largely financed resource exploitation. Past provincial efforts better placed Toronto against Montréal by the 1920s. Coupled with financing Canadian, i.e. Toronto-based, mining corporations, the influx of American capital into northern Ontario mines made good use of Torontonians know-how.¹⁹⁵ Although they did connect with the Canadian Pacific Railways' lines, the construction of railways on a north-south axis was informed by a need to counter Montréal.¹⁹⁶

Under the National Policy, Ontario's province-building measures meant two things. First, a sufficient industrial base made Ontario attractive to American investors once the National Policy's tariff wall was erected. Tables 2.2.2.1 and 2.2.2.2 show how Ontario outpaced Quebec for the period 1871 to 1911 in manufacturing investment and products. Ontario maintained its steady hold on manufacturing between 1870 and 1900, just above 50 percent of the national share. Similarly, Quebec accounted for a third of all manufacturing in the same period, yet the latter was overwhelmingly located in Montréal.¹⁹⁷ What mattered, however, was the rate of capital invested in industry.

Table 2.2.2.1: Capital invested in Ontarian industry.

Year	Capital invested	Value product	Value added
1871	37, 874, 010	114, 706, 799	49, 591, 995
1881	80, 950, 847	157, 989, 870	66, 825, 714
1891	175, 972, 021	239, 781, 926	111, 639, 555
1901	214, 972, 275	241, 533, 486	103, 303, 086
1911	595, 394, 608	579, 810, 225	282, 230, 100

Source Gregory S Kealey and Bryan D Palmer *Dreaming of What Might Have Been The Knights of Labor in Ontario, 1880-1900*, 30

Table 2.2.2.2: Capital invested in Quebec's industry.

Year	Capital invested	Value product	Value added
1871	11, 101, 031	77, 205, 182	32, 650, 157
1881	59, 216, 992	104, 662, 258	42, 098, 291
1891	118, 291, 115	153, 255, 583	67, 625, 087
1901	142, 403, 407	158, 287, 994	71, 608, 215
1911	326, 946, 925	350, 901, 656	166, 527, 603

Sources: Canada, Department of Agriculture, *Census of Canada, 1870-71*, vol. 3; Canada, Department of Agriculture, *Census of Canada, 1880-81*, vol. 3; Canada, Department of Agriculture, *Census of Canada 1890-91*, vol. 3; Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Fourth Census of Canada, 1901*, vol. 3, *Manufactures*; Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *Fifth Census of Canada 1911*, vol. 3, *Manufactures for 1910 as Enumerated in June 1911*.

Ontario was thus becoming differently positioned from the rest of the country as far as its geo-economic interests were concerned. The pattern of American versus British investment during the late twentieth century shows the former preferring to invest directly in industry while the latter was content to engage in speculative activities in the resource sector.¹⁹⁸ To a great extent, Ontario's fortunes lay far more with the USA than with the UK. Transportation in Ontario had been oriented towards the American west's markets prior to Confederation. While railroads stimulated industrial activity in Ontario, so did the demands generated by the American Civil War.¹⁹⁹ World War I also proved generous to Ontarian industries as a quarter of all war manufacturing was done in Ontario and 40 percent of its goods were sold overseas.²⁰⁰

Second, Ontario prospered under the National Policy. Due to the past demands of well-off Ontarian farmers, Ontario's agricultural implements industry was the most robust in the country. Once the National Policy began settlement of the West to achieve a national market stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, Ontarian agricultural implements were ready to serve new Western markets, making it Ontario's main westward exports.²⁰¹ Western markets demanding a variety of manufactured goods beyond agricultural implements, however, only appeared twenty-one years after the National Policy's birth. As Brodie states, "The settlement of the Canadian West awaited better transportation links, the saturation of the American frontier, and the wheat boom.

By 1900, for example, only twenty percent of the potential homestead land had been settled, compared to ninety percent in 1914."²⁰² Given this situation, in the first two decades of the National Policy, Ontario manufacturers were more concerned with serving provincial markets than national markets. Above all, prosperous southern Ontario had sufficient demand for manufactured goods.²⁰³ Thus, Ontario had succeeded in creating its own regime of accumulation centred on a provincially-led industrialization programme running in a north-south direction. In comparison, Ottawa's regime was predicated on a mercantilism sitting on an east-west axis, tied in with the British Empire. This is not to say, of course, that a fit between the two did not emerge.

Being the wealthiest province accorded Ontario confidence to ward off what was regarded as Ottawa's incursions. The National Policy vitalized a notion of "Ontario-for-itself." On the one hand, half of all federal revenues came from Ontario, which meant that the province neither required nor relied too much on transfer payments from Ottawa.²⁰⁴ On the other hand, Ontario vacillated between the National Policy and an "Ontario Policy."²⁰⁵ That Ontario was ensconced in a changed territorial environment, i.e. from colony to sovereign statehood, supplemented the national project of territorialization. The revenues needed to pay for the transcontinental railroad's completion were largely furnished by Ontario's industrialization. In turn, industrialization marked out a territorial entity aware of and determined to keep its potential. Indeed, Ontario's growth was instrumental to the construction of a potential rival to Montréal with Toronto. If Montréal had prospered from the National Policy, then Toronto did so with the Ontario Policy. If Ontario's place in federalism would grow, then it was only natural for the province's centrepiece city to begin the process of challenging

the prevailing urban hierarchy privileging Montréal under the established regime of accumulation.

2.3 Contesting the First National Policy on Toronto's Waterfront

2.3.1 The Emergence of Toronto as a Contending Centre to Montréal

As the previous two sections have discussed, the political economy of the National Policy had resulted in the construction of two territorialized scales each with their own separate logic. Notwithstanding this separateness and tensions, Ontario and Canada had developed their respective regimes of accumulation. What about cities? The federal and Ontario governments had used the railway to connect urban areas. This did not mean, however, that Canadian cities were passive. If a logic stood behind the federal and provincial states' regimes of accumulation, then there is no reason to rule out that cities had one too.

Toronto's rise to national prominence was fundamentally different from Montréal's. In 1867, Montréal stood atop Canada's urban system as the First National Policy had preserved its role as the national entrepôt. Like most Canadian cities, Montréal had been established as a trading outpost connecting a colony to the imperial centre. Managing and organizing trade networks for the French Empire and then for the British Empire always meant Montréal looked trans-Atlantic first.²⁰⁶ Only when Canada's statehood (within the British Empire) was achieved did Montréal gain national city-status. Under these circumstances, Toronto remained a secondary city. In fact, scant attention had been paid to Toronto until the nineteenth century. Initially, it was a minor trading post linked to Montréal which had been abandoned several times over in the eighteenth century.²⁰⁷

Until Confederation, Toronto's development depended solely on provincial efforts.²⁰⁸ As shown in the previous section, Toronto became Ontario's political economic seat under the National Policy through (1) a provincially directed development of northern Ontario that (2) exercised the powers given to the province under the BNA Act (3) to counter Sir John A. Macdonald's vision of Canada such that (4) Ontario, economically speaking, became more American- than British-oriented. As a result, Toronto became headquarters to resource firms and amassed considerable knowledge of northern conditions. What must not be forgotten, however, is Toronto's status as a provincial capital. Provincial politicians and administrators had to be approached for mineral rights, adding substantially to Toronto's attractiveness as a site for headquarters.²⁰⁹

As already mentioned above, the National Policy aimed to industrialize Canada and Ontario became the country's manufacturing sector. Through its business community, Toronto grew aware of the city's economic importance. Toronto support for the National Policy only materialized in 1877, due in large part to the recession of 1873 to 1875. Faced with economic instability, the city's main voice of business, the Toronto Board of Trade (TBT), had advocated protectionism by championing tariffs.²¹⁰ To some extent, the TBT's newfound policy orientation reflected an awareness of how much Toronto's fortunes were linked to Ontario's fortunes. Provincial organization of the economy entailed geographic shifts of industry in and around Toronto. Mergers and acquisitions inside Ontario were often orchestrated from Toronto and, typically, the pattern involved buying firms in small towns and moving them to Toronto, cementing its dominance.²¹¹ Indeed, Toronto's business community had already begun to lobby hard to

make its presence felt nationally. Thus, the 1871 reforms made to Canada's bank laws were undertaken with the aim of countering Montréal. The Bank of Montreal was to have controlled note issues and already massive deposits made against note issues would have seen the Bank of Montreal's size further expand. As Masters pointed out, "The Toronto conception of banking policy favoured a more elastic note issue, controlled by the various branches. This plan, it was felt, would permit the expansion which Toronto desired."²¹² Therefore, there was no reason to believe petitioning Ottawa could injure Torontonians' interests. If Canada had its National Policy and Ontario had its Ontario Policy, then surely Toronto could have its own Toronto Policy.

Toronto's national fortunes brightened in 1879. Massey, Canada's largest manufacturer of agricultural implements, was relocated from the tiny Ontario town of Newcastle to Toronto. Anticipating huge demand from Western Canada's settlement, Toronto aimed to become the source for a product vital to the nation-building project.²¹³ As the National Policy dragged on and industrialization increased inside Toronto and Ontario, the Canadian Pacific Railway's construction provided the two's manufacturers with captive markets. It was becoming clearer, however, that Toronto was tied into the national economy in a different way than Montréal. The former provided the country with manufactured goods; the latter shipped those goods.²¹⁴ Quite like the railways running north-south in Ontario, those running east-west made possible Toronto's expansion on a national scale, spurring fantastic growth inside the city. As important as the Ontario and Canada scales were to Toronto, this did not mean that the feeling was mutual. Both gained, but Toronto had to deal with the prevailing regimes of accumulation and protect its own.

2.3.2 Towards a Toronto Policy: Politicizing the Waterfront

An uneasy relationship had existed between Toronto and the railways. It must be remembered that the railways were a new technology in the nineteenth century and they were seen as the solution to any economic problem inside a municipality. For example, Naylor argues that heavy inter-urban competition came of this, putting many small towns under Montréal's sway.²¹⁵ Toronto was no different in this respect. In general, the city operated on the waterfront as both owner and developer and close links existed between city politicians and railways. It was not unusual to see city office holders sitting on railway boards. As a result, railway interests seemed to trump all other interests,²¹⁶ providing a clear example of a level of the state acting as, in Marx's words, the executive committee of the bourgeoisie.

When describing a local regime of accumulation, consideration must be given to the role property played and the way it is intended to serve the wider urban political economy. As already shown, the railways acted as an important piece of the puzzle for Toronto's rise. Toronto's political economic marriage to Ontario meant the business community was always keen on aiding the latter's efforts where gains for the city were to be made. For example, Armstrong shows how Toronto got together with Ontario to press Ottawa for subsidies to a new rail line, the Temiskaming and Northern Ontario Railway, in order to break into more of Ontario's north.²¹⁷ So long as the railways' presence served Toronto's interests, there was little reason to protest against them. Something, however, caused this to change.

Expansionary Toronto fomented pressures of growth, and these were articulated by the TBT. The TBT viewed the waterfront as a roadblock to Toronto's national

potential.²¹⁸ It proffered three reasons:

1. The railway technology boom associated with the First Industrial Revolution petered out during the nineteenth century's sunset. Though this profited Montréal, Toronto's advantages increasingly lay with industry. With the railways in the way, the waterfront's potential to underline Toronto's national centrality became difficult. Discourses about the waterfront's importance to a new, industrial Toronto able to break with the past flourished.²¹⁹
2. By virtue of the railways' presence, Montréal owned Toronto's waterfront. What is most interesting about this situation was the National Policy's contribution to this. That Ottawa granted the national charter to the Canadian Pacific, and then subsidized it, led the Grand Trunk to buy up as many lines as it could. As Drummond notes, "Thus the Northern and Northwestern, the Midland, and many other lines that has been owned in Ontario and managed from Hamilton, Peterborough, and Toronto came to be owned in Britain and managed in Montreal."²²⁰ Where Toronto's waterfront is concerned, the question was whether the CPR or the Grand Trunk would end up owning waterfront lands. Although the city attempted to curtail both railway companies, its efforts were squashed. It was not so much the companies' sheer size, but the powers of expropriation that an 1886 amendment to the federal Railway Act gave them. In 1887, the CPR threatened Toronto with its powers of expropriation to gain waterfront lands.²²¹
3. An ecological crisis had emerged on Toronto's waterfront threatening to destabilize the city. Uncontrolled growth and the absence of city planning culminated in Ashbridge's Bay becoming a site of intense pollution, giving rise to

cholera epidemics. Local officials, however, did not feel compelled to resolve this.²²² These factors combined together to occasion the politicization of the waterfront, enabling a Toronto Policy.

The TBT began leading the charge to remedy the waterfront as early as 1889, but envisioned action only at the city scale, seeing the concern as a local matter. Thus, a local agreement was hammered out whereby the CPR and the Grand Trunk agreed to build bridges and facilitate movement in and out of the waterfront. Though bridges were built over John and York Streets, railway-induced congestion around the waterfront remained.²²³ Montréal's activities continued to control the wider city's waterfront.

The TBT's next step was to use the thorny issue of freight rates to jump scale. On the one hand, City Council could not and would not deal with the railways. They could not because actually ordering the railroads out of the city was beyond the city's powers and they would not because some city councillors were deeply implicated in railway operations. Wishing to advance Toronto, the TBT had to summon Ottawa to resolve a seemingly local affair. The TBT urged the federal government to launch the Board of Railway Commissioners in 1903 to ensure fairer rates.²²⁴ To justify its position, the TBT used figures from other provinces.²²⁵ The TBT sought to position Toronto as part of a single national space, unduly hamstrung by Montréal. Despite the TBT's efforts, Montréal maintained its presence on Toronto's waterfront.²²⁶

A second encounter with the Board of Railway Commissioners occurred a few years later. This time, however, the TBT sought the Board's help in dismantling tracks running along Toronto's waterfront. Removing the rail lines, the TBT anticipated, would open up waterfront lands for industrial development. Effectively, this meant severing

Montréal's hold on large land parcels which hobbled Toronto's ability to steer growth within its own boundaries.²²⁷ City politicians, however, were enlisted by the railways to counter the TBT's efforts.

In 1907, City Council received a TBT-authored plan showing the construction of a viaduct. Called the Esplanade Viaduct, it would provide the space needed to maintain rail lines while simultaneously opening up waterfront lots. In response, the railways enlisted the services of Toronto's mayor, Emerson Coatsworth, to voice opposition to the TBT's plans.²²⁸ The choice of Coatsworth was symbolic as the mayor is the only figure on City Council able to claim that his or her authority is derived from all eligible voters; councillors are only elected by a ward's residents. Therefore, the mayor was the voice of "the people" while the TBT and its Council supporters were special interests working against the good of the city.

The matter was eventually taken to the Board of Railway Commissioners. The Board of Trade argued City Council worked *against* Toronto's best interests. A viaduct was the preferred infrastructural solution and not City Council's, the Grand Trunk's, and the Canadian Pacific's preferred grade separation between streets and tracks.²²⁹ The Board of Railway Commissioners ruled in favour of the TBT. Thus, the Esplanade Viaduct resulted from the TBT's ability to jump scale and show the scalar importance of its plan. In response, the CPR and the Grand Trunk jumped scales themselves, appealing to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, but judges in London rejected their argument that the Railway Commissioners' ruling was *ultra vires* and allowed the construction of the viaduct, which proceeded in 1909.²³⁰

What is important about this example is that a nascent Toronto Policy did not

emanate from council chambers. The push for asserting Toronto's national presence and the need to temper Montréal's dominance came from Toronto's business community acting through the TBT. The situation thus appears as a City Council content with allowing a business-as-usual model to continue. In this case, Montréal's waterfront presence was a continual reminder of how the National Policy's regime of accumulation privileged Montréal. The TBT, however, was cognizant that another regime of accumulation was being formed and Toronto sat in its middle.

Plate 2.3.2.1: The Esplanade Viaduct today. The railways' stalling tactics and then the nationalization that followed their bankruptcies stalled its construction until 1930.

2.3.3 Going National: The Toronto Harbour Commissioners as an Institutional Fix

There had been a federal presence on Toronto's waterfront since 1852. The Commissioners of the Harbour of Toronto's role had been legally limited to collecting vessel fees and limiting nautical speeds.²³¹ Anxious to replace the Commissioners, the TBT erected its Special Committee Regarding the Waterfront in 1907. The Special Committee examined American cities and relied on New York City consultants to give advice on catalyzing an industrial waterfront. Ironically, the TBT settled on a Montréal solution: the Montreal Harbour Commission. This Commission was an independent government agency with land development powers. At that time, the TBT felt the City of

Toronto was too incapable of advancing on the waterfront.²³² The legacy of granting lots to the railways drove industrial development away from the waterfront rather than towards it.²³³

Citizen movements drove Toronto towards planning, however piecemeal it may have been. Armstrong and Nelles have shown how citizen movements advocating public regulation in Toronto often transcended social lines. Here, the "public good" was associated with an orderly city promoting economic vitality.²³⁴ The Board of Trade seized on this mood to strategically position the waterfront as a public good needing extra-local control to generate national wealth. Aid was provided by local newspapers where frequent reports about the poor state of the waterfront appeared. Feeling pressured, the City of Toronto arranged its own Special Committee Regarding the Waterfront in 1910 and put the proposals' contents to a citywide vote. Those who were allowed to vote at the time, i.e. citizens qualifying as propertied, approved and the proposals in the form of a bill were sent to Ottawa for legislative approval. In 1911, Ottawa legislated into existence the Toronto Harbour Commissioners (THC).²³⁵ If anything, then, the establishment of the THC represented a successful political project within the City of Toronto. Popularly backed locally, the THC was a federal agency empowered to act in and on Toronto.

The THC's character and responsibilities reflected a growing local eagerness for rational planning in response to past questionable dealings by City Council which, ratepayers felt, had let private interests overrun public virtue. Yet despite its populist beginnings, the THC was designed to be insulated from popular pressures. Desfor describes the local milieu just before the THC's formation as follows: "urban reformers

[in Toronto] were intent on reducing participation, narrowing the role of the state, promoting the interests of a wealthy elite, and establishing a municipal corporation run by efficient managers."²³⁶ The THC was vested with powers to expropriate land and to develop its land holdings within areas under its control. Moreover, the THC did not rely on the public purse as funds were to be raised from their land holdings. Despite its democratic origins, the THC's nature as a federal agency insulated it from public accountability. All in all, though, the waterfront was now a federal concern.

The THC was successful in its first few years. Some of the problems associated with the waterfront had been cleared up. Desfor's studies of Toronto's waterfront show just how capable the THC was in resolving the regimes of accumulation of Canada's multiple scales. Health, city planning, and business needs were all solved through the THC's operations. Ashbridge's Bay marshland, which had been a dumping ground for industrial refuse and a source of citywide cholera, was resolved by turning the marshland into industrial land through landfill (see Map 2.3.3.1 for the THC's waterfront plans).²³⁷ As Desfor and Vesalon suggest, "The economic and political justification for connecting the creation of an industrial district at Ashbridge's Bay with the idea of a national interest was mainly based on the hope that rapid industrialization was a key element in transforming Toronto into a dominant economic centre of the region."²³⁸

The THC's appearance did not, however, automatically guarantee the industrialization of Toronto. Drawing on American practices, the THC eagerly drafted plans for an industrial waterfront. Successfully transitioning into an up-and-coming regime of accumulation depended, so it was predicted, on industrialization.²³⁹ The pre-World War I boom informed the THC's premonitions of endless economic growth.

Though its 1912 plan noted the railways were not going to go away overnight, its section-by-section method of planning was laid out to accommodate the specific needs of coming land-hungry industrialists. As the 1912 plan said, "The district has been so laid out that the area north of the ship channel will be reserved for light manufacturing plants, the area to the east of the turning basin will be the home of heavier plants which do not require water access, while south of the channel will be located the heaviest class of manufacturing industries which require a frontage direct on navigable water."²⁴⁰

Map 2.3.3.1: A THC map showing the ex-Ashbridge's Bay, the area between the Ship Channel and Keating Street on the east.

Source: [http://maps.library.utoronto.ca/datapub/digital/G_3524_T621_G463_30\[1913\].JPG](http://maps.library.utoronto.ca/datapub/digital/G_3524_T621_G463_30[1913].JPG). Accessed on August 15, 2009.

2.3.4 Assessing the Toronto Harbour Commissioners: Policy Success through Failure?

The THC's plans for an industrial waterfront never panned out as problems quickly emerged. First and foremost, the institutional design of the THC impeded its ability to execute the 1912 plan. Like the Montreal Harbour Commission it was patterned after and the old Commissioners of the Harbour of Toronto, the THC was required to be self-financing. Its role as a harbour master was secondary to its role as a land developer. The THC was entrusted to pay for the creation of a supply of industrial land, recouping costs through leases, rents, sales, and fees.

Eager to make the 1912 plan a concrete reality, the THC looked to bond markets. Forty year bonds were issued on New York City's Wall Street in 1913 in the belief that they would be easily payable once THC tenants appeared. When reality proved otherwise, traders rapidly discounted THC bonds, causing a serious deterioration in the THC's financial situation. Of greater significance, though, was that World War I bonds took precedence over all other bonds. Rather than waiting for forty years, investors seized the moment and received more immediate returns given (1) the high interest rates triggered by the war's inflation and (2) handsome returns would be received in a much shorter period of time by buying war bonds.²⁴¹ Compounded by the City of Toronto's refusal to cover the THC's mounting debts because it owed \$350, 000 in back taxes and, more important, federal legislation prohibited this, a made-in-Toronto solution to the federal agency's mounting financial problems stemming from bond issuing was devised: the THC was to sell land to anyone who wanted it. From this point on, the 1912 plan ceased operating; industries having little need for access to port facilities could settle into the area.²⁴²

Second, demand generated by World War I led the THC to overestimate the attractiveness of the waterfront as a place for industry to settle. Believing that everything was going according to plan, the war effort prompted the THC to hastily make serviceable those lands which it thought could immediately sustain future industries. Ignoring that these were wartime industries, the THC did not develop any plans for what would happen once the war would end. In fact, private industry was not even the THC's first tenant. An electrical steel factory, British Forgings Limited, was set up by the federal Imperial Munitions Board to convert scrap metal into shells for the war effort and World War I reignited Toronto's shipbuilding industry. Once European hostilities finished, shipbuilding and steelworks dropped off. Although the Imperial Munitions Board sold off British Forgings Limited to a Welsh steel company, Baldwins Limited, it closed in 1926. Essentially, the THC mistakenly came to believe that the industrial activity on its lands were due to economic factors when, in fact, they were decidedly non-economic in origin.²⁴³

Third, the success which the THC encountered in 1927 sowed the seeds for another round of excessive optimism. Unlike World War I, this time, underlying economic factors were the reason for a rise in land leases. Waterfront tenants expressed interest in purchasing properties worth in excess of \$1 million. Given its role as a land developer, the THC engaged in a flurry of activity to develop serviceable land and failed to anticipate the calamity of 1929. In response to the fiscal mess in the aftermath of the crisis, the THC began to move away from its industrial orientation and towards low intensity uses of its lands. The industries the THC never wanted would have to be welcomed. Coal mounds and oil tankers would thus come to dot THC lands rather than

industry.²⁴⁴ Again, the potential of the waterfront was overestimated because the present was thought to have presaged the future.

Where did all of this leave the THC then? If it is to be judged by (1) how many industrial tenants it attracted and (2) its contribution to Toronto's industrialization under the National Policy, then the THC as an institution appears to have failed. Toronto's pre-THC waterfront was perhaps more important economically to its rise. Despite Montréal's eventual ownership, the railways did organize the province around Toronto and provided it with access to national markets. Oddly enough, this was a selling point in a THC brochure intended to attract industrialists to the waterfront.²⁴⁵ Yet industry had already located throughout Toronto and the waterfront played no part in Toronto's industrialization.²⁴⁶

If the railways provided the *raison d'être* for Montréal's primacy under the National Policy, they would also be Montréal's downfall. Canada simply could not provide the freight required to keep the railways profitable. In short, excessive railway building and the eventual railway bankruptcy wave provided the most significant blow to Montréal's national dominance.²⁴⁷ Indeed, Montréal's fortunes were connected to railway fortunes. Montréal had considerable light and heavy industry. These, however, had been geared to service railways and waterborne shipping and these were well passed their zenith.²⁴⁸ Geo-political shifts also undermined Montréal. World War I shook up the UK's role as a global power. Though it emerged victorious, an American successor was materializing. Montréal's fortunes depended on a strong Britain not only because of the financial networks made through having to finance railroads, but also because Britain was the main market for Canadian staples. All goods had to pass through Montréal to get

to Britain.²⁴⁹ In contrast, Toronto's fortunes depended on making consumer goods and its ties rested with an emerging America. All of this was well beyond the THC's powers.

Extra-economically, however, a different picture of the THC can be painted. Railways lined the waterfront and caused the local business community much irritation. Easy and rapid movement in and out of the waterfront had been prohibited and City Council sat idly by, choosing not to deal with the effects of the railways on the city's growth prospects. Making the THC independent and politically free translated into aggressively reorganizing waterfront lands. Of significance here was its decommodifying role. The THC's sweeping political powers solved the city's health and planning problems that came with untrammelled growth in the waterfront. Moreover, just because an institution is required to be self-financing, it does not mean profit-making will be the goal. To be sure, other aspects of the THC's 1912 plans took a backseat to self-financing, in particular parklands because they do not generate revenue.²⁵⁰ In spite of this, the THC could rightly claim that its sole role was to make serviceable land. Profit-making or -seeking motives were renounced in order to advertise cheap lands.²⁵¹

Lemon's description of the industries eventually settling on THC lands paints an unflattering picture. Low intensity industries like bulk storage and bulk processing made the 1912 plan a failure.²⁵² In the long run, however, the organization of the waterfront would set itself up for the next round's regime of accumulation and provide the extra-economic foundations needed to sustain it. These low intensity industries would come to need cheap lands and more importantly, Fordism would require their presence. As well, with the railroads cleared and keeping City Council's hands off of the waterfront, the THC had established the waterfront as a scale on which action could be taken to enable a

succeeding regime of accumulation. It was the platform on which Toronto's position as Canada's economic centrepiece could be staged.

2.4 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter has been to establish how Toronto's waterfront became a scale on which action could be taken. Canada is unique because Montréal, the country's primate city, had a successor in Toronto to push it aside. The nature of the National Policy's territorialization project situated Canada as a sovereign country within Britain's geopolitical orbit. Using the railways to this end had initially perpetuated Montréal's dominance. Another aim of the National Policy was to further the centralizing federalism favoured by Sir John A. Macdonald. In part, this can be attributed to the nature of the pre-Keynesian state in Canada which sought to organize its capacities in order to facilitate adjustment to changing international circumstances. As a late industrializer, Canada used protectionist measures to build up industry. At the same time, a policy of *laissez-faire* was followed domestically insofar as the state remained arm's-length from the determination of how resources would be allocated. In any federal country, different scales of the state are allocated different powers. Canada was no different. While Canada was proceeding with its political economic programme that had created a national network fanning out of Montréal via the railways, Ontario used its powers to develop its own.

Interests developed at, and helped to constitute, the Ontario scale and, in doing so, the province's geo-economic compass pointed to the south rather than to the Atlantic. The nature of Ontario's regime of accumulation depended on industrializing the province and constructing its own urban system that supported resource extraction activities in

Canada. This contributed to Toronto becoming more aware of its spatial and scalar significance. By beginning to act for itself, Toronto could begin to mount a challenge to Montréal's pre-eminence. Railways were both a Montréal symbol and weapon of national dominance. Their location on Toronto's waterfront reminded the local business community of the necessity to assert control over space. The possibility existed that Toronto could have been subordinated to Montréal without urgent action on the waterfront. Toronto's built environment had to be better organized through a political agency with unambiguous powers of land development.

Founding the THC meant putting boundaries around the area the Commissioners governed. As such, an agency dedicated to Toronto indicated extra-Toronto interests would not be tolerated. For the waterfront to elevate Toronto's status, it needed to be defended from developments potentially running counter to the city and a federal agency was seen to be the only one capable of doing that as the rising pressures of local growth, i.e. pollution and poor mobility, seemed beyond City Council's capacities. Without better planning, Toronto could not shift the national urban hierarchy in its favour. During the era of the National Policy, the waterfront symbolized all that was wrong with Toronto. Through the THC, however, the waterfront became the key to make Toronto Canada's national economic centrepiece, especially once the shift from a regime of accumulation based on railways to a regime of accumulation based on industrial production took hold. Indeed, the THC can be seen as a consequence of the inter-scalar transformations that the First National Policy had set off. Not only was the Canadian space economy undergoing important transformations, but so too were economies at sub-national scales as a result of the transition to semi-sovereign statehood. Yet, the shift to a regime of accumulation

based on industrial production required considerable political effort given the political roadblocks that emerged in the 1930s as the prevailing form of federalism was ill-equipped to handle the challenges that Canada faces. The next chapter will turn to this matter and its effects on the waterfront.

Chapter 3: The Making of Toronto's Keynesian-Fordist Waterfront, 1940-1970

Introduction

During World War II, the role of the state in Canadian economic life began to undergo important transformations. The 1930s had shown that the inter-scalar arrangements that prevailed during the First National Policy were inadequate. During and immediately after World War II, new measures would come into play to transform federalism and enable the development of a stronger and more prosperous Canada. This would have important consequences for Toronto's waterfront because a new inter-scalar framework, informed by the thinking of John Maynard Keynes, would affect the THC and change the economic activities taking place on the waterfront.

If the last chapter examined how Toronto's waterfront emerged as a means of confronting Montréal's dominance under the National Policy's mercantilist regime of accumulation, this chapter seeks to examine how waterfront politics contributed to the city's centrality to the Keynesian-Fordist regime of accumulation. The waterfront became an extra-economic site for sustaining Toronto under the Keynesian-Fordist regime. The first section of the chapter examines the macro framework established during World War II and implemented under the leadership of the federal government in peacetime. In particular, it examines how the Canadian national state was reterritorialized. The second part of this chapter looks at the transformative effects of the Keynesian-Fordist-led reterritorialization on Ontario's political economic framework. Of particular importance here is the effect on Ontario's role in the federation. The third section delves into the ramifications of these changes for Toronto and its waterfront. As we shall see, the federal and provincial governments were to play a more direct economic role while

Toronto's waterfront would facilitate the extra-economic aspects required for Keynesianism-Fordism's success.

3.1 Reterritorializing the Post-war Canadian State: New Wine in Old Bottles

3.1.1 Laying the Foundations for Keynesian-Fordist Canada: Scaling Rowell-Sirois

The steps envisioned by the Rowell-Sirois Commission to overcome the limits imposed by pre-Keynesian-Fordist territorial structures should be seen in the context of an attempt of the state at the national scale to reterritorialize the Canadian state. The Rowell-Sirois Commission made clear the need to change the state's architecture and to create new relations between the scales of the Canadian state. A detailed analysis of the Rowell-Sirois Commission's findings cannot be provided here, but a brief summary of two of its most important findings is needed. First, Book I of the report recognized that existing federal arrangements inhibited the launching of appropriate measures to counter the massive social destabilization brought on by the Depression. While Ottawa chose not to employ its superior fiscal powers to alleviate social dislocation, the provinces' weak revenue raising powers meant that many failed to meet their constitutional obligations,²⁵³ dependent on a province's economic base.²⁵⁴

Second, in Book II, the Commission advocated strengthening the service provision capacities of Canada's sub-national units by making use of the federal government's superior fiscal power.²⁵⁵ This recommendation tends to be interpreted as a shift towards greater centralization in the federation. Owsram, for example, explains that the provinces had become financially weakened during the Depression and only Ottawa had the means to fill in the financial gaps, necessitating centralization. As he argues:

"The shift to the Dominion occurred in part because the Depression was manifestly not manageable at a local level. It was a national and international phenomenon that demanded a broad range of action over

the widest possible area. The collapse of municipal finance and the disparities in the treatment of the unemployed across the nation testified to that fact. Neither the provinces nor the cities had the resources or the power to deal with the problems of the 1930s."²⁵⁶

Yet centralization did not have to occur for sub-national units to carry out their responsibilities.²⁵⁷ W.A. Mackintosh recounted how the aim was never to solidify Ottawa's position at the expense of the provinces. Instead, the aim was to creatively exercise federal revenue-raising powers for the purposes of making transfer payments to the provinces more generous, thereby enabling provincial obligations to be carried out more effectively. Unconditional grants would then enable the provinces to pursue their own paths rather than having Ottawa dictate what they should do and how they should go about doing it.²⁵⁸

Conditional grants, however, were another matter as they imposed criteria to be met before a province received federal money. The aim here was to provide a pan-Canadian floor so that citizens living in each province would therefore enjoy minimum standards. "Minimum standards," however, should not be confused with "equality." Pursuing minimum standards allowed for substantial variations between provinces even in the era of conditional grants. For this reason, Smiley argues, conditional grants were not anathema to provinces as they "were glad to accept "50-cent dollars", i.e., to spend their own revenues in ways which would qualify for federal assistance."²⁵⁹ This particular inter-scalar arrangement involved a process of federally-led provincial centralization to alleviate the burdens associated with constitutionally imposed obligations. Canadian welfare state theorists such as Banting,²⁶⁰ Bryden,²⁶¹ and Mahon²⁶² show how federal programme designs intersected with provincial programmes. Supplementing rather than supplanting the provinces was the key goal, and in the

process, new inter-scalar arrangements were developed.

It would thus be incorrect to argue that what emerged during the post-war era was a kind of "Sir John A's revenge" as such an interpretation presupposes a fixed sum of power whereby Ottawa could only win when the provinces lost.²⁶³ What emerged during the post-war era in Canada were mutually supportive arrangements designed to mitigate spatial disparities in step with the ideas set out in Rowell-Sirois.

3.1.2 Establishing Keynesian-Fordist Canada: The International Conditions

If the post-war vision of Rowell-Sirois was to succeed, the conditions protecting the effective use of national state power to stabilize a new inter-scalar regime had to hold. Keynesian economic policies required governments to stimulate aggregate demand in order to avoid a repeat of the Depression. In this sense, Keynes very much intended to place the national state in a central, stabilizing role. For him, economic health was measured at the national scale. As his biographer Robert Skidelsky has pointed out, Keynes's contributions to the economic sciences lay in constructing notions of aggregate demand through the rise of national accounts.²⁶⁴ It is for this reason then that legitimacy was lent to regional equalization schemes in Canada which provided the national floor guaranteeing a minimum standard of living for all Canadians.

As a political economic theory, Keynesianism was quite conservative in its orientations. By and large, Keynesian measures were to be enacted in a strictly technocratic manner, carried out by bureaucracies colonized by graduates of élite schools. Appeals to populist sentiments were dismissed.²⁶⁵ Nevertheless, politicians often resisted change until Keynesian principles could show they were vote-getters. As Whitaker shows, the Liberal Party's shift to Keynesianism resulted from (1) a strong challenge

from the social democratic Co-operative Commonwealth Federation that was countered by (2) drawing on bureaucrats' knowledge of Keynesian principles.²⁶⁶ To a degree, then, Keynesianism had to be insulated from below, i.e. popular pressures. Policymaking in Keynesian Canada was a highly technical affair with multiple agencies assigned the task of managing issues.²⁶⁷

Taming popular pressures, however, was not enough to stabilize the national state. As a small, open economy, Canada was dependent on a stable internationalized economy.²⁶⁸ Three moments demonstrate the importance of the international scale to the territorializing opportunities of the Canadian state. The first and most obvious moment was the 1930s Depression during which international trade practically halted. As a result of this experience, the Canadian government was committed to establishing a post-war multilateral order to avoid a repeat of the Depression.²⁶⁹ Second, after World War II hostilities ceased, the USA sat at the centre of the capitalist democracies' geopolitical and geo-economic order. Cold War alliances solidified an anti-communist political consensus residing in Anglo-America, Western Europe, and Japan. This bloc would also prosper from American hegemony and its link to the spread of mass consumption, mass production, and monopoly capitalism.²⁷⁰ The Canadian government thus knew it had to be on friendly terms with Americans, even though this bred identity-based difficulties.²⁷¹ Yet the British turn inwards ruled out any alternative to the USA. For Britons, "empire" no longer mattered and the cost and effort to maintain it were not only prohibitive given the impact of World War II, but Britain's new future lay with Western Europe's capitalist democracies. Put simply, Canada was no longer a priority for the British.²⁷²

The Canadian government had realized the necessity of establishing an

international scalar fix in changed geopolitical and geo-economic contexts. Although understated, Canada's involvement in the construction of post-war economic and political institutions is testament to this.²⁷³ Political institutions, primarily the United Nations, institutionally affirmed the supremacy of national state in a post-war world. Post-war economic institutions and practices founded in the Bretton Woods Agreement underwrote the primacy of national stability.²⁷⁴

At a continental scale, Canada pursued access to American markets and encouraged deeper ties with American capital. First during World War II through the Hyde Park Agreement, Canadian war production serviced American military purchases and deeper continentalization continued after the war. As Anastakis states, "Notwithstanding the newfound appreciation of multilateralism that dominated much post-1945 thinking, the tight Canada-US co-operation necessitated by the vagrancies of the war had illustrated to many Canadians (and to many Americans as well) that closer continental coexistence in the economic field was a worthy goal. Wartime agreements ... had driven home the utility and sensibility of working together."²⁷⁵ Indeed, Anastakis's exploration of the 1965 Canada-US Auto Pact has demonstrated how Canadian post-war prosperity was heightened by Americans' appetite for cars.²⁷⁶

The third aspect demonstrating the role that the international scale could play in making the national state more effective was the impact of World War II. Shaw noted how war initiated Europe's flirtations with Keynesianism.²⁷⁷ The exceptional circumstances provided by World War II also helped centralize Ottawa's fiscal authority.²⁷⁸ Moreover, the war demonstrated the federal government's ability to organize the economy. For example, Bellamy's study on the development of Canada's

synthetic rubber industry showed that when the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia cut off rubber supplies, Ottawa was quick to apply Canadian ingenuity to an entirely new sector.²⁷⁹ That Ottawa accomplished this showed the importance of politics in effectively determining resource allocation. Ottawa's war efforts also developed administrative knowledge on how to affect demand. This was not limited to the field of taxation, though that fiscal tool was vital to winning the war. Rationing consumer goods, however, meant Ottawa became more intimately involved in citizens' daily lives in order to win the war.²⁸⁰ Unknowingly, a Keynesian experiment on the demand-side had been taking place.

3.1.3 Keynesian-Fordist Canada Goes Local

Reconciling the national with the provincial through an international scalar fix was also important. Often overlooked in explanations of Keynesian-Fordist Canada, however, is the local setting. To be sure, federal-provincial relations count for quite a lot as concerns rarely get elevated to the federal scale unless they are channelled through provincial programmes.²⁸¹ Cities, however, constituted an important aspect of Keynesian-Fordist Canada. Bradford has argued that national solutions to local problems prevailed during Canada's post-war era even while, in the process of shoring up national and provincial scales, cities fell off the political radar. Comparing the position of post-war Canadian cities to the Canadian cities of the twentieth century's first thirty years, Bradford contends cities became de-politicized as places where "real" politics were carried out.²⁸² As Hamel and Jalbert suggest, the general trend across Canada was the centralization of responsibilities to the provincial scale. As a consequence, cities became less and less autonomous during the post-war era as provinces assumed greater

responsibility for social provision.²⁸³

There is much merit to these arguments because they highlight the inter-scalar configurations that came of age in the post-war era. Cities undoubtedly saw their authority wane relative to their federal and provincial counterparts. Canadian cities became more concerned with Fordist styles of planning, with emphases on efficient planning and infrastructural provision rather than on democratic considerations. It was not so much that Canadian cities lost their (limited) social reproduction role. Rather, the focus went from social to physical resources directed by provincial grants to municipalities.²⁸⁴

The Rowell-Sirois Commission's recommendations gave due consideration to the role of municipalities in the reformation of Canadian federalism's inter-scalar architecture. In light of the heavy load they shouldered during the Depression, Rowell-Sirois insisted on "fiscal justice," to be obtained via Ottawa's fiscal superiority. With the federal spending power putting the provinces on sounder fiscal footing, pan-Canadian standards could be achieved through provincial grants flowing to municipalities. Furthermore, Rowell-Sirois insisted these grants would not prevent the provinces from responding to municipal circumstances in their own way given the varying nature and causes of growth amongst the provinces.²⁸⁵

To be sure, the Rowell-Sirois Commission was critical of the provinces' dismissive attitude towards their cities: municipal problems remained municipal and the provinces had no desire to intervene. The Commission even directed attention to the destructive inter-urban competition that was draining local tax bases.²⁸⁶ The Commission sensed a scalar disconnect: "Although municipalities fall within the exclusive jurisdiction

of the provinces, revenue powers and expenditure responsibilities have been delegated to them by the provincial governments which makes their financial position an integral part of the whole provincial picture, and consequently, to that extent, of Dominion-provincial relations."²⁸⁷

Without healthy cities, no federal-provincial arrangement was likely to succeed in Keynesian-Fordist Canada. Therefore, a case can be made that Canadian cities were important to the success of the post-war compromise. As the preceding two subsections have argued, the provincial and international scales and the new inter-scalar arrangements enabled a new role for the state at the national scale. Why would cities not figure into the equation too? Rather than suggesting that cities were invisible during the post-war era, as Bradford and Hamel and Jalbert do, the alternative explanation offered here contends Canada's post-war vision for cities intended to protect them from economic convulsions. City fiscal burdens would be alleviated as federal funds flowed to the provinces, which could translate Ottawa's dollars into transfer payments to their municipalities. By way of the provinces, then, national equalization was achieved in cities. The provinces, however, had to forge new relationships with their municipalities if a new federalism was going to work. In effect, this led to a situation where reterritorialization was becoming territorialization as the roles, responsibilities, and relationships of the different scales of the Canadian state were becoming clearer.

3.2 Post-war Ontario and the New Scalar Reality

3.2.1 Keeping Old Ontario Alive? Reassertion through Momentary Spatial Caesarism

For national equalization to work, Ontario had to be on board because it was the richest and most populous province. Yet Ontario's support for the rescaling of the

Canadian state was by no means a foregone conclusion. When discussions of post-war Canada's arrangements got underway in 1940, Ontario's Liberal premier Mitchell Hepburn took an adversarial stand. As Armstrong shows, under Hepburn's leadership, Ontario opposed equalization and the Rowell-Sirois recommendations. For Hepburn, the problem did not lie with federalism-as-it-stood but rather Western Canada's "reckless" spending and decision to focus on a wheat-based economy. Hepburn reflected a position Ontario had held since Mowat's days: other provinces had no business cashing in on Ontario's prosperity. Equalization, national standards, and the like were just another way for Ottawa to meddle in Ontario's affairs. Spending Ontario dollars to build up the rest of the country took away from the province's ability to continue building its economy and furthering its own goals.²⁸⁸ Under these circumstances, the reterritorializing efforts initiated by the Rowell-Sirois Commission were seen by Hepburn as a threat to Ontario.

While there was no inclination to change the terms of the federation, Hepburn's actions did highlight Ontario's centrality. By insisting on keeping the status quo, Hepburn's Ontario ensured that Ottawa left Ontario alone in matters concerning its economic destiny. In other words, the Ontario government denied the existence of an inter-scalar crisis to ensure its centrality in any post-war arrangement.

If, under Hepburn, Queen's Park took this attitude against the state at the national scale, it took a still tougher stance with sub-provincial units. To be fair, unconditional grants did begin flowing to the municipalities in 1938,²⁸⁹ but these grants were not enough to undo the damage lingering from the Great Depression. The only real relief came in the form of the province's assumption of highway costs. On behalf of the bankrupt municipalities, Ontario did seek lower debt charges, but otherwise,

municipalities were left on their own to ensure costs matched revenues.²⁹⁰ In some measure, the treatment of municipal finances reflected Hepburn's federal stance: no inter-scalar change was required and the solution to every problem lay in balancing budgets.

Like Canada, Ontario endured the Great Depression. The politics practiced in Ontario was not unlike that of other provinces coping with the social dislocation of the 1930s. Promises were made to desperate populations that the provincial government would provide them with security, but no substantial relief programmes materialized.²⁹¹ Hepburn was no different than many other premiers in his opposition to government intervention in the provincial economy. For this reason, the Keynesian principles that had an effect on bureaucratic thinking in Ottawa failed to leave a mark on Queen's Park.²⁹²

One aspect of Hepburn's politics was his disdain for bureaucratic expertise. As mentioned in Section 3.1.2, Keynesianism was intended as a technocratic affair. Hepburn's attitude towards "bureaucratic meddling" resulted in his inability to admit that a new reality was dawning in Ontario. The province's economy had changed considerably. Industrialization meant new social conditions at the Ontario scale, making the Ontario of the nineteenth century a memory. With this, a new class structure emerged that came to be reflected in the party system. These changes became apparent in the 1942 election when Hepburn's Liberals became an agrarian rump. It was the Progressive Conservative Party which recognized the political economic reality of mid-twentieth century Ontario, drawing support from a mix of working and middle classes, farmers, and big and small capital.²⁹³ It was through the Conservatives that a new round of province-building would take place, within a context shaped by Keynesian-Fordist Canada.

3.2.2 *Establishing Ontario's Post-war Space Economy: A Second Ontario Policy*

The Conservatives' tenure was defined by the 22 Points Declaration, announced during the 1943 election. Five aspects of the Declaration are worth noting. First, the Declaration aimed to transcend Ontario's social divisions. Just as business had a place, so too did social stability and this involved recognizing the role various groups played in provincial prosperity. Second, the Declaration pledged to maintain high and stable levels of employment *in Ontario*. Legislative measures and controlling tax rates would achieve this stable and predictable investment climate. Third, the Declaration promised full co-operation with Ottawa as long as it did not limit Ontario's economic destiny. Economic planning was understood as a provincial purview and, as such, non-negotiable.²⁹⁴ Fourth, the 22 Points Declaration was not a technocratic exercise. Whereas Ottawa relied on the ideas and expertise of federal bureaucrats to draft a post-war blueprint, the Declaration was an election platform before it became entrenched in the thinking of Ontarian bureaucrats. Finally, Ontario's post-war plan preceded Ottawa's and the province's ideas of social stability, business's unquestionable role in the post-war era, and the limitation of government to a co-ordinating role, which figured centrally in 22 Points, would also appear in the federal government's 1944 White Paper on Employment and Income.²⁹⁵

Winch has shown how Keynes claimed his policy prescriptions did not require a complete overhaul of political architectures. Even though the national state played the stabilizer role, enough flexibility was built in to manage the complexities inherent in any political system.²⁹⁶ As such, Keynesianism did not necessitate a supreme national state and Ontario could chart its own post-war course while recognizing the potentially constructive role it played in the federation. As Rea shows, when Ottawa met with the

provinces in 1945, Ontario objected to the federal government's preferences for more centralized planning and instead floated the idea of joint federal-provincial planning committees. Although this idea never gained currency, the logic of such co-operation lay in a belief that the provinces knew what economic course was best for them. Ottawa should simply be there to help them out.²⁹⁷

Under Leslie Frost, Ontario's post-war province-building strategies did involve new co-operative arrangements with the federal government. The resulting tax agreements involved Ontario shedding business taxes, which meant that Ottawa provided Ontario with the revenue to achieve the tax plank in the 22 Points Declaration. More importantly, Ontario stood to gain an extra \$25 million for the construction of Ontario's highway infrastructure.²⁹⁸

A second round of province-building commenced to promote Ontario's changed economic landscape in the context of the new territorial architecture of the Canadian state. Policies in Ontario were designed to complement private sector activity. After the end of World War II, Ontario's economy was in full swing and unemployment was low. Yet, infrastructural shortfalls threatened to impede Ontario's economic growth. Thus, Ontario turned its attention to constructing highways and power plants, the very infrastructures associated with a Fordist regime of accumulation.²⁹⁹

Yet national infrastructures mattered to Ontario too. As stated in the first chapter, infrastructures sustain regimes of accumulation by creating connections between scales that promote the circulation of capital. If the railroad had been the key infrastructure linking Ontario to the West under the previous regime of accumulation, this time it would be a gas pipeline to service the energy needs of Ontario's booming manufacturing sector.

Ottawa was initially sceptical about the pipeline because it had to be built over the rugged Canadian Shield. A Texan oil entrepreneur who sided with Frost, however, helped convince the Minister of Trade and Commerce, C.D. Howe, that the endeavour was worthwhile.³⁰⁰

More needed to be done to promote the expansion of Fordism in Ontario. In the post-war period, the automobile sector had become central to Ontario as Canada's manufacturing heartland.³⁰¹ Yet Ontario's auto industry faced problems of demand and layoffs which not only hurt provincial finances, but also had a national importance. Automobiles were an essential component of a Fordist regime of accumulation and for Ontario's automobile industry to fail could have threatened the stability of post-war federalism. There is not enough space to examine the complexities behind the continentalization of the automobile industry. Suffice it to say, Ontario's economy was supported by federal efforts to obtain an agreement with the USA allowing free trade in automobile parts, i.e. the 1965 Canada-US Auto Pact.³⁰² Such national policies only served to further existing provincial policies.

If the 1950s under Frost cemented Ontario's place in the Canadian political economy through infrastructure building, then the 1960s under Premier John Robarts saw Ontario become an important space in the North American political economy. Robarts aimed to further internationalize the Ontario economy. Certainly, the actions taken in Ottawa to address the shortcomings of the automobile industry added to this but Ontario's administrative capacities were also reorganized to promote Ontario as a good place to invest. Robert Macaulay amalgamated the Department of Development and Commerce with the Department of Economics and turned it into the Department of Economics and

Development. Through Economics and Development, Ontario generally took a policy stance emphasizing exports over imports. What this signalled was a potential de-linking of the Ontario economy from the wider Canadian space economy. Federal officials were uneasy about Ontario making its voice heard internationally because this was understood as a federal power.³⁰³

Garth Stevenson has argued that the creeping economic nationalism in Ottawa during the 1960s received a cold response in Robarts's Ontario and Queen's Park focused on promoting the province as a good destination for foreign capital. This clashed with a swelling backlash against foreign ownership, i.e. *American* ownership, at the federal scale. The Ontario government went on the offensive, forging an alliance with Quebec to counter the federal government's perceived attempts at centralization under the cloak of economic nationalism. Paradoxically, Ontario's alliance with Quebec to combat the federal government contributed to the view that it was a champion of national unity.³⁰⁴

While Stevenson is right to note how Ontario's interests clashed with federal interests, he understates the delicate compromises marking Keynesian-Fordist Canada. On the one hand, wealth needed to be produced to fund federal equalization programmes, part of the bargain Ontario struck with Ottawa to ease the unevenness of the national political economy.³⁰⁵ On the other hand, Ontario could not forget about its own population. The Conservatives dominated Ontario politics in the post-war era precisely because they delivered prosperity even if it had to be shared with other parts of the country.

3.2.3 *Bringing the Municipalities into the Ontario Fold: A New Scalar Relationship*

If Ottawa's reterritorializing strategy depended on uncovering a new inter-scalar

relationship with the provinces, then Ontario's experience suggests that it too would have to pursue a reterritorializing strategy by reworking the provincial-municipal relationship. A new inter-scalar relationship between Ontario and its municipalities was struck to deal with the province's impressive post-war economic growth. Ontario's growth had brought with it sizeable increases in the provincial population and a transformation of the urban landscape. In addition to the baby boom, two-thirds of Canada's immigrants settled into Ontario during the post-war era which gave rise to pressures in cities. The physical complexion of urban Ontario changed significantly too. While the network of highways that began under Frost was part of making Ontario business-friendly, its role in supporting suburbanization cannot be understated. The intersection of federal and provincial housing policies complemented such highway building. Federally, home ownership was encouraged through the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation. Its low-rate mortgage policy privileged buyers of single-family dwellings, which provided the spaces to put the consumer goods associated with Fordist ideals of the good life. The provinces wrote the planning and zoning regulations that municipalities implemented in order to deal with what was perceived as a simple matter of consumer preference.³⁰⁶

Ontario became increasingly concerned with the potential disruptions generated by rapid urban growth, including inadequate and overstressed infrastructures. The preferred strategy in post-war Ontario was to tell the municipalities to get their fiscal houses in order. In particular, Premier Frost made clear that the extra money coming Ontario's way in 1952 would not be used to meet municipal needs. The situation was most dire in Toronto. Given Toronto's centrality to the Ontarian political economy, its phenomenal growth outpaced its ability to provide services, especially in light of

accelerating suburbanization. As a result, the 1952 Metropolitan Toronto Act was created and a regional agency became responsible for the provision of transportation and infrastructures which local governments could not handle.³⁰⁷

Map 3.2.3.1: Metropolitan Toronto.

Source: http://www.dmg.utoronto.ca/images/tts/2006/regional_travel_summaries/toronto.png. Accessed on August 5, 2009.

The creation of Metropolitan Toronto (hereafter referred to as Metro) represented a move towards dealing with growth by emphasizing efficiency on a regional scale.³⁰⁸ Metro was to do the province's bidding: local needs would be met while satisfying Ontario's desire to organize growth out of the emerging chaos. Metro thus represented an inter-scalar fix for Ontario, providing the institutional linkage meeting Toronto's and Ontario's needs. At the same time, Metro had its own responsibilities.³⁰⁹ In effect, Queen's Park created a new scale of state action to stabilize its own version of Keynesian-Fordist territorialization.

Andrew's reflections on the municipal condition *vis à vis* provincial priorities

shows how much overlap had come from building new provincial-municipal relations. It was not so easy to separate provincial from municipal interests.³¹⁰ Indeed, when a downturn in the late 1950s occurred, Ontario turned to its cities to help fight the recession. Half the costs of improving municipal infrastructures, amenities, and equipment were shared between the provinces and municipalities.³¹¹ In this way, Ontario used its municipalities to pick up a demand-side slack that rose from Ottawa's sudden turn towards managing supply-side factors to revive the Canadian economy in the late 1950s and early 1960s.³¹² In turn, municipalities could use this situation to proceed with projects commensurate with local needs. That Ontario took on more municipal responsibilities left municipalities to focus on their needs, but in such a manner as to reflect provincial priorities. To some degree, this reflected the increasing centralization occurring in Ontario during the post-war years.

3.3 The Waterfront and Toronto: Entrenching the Post-War Urban System

3.3.1 Understanding Toronto's Place in Keynesian-Fordist Canada

As the last chapter pointed out, the formulation of a new regime of accumulation has the potential to reorganize urban systems and Keynesian-Fordism was no different. Montréal's state of decline would accelerate throughout the post-war period, cementing Toronto's dominance. A brief overview of Toronto's general role in Keynesian-Fordist Canada will be provided here to establish the inter-scalar setting for the role its waterfront played.

Federal and provincial centralization policies heightened Toronto's place in the wider North American space economy. Moreover, the post-war boom generated a need for labour and immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe who, having fled a

destroyed and politically unstable Europe, flooded in to fill these jobs. Toronto was the preferred destination, but the city was hardly a passive recipient. Certainly, actions taken at the federal and provincial scales were beyond the city's control. This did not, however, inhibit the city from taking action to create an investment climate and this, in turn, entailed a reorganization of the city's bureaucracy. Zoning regulations, a neglected power of city government, were consolidated, making a more predictable climate for businesses to operate in. Similar to the federal and provincial governments' policy preferences, city infrastructures were developed to lubricate economic flows, but city activities were always to complement, and never to compete with, private sector activity.³¹³

Even before the post-war boom, Toronto already had plans to deal with the end of wartime industries. The Toronto Reconstruction Council was formed in 1943 to maintain the high levels of employment once wartime industries shut down. Social welfare functions were soon included in its mandate and a change in name (the Civic Advisory Council) and role quickly followed its birth. Moreover, the city knew it had to come to terms with a metropolitan structure to mitigate the impact of the booming suburbs on the downtown.³¹⁴ Together, these developments point to Toronto's awareness that it had to act in order to assert the city as a scale in its own right.

As stated in the previous section, Metro was created as the institutional go-between for Queen's Park and Toronto. Growth had to be managed or the province's plans could fail. Metro's first Official Plan placed Toronto at the region's heart in order to protect Toronto's downtown.³¹⁵ A notable aspect of Metro's Official Plan was its recognition of the nature of employment in the downtown and a concomitant focus on Toronto's Central Business District (CBD) as the site for dynamic growth, concentrated

in the service sector. Toronto's manufacturing industries were expected to exit to suburban sites. In other words, already Toronto was to become a white-collar city, with a reduced blue-collar presence, but this would be achieved in an orderly manner.³¹⁶

Toronto's growth was diverging from Keynesian-Fordism. As early as 1951, a demographic shift was becoming apparent in the city as fewer nuclear families and more single and childless households appeared.³¹⁷ This is, of course, not to suggest that the male breadwinner model was disappearing as, to a great extent, it was propped up by the immigrant influx throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The presence of newcomers, however, sat poorly with Orange Toronto's social order. The National Policy's immigration policies had naturalized a view of immigrant labour as farm labour³¹⁸ and the persistence of such attitudes contributed to the marginalization of Toronto's largely blue-collar immigrant labour force. As Iacovetta's history of Italian immigrants living in Toronto demonstrates, this racialization informed struggles around the workplace: the ability to be a male breadwinner was connected to receiving equitable treatment as a Canadian regardless of ethnic origin.³¹⁹ The success of these struggles sustained an important component of Keynesian-Fordism in the city because it enabled immigrants to purchase homes in the downtown core and the commodities that helped to sustain the post-war boom. Nonetheless, changes in Toronto's cityscape were well under way by the 1960s.

By and large, office tower construction formed the basis of the downtown's building boom of the 1960s. What is particularly important here is the Toronto CBD's increased specialization toward high order service functions, reflecting the fact that Toronto was overtaking Montréal as the centrepiece city in the Canadian political

economy.³²⁰ Moreover, the transformation of the downtown aided the suburbanization of particular forms of office employment. The routine but necessary work of data processing started to be located in the suburbs. Spatially, then, downtown Toronto was becoming a place where corporate decisions were made.³²¹

For Toronto, Metro represented its Keynesian-Fordist bargain. Metro worked to reconcile the variants of growth occurring within the wider metropolitan area, providing effective co-ordination while allowing each part to pursue its own interests. Accomplishing this was no easy feat. New subdivisions on lands lacking basic infrastructures sat beside a Toronto in renewal. Hard infrastructures were built to cope with the uneven growth occurring inside Metro's boundaries, as booming Toronto was surrounded by exploding suburbs.³²² The stresses placed on the downtown cannot be overstated. Metro's chairman, Frederick Gardiner, had recognized that Toronto's inner suburban growth imperilled the entire area's growth. To stop this, Metro needed to take on region-wide infrastructural responsibilities: arterial roads, large-scale public works, regional planning, and parks. Technocratic engineering was the preferred method of implementation over democratic consultation.³²³ On the whole, Metro paid for these projects out of Toronto's pockets as the surrounding suburbs did not have the financial means to do so. Thus, Toronto paid for managed suburban growth in exchange for protecting its economic centrepiece status.³²⁴

Much infrastructure construction was done with Toronto's downtown in mind. The spatial transformation of post-war Toronto and its region could not be neglected. Donald characterizes Metro's institutional orientation as a metropolitan-wide equalization programme designed to protect the general business environment.³²⁵ One element that

achieved this was the way Metro handled its transportation responsibilities. Metro had seen itself as a component of Canada's post-war order, governing an area that generated provincial wealth that in turn was redistributed across the country.³²⁶ Its activities were to complement Keynesian-Fordism. Colton recounts Gardiner's thoughts on the nature of growth throughout Metro: "The suburbs ... were what people wanted, and the suburbs were what Metro was going to give them."³²⁷

Mobility became a contentious issue because of its association with growth. If roads were jammed, neither labour nor goods could move about the rich region. The automobile, which was a crucial component of the national and provincial Fordist regimes of accumulation, required supporting road infrastructures.³²⁸ Ontario was quite adept at doing this as highways formed an integral part of post-war Ontario's province-building strategy. For Toronto, however, the very commodity providing provincial – and, by virtue of post-war federalism, federal – windfalls could prove to be disruptive. Cars had made it possible for new socio-geographical relations to emerge by widening the spaces for interaction.³²⁹ The automobile thus represented a new source of connectivity between downtowns and their outlying areas. The automobile tied together heterogeneous places, but at the same time the infrastructure supporting the automobile also affected spatial relationships.³³⁰ The road-building that was done throughout Metro recognized this by supporting Fordist social reproduction without endangering the downtown's viability. In doing this, Metro could not afford to ignore provincial preferences when it came to managing the region. Roadways were touted over public transit because gas taxes filled provincial coffers and public transit did not.³³¹ How does the waterfront figure into the inter-scalar architecture, then? The next sub-sections will

turn to this.

3.3.2 The Economic Ambiguity of Toronto's Keynesian-Fordist Waterfront

If the THC intended the waterfront to further industrialize Toronto in anticipation of a Fordist regime of accumulation, it would fall far short of this goal. Throughout the entire post-war period, the THC's lands stood in an economically ambiguous position. Despite having been necessary to the reorganization of Toronto's built environment during the National Policy, the 1912 plan, wanting to usher in a new regime of accumulation, failed as THC lands stood relatively empty. The onset of World War II changed this. The federal Department of National Defence became the THC's first large tenant on the East Bayfront, a section on the western waterfront. Part of the waterfront was needed for National Defence's air force equipment depot and THC lands' layouts suited National Defence's needs, providing it with the space to accommodate the large factories and large warehouses wartime production demanded.³³²

Federal action during World War II also generated some private sector activity on Toronto's waterfront. With the breakout of war in the Pacific, oils and fats were in short supply and the Department of Agriculture's Administration of Oil and Fats called on Sunsoy Products, then a division of brewing giant Canadian Breweries, to alleviate the shortage. Influenced by the array of transportation facilities it offered, in 1943, Sunsoy leased a parcel of THC land. Technologically, the Sunsoy plant was the first plant chemically to process soy beans. When the plant officially opened for post-war business, it was renamed Victory Mills to honour its wartime role, and Victory Mills did become a central piece of Ottawa's plans to develop Canada's soy bean sector. That Canadian farmers had a guaranteed place to mill their product encouraged increasing yields.

Canadian soy bean bushels rose from 220, 000 in 1940 to 4, 406, 000 in 1953, yet it was never enough to make Victory Mills run at full capacity.³³³ What is important about Victory Mills' place on the waterfront is that its location symbolized the continued uneven development within the Canadian political economy. For Western Canadian farmers, "Central Canada" – more often than not a euphemism for Toronto and/or Montréal – continued to dominate the country with an economic muscle that seemed to always translate into political muscle too.

Plate 3.3.2.1: The abandoned Victory Mills as it stood in December 2008. Prior to closing because of continental rationalization, soy bean trucks lining up to dump their cargo into Victory Mills was a common sight on Toronto's waterfront.

As Desfor, Goldrick, and Merrens note, the waterfront cannot be separated from the wider spatial politics of Toronto; it is an intimate part of the urban fabric.³³⁴ That Toronto was positioned to be at the centre of post-war Canada informed the THC's actions. Federal action appeared to be pointing to the waterfront as a core component of Keynesian-Fordism during and after World War II. Believing that World War II was just the beginning of industrial fortunes, the THC followed the same strategy it pursued following World War I: increase the availability of serviceable lands. Queries for commercial developments piled up in the summer of 1944, with the most significant request coming from Toronto Star Limited, the publisher of the local daily *The Toronto Star*.

The Toronto Star was fast becoming a *de facto* national daily and Toronto Star Limited needed the space to satisfy its production requirements. National Defence's air equipment, however, sat in the space sought by Toronto Star. Though National Defence did move at the THC's request, the land layouts did not satisfy Toronto Star and it asked the THC to revise them. Generally, the revisions were made because (1) it justified the THC's role as a port authority and (2) the coming of the St. Lawrence Seaway in the 1950s presented Toronto Star with the promise of more easily shipping newsprint.³³⁵

The THC's optimism was further heightened when the Montréal-based Canadian Dominion and Sugar Company announced its intention to build a massive warehouse. The storage capacity at the THC's Terminal Warehouse restricted the amount of refined sugar it could store and distribute. Shipping delays to Canadian Dominion customers thus became more frequent. Just as it did with Toronto Star, the THC obliged Canadian Dominion's wishes since the latter too would make use of an otherwise idle port. Building what came to be a Toronto waterfront landmark, the Redpath Sugar factory, it intended to take advantage of the coming St. Lawrence Seaway, permitting the trouble-free passage of sugar cane from source countries into a central location.³³⁶

Plate 3.3.2.2: The waterfront's landmark Redpath Sugar refinery.

However quickly industries may have moved in to THC lands during World War II, they also moved out quickly. As Figure 3.3.2.1 shows, by 1961, Toronto was less reliant on manufacturing as a source of employment. Also, as the previous sub-section has argued, more offices were going up in the downtown, reflecting the city's command-and-control role in the Canadian political economy. Moreover, wider changes in the Metropolitan Toronto space economy adversely affected the waterfront. The support and preference given to road-based transportation and industry's shift to suburban sites meant that the waterfront was losing attractiveness as an economic site supporting Toronto's role in the Fordist-Keynesian regime of accumulation.³³⁷

Figure 3.3.2.1: Employment in Toronto by Industry, 1961.

Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, *1961 Census of Canada: Labour Force*, Cat. No. 94-544.

On the whole, the THC was overseeing a flagging port. The waterfront, however, could not be separated from the wider Toronto and Metro urban fabric because (1) the creation of the THC in 1912 had established a scale of action nested inside, but nonetheless overlapping, the City of Toronto and (2) Metro as a new scale of action ensured another instance of scalar overlap. With Metro's leadership, a Waterfront Planning Committee was formed to determine the area's planning future. Representatives from Metro, the City of Toronto, the THC, Canadian National and Canadian Pacific Railways, Queen's Park, and the Toronto Civic Historical Society would come together and discuss the waterfront in Metro and Toronto terms.

Two logics guided Metro's designs on the waterfront. First, isolated and uncoordinated developments had to be avoided. In particular, Metro saw the waterfront in regional terms: Toronto's waterfront could not be detached from the Scarborough and Etobicoke waterfronts, its neighbouring Metro municipalities. In step with its managed-growth-orientation, market-led development was treated with suspicion. Second, Metro noted the waterfront's potential to give the Metropolitan Toronto region a competitive edge. A healthy city was an economically viable city *and an attractive city*. A city's complexion could not be divorced from its economic health.³³⁸ Metro saw THC lands between the harbour and Toronto's CBD as a no-man's-land. Therefore, Metro's 1961 waterfront report recommended converting the THC's underutilized lands into office space to capitalize on office building boom already underway in the downtown.³³⁹

The city had its own thoughts about the waterfront. A year after Metro's report appeared, the City of Toronto Planning Board voiced concerns over local overheating if the 1961 Metro plan went ahead. Knowing the downtown needed protection to ensure

Toronto's centrepiece position, Toronto's Planning Board wrote that Metro's office proposals were "too far from the Downtown office core, centred on King and Bay Streets, to be part of it and it does not have other significant advantages of general competitive offices. Should these by any chance be built, they might have a harmful effect on the "Downtown core.""³⁴⁰ As the THC relied on own-source revenue, and therefore had no choice but to attract tenants from other parts of the city, the City of Toronto was concerned that this injected destructive competition into the local office market, which could undermine the CBD's stability.³⁴¹

What Toronto did want was to utilize THC lands near the CBD to amplify the city's service functions and this meant constructing offices "suitable for agencies, exporters and importers, service businesses, company offices, and professional people."³⁴² In some measure, the THC responded to Toronto's changing environment by allowing a major developer, the Campeau Corporation, to begin the Harbour Square project. Since the city was still the planning authority, a tripartite agreement was struck between Toronto, the THC, and Campeau. Harbour Square was not aesthetically pleasing, largely mirroring the functionalist ethic of Fordist buildings. Yet Toronto architect Ken Greenberg noted how forward looking the Campeau Corporation was because in Harbour Square, it "saw an opportunity to reach a promising new market for luxury condominium apartments and hotel suites with spectacular waterfront views."³⁴³

That the THC had made room for a project like Harbour Square owed more to its recognition that it was out of step with the Keynesian-Fordist regime of accumulation in which Toronto played a central command-and-control function. Thus, the THC began reorganizing land uses on the waterfront in the 1960s to capitalize on developing office

space. Lands near the CBD would respond to the trends in Toronto's economy.³⁴⁴

Towards the end of the 1960s, a sense of urgency emerged over the waterfront. Metro wanted to use the waterfront to position internationally the city and its metropolitan area. Metro's Planning Board exhorted "big thinking" to excite Metro citizens, including floating the idea of hosting the Olympic Games because it spoke to Toronto's internationalization, but was at the same time concerned with controlling costs.³⁴⁵ A global purpose could solve problems affecting the waterfront³⁴⁶ and the THC sensed this.

The THC's first major statement since the 1912 plan, *A Bold Concept*, picked up on Toronto's growing internationalization. Generally, *A Bold Concept* claimed to be able to achieve a range of local, provincial, national, and international goals within the City of Toronto. Locally, Toronto was experiencing housing pressures and at the provincial scale, the idea of building Harbour City, a housing project on Toronto's waterfront, was being discussed. Nationally and internationally, Olympic facilities would serve as a reminder of Toronto's ability to host a global event. As well, *A Bold Concept* posited it could avoid impending disjointed development, paralleling the distrust of market-led waterfront development.³⁴⁷ Yet, the THC consulted neither the city nor the public and the lack of public consultation proved especially decisive in *A Bold Concept*'s short life.³⁴⁸

Filion notes that urban political economies have their own interest groups who can strike back at established regimes of accumulation.³⁴⁹ In Toronto, middle-class movements became stronger as a result of the downtown's continued vibrancy, thanks to post-war immigration. This changed the terrain of action at the Toronto scale because the

problem was that Metro's and Toronto's views on growth and planning clashed with a growing sense of local attachment. Although planning had become more predictable in post-war Toronto, zoning regulations were loose so as not to discourage new developments.³⁵⁰ Residents in the downtown began objecting to the city's role in the dominant regime of accumulation and this began affecting the trajectory of development on the waterfront. Toronto's 1969 Official Plan did not provide a satisfactory response. Worried about losing ground to other Metro municipalities, Keynesian-Fordist Toronto's emphasis on efficiency, technical expertise, and growth were proving unsatisfactory to a downtown that was becoming increasingly middle-class and unwilling to accept growth for growth's sake if it meant sacrificing the distinguishing features downtown living provided them.³⁵¹

3.3.3 The Extra-Economic Role of the Keynesian-Fordist Waterfront

Solving the THC's land problems taxed Metro and Toronto. A large swath of land in Canada's busiest city sat relatively idle and efforts to reintegrate the waterfront with the city consistently fell apart. On the whole, the waterfront did not contribute economically to Toronto's role in Keynesian-Fordist Canada. The waterfront did, however, provide a crucial extra-economic contribution to Toronto's centrepiece role as vital public infrastructures powering and sustaining Toronto were located on THC lands. Too often, infrastructures remain in the background and are understood as being bereft of political and social rationales.³⁵² Yet infrastructures can serve a number of political economic roles, from realizing a political project to managing the tensions emanating from one.³⁵³ As the remainder of this section will show, infrastructures can serve to link the state at various scales together, helping to stabilize the Canadian variant of

Keynesian-Fordism while simultaneously being used to further interests and actions at specific scales.

Given the THC's sagging industrial fortunes, it became more willing to listen to offers for any developments because of its mandate as a self-financing public corporation. As such, this presented an opportunity for Metro to obtain parts of the THC's western lands, which contained parks and recreational sites, to build the Gardiner to alleviate traffic in the downtown. For the THC, transferring these western lands to Metro meant it could officially jettison the recreational responsibilities contained in its 1912 plan, which it wanted to as these were a drain on the THC's finances.³⁵⁴

According to Metro, the Gardiner was developed to wedge open development on the waterfront. The Gardiner was expected to form the backbone of a waterfront-area road network. THC parklands were now in Metro hands and parks could be linked together, giving Gardiner motorists a visual treat. More importantly, the Gardiner formed a regional link between Toronto's CBD and the waterfront. Metro thus invited the city's Toronto Parking Authority to design parking lots to serve people coming into the CBD.³⁵⁵ Thus, the Gardiner satisfied demands at all three scales: Toronto's CBD was protected, Metro fulfilled its regional planning mandate, and the THC lessened its financial stress.

The Gardiner embodied the protection of the downtown, especially its business environment. The Gardiner Expressway was designed to mitigate the problems associated with suburban growth, permitting suburban commuters to bypass the downtown core, by making the waterfront a vital thruway. While the automobile had been a boon to the post-war Canadian and Ontarian states in the forms of taxes and licensing fees, its costs fell onto municipalities. Of course, roads and highways were a

provincial responsibility too. Yet whereas they were designed to promote growth, municipal roads had a *partial function* of managing wider scalar growth that had concentrated within its boundaries.

Ultimately, the Gardiner buttressed Metropolitan Toronto's post-war socio-geographical relations. At that time, the Gardiner's east-west linkage was seen as a solution to the heavy traffic that Ontario's Queen Elizabeth Way brought to downtown Toronto.³⁵⁶ If Toronto became immobile, it would fail to get the goods, services, and labour flowing in and out of the city. The Gardiner's waterfront location is a reminder of Metro's role in achieving the Canadian Keynesian-Fordist "spatial compromise." Although Metro had important social redistributive functions within its jurisdiction, physical infrastructures served as a form of equalization as well in order to achieve stability.³⁵⁷ Thus, the Fordist lifestyle of car-based mobility supporting suburban living³⁵⁸ was supported without undermining the City of Toronto's ability to generate the wealth which financed Metro.

There was more to the Fordist waterfront than just the Gardiner. Other vital public infrastructures were also located on THC lands that tied together scales above Metro. While the THC's Port Industrial District had lacked industrial activity, Toronto's growth in the late 1940s and late 1950s changed this. Two major tenants settled in the District and both dealt with a growing city's demands. First, Ontario's Hydro Electric Power Commission had set up two generating stations to satisfy the city's growing needs. More than anything, this represented a provincial interest in the city's growth.³⁵⁹ The larger of the two, the R.L. Hearn Generating Station, used coal to satisfy the city's energy needs. Using the THC's port facilities, coal for the Station was brought to Toronto via

the St. Lawrence Seaway. Thus, federally and provincially sponsored infrastructures also underwrote Toronto's growth.

Second, the City of Toronto had taken measures to deal with the waste produced by a growing city. The last chapter had shown how the health threat coming from a polluted Ashbridge's Bay potentially undermined Toronto's general economic well-being. Though landfill no longer made Ashbridge's Bay a bay, the city expanded the existing sewage facilities in the post-war era, leasing more land from the THC to dispose of Toronto's mounting household waste.³⁶⁰

What the expansion of the Ashbridge's Bay sewage plant shows is that the waterfront had become a crucial site of ecological regulation for the city. While waste management is a curiously under-studied aspect of urban political economies, mass consumption patterns under Fordism accumulated capital *and* waste.³⁶¹ Rather than encouraging individuals to restrict their purchases, expanding waste management facilities demonstrates the vital role the city played in encouraging Fordist mass consumption within Toronto boundaries. Had there been a refusal – no doubt unlikely given political repercussions – to do this, Canada's economic centrepiece may very well have disrupted Keynesian-Fordist Canada. Without the mass consumption to spur mass production in the Canadian state's richest city, decelerated economic activity in Toronto could have starved Ottawa of the funds Ontario provided for its regional equalization schemes. Therefore, enlarging sewage treatment capacity on the waterfront contributed to higher rates of household consumption for the primary reason that waste has to go somewhere. Absent the public provision of waste disposal services, it is unlikely that households in Toronto or anywhere would be willing to consume at the rates they did if

waste had to be dealt with individually. Thus, economic expansion was secured by publicly providing the capacity to deal with rising amounts of household waste.³⁶² Within the wider nested spaces comprising Keynesian-Fordist Canada, the waterfront had provided the extra-economic aspects required for social reproduction within the City of Toronto.

3.4 Conclusion

The overall aim of this chapter has been to examine the role that the waterfront had played for Toronto in securing the post-war regime of accumulation. Federal-provincial relations underwent significant re-regulation given the limits imposed under the political structures of the prior regime of accumulation predicated on mercantile capitalism. Securing Keynesian-Fordism in Canada depended on creating new inter-scalar political relationships between the federal, provincial, and local states. Getting this done, however, required federal inventiveness to recompose the national state's scalar architecture.

Notwithstanding the accompanying anxiety, geo-political circumstances had situated the Canada, Ontario, and Toronto scales similarly. This time, however, the national regime of accumulation deepened the relationship Ontario and Toronto had long enjoyed with the USA. Stability became lent to economic planning and perhaps provided for inter-scalar coherence insofar as political economic orientations at the international scale were concerned. At first glance, this newer version of Canadian-American relations at the federal scale turned out to be an intensification of existing political economic relationships at the Ontario and Toronto scales. Indeed, the overall thrust of the post-war Canada's inter-scalar architecture had been for Ottawa to pursue policies strengthening

sub-national scales.

Keynesian-Fordist Canada rested largely on spatial equalization schemes. Ontario chiefly funded Ottawa's programmes. Ontario had been at the centre of post-war federalism, equating what was good for Ontario was good for Canada. Likewise, what was bad for Ontario was bad for Canada. Overall, Ontario rejected the federal usurpation of provincial planning powers. Accumulation should remain in provincial jurisdiction and any changes in the federation should contribute to strengthening it.

One outcome of strengthening provincial jurisdiction had been to strengthen municipalities. Ontario's actions regarding Toronto reflected this. The creation of Metro intended to better city planning and insulated downtown Toronto from the growth pressures that suburbanization had engendered. As the THC fell far short of attracting industrial tenants to its lands, Metro, Toronto, and Ontario proceeded to take advantage of underutilized waterfront lands to construct or expand the infrastructural services necessitated by what became a national, provincial, and regional economic centrepiece. With the partial exception of Victory Mills, the waterfront hardly made an economic contribution to any scale.

An extra-economic role, however, saw a new role emerge at the waterfront scale: to stabilize Toronto and enable the maintenance of the inter-scalar rule regime governing Canada's version of a Keynesian-Fordist regime of accumulation. Providing the "right business environment" in Toronto therefore meant containing the excesses mass production and mass consumption aroused. In this way, waterfront development helped reconcile the growth pressures taking place at the Toronto, Metro, Ontario, and Canada scales. Forms of growth contained in a regime of accumulation can be constructive at

one scale and destructive to another, but only so much pressure can be withstood before one element in an inter-scalar relationship buckles. That energy requirements, household waste, and traffic had been tamed because of the flabby interest shown in THC lands by industry ended up sustaining Keynesian-Fordist Canada.

All in all, post-war regime of accumulation developments on the waterfront played an extra-economic role for the City of Toronto, contributing to its status as Canada's economic centrepiece. Thus, there was nothing inevitable about the waterfront having one particular role. Yet, if the post-war regime of accumulation caused the waterfront to fall into the political background, a Keynesian-Fordist collapse could surely throw the political economy of the waterfront scale into turmoil. The next chapter will examine what happened to the waterfront when Keynesian-Fordism began its descent.

Chapter 4: A Waterfront in Crisis: The Unravelling of Keynesian-Fordism, 1970-1995

Introduction

With the arrival of the 1970s, Canada began to experience a series of economic problems that undermined the post-war regime of accumulation and the inter-scalar compromise on which it rested. Rising inflation married to rising unemployment generated a new problem – stagflation – giving rise to debates about new solutions. The period of 1970 to 1995 represents a long period of crisis that put post-war Canada's spatial compromises into question. If the national state had been the focus of post-war prosperity, it would soon become a victim of the downturn.

However problematic the institutional arrangement of post-war Canada came to be seen, its legacies could not be discounted. As recounted in the last chapter, in Canada, the national state established the framework within which the sub-national spaces could pursue their own economic policies. The national state would again play this role in the search for a new regime of accumulation and this involved dealing with territorial legacies, of which Toronto was a part. The 1970s witnessed the first attempts to replace the Keynesian-Fordist state with a Schumpeterian post-national workfare regime. It is in this period that the Toronto waterfront re-emerged as a hot button issue as the numerous attempts to reterritorialize Canada involved using the waterfront to redefine Toronto's role.

This chapter argues that the period of crisis that emerged in the 1970s led to the re-politicization of the Toronto waterfront. The first section provides the macro framework to situate the political economic environment in which this took place. The uncertainty of a solution to the crisis of Keynesian-Fordism was reflected in the debates

over the best course of action to redefine the federal government's spatial role. The second section examines Ontario's response, which involved substantially rethinking its role as a space of accumulation in light of changing inter-scalar regimes. The final section brings these themes together around Toronto's waterfront.

4.1 The Post-Golden Age Solution: Refashioning the Federal Role

4.1.1 The End of the Keynesian-Fordist National State Canada and the (Momentary) Rise of Spatial Targeting, 1970-1980

As Canada entered the 1970s, a series of economic and political crises that had both international and domestic sources overwhelmed its Keynesian-Fordist framework. The international scalar fix provided by the Bretton Woods Agreement collapsed in 1971 when Washington unilaterally announced its withdrawal. Compounding this situation was the American turn inwards, which left the Canadian state in an awkward position. Ottawa (unsuccessfully) approached Washington to create a North American space to buffer the two from wider international pressures.³⁶³ Such a strategy made sense given the depth of the economic ties between the two countries. Fundamental decisions had to be made with regard to refiguring the state at the federal scale to make it capable of developing an effective response to the disorder triggered by events at the international scale.

The international scale was clearly becoming a space of competition. As Robert Brenner shows, the contradictions inherent in the post-war, American-centred international trading system had resulted in greater industrial competition between countries, especially Germany and Japan. International competition had squeezed firms' profits, precipitating the eventual preference for short-term time horizons. As such, facilitating national adjustments would prove difficult.³⁶⁴ Indeed, it is at this point where

the global scale becomes an incipient space of competition in contrast to the post-war era of a managed and regulated global scale.

The national economic picture also was of concern. Rising unemployment and inflation were something that standard Keynesian demand-side strategies could not solve. From 1960 to 1973, real GDP growth fell from 5.3% to an average of 3.9% for the rest of the decade while the next two decades saw it drop to 2.9% then 1.5%. In addition, there was enormous unevenness in rates of unemployment across the country.

Throughout the 1970s, the federal government sought to reassert its position by undertaking a series of spatial targeting programmes. If Canada's post-war national state had largely left economic management to the provinces, the crisis-laden 1970s would see the federal government begin to more actively micro-manage the national economy. Such a strategy would not involve direct intervention into the private sphere for post-war Canada did not have reservations about private decisions guiding investment and this stance was not about to change. Ottawa's desire to solve the problem of slow growth while first getting a handle on inflation reflected the stronger commitment to supply-side macroeconomic policy.³⁶⁵

A turn towards spatial targeting played a complementary role to supply-side macroeconomic policy. Although national aggregates remained important, the Canadian federal state's turn to spatial targeting represent what Poulantzas describes as an inherent component of state crisis. National states come to be progressively implicated in sub-national affairs once outside their purview.³⁶⁶ The Ottawa-led sub-national experiments of the 1970s may thus be seen as the initial attempt to transform the Canadian state, shifting it from a Keynesian-Fordist state to a SPWR. As discussed in the first chapter,

developing the SPWR to resolve the crisis of the Keynesian-Fordist regime of accumulation involved changing the national form to promote a return to prosperity by identifying and enhancing scale-specific capacities. This shift also involved the progressive removal of guarantees against failure. In Canada's case, the role of the national state was about to change for the first time from that of stabilizer to promoter of innovation. Ottawa's efforts encouraged the provinces to identify problematic areas, patterns of growth, and sectors on which they could capitalize. Although these efforts were not new, slow growth and unemployment in the 1970s intensified Ottawa's concern over regions and the key department promoting the turn towards innovation, the Department of Regional Economic Expansion, demanded greater specificity in planning as economic circumstances worsened.³⁶⁷

The Department of Regional Economic Expansion triggered an "alphabet soup" of acronyms as the national state tried to cope with ever-shifting circumstances. Every new acronym spelled out a more specific response to a problem by the federal government.³⁶⁸ The impetus for heightened specificity, as Brodie shows, arose out of provincial concerns. Above all, the interest in mitigating uneven development, which had marked Canada's post-war national state, began to wane as the successor to Regional Economic Expansion, the Department of Regional and Industrial Expansion, aimed to pick winners which, by extension, meant forgetting about "losers."³⁶⁹

In accounts of regional development, the federal government's foray into cities is often neglected, yet a new interest in urban management grew alongside the concern for regions. The crisis ridden 1970s had benefited some cities while disadvantaging others, causing new problems for economic planning. Cities in Alberta, such as Calgary,

enjoyed a growth spurt from the international oil crisis of 1973, while cities in non-petroleum producing provinces faced different circumstances. As Bradford shows, the new federal interest in urban development signalled a turn away from the Keynesian-Fordist state because ideas of "place" began to find a warmer reception, partly as a reaction to the weight Keynesianism placed on national spaces.

Ottawa founded a new ministry, the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs (MSUA), to more closely implicate itself in sub-national affairs. The MSUA collected information about urban Canada and then applied it to policymaking. This was important in light of the uneven development in Canada's urban system.³⁷⁰ The original intent of the MSUA had been to bring together federal departments and agencies to focus on urban issues and engender new forms of intergovernmental relations once *federal* urban policies were identified and integrated. Towards the end of its life, however, the MSUA had abandoned any plans to develop a national urban policy, choosing instead to target city places and offer technical advice to cities. Bureaucratic territorialism and provincial resentment towards a new federal ministry "interfering" in provincial affairs contributed to the MSUA's failure.³⁷¹

Although the MSUA only existed from 1971 to 1979, it did succeed in promoting an emphasis on places as capable of regenerating economies. If regional policies sought to stimulate provincial economic activity, then the MSUA may be interpreted as an attempt to forge new federal-municipal relations, as part of a broader move towards an appropriate territorial mix to replace the previous political arrangements. For example, in one of its last reports, the MSUA commented on the usefulness of national aggregates. Averages, it believed, missed the contexts that cities were operating in and definite steps

had to be taken to solve locale-specific problems.³⁷² Indeed, the MSUA argued that a different international economic environment was forming in which cities represented key nodes to facilitate capital flows. A report written by D. Michael Ray highlighted the networks cultivated between cities, which were helped along by the international relationships forged by their national states. In this case, the nature of the Canadian economy meant Canadian cities were tied in with American cities.³⁷³ For smaller Canadian cities that lacked international connections, the MSUA still encouraged them to attempt local experimentations.³⁷⁴ More vitally, the MSUA took a number of separate federal programmes and rolled them into one. The Community Services Program – an amalgamation of the Neighbourhood Improvement Program, the Municipal Infrastructure Program, and the Municipal Incentive Grant Program – had hoped to help the provinces adjust at the city scale by bettering their infrastructural capacities. Using federal dollars, the provinces could choose how they wanted to use Community Services Programs funds.³⁷⁵

4.1.2 Towards a New Form of National State: Competition through Continentalization

The exercises pursued in the 1970s aimed to construct a new role for the federal government under changing international conditions. Singular thinking about national spaces was replaced by plural thinking as different spaces had different contributions to make to the Canadian economy. In the face of international disorder, the federal state's attempts to assert a stabilizing role ended unsuccessfully and growth rates remained sluggish alongside stubborn unemployment. Moreover, no new spatial compromise was reached because, as Thorburn notes, federal initiatives were met with provincial resistance.³⁷⁶ While this "interventionism" was more an Ottawa-led adjustment than

anything else, the federal government under Trudeau was acting in a manner typical of a small country reliant on the international economy. As Katzenstein notes, "Political laissez-faire is a luxury of large industrial countries, a luxury which the small European states cannot indulge."³⁷⁷

Still, the 1970s did provide the foundation for a post-Golden Age Canadian federal state that would encourage sub-national innovation. A search was started to find the best form to stimulate innovation amongst the numerous spaces comprising the Canadian political economy. In effect, this reflected transition to a SPWR at the national scale. "Transitions," as Jessop suggests, "are moments of disjunction and relative openness. They involve relatively unstructured complexity as the preceding structural coherence decomposes and new institutional fixes are sought."³⁷⁸

An alternative method of policymaking at the national scale had to be found as the national and international problems of the 1970s refused to go away even with the arrival of a new decade. Outside Canada, an unregulated space of competition continued to exist and grow while inside Canada, debts, deficits, and escalating inflation limited policy choices.³⁷⁹ The turning point in all of this was the appointment of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada in 1982, headed by Donald Macdonald.³⁸⁰ In recounting the Commission's work, Macdonald posited that it was motivated by the impulse to remake the national economy.³⁸¹ To put the Macdonald Commission in scalar language, the central question it faced was: What role for the state at the national scale in managing the contradictions of an unregulated international space of competition?

The Macdonald Commission's findings proved enormously significant for the

Canadian national state. Reporting in 1985 to a government now led by the Progressive Conservatives under Brian Mulroney, the Commission produced a statement on the national state's role that suggested a significant reordering of inter-scalar arrangements.³⁸² It made two central recommendations. First, it recommended the consolidation of a defined space of competition via a free trade agreement with Canada's main trading partner, the USA. Second, it argued that enhancing Canada's economic prospects required national stabilization, i.e. tackling inflation rather than unemployment.³⁸³

The free trade debates of the 1980s have often been presented as a contest between nationalists and continentalists. A more nuanced approach may be to see these debates as contests over the appropriate role that the state at the national scale should play and whether states or markets should lead adjustment.³⁸⁴ This is not to discount the role that nationalism had played. Doern and Tomlin distinguish between old and new nationalists. Old nationalists, who were never more than a minority, reacted to a perceived Americanization of Canada and they were eager to keep Sir John A. Macdonald's east-west dream alive. New nationalists, who were broader based, expressed concern over the costs of adjustments ensuing from free trade. Thus, new nationalists called for states to lead.³⁸⁵ Continentalists, in contrast, viewed exposing Canada to international, i.e. North American, competition as a means to animate competitive tendencies.³⁸⁶

4.1.3 Continentalizing Spatial Targeting

The Commission's findings on the free trade option were seized on by the Mulroney government to solidify a particular national state form. Yet particular sub-national forms had to be consolidated too. Thus, Clarkson's argument that Mulroney

sought to accomplish national restructuring through continentalization, leaving it to the provinces to stake out "Canada's" continental place, was prescient³⁸⁷ as the Macdonald Commission emphasized getting the provinces to locate their own places of prosperity. More specifically, the Macdonald Commission advised Ottawa to "not involve itself directly in regional job creation. Its responsibilities end with its commitment to overcome regional productivity gaps and labour market imperfections." At the same time, the Commission recommended the federal government provide support for provincial growth poles. Thus, national policies should stimulate an efficient allocation of resources based on provincial capacities.³⁸⁸

The Macdonald Commission's statements on municipal-provincial relations have largely been overlooked. The Commission recommended re-examining municipal-provincial relations to produce more capable urban economies.³⁸⁹ This was of particular importance given the Macdonald Commission's *de facto* acceptance of a space of competition. Principally, a city's ability to attract people was contingent on its amenities' cosmetic attractiveness, arts, and major league sports facilities. The notion of image-making in the services of inter-urban competition informed the Macdonald Commission's position and would form an important component of future urban economic strategies. The Macdonald Commission predicted the trajectory of Canadian economic development to be primarily urban, therefore losing the urban edge could weaken economic growth.³⁹⁰

As the Macdonald Commission had warned, Ottawa's entanglements with sub-national scales of government made the complete federal withdrawal that Mulroney had hoped for impossible.³⁹¹ Existing inter-scalar arrangements could not be done away with on a whim, but they could be re-examined in order to orient them towards hollowing out

the (Keynesian-Fordist) state. Existing inter-scalar arrangements did, however, restrict the avenues of transformation, forcing the Canadian state at the national scale to work with what it had. Nevertheless, the Macdonald Commission advised Ottawa not to nurture sunrise industries, while touting general research and development (R&D) activity. Thus, markets should determine what R&D is required and the national state should respond only when a growth pole seems to be on surer footing.³⁹² Such a neo-liberal perspective drove the Mulroney government's policies on innovation in the late 1980s.

Prior to the Macdonald Commission's published recommendations and the 1989 Canada-US Free Trade Agreement, the now defunct federal Science Council of Canada had observed the necessity of nurturing a national-local relationship: "A wise national policy will take account of these local initiatives, build on them and attempt to ensure they are complementary."³⁹³ Cities should develop their own "metropolitan technology council" to boost nascent industries. Each metropolitan technology council "should be funded by senior governments and local municipalities, with supplements from corporate and institutional member subscriptions."³⁹⁴ For this strategy to succeed, however, federal or provincial secretariats would be needed to monitor local developments and prevent potential inter-urban competition that lead to unnecessary duplication, allowing islands of specialization to bloom.³⁹⁵

Rocher and Rouillard criticize continentalization on the grounds that it put to rest national regulation.³⁹⁶ Since the 1970s, however, national regulation of a different form was taking hold. A Keynesian-Fordist form of national state space was being reconstituted along Schumpeterian lines. What this new form of national state space did

take for granted, however, was the willingness of the state at sub-national scales to pursue innovation under a changed international environment. If the Keynesian-Fordist arrangement was falling apart, then the relations between scales maintaining them would be transformed as well.

4.2 Ontario Responds to the Crisis: What's Good for Canada Is (Not) Good for Ontario

4.2.1 Contending State Forms: The Struggle for a New Ontario State in the 1970s

If anything could be said of Ontario's role in Canada's post-war settlement, it is perhaps that the national state's framework helped temper Ontario's traditional stance *vis-à-vis* federalism. At the end of the post-war boom and the beginning of the Keynesian-Fordist decline, however, some tension returned to the relationship between Ontario and Canada. Not only had Ottawa taken away dollars from the provinces when they needed them most, but the federal initiatives aiming to enhance provincial capacities were inadequate. For Ontario, this meant that it would have to become less "invisible" than it had been during post-war Canada's heyday. This would involve Ontario more aggressively pursuing its own interests as the Canadian state reterritorialized in response to the Keynesian-Fordist collapse.

Responding to the earliest signs of crisis, Robarts's Ontario moved to co-operate with municipalities to achieve long-run growth through careful budgeting. This represented a first attempt to reconfigure provincial-municipal scalar relations. To complement this, Queen's Park invited Ottawa to shift federal budgeting priorities to the short-run by covering provincial shortfalls, but the federal government's own budgetary pressures led it to reject this proposal.³⁹⁷ Queen's Park was also disappointed with Ottawa's allegedly weak response to protectionism in the USA, Ontario's main market.

For example, as Armstrong recounted, "Premier William Davis has declared that if federal action is not forthcoming to offset the effects of the 10 per cent surcharge on imports, imposed by President Richard Nixon in August 1971, upon Ontario businesses, then the provincial government will take action."³⁹⁸ These matters combined to point to an uncomfortable political reality in the federation: Ontario kept quiet so long as Canada worked for Ontario; otherwise, Ontario would take its own path. That Ontario sought to rework its inter-scalar arrangements with the federal and municipal scales of government, however, represented a means for Ontario to pursue its variant of reterritorialization.

Federal-provincial relations were not the only source of inter-scalar tension for Ontario because municipal pursuit of short-term growth countered Queen's Park's plans for consistent long-term growth. Just like Ottawa, Queen's Park pursued regional development policies to contain a growing economic crisis. In 1965, Ontario launched a regional development programme, Design for Development, and Robarts's government proposed redrawing municipal boundaries to reflect provincially-set economic regions. Not only could this have overhauled the Ontario state and its components, but municipal growth patterns may have been realigned with the province's.³⁹⁹ Without municipal collaboration, Ontario could not hope to achieve stable growth rates in the long-run. The provincial and municipal scales were intertwined for the protection afforded to municipalities under the post-war era helped to lock in Ontario's centrality to the Canadian federation. Therefore, a new era of provincial-municipal relations were required to resolve the Keynesian-Fordist crisis, thereby maintaining Ontarian centrality.⁴⁰⁰

Yet, Queen's Park was facing problems at the provincial scale as industrial

restructuring became a reality. When job losses first struck Ontario in 1970, Premier Robarts asked Ontarians to channel their discontent towards Ottawa and not Queen's Park, claiming that the Bank of Canada's macroeconomic policies had put Ontario in an undesirable situation. However plausible this may have been, Queen's Park's policy during the post-war era had been to attract American investment which could potentially leave Ontario vulnerable to American decisions. Moreover, the ecological destruction embodied in Fordist production methods could no longer be ignored in southern Ontario. As a result, the production paradigm prevailing in Ontario encountered the first instances of political opposition.⁴⁰¹

The direction that Ontario would take in the 1970s was not entirely clear. Bradford has argued that the federalism of the unstable 1970s indicated a shift in the provinces' political roles. Whereas the provinces had been junior partners in post-war Canada, the crisis turned them into partners. In particular, the oil crisis emboldened a new round of province-building,⁴⁰² which seems also to have been the case for Ontario. Unlike oil-rich Alberta, which sought to free itself from national obligations, oil-dependent Ontario demanded federal action to stem the political instabilities that threatened its political economic centrality to the federation, with some success. Striking a deal in 1974 with the Department of Regional Economic Expansion through Design for Development, Ontario secured the Canada-Ontario General Development Agreement to further the province's regional development efforts.⁴⁰³

Generally, Ontario preferred comprehensive regional development programmes. To this extent, Design for Development was put aside in favour of the Regional Planning Branch "to encourage the development of comprehensive planning policies for the entire

province in which physical, economic, social, and environmental components would be mutually reinforcing."⁴⁰⁴ This was Ontario's own first cut version of a SPWR at the provincial scale as the government sought to identify the places and spaces capable of reflating Ontario's economy. In spite of Ontario's best efforts throughout the 1970s, however, it failed to secure an effective inter-scalar innovation strategy. International disorder may have contributed to this, leaving Ontario with an uncertain position inside the federation. Under Trudeau, Ottawa attempted to recondition the national state's geo-political and geo-economic relationships, but only on the federal government's terms. Despite the Canada-Ontario General Development Agreement, Queen's Park started seeing Ottawa as a competing jurisdiction that distorted a just allocation of resources with its regional development policies.⁴⁰⁵

Ontario realized the challenge of the new environment it faced. The spatial security of Keynesian-Fordist Canada was not going to return. Less trusting of the federal government and cognizant of international disorder, the Ontario state began pursuing policies designed to strengthen the competitiveness of its economy. The first announcement, which occurred at the end of Robarts's tenure as premier, focused on updating job skills and encouraging investment.⁴⁰⁶

While Ontario suffered the lowest rate of growth amongst the provinces between 1970 and 1977,⁴⁰⁷ an active Ontario state was not automatically accepted as the means to counter this. Robarts's successor, Bill Davis, took office in 1971 and announced government, i.e. the *federal* government, was part of the problem. In fact, Queen's Park intervened in the provincial economy to combat job losses, but this led to rising deficits, which Davis wanted to curtail by promising (1) to reduce the public sector's size by

making the bureaucracy more efficient and (2) to help expand private sector activity. Furthermore, Queen's Park proposed a "reprivatization" scheme to allow private sector actors to bid on public sector activities. Here, the rationale was to expand the public sector's knowledge base and expertise by drawing on the private sector's experiences and practices. The Ontario government also moved to decentralize programme delivery to local governments. The objective here was to enlarge the size and scope of local government to carry out provincial directives. Continuing with Robarts's reforms, then, Davis was fleshing out the Ontarian variant of a Schumpeterian post-national workfare regime. Reprivatization and decentralizing programme delivery point to a way in which Ontario could more effectively reposition the provincial scale in an era of uncertainty. At the same time, Ontario was critical of federal "interventionism," while ignoring provincial plans that were just as interventionist.⁴⁰⁸

The "active Ontario" and "problematic government" perspectives fomented internecine battles within the sitting government. The Conservatives were responsible for programming post-war Ontario and ideological ruptures inside the province's ruling party indicated the political end of Keynesian-Fordist Ontario's run. Inside the Conservative Party, two camps formed and debated the features of a post-Golden Age Ontario. The first camp rejected the link between a good business environment and an active government and believed the two were irreconcilable, while the second camp articulated a more nuanced view, arguing that an active government was necessary precisely because the changing business environment indicated the end of Keynesianism-Fordism.

The first confrontation between the two camps occurred during the 1973 oil shock that had halted Ontario's long boom. Here, the active government camp prevailed,

reflected in the Ontario Charter produced during the 1977 election. Like the 22 Points Declaration explored in the third chapter, the Ontario Charter plotted a path for provincial prosperity that relied on electoral support rather than technocratic expertise as witnessed in Ottawa.⁴⁰⁹ Thus, an active state would be the form that a competitive Ontario state would follow from 1980 onwards.

4.2.2 The Rise of the Competitive State in Ontario: 1980-1995

Davis's vision for a post-Golden Age Ontario state clearly emphasized competitiveness. The Davis government founded the Board of Industrial Leadership and Development (BILD), which was the clearest statement on an *after*-Fordist Ontario. BILD was intended to rectify the political and economic contradictions of the 1970s by reworking Ontario's political economic fabric. Specifically, Queen's Park would refashion its own framework to reinforce the province as the key space of accumulation within the wider Canadian political economy. "Economic transformation" and "ecological modernization" meant channelling BILD's energies into fostering industries with the greatest potential to succeed. This strategy included retraining the workforce because the transition necessitated the conversion of a low- and semi-skilled Fordist workforce to a high-skilled after-Fordist workforce.⁴¹⁰

BILD's multi-faceted programme *implicitly* supported the rise of sub-provincial spaces of innovation as part of a wider provincial effort against changing inter-scalar relationships. On the matter of ecological modernization, BILD was eager to break Ontario's addiction to oil because the 1970s showed (1) cheap energy was no longer a given and (2) the potential stood for a national shift of political economic power westward, i.e. oil-rich Alberta. Indeed, cheap oil had very much driven Keynesian-

Fordism in all industrial democracies to sustain economic geographies of accumulation and dominance which revolved around automobiles and suburbanization.⁴¹¹ In order to reduce Ontario's dependence on oil and prevent a shift in Canada's economic geography, BILD pledged support to municipal public transportation projects that decreased the reliance on oil.⁴¹² In this way, BILD was partly designed to embark on a new round of infrastructure building that would (re-)link the municipal and provincial scales with one another.

If the national scale of the Canadian state would learn from the Macdonald Commission that exiting existing post-war inter-scalar relationships were counterproductive, then BILD could be interpreted as Ontario's admission that the inter-scalar relationship between the province and the municipalities had to be reconfigured to create a competitive Ontario. BILD's explicit support for local sites of innovation was embodied in the Innovation Development for Employment Advance (IDEA) Corporation. IDEA was formed to monitor and report on the progress of the province's clusters. In addition, IDEA, which assisted cluster formation, was "empowered to purchase patents and license rights" and "enter into joint research and development ventures with the private sector."⁴¹³ As BILD stated, "This coordinated approach to industrial research and development should foster the interchange of staff among universities, industry, and research clusters."⁴¹⁴ BILD felt that these measures would (1) reduce Ontario's reliance on foreign technology transfers to boost productivity and (2) provide long-term funding for new investments which would have been difficult to obtain through Canadian banks.⁴¹⁵ Indeed, as Table 4.2.2.1 demonstrates, BILD's R&D strategy was to promote innovation in specific Ontario cities through the use of public agencies. What is perhaps

most telling about these agencies is that those responsible for raising capital – the IDEA Corporation and the Biotechnology Company – were located in the province's (and country's) main financial centre, Toronto. In other words, Toronto's financial cluster could be harnessed to motor after-Fordist Ontario.

Table 4.2.2.1: Ontario's R&D agencies.

Agency	Purpose	Proposed City/Region
IDEA Corporation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stimulate research and development Engage directly in the development of firms 	Toronto
Auto Parts Technology Centre	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provide resources for firms in the automotive sector to respond to challenges and opportunities 	Chatham or the Niagara Peninsula
Microelectronics Development Centre	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Re-establish Ontario as a key exporter of cutting-edge microelectronic products 	Cambridge or Ottawa
CAD/CAM Development and Training Facility	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Help firms to adopt and integrate microelectronics into their production systems 	Undetermined
The Biotechnology Company	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Work with investors to finance firms developing biotechnology products 	Toronto
Centre for Toxicology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Research the long-term effects of commercial and industrial chemicals on public health and how to remedy their presence in the environment Assist firms with the development of safer chemicals for sale 	Joint action between Guelph's University of Guelph and Toronto's University of Toronto

Source: BILD, *Building Ontario in the 1980's*, pp. 27-30.

BILD also proposed local regeneration schemes in which the province would engage with municipalities to identify communities' strengths and weaknesses. Growth poles could then be established at local scales to support the province's long-term planning strategy.⁴¹⁶ By 1985, however, BILD came to an end as internecine battles within the Progressive Conservative Party re-emerged. While the active Ontario side won out during the 1970s, Bill Davis's decision to step down opened the door for the anti-government camp to take the lead. Though Frank Miller's government lasted for four months, its decision to abandon BILD in favour of Enterprise Ontario briefly took Ontario in a tax-cutting direction to stimulate the growth of innovative small businesses. Enterprise Ontario too was abandoned, however, when the government fell in 1985 and

was replaced by a minority Liberal government working with the New Democratic Party (NDP). The new government indicated that a proactive province could enable competitiveness under internationalizing conditions. Such a "proactive" province, however, did not challenge the zero sum logic contained in the space of competition where a jurisdiction wins only when another jurisdiction loses. As a result, "competitiveness" translated into accepting a state of permanent economic insecurity.⁴¹⁷

Peterson continued Davis's agenda, establishing the Premier's Council to form a made-in-Ontario industrial strategy. Ontario would become a high-technology, knowledge-intensive, and high-skilled jurisdiction to compete in the space of competition opened by the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA). Firms rather than regions would make Ontario a competitive jurisdiction. As well, firms receiving provincial support would act as conduits to build up local capacities, which amounted to a form of regional planning. The Premier's Council fit with Ottawa's efforts to create a North American space of competition.⁴¹⁸

Ontario's embrace of competitiveness can be attributed to Ottawa-based initiatives to change the terms of post-war federalism. Yet, this should not be interpreted as an attempt by Ontario to save post-war federalism. Nelles points out that Mulroney's tactics to de-legitimize the national state deliberately alienated Ontario from federal policymaking and privileged Alberta and Quebec, provinces traditionally objecting to Ottawa's presence in "provincial" affairs. Indeed, Ottawa's displeasure with Ontario points to the losses in translation between scales during transitioning state forms. Just as Ottawa wanted, Ontario was acting in its own best interests by prolonging its economic boom. Ironically, Ontario was the most continentalized provincial economy and,

therefore, the least dependent on the national state.⁴¹⁹

Yet the province's alienation from the federal government contributed to Ontario refusing to lend its support to the federal government's project for a free trade agreement with the USA.⁴²⁰ Though the Canadian state at the national scale sought to create a continental space of competition and simultaneously reterritorialize the Canadian state to nurse a new national regime of accumulation, it had done so without including Ontario.

The CUSFTA as a space of competition had consequences for Ontario as a space of competitiveness. Free trade proponents like McCallum and Lipsey contend that the CUSFTA pried open American markets for Canadian goods. This engendered comparative advantage and led Canadians to produce what they were best at producing.⁴²¹ Yet as Jackson shows, the CUSFTA most affected Ontario. Between 1989 and 1992, one in five manufacturing jobs had been shed, with most of the layoffs done by American firms.⁴²² CUSFTA and its successor, the 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), lacked the institutional mechanisms to support the trade agreements' provisions and curtail American power. As a result, the competitive position of Canadian goods *vis à vis* American markets would be determined more by the value of the Canadian dollar and less by the CUSFTA/NAFTA.⁴²³

As financial markets determined Ontario's competitive position in the wider North American space economy, this placed the province in a permanent state of (re)adjustment, representing what Robert Boyer describes as a "finance-led regime of accumulation." This finance-led regime of accumulation exposes economies to persistent instability. The short-term time horizons built into speculative activities may force constant economic readjustment in order to capitalize on prevailing short-run

tendencies.⁴²⁴ It may also condition responses to price signals and cause firms to refrain from investing in new technologies and updating labour market skills. In other words, the insecurity associated with a short-term, finance-led regime of accumulation discourages long-term strategies. Yet some headway was made during Peterson under the Premier's Council to counter the price signal strategy.

The Premier's Council's Technology Fund established the Industry Research Program to direct research in a direction which (1) displaced imports or (2) enhanced Ontario's export potential. To achieve this, centres of excellence would be organized to form tighter links between universities and firms. This technology strategy was sustained under the social democratic successor to Peterson's Liberal government, Bob Rae's NDP, through the Sector Partnership Fund. The Sector Partnership Fund, however, went beyond the Industry Research Program by bringing business, labour, and the provincial state together to discuss and implement a long-term industrial strategy for Ontario.⁴²⁵

The business recalcitrance over the interventionist strategy taken in NDP Ontario has been well documented already and will not be recounted here.⁴²⁶ Two points are of note about this situation, though. First, Ontario's industrial culture shows, at best, little interest in long-term, strategic planning. This can be blamed on the legacy of Keynesian-Fordist Ontario's belief that the state should refrain from placing any demands on capital. The combination of the CUSFTA and the Bank of Canada's monetary policy made it difficult for Ontario businesses to plan for the long-term given the economic environment they were operating in.⁴²⁷ Such an economic environment led to businesses to resent provincial initiatives "interfering" with their operations.

Second, the Liberal and NDP governments' focus on a provincial innovation

strategy led them to ignore the need to develop municipal capacities. The last such initiative had taken place briefly in the 1970s. At that time, economic decline halted planning because the electorate would object to constricting investment.⁴²⁸ In the 1980s and 1990s, municipal planning took the form of scattered amalgamations. The principle here was to consolidate the financially worse off municipalities with financially better off municipalities in order to better service areas and realize the infrastructures needed to promote development.⁴²⁹ In effect, the province was reinforcing its Keynesian-Fordist stance by letting the municipalities to determine the pace and nature of economic development rather than the province. In sum, the inter-scalar transformations and battles between Ontario and Canada during Keynesian-Fordism's interruption led to the province becoming self-absorbed.

4.3 A Waterfront in Crisis: Making, Solving, and Renewing Inter-scalar Tensions

4.3.1 Toronto Comes Into Its Own and Goes Its Own: The Usefulness of Crisis

If the unravelling of Keynesian-Fordism led to tensions between Canada and Ontario, the same may not be said of Toronto. As the previous chapter had shown, Toronto had become the centrepiece of the Canadian political economy because the nature of post-war federalism insulated cities from economic shocks. The period of crisis meant something different for the city, as changes to Toronto's political economy became visible. Keynesian-Fordism's long decline pushed the Canadian and Ontarian governments to search for a competitiveness strategy that would fit in the emergent North American space of competition. Toronto's response to the crisis stemmed from the senior scales of the state's preoccupation with their own vitality which, paradoxically, led them to undertake local interventions. In this way, the crisis provided the city with an

opportunity to become more assertive. While Toronto may have pursued its own strategy to make the city a competitive scale, it did not proceed with the kinds of hollowing out processes launched at the federal and provincial scales.

Toronto's reaction to the crisis was, on the surface, counterintuitive. Although it experienced industrial decline, the city expended little energy to stem deindustrialization, even if lip service was paid to this in the 1970 Official Plan. The 1970 Official Plan noted, "Council will encourage industries to locate in the City which require ready access to the harbour or to the business facilities of the Central Area."⁴³⁰ The Official Plan's attitude towards industry was indicative of how the Keynesian-Fordist crisis would be managed in Toronto. Whereas manufacturing's troubles posed significant challenges to the growth regime nationally and provincially, locally they were seen to open up opportunities. As the previous chapter explored, the city's regime of accumulation had diverged somewhat from the national and provincial regimes for it was tending towards a stereotypical, white-collar "post-industrial" political economy. The period of crisis had accelerated this as Toronto's employment composition changed. Between 1971 and 1991, manufacturing as a share of employment fell below 20% to 17.1% while services rose from 55.8% to 70.7%.

Toronto was reacting to what it had perceived as the excesses associated with Keynesian-Fordism: untrammelled growth, car-centred built environments, and ecological degradation. The reform movement of the 1970s represented the first political expression for an un-Fordist Toronto as a winning coalition of social democrats and urban conservatives mindful of social cohesion – Red Tories – actively pursued saving Toronto from being bulldozed in the name of perpetual growth and pushed for better

building designs.⁴³¹

Toronto's middle class became increasingly critical of the logics residing in the institutional complexes governing Keynesian-Fordist Toronto, i.e. Metro and Toronto's City Council. Greater civic participation formed part of the reform movement's agenda, with downtown Toronto as the epicentre. The decisions made surrounding the downtown focused on its economic role rather than on the social implications for its residents.⁴³² Caulfield has narrated the rise of Toronto's reform movement led by David Crombie and it will not be repeated here. What is important to note, however, is that actors in the reform era wanted a different kind of growth to take root in Toronto, which respected the character of surrounding neighbourhoods and complemented the social and economic complexion of downtown Toronto. As stated in the first chapter, grassroots movements can inadvertently contribute to the conditions precipitating urban entrepreneurialism. Undoubtedly, the reform movement was popularly based but one outcome of its actions was to place importance on the city's visual appearance rather than challenging perpetual growth.⁴³³ We shall return to this in chapter six.

Toronto began experiencing a manufacturing exodus. Plants not only shut down in Toronto, but they migrated outside of Metro's limits too. At this point, the regions outside of Metro – Durham, Halton, Peel, and York – begin to grow and exert their own pressures on the city in two forms. First, as Table 4.3.1.1 demonstrates, they began to draw manufacturing employment away from Toronto and Metro. Second, commuting communities started to put stress on Toronto's downtown core. As Table 4.3.1.2 shows, while Metro experienced a modest 9.1% population increase between 1971 and 1991 and Toronto's population actually declined by 10.9%, the 905 belt's population exploded,

increasing by 195.4%.

Table 4.3.1.1: Percent Change in Manufacturing Employment in the GTA, 1971-1991.

City/Region	1971-1981	1981-1991	1971-1991
Toronto	-13.5	-19.8	-30.6
Metropolitan Toronto	12.2	-25.4	-16.2
Metro minus Toronto	23.5	-27.1	-9.9
905	122.8	17.5	161.9
GTA	40.5	-8.0	29.3

Sources: Statistics Canada, *1971 Census of Canada Industries*, Cat No 94-471, Statistics Canada, *1981 Census of Canada Population*, Cat No 93-966, Statistics Canada, *Profile of Census Divisions and Subdivisions in Ontario – Part B*, Cat No 95-338

Table 4.3.1.2: Total Population and Percent Change of Population in the GTA, 1971-1991.

City/Region	Total Population in Each Year			Percent Change of Population by Period		
	1971	1981	1991	1971-1981	1981-1991	1971-1991
Toronto	712,786	599,217	635,395	-15.9	6.0	-10.9
East York	104,784	101,974	102,696	-2.7	0.7	-2.0
Etobicoke	282,686	298,713	309,993	5.7	3.8	9.7
North York	504,150	559,521	562,564	11.0	0.5	11.6
Scarborough	334,310	443,353	524,598	32.6	18.3	56.9
Borough of York	147,301	134,617	140,525	-8.6	4.4	-4.6
Total Metro minus Toronto	1,373,231	1,538,178	1,640,375	12.0	6.6	19.5
Total Metro	2,086,017	2,137,359	2,275,771	2.5	6.5	9.1
Durham	47,494	283,639	409,070	497.0	44.2	761.3
Halton	190,469	253,883	313,136	33.3	23.3	64.4
Peel	259,402	490,731	732,798	89.2	49.3	182.5
York	166,060	252,053	504,981	51.8	100.4	204.1
Total 905	663,425	1,280,306	1,959,985	93.0	53.1	195.4
Total GTA	2,749,442	3,417,665	4,235,756	24.3	23.9	54.1

Sources: Statistics Canada, *1971 Census of Canada Households*, Cat No 93-702, Statistics Canada, *1981 Census of Canada Census Divisions and Subdivisions*, Cat No 95-988, Statistics Canada, *Profile of Census Divisions and Subdivisions in Ontario – Part A*, Cat No 95-337

The growth centred in Durham, Halton, Peel, and York (see Table 4.3.1.1) would come to be known as the 905 belt, named after the telephone area code introduced in 1993, and form the Greater Toronto Area with Toronto (GTA) (see Map 4.3.1.1). Even though the full force of this growth would not be realized until the latter half of the 1980s, it did have implications for the City of Toronto, especially the legitimacy of Metro.

At the risk of overstating Metro's effectiveness, its post-war role as a space to manage growth had ensured suburban growth did not eat away at Toronto's downtown. Yet the 905's rise put Metro's regional planning role into question because it had no say in matters outside its jurisdiction. In some respect, this led Toronto to more aggressively protect the downtown from suburbanizing pressures; Metro's *raison d'être* appeared to be

at an end.⁴³⁴ It is not without irony, then, that Metro was created in the 1950s to manage but not challenge suburban growth. That meant this suburban growth occurred beyond its borders, hampering Metro's ability to effectively manage the relationship between the City of Toronto and its Metro neighbours.

Map 4.3.1.1: The Greater Toronto Area. The province amalgamated Metro Toronto into a single unit, the City of Toronto, in 1998.

Source: GTA Task Force, *Report of the GTA Task Force* [scanned reproduction].

Metro faced legitimacy questions on another front too. As noted above, Toronto's reformers had pledged citizen involvement in city planning, breaking the pre-reform days' tradition of purely technocratic city planning. Neighbourhood associations, business associations, labour, and City Council engaged in a dialogue on the city's (after-Fordist) future through the new Core Area Task Force.⁴³⁵ Metro chose not to move in a participatory direction, staying with the position that Gardiner established: planning should be kept out of the public arena because it ought to remain apolitical.⁴³⁶ Thus, tensions emerged between Metro and Toronto. What was good for Metropolitan Toronto was not always good for Toronto and vice-versa and this tension persisted into the 1990s.⁴³⁷ All in all, Metro's role in co-ordinating Fordist growth lost steam.

The combination of growth outside of Metropolitan Toronto's borders and Metro's waning political legitimacy emboldened the City of Toronto to take a more assertive stance. Yet the changes to intra-scalar arrangements cannot be divorced from changes induced by the actions at the federal and provincial scales of the state. Especially where the turn towards the then little known strategy of image-making is concerned, federal and provincial actions contributed to the middle class activism that the city had begun to nourish. Of significance here is the federal government's Neighbourhood Improvement Plan of 1973, administered by the MSUA, which made resources available to renew rather than level existing housing stocks. Materially, this furthered the inner city gentrification that had already begun apace.⁴³⁸ Indeed, the Neighbourhood Improvement Plan contributed to what Ley identifies as the value of "difference" associated with downtown living. In contrast to the perceived blandness of suburban built environments, downtown living provided a social marker for the middle classes inhabiting downtowns.⁴³⁹ Protecting this social marker, however, required a definite political programme.

Arguably, a defining moment for the middle class radicalism in Toronto was the defeat of the Spadina Expressway in 1971. Symbolic of Fordist city planning *and* a Metro plan, plans for the Spadina Expressway required slicing through downtown neighbourhoods. Desfor, Keil, Kipfer and Wekerle have pointed out that the Spadina Expressway's protests were a crucial moment in the formation of an active middle class citizenry in Toronto. It helped to propel quality of life issues into the public sphere that Fordist styles supposedly neglected in the pursuit of endless growth.⁴⁴⁰ This also brought to the province's attention the political implications of the manner of urban growth and

the Spadina Expressway was squashed by Queen's Park. The province decided to support a different path of growth *inside* Toronto. Provincial funds would be channelled into public transit instead of more roads.⁴⁴¹ For that reason, the province made a *de facto* admission that urban qualities of life deserved protection. So, while local protests were instrumental in bringing this to light, the province's powers to override municipal decisions made it a decisive scale in this instance.

Provincial efforts to remake the institutions governing the Toronto region remained weak, however. The only attempt to govern after-Fordist growth in Toronto and its surrounding areas came in the form of the Toronto-centred region. Queen's Park intended to contain the growth in Halton and Peel Regions along a corridor following the Lake Ontario shoreline.⁴⁴² This plan, however, died as a result of "a coalition of exurban landowners, developers, and politicians and undermined by the growth-oriented infrastructure and commuter transit policies of the provincial government."⁴⁴³ The Toronto centred-region's defeat does not, however, contradict the province's decision to put public transit in the Spadina Expressway's stead. It was a distinctly after-Fordist style of planning and the importance accrued to highways was linked to Toronto's deindustrialization. The shift away from mass production towards just-in-time production necessitated firms' closer proximity to highway networks and the regions outside of Metro had plenty of this. They also had large tracts of land to accommodate firms' new production requirements. Concurrently, Toronto saw corporate decision-making activities intensify inside its boundaries as manufacturing and routine office jobs left the city for Toronto's periphery.⁴⁴⁴

While this regionalization trend deepened, the province failed to provide the

political infrastructure needed to keep pace, preferring instead to have existing provincial agencies deal with growth issues as they emerged or to establish issue-specific boards acting as GTA roundtables.⁴⁴⁵ The failure to provide an institutional fix at a regional level pushed the city to assert its multiple centralities. Under the banner of city reform, protecting the downtown core was justified by demonstrating Toronto's importance at and above the local scale.⁴⁴⁶ Specifically, the quality of life issue that put an end to the Spadina Expressway's construction acted as the supporting discourse in the remaking of Toronto in a post-Keynesian-Fordist world. Indeed, the inter-scalar crisis triggered by the end of Keynesian-Fordism afforded Toronto the opportunity to assert its importance to a number of scales. Notable here is the federal and provincial recognition of a space of competition. As the previous chapter showed, Toronto's emergence as Canada's and Ontario's primary city during the Keynesian-Fordist era primed it as a regulator of Canadian capitalism. The emerging international space of competition, rooted in the dismantling of Bretton Woods, reaffirmed *but also deepened* Toronto's command-and-control role in the Canadian economy.⁴⁴⁷

As Toronto entered the 1980s, the distinctiveness associated with downtown living led the city to capitalize on its linkages to the global political economy. Under the mayoralty of Art Eggleton, Toronto instigated a "world class city" project. Inside the Toronto of the 1980s, the salience of luxury goods and services reflected the city's changing economic base. Underlying economic shifts saw abandoned industrial buildings being salvaged for non-industrial and residential purposes.⁴⁴⁸ As Table 4.3.1.3 shows, the household income demographics changed substantially between 1981 and 1991. The number of upper income households in the City of Toronto increased while

the number of lower and lower-middle income households dropped. The number of middle income households, however, more than doubled, maintaining a strong presence within the city.

Table 4.3.1.3: Number and Percent Change of Toronto Households by Income, 1981-1991.

Income Level	1981	1991	Percent change from 1981 to 1991
Low	54,860 ^a	47,405 ^f	-13.6
Lower-Middle	66,515 ^b	55,200 ^g	-17.0
Middle	28,435 ^c	63,735 ^h	124.5
Upper-Middle	51,990 ^d	42,020 ⁱ	-19.2
Upper	39,475 ^e	62,305 ^j	57.8

Sources: Statistics Canada, *1981 Census of Canada: Census Divisions and Subdivisions*, Cat No 95-988, Statistics Canada, *Profile of Census Divisions and Subdivisions in Ontario – Part B*, Cat No 95-338. All calculations are the author's. "Income Level" calculations are as follows: *a* combines under \$5,000 with \$5,000-\$9,999, *b* combines \$10,000-\$14,999 with \$15,000-\$19,999, *c* is \$20,000-\$24,999, *d* combines \$25,000-\$29,999 with \$30,000-\$39,999, *e* is \$40,000 and over, *f* combines under \$10,000 with \$10,000-\$14,999, *g* combines \$15,000-\$19,999 with \$20,000-\$29,999, *h* combines \$30,000-\$39,999 with \$40,000-\$49,999, *i* combines \$50,000-\$59,999 with \$60,000-\$69,999, and *j* is \$70,000 and over.

Overall, however, like efforts taken by the state at the federal and provincial scales, the state at the Toronto scale in the 1980s sought to become competitive. Greater city activism in the field of property development ensued, which broke from city's Keynesian-Fordist policies that left such decisions up to the private sector. If anything, Toronto's move towards becoming a space of competitiveness aimed to strengthen the municipal state's capacities. Coterminous with image-making, the city founded the Toronto Economic Development Corporation (TEDCO) in 1985. While TEDCO's initial mandate was to protect blue-collar industries, it switched its focus to advertising Toronto's strengths in the service sector, thereby carving out a property development role for itself. In general, TEDCO was an after-Fordist city institution focused on stimulating downtown development.⁴⁴⁹

How Toronto's strategy differs from the state at the federal and provincial scales is that the strategic appeals to an incipient space of competition amplified traditional boosterist phrases. In Toronto's case, the only desirable investments were those adding to its "global" profile. As Savitch and Kantor show, that Toronto could actively pick and

choose investments on the basis of their contribution to the city's economic profile reflects the city's bargaining strength. Due to this, they rightly typify Toronto as a dirigiste regime.⁴⁵⁰ If anything, Toronto was far more interventionist in the local economy after Keynesian-Fordism than it had been during Keynesian-Fordism. Investments had to meet two tests: maximize the city's global economic potential and receive middle class activists' approval. "Global" investments were always going to be required to complement local quality of life as it had been conceptualized by middle class activists.

4.3.2 An After-Fordist Waterfront? Too Many Projects, One Crisis

Toronto's waterfront was not immune from the political economy of inter-scalar change. Two political economic challenges faced the waterfront. The first challenge was economic. Although the THC continued its landowner role, deindustrialization exacerbated the problems it had had with attracting industry on its lands and the THC's problems worsened. Much like blue-collar Toronto, a blue-collar waterfront was in decline along with the decline of manufacturing. For the period 1981 to 1987, however, manufacturing did absorb a not insignificant amount of labour, despite falling from 33.6% to 22.8%. Yet the rate of employment associated with the residential, retail, and recreation sectors, notwithstanding the small numbers which mask the larger trends taking place on Toronto's waterfront, is telling. A massive jump of 30,000% occurred in the residential sector, while the retail and recreation sectors experienced a big jump of 100.7 and 225.9% respectively.⁴⁵¹

The THC intended to cope with declining industrial fortunes in the 1970s. Typical of any public institution fighting for its political life, the THC attempted to

legitimate itself as a protector of industry in Toronto. Advancing the cause of industry on the waterfront, however, was the City of Toronto with its Port Industry Task Force. Toronto's 1970 Official Plan, as already seen, pledged to keep industry *needing port facilities* in the waterfront. The contradictions are, of course, apparent. In light of the reformers' anti-industry stance, keeping industry should not have been a priority.

The Port Industry Task Force took its lead from a City of Toronto Planning Board paper, *A Place for Industry*. Although this paper was not a policy statement, it challenged prevailing notions that a liveable city meant foregoing industrial zones.⁴⁵² Furthermore, *A Place for Industry* directed attention to the potential social toll of losing industry. Well-paid jobs leaving the city for greenfield sites meant more traffic and, most important, shrinking job opportunities for low- and semi-skilled new Canadians arriving in Toronto.⁴⁵³ The latter concern was emblematic of the nature of post-war Toronto immigrant employment on which the city's success was predicated. Concerns over becoming a city of speculation rather than production also figured in the Planning Board's report. Developers purchasing industrial sites left them vacant until a property boom occurred and, sometimes, once productive sites were turned into parking lots. This was not the only problem because commercial spaces commanded more dollars per square foot than industrial spaces did, potentially pricing industry out of Toronto.⁴⁵⁴

Building on *A Place for Industry*, the Port Industry Task Force recommended dedicating a portion of THC lands for industry because manufacturing provided gainful employment and was, therefore, socially useful.⁴⁵⁵ The Task Force also spoke out against the logic framing business improvement areas throughout the city. It was concerned about the city's productive potential falling off as low-productivity retail was promoted as

a way to fix up after-Fordist Toronto, leaving the city to look busy without being productive.⁴⁵⁶

The Port Industry Task Force's work was suspended in 1979 by the Central Waterfront Planning Committee, a city-based waterfront committee fathered by the Crombie-led reform City Council in 1973.⁴⁵⁷ This suspension resulted from disagreements with City Council over the right location for the Task Force's proposed Port of Toronto Industrial Park. The Planning Committee was composed of twenty-six public and private agencies. Beyond being a discussion forum, there was little else to the Planning Committee.⁴⁵⁸ Yet it was strong enough to come to the conclusion that planning considerations should promote the use of public spaces to stir up public support. Industry would only be protected where it could show a benefit to an improved waterfront.⁴⁵⁹

The origins of the strategic turn to use public space to make Torontonians aware of the waterfront came from two sources. The first source was the federal government's 1972 Harbourfront initiative. Ottawa purchased 100 acres of vacant industrial land with the intention of turning it into a city park. It had been portrayed as the federal government's gift to Toronto's citizens in honour of Canada's centenary. The federal Department of Works and the MSUA had worked with the city to transform the area. Dovetailing with the reformers' vow to open up planning, an Intergovernmental Waterfront Park Committee was set up to provide information to the public about Harbourfront and to activate public participation.⁴⁶⁰ This federal initiative on Toronto's waterfront, however, did represent a direct intervention in transforming cities in the wake of industrial restructuring. A 1975 MSUA paper indicated the essential role that ports

played in developing Canadian cities. Economic changes necessitated a review of ports and their roles.⁴⁶¹

The second source was the province. Ontario's Ontario Place, located on the waterfront's western end, was constructed to showcase Ontario's economic and social achievements. In part, this was a reaction to Ontario's post-war economic role which overshadowed its other identities. Yet Ontario Place was not intended to be a waterfront project. Rather, Ontario Place was a piece of provincial cultural infrastructure bringing crowds to the waterfront because that is where it happened to be located.⁴⁶² There was direct provincial involvement on the waterfront, however. In line with the ecological modernization that Robarts started, the province founded the Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority to execute Metro's 1967 waterfront plan. The Authority was responsible for getting a land base along the Lake Ontario shoreline because of its resource management mandate. This land base was to become primarily recreational. The Authority's ultimate significance lies more with recognizing a region expanding outside Metropolitan Toronto's boundaries but nevertheless centred firmly on Toronto.⁴⁶³

The Port Industry Task Force eventually resurfaced as the Port Industrial Development Task Force. This time, the city partnered with the THC to examine industrial Toronto's after-Fordist possibilities on the waterfront. In 1980, the Port Industrial Development Task Force recommended developing an urban industrial park on THC lands and aggressively marketing it to an international audience. At the same time, the Port Industrial Development Task Force recognized the changing scalar composition Toronto was finding itself in regionally. Up against the 905 belt, it believed rising energy costs meant industry would settle in a central location. The forecasted after-Fordist

energy crunch could only cramp extra-Metropolitan Toronto growth and "will likely favour increased activity in both bulk handling (e.g. coal) and in the heavy industrial category (especially those dealing in recycling)."⁴⁶⁴

The Task Force's recommendations never went anywhere, although they were repeated in the THC's 1988 Port Industrial Area Concept Plan.⁴⁶⁵ What had happened on the waterfront was an acceleration of construction to accommodate rising numbers of white-collar workers. That is to say, waterfront lands were becoming used for residential purposes. Given the devaluation of industry and the increasing emphasis on short-term returns, real estate in Toronto proved to be an excellent sink for excess capital.⁴⁶⁶ Yet the nature of waterfront redevelopment was politically driven because the two land-owning agencies on the waterfront, the THC and Harbourfront, found themselves in financial straits. That they were mandated to be financially self-sufficient led them to develop the only asset they had in a city labelling itself "world class": land.⁴⁶⁷ Indeed, the financial self-sufficiency directive provoked a scalar disconnect that was rooted in contradiction. While the THC and Harbourfront were onboard with the city that waterfront lands should be used for in a post-industrializing Toronto, they were still viewed as being rogue institutions solely interested in maximizing their revenue without due consideration to the effects that they had on planning at the Toronto scale.

Activities on the waterfront were thus becoming problematic. Despite the constant discussions, scalar disconnects made waterfront developments seem disjointed. Indeed, by the 1980s, Toronto's waterfront had expanded significantly because of provincial, federal, and THC activities. The tone of a 1984 report authored by the City of Toronto Planning and Development Department – the body replacing the City of Toronto

Planning Board under Eggleton and a name-change suggestive of the direction that the city was headed – wanted the waterfront to complement the underlying economic patterns and social composition of Toronto. As Map 4.3.2.1 shows, the Planning and Development Department divided the waterfront into eight precincts to accurately assess what each one could contribute to Toronto. Ultimately, the 1984 report put closure to the debate about industry's place in Toronto. While not wishing to provoke an unnecessary round of industrial restructuring given two large employers residing on East Bayfront lands, the city made it clear that future land uses were going to be non-industrial.⁴⁶⁸

Map 4.3.2.1: The City of Toronto Planning Department's waterfront precincts.

Source: City of Toronto Planning and Development Department, *The Central Waterfront: Final Recommendations* [scanned reproduction].

The failure to rationalize waterfront planning stemmed from projects either standing alone or being cancelled because of jurisdictional gridlock. Table 4.3.2.1 provides a list of built and failed waterfront projects. Whatever the case may be, Art Eggleton's "world class city" dream included attracting the 1996 Olympic Games, once again highlighting the trans-scalar importance of the waterfront space. More than any

other waterfront project, Eggleton's Olympic bid provided the moment to restate Toronto as the centrepiece of a changing Canadian political economy. Critical here was the city's need to make appeals to the global scale in order to attract political attention. To be sure, Toronto planned to host the usual Olympic pomp and circumstance along the city's waterfront and winning the Olympics required getting a handle on the state of the waterfront.⁴⁶⁹ Often forgotten too is that the 2000 World Fair was another component of Eggleton's world class city, in which the waterfront figured prominently. A changed inter-scalar architecture was thus becoming vital to realizing Toronto's "world class" status.

Table 4.3.2.1: Built and Failed Projects on Toronto's Waterfront, 1969-1993.

Project	Purpose	Status	Years	Scale
Metro Centre ^a	Office towers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Only the CN Tower was completed The relocation of rail lines proved too costly for the city to consider 	1968-1974	Canadian National Railway and Canadian Pacific Railways through their landholding arms and the City of Toronto
Ontario Place ^a	Showcase Ontario's achievements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Completed 	1967-1971	Ontario
St. Lawrence Neighbourhood ^a	Rehabilitate dead industrial buildings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Completed 	1972-1974	City of Toronto
Harbourfront ^a	Ottawa's centenary gift of parkland to Toronto	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Completed but transformed into a <i>de facto</i> development corporation to support its arts programming 	1972-1976	Canada
Intermediate Capacity Transit System	Demonstrate a made-in-Ontario technology to the world along the western part of the Toronto waterfront	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Due to a provincial decision, it was located in Scarborough instead 	1980	Ontario
Garrison Common ^a	Link together Fort York, Ontario Place, the Canadian National Exhibition, and Coronation Park	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Plans exist on the books but no movement has been made 	1991	Recommended by the Royal Commission on the Toronto Waterfront

Source: *a* from Greenberg, "Toronto: The Urban Waterfront as a Terrain of Availability."

4.3.3 A Royal Commission for an After-Fordist Toronto or Waterfront? First-cut Rescaling

On March, 30, 1988, an Order-in-Council had created the Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront (RCFTW). David Crombie, Toronto's former

reformist mayor and ex-federal Member of Parliament (MP), was entrusted to investigate Harbourfront and why condominiums crowded out park space, the THC's future, and the status of the Toronto Island Airport. Ecological questions and a federal desire to support Toronto's Olympic and World Fair bids were attached to this.⁴⁷⁰ Overall, though, the RCFTW was guided by Mulroney's broader project of extracting the federal government from sub-national affairs. The THC, the Toronto Island Airport, and Harbourfront were federal operations in the municipality.

Constitutionally, municipalities are under provincial jurisdiction. Ending the waterfront malaise had to dovetail with streamlining federal-provincial relations, fiscal retrenchment, and better administrative practices. Ottawa's stance towards land management was to move away from achieving social and economic objectives. "Federal objectives" were nebulous yet rationalized Ottawa holding on to lands.⁴⁷¹

Concerns over underlying economic shifts still managed to find a way into the RCFTW. Two fundamental concerns were expressed – the role of cities under new economic circumstances and ecology⁴⁷² – which hinted at a turn away from Keynesian-Fordism because cities were becoming new economic spaces in their own right. As the RCFTW accepted this logic, national states were no longer given primacy as a space of accumulation, a key component of Keynesian principles. Moreover, the concern over ecology provided a strategy to justify moving away from Fordism. Certainly, the ecological consequences of Fordist mass production and mass consumption cannot be ignored. The problem, however, is that ecology became employed as a bridge to another regime of accumulation.

As the RCFTW's work continued, greater emphases was placed on ecological

concerns. Its second report, *Watershed*, made ecology the primary concern, providing an entry point to exploring the wider regional and international position of the waterfront while keeping in mind federal objectives. The RCFTW's first report made three key recommendations on the institutional future of the waterfront:

1. The THC should be reduced to a port management role for the Toronto region given the insignificant tonnage entering it.
2. Lands not required for port activities should be released.
3. The province should be free to set socio-economic objectives for adjacent lands with the federal government assisting it to achieve them.⁴⁷³

Final recommendations had to stay within these confines.

Still, the growth pressures facing Toronto because of its more visible global role led the RCFTW to provide a template for governing the GTA, the Greater Toronto Bioregion (see Map 4.3.3.1).⁴⁷⁴ This was made possible because Ontario permitted the RCFTW's scope of inquiry to include Halton and Peel Regions, thus allowing a federal agency to comment on provincial matters.⁴⁷⁵ What was at first an exercise designed to see Ottawa out of the land management business in Toronto because its agencies had lost so much legitimacy was now becoming an inquiry into how Toronto's waterfront could be used to institutionally restructure the GTA. The nature of growth in the GTA put pressure on the watershed. Rethinking the nature of growth in and around Toronto was, of course, done in the context of getting ready for a global event while simultaneously rescaling the Canadian state.

Whatever may have come out of the RCFTW, it did provide a framework that spoke to scale-specific interests. Ontario's interest in planning waterfront redevelopment

is an example of this. In 1987, cognizant of the economic transformations causing waterfront disuse, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs produced a document, *Urban Waterfronts*, drawing attention to a province-wide problem of declining ports. Avoiding a one-size-fits-all prescription, the report signalled the uniqueness of waterfronts while also acknowledging that decisions about them were best made at the municipal level. Existing municipal powers in the Planning Act were highlighted and municipalities were told that the Act permitted them to specially designate their waterfronts as a "community improvement project area." This involved drafting "a plan for the re-use, redevelopment or improvement of existing areas and sets out a convenient process to be followed."⁴⁷⁶

Map 4.3.3.1: The RCFTW's Greater Toronto Bioregion.

Source: Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront, *Regeneration: Toronto's Waterfront and the Sustainable City: Final Report*, p. 22 [scanned reproduction].

Instrumental to this provincial call for action was the statement linking waterfronts to municipalities' CBDs. According to Municipal Affairs, this linkage would create symbiotic points of commercial and recreational activity. Municipal Affairs was particularly interested in generating new areas for tourism, noting tourist attractions were

usually located in CBDs.⁴⁷⁷ This implicitly counselled municipalities to pursue image-making strategies by referring to projects that can revive activities on ports. Through strategic investments, waterfronts provided an entry point for municipal entrepreneurialism by expanding the number of places available for investment.⁴⁷⁸ With the Olympic and World Fair bids, the RCFTW's work was fulfilling a provincial objective seeking to reenergize a relatively large swath of idle land in its key city.

Much of the RCFTW's work was dedicated to examining how to rework inter-scalar arrangements to maximize the economic benefits of the waterfront without looking at the existing social implications this could have on Toronto. In particular, controversy mounted over Toronto's Olympic bid, raising questions over using local resources to pay for a global event. In reaction to the consequences of being a "world class city," a local coalition of activists, Bread not Circuses, protested Toronto's Olympic bid.

As the City of Toronto's expenditures contained in Table 4.3.3.1 shows, while social service spending in Toronto never exceeded 0.3% of the city budget, the two major components implicated in image-making, planning and development and recreation and culture, absorbed more spending. Recreation and culture, however, was spared from the budget cuts between 1989 and 1995 as the recessionary early 1990s surfaced.

As Table 4.3.3.2 shows, the incidence of low-income amongst all economic families within the city rose during the period 1981 to 1991. During the period 1986 to 1991, the City of Toronto had the highest incidence of low-income amongst total households within the GTA and Metropolitan Toronto. Nothing had been said in the RCFTW about how to terminate social polarization, as it preferred instead to highlight the problems associated with a changing Toronto and its region.⁴⁷⁹ It was left up to the

city to manage this social polarization.

Social housing had become contentious. A property boom in the late 1980s combined with Toronto actively promoting itself as a global city inflated housing prices. This signified a new era for the Toronto economy as speculative rather than productive activities drove the city's economy. As Caulfield notes, "Toronto property costs came to reflect not only demands for metropolitan placement by potential residential or commercial users but also demands for secure placement by 'world-class' capital."⁴⁸⁰

Table 4.3.3.1: Consolidated Expenditures in the City of Toronto (% of Total), 1983-1995

Type of Expenditure	Years			Percent Change Over Period		
	1983	1989	1995	1983-1989	1989-1995	1983-1995
General Government	83,795,000 (20.2)	145,181,000 (20.9)	177,287,000 (23.0)	73.2	22.1	111.6
Protection of Property and Persons	71,878,000 (17.3)	101,280,000 (14.6)	115,586,000 (15.0)	40.9	14.1	60.8
Transportation	65,828,000 (15.9)	118,073,000 (17.0)	102,414,000 (13.3)	79.4	-13.3	55.6
Environmental Services	68,357,000 (16.5)	65,187,000 (9.4)	79,742,000 (10.4)	-4.6	22.3	16.7
Health	23,267,000 (5.6)	39,466,000 (5.7)	40,406,000 (5.3)	69.6	2.4	73.7
Social Services	566,000 (0.1)	2,383,000 (0.3)	1,316,000 (0.2) ^a	321.0	-44.8	132.5
Recreation and Culture	78,340,000 (18.9)	124,687,000 (17.9)	159,007,000 (20.7)	59.2	27.6	103.0
Planning and Development	22,326,000 (5.4)	99,587,000 (14.3)	93,569,000 (12.2)	346.1	-6.0	319.5
Total	414,357,000 (100)	695,845,000 (100)	769,417,000 (100)	67.9	10.6	85.7

Sources: Canadian Tax Foundation, *Provincial and Municipal Finances*, 1985, 1991, Canadian Tax Foundations, *Finances of the Nation*, 1997, ^a indicates Social and Family Services

Table 4.3.3.2: Percent Incidence of Low-Income in Toronto and the Surrounding Region, 1981-1991.

City/Region	1981			1986			1991		
	All Economic Families	Unattached Individuals	Household	All Economic Families	Unattached Individuals	Household	All Economic Families	Unattached Individuals	Household
Toronto	17.2	34.3	—	16.5	35.2	21.5	19.2	33.1	22.8
East York	11.1	26.7	—	11.8	27.3	14.9	13.9	27.8	16.5
Etobicoke	9.5	29.5	—	9.6	28.9	12.0	12.2	30.3	14.8
North York	12.9	31.9	—	12.9	32.8	15.3	16.4	34.0	18.8
Scarborough	11.2	38.1	—	11.7	35.3	13.5	15.4	37.0	17.3
Borough of York	15.8	38.0	—	15.6	37.8	19.3	19.8	37.2	22.6
Metro	13.2	33.6	—	13.1	33.8	16.4	16.3	33.5	19.1
Durham	8.3	33.7	—	7.6	30.8	9.0	7.3	27.1	8.5
Halton	6.3	29.8	—	5.3	27.8	6.6	5.3	26.6	6.8
Peel	7.5	26.4	—	7.0	25.7	8.1	13.6	31.2	15.0
York	6.7	33.3	—	5.4	29.7	6.6	6.3	30.2	7.5

Sources: Statistics Canada, *1981 Census of Canada: Census Divisions and Subdivisions*, Cat No 95-988, Statistics Canada, *Profiles: Population and Dwelling Characteristics - Census Divisions and Subdivisions Ontario Part 2*, Cat No 94-112, Statistics Canada, *Profile of Census Divisions and Subdivisions in Ontario - Part B*, Cat No 95-338

The potential changes arriving from a rescaled waterfront were *indirectly*

questioned as a result of activists protesting the nature of growth in the city. We will deal with this at greater length in chapter six. What is important to take away here is that the activism surrounding an Olympic bid occurring on the waterfront, supported by all levels of government and helped along by a royal commission, raised important questions about the nature of growth in Toronto: principally what kind of city was going to emerge.⁴⁸¹ At the same time, it did give rise to waterfront projects as a site for addressing the problem of social polarization in Toronto. Getting City Council to support the bid was a key strategy on the part of Mayor Eggleton because Council represented a channel for citizens to have their concerns heard. For example, City Councillor Kay Gardner promised support for an Olympic bid only when social housing guarantees were plainly stated and undoubtedly committed.⁴⁸² In a letter to her, Eggleton invited Gardner to reconsider her position because everything would be lost and this included 5,700 units of housing. Eggleton stated the problem was that no financial commitment had ever been made by the federal or provincial government, so the city could not be held at fault. Eggleton concluded by emphasizing Toronto's and Canada's coming international embarrassment because of such opposition to the Olympic Games.⁴⁸³

Whether or not the Olympic and World Fair bids were going to go in Toronto's favour – and they did not as the 1996 Olympics went to Atlanta and Hanover won the 2000 World Fair – the RCFTW did make recommendations on the waterfront's regional and international roles and how these could be squared with the Greater Toronto Bioregion framework. At the risk of oversimplifying the RCFTW's final conclusions, two themes can be identified. First, by employing Toronto's waterfront, the RCFTW set the stage to push for a new institutional framework governing the nature of growth in the

GTA. As seen in the second section, GTA municipalities were left to solve growth problems on their own because Ontario had fixated on the inter-scalar changes from above.

Second, the RCFTW advocated utilizing the downtown waterfront as a site of experimentation for up-and-coming "green" industries. Moreover, Toronto was seen as the right political scale for growing and showcasing green industries. The RCFTW felt this could be accomplished through TEDCO. Once THC lands were transferred to it, TEDCO could move forward with creating a centre of green excellence, the Centre for Green Enterprise. The Centre would act as a national incubator of un-Fordist industry, i.e. one that allegedly respects ecological limits.⁴⁸⁴ This was a firm rejection of a Fordist style of growth and as a former RCFTW official stated in an interview,

"The basic structure of Toronto – the Greater Toronto Area, the generic Toronto – is the river valleys and the lakes. If you miss that part, ... you shouldn't show up to the planning meetings because that's the guts of it. And we've spent much of, therefore, what we've had to do over a millennia and years and years and years is: How do we deal with the lake and the river valleys? Now we've tended to obscure that, and kind of mid-twentieth or part of the twentieth century, ... because the Industrial Revolution had a view: the only way to move forward was to take nature by the throat, and bury it, burn it, and strangle it, get rid of it, put it in pipes, whatever else you need. The idea was to exploit nature ... and we did."⁴⁸⁵

The after-Fordist framework for Toronto would be one, as Keil and Graham argue, where "urban growth and development occurs through and not against nature."⁴⁸⁶ Keil and Graham rightly view the kind of growth that had taken place in the Toronto region as "an emerging mode of social regulation that appears more as a rough-and-tumble reaction to the crisis of Fordism in the Toronto region and less as the beginning of a new era."⁴⁸⁷

4.3.4 After the Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront: The Schumpeterian Post-national Workfare Regime Takes Shape

The RCFTW has to be seen in the context of the neo-liberalization of Canada and efforts to arrive at a Canadian Schumpeterian post-national workfare regime. Four things emerged out of the RCFTW which could be said to have provided a platform for new institutional configurations governing an after-Fordist regime of accumulation. First, following the RCFTW's recommendations, the federal government freed itself from land management on Toronto's waterfront by relegating the THC to a port management role and transferring its lands to TEDCO. Harbourfront lost its status as a Crown corporation. Since Harbourfront never really became a major component of the RCFTW's inquiry, on the advice of Darcy McKeough, a former minister in the Davis Cabinet,⁴⁸⁸ Ottawa decided to turn it into an endowment and sever its programming from land development.⁴⁸⁹ A Harbourfront official describes the conclusion of the institution's Crown corporation years,

"In 1995, the Government of Canada gave the buildings and land over to the City of Toronto on the proviso that Harbourfront Centre would have a perpetually renewable lease on the buildings and the lands. So, we're the virtual owners of the land and the buildings. If Harbourfront Centre as a non-profit charity should fail or should go bankrupt, the building and the lands revert to the City of Toronto."⁴⁹⁰

Both governments realized the RCFTW's mandate to lead Ottawa out of sub-national affairs as a way to restructure the Canadian state, representing what Savoie has called "load shedding": government services should be delivered by the agents closest to the individual.⁴⁹¹ In the context of continentalization, the RCFTW floated after-Fordist possibilities for the Toronto waterfront that could turn it into a national site of innovation. In this way, the federal government gave the waterfront national political legitimacy and implicitly recognized the importance of Toronto to Canada's political economy.

The second result from the RCFTW had been to highlight the importance of the

GTA for Ontario, contributing to Queen's Park's reterritorialization efforts. As suburban and exurban growth pressures strained the GTA's watershed, Ontario followed the course charted by the RCFTW. The province set up the Commission on Planning and Development to examine the ecological impacts of land use and how to adjust growth accordingly.⁴⁹² Subsequently, under the NDP, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs tried to integrate bioregionalism in its planning policies.⁴⁹³ Indeed, re-regulating the GTA's institutional framework became a key goal for the NDP government in its desire to resolve the crisis of Keynesian-Fordism by putting an end to the contradictions of suburbanization.

The RCFTW had emphasized the importance of a political economy of place, the activities which went on between them to occasion spaces, and the implications this had for scales. Ontario was fighting a recession which worsened because of the Bank of Canada's high-interest rate policy.⁴⁹⁴ With the RCFTW using ecology to politicize the GTA, Bob Rae created a provincial task force on the region's future, the GTA Task Force, in 1995. Generally, the GTA Task Force set out to determine the best possible political arrangements securing a coherent growth regime set against the backdrop of an Ontario in a global economy.⁴⁹⁵ Seeking to renew the province in its last days in office, Ontario's NDP would use the GTA as the centrepiece for a reflationary strategy to support Ontario's development as a green and competitive jurisdiction in a global economy.

Third, the RCFTW's recognition of the potential locked in the waterfront for an after-Fordist Toronto contributed to the de-legitimation of the Metro scale. Scrutinizing Fordist styles of planning, the RCFTW criticized the presence of the Gardiner

Expressway, a key piece of Fordist infrastructure that knit post-war Metropolitan Toronto together. Judging the Gardiner Expressway to be a barrier, the RCFTW said its demolition could sew the waterfront back into the city's fabric and make it inhabitable.⁴⁹⁶ This put Metro on the defensive and it asserted that the waterfront was Metro-wide because the Gardiner was a vital piece of road infrastructure holding Metropolitan Toronto together.⁴⁹⁷ The post-war growth taking place within Metro was not going to disappear anytime soon as the car-centred inner suburbs still had to be contained on an east-west axis and the alternative of cars spilling into the downtown core remained.

Although Metro accepted the RCFTW's terms of a green and working waterfront, it was concerned that the infrastructures located on the waterfront would be sharply criticized. In particular, these ugly but vital infrastructures did not fit with image-making plans. As Metro reported, "Municipal facilities along the waterfront are essential to human health, social well-being, and economic vitality. The ability of Metropolitan Toronto to support additional population in the next century is dependent on the capacity to expand these facilities to accommodate growth and improve operating efficiency."⁴⁹⁸

Even though calls were being made to find an after-Fordist use for the waterfront, the "Fordist" infrastructures located there would not suddenly lose their usefulness. If anything, Fordist infrastructures were going to become increasingly important precisely because they did the unglamorous but nonetheless necessary work of keeping city inhabitants alive, moving, and working. Metro did seek out ways to redefine itself in the public's eyes by holding consultations on the entire Metropolitan Toronto lakeshore to show that it was moving away from its traditional stance of being insulated from public pressures. By doing so, Metro was able to claim that the *entire* waterfront had to

represent the needs and wishes of the population.⁴⁹⁹ Notwithstanding this, Metro continued to repeat its role as a provider of infrastructure, although it was willing to acquiesce to image-making by enhancing the Gardiner Expressway's appearance through better streetscaping and signage.⁵⁰⁰

The fourth effect arising from the RCFTW is that it gave full expression to ecological modernization as a way out of Fordist Toronto. The only agency to have emerged out of the Royal Commission's exercises was the Waterfront Regeneration Trust. Created by provincial legislation, the Trust was responsible for implementing a trail, the Martin Goodman Trail, along the entire Lake Ontario shore to, as the Trust claims, reconnect citizens to the Lake. Yet the Waterfront Regeneration Trust was responsible for ecological modernization. Ecological modernization is, in part, associated with green industries. The Trust solicited advice on Garrison Common, an area that the RCFTW cordoned off as a site to practice innovation.⁵⁰¹

Garrison Common's status as a reindustrialized area would lead it to focus on key sectors and then combat the Fordist industrial façade surrounding it. Map 4.3.4.1 shows the after-Fordist vision for Garrison Common. An after-Fordist Garrison Common was going to be achieved by (1) practicing land intensification and (2) bettering transportation access. In addition, the construction of a trade and exhibition centre and grandiose visual treats would garner international attention for Garrison Common.⁵⁰² In effect, the city's role was to be a display case to lure investment into Ontario and Canada.⁵⁰³ As such, the Trust provided a discursive framework to reframe the Toronto waterfront, outlining which projects were permissible in Toronto's transition to become an after-Fordist city with global ambitions.

There is an irony to all of this. Even though the RCFTW's inquiry centred on the waterfront motivated asking questions about the Toronto region's nature of growth and institutions, Toronto's waterfront itself fell off of the political radar. Beset by a recession and, in part, a failed Olympic bid, political attention turned away from the waterfront and towards issues of joblessness.

Map 4.3.4.1: Garrison Common as conceptualized by the RCFTW.

Source: Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront, *Regeneration: Toronto's Waterfront and the Sustainable City Final Report*, p. 358 [scanned reproduction]

4.4 Conclusion

Crisis conditions offer opportunities to reorient scales' actions and remake political relationships. At this chapter has shown, an emergent Schumpeterian post-national workfare regime had been in the making because political relationships get remade when actors involved in forging a new political architecture etch out roles for themselves which may diverge from those established during a period of stability. Despite the changes that occur whenever a regime of accumulation comes undone,

continuities remain. The insertion of Toronto at the centre of a Keynesian-Fordist Canada dependent on foreign investment furthered its internationalization. That Toronto was able to begin the world class city project under Eggleton can be attributed to the national state's role in setting the political framework for economic action. Especially where international regimes are concerned, the state at the national scale is the only actor capable of having a say on what kind of structures will be present and how participation will occur.

Disagreements, of course, will occur, but how sub-national units respond is not determined by the national state. As this chapter has explored, Ontario's responses were being formed in reaction to the disarticulation of old inter-scalar links. Ontario's silence in the federation functioned so long as Ottawa never interfered in ways which threatened the province's economy. This changed because the legitimacy of the federal state was no longer taken for granted. Post-war stability ended, due in large measure to international disorder. Reasserting federal power generated greater spatial intervention on Ottawa's part in the 1970s and provinces saw it as an intrusion on their own affairs. Yet, the case of Ontario demonstrated how it too was going about creating its own variant of the SPWR for it had begun to admit that that era of national management was coming to a close.

Ottawa's "intrusions" politicized previously apolitical matters and in the case of Toronto, it supplemented civic action, which became more effective as a result of the electoral victory of David Crombie and the reformers. These two factors came together and produced an image-making project pursued at the city scale, which would receive fuller expression in the 1980s under Art Eggleton's world class city sloganeering. Indeed,

"world class" could only have been possible under political conditions furthering the internationalization of the Canadian economy. Ontario participated in this too, however much it may have grumbled about Ottawa's programme which, under Mulroney, used free trade with the USA to generate Canada's space of competition. Notwithstanding this, the province's strategy of innovation to define the Ontarian economy as a competitive jurisdiction was a tacit acceptance of the direction that it was headed in as Ottawa negotiated with Washington, DC.

The creation of a North American space of competition and the reform of the Canadian state together triggered a national royal commission of Toronto's waterfront. Through this, interests generated at specific scales were articulated. While withdrawing from land management and getting out of a nominally provincial matter, the federal government under the RCFTW was providing an after-Fordist template. It (1) assisted Toronto's image-making project and (2) provided a framework which spoke to the province's desire to become competitive. At the same time, the political inquiry into Toronto's waterfront touched on the necessity of new institutions and arrangements to effectively govern the GTA.

Metro seemed to have run its course because its powers could do nothing to dull the impact of the 905's growth on downtown Toronto. Perhaps more decisive was the RCFTW's criticisms of the Gardiner Expressway which undercut Metro's role as a provider of infrastructures. In other words, a Metro infrastructure on the waterfront kept Toronto from charting its own course. This had the effect of putting into question the appropriate role for each scale. Under crisis conditions, scales' roles were being redefined and the scopes of and for action had to be reconsidered. In Toronto, all of this

occurred on a waterfront which fell out of the public's eye in the post-war era and then re-emerged in the 1970s and 1980s as the post-war inter-scalar scaffolding fell down.

Since the 1970s witnessed the beginnings of the shift away from Keynesian-Fordism, it triggered a long process of inter-scalar transformations that were symptomatic of experimentation. Overall, what was notable about this experimentation was that it provided a preliminary sketch for the waterfront's future: it should "reconnect" with the rest of Toronto, become a site of innovation, and be global in its orientation. This had to be accomplished in the context of a firmer commitment to changing inter-scalar relations in Canada. The next chapter will be turning its attention to this matter.

Chapter 5: Rolling Back and Rolling Out Toronto's Waterfront: The TWRC, the Re-emergence, and Neo-liberalization of the Waterfront, 1995-2005

Introduction

The current round of waterfront revitalization in Toronto can be seen as a relatively straightforward process whereby a constellation of political and economic elites seek to make Toronto a top world city. As a result, some observers have claimed that the city has been sidestepping issues surrounding social exclusion. The main agency charged with remaking Toronto's waterfront, the Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation⁵⁰⁴ (TWRC), has been portrayed as furthering an image-making strategy to make Toronto attractive for capital investment.⁵⁰⁵

Although the TWRC does emphasize marketing Toronto to the world, the project is better understood as a response to the limits and contradictions of the roll-back and roll-out phases of the neo-liberalizing Canadian state. This chapter argues that the waterfront was utilized as a city-building project that contributed to the development of the transformation of the Canadian state's inter-scalar architecture. The first and second sections examine roll-back and roll-out neo-liberalism at the federal and provincial scales as the state sought to eliminate the deficits accumulated during the period of crisis via downloading. The third section situates the waterfront development in the context of changed inter-scalar relations. It examines the tactics employed by the TWRC to deal with the contradictions and limitations of neo-liberalization.

5.1 The Roll-back and Roll-out of the Canadian State

5.1.1 Fiscal Deficits and Public Deficits: The Canadian State's National Retreat, 1995-98

While neo-liberal roll-back measures were initiated in the 1980s, they intensified in 1995 as federal and provincial governments terminated the post-war social contract

and its inter-scalar arrangements. With the exception of Quebec and British Columbia, the provinces and Ottawa concluded an inter-scalar compromise premised on supply-side federalism.⁵⁰⁶ The more intense roll-back measures were concentrated in the period between 1995 and 1998. While the first phase, explored in the last chapter, focused on the construction of a space of competition and quasi-Schumpeterian innovation, roll-back neo-liberalism centred on fiscal retrenchment.

Two explanations help to account for the politics of roll-back neo-liberalism at the federal scale. First, Ottawa found itself in a political environment where citizens' faith in government declined as service delivery deteriorated and taxes rose. Stagnant or declining incomes compounded the situation. Lewis highlights the way this provided Ottawa the support needed to tackle the deficit: citizens facing economic insecurity and disillusioned with successive administrations wanted "big government" off their backs.⁵⁰⁷ Yet it was more complicated than this: the government selectively played on elements of resentment that suited its purpose. Thus, a 1996 Gallup poll showed that there was political support for deficit reduction, with 49% of respondents very concerned and 37% somewhat concerned. That same poll, however, pointed to a much wider appetite for addressing economic insecurities as a majority of respondents prioritized the reduction of unemployment over deficit reduction. Even more telling, Canadians were unwilling to cut universal social programmes in exchange for smaller deficits, although a (bare) majority favoured reducing targeted social programmes.⁵⁰⁸ Canadians' appreciation for the social solidarities institutionalized during the post-war era could not be ignored even as the federal government kept playing on their disenchantment with government and concern over the size of the federal deficit. The rationale for tackling the federal deficit

was that financing social solidarity was only possible by shrinking the public sector, rolling back "big government."

The second rationale was the emergence of the global and North American spaces of competition. Although the spending reductions in the 1995 budget are often seen as the watershed for roll-back politics in Canada, it was the Department of Finance's 1994 report, *A New Framework for Economic Policy*, which outlined the direction that the new Liberal government would take. *A New Framework for Economic Policy* married deficit reduction to Canada's global competitiveness and accepted that an after-Fordist regime would be predicated on innovation associated with "information economy." Moreover, in a globalizing economy, Canada had to accept that (1) regions, not national states, were the yardsticks measuring effective economic performance and (2) people and capital moved freely across borders.⁵⁰⁹ To promote Canadians' competitiveness, Finance argued for cutting government spending in order to free the individual. Using the example of Unemployment Insurance, Finance insisted too much government restrained individual initiative⁵¹⁰ and went on to suggest that self-motivated individuals can prosper in an otherwise bleak economy: "Although between 1990 and 1993, there was a net loss of 190, 000 jobs in Canada, for people with preparation beyond high school there was a net job *gain* of 450, 000. For those with high school education or less, on the other hand, the net loss was 640, 000."⁵¹¹

Finance thus took a classical liberal view of government by stressing freedom from the state could enhance individual economic prospects. It was thus imperative for the federal government to renege on its remaining Keynesian-Fordist obligations⁵¹² by dismantling the remnants of the post-war inter-scalar architecture.⁵¹³ Ottawa first needed

to put its finances in order before uncovering its role in a federation which, at all scales, accepted the global and, especially, North American spaces of competition.⁵¹⁴ Between 1995 and 1998, the federal government made more than \$27 billion in cuts to spending. Some of these costs savings were secured through institutional redesign. For example, the Unemployment Insurance programme was restructured (and renamed Employment Insurance) to disqualify more claimants. Public debt charges saw the largest reductions, followed by transfers to other levels of government (see Table 5.1.1.1), which were in fact Ottawa's main target. As Table 5.1.1.2 shows, in 1995, transfers to other levels of government were the second largest item on the list of federal expenditures, but by 1998, these had fallen to fifth place. In exchange for reducing transfer payments to the provinces, the federal government imposed fewer restrictions on them.⁵¹⁵ As Graefe notes on the rescaling of Canadian federalism,

"When policies are imbricated with deeply institutionalized understandings of legitimacy and citizenship, changes in state form may involve a messy reworking of interscalar relations that leaves existing understandings of the appropriate scales for particular processes untouched, but redefines the problem being regulated and the ends sought by said regulation."⁵¹⁶

Omitted in narratives of the Canadian state's roll-back phase, however, is Ottawa's entry into policy fields. Recounting her experiences as Saskatchewan's finance minister, Janice MacKinnon notes that the new programmes that Ottawa introduced during deficit reduction saw it "repositioning itself for a new role in the twenty-first century."⁵¹⁷ These new programmes, however, were market-enhancing instruments designed to shore up Canada's position in a liberalized space of competition that neglected the effects of the federal government's withdrawal on the public sphere.⁵¹⁸ As *A New Framework for Economic Policy* had argued, if Canada was going to move forward in a globalizing/NAFTA economy, new measures needed to be in place. Since the American

market largely determines Canadian prosperity and efforts to counter American unilateralism through NAFTA had proved too difficult, new federal arrangements were needed to cope with a largely unregulated NAFTA space.⁵¹⁹

Table 5.1.1.1: Reduction in Expenditures by Line Item, 1995-1998.

Item	Years			Period
	1995-1996	1996-1997	1997-1998	1995-1998
Transfers to other levels of government	36.6	2.5	23.3	21.3
Employment Insurance Benefits	12.5	11.6	7.6	10.9
Child Tax Benefit	1.0	–	–	0.4
Other Transfer Payments	16.9	6.6	–	8.9
Crown Corporation Expenses	–	46.0	10.7	18.7
National Defence	7.1	10.7	–	6.5
All Other Departments and Agencies	25.9	–	–	10.1
Public Debt Charges	–	22.5	58.4	23.1

Sources: Government of Canada, *National Public Accounts*, vol. 1, *Summary Report and Financial Statements*, 2004, 2005. All calculations are the author's.

Table 5.1.1.2: Line Items as a Percent of Total Expenditures, 1995 and 1998 (Rank).

Line Item	1995	1998
Old Age Security, Guaranteed Income Supplement, and Spouse's Allowance	12.0 (4)	13.7 (2)
Transfers to Other Levels of Government	15.7 (2)	12.9 (5)
Employment Insurance Benefits	8.8 (6)	7.5 (6)
Child Tax Benefit	3.2 (8)	3.4 (8)
Other Transfers	11.0 (5)	13.3 (4)
Crown Corporation Expenses	3.1 (9)	2.8 (9)
National Defence	6.3 (7)	5.7 (7)
All Other Departments and Agencies	13.4 (3)	13.6 (3)
Public Debt Charges	26.4 (1)	27.2 (1)

Sources: Government of Canada, *National Public Accounts*, vol. 1, *Summary Report and Financial Statements*, 2004, 2005. All calculations are the author's.

5.1.2 Rolling-Out Canada, 1998-2005: Rebuilding Communities, Rebuilding the Country

Once the deficit had been eliminated, the federal government could no longer justify its emphasis on roll-back politics. Nonetheless, Ottawa's roll-back phase generated a paradigm which Lewis calls the "fiscalization of politics" whereby costing benchmarks determine "good" and "bad" public policy.⁵²⁰ This penetrated practices at provincial scales too because less generous transfer payments to the provinces put fewer resources at their disposal. In this respect, Clarkson and Lewis's proposition that neo-liberalism provides a long-term vision for policymaking seems correct because the disciplinary effects narrow policy choices.⁵²¹ What Clarkson and Lewis underestimate,

however, is the political instability this produces. Ottawa's roll-back politics produced new fissures within federalism and gave rise to debates over how to reconstitute the public sphere. In response to these fissures, the federal government turned to roll-out neo-liberalism. As Peck and Tickell argue, roll-out neo-liberalism seeks to redress the political imbalances generated by the roll-back phase and "provide a positive spur to regulatory reinvention."⁵²²

Bakvis observes that the changing political climate of the 1990s allowed new ideas to develop *outside* the traditional government forum,⁵²³ while for Prince "[b]udgetary surpluses obviously weaken arguments for further cutbacks and strengthen the credibility of client groups and other constituencies in calling for the reinstatement of some programs that have been cut and the allocation of additional resources."⁵²⁴ In post-deficit Canada, the priority was to restore spending, but the pattern of federal spending increases was uneven and some expenditure items were very slow to recover (see Table 5.1.2.1). The next section will explore Ontario's experience with fiscal retrenchment. For now, it suffices to say that, as a result, the provinces turned their attention to their own finances and responsibilities.

Table 5.1.2.1: Year Federal Programmes were Cut and Restored.

Item	Year of Decrease	Year First Restored/Exceeded 1995 Levels
Old Age Security, Guaranteed Income Supplement, and Spouse's Allowance	Never cut	
Transfers to Other Levels of Government	1996	2002
Employment Insurance Benefits	1996	2004
Child Tax Benefit	1996	1998
Other Transfers	1996	1998
Crown Corporation Expenses	1995	1997
National Defence	1996	2003
All Other Departments and Agencies	1996	2001
Public Debt Charges	1997	Never returned to 1995 levels
Total Expenditures	1997	2001

Sources: Government of Canada, *National Public Accounts*, vol. 1, *Summary Report and Financial Statements*, 2004, 2005.

The 1997 federal election reflected Ottawa's assertion that regions were an ingredient in a global, informationalized economy. Chrétien's campaign promised to

rebalance the federation and to offset the widening regional disparities precipitated by the cuts.⁵²⁵ This culminated in the 1999 Social Union Framework Agreement. The Framework Agreement stated, however, that the provinces would shoulder what were once relatively joint federal-provincial responsibilities and, as a result, it neglected to deal with the roll-back phase's social deficits. As Phillips notes, "Even in an era of budget surpluses, governments are choosing to do less than they used to; they are sticking to their defined "core business" and leaving many societal needs to be met by families and communities."⁵²⁶

Andrew shows how the social effects of deficit-cutting were most starkly manifested at the urban scale. She notes that Ottawa was blind to the changes and challenges coming urban Canada's way.⁵²⁷ While some provinces solved their fiscal problems by downloading service delivery onto municipalities, others expanded municipal responsibilities, allowing municipalities to come up with their own solutions to local problems instead of looking to the provincial capitol.⁵²⁸ Either way, urban problems multiplied across the country.

Over time, however, a roll-out framework took shape in Ottawa, which included measures directed at municipalities. The February 2000 budget witnessed the federal government's renewed interest in municipalities with the aim of enhancing urban growth prospects through explicit interventions – e.g. paying for the renewal of physical infrastructures – and implicit interventions – e.g. strengthening existing research clusters. Ottawa also promised to address quality of life issues affected by urban sprawl, such as ecological degradation and traffic congestion.⁵²⁹ As we shall see, this turn would provide openings for Toronto's waterfront revitalization proponents. In 2002, the federal

government formed the Prime Minister's Caucus Task Force on Urban Issues. The Caucus Task Force recommended the replacement of the prevailing federal practice of calculated urban interventions with an effective federal-municipal relationship.⁵³⁰ Despite this, urban issues were a negligible aspect of the 2002 and 2003 budgets. In fact, Ottawa's financial commitments to municipalities declined as federal transfers to local governments were lower than they had been *during* the roll-back years of 1995 to 1998 (see Figure 5.1.2.1).

Figure 5.1.2.1: Federal Transfers to Local Governments, 1995-2005 (000, 000s of dollars).

Source: CANSIM, Table 384-0011.

A turning point came in the 2004 budget where cities provided the platform for rescaling Canadian federalism. Recognizing the changing territorialities of Canada and the challenges and opportunities this entailed for renewing cities' physical and social infrastructures, Martin's "New Deal for Communities" acknowledged the substantial roles that cities play in the political, economic, and social lives of Canadians. Cities deserved political respect not only because they were legitimate scales of action, but also because they affected the ability of the state at the national scale to proceed with roll-out politics.⁵³¹

Ottawa's urban turn would constitute a national strategy to refashion federalism's inter-scalar architecture. As Bradford argues, the Martin government began to forge a federal-municipal relationship that would act as the platform for nation-rebuilding. New

programmes were dedicated to urban issues and spending timelines were compressed for existing programmes with an urban component.⁵³² Leo's notion of "deep federalism" captures the political logic running through the New Deal for Communities. Ottawa recognized that only by dealing with circumstances specific to a local scale could it recoup the legitimacy that it had lost during the roll-back phase.⁵³³ Throughout the last half of the 1990s, Ottawa's decision to lower its commitments to spatial equalization contributed to the deepening of urban. Inter-scalar obligations had been weakened even as spatial differences were heightening. In turn, this prompted states at the local scale to reassess their relations to other scales of government in terms of wants and needs and the strategies to obtain them. With the political openings provided by the New Deal, municipal governments submitted lists of demands to Ottawa. Enough flexibility was built into the New Deal programmes so that Ottawa could be all things to social and political actors at local scales. As we shall see later on in this chapter, Ottawa's increased openness to municipal problems provided Toronto with an opportunity to bring the federal government on board to redevelop the waterfront.

5.2 Two Roll-backs, Two Roll-outs: Ontario's Offensive from Above and Below

5.2.1 Fiscal Deficits Again! Ontario for Itself and No Other

Ontario's rescaling project revolved around getting its finances in order. This time, however, the matter had been put to the electoral test. In an interesting parallel to the rise of Keynesian-Fordism in Ontario, the dismantling of Keynesian-Fordist Ontario gained a public stamp of approval through an election won by the Conservatives. If opinion polls legitimized Ottawa's methods to fight the federal deficit, a successful election campaign gave even greater legitimacy to Queen's Park's actions. Riding on

promises of lower taxes and less government, the Harris government pledged to cut back the province's public sector and re-establish Ontario's competitiveness. While Ottawa had disengaged from the provinces, Ontario's roll-back rested on disengaging from citizens, as the Harris government embarked on a process of insulating the province from popular demands to make it easier to create a leaner provincial public sector.

Some suggest that there was a marked rural character to the support for Ontario's hard turn to the Right. For example, Wiseman posits that Harris's electoral victories can be attributed to the Conservatives catering to small-town Ontario's "parochial" mindset, reflected in the government's anti-urban biases.⁵³⁴ Such a view is problematic because the Conservatives under Harris initially did quite well in the GTA, Ontario's most urbanized region, sweeping the 905 area seats and winning sixteen out of thirty seats in the in the 416 area, one of which was a downtown Toronto riding.⁵³⁵

To explain what happened in Ontario, one needs to consider the scalar setting in which it was embedded. Harris's ideological framework, the Common Sense Revolution (CSR), was a response to broader scalar pressures emanating from above and below. From above, federal and global pressures made Ontario-based businesses cost-sensitive since the value of the Canadian dollar determined adjustment to a continentalizing regime of production. As the same time, federal downloading undid the inter-scalar underpinnings of Keynesian-Fordist Canada while pressure from below emerged as citizens had become dissatisfied with the way the NDP government handled its fiscal difficulties.⁵³⁶

What was novel about the CSR was its depiction of the Ontario state. During and immediately after the post-war era, the provincial state had assured a constructive role.

In the CSR's narrative, however, the provincial state had become "the problem, to be reduced as much as possible so that the market can operate without constraint."⁵³⁷ However crudely the CSR's vision for Ontario may have been put, it did touch on Ontario's new realities. White has shown that Harris was similar in one respect to his NDP predecessor. Both recognized the necessity of transforming the provincial state as the status quo was no longer acceptable. Indeed, the NDP and the Conservatives *under Harris* were fundamentally protest parties and their ascent to power was enabled by the inter-scalar ruptures that gave rise to debates about Ontario's post-Keynesian-Fordist future.⁵³⁸ The scale politics of Canada, which no longer respected Keynesian-Fordist principles, was thus reterritorializing to uncover an appropriate scalar mix *and* fix.

This CSR can thus best be understood as a reterritorialization: if Ottawa was unwilling to support the provinces' social entitlements and to level out national fiscal imbalances, Ontario would discover ways to strengthen the provincial state's capacities. As in the rest of Canada, roll-back politics in Ontario involved expenditure cuts. Unlike the rest of Canada, in Ontario, taxes were also put on the cutting board, "a path that obviously delayed deficit elimination in the province by a couple of years."⁵³⁹

Did provincial coffers starve because of tax cuts? How much actual retrenchment occurred under Harris Ontario's roll-back phase? The answers to these questions may not be so straightforward. On the question of taxation, the data in Table 5.2.1.1 shows provincial revenues consistently rose and the most heavily criticized tax cuts, personal and corporate taxes, dipped very slightly once between 1995 and 1999. Moreover, income taxes as a percentage of total revenue remained fairly constant. Indeed, corporate taxes increased during precisely the period they should have shrunk (see Figure 5.2.1.1).

Table 5.2.1.1: Percent Change in Ontario Tax Revenues, 1995-2005.

Tax	Roll-back Years				Harris's Roll-back-as-roll-out Years				Re-roll-out Years		Period Change		
	1995-1996	1996-1997	1997-1998	1998-1999	1999-2000	2000-2001	2001-2002	2002-2003	2003-2004	2004-2005	1995-1998	1998-2003	2003-2005
Personal Income Tax	5.9	4.5	-0.4	5.5	2.5	1.7	6.6	-4.7	0.6	5.6	10.4	11.7	6.2
Retail Sales Tax	3.7	5.7	8.8	7.5	10.5	6.6	0.5	2.8	0.5	4.2	19.3	30.8	4.7
Total Taxes	5.4	5.9	7.1	4.6	6.5	5.9	-1.9	4.0	-0.8	13.9	19.6	20.3	13.0

Sources: Ontario, Ministry of Finance, *Public Accounts of Ontario*, 1995-2005. All calculations are the author's. Note: "—" indicates "not applicable."

Figure 5.2.1.1: Sources as a Percent of Ontario's Revenues, 1995 and 1998.

Sources: Ontario, Ministry of Finance, *Public Accounts of Ontario*, 1995, 1998.

What can account for this? Duane Swank's study on national tax rates and social policy offers some insight. Although states find it more difficult to justify high tax rates in open economies, Swank shows that they must protect revenue streams in order to effectively perform their duties. Thus, tax decreases tend to be neutralized by reducing previously permitted tax-saving measures.⁵⁴⁰ Corporate taxes as a percent of total revenues took up a larger proportion of provincial revenue sources because of the federal government's cuts to transfer payments.

On the expenditure side, the Harris government's call for spending restraint did

not match its practices. Table 5.2.1.2 shows that the largest decline in overall actual spending – -1.3% – occurred in 1996 to 1997. Otherwise, expenditures generally rose throughout Harris's time in government. Yet, environment, resources, and economic development sustained the largest and most prolonged cuts, followed by social services. Neither returned to the levels at the year in which they were first slashed (see Table 5.2.1.3). Areas receiving popular support – health, education, and training – were cut but then quickly had their spending restored.

Table 5.2.1.2: Percent Change in Ontario's Actual Expenditures, 1995-2005.

Line Item	Harris's Roll-back Years			Harris's Roll-back-as-roll-out Years					Re-roll out Years		Period Change		
	1995-1996	1996-1997	1997-1998	1998-1999	1999-2000	2000-2001	2001-2002	2002-2003	2003-2004	2004-2005	1995-1998	1998-2003	2003-2005
Health	-0.5	0.8	2.8	6.9	11.5	4.7	4.8	8.4	11.8	7.8	3.2	41.9	20.6
Social Services	-0.3	-11.2	<-0.1	-1.7	4.0	1.3	1.8	2.4 ^a	8.6	6.7 ^b	11.4	-14.2	15.9
Education and Training	6.0	-10.8	9.4	18.6	6.1	-11.5	6.6 ^c	9.2 ^c	8.8	11.2	3.4	34.3	21.0
Public Debt Interest	3.1	4.3	1.4	3.3	-0.4	-0.9	-4.4	13.9	0.9	-2.5	9.0	11.1	-3.4
Environment, Resources, and Economic Development	-18.1 ^d	-12.3	-8.1	20.8	12.3	-6.4	-3.3	-12.8	9.1	10.8	-20.7	-6.4	13.1
Justice	5.0	-15.5	6.7	14.2	9.9	8.6	4.6	6.5	1.0	0.8	-5.2	114.6	1.8
General Government	5.3	-5.8	-7.6	44.4	-49.3	31.4	15.6	86.5	1.6	7.9	-8.4	169.8	19.8
Restructuring and Other Charges	—	79.7	-34.4	-95.2	177.6	-100	—	—	—	—	-15.2 ^e	-100 ^f	—
Interest in Investment in Electricity Sector	—	—	—	—	—	0	0	—	—	—	—	0 ^g	—
Provision for Electricity	—	—	—	—	—	6.5	-100	—	—	—	—	-100 ^g	—
Total	0.2	-1.3	0.2	2.4	7.1	-0.5	2.4	8.0	7.9	7.5	0.5	21.3	—

Sources: Ontario, Ministry of Finance, *Public Accounts of Ontario*, 1995-2005. All calculations are the author's. Note: "—" indicates "not applicable", ^a categorized as Community, Family, Children's Services, ^b categorized as Children's and Social Services, ^c categorized as Education, Training, Colleges and Universities, ^d categorized as Resources and Economic Development, ^e is the period 1996-1998, ^f is the period 1998-2001, ^g is the period 2000-2002.

Table 5.2.1.3: Year Provincial Programmes were Cut and Restored.

Item	Year of Decrease	Year Restored to/Exceeded Year First Cut
Health	1996	1997
Social Services	1996	Did not return to 1996 levels
Education and Training	1997	1998
Public Debt Interest	2000	2002
Environment, Resources, and Economic Development	1996	Did not return to 1996 levels
Justice	1997	1999
General Government	1997	1999
Total Expenditures	1997	1998

Sources: Ontario, Ministry of Finance, *Public Accounts of Ontario*, 1995-2005.

What is perhaps most telling was the addition of "Restructuring and Other Charges" to the provincial budget, which lay the groundwork for rescaling the Ontario state. More specifically, Queen's Park's Restructuring and Other Charges would fund the reshuffling of responsibilities between the province and the municipalities, which will be explored below.

What, then, was the point to Ontario's roll-back years? A possible explanation lies in the political re-establishment of the Ontario scale. As Courchene notes, the consolidation of a continental space of competition reinforced Ontario's north-south geo-economic orientation, which in turn provided the opening for reducing tax rates because "the tax rates that matter to Ontario are not those in British Columbia and Manitoba but those in Michigan, Ohio, New York, and Pennsylvania. This is part and parcel of what it means to be a North American region-state."⁵⁴¹ In other words, the reductions reflect the Harris government's acceptance that the province's political economic interests no longer lay with Canada. Therefore, Ontario needed to take full advantage of continental opportunities.

In part, as Boismenu and Jenson argue, rescaling heightened the every-province-for-itself movement that Ontario, joined by Alberta, more aggressively pursued in the late 1990s.⁵⁴² This speaks to the reduction-in-expenditure-side of the CSR as Harris's Ontario could claim that the province's finances were strained. Thus, on the one hand, Ontario's tax reductions were a discursive reflection of the political economic realities facing Ontario as a national regime of accumulation was replaced by a continental one. On the other hand, expenditure reductions responded to a federal government which had reduced its role in funding provincial social programmes.

5.2.2 Roll-back-as-roll-out: Rescaling Ontario through Municipal Restructuring

If 1995 to 1998 served to restate Ontario's scale-specific interests, from 1998 to 2003, the Harris government aimed to rescale provincial-municipal relations, streamlining administrative responsibilities and downloading them onto municipalities. Minor steps had been taken during the roll-back phase, with the first in 1996 when the Ministry of Energy and Environment released new guidelines for decontaminating brownfield sites. Desfor and Keil note the flexibility contained within these brownfield guidelines was an exercise in reducing provincial regulation,⁵⁴³ but the overall intent was to absolve the province of the risks associated with soil decontamination. The burden of brownfield redevelopment, i.e. risk assessment, now shifted onto the municipalities who only reported to the province when risk management became too costly to assume. Thus, Ontario would only act if the municipality came forward with documentation of risk management and risk assessment.⁵⁴⁴

The most significant action occurred in 1998 with the "Who Does What Panel," which aimed to reorganize provincial and municipal responsibilities. As Graham and Phillips recount, the impetus for downloading was the desire for efficiency gains. While downloading was seen by the municipalities as a provincial attempt to protect Ontario's finances by increasing municipal responsibilities, Harris's government preferred to call its course of action "disentanglement," suggesting duplication was being purged from the entire public sector. As Graham and Phillips suggest, this "embodied the ethos of less government. The aim was to get government out of "non-essential" activities and reduce the direct involvement of the province in program and service delivery. Privatization and voluntarism were two primary channels through which this would occur."⁵⁴⁵

In some respects, the Harris government's downloading can be interpreted as a second roll-back round. The government began relieving the province of responsibilities by realigning provincial and municipal responsibilities. Table 5.2.2.1 outlines the provincial-municipal breakdown before and after downloading. It is important to note, however, that downloading began with the province wanting to gain total control over education which was delivered by local school boards. While the province wanted to put an end to the school boards' perceived loose and fast spending, taking on education would cause provincial expenditures to rise. To avoid this, the province chose to swap responsibilities with the municipalities.⁵⁴⁶

Table 5.2.2.1: Provincial-Municipal Breakdown of Funding for Responsibilities Before and After Downloading.

Responsibility	Previous	Current
General Welfare Assistance		
• Benefits	80-20	80-20
• Administration	50-50	50-50
Family Benefits Assistance		
• Benefits	Provincial	80-20
• Administration	Provincial	80-20
Child-care services	80-20	80-20
Long-term care	Provincial	Provincial
Hostels	80-20	80-20
Homes for special care	Provincial	Provincial
Women's shelters	95-5	Provincial
Social housing	Provincial-Municipal	Municipal
Child welfare	80-20	Provincial
Municipal transit	33-67	Municipal
GO Transit	Provincial	Municipal
Ferries	Provincial	Municipal
Airports	40-60	Municipal
Sewers and water	10-90	Municipal
Policing	10-90 in rural areas	Municipal
Farm tax rebate	Provincial	Municipal
Property assessment	Provincial	Municipal
Public health	70-30	50-50
Ambulance	90-10	50-50
Roads	Provincial-Municipal	More municipal
Gross receipts tax	Municipal	Provincial
Provincial offences	Provincial	Municipal
Residential education taxes	School boards	50-50

Source: Harry M. Kitchen, *Municipal Revenue and Expenditure Issues in Canada*, p. 31.

Sancton has argued that downloading was never a part of Harris's agenda because reforming provincial-municipal relations had not been included in his electoral platform.⁵⁴⁷ Although provincial-municipal relations were not mentioned in the CSR, downloading can be understood as another step towards reterritorializing a post-

Keynesian-Fordist Ontario. Whereas the "Who Does What" Panel recommended the province assume full control over social services and leave infrastructure to municipalities, Al Leach, the Harris government's sole downtown Toronto MPP, advised the government to make municipalities pay for social services, specifically social assistance. According to Leach, since municipalities were the level of government closest to citizens, they were best equipped to detect welfare fraud, a central component of the CSR's promise to reform social assistance. Inside the Conservative caucus, Leach's proposals were controversial because the province's control over social assistance would be limited if municipalities funded, administered, and delivered it.⁵⁴⁸

These changes contained an inherent contradiction, for downloading once again entangled the province with the municipalities. In the name of leaner government, the province used a top-down approach to manage municipal-provincial affairs. Refusing to admit that the municipalities were ill-equipped to meet the new demands being put on them by the province, "community leaders and voluntary organizations were apparently expected to cope with the consequences of provincially imposed change."⁵⁴⁹ This speaks to the Harris government's "one-dimensional characterization" of municipal politics which reduced citizens to rent-seeking actors who look to maximize benefits and minimize costs.⁵⁵⁰ As municipalities have few tax powers, the province believed they could act entrepreneurially and find ways to (1) trim public spending and/or (2) involve the private sector to deliver public services. Where a municipality felt this was not possible, the province would step and do it for them.⁵⁵¹

Downloading was quickly followed by plans to amalgamate municipalities. Not only would an enlarged City of Toronto accomplish the CSR's goal of shrinking the

overall size of government, but the subsequent pooling of local resources and capacities and streamlining of local regulations would also engender more effective municipal entrepreneurialism, diminishing inter-urban competition inside the province and enabling Ontario municipalities to focus on the actions of cities in foreign jurisdictions.⁵⁵²

Amalgamation involved more than the creation of new municipalities for it signalled a new attitude towards municipal roles. Where the first roll-back round sought to redefine the province's roles and responsibilities, the second sought to force municipalities to achieve the province's objectives of restructuring public services and opening Ontario for business. The first roll-back round did away with post-war Ontario's economic role,⁵⁵³ while the second sought to transform the nature of municipal government and synchronize it with provincial priorities. This is where roll-back begins to double as roll-out, for it was left to the municipalities to determine how they would employ their capacities as entrepreneurial actors to attract investment.

The Ontario SuperBuild Corporation and the Ontario Jobs and Investment Board can, to some extent, be interpreted as part of a wider strategy to further Ontario's variant of a Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime as it represented a means of not only hollowing out the Ontario state, but also making the municipalities do the growth work which the preceding Keynesian era expected the provinces to do with the support of the federal scale.

The Jobs and Investment Board was created to promote growth poles and stimulate investment in sunrise industries. This way, local areas could become the strategic sites to realize the potential lying in the NAFTA space of competition.⁵⁵⁴ Indeed, the Board saw cities as places for growth and advocated greater growth powers to

municipalities.⁵⁵⁵ The Ontario SuperBuild Corporation was designed to further municipal entrepreneurialism by inviting the private sector to increase its involvement in building infrastructures.⁵⁵⁶ It complemented the Ontario Jobs and Investment Board, which urged municipalities to achieve first-rate infrastructures that enhanced global connectivity. As the Jobs and Investment Board stated, "In addition to changing our collective attitude to think globally, Ontario needs to act locally – by ensuring, for example, that we have world-class infrastructure to connect our cities, communities and businesses with global markets."⁵⁵⁷

However much or little the new provincial-municipal relationship may have contributed to Ontario's position within the global and North American marketplaces, the regulatory deficits of the province's roll-back rounds could no longer be ignored. One outcome of downloading had been to intensify urban sprawl across the province. Table 5.2.2.1 showed how downloading shifted the costs of infrastructure onto municipalities while general transfers that help municipalities meet their responsibilities decreased as a proportion of overall transfers (see Figure 5.2.2.1). Faster growing suburban and exurban regions could only deal with this by allowing more development within their boundaries. So, where the province increased the costs of urban areas' social services, suburban and exurban areas coped with the costs married to their growth regime.

Figure 5.2.2.1: Ontario Transfers to Local Governments, 1995-2005.

Source: CANSIM, Table 384-0011

The decline in general transfers to local governments was instrumental in pushing

municipalities towards a growth orientation. The only way to meet their new responsibilities was to increase developments within their boundaries. The province, however, took a hands-off approach to planning. In the past, municipalities were responsible to the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing given the latter's supervisory powers. Under Harris's government, Municipal Affairs and Housing was limited to a funding and advising role, ending its commitment to supervising developments.⁵⁵⁸ Indeed, Municipal Affairs and Housing's first policy statement under the Harris government made no reference to the role that the province could play beyond setting a developmental agenda that championed economic growth. Municipal governments were simply "asked" to match local goals with provincial goals.⁵⁵⁹

The financial straits local governments found themselves in, however, forced them to focus on their own jurisdictions and, as a result, to diverge from provincial goals. In response to this, the Harris government launched the Ontario Smart Growth programme, a series of regional panels among area municipalities to discuss the problems stemming from land developments.

Despite Smart Growth's premise, Municipal Affairs and Housing continued to focus on the municipal reliance on property tax revenue streams.⁵⁶⁰ The onus remained on municipalities to move Ontario's economy forward into the global economy.⁵⁶¹ The financial tools that were made available to municipalities tended to have a supply-side orientation, with a preference for tax exemptions and creative tax holidays. This was consistent with Harris's dedication to a market-orientated Ontario.⁵⁶²

5.2.3 One More Roll-out! Re-integrating Ontario as State Space

Despite the economic boom and the budget surpluses accumulated during Harris's

tenure, his successor could not mute the public's rising dissatisfaction with the mounting deficits in the public sphere. In autumn 2003, the Conservatives were defeated by the Ontario Liberal Party and with this, a more reflexive approach to policymaking took hold, focused on addressing the municipal-provincial scalar disconnect left by the Conservative governments. In this sense, the Liberal victory saw the beginning of a wholly *provincial* roll-out. The first moments of this roll-out phase, however, were consistent with the preference for supply-side solutions. For example, under the guidance of the Ministry of Finance, the McGuinty Liberals introduced a financial tax incentive programme for brownfield redevelopment. To gain assistance from Finance, municipalities had to first get their community improvement plan for brownfield redevelopment approved by Municipal Affairs and Housing. If successful, Finance agreed to refund the education portion of the local property tax a developer was exempted from paying, in exchange for cleaning up and redeveloping a brownfield.⁵⁶³

On the surface, this appears similar to the Harris/Eves government's chosen path. The qualitative difference, however, was the recognition of, and explicit link to, municipal planning problems which the province felt it had to mediate. Through Places to Grow, the province would again set planning priorities and the brownfields initiative was clearly understood as one of these. In Finance's own words, "The Brownfields Financial Tax Incentive Program is part of the Province's *Places to Grow* initiative that encourages investment and development of existing urban areas in order to reduce urban sprawl. Growth is encouraged ... in those areas that can best accommodate it, thereby steering growth pressures away from the places and systems in need of protection."⁵⁶⁴ As we shall see in the following section, Places to Grow became an important component for

waterfront redevelopment in order to curb the effects of the 905's urban sprawl on Toronto. Moreover, Places to Grow served to frame the new planning relationship between Ontario and the City of Toronto in order to move ahead on waterfront redevelopment.

A newly created Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal was responsible for administering Places to Grow. That "renewal" was included in the name of the then new ministry symbolized the limits and contradictions that the Conservative governments had ignored. Outlining the objectives of Places to Grow, Public Infrastructure Renewal rejected the preceding government's growth-for-growth's-sake mindset, which assumed public infrastructural deficits could be solved through a virtuous circle of growth. Instead, Places to Grow sought to establish urban growth centres to steer development and to ensure land-use policy promoted transit-friendly, high-density developments.⁵⁶⁵

With Places to Grow as a framework, Public Infrastructure Renewal kicked off Ontario's roll-out phase with two new programmes. ReNew Ontario aimed to modernize infrastructure and Move Ontario was dedicated to transportation. A range of financial tools and infrastructure management directives were also established.⁵⁶⁶ More important, however, Places to Grow sought to reconcile the short-term needs of local governments with the long-term needs of the province. Provincial intervention was urgently required to realize Ontario's place in a continental regime of accumulation. Without overstating the relief that Places to Grow provided for municipalities – the McGuinty government was unprepared to rework provincial-municipal relations at that time – Places to Grow did present a blueprint to handle the effects of unchecked municipal growth and its impact on Ontario's competitiveness.

Infrastructure renewal represented a more concerted effort on Queen's Park's part to construct a regime of accumulation at the provincial scale. Accomplishing this required reconnecting the support of the state at the provincial and municipal scales. Infrastructures were becoming less capable of absorbing current growth demands and providing the capacity for future rounds of growth. Congested roads meant lost productivity and overloaded power plants meant looming blackouts that shut down factories and hindered informational flows. Therefore, the challenge was to manage growth in a way that did not put a brake on flows of people and goods. In other words, Queen's Park had to reinvest in public goods. As we shall see in the next section, the province's commitment to waterfront redevelopment partly served to illustrate to the City of Toronto and its citizens that Queen's Park was serious about remedying the deficits in the public realm that the Conservative government ignored. As such, the province hoped it could recoup some of the legitimacy it had lost with the city and its citizens during the late 1990s.

5.3 Towards a Neo-Liberal Waterfront: Toronto Confronts Rescaling

5.3.1 Toronto Rethinks Its Place in the Scale of Things

Where did these rescaling exercises leave Toronto? Toronto sought to find ways to deal with the new scalar reality of federal and provincial downloading. This had serious implications for Toronto's developmental possibilities as the city was forced to worry about its finances.⁵⁶⁷ Yet, Toronto did not accept its constitutional status as a "creature of the province." In fact, under the social democratic mayoralty of Barbara Hall, the city became a source of irritation for the Harris government as Toronto sought to maintain its infrastructural and social supports. Opposition to the Harris government

intensified as the province proceeded with its plans for amalgamation.

The Toronto-based opposition to this amalgamation reflected a local effort to retain the collectivism lost at the federal and provincial scales. If Toronto's expenditures between 1995 and 1997 provide an indication of city priorities versus provincial priorities, Hall's mayoralty placed greater importance on socialization than on the developmental direction consistent with the Harris government's priorities. As data for the changes in the City of Toronto's expenditures in Table 5.3.1.1 shows, although total expenditures fell, expenditures on transportation, environmental services, and social and family services increased; spending on planning and development dropped sharply. By 1997, planning and development constituted a significantly smaller proportion of overall expenditures (6.8% versus 12.2% in 1995). Social spending, however, rose from 0.2 to 0.4% of total expenditures and environmental services from 10.4% to 12.8% by 1997. Although the logic of amalgamation was to eliminate Metro and combine its six members in a new City of Toronto capable of promoting itself on the world stage, this nevertheless afforded Harris a political opportunity to subdue the opposition mounted by Mayor Hall.⁵⁶⁸

Table 5.3.1.1: Percent Change in the City of Toronto's Expenditures, 1995-1997.

Expenditures	Change in Spending
General government	-10.1
Protection to persons and property	1.9
Transportation	10.0
Environmental services	15.6
Health	-18.6
Social and family services	111.5
Recreation and culture	-3.9
Planning and development	-47.8
<i>Total</i>	-6.5

Sources: Canadian Tax Foundation, *Finances of the Nation 1997*, p. C:10, Canadian Tax Foundation, *Finances of the Nation 1999*, p. C:10. All calculations are the author's. Note: Numbers may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

The defeat of Toronto's anti-amalgamation movement has been told at length.⁵⁶⁹

Here, it is important to recall that once amalgamation was completed, the Harris government found a more sympathetic counterpart as Mel Lastman became the new

mayor of the city. In order to proceed with his boosterist agenda, Lastman astutely employed the province's agenda to squeeze significant sums of money out of Queen's Park.⁵⁷⁰ With the province thus assisting Toronto's restructuring, the city could focus on strategizing a future of competitiveness.

An important piece of the competitive puzzle lay in the planning situation in which Toronto found itself. Sprawl had intensified outside of the new City of Toronto's boundaries as the 905 dealt with downloaded infrastructure costs by accelerating developments inside their boundaries and overloading existing infrastructural capacities. Given Toronto's centrality to the GTA economy, the problems associated with the 905's excessive low-density developments had begun spilling into Toronto.

In 2000, Toronto's planning and economic development departments initiated a broad process to provide a coherent growth strategy for the GTA. Two reports are noteworthy because they provided a preliminary framework for planning and Toronto that would inform waterfront redevelopment. The aim of the first, *Toronto Competes* (TC), was to demonstrate the organic relationship between Toronto and the 905 belt. As *Toronto Competes* states,

"When pronounced cost differences occur within regions, an unsustainable cycle can develop in which new investment to greenfield areas can undermine the developed area and ultimately the entire region. Ultimately, the GTA cannot be a competitive region internationally if the City of Toronto is not a competitive location locally."⁵⁷¹

While TC presented NAFTA as the city's space of competition, more pressing was the potential danger of allowing the 905 and 416 to vie for investments, which would move the city's focus from a continental space of competition to a regional space of competition. In such a circumstance, investments might be endlessly reshuffled from one jurisdiction to another in the GTA. The interdependencies that GTA clusters had come to

depend on could also be disrupted in the process. To avoid this, *TC* proposed the 416 and 905 area build on existing clusters by identifying (1) concentrations of employment, (2) the degree of internationalization, and (3) the extent of a cluster's competitiveness.⁵⁷²

The second report, *The Future of Downtown Toronto (FDT)*, followed on the heels of *Toronto Competes*, but its tone was decidedly different. *FDT* questioned the logic of firm mobility by showing that the cost savings associated with locating in greenfields was not as clear as *TC* suggested. The main significance of *FDT*, however, is that it showed that the GTA's economic geography was skewed towards the downtown core. Much of the command in the command-and-control model of the GTA was located in Toronto's central business district, visible in the intensified specialization of high order services in knowledge-based industries and the financial service sector.⁵⁷³

FDT raised additional considerations with regard to the city's ability to absorb future population growth within the downtown core where already 60 percent of the population growth was taking place.⁵⁷⁴ This is not surprising given the intensity of office spaces in the downtown core. Of the 149 million square feet of office space throughout Toronto, 77 million stood in the pre-amalgamation borders of the city and 59 million of this was located in the downtown core.⁵⁷⁵ Housing was now needed to lodge higher order service workers who worked there. As the past strategy of gentrification reached its limits, new stocks of housing had to be built to meet future demand. Between 2015 and 2020, *FDT* expected 30, 000 to 42, 000 additional residents in the downtown core.

The Future of Downtown Toronto highlighted the six districts providing new living spaces to absorb the downtown's population growth. As Table 5.3.1.2 shows, among the six areas of population growth in downtown Toronto, the central waterfront

experienced the most growth. *FDT* was clear that these new living spaces were built with upper- and middle-income earners in mind. At the same time, questions of social polarization had to be addressed in light of the following: (1) income disparities, (2) unequal access to home ownership, (3) the population's young age, (4) the racialization of poverty in Toronto's central area, and (5) the balance of housing tipped towards renting rather than ownership.⁵⁷⁶

Table 5.3.1.2: Major Areas of Population Growth in Downtown Toronto, 1980-1999.

District	New Population
Central waterfront	12,350
Mid-town	7,560
Up-town	7,100
St. Lawrence Market	5,200
Yorkville	2,200
Financial district	1,900

Source: City of Toronto, *The Future of Downtown Toronto*, p. 77.

Table 5.3.1.3: Percent Change in Households by Income in the GTA, 1991-1996.

Income	416							905 Regions			
	Toronto	East York	Etobicoke	North York	Scarborough	Borough of York	Metro	Durham	Halton	Peel	York
Under \$10,000	22.1	40.6	57.9	46.7	48.1	38.5	37.3	21.3	21.1	48.3	63.6
\$10,000-\$19,999 ^a	14.7	11.3	18.0	18.6	25.8	7.2	17.0	15.6	18.0	35.8	50.3
\$20,000-\$29,999	-0.7	-8.6	4.8	7.8	13.9	7.3	4.5	16.1	12.4	22.6	41.4
\$30,000-\$39,999	-0.2	-4.2	-0.7	2.1	24.1	-1.1	1.0	9.4	6.5	10.6	21.4
\$40,000-\$49,999	-0.5	-0.2	0.3	-5.9	-7.2	-7.1	-3.5	-2.7	-1.6	4.7	5.2
\$50,000-\$59,999	-3.8	-15.2	-10.7	-8.9	-13.0	-10.5	-9.2	-4.1	-6.6	0.4	6.4
\$60,000-\$69,999	-1.6	-17.8	-2.5	-11.2	-6.4	-10.7	-6.6	-0.8	-4.8	-1.8	-0.8
\$70,000 and above ^b	9.6	13.6	1.6	-2.1	0.2	0.8	3.1	30.1	22.7	24.1	17.6
All	5.8	1.6	4.3	3.4	5.3	2.7	4.5	13.2	11.0	15.8	18.0

Sources: Statistics Canada, *1991 Canada Census*, Cat. No. 95-388; Statistics Canada, *1996 Canada Census*, Cat. No. 95-187-XPB. Note: *a* combines \$10,000-\$14,999 and \$15,000-\$19,999 for 1991; *b* combines \$70,000-\$79,999, \$80,000-\$89,999, \$90,000-\$99,999, and \$100,000 and over for 1996. All calculations are the author's.

As Table 5.3.1.3 above shows, between 1991 and 1996, there was a substantial rise in the number of households earning less than \$20,000 in Toronto, although the increase in the rest of Metro and the 905 was greater. Moreover, within Metro, only Toronto and East York saw the share of top-income households rising above the overall increase in households. Meanwhile, in the 905, only Peel and York Regions saw a

general rise in middle-income households. The growth in high-income households soundly outpaced Toronto and the rest of Metro. Overall, the GTA was clearly moving towards polarized growth in high-income and low-income households while the numbers of middle- and lower middle-income households were decreasing.

Although Toronto noted the urgency of managing its new regional context, neither the federal nor the provincial governments provided adequate inter-scalar supports for this. Prior to the New Deal for Communities, the federal government had recognized the need to rearticulate a federal-municipal scalar relationship in the 2001 Speech from the Throne, leading Transport Canada to provide a sketch of its plans to foster better mobility in Canada's urban areas.⁵⁷⁷ The provincial government, however, continued to focus on the Ontario scale. A Smart Growth Panel for the GTA reaffirmed the province's position that municipalities sort out planning issues among themselves, although it did ask the province to help the region solve its mobility and waste management problems. Given the resources at the disposal of the GTA municipalities, Ontario's assistance was vital to ensure the area's long-term growth. The Panel also recognized Toronto's health had to be protected if the GTA was going to thrive as a globally competitive region.⁵⁷⁸

As noted earlier, the Liberal victory in Ontario in 2003 brought a renewed provincial interest in planning. For Toronto, this entailed Ontario's recognition of the limits the GTA's growth was running up against. In the GTA, 600 growth nodes were identified, 400 of which were located within the City of Toronto (see Map 5.3.1.1).⁵⁷⁹ As we shall see shortly, the waterfront would become one of the growth nodes, providing for the start for a provincial reworking of the inter-scalar relationship it had with Toronto.

Map 5.3.1.1: Priority Nodes in the Places to Grow Programme.

Source: Ontario, Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal, *Places to Grow Better Choices, Brighter Future*, p. 15 [scanned reproduction]

Municipal Affairs and Housing also established a joint task force with the city, which recognized the Toronto-Ontario relationship was one of mutable nestedness, i.e. that the two scales do in fact shape each other. The joint task force was aware of the need to consolidate the reconstituted inter-scalar relationship and Toronto as a legitimate political scale and partner and to enable Toronto to reach its fullest potential as a space of competitiveness.⁵⁸⁰ This made political sense because Queen's Park had lost much legitimacy in the city during the Harris/Eves governments.

Where does the waterfront fit into all of this rescaling? How, then, does Toronto utilize it as the staging ground to firm up the city as the national economic centrepiece?

It is to this question that this chapter now turns to.

5.3.2: Rolling Back the Waterfront: Re-establishing the Waterfront

While Ontario and Canada were preoccupied with their own scale-specific problems, the city set to work on the transfer of THC lands to the Toronto Economic Development Corporation (TEDCO), Toronto's local development arm, which the RCFTW had recommended. Of the two remaining agencies dedicated to waterfront planning, the Metropolitan Toronto and Region Conservation Authority (MTRCA) and the Waterfront Regeneration Trust (WRT), only the WRT was able to act on the Harris government's first push towards making cities more entrepreneurial through the Ministry of Energy and Environment's brownfield policy. The legislation governing the WRT mandated it to act (1) on the wishes of Energy and Environment and (2) as an information clearinghouse for the province concerning waterfront lands.⁵⁸¹ Thus, following the adoption of the 1996 brownfield guidelines, the WRT moved to modernize the Toronto Port Lands. The WRT's 1997 report, *Greening the Toronto Port Lands*, which hinted at the direction Toronto's waterfront should take, was more than a call for ecological modernization. It was also a call for the City of Toronto to commodify the Port Lands in order to enlarge tax revenues. Non-economic spaces on the Port Lands could now be used to enhance the area's property values.⁵⁸²

The WRT held an international policy forum to develop expertise on how to prompt brownfield redevelopment through its International Brownfield Exchange. Although this was a WRT-led initiative, it grew out of a consensus between the WRT, private sector developers, municipalities, Environment Canada, and Municipal Affairs and Housing regarding the need to develop a framework to overcome roadblocks to

brownfield reinvestment. In a classic case of fast policy transfer, a blueprint for brownfield redevelopment was drafted through the International Brownfield Exchange, which local governments everywhere could apply. The Exchange encouraged municipalities to seek supply-side solutions. Recommendations included streamlined planning, competitive tax structures to counter greenfield development, legislative transparency for risk assessment, better municipal expertise, and making markets for brownfields.⁵⁸³

The WRT's efforts could only go so far as its role was simply advisory. Broad agreement existed, however, that the waterfront required extensive redevelopment and Ontario's 1996 brownfield guidelines could lead the way forward. Indeed, the city and the province concurred on the necessity of economic growth. As Desfor and Keil state, "We observe that much of the discourse concerned with the 1996 guidelines supports the notion ... that economic growth is a broadly enjoyed public good, and hence, an appropriate role of the local state is to promote growth."⁵⁸⁴ As noted earlier, however, Toronto's attention was not on planning and development but rather on coping with the rescaling of responsibilities. One example is the MTRCA, a key planning agency for Toronto's waterfront, which had trouble implementing its plans when the province reduced its capital funding to zero, forcing the MTRCA to seek out public-private partnerships to compensate for this.⁵⁸⁵

Mayor Hall had different ideas about the waterfront. Under her leadership, Toronto City Council attempted to assert the waterfront's usefulness beyond economic considerations.⁵⁸⁶ Amalgamation, however, pushed Hall out, replacing her with the more entrepreneurial-minded Mel Lastman. One of Lastman's first acts was to address the

visual appearance of the Port Lands, the largest swath of vacant land on the waterfront. Redeveloping the Port Lands would come to be framed as a city-building opportunity. At the same time, a decision was made to be market-leading rather than market-led, avoiding a big box-infested waterfront. Thus the city denied a building permit for the big box retailer Home Depot, in favour of the more glamorous industries in sunrise sectors.⁵⁸⁷ In this sense, Lastman accepted the supply-side developmental role that Harris's government hoped municipalities would take, but rejected a highest-bidder-approach to land development witnessed in the ORC's aborted 1997 sale of land in the West Don Lands.

The growing interest in the Port Lands was oriented to readying Toronto for a bid on the 2008 Olympic Games, with the aid of the WRT and its chair, David Crombie. There were two aspects to the bid. First, whereas the 1996 bid used the waterfront to attract the Olympics, in 2008, Toronto intended to use the Olympics to get the waterfront. Second, as the province withdrew from planning, the Olympic bid came to be seen as a way to address the social and economic issues emanating from intensified sprawl in the GTA. The region's ever more stressed transportation infrastructure figured prominently in this equation. The idea of strategically placing transfer lots on western and eastern points of Highway 401, North America's busiest highway, was floated as a way to make it easier for the 905 belt's commuters to arrive in downtown Toronto via public transit.⁵⁸⁸

A third aspect may be added. The waterfront appeared to serve as an opening for federal and provincial re-involvement in city affairs through the staging of an Olympic Games. In what eventually became the basis for a 2000 report for the tri-level Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Task Force (TWRTF), *Our Toronto Waterfront!* summarized Toronto's future waterfront hopes. The report appears to have been intended for a federal

and provincial audience. Repeating many of the same themes in the first Port Lands process, it talked up the waterfront's potential to make Toronto into a world city. Special emphasis was placed on a claim that "Toronto will surpass other world cities – Barcelona, London, Sydney, and New York – cities that have turned old industrial areas and vacant lands into showcases."⁵⁸⁹ It should be noted, however, that *Our Toronto Waterfront!* stated that waterfront redevelopment was urgent even without an Olympic bid.⁵⁹⁰

Using the Olympics to bring attention to the waterfront spoke to two federal interests. First, if the Olympics were held in Toronto, this could conceivably draw international attention on the nation. Thus, the federal government's interest in obtaining more international investment in Canada, albeit investment funnelled into Toronto, could be achieved through the waterfront. Second, hosting the Olympics on Toronto's waterfront afforded an opportunity to insert the federal government into Canada's primary world city. The unravelling of the inter-scalar architecture that had supported Keynesian-Fordist Canada could now be countered by visible forays into cities.

Some federal concern with Toronto, however, had been shown prior to the 2008 Olympic bid. Two Toronto MPs, Tony Ianno and Dennis Mills, persuaded Parliament to add an amendment to the 1999 Canada Marine Act which replaced the THC with a new agency, the Toronto Port Authority. Ports deemed to be in the federal interest, i.e. profitable ports, remained under Ottawa's jurisdiction. The rest were bequeathed to the municipalities they were located in because "this was one way of moving a large drain of the federal treasury."⁵⁹¹

The prospect of attracting tourism to Canada's largest city justified having a

federal port authority in Toronto. In particular, the strategy anticipated gambling boats and cruise ships filled with tourists. Yet, a more likely reason for federal interest stemmed from enabling the city's port to make it function and grow. To quote an official from the federal waterfront riding of Toronto Centre, "The port is one of the most important places where aggregates and salt for the roads and things like that are brought into the city and that if you didn't have that heavy cargo brought in by ship, it'd all have to be trucked in." The individual, however, cautiously concluded, "That's certainly a strong, logical reason for it, but in terms of the reality of it, you have to look at the number of tons being moved ... to see if that's still there."⁵⁹² In other words, the Toronto Port Authority appears to have been formed out of a concern that it was in the federal interest to keep up a presence in Toronto and ensure the flow of necessary materials into the city.

With regard to the province's interest in the waterfront-based Olympic bid, it spoke to Queen's Park in three ways. First, plans for the Olympics represented a way to deal with the GTA's traffic woes. The proposed Highway 401 transfer lots for the 2008 Olympics, which would have provided parking spaces to move drivers in the GTA from their cars to public transit, demonstrated to the province that the GTA municipalities were capable of dealing with planning issues. In other words, this showed the province that the GTA municipalities accepted planning issues could be resolved amongst themselves. Second, an event of this kind enriched the Harris government's political base, namely small-business owners located in the 905 belt.⁵⁹³ Visitors to the Olympic Games could be expected to frequent the many bars, restaurants, and independent hotels and motels scattered throughout the GTA. Third, the bid spoke to the desire to make Ontario's cities

crucibles of global competitiveness. The Ontario Jobs and Investment Board believed Ontario cities wishing to keep up with their American competitors had to modernize their infrastructures if they were going to be successfully inserted into the NAFTA space of competition.⁵⁹⁴ Holding a waterfront Olympics, then, would have provided an impetus to install the latest infrastructures.

Overall, then, the impetus for waterfront development was to deal with the issues arising from the roll-back phase at the federal and provincial scales and the reallocation of appropriate responsibilities therewith. Recognizing this, the waterfront became a scale which Toronto could employ in order to pursue local supply-side strategies. The insularities resulting from the nature of rescaling in Canada had erected policy silos, making policy co-ordination difficult.⁵⁹⁵ Pitching the waterfront as the lodestar for a new era in supply-side city-building therefore offered an opportunity to overcome these barriers. As Mel Lastman's cover letter for *Our Toronto Waterfront!* perceptively proclaimed, "We'll reshape this front porch to our city as a seamless whole instead of a patchwork quilt. It's going to happen! We have the will, and the co-operation and investment of the three levels of government and the private sector, we'll have the way."⁵⁹⁶

5.3.3: Rolling Out Toronto's Waterfront? Getting a Competitive Toronto Ready

The logic of the waterfront's roll-out phase rests on the institutional deficiencies arising from regulatory deficits. As stated in the first chapter, roll-out policies result from the limits of roll-back politics. As Peck and Tickell suggest, these limits "provide a positive spur to regulatory reinvention."⁵⁹⁷ In the case of Toronto's waterfront, the formation of the TWRC's tri-level predecessor, the TWRTF, in late 1999 proved to be a

vital step towards framing waterfront revitalization.

The TWRTF's final report outlined the terms of engagement for the tri-level waterfront revitalization, pointing out the two spaces of competition that made waterfront redevelopment so necessary for Canada, Ontario, and Toronto. If North America was the first space of competition, the second space of competition was that of world cities.⁵⁹⁸ Better positioning the three scales *vis à vis* the spaces of North America and world cities demanded a commitment to waterfront redevelopment from all three governments. This understanding not only derived from the TWRTF's view that other gateway cities benefited from waterfront redevelopment, but also cities were being rediscovered as the places where competitiveness happens on a number of axes.⁵⁹⁹ From this perspective, continued neglect of the Toronto waterfront would adversely affect the competitiveness of Toronto, Ontario, and Canada. In addition, the TWRTF believed that land use intensification of significant proportions on the last swath of undeveloped land in the downtown core could temper the 905 belt's sprawl. In addition, given the size of available land, range of housing needs could be accommodated.⁶⁰⁰

The TWRTF needs to be situated as part of the wider process initiated by the City of Toronto in 2000 and outlined the *TC* and *FDT* reports. As already noted, the 2000 TWRTF report discussed competitiveness and sprawl. The TWRTF believed coaxing investment in sunrise industries into the waterfront could be achieved through the creation of exciting public spaces. This telegraphed a strong commitment on the part of political authorities to move forward and in the process, engender public support. Moreover, these public spaces would serve a strategic purpose. Increased pedestrian traffic in and around the waterfront could be harnessed and demonstrate to the business

community that public interest existed in the area. As such, investing in it will be in their best interests.⁶⁰¹

The sorts of businesses the TWRTF desired, however, were of a particular sort for a city's material resources shape, but do not necessarily determine, available avenues for action.⁶⁰² On this basis, Toronto's chief administrative officer, Michael Garrett, saw the TWRTF's proposal for a convergence centre for innovative businesses on the Port Lands⁶⁰³ as a means to capitalize on the city's existing economic capabilities. He believed that "businesses like information technology, and telecommunications, tourism, biomedical and biotechnology, and business and professional services are already well represented in the city and should serve as a focus for the development of the Convergence Centre."⁶⁰⁴ At the same time, Garrett felt that the TWRTF's vision could subsequently be used to better local infrastructures.⁶⁰⁵

Garrett's suggestions were reaffirmed by one of the city's first policy statements on the city's Official Plan. In recognition of the GTA's division of labour, a strategy focusing on existing linkages between regional clusters was to be maintained. This meant intensifying the high order service function of the city, complemented by the routine activities of the 905 belt.⁶⁰⁶ Toronto's new Official Plan articulated the city commitment to follow the TWRTF's waterfront prescriptions.⁶⁰⁷ At the same time, the TWRTF's eventual successor, the TWRC, would respond to the city's planning focus – protecting the downtown core – an element of which included using the waterfront to provide housing adjacent to the central business district area.⁶⁰⁸

The city consolidated its waterfront agenda with the publication of *Making Waves*. This document expressed how a new regime of accumulation could materialize.

It argued Toronto was the undisputed gateway city for the Canadian economy, while also pointing out Ontario's dependency on Toronto's economic health.⁶⁰⁹ *Making Waves* restated a focus on the downtown core. The Port Lands were justified as the centrepiece of the whole project as it was where the bulk of housing, business, and recreation would develop. The adjacent East Bayfront and West Don Lands lands were to act as pathways directing investment and people flows into the Port Lands.⁶¹⁰ As a result, *Making Waves* broke with the TWRTF's original intent of redeveloping the entire Lake Ontario shoreline in favour of a narrower geographic focus.

Harvey argues that urban entrepreneurialism stresses the *prospective* benefits of place-based projects, so much so that they "also have the habit of becoming such a focus of public and political attention that they divert concern and even resources from the broader problems that may beset the region or territory as a whole."⁶¹¹ This orientation is well reflected in *Making Waves* which stated the existing plans did not need to be changed for the waterfronts in the former cities of Scarborough and Etobicoke. The key difference in the plans for the downtown waterfronts and the Scarborough and Etobicoke waterfronts was that no economic strategies were developed for the latter two. It may be for this reason, then, that *Making Waves* felt that accomplishing the recreational, public access, and environmental clean-up goals in these areas "does not require the same level of intervention that is necessary in the Central Waterfront."⁶¹² The expectations for the waterfront were dependent on obtaining new infrastructures and affordable housing, i.e. social reproduction features, to enhance the odds of Toronto becoming the scalar fix within the unfolding and rescaled Canadian space economy. This required a relatively broad consensus among city agencies and departments. The Toronto Waterfront

Reference Group (TWRG) was established in 2001 to co-ordinate city agency and department responses to the downtown waterfront. The TWRG followed the terms set in *Making Waves*.

Generally, the TWRG was concerned with the amount of idle, visually unappealing lands believed to be hurting Toronto's international reputation. One ex-TWRG official went so far as to compare Toronto's waterfront to a beautiful home with a crumbling façade: what goes on inside is irrelevant because the outside is unappealing. In the ex-official's eyes, perception was everything. He went on to say, "A lot of other cities have branded themselves, if you will, in terms of attracting investment ... by redeveloping their waterfront."⁶¹³ The TWRG was also concerned about the "doughnut effect" in the CBD/downtown core and it needed to be protected from the perceived threats from the 905 belt's sprawl.

Toronto's loss of the Olympics to Beijing did not dampen federal and provincial interest in the waterfront. As the TWRTF stated, the role of the Olympic bid was to bring attention to the waterfront because it "provides a focus and sense of urgency which should be seized."⁶¹⁴ This sense of urgency was indeed retained at the Toronto scale with the release of the new Official Plan. Taking its cue from a final pre-Official Plan document,⁶¹⁵ the Official Plan highlighted the role the downtown waterfront would come to play in the city's reurbanizing strategy. Thus, waterfront redevelopment became a way to mitigate the 905 belt's sprawl and to provide social housing measures.⁶¹⁶

5.3.4 The TWRC and New Roll-outs

Though the TWRC was established in 2001 under Ontario's *Business Corporations Act*, in December 2002, Bill 151 gave the agency its directives to push

waterfront redevelopment forward. Bill 151's fiscal orientation may suggest why the Ontario Minister of Finance, and not Municipal Affairs and Housing, introduced it into the legislature. Bill 151 mandated the TWRC to produce financial audits of its activities. In addition, although it was mainly to act as a steering agency, to receive the monies promised in October 2000, the TWRC had to present business case justifications for proposed projects.⁶¹⁷

Map 5.3.4.1: The TWRC's Planning Jurisdiction.

Source: Toronto Economic Development Corporation website: http://www.tedco.ca/pdfs/OwnershipMap_2009.pdf. Accessed January 15, 2009.

While the TWRC has been seen as preferring markets to guide its operations, the way it was established negates the inter-scalar context surrounding its establishment. The release of the TWRC's development plan and business strategy reflected its legislated responsibilities of being "fiscally prudent." Yet, the TWRC heightened the urgency of releasing monies by alluding to Toronto's centrality to the Ontarian and Canadian space

economies.⁶¹⁸ Above all, it very much spoke to the federal government's overall economic strategy of opening up the doors as widely as possible to international investment flows.⁶¹⁹ Using Toronto's status as a gateway city, the (partial) image-making logic embedded in waterfront redevelopment policy would lead to, the TWRC believed, "rebranding Canada" to the world. Yet there was another aspect to this argument that spoke to all three scales of government: the changing geography of the American economy. As the movement away from the north-east to the south-west had the potential to make Mexico rather than Canada America's most important trading partner, the TWRC suggested that a redeveloped waterfront could contribute to a cross-border scalar fix against such a respatialized economic geography.⁶²⁰

Stimulating developmental strategies was another matter. Given the size of waterfront redevelopment, the \$1.5 billion allotted to the TWRC has to be seen as seed capital to excite interest in the area. This seed capital is to be directed into infrastructure and public spaces, speaking to the role the extra-economic sphere plays in facilitating the accumulation process. It is therefore not surprising that the TWRC's first strategic intervention was in the public realm, for Bill 151 instructed it "[t]o promote and encourage the involvement of the private sector in the development of the designated waterfront."⁶²¹ Such an emphasis need not be equated with neo-liberalism. As Rose notes, "Some of us may still dream of a radically different future. But, in our present, who would oppose the proposition that it would be sensible to create a 'modern, dynamic economy' (as opposed to an outdated and stagnant one?). That government should 'work in partnership' with other agencies and organizations, including those from the private sector – it has been doing this for at least a century."⁶²²

Nor should a pledge to revive the public sphere be seen as an axiomatic rejection of neo-liberalism. Still, the construction of public spaces constituted a strategically important point of intervention for the TWRC. "Public Space Districts" would stimulate private reinvestment into mostly non-productive lands.⁶²³ This focus on public spaces relates to the limits that Bill 151 placed on the TWRC. Legally prohibited from owning land, the TWRC was largely reduced to a steering role. Capitalizing on the public realm, however, enabled the TWRC to carve out a role for itself. Extra-economic projects thus provided the catalyst to entice economic projects.

The federal government's declaration of its intentions for Canadian cities seemed to augur well for the TWRC's public space plans. The Prime Minister's Caucus Task Force on Urban Issues sought to give Ottawa a more direct role in cities, which the TWRC felt would support its programmes.⁶²⁴ A TWRC official cheered this:

"It suits our needs because we do believe ... we have to invest in the public realm to get the quality of community we want – we've got to have great parks and public spaces. I mean, what defines great cities are not buildings: it's great parks and public spaces. That's the statement of the city. So, the federal government is clearly aligned with the viewpoint, so I think ... having their money out in front, building these kinds of things, ties quite well with our overall corporate objectives. It fits in quite nicely with how we get to proceed."⁶²⁵

The TWRC got a shot in the arm from the province. The final report of the Central Ontario Smart Growth Panel validated the weight given to the waterfront by the City of Toronto and the TWRC: waterfront redevelopment acted "as an economic driver for the central Ontario zone" since the stretch of brownfields provided a significant opening to attain the goals of compact urban forms to calm the traffic troubles that the 905 belt's sprawl stirred up.⁶²⁶

The TWRC still faced a mammoth task. Drumming up public support for a project of this magnitude was especially crucial, in large part because the TWRC was but

one institutional actor on the waterfront. This made tactical sense for two reasons. First, the failure of prior schemes had generated substantial scepticism – most recently, an unsuccessful Olympic bid. Second, Bill 151's imposition of business case justifications on the TWRC's operations made it ready to show early accomplishments. Thus, the TWRC's initial business plan called for pinpointing key projects that required little or no start-up costs.⁶²⁷

The first institutional alliance the TWRC forged was with the Toronto and Region Conservation Authority. As a provincial authority dedicated to greening the GTA's shoreline, it had numerous projects underway which the TWRC could easily attach itself to. As one Conservation Authority official noted, "[The TWRC] decided that they were low risk and good projects to sign up for."⁶²⁸ The Conservation Authority also helped mollify, for the time being at least, any political repercussions flowing from redeveloping the downtown's waterfront. By harnessing its Port Union Park project in the western ex-city of Etobicoke, the TWRC aimed to demonstrate that redeveloping the downtown waterfront benefited the entire city.⁶²⁹

Despite movement on public places, the TWRC faced substantial obstacles in funding. This, in fact, brought it close to permanently closing its doors. The problem resided at the federal and provincial scales. Notwithstanding successively large budgetary surpluses, federal funding for the TWRC proceeds project-by-project. Thus, individual contribution agreements spelling out what can and cannot be done on a project have to be struck between the TWRC and Ottawa's Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Initiative,⁶³⁰ which created a lengthy process tying up funds for the TWRC. Provincially, the problem resided with the government's view that planning and growth were best left

to municipalities. Though the province agreed to contribute money to the TWRC's activities, it did not appear to have entirely bought into the TWRC's role. The West Don Lands area of the TWRC's jurisdiction is owned by the Ontario Realty Corporation, the province's real estate arm. Under the Harris government, the ORC insisted that a good tax atmosphere would remediate polluted lands.

The problems were much deeper than the Harris government's taste for lean and mean government. The contradictions inherent in its one-dimensional notion of public-private partnerships blocked the development of the proposed Metronome Project. Public-private partnerships were intended more as an offensive against public sector unions than bettering public infrastructure in innovative ways.⁶³¹ The Metronome consortium submitted an application for \$30 million to the Ontario SuperBuild Corporation, half of which would have been federal dollars coming from the Canada-Ontario Infrastructure Agreement. Hoping to build Canada's and the world's first and only Music City on the waterfront, Metronome became a victim of SuperBuild's conception of public infrastructure. Although it raised \$15 million from private sources, obtained a 99 year lease from the City of Toronto for the empty, architecturally significant Canada Malting complex at the foot of Bathurst Street, and had 6, 000 letters of support sent to the appropriate politicians, Metronome was rejected. As a Metronome representative's tale of the SuperBuild experience shows,

"[W]hen we got to SuperBuild [in 2001], SuperBuild was defined as a public infrastructure fund and because we had private corporations interfacing with what we were doing – for example, offices for the music industry, restaurants, retail – that was ... held against us because it wasn't public infrastructure. And I tried to explain to them, 'Yes, but that enables us to ask for funding on a one-time basis. We're never [going to] come back to you, province/federal government'. But that didn't fly."⁶³²

Further reflected in this decision, however, was the Harris government's disdain for arts

funding. Although the \$240 million geared towards the arts in Toronto under the Canada-Ontario Infrastructure Agreement arrived at its intended destination, only the six most established arts institutions in Toronto received it.⁶³³

The election of the Liberals in 2003 saw the province's stance towards the TWRC change. The ORC's willingness to co-operate with the TWRC under the Liberals is represented by its eagerness to satisfy the waterfront's "building communities" aspect. To quote an ORC official, "The main political objective that [the ORC] is aware of ... is the issue of ... first occupancy."⁶³⁴

The municipal government's role in the TWRC's troubles stemmed from co-ordinating city agency responses. Once the waterfront's governance skeleton was established, the City of Toronto quickly moved to set up its own co-ordinating body, the Waterfront Secretariat. Its stated purpose was to act as a one-window access for services, programmes, and support for the TWRC's activities. The Waterfront Secretariat also advises City Council on waterfront happenings. Yet its capacity to fulfill its role was inherently limited as it cannot oblige the appropriate city agencies to work with the TWRC. Here, the most pertinent city agency frustrating the TWRC's efforts was TEDCO.

As it was the majority landowner in the East Bayfront and Port Lands sections, TEDCO was instituted by the City of Toronto in the 1980s to cope with changing local economic circumstances. TEDCO was designed to ensure that developing city-owned properties would be closed to political contestation – or as proponents of such agencies would have it, guarantee that development is "value-free."⁶³⁵ As a TEDCO representative described the agency's function, "Our purpose is to follow what our

shareholders, City Council, has [*sic*] directed us to do, which is with respect to our landownings, act a prudent owner. So we have commercially normal, prudent owner responsibilities."⁶³⁶ Unlike TEDCO's singular political master (City Council), the TWRC had three political masters operating at three different political scales. Judging the TWRC as being in a state of governance overload, the TEDCO representative contended that "they're accountable to three which has the danger that you're accountable to none. And there is no model in the world where you have three that you're accountable to for."⁶³⁷

TEDCO's concerns over the TWRC ought not to be interpreted as a simple matter of guarding its administrative turf. The TEDCO representative also expressed displeasure with the rezoning processes in the waterfront. More than anything else, zoning was responsible for the waterfront's derelict appearance.⁶³⁸ Nonetheless, the key problem between TEDCO and the TWRC seemed to be an inability to reconcile the former's role of acquiring maximum returns on city-owned land with the latter's need to meet a mix of local, provincial, and federal objectives. This failure of reconciliation culminated in autumn 2005 when a public dispute over which agency's plans for the East Bayfront's Queen Elizabeth Docks redevelopment would win the day erupted.⁶³⁹

What this period of the roll-out phase of Toronto's waterfront suggests is that the logics operating between, among, and within different spatial scales were unevenly rolled out. Substantial complications for the TWRC's governance role arose as scalar disconnects and the relative stubborn staying power of certain aspects of the roll-back phases at the federal and provincial scales ran up against features of the rolled out waterfront. The next chapter will examine how the TWRC addressed this by another

roll-out round.

5.3.5 The TWRC Goes Green

The TWRC set in motion a framework for sustainability that helped reframe the parameters of inter-scalar co-operation. Shifting the focus from public spaces to "sustainability" gave the TWRC the necessary flexibility to fuel the governance machine while at the same time it was specific to enable the TWRC to attach its vision to projects at the provincial and federal scales.⁶⁴⁰ As the TWRC's sustainability statement indicated, "[N]ational, provincial, and local policy and regulations can create barriers or reinforce sustainability aims. Fortunately, sustainable community is also central to the objectives of Toronto's new Official Plan, Ontario's Smart Growth initiative and the federal government's Sustainable Development Strategies."⁶⁴¹

The sustainability framework thus capitalized on the ecological turn in public policy. The waterfront could be presented as an opportunity for Toronto, Ontario, and Canada to showcase a "sustainable" economy.⁶⁴² On the waterfront, the heavy soil and water pollution left behind by previous industrial tenants was seen as evidence of the ecologically exhausted aspect of Keynesianism-Fordism. This fit well with TEDCO's institutional expertise in brownfield remediation. The memorandum of understanding struck between the City of Toronto, TEDCO, and the TWRC in March 2006 stressed sustainability and the need to address the previous regime of accumulation's ecological exhaustion by attracting post-industrial industries.⁶⁴³

With respect to ecologically exhausting Keynesianism-Fordism, the TWRC's newfound interest in sustainability established stronger links with the Toronto Official Plan's reurbanization strategy which emphasized the importance of redeveloping existing

built environments.⁶⁴⁴ Acquiring provincial sympathy for sustainability in a second roll-out round was another matter. The section on provincial roll-out examined how the election of the Liberals in 2003 led to an about-face in the province's handling of the Toronto waterfront, reflected in Places to Grow in which the waterfront jurisdiction the TWRC watches over is identified as a priority node.⁶⁴⁵ This is particularly important given that provincial monies earmarked for the TWRC flow through Public Infrastructure Renewal to the appropriate agencies, thus helping the waterfront vision along.

While roll-out actions at the provincial scale may have facilitated inter-scalar co-operation, the TWRC's own actions contributed to this by adding greater substance to provincial objectives. Complementing Public Infrastructure Renewal's request for municipalities to make blueprints for a range of water, waste, and energy conservation efforts, the TWRC forced developers to adopt the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) programme, which provides standards to reduce new buildings' environmental impacts.⁶⁴⁶ The application of LEED principles on the waterfront could, in turn, contribute to making Ontario competitive with the anticipated multitude of LEED buildings operating as Toronto's sustainability display case.⁶⁴⁷

Municipal Affairs and Housing also indirectly assisted the TWRC's vision with the joint task force to strike a new relationship between the province and the city for it showed that Queen's Park was serious about dealing with post-amalgamation Toronto's problems. In turn, the McGuinty government would become more interested in mitigating Toronto's problems. Given the waterfront is a priority for the city and the province, this made for a more amicable relationship between the province and the TWRC.

As part of its “greening” strategy, the TWRC has adopted an anti-heavy industry policy, preferring instead to attract creative employment.⁶⁴⁸ In fact, Florida's creative class thesis was explicitly invoked by a representative of the TWRC. Commenting on the TWRC's spring 2005 tour to Barcelona, Berlin, and London, the TWRC official indicated that the aim of the visit was “to try and figure out ... what is it you do in the way of policy and other things that promote creativity because that's the future of the city. You know, Edinburgh's realized it, Berlin's realized it. I mean, we're not alone in this and if we don't get on the bandwagon and do something about this, we are going to miss the boat.”⁶⁴⁹

As Table 5.3.5.1 shows that even though manufacturing as a source of employment increased throughout the Toronto census metropolitan area, since 1991, it has fallen on the waterfront, to be replaced by white collar jobs. According to the TWRC official interviewed, “In the long-term, there's really no role for metal recyclers or rubber tire shredders.” The TWRC official went on to suggest that heavy industries move out to more appropriate areas.⁶⁵⁰ Creating an unfriendly climate for heavy industry seems to rest on image-making, projecting that the view that Toronto has transcended the Fordist era and is now colonized by the creative class, which make a city world class.

An exaggerated picture of “creative” jobs is often painted. Ross's and Huws's studies on high-tech workers provide snapshots of the creative world quite different from Florida's as intense job insecurity, incomes below skill sets, and little or no worker autonomy seem to be the rule.⁶⁵¹ Moreover, jobs in heavy industry can be more “creative” and “high-tech” than the current creative mantra suggests and heavy industries on Toronto's waterfront engage in significant innovation. An example of heavy industry's innovative

potential is the proposal made in 2006 by the now closed Cascades paperboard plant and Toronto Hydro to establish an energy cogeneration scheme. Hot water from Toronto Hydro's 30 megawatt natural gas facility otherwise destined for Lake Ontario would have been used for the steam to power Cascades.

Table 5.3.5.1: Percent Change in Employment by Industry on the Toronto Waterfront and Toronto CMA, 1991-2001.

Industry	Census Tract 1	Census Tract 13	Census Tract 17	Toronto Census Metropolitan Area
Agricultural and related service	-100.0	-100	-	-19.8
Fishing and trapping	-	-	-	-29.6
Logging and forestry	-	-	-	-82.6
Mining, quarrying, and oil well industries	-100	0.0	-	-30.6
Manufacturing	-27.3	-44.6	-42.5	9.6
Construction	-56.1	-66.0	15.8	-41.3
Transportation and storage	8.1	67.4	-83.3	2.9
Communication and other utility	78.1	425.0	72.7	-2.4
Wholesale trade	-56.3	-3.9	457.1	46.0
Retail trade	-68.1	55.0	24.1	2.6
Finance and insurance	0.0	-4.7	-56.8	14.2
Real estate operator and insurance agent	New industry	295.3	229.4	4.9
Business services	34.8	237.5	98.0	45.3
Government service	-5.5	-29.5	34.1	-31.9
Educational service	-53.8	186.7	50.0	5.7
Health and social service	-55.6	42.9	76.7	18.4
Accommodation, food, and beverage	75.0	93.9	-5.9	25.9
Other service	90.4	137.3	131.4	12.9
Total	-7.7	31.9	19.4	9.3

Source: City of Toronto, Economic Development Division, http://www.toronto.ca/invest-in-toronto/pdf/ct_profiles/Downtown.pdf; accessed February 9, 2010. All calculations are the author's using data for census tracts 1, 13, and 17.

More broadly, while numerous businesses operating on the waterfront fit with the waterfront's creative class vision, their operations are threatened with being replace to make way for the public spaces, amenities, and beautification projects at the core of a creative waterfront. This is a particularly sensitive issue on the Port Lands. One business, Eastern Marine Systems, stated that the property it sits on was ignored until waterfront revitalization commenced and the site's attractiveness became clearer as it is located beside strategic road and water access. An Eastern Marine Systems representative said, "So, every plan that you see involves Eastern Marine drawn around it, built over, or

something, simply because we have ... water and road access."⁶⁵²

Another Port Lands tenant, Telesat, encountered a similar problem. Operating on land leased from TEDCO, Telesat provides satellite communication services for television broadcasters located in downtown Toronto and Fortune 500 companies in other words, essential infrastructure enabling Toronto to attract and serve the media members of the creative class. Even so, Telesat narrowly dodged a decision not to renew its lease. A one year lease extension was granted in 2006 only after Telesat agreed to beautify its site.⁶⁵³

To the extent that optics drive waterfront planning, the parks component of the waterfront vision has drawn the ire of existing Port Lands businesses. In particular, the TWRC's plan for Commissioners Park aims to satisfy a demand for downtown parks.⁶⁵⁴ Yet there are alternative locations. For instance, the York Quay Neighbourhood Association suggested park lands could be opened by tearing out the Gardiner Expressway's York Street off-ramp, which would simultaneously open up a waterfront entrance to Union Station, the central nerve of Toronto's public transportation system.⁶⁵⁵

It is not clear how amenities like Commissioners Park contribute to a creative city. If anything, Commissioners Park threatens to displace the area's "creative" businesses. Thus one business that sits on land waiting to be turned into the park, PS Productions, provides equipment to businesses in Toronto's unofficial studio district. PS's position is similar to Telesat's: its operations service a creative industry while the city's main concern remains with optics. The PS representative appeared to accept the company's potential fate: "Waterfront development – yeah, it's – we're always aware of it, we're always – we like to be ready [for the one year notice]." At the same time he

pointed to the presence of CIMCO and Coopers Iron and Metal, a scrap metal business, in the surrounding area.⁶⁵⁶ As Plate 5.3.5.1 suggests, the proposed site for Commissioners Park does not easily lend itself to becoming a park.

Plate 5.3.5.1: The future site of Commissioners Park.

Perhaps the single best example of the inconsistency of the TWRC's and the city's creative waterfront logic is the example of Cherry Beach Sound, which is a world-renowned recording studio and an incubator of Canadian music artists that provides ten to fifteen spaces for co-op students in sound engineering. A Cherry Beach Sound representative felt the business was being unfairly targeted because of its location: "Rollerblades, kids, bicycles, people running with their dogs and this is why now that the city is finally realizing that this is ... the gateway to the future of the area and the gateway to the future is right here are Cherry Street and Lakeshore."⁶⁵⁷

It is no coincidence that the construction of Commissioners Park sits beside the purely residential Quays and Central precincts in the Port Lands. Outlining its precinct planning strategy, the TWRC had on the one hand attached specific conditions for developers in environmental design, access to shoreline, and minimum walk times to transit stops. On the other hand, the TWRC advocated a looser building regime for

height and density maximums.⁶⁵⁸ This reflects the extra-economic aspects property developers depend on to obtain premiums on lands that, for all intents and purposes, are decommodified as all can access them.

5.4 Conclusion

What can be gathered about rescaling processes from this chapter? The state at the national scale continues to play a crucial role in setting the context within which other scales operate. This is not to suggest, of course, a top-down process. As this chapter has discussed, the scope and nature of roll-back and roll-out neo-liberalism are inherently political choices. Indeed, this chapter highlighted how battles between the state at different scales emerged over what role each should play in an emerging regime of accumulation. Yet, an organizing principle for rescaling exercises is needed and in this case, rescaling was triggered by fiscal concerns.

The federal government's decision to employ the deficit as the rationale for making the Canadian state competitive was located in the acceptance of a global (and NAFTA) space of competition. This shaped the response by the state at the Ontario scale because post-war policies were designed to continentalize the Ontarian economy. The federal government's actions to wipe out the deficit served notice to the provinces that Ottawa could no longer be counted on to help them with their obligations as it once had. For Ontario, this meant a roll-back phase focused more on reshaping provincial-municipal relations than on the provincial deficit. As the second section showed, spending cuts in Ontario were not particularly deep: roll-back politics in Ontario aimed to redefine the appropriate activities that the province should undertake. To do this required forcing the municipal scale to do so too. Responsibilities were piled onto municipalities

without transferring the tools to deal with them. Thus, the hoped-for path municipal governments would take was to stimulate economic activity within their boundaries to generate a wider pool of property tax to cope with these new responsibilities.

In Toronto's case, however, the type of political regime in place led to inter-scalar battles over the *role* that the city should play. What the waterfront represented was a distinct alternative to the growth politics that the province hoped would occur as a result of the transformations in municipal-provincial relations. Yet, with the province invoking its powers over municipalities to, among other things, end the City of Toronto's oppositional stance towards the Harris government's policies by amalgamating it, the stage was set for Lastman's pro-growth policies.

The idea that Toronto was a global city was, as the last chapter showed, a local initiative. That Lastman applied this to the waterfront was clearly strategic. Broader scalar changes at the federal and provincial levels led to the city facing infrastructural deficits which threatened to undermine it. With deficits keeping Ottawa busy and Queen's Park offloading as many responsibilities as it could, Toronto utilized the waterfront as a means to re-establish scalar linkages with the two senior scales. Toronto was cognizant that the state at the Ontario and Canada scales required appeals to attracting global capital. Initiatives speaking to this bettered the chances of obtaining a federal and provincial ear. At the same time, Toronto had its own local pressures to deal with which threatened to dislodge it from the centre of the Canadian political economy. Urban sprawl in the 905 belt and the possibility of wasteful inter-urban competition became recognized as a region-wide problem via the Smart Growth Panel instituted by the province. The waterfront, Toronto believed, could counter this.

The creation of the TWRC after the Olympic bid died represents the moment for inter-scalar co-operation in Toronto. The lesson in roll-out politics that the TWRC shows is that rescaling exercises can be quite messy. The limitations placed on it by the federal and provincial emphasis on fiscal discipline demonstrated that contorting the nature and logic of projects in order to get them to fit with scale-specific objectives entails creative policy work. In this way, the TWRC made itself into a capable actor on the waterfront in order to tie the city, provincial, and federal scales together. Of course, no story about Toronto's waterfront would be complete without examining the initiatives taken by actors below the city scale. As prior chapters have shown, Toronto's tradition of civic activism contributed to actions taken at the city scale to transform inter-scalar relations. The next chapter will now turn to this matter.

Chapter 6: Community and Neighbourhood Associations, the TWRC, and the Toronto Waterfront

Introduction

While the previous chapters focused on the governmental side of rescaling, this chapter seeks to bring non-governmental actors into the analytic fold. As the previous chapters have shown, the city's increased interest in developing the waterfront occurred in part as a response to the rescaling imposed by the federal and provincial governments which, state actors at the Toronto scale believed, had undermined the city's political and economic stability. The story of Toronto's waterfront, however, must include the role that community and neighbourhood organizations play in its planning. As noted in chapter four, community and neighbourhood organizations' participation in city planning became increasingly important as the city started its transition from Fordist city planning in the 1970s. Over the years, an intimate relationship developed between the City of Toronto and local civil society groups, especially as social and economic changes in the city accelerated. Indeed, developments, particularly in the downtown core, required the approval of neighbourhood and community organizations in order to gain legitimacy. In this chapter, it is argued that neighbourhood associations and community organizations have helped to legitimize the TWRC's efforts to redevelop a "creative" waterfront.

The first part of this chapter reviews the origins of civic activism in Toronto and then provides an overview of the community groups involved in waterfront revitalization processes. While highlighting the associations' middle class leadership, it is argued that this does not mean they lacked a "progressive" potential, for there is a strong communitarian strand to their politics. This was especially visible in their demand that affordable housing form part of the area's redevelopment. Their concern to combat social

polarization did not, however, extend to addressing the root cause of poverty – the replacement of Fordist jobs with low paid and insecure post-industrial employment. Instead, the TWRC was able to mobilize community support for its "green" – and industry-less – version of the "creative" waterfront.

6.1 Community Groups Get Involved: Toronto's Civil Society and the Waterfront

6.1.1 Understanding Community Participation in Waterfront Planning

Historically, strong neighbourhood activism has featured in Toronto's civil and political life. Prior to the post-war era, neighbourhood activism had a marked middle class character. Thus for instance, Ley shows that Toronto's first organized neighbourhood association – or ratepayers' association – emerge in the upscale Rosedale neighbourhood.⁶⁵⁹ More broadly, Magnusson has argued that Toronto neighbourhood and community associations have largely given voice to the concerns of better-off residents. This is not to discount the impact that Toronto's working class have had on Toronto's civic life. Yet, issues associated with property usually stood at the heart of middle class neighbourhood associations' concerns. Ensuring the social and economic dimensions of city planning maintained property values and, above all, neighbourhood character were paramount. The latter especially took centre stage for the civic reform movement of the 1960s.⁶⁶⁰ As chapters three and four showed, it set the stage for urban development strategies predicated on city imaging.

Two points are notable about Toronto's civic activism. First, although not given formal political recognition, citizen activity made neighbourhoods important scales of action where city matters were concerned. Second, by defining the neighbourhood as a political scale nested within the city scale, neighbourhood associations bred a

communitarianism that acknowledged the affinity between the public and private spheres. Thus, the advancement of private interests depended on political action in the public sphere. Protecting "quality of life" played a particularly important role in galvanizing neighbourhood associations. As Isin's analysis of Toronto's anti-amalgamation movement shows, community and neighbourhood organizations in the downtown were roused to action when it became clear that the province's plans threatened to undermine the public services essential to the quality of life in their neighbourhoods.⁶⁶¹ Indeed, Toronto's community and neighbourhood organizations have been most vocal in their appeals to quality of life.

The form that Toronto's civic activism took during the 1960s was centred on communitarian claims. For Caulfield, this involved efforts to decommodify the city, letting use value prevail over exchange value. Moreover, their demands included elements of redistributive justice to enable all Torontonians to enjoy the city. Caulfield's appraisal of Toronto's neighbourhood-based movements focused on their critique of Fordist methods of planning, which disregarded neighbourhood specificities.⁶⁶² This fits with Golberg and Mercer's analysis, which suggests that Canadian cities exhibit greater progressive tendencies than American cities because of the collectivist culture that has historically marked the country's political landscape.⁶⁶³ It is perhaps more apt to stress the communitarian nature of their demands, while noting that there can be both "exclusive" and "inclusive" variants of communitarianism. Moreover, as Eder has argued, middle class radicalism tends to revolve around moral issues and discussions of the "good life" and "community" tend to take priority over redistributive matters, though this is not always the case.⁶⁶⁴ As we will later show, moral and redistributive concerns

can be intertwined.

In the case of waterfront redevelopment, as we shall see, a progressive communitarianism has taken hold amongst neighbourhood associations. This has been especially visible with the West Don Lands Committee (WDLC) and the Gooderham and Worts Neighbourhood Association (GWNA), which associate social inclusion with quality of life in the city. As such, they have sought to ensure waterfront redevelopment addresses social deficits. Both associations seek to strategically use the waterfront to build stable communities in the City of Toronto. This is clear in their push for inclusion of affordable housing in waterfront redevelopment.

Chapter four discussed the new importance that neighbourhood associations assumed within Toronto politics in the 1970s. The late 1990s saw more vigorous forays into city politics by neighbourhood and community organizations. In part, this can be attributed to amalgamation. As Keil and Young argue, amalgamation left a more assertive Toronto as mounting local problems received less and less attention from extra-local scales.⁶⁶⁵ This intersected with the historical legacy of civic activism at the neighbourhood scale, leading the associations to become more assertive.⁶⁶⁶

Quality of life in the city and on the waterfront was central to their demands. As Table 6.1.1.1 shows, although the origins of these groups varied, all are oriented towards development that adds to neighbourhood character and city life. Even before the current round of waterfront revitalization, the WDLC showed an acute awareness of the global pressures facing Toronto's local needs. It supported Toronto's Olympic bid but only if the latter included social projects: "Olympic projects must be planned first with the community's long-term goals in mind and then planned again to meet the needs of the

Olympics."⁶⁶⁷

Similarly, the Gooderham and Worts Neighbourhood Association protested the lack of many of the day-to-day services in and around the West Don Lands and sought to address this through waterfront redevelopment.⁶⁶⁸ Like the WDLC, the GWNA was alert to the inter-scalar pressures Toronto was facing and their adverse impact on local services. Above all, it felt that Toronto had to position itself globally in order to obtain national attention. According to a GWNA representative, "You have to put on a circus that the [federal government] can sell in Calgary to get any money for Toronto at all."⁶⁶⁹ Waterfront Action, an amalgam of various community groups focused on Toronto's waterfront issues, has also been a voice for the improvement of Toronto's quality of life and events make that possible.⁶⁷⁰ Thus, Waterfront Action was involved in the design of the TWRC's Dragon Boat race course which hosted the 2006 International Dragon Boat Federation championships.⁶⁷¹

Table 6.1.1.1: Waterfront Groups in Toronto.

Group	Origins	Orientation	Membership
West Don Lands Committee	Formed in 1997 to contest to the Harris government's plans to sell half of the lands in the West Don Lands to private developers who wanted to turn it into a harness racing facility.	To ensure good development that complements and advances existing neighbourhoods in the West Don Lands.	The Committee is composed of a number of individual local business associations, community organizations, and neighbourhood associations in middle- and low-income areas in the West Don Lands.
Gooderham and Worts Neighbourhood Association	Formed in 2001 to ensure good quality development.	Although Gooderham and Worts promotes good development, it also seeks out that all developments address social exclusion.	The Association is composed of residents from three buildings on Mill Street in the Gooderham and Worts Neighbourhood.
Waterfront Action	Formed to advocate for appropriate development along the entire Toronto waterfront.	Waterfront Action seeks to involve itself with waterfront planning across the entire Toronto waterfront.	Waterfront Action is made up of a variety of waterfront and non-waterfront groups concerned about social and environmental matters.
Toronto Islands Community Association	Formed in response to Metro chair Frederick Gardiner's decision to remake the Toronto Islands in the image of a Fordist city.	To protect and advocate for Islands residents.	Membership is entirely composed of Toronto Islands residents.

The Toronto Islands Community Association (TICA) has been one of the more active neighbourhood associations in the city. With its interest in waterfront planning

prompted by the association's opposition to the Toronto Port Authority's Toronto City Centre Airport, the TICA's strong history of activism led the TWRC to invite it into the planning process even though it lies outside the current planning area. The TICA's concern to promote revitalization was, like the other associations, prompted by its concern with quality of life. As a TICA representative noted, "We haven't had anything new in this city except for maybe the Gooderham and Worts neighbourhood, you know, we still have the CN Tower, the [Royal Ontario Museum], the same old things."⁶⁷²

The neighbourhood associations and community organizations interview thus enthusiastically endorsed the TWRC because its waterfront revitalization initiatives appeared to address quality of life issues. Toronto, in fact, has become adept at using "quality of life," i.e. excellent public and live-work-play spaces, to reach global city status,⁶⁷³ and the TWRC has capitalized on this by being seen to support neighbourhood associations' and community organizations' efforts to remedy deficits in the public realm.

While the associations involved in waterfront redevelopment may stress quality of life for all, Lehrer and Laidley highlight the highly class-inflected nature of Toronto's waterfront redevelopment.⁶⁷⁴ Membership in many of the neighbourhood associations and community groups participating in waterfront consultations, like associational politics in Toronto more generally, is largely composed of middle class professionals. Of the groups involved with waterfront redevelopment, only the West Don Lands Committee noted the lack of engagement by marginalized communities.⁶⁷⁵ This is especially problematic given the social demographics on the waterfront. As the trends in household income on the waterfront that Table 6.1.1.2 shows, between 1991 and 2001, there was a clear uptrend in higher-income households settling into or near waterfront communities.

At the same time, there was an increase in the number of low-income households. On the whole, however, the structure of public consultations privilege middle class-based neighbourhood associations and community organizations, a point to which we will now turn.

Table 6.1.1.2: Percent Change in Households by Income on the Waterfront, 1991-2001.

Income	Census Tract 1 (Eastern Port Lands)	Census Tract 13 (East Bayfront and Western Port Lands)	Census Tract 17 (Central Port Lands and the West Don Lands)
Under \$10, 000	0	24.3	44.9
\$10, 000-\$19, 999 ^a	-40	97.1	12.9
\$20, 000-\$29, 999	60	-1.6	-13.6
\$30, 000-\$39, 999	166.7	-4.8	65.6
\$40, 000-\$49, 999	40	-4.3	18.6
\$50, 000-\$59, 999	-20	-19.1	77.1
\$60, 000-\$69, 999	0	-15.4	41.3
\$70, 000 and over ^b	33.3	113.9	138.6

Sources: Statistics Canada, *Profile of Census Tracts in Toronto – Part B*, Cat. No. 95-354; Statistics Canada, *Profile of Census Tracts in Toronto*, vol. 1, Cat. No. 95-240-XPB. All calculations are the author's; ^a combines \$10, 000-\$14, 999 and \$15, 000-\$19, 999 household income categories; ^b combines \$70, 000-\$79, 999, \$80, 000-\$89, 999, \$90, 000-\$99, 999, and \$100, 000 and over household income categories for 2001.

6.2 The Structure of Waterfront Consultations

6.2.1 Civil Society Comes into the Planning Fold

While the City of Toronto may have developed close ties with civic organizations in the 1970s, waterfront redevelopments in Toronto have not traditionally welcomed public participation. Plans have often been determined prior to receiving community input. Commenting on the current waterfront development under the TWRC's auspice, Desfor, Kipfer, Keil, and Wekerle argue, "Current authoritarian and grandiose waterfront planning is threatening Toronto's inner-city style of growth, often praised for its capacity to produce heterogeneous, progressive urban communities."⁶⁷⁶ This reflects the generally undemocratic component built into waterfront planning. Thus, Wolfson and Frisken have show how a plan for waterfront redevelopment was drafted without community input soon after Ottawa transferred THC-lands to TEDCO in the early 1990s.⁶⁷⁷ In addition, there was no public discussion during the TWRTF's inquiry into readying the waterfront for the 2008 Olympics. In justifying its decision, the TWRTF referred to time

constraints, though it did note that it anticipated "an extensive consultation process before implementation commences."⁶⁷⁸

Yet there was an appetite for direct public involvement in waterfront planning, especially in the early 1990s as initiatives launched at the federal, provincial, and city scales encouraged greater citizen participation in planning. Federally, the RCFTW opened a door for public participation on waterfront planning for the first time since the 1911 municipal election. At the provincial scale, public consultations on the West Don Lands (when it was formerly called Ataratiri) in the early 1990s helped bring civil society groups into the planning fold, although the onset of a severe recession brought the redevelopment of the West Don Lands/Ataratiri to a halt. At the local scale, the run-up to the 1991 Official Plan witnessed city officials in the old City of Toronto campaigning for better participation after a dismal response to a questionnaire asking citizens about their views on planning.⁶⁷⁹

A template for such public consultations was in place, which the TWRC came to follow, that exhibited a conception of democratic politics similar to the one Robert Dahl described five decades ago.⁶⁸⁰ As Lehrer and Laidley argue, the TWRC's consultation process neglects Toronto's less fortunate populations in the downtown and the ex-Metro inner-suburbs. Moreover, "this lack of concern for anything but already enfranchised populations demonstrates an active disregard for particular populations in this new mega-project."⁶⁸¹

In general, the consultations focus on issues concerning the public realm rather than social redistribution. Moreover, the scheduling of public hearings makes it difficult for a wider cross-section of Toronto to participate. Daytime hearings are set aside for

businesses, while evenings are reserved for community participation. A facilitator was aware of the problem this posed for marginalized groups, saying, "They don't have time to blow hours in the evening," but then concluding that little could be done to remedy this.⁶⁸²

The South Riverdale Community Health Centre pointed out some of the deficiencies existing in waterfront consultations. On the one hand, the Health Centre representative concurred with the facilitator who felt working-class/marginalized populations "don't have time to blow hours in the evening." On the other hand, the Health Centre representative listed reasons for non-participation. First, design teams working for the TWRC do not approach the communities at large. Moreover, the design teams hired are not from Toronto and, as a result, are unfamiliar with the city's social setting. This may affect how aware marginalized populations may be about what waterfront plans might entail. The Health Centre representative noted this by saying, "There is a perspective that's basically the adjacent community seems to be missing. That's understandable when you have consultant teams that's [*sic*] coming from Boston. You know, they don't have time to do chit-chats with communities."⁶⁸³

The West Don Lands Committee also voiced concern about the overwhelmingly middle-class nature of public consultations, perhaps because the West Don Lands' M5A postal code has a high poverty rate, with single mothers, new Canadians, and individuals with substance addictions. The needs of these populations diverge significantly from the sorts of planning issues middle class groups have tended to focus on. In turn, this prevents low-income/marginalized populations from forcing their issues onto the table.⁶⁸⁴

Second, public consultations do not provide facilities and services aiding wider

participation. Of particular note here was the need for child care facilities and interpreters. A lack of child care facilities blocks the participation of single parents, who have high rates of poverty. Furthermore, as Figures 6.2.1.1 and 6.2.1.2 show, the waterfront is not only ethnically diverse, but it has also, with the exception of the eastern Port Lands, received a large wave of recent immigration. Despite this, there has been an absence of interpreters in the consultations, thus non-English speakers face communication barriers. Although the Health Centre representative did not suggest the TWRC was not interested in hearing marginalized voices, the absence of such services unintentionally made an otherwise public process exclusive: "By not doing that, it sends a message, right? That it's not important to us to have Cantonese or Mandarin because they're not really – so we've got these completely White worlds, retired people, activists. That's about it. Those are the people who don't have kids to look after. Basically, you don't have to go to work early the next day."⁶⁸⁵

Figure 6.2.1.1: Number of Immigrants by Decade on the Toronto Waterfront.

Source: Statistics Canada, *Profile of Census Tracts in Toronto*, vol 1, Cat No 95-240-XPB. All calculations are the author's.

Figure 6.2.1.2: Ethnicity on the Toronto Waterfront, 2001.

Source: Statistics Canada, *Profile of Census Tracts in Toronto*, vol 1, Cat No 95-240-XPB. All calculations are the author's.

6.3 Contestation on the Waterfront: The Issue of Housing

6.3.1 The Emergence of Housing as a Waterfront Issue

Chapter five noted how housing was becoming an issue – one that would wash up on the waterfront's shore. The City of Toronto's report, *The Future of Downtown Toronto*, had identified the need for housing to lodge higher order service workers and the waterfront was included in the areas where such new accommodation could be located. At the same time, the rent increases in the city and the waterfront have made access to adequate housing much more difficult for low-income people. The WDLC and the GUNA supported waterfront revitalization in part because they believed the TWRC was prepared to make affordable housing part of the deal.

The withdrawal of Ottawa and Queen's Park from social housing initiatives had left Toronto to rely increasingly on the private sector to offer affordable housing. Yet during the economic boom, real estate developers preferred the immediate returns that building condominiums offered over rental units that may take years to yield returns.⁶⁸⁶

The City of Toronto's 2003 report card on affordable housing showed that in 1996, units rented at \$800 or less composed 65% of all rental units, but by 2002, this dropped to 20%.⁶⁸⁷ It went on to note that "[f]rom 1996 to 2002, average rents have gone up by 31%, more than double the 14% rate of inflation for this period."⁶⁸⁸

For the WDLC and the GWNA, building affordable housing on the waterfront could help alleviate the problem and they believed the TWRC was prepared to address this. The GWNA was impressed by the orientation of the TWRC's first chair Robert Fung, the successful Vancouver-based, Jamaican-Canadian real estate developer who left the Corporation in 2006. The GWNA representative felt that while Fung was aware of the need to talk about the waterfront's global necessity to a federal audience, he always saw the waterfront as a means to build neighbourhoods to local audiences.⁶⁸⁹ The WDLC also noted the TWRC's positive position on affordable housing, pointing to a preferred target of 20 percent of all units set aside for that purpose. Yet the WDLC representative was aware of a problem with the commitment to rent-geared-to-income (RGI) units, the most affordable units for citizens making less than \$20, 000 per year.⁶⁹⁰ The WDLC representative stated: "I know the [TWRC] would like to deliver it, but ... whatever needs to happen isn't happening in terms of getting the provincial/federal dollars to actually provide RGI accommodation."⁶⁹¹

6.3.2 The Battles for Housing

The first instance of a struggle for affordable housing on the waterfront, however, originated neither in the West Don Lands nor in demands made by neighbourhood associations like the WDLC or the GWNA. Rather, it began on the idle Home Depot site in the central Port Lands in 2002. Blackwell and Goonewardena recount this tale and

show how the site, named Tent City, was taken over and inhabited by homeless Torontonians. More than anything else, Tent City symbolized the two faces of planning in Toronto: glitzy built environments for a global city and the way social exclusion is handled. Indeed, Tent City residents were expelled from the Home Depot property by private security guards under the eye of the Toronto police force.⁶⁹² As it currently stands, the Home Depot site sits empty, with the only reminder being commemorative stickers on "No Trespassing" signs (see Plate 6.3.2.1).

Plate 6.3.2.1: Tent City today. The sticker reads, "THIS USED TO BE TENT CITY. PEOPLE LIVED HERE. NOW LOOK AT IT ... THANKS HOME DESPOT!" The final line says, "Shop. Destroy. Rule."

Nevertheless, getting a handle on social exclusion has become a firm principle for the WDLC and the GWNA as both are committed to inclusive communitarian principles which ensure all income groups can inhabit Toronto. In other words, a good quality of life in Toronto should be available to all Torontonians. Yet, a challenge to glitzy built environments has not been issued. Toronto's goals of excellent public spaces, live-work-play spaces, and so on, have kept in line with using "quality of life" to reach global city status.

Precinct plans for the West Don Lands and the East Bayfront contained statements for affordable housing that reflected the WDLC's and GWNA's agenda and

the Toronto Official Plan's desire to maintain quality of life. Yet, the TWRC subjected it to funding provisos and its vague promises of delivery open up the prospect for *no* affordable housing provisions.⁶⁹³ Moreover, while all three precincts were to have affordable housing, no mention is made of affordable housing in the Port Lands precinct plan.⁶⁹⁴

Global city dreams wrapped up in a shiny new waterfront have not been effectively challenged. In part, the enthusiasm for the TWRC, courtesy of public consultations, can make contestations more difficult because dealing with the affordable housing crunch becomes dependent on building a glamorous waterfront, reflecting Slater's claim that neo-liberalizing cities are able to calm criticisms by attaching such measures to redevelopments.⁶⁹⁵ Moreover, a larger scale challenge to such a growth regime has yet to emerge.

The neighbourhood associations have, however, tended to look more favourably on the TWRC and put the blame on the provincial or federal governments for the lack of committed funds.⁶⁹⁶ The GWNA blamed the province's Ontario Municipal Board in particular. After having successfully argued minimum requirements instead of targets for the provision of social housing, the GWNA feared private landowners could always appeal to the Ontario Municipal Board to overturn the city's decision.⁶⁹⁷ If this were to occur, it would represent a defeat for affordable housing in Toronto because minimum requirements force developers to set aside a certain percentage of units for low-income individuals. Targets, however, require *but do not compel* developers to set aside units for affordable housing. The most unsettling but sober statement on the possibilities of affordable housing came from one of Toronto's largest construction trade unions, the

Labourers International Union of North America 183. When asked about the likelihood of affordable housing, the 183 official stated, "This is my own opinion, my own very humble opinion, but I don't foresee ... high-density, low-income houses going down there. The value of the land is just too great." A realistic description of the kinds of waterfront dwellings that would go up followed: condominiums that were 600 square feet in size and aimed at childless professional couples or single professionals.⁶⁹⁸

6.3 The TWRC's Use of Grassroots Support for Waterfront Redevelopment

6.3.1 Understanding the Rise of Opposition to Industry: "Sustainability" in the City

City liveability has not been the only quality of life issue that neighbourhood and community associations have raised. Environmental sustainability has formed an important part of neighbourhood and community associations' agenda for enhancing Toronto's quality of life. Grassroots support for the elimination of manufacturing from the Toronto waterfront, however, needs to be seen as contributing to the making of a post-industrial city and the legitimization of the TWRC's plans for an industry-free waterfront. Desfor and Keil's study of Toronto's Don River shows how the city's environmental movements established their roots in the reformist atmosphere of 1970s Toronto. Above all, Toronto's brand of environmentalism was married to a highly idealized conception of nature that ran counter to the instrumental treatment of nature by Fordist styles of planning.⁶⁹⁹ The rediscovery of ecology in the city has resulted in occasioning a liveable city, defined in terms of aesthetically pleasing surroundings rather than social justice.⁷⁰⁰

The discourse of environmentalism has been present throughout discussions of how to reclaim the Toronto waterfront from industry and move it in a greener direction.

One of the first instances of direct *local* action transpired on the eastern edges of the Port Lands. Ward 32 Councillor Sandra Bussin became actively involved in a campaign to stop beach erosion and landscape Ward 32's portion of the waterfront. Indeed, landscaping has been "captured now in the waterfront revitalization plan but it was ... an initiative that we had started locally." Improving water quality in Coatsworth Cut was a prominent issue in Ward 32 too because sewage and storm water outflows gushed into it during rainy weather. Ward 32 residents were also active in closing the Ashbridge's Bay sewage incinerator. All of these incidents reflect the concern of residents with the area's quality of life.⁷⁰¹ In Ward 30, Councillor Paula Fletcher heard concerns about environmental justice in South Riverdale, a gentrifying neighbourhood near the remaining heavy pockets of heavy industry on the eastern edges of the Port Lands.⁷⁰² Thus the South Riverdale Community Health Centre called attention to the high levels of lead found in South Riverdale's children.⁷⁰³

6.3.2 Civil Society Goes Post-Industrial

While heavy industry may rightly be treated with suspicion, some heavy industry on the waterfront engages with surrounding communities through the South Riverdale Environmental Liaison Committee. In the words of its representative, the Liaison Committee acts as an "information clearing house for people who want to find out more about local pollution and any sort of environmental studies that are going on." The Liaison Committee's role as a provider of information helps raise awareness of bad behaviour. The key issues that a Liaison Committee representative raised about heavy industry's future in the Port Lands were (1) the kinds of jobs being provided and (2) the impact on existing jobs given Toronto's antipathy to heavy industry.⁷⁰⁴

Whereas industry was once seen as a sign of progress, the greening of economies led to the association of industry with backwardness and environmental degradation. Neighbourhood associations and community groups, in pursuit of quality of life, have clearly come to share this view and have thus been involved in the move to create an industry-free waterfront. The West Don Lands Committee has been one of the most active neighbourhood associations in this regard. A WDLC document on the West Don Lands' future put forward three possible scenarios, none of which included the presence of manufacturing on the West Don Lands. Instead, a mix of residential and commercial uses was preferred.⁷⁰⁵

In developing its vision, the WDLC looked to Joan Busquets, Barcelona's former head of urban policy, to explore "examples of how cities have used special events (Olympics and Expo) and icons (striking public buildings, bridges and public space) as catalysts to transform aging industrial sites."⁷⁰⁶ Busquets's message reinforced the message that old Fordist-style businesses were blocking the West Don Lands from redeveloping. Thus, the WDLC pointed to the West Don Lands' edges, described as pockmarked with abandoned properties and low-intensity/blighted businesses, e.g. auto body repair and paint shops and warehousing. Such land use prevented the West Don Lands from capitalizing on its large inventory of heritage buildings which had made it "the historic heart of Toronto." Continuing to neglect the area's historical character, the WDLC argued, hobbled tourism – a key economic driver in Toronto.⁷⁰⁷

Waterfront Action, another civil society participant in Toronto's waterfront planning exercise, took a similar tack. In making its case, Waterfront Action rather referred to Vancouver's waterfront as a model. The Waterfront Action representative was

pleased with Vancouver's ability to mix commercial with residential uses while delivering public access to the water's edge.⁷⁰⁸ Waterfront Action also presented a more complete post-industrial vision for the Toronto waterfront than the WDLC in that it recognized that workspaces had to be integrated into the waterfront vision. Yet again, Waterfront action argued against the location of heavy industry on the Toronto waterfront, championing instead "creative" industries: high-tech, entertainment, film, and music. As the Waterfront Action representative stated, "The list of types of businesses that can happen which aren't heavy industrial are numerous. And the heavy industrial jobs are locating themselves in other parts of the city and other parts of the province."⁷⁰⁹

The West Don Lands Committee and Waterfront Action prescriptions for a post-industrial waterfront are notable for two reasons. First, they looked to trends occurring in other cities that fertilized the ground for a post-industrial waterfront vision. This helped to make Toronto grassroots associations receptive to Richard Florida's message. Second, in drawing on the Vancouver and Barcelona "models," the WDLC and Waterfront Action engaged in fast policy transfer, which decontextualizes the circumstances in which each waterfront redevelopment occurred. A richly complex political and cultural context underpinned Barcelona's planning, which was used to carve out a Catalan identity in post-Franco Spain. Though Barcelona's facelift has attracted international attention, this did not figure into its campaigns to attract global events like the 1992 Summer Olympics.⁷¹⁰ Indeed, McNeill recounts how the waterfront was a *piece* and *not the centrepiece* for neighbourhoods wanting to reclaim Barcelona.⁷¹¹ With regard to Vancouver, Waterfront Action negated the sub-national, national, and international forces which shaped that city's political economy. This is especially important considering the

Vancouver economy's dependency on speculation and portfolio investments from East Asia.⁷¹²

Like the WDLC and Waterfront Action, the Gooderham and Worts Neighbourhood Association adopted the post-industrial creative cities vision of the waterfront.⁷¹³ The WDLC and the GWNA concur that the West Don Lands must contain economic activities which add to street life. They also agree that the low-intensity/blighted businesses in the West Don Lands do not offer the hours of operation which are believed to discourage the prostitution and drug dealing that afflict parts of the West Don Lands.⁷¹⁴

Waterfront Action also echoes the WDLC's and GWNA's sentiments. Liveability is central to its waterfront programme and this is translated into support for a creative waterfront strategy. Thus, it supported Filmport, which is at the heart of a "creative" waterfront. The project was launched in mid-2008 on twenty hectares of land in a southeast corner of the Port Lands on land obtained by a Toronto-based development company, the Rose Corporation, from TEDCO in a secret 99 year ground lease agreement. In an interview, a TEDCO official claimed Filmport was necessary because the city lacked film space.⁷¹⁵ To some extent, Filmport serves as one of those iconic buildings that the WDLC's 1999 workshop championed to ignite redevelopment, albeit in the West Don Lands.

6.3.3 Post-Industrialism, City Liveability, and the Hard Question of Employment

How "quality of life" has been defined by community and neighbourhood organizations involved in waterfront redevelopment exemplifies a longstanding tendency in Toronto's middle-class civic activism to manage social problems rather than confront

the structural factors causing them.⁷¹⁶ As Offe argues, one of neo-liberalism's central triumphs is the silencing of redistributive discussions as these are linked to the organization of production.⁷¹⁷ Advocates of social housing tend to ignore the crucial issue of employment in a "creative" city" and instead simply call on the public sector to ameliorate the social deficits that the private sector has created by squeezing workers at the bottom-end of the wage scale.

Thus, while affordable housing has formed an important component of neighbourhood associations' quest for quality of life on the waterfront, the question of the quality of employment throughout the city and on the waterfront has not received the same attention. Although higher rents and a weak social housing programme do contribute to housing problems, low income and the kinds of jobs on which it rests remains the root of the problem. As Engeland, Lewis, Ehrlich, and Che's comments on low-income earners' access to housing show, "The fact that rents are lower in highest-need neighbourhoods suggests that low incomes, rather than high housing costs, are at the root of the high incidence of housing need in these neighbourhoods."⁷¹⁸

The question of employment is particularly problematic for the South Riverdale neighbourhood. As Ley and Frost have pointed out, gentrifying areas cluster around existing well-established neighbourhoods.⁷¹⁹ South Riverdale is sandwiched between the eastern Port Lands and the better-off neighbourhood of North Riverdale. A South Riverdale Community Health Centre reflected on the history of the area: "This was kind of the lunch-bucket strip ... [E]verybody went to work here on Carlaw [Avenue]. If you read *In the Skin of a Lion*, Michael Ondaatje, he makes reference to this neighbourhood as, kind of like, if you're coming from overseas looking for work, you would come to

Carlaw and Queen [Street East] and just kind of walk the factories and get a job. Eastern Avenue as well."⁷²⁰ South Riverdale, however, is located in a band of redevelopment and many small-scale industries are closing and ex-factories are being converted into lofts. At the same time, the creative jobs that the TWRC and the city hope to attract require high levels of education and skill, excluding South Riverdale's low-income earners from participating in a creative economy.⁷²¹

This is not to suggest that quality employment has been ignored. For example, the WDLC raised this matter with the TWRC and suggested that Toronto could learn from Vancouver's waterfront experience, "One of the issues we're about to raise with the [TWRC] – this is really something [the WDLC] got from the tour of Vancouver – is: what about a local employment component to the construction and tendering process that is going to be going on in the West Don Lands?" Citing the high unemployment in West Don Lands neighbourhoods, the WDLC representative went on to suggest Toronto could adopt a version of Vancouver's North False Creek youth programme: "We have a huge pool of kids who actually have difficulty getting jobs and integrating trades or university or whatever. So that's an issue at this early stage that I want to start raising."⁷²²

Such a programme would be an important first step, but what is missing is (1) what to do with individuals already in the labour market and (2) the correlation between incomes and access to housing. As Herzenberg, Alic, and Wial have shown in an American context, the expansion of the service sector does not have to lead to low-paying jobs. Strategies can be developed to avoid this and better cushion the economic shifts that are currently in process.⁷²³

Even if the WDLC's proposal is taken up, the current emphasis on "creative"

forms of work devalue blue-collar jobs. The Labourers International Union of North America 183 was asked about the possibility of such a strategy and the prospects were bleak:

"We had a skilled individual shortage or a manpower shortage over the last five years [since 2002] totalling in the neighbourhood of 3 to 4 thousand people. We just couldn't fill the need. And look, these are very well-paying jobs. People still not interested in it. But do we have an interest in ensuring that the ... we'll call it the 'forgotten individuals' in the city are integrated into society? Absolutely! We run training programmes. We have three training centres in the Greater Toronto Area, one in Cobourg, ... we have one here at our principal office at Keele and Wilson right in the centre of Toronto, and ... we have one in Barrie and one in Vaughan and we train ... somewhere in the neighbourhood of about 45, 000 ... man-training days. ... We're training a ton of people to put them into the working environment. And like I said, the young, uninitiated, forgotten, withdrawn individuals in the city, they don't seem to be interested in working in a manual environment."⁷²⁴

The celebration of "creativity" reflects a turn away from recognizing the value of types of labour, often blue-collar, which require long-term commitments to skills development. It seems that there is very little appetite amongst Toronto's civil society actors on the waterfront to actively interrogate the assumptions built into the "creative" city and waterfront and this could further widen social polarization in the city.

In the event that "creativity" does successfully take off on the Toronto waterfront, no strategy exists to ensure low-income earners are able to obtain these jobs. Moreover, the kinds of amenities and services expected to land in the Toronto waterfront may exacerbate social polarization if income does not get addressed. What is to happen to residents in affordable housing units who will be unable to buy the products on offer in the luxury retail stores around them? As David Harvey has pointed out, the interaction between public and private spaces affects individuals' belonging in a place, determining who can and cannot participate in public life.⁷²⁵ The communitarianism that Toronto's civic activism engenders assumes the contradictions of urban political economies can be

wiped away and actually existing differences ignored. As Katznelson reminded readers three decades ago, relations outside of the workplace do have consequences and the relations of production *and* consumption directly implicate one another.⁷²⁶ So long as affordable housing continues to be the focus of neighbourhood associations, this round of waterfront redevelopment is likely to continue adding to the social polarization that Toronto is experiencing.

6.3.4 Community Support: Necessary but Not Sufficient

The neighbourhood associations' endorsement of the TWRC's green agenda is important but not sufficient to guarantee the TWRC's ability to move ahead with its plans. The lack of adequate support from federal and provincial governments remains critical. Thus, the federal government has continued to attach stringent financial strings to TWRC-designated funds. To date, no memorandum of understanding has been signed with a federal agency, reflecting its preference for funding on a project-by-project basis.⁷²⁷

Despite the congruence between the TWRC's and community and neighbourhood organizations' position on the importance of quality of life, the TWRC's ability to move ahead with its plans by utilizing grassroots support does have its limits due to existing scalar hierarchies. In particular, the role of the federal government puts up a roadblock. Although the TWRC was content with Ottawa's public space focus, there did not seem to be any movement away from attaching stringent financial strings to TWRC-designated funds. To date, no memorandum of understanding like the TEDCO and Ontario Realty Corporation memorandums has been signed with a federal agency. A Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Initiative official's comments revealed that Ottawa does not

wish to deviate from agreements accounting for each dollar spent on a project-by-project basis.⁷²⁸

All of this is not to suggest that the TWRC failed to demonstrate the harmony between its sustainability framework and federal policy objectives. A good example here is the issue of transportation on the waterfront. Transport Canada's *Straight Ahead* openly expressed a federal desire to assist cities to reduce the environmental costs of road congestion *and* ensure economic betterment in the process.⁷²⁹ For the TWRC, this meant not only was federal money for transportation infrastructure now on the horizon, but also that the city's public transportation authority, the Toronto Transit Commission (TTC), could include its longstanding plans to waterfront revitalization. Specifically, the stretched-to-the-limit Union Station located in Toronto's central business district required considerable subway platform expansion. Thus far, though, no money has been earmarked for these TTC projects and will not be unless a business case justification is made.

Although tight federal purse strings are a problem for the TWRC, another source of tension, and one that the sustainability framework may have encouraged, was the question of infrastructure funding. Here, the difficulty emanated from within the federal Liberal Party's GTA caucus where there have long been tensions between the 416 and 905 MPs. As an official in the federal waterfront riding of Toronto Centre indicated, "There has always been a debate in the Liberal caucus between the 905 and the Toronto people as having somewhat different things and the waterfront figured into that for sure in terms of what resources it was taking, whether once it got that resource and then Toronto got its share."⁷³⁰

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has explored how the efforts of community and neighbourhood organizations have helped to legitimize the current trajectory of waterfront redevelopment. The demands made by neighbourhood associations and community organizations were consistent with the projects that the TWRC touted: a creative and green waterfront in order to transcend Toronto's lingering Fordist past. The governance of the Toronto waterfront served to privilege neighbourhood associations and community organizations whose origins can be found in the middle classes. This is not to suggest that they ignored social justice dimensions. As we have seen, the inclusion of affordable housing on the waterfront was embraced as a way to create a more inclusive Toronto.

Yet, the nature of waterfront redevelopment has gone unchallenged by neighbourhood associations and community organizations. In particular, low income and the bad or non-existent jobs that give rise to it continue to be the main barrier to access to housing. Yet for the most part, the neighbourhood associations have not raised questions about income in Toronto. As long as the structural conditions perpetuating neo-liberal urbanism remain in tact, a redeveloped waterfront will, at best, temper social polarization in Toronto.

Chapter 7: Conclusions

This thesis has used the example of Toronto's waterfront as a window on the rescaling of the Canadian state and to see how waterfront redevelopment, in turn, has been strategically employed to make the city become the centrepiece of the Canadian political economy. Through a historically-grounded analysis influenced by the *Régulation* School, this thesis has also looked at how rescaling processes are ultimately bound up with transitions in regimes of accumulation. At the same time, it highlights the importance of agency: the waterfront's importance was neither inevitable nor natural. Rather, local actors seized upon local social and political crises to promote the waterfront and in so doing, frequently sought inter-scalar co-operation. In turn, the role the waterfront came to play in Toronto's local regime of accumulation helped consolidate the infrastructural underpinnings needed to establish the city as a place where (post-industrial) business happens *and* (white-collar) people live.

Using insights provided by the *Régulation* School and a political economy of scale, this thesis has sketched how urban development projects like the revitalization of the Toronto waterfront reflect a response to changing political economic circumstances. In the current conjuncture, the primacy given to urban sites represents an attempt to recapture the prosperity that Keynesian-Fordist principles had established during the post-war era. The case study is important for illuminating this. As the first chapter argued, political science has tended to marginalize the study of localities because of the emphasis placed on the state at the national scale. By choosing Toronto, this thesis has sought to show how the state at the national scale is dependent on activities at sub-national scales, including the urban, to establish a wider regime of accumulation.

Moreover, the impetus to change a prevailing regime of accumulation can emerge at scales below the national scale.

The choice of the Toronto's waterfront helps to highlight this process as actors at the local scale were aware of the problems that Toronto faced under a prevailing regime of accumulation. To solve these problems, actors sought to use and transform inter-scalar arrangements to establish the institutional fixes that can emerge and sustain the many regimes of accumulation existing at various scales. Yet, the value of choosing a place to illustrate these processes comes from being able to demonstrate the material realities of a regime of accumulation. As the second chapter has shown, the Toronto Board of Trade's actions to politicize the waterfront stemmed from a concern that the key commodity and infrastructure underpinning the National Policy's pre-Keynesian regime of accumulation, the railroad, was inhibiting the city's ability to provide a good business environment. Indeed, while the logic behind waterfront uses changed in the time periods studied here, it became clear that the Board of Trade's actions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had made the waterfront central to initiatives at the Toronto scale to create and then maintain its centrality to Canada's political economy.

Since the post-war era, considerable effort has been expended by the state at the federal and Ontario scales to continue privileging Toronto. This had been accomplished through changing inter-scalar relations. As chapter two showed, the Board of Trade's decision to jump scale and approach Ottawa on the matter of the railroads was not only a matter of trying to generate federal interest in Toronto affairs. It can also be interpreted as the first instance of a series of reterritorializations aimed at situating Toronto at the centre of Canada's political economy. The concept of "reterritorialization" has been used

to highlight the way the roles and responsibilities residing at various scales can be reshuffled as part of the rescaling process. As such, even though the initial purpose of the Toronto waterfront was economic, chapter three showed how the emergence of the post-war era's Keynesian-Fordist regime of accumulation had redefined waterfront uses into extra-economic ones, due largely to the redefined roles and responsibilities that emerged out of the Rowell-Sirois Commission's inquiry into the future of federalism.

An interesting aspect of this case study was the role that crises played. Crises are important because they prompt changes in the inter-scalar relationships that prevailed for a period of time. More specifically, crises serve as important moments for the state at various scales to pursue its own interests in the course of arriving at a new regime of accumulation.

Given the multi-scalar analysis presented here, the story of the waterfront's contribution to Toronto's centrepiece role must include Ontario. Discussions of the Canadian political economy have tended to ignore Ontario's role in the federation. The analysis presented here suggests that discord has traditionally marked the relationship between Queen's Park and Ottawa. Canada's transition to semi-sovereign statehood precipitated the National Policy so that the state at the federal scale could organize a distinctly Canadian economic space. In turn, this facilitated a reterritorializing process which prompted Ontario to assert itself as an actor in its own right. What this highlights is that moments of reterritorialization result in intense negotiating processes and that they are quite dependent on reworking inter-scalar relations.

Ontario's post-war "silence" should be seen as an exceptional period in the history of Canada's, Ontario's, and Toronto's political economy. As chapter three showed,

Ontario vigorously pursued its own interests when the Canadian state tried to rework federalism in response to the exhaustion of the regime of accumulation centred on the National Policy. Ontario's invisibility at the federal scale only occurred when inter-scalar relations did not detract from Queen's Park's economic decision-making powers. Only when the federal government capitulated to Queen's Park's demands that economic decision-making powers should continue to reside at the provincial scale did Ontario agree to fund Ottawa's post-war spatial equalization programmes. Ontario only became visible again when the post-war regime of accumulation began showing signs of weakness in the early 1970s. Chapters four and five show that as the Keynesian-Fordist crisis dragged on, Ontario became bolder in its dealings with the federal government as successive reterritorialization efforts at the federal scale aimed (and failed) to restore stability.

While this thesis highlights the importance of the provincial-federal relationship, it also illustrates the crucial role played by the provincial-municipal relationship in establishing a regime of accumulation. In pursuing its own prevailing regime of accumulation, Ontario had to discover an appropriate institutional fix with its municipalities. As such, the developmental efforts taken at the Ontario scale cannot be separated from those taken at the Toronto scale. The nature of the provincial-municipal relationship ensured Ontario's presence in Toronto. Indeed, by virtue of Toronto's status as the provincial capital and the links that Queen's Park's policies forged with American capital to industrialize Ontario, actors at the Toronto scale wanted to ensure that the city would continue to be a central place to do business. This provincial-municipal relationship, however, would change during the course of each regime of accumulation,

affecting the strategies taken at the waterfront scale. Such changes can be summarized as follows:

1. In its battles with the federal government, Ontario's efforts to ensure a strict interpretation of economic development powers in the 1867 BNA Act during the pre-Keynesian era contributed to the practice of capitalizing on economic booms. Politicians at the Toronto scale followed this line of thinking and continually encouraged railroad development, practically all of which occurred along the waterfront. Ontario's contribution to the rescaling of the waterfront here was its hands-off approach to municipal affairs, leading non-state actors – in this case, the Toronto Board of Trade – to jump scale and lobby the state at the federal scale to create an institution that could seize control of the waterfront from the railroads. The TBT's strategic use of a referendum at the local scale gave rise to new inter-scalar relations between the city and Ottawa, thereby ensuring that Ottawa would now have a direct interest in Toronto.
2. Ontario's acceptance of post-war federalism included rescaling its relations with the municipalities. In fact, the province created a new scale – Metro – for managing Toronto and the consequences of post-war growth. While the waterfront would remain a federal institution, it would be rescaled and come to play a regional role with Metro, Toronto, and Ontario using THC lands to provide the infrastructures which sustained the Keynesian-Fordist regime of accumulation. At the same time, the logic of financial self-sufficiency embedded in the THC pushed it to respond to events unique to the Toronto scale. More specifically, Toronto had begun to move away from a Fordist regime of

accumulation. Indeed, Toronto was becoming a less blue-collar city and a more white-collar city and lands that the THC had designated for industrial purposes were now being put to commercial and residential use. Moreover, the THC, Metro, and Toronto, were becoming increasingly cognizant of Toronto's emergent global status. The waterfront thus became a potential site to hold events, house businesses, and build communities to further this global status.

3. As the Keynesian-Fordist regime of accumulation began to collapse, Ontario moved to shore up the province. While Ontario had tried to create new inter-scalar relations with municipalities, such as Bill Davis's BILD which sought to foster centres of innovation at the municipal scale, these largely failed, opening the door for municipalities to pursue their own scale-specific interests. With regard to Toronto, socio-economic changes led the city to pursue economic policies which accelerated the shift away from a Fordist regime of accumulation. With the active support of middle class neighbourhood activists, a post-industrial Toronto had begun to emerge where emphasis was on image-making in the city. This began the process of urban entrepreneurialism, which was heightened throughout the 1980s as efforts at the Toronto scale sought to increase the city's profile as a global city by bidding on the 1996 Summer Olympics to be held on the waterfront. Thus, the waterfront's purpose would be a global one.
4. In the period 1995 to 2005, the election of a neo-liberal government in Ontario combined with federal efforts to eliminate the inter-scalar fiscal arrangements associated with the Keynesian-Fordist era had an impact on the provincial-municipal relationship. While the Harris government's desire to "re-open"

Ontario for business meant attracting investment, the associated inter-scalar changes fed the urban entrepreneurialism that had already been developing at the Toronto scale. Even though the waterfront would act as a strategic site to deepen Toronto's global city status, it would also be an important site for investment, generating revenue for the city to cope with the costs of provincial downloading and amalgamation.

While arguments like Florida's contend that all of this is a clear example of the global interacting with the local, the case presented here suggests that waterfront redevelopment involved realizing Toronto's global aspirations, as these were reflected in a long and drawn out process engaging the state at the federal and provincial scales. While actors at the Toronto scale were acutely aware that changes at the global scale could favour the city's developmental possibilities, efforts to "globalize" Toronto were supported through changes in the form of the Canadian state.

The thesis has employed Jessop's notion of the Schumpeterian post-national workfare regime to show the transition from a Keynesian welfare national state has occurred in the context of the Toronto waterfront. This helped to illustrate how the role of the state at the national state moved away from the role of stabilizer to promoter of innovation and the responses this engendered by the state at sub-national scales. It also illuminated the processes behind the rise of spaces of competitiveness and the relationship these have with the space of competition, showing how the state's inter-scalar relationships become redefined.

States at the national scale continue to perform the work of establishing international regimes. Jessop's concept of "spaces of competition" has been used to

highlight how the state at the federal scale not only negotiated free trade agreements, but also assisted with global strategies at the Toronto scale such as the 1996 and 2008 Olympic bids. At the same time, this space of competition created much insecurity for the provincial state as the federal government was in the process of abandoning Keynesian macroeconomic management. In response, the provincial state began to reorient its economic interests towards this space of competition to become a "space of competitiveness," stimulating innovation in sunrise industries.

The shift away from Keynesian-Fordism and the advent of spaces of competition influenced the establishment of the Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront. As chapter four showed, the waterfront underwent a re-politicization as the inter-scalar relations defining Keynesian-Fordist Canada began to slowly unravel. Too many experiments had been performed by states at each scale in response to growing instability, resulting in a jumble of unrelated waterfront projects. The federal government began to reassess the institutions governing the waterfront, partly because Ottawa took the view that its obligations to the provinces prevented it from effectively dealing with its own problems. This left the RCFTW to conclude that the institutions governing the waterfront should be restructured. Along with the reduction of the THC to a port management role, the federal government should transfer THC lands to TEDCO, the City of Toronto's real estate arm. The waterfront was also tagged as a site of innovation that could enhance Toronto's global standing, while acting as a focal point to reorganize inter-scalar relationships. Indeed, the RCFTW provided a blueprint for Toronto and Ontario to shift from Fordism by identifying a key space to promote after-Fordist competitiveness. It was part and parcel of an attempt to establish a SPWR as the federal government would

assist *but not steer* measures that would stoke the innovation needed to be competitive.

The fifth chapter turned to the waterfront during the rescaling of the Canadian state. Peck and Tickell's concept of roll-back and roll-out neo-liberalism was employed to understand the unevenness involved in rescaling. As we saw, the form and nature of rescaling differed amongst the scales that this thesis analyzed. Federally initiated rescaling ignited by Ottawa's fight against the deficit which, in turn, led state at provincial scales to reassess their roles *vis à vis* other scales of action. Examining how these roles were reassessed offers an opportunity to build on Neil Brenner's work on rescaling. While he focuses attention on how the connections between scales get reworked, it is also important to interrogate the way the state at various scales becomes transformed internally. In Ontario's case, the financial pressures springing from federal cuts to transfer payments provided the justification for the Harris government to remake provincial-municipal relations by downloading. Municipalities, in turn, met the costs of downloading by allowing greater growth within their boundaries.

Under Mayor Hall, pre-amalgamation Toronto became an active opponent of the Harris government. Amalgamation changed the city's political landscape, however, when Lastman defeated Hall and made it clear that a post-amalgamation Toronto would turn its attention to development, implicitly complementing the Harris government's pro-growth agenda. Still, sensing an opportunity for a city-building project, under Lastman, Toronto turned to the waterfront to make a run for the 2008 Summer Olympics. A successful bid could have helped to re-forge inter-scalar arrangements with Ottawa and Queen's Park, while at the same time helping to remedy the city's deficits in the public sphere. These deficits, accumulated during Ottawa's and Queen's Park's roll-back phases, threatened to

undermine Toronto ability to maintain its status as Canada's economic centrepiece. In particular, the threat to Toronto's status primarily emanated from the unchecked urban sprawl in the 905 belt created stress on a range of social and physical infrastructures throughout the city and the GTA.

An agency was required to bring the attention of the state at different scales on the waterfront. The establishment of the TWRC in 2002 served to co-ordinate the inter-scalar interests in waterfront redevelopment within the framework of positioning Toronto to succeed in the NAFTA and the world city spaces of competition. In managing inter-scalar interest in waterfront redevelopment, however, the TWRC was running up against the limitations of the post-Keynesian-Fordist inter-scalar relations. As such, it was forced to re-establish the terms of waterfront redevelopment and, in turn, recreate new inter-scalar relations. The concept of "scalar disconnect" was introduced to demonstrate how the reterritorializing policies enacted at different scales of the state can frustrate effective institution building. As the case of the TWRC shows, in the search for a new regime of accumulation, the roles and responsibilities the state has at a particular scale can prevent movement on a project. As such, much creativity goes into connecting how the interests residing at a local scale respond to interests at extra-local scales.

Waterfront redevelopment policies, however, do not operate in a political vacuum as there has to be a base of support. Chapter six has shown how Toronto's neighbourhood associations and community organizations supported the notion that the current state of the waterfront retarded the city's competitiveness. Many of the ideas espoused by the TWRC, in fact, were already commonly accepted amongst neighbourhood associations and community organizations. While the waterfront was

supposed to make Toronto a competitive city, neighbourhood associations generally believed competitiveness should not come at the expense of social sustainability, thus the waterfront needed to be turned into a social project as well as an economic project. At the same time, neighbourhood associations and community organizations never challenged the premises of urban neo-liberalism built into waterfront redevelopment, leaving the multi- and inter-scalar bases of its logic untouched.

In the years following the period examined by this thesis, significant movement has been made on waterfront redevelopment in the West Don Lands and the East Bayfront precincts and headway has been made on parks in the Port Lands. A new precinct, the Lower Don Lands, has been introduced, reducing the size of the Port Lands. In 2007, the TWRC was renamed WATERFRONToronto to better communicate to the public the agency's role. TEDCO has since been renamed the Toronto Port Lands Company, although TEDCO still remains its legal operating name and continues to operate and act as TEDCO did. The name change perhaps reflects the role Toronto wants the waterfront to play, highlighting its character as a waterfront city. Yet as this thesis showed, despite having shoreline, Toronto never was a "waterfront city." If anything, the waterfront has more and more been seen as a means to brand Toronto to the world.

Undoubtedly, the Toronto waterfront will always be part of the city's fabric. Like any city, Toronto will change and so too will its parts. Given that a successor to Keynesian-Fordism has yet to be found, what this round of waterfront redevelopment will mean to Toronto may not fully known until at least the middle of this century. Cities are complex entities, always changing and, as such, many unexpected variables will intervene to shape developments on the waterfront. Even if Richard Florida's "creativity

economy" will define cities and the waterfront does become the space where creativity happens, there is no guarantee that it will sustain Toronto.

It is therefore fitting to end where this thesis began. For someone to tell my father to get off a streetcar because his blue-collar status was obvious might have been unheard of thirty years ago. While it may have been an isolated incident, a blue-collar worker riding public transit in Toronto is becoming a rarer sight. At the end of the day, most blue-collar workers prefer the comfort of their car in order to get back to a home that is likely located somewhere in the 905 belt. For Toronto to push only white-collar forms of work on the waterfront suggests that there is more rather than less planning involved in neo-liberalization projects. Taking a page out of Toronto's social past should show that letting everyday life in the city take its course was the key to Toronto's prosperity. There is no reason to believe that this has stopped being the case. In the end, the best strategy for the waterfront may very well have been to just leave it alone.

Appendix A: Events at the Scale of the Waterfront

Year	Event
1852	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Commissioners of the Harbour of Toronto is established to oversee the management of the Port of Toronto.
1889	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Toronto Board of Trade becomes concerned with the effects of railroads on Toronto's waterfront. The Board of Trade strikes a deal with the Grand Trunk Railroad and the Canadian Pacific Railroad to build a viaduct to relieve congestion along the waterfront.
1903	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To address the railroads' dominance on the waterfront, the Board of Trade successfully lobbies the federal government to address the issue of freight rates by establishing a national regulatory body, the Board of Railway Commissioners, to effect more competition.
1907	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Still concerned with the railroads along the waterfront and the mounting mobility problems they are causing, the Toronto Board of Trade proposes to Toronto City Council the idea of an Esplanade Viaduct. The Board of Trade established its Special Committee Regarding the Waterfront.
1909	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Canadian Pacific Railroad and the Grand Trunk Railroad contest the Esplanade Viaduct, asking the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to rule <i>ultra vires</i> on the Viaduct. The two companies argue unsuccessfully.
1911	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A referendum is held in the City of Toronto on whether or not voters want to establish a new harbour institution.

1912	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ottawa accepts the wishes of Toronto voters and replaces the Commissioners of the Harbour of Toronto with the Toronto Harbour Commissioners, a federal agency with land development and port management powers, which quickly wrests control of the waterfront from the Canadian Pacific and Grand Trunk. • The THC drafts its 1912 Plan, which would not be revisited until 1968.
1914	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • After the outbreak of World War I, the THC's first tenant, British Forgings Limited, moves in, with the aid of the Imperial Munitions Board.
1926	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Despite being converted to peacetime production, British Forgings shuts down due to too much international competition, but the THC is still optimistic based on the number of industrial tenants moving in. To develop serviceable lands, the THC looks to New York bond markets to raise capital.
1930s	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Great Depression hits and the THC's fortunes begin to sag.
1939-1944	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • World War II revives the THC's fortunes as Ottawa sets up a number of agencies on its lands to help with the war effort.
1944	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Toronto Star Limited begins its plans to move onto THC lands because of the shipping possibilities that the coming St. Lawrence Seaway had for newsprint.
1958	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Redpath Sugar Refinery, now a Toronto landmark, opens to take advantage of port facilities because of the St. Lawrence Seaway.

1959	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The St. Lawrence Seaway opens but without the financial bonanza for the THC.
1961	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Metropolitan Toronto examines the potential that the waterfront had for the Toronto region, recommending that waterfront lands should be used for commercial rather than industrial purposes. The City of Toronto Planning Board opposes this because of concerns over overheating the local economy.
1966	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A deal is struck between the Campeau Corporation, the City of Toronto, and the THC to begin developing Harbour Square, the first large-scale, non-industrial project on the waterfront, reflecting the changing economic realities of the Toronto economy,
1967	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Metro raises the matter of Toronto's growing global status and suggests that the waterfront could be used to hold a Summer Olympics.
1968	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The THC revisits its 1912 Plan. A <i>Bold Concept</i> paints a post-industrial picture of the waterfront, but it fails due to the unpopularity of the THC with Toronto residents.
1972	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ottawa purchases 100 acres of land on the Toronto waterfront and Harbourfront, an own-source revenue public agency oriented towards arts programming, begins.
1974	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Under a reform City Council, the Central Waterfront Planning Committee is established. A mix of community groups, neighbourhood associations, and state agencies participate and seek to arrive at workable plans for the waterfront's future.

1975	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The City of Toronto establishes the Port Industry Task Force, building on the city's <i>A Place for Industry</i>. Its work was suspended by the Central Waterfront Planning Committee because the Committee disagreed with the Task Force's location of an industrial park.
1980	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In co-operation with the THC, Toronto revives the Port Industry Task Force, renaming it the Port Industry Development Task Force, but its recommendations are ignored.
1988	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partly to support Toronto's bid for the 1996 Summer Olympics, Ottawa launches the Royal Commission on the Future of the Toronto Waterfront. The status of the THC and Harbourfront are put into question given the federal government's turn towards extricating itself from matters, which, constitutionally, are in the provinces' jurisdiction. • The THC sets out a new plan for its lands, but it is soon forgotten,
1992	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • After releasing interim reports in 1989 and 1990, the RCFTW releases its final report and the THC is (1) ordered to transfer its lands to Toronto's TEDCO and (2) reduced to a port management role. Also, the RCFTW uses the waterfront to recognize the Greater Toronto Area, setting the stage for using activities at sub-national scales as a source for Canada's economic renewal. • On the RCFTW's recommendations, Ontario legislates the Waterfront Regeneration Trust into existence.

1999	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The THC is wound down and replaced by the Toronto Port Authority through an amendment to the Federal Marine Act. • New movement begins on the waterfront as the City of Toronto sense a city-building opportunity in the wake of a provincially-imposed amalgamation on the municipalities making up Metro Toronto. The Port Lands area becomes the focus, due in large part to Home Depot's denied building permit and the decision to make another run at a Summer Olympics in 2008.
2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Task Force begins its work on behalf of the City of Toronto, Queen's Park, and Ottawa to examine how to regenerate the waterfront in time for a 2008 Summer Olympics. Unlike the failed 1996 bid, the TWRTF states that a failed 2008 bid will not squash waterfront redevelopment.
2001	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The City of Toronto releases its Official Plan for the waterfront. • The Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation is created by an act of provincial parliament to oversee and co-ordinate agencies working to redevelop the waterfront. The City of Toronto, Queen's Park, and Ottawa agree to equally contribute to a \$1.5 billion pot for seed capital, thus launching the most current round of waterfront redevelopment.

Appendix B: Events at the Scale of Toronto

Year	Event
1793	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Governor John Graves Simcoe founds present day Toronto, calling it York
1834	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Toronto becomes incorporated and replaces York as the city's name.
1871	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Toronto businessmen lobby Ottawa to change its banking laws to avoid giving the Bank of Montreal a <i>de facto</i> monopoly on lending.
1877	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Toronto Board of Trade begins to champion the idea of a national tariff, supporting Sir John A. Macdonald's National Policy.
1879	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Agricultural implements manufacturer Massey moves to Toronto, making the city an important national industrial hub because of the demand that would be generated by Western Canadian settlement.
1889-1910	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A local health crisis emerges in Ashbridge's Bay due to pollution coming from the surrounding area's businesses. Cholera becomes a concern, providing the first moment of politicizing the waterfront.
1907	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Toronto follows the THC's lead and establishes its own
1910	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Following the Board of Trade's lead, the City of Toronto sets up its own Special Committee Regarding the Waterfront to inquire into what is the best course of action on the waterfront.
1943	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Toronto Reconstruction Council is established by the City of Toronto to uncover ways to maintain conditions for high and stable levels of employment once World War II ends.

1952	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Metropolitan Toronto Act is passed by the province, in part as a response to the growth pressures Toronto and its immediate neighbours were facing.
1955	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The first section of the Frederick Gardiner Expressway is opened, with the final section being completed in 1966. The Gardiner, as it comes to be called throughout the Toronto area, acts as an important east-west thruway for commuters coming into the city from what are now the downtown's inner suburbs.
1971	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Spadina Expressway goes down to defeat by an amalgam of neighbourhood activists. This represents the first major victory by a revitalizing middle-class activism over Fordist styles of city planning.
1972	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> City reformers emerge victorious in the 1972 Toronto elections. Led by the mayoralty of David Crombie, a Red Tory, the reformers promise to do business differently in Toronto, rejecting Fordist methods of city planning.
1978	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> After David Crombie decided not to run for mayor again, fellow reformer John Sewell wins the 1978 Toronto election to lead the reformers to victory.
1980	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> In the 1980 Toronto election, John Sewell is defeated by Art Eggleton. Eggleton brings significant new developments to the city. Throughout his mayoralty, Eggleton embarked on a strategy to make Toronto a "world class city." Eggleton would become the city's longest serving mayor, permanently retiring from municipal politics in 1991.

1988	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As part of his "world class city" campaign, Eggleton successfully organizes support for the City of Toronto to make a bid for the 1996 Summer Olympics. The bid encounters significant local opposition from Left city councillors and activists, bringing into question the use of local resources for a global event, especially in the midst of a severe recession.
1991	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • June Rowlands wins the mayor's race to replace Eggleton.
1994	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Barbara Hall defeats Rowlands to become Toronto's new mayor, representing a shift to the Left at City Hall. One year later under Hall's leadership, Toronto would become a major source of opposition to the neo-liberal Conservative government at Queen's Park.
1997	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Government of Ontario announces that it intends to eliminate the Metro level of government and amalgamate the municipalities constituting Metropolitan Toronto into the City of Toronto. Downtown neighbourhood and community organizations fruitlessly mount a significant campaign against amalgamation. • An election is held in autumn of 1997 to determine who would be the new mayor of the new City of Toronto. North York's boosterist mayor, Mel Lastman, defeats Barbara Hall, causing a shift to the Right at City Hall.
1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Toronto becomes amalgamated on January 1, 1998, and Mel Lastman becomes its first mayor.

2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Toronto releases its first report on the city's planning future. In part, it recognizes Toronto's centrality to the Greater Toronto Area.• Toronto takes another run at the Summer Olympics, making a bid to be the 2008 host.
2001	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Toronto's first Official Plan is released.
2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• David Miller becomes the Mayor of Toronto, replacing the retired Mel Lastman, causing a shift to the Left at City Hall. Like Lastman, the waterfront was high on Miller's list of priorities.

Appendix C: Events at the Scale of Ontario

Year	Event
1867	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ontario becomes a province of Canada.
1872	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oliver Mowat becomes the premier of Ontario. Mowat actively opposes Sir John A. Macdonald's vision of Canada, setting the stage for a series of future disputes between the province and the federal government over the interpretation of the powers enumerated in the BNA Act of 1867. • To contest Ottawa's interpretation of the BNA Act, Mowat's Ontario actively uses its powers to initiate a process of province-building to industrialize Ontario. In so doing, it becomes Canada's wealthiest province.
1934	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mitchell Hepburn is elected as premier of Ontario. Like his counterparts in other provinces in the 1930s, Hepburn practices illiberal politics. Moreover, he champions provincial rights and opposes Ottawa's attempts to centralize economic powers as a means to counter the Great Depression.
1943	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario announces its platform for the 1944 provincial election. The 22 Points Declaration is essentially a statement on the Conservatives' plans for post-war Ontario.
1944	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conservative George Drew wins the election and ends 77 years of Liberal Party rule in Ontario. • Drew's victory is the beginning of 41 years of Conservative rule in Ontario, making it the province's post-war ruling party.

1949	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leslie Frost becomes premier of Ontario and begins to rapidly execute plans to develop Ontario's infrastructures to ensure the province could maintain its rate of economic growth.
1961	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • John Robarts succeeds Frost as the premier of Ontario in the 1961 provincial election. Robarts recognizes the basis of Ontario's post-war boom and aims to further internationalize Ontario as a key space of accumulation within the wider North American economy. • Robarts's tenure is also marked by a series of clashes with the federal government over economic development.
1965	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Robarts's government deals with the first signs of a Keynesian-Fordist collapse by turning its attention to regional development initiatives through Design for Development.
1971	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bill Davis succeeds John Robarts as Ontario's premier. • Davis begins to deal with the onset of the Keynesian-Fordist collapse by proposing to curtail the size of the public sector while making it more efficient to promote private sector activity. • In the debates over the best course of action to deal with the coming end of the post-war boom in Ontario, a split emerges within the Conservative caucus between those who advocate for less government and those who advocate for a more active government.
1973	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The oil shock of 1973 leads to Conservatives wanting a more active government to win out over less government colleagues.

1977	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Davis produces the Ontario Charter for the upcoming provincial election, plotting a path for a post-Keynesian-Fordist Ontario.
1980	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Davis's government implements the Board of Industrial Leadership and Design to modernize Ontario's economy by focusing on leading sectors and centres of excellence.
1985	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Davis's decision to step down as premier opens the door for a neo-liberal successor, Frank Miller, to take over the leadership of the Progressive Conservative Party. • Miller wins the 1985 election, but it is a minority government and short-lived as the Conservatives could not satisfy the demands of the NDP. • Due to its now neo-liberal orientation, the Conservatives scrap BILD and replace it with Enterprise Ontario, which promotes lowering taxes as a means to attract investment and modernize the Ontario economy. • A non-confidence motion leads to the end of Conservative rule in Ontario and Liberal David Peterson become premier after signing an accord with the NDP.
1987	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Peterson's Liberals win a majority. • Peterson would continue where Davis left off by establishing the Premier's Council. • The Peterson government would become a source of opposition to the federal government, headed by Brian Mulroney's Progressive Conservative Party, and its free trade project.
1990	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bob Rae's NDP wins a surprise majority after Peterson calls what is seen to be an unnecessary early election.

1991	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A major recession hits Ontario and combined with the effects of the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement on the provincial economy, the Rae government goes one step further than Peterson by attempting to bring business, labour, and government together to reflate the Ontario economy and reinforce its position as a key space of accumulation in the North American space economy.
1993	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Influenced by the RCFTW, the Rae government establishes the Commission on Planning and Development to investigate how to sensitize planning to ecology and how to adjust growth accordingly.
1995	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prior to calling the 1995 election, the Rae government establishes the GTA Task Force to examine the problems facing Ontario's key economic region, its solutions, and how it fit with the province's overall efforts to create a post-industrial economy in what was now a continental/global economy. • With Mike Harris as its leader, the Progressive Conservative Party defeats the NDP. Its Common Sense Revolution provides the platform to neo-liberalize the province, promising less government and lower taxes to make sure Ontario is once more "open for business."
1997	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Harris government announces its intentions to amalgamate municipalities, justifying it by claiming the Common Sense Revolution pledged to reduce the size of government in Ontario.

1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wanting to streamline public administration, the Harris government institutes the Who Does What Panel, headed by former Toronto mayor David Crombie, to eliminate service duplication between the provincial and municipal governments. • The Who Does What Panel recommends that the province takes over social services and municipalities take on the costs of infrastructure. The Panel's recommendations are ignored as the Harris government's decision to take over education funding from the municipalities leads to downloading a mix of services onto municipal governments.
1999	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Ontario Jobs and Investment Board is established by the Harris government because its approach to attracting business investment, i.e. lower taxes and less regulation, fell short of expectations. While not as strong as previous governments' strategies, the Ontario Jobs and Investment Board did represent some movement towards a more active government under Harris.
2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Ontario SuperBuild Corporation is established. Promoting public-private partnerships, the Corporation aimed to renew Ontario's infrastructure at the municipal level to enhance the province's attractiveness as a key site of investment.
2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ernie Eves becomes premier of Ontario after Mike Harris announces his resignation.

2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The Ontario Liberal Party defeats Eves's Progressive Conservatives. Dalton McGuinty becomes the new premier of Ontario, signalling a change in the province's attitude towards governing Ontario in a global era.
2004	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• To address the shortcomings of the Harris/Eves government, McGuinty's Ontario establishes the Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal. The Ministry begins to implement Places to Grow, a strategy designed to steer urban growth and renew infrastructure in ways which would make Ontario a more competitive jurisdiction in North America.

Appendix D: Events at the Scale of Canada

Year	Event
1867	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Canada becomes a semi-sovereign country, retaining its links with the UK.
1879	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sir John A. Macdonald implements the First National Policy to (1) head off the prospect of the USA taking over what is now Western Canada by settling it, (2) industrialize Canada through tariffs, and (3) create a Canadian economic space. • Constructing a railway stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean is central to the National Policy's aims.
1881	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The federal government grants a charter to the Canadian Pacific Railway to construct the National Policy's railway. Like Canada's other major railway company, the Grand Trunk, the CPR is headquartered in Montréal, lending to that city's dominance during the era of the National Policy.
1903	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Board of Railway Commissioners is established to regulate railway freight rates.
1918-1923	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The federal government begins to nationalize railways, amalgamating a number of railways in bankruptcy into the Canadian National Railway. The CPR remains the only major privately owned railway company.
1929	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Great Depression sets in, miring Canada in economic trouble for the next decade until World War II begins.
1939	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Rowell-Sirois Commission is established to examine how to change Canadian federalism in order to avoid a return to the Depression.

1939	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • World War II breaks out on September 1, 1939. Canada declares war on Nazi Germany on September 10, 1939. • One effect of World War II on the Canadian economy was that it demonstrated the ability of the federal government to organize the economy.
1940	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Rowell-Sirois Commission delivers its final recommendations to Ottawa, calling for co-operation between the federal and provincial governments.
1944	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In anticipation of war's end, Ottawa releases the White Paper on Employment and Income to outline how high and stable levels of employment will continue. It sees the role of governments as being one which is limited to assisting the private sector. Wartime industries would be sold off in peacetime in recognition of the dominance of business.
1945	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On September 2, 1945, World War II ends. • The Dominion-Provincial Conference on Reconstruction sees the federal government meet with its provincial counterparts to chart a course for post-war federalism which would see Ottawa enable the provinces to meet their obligations.
1965	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Canada-US Auto Pact comes into effect, removing tariffs on automobile parts, and greatly benefiting Ontario in the process.
1971	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In response to the American turn inwards, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau travels to Washington to unsuccessfully convince US President Richard Nixon to be protectionist with Canada.

1972	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As part of its response to the collapse of Keynesian-Fordism, Ottawa establishes the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs as a means to begin spatial targeting and establish a new era of federal-municipal relations. • Along with provincial opposition to Ottawa's perceived interference in a provincial matter, federal bureaucrats who guard their territory and prevent inter-institutional dialogue hobble the MSUA's ability to meet its goals.
1973	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Another spatial targeting measure, the Department of Regional Economic Expansion, is established. It indicates that Ottawa is become less and less concerned with the unevenness of Canada's political economy.
1979	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The MSUA winds up as a result of budget cuts.
1982	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Due to Ottawa's inability to find a way out of the crisis of Keynesian-Fordism, Trudeau appoints his former finance minister Donald Macdonald to head the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, otherwise popularly known as the Macdonald Commission.
1984	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Progressive Conservatives come to power under the leadership of Brian Mulroney, promising to steer Canada in a more neo-liberal direction by focusing on deficit reduction and trimming the public sector. Mulroney, however, promises not to explore free trade as a potential solution to Canada's economic woes.

1985	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Macdonald Commission delivers its recommendations. It advocates exploring free trade as an option the federal government should explore. The Macdonald Commission also advocates for transforming the nature of federalism, but warns Ottawa of the impossibility of excusing itself from sub-national affairs because of the legacy of post-war federalism.
1986	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Breaking its promise, the Mulroney government enters free trade negotiations with the USA.
1989	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • After receiving a new mandate in the 1988 "free trade election," the Mulroney government signs the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement.
1991	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Canada, Mexico, and the USA begin negotiations for a North America-wide free trade agreement.
1993	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As leader of the Liberal Party, Jean Chrétien wins the 1993 election to become Canada's new prime minister.
1994	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NAFTA comes into effect. • The Chrétien government announces that it intends to eliminate the deficit.
1995	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Led by Minister of Finance Paul Martin, the Chrétien government initiates the process of eliminating the deficit. Transfer payments to the provinces receive the lion's share of budget cuts.
1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Government of Canada enters an era of surpluses and embarks on a new round of nation-building in a post-deficit era.
2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • To examine the problems plaguing urban Canada, the Prime Minister's Caucus Task Force on Urban Issues is created, largely focusing on the deficits that emerged in the public sphere during the Martin cuts.

2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Paul Martin takes over as leader of the Liberal Party, becoming Canada's new prime minister after Jean Chrétien announces his retirement.
2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The Martin government establishes the New Deal for Communities, making it the first significant federal measure in a post-deficit era to create a new federal-municipal relationship.

Endnotes

¹ Despite being an agent-centred study of modern Toronto being put on display at the Industrial Exhibition, which came to be the Canadian National Exhibition, the best illustration of this Torontonians preoccupation lies in Keith Walden, *Becoming Modern in Toronto: The Industrial Exhibition and the Shaping of a Late Victorian Culture* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).

² This is not to suggest, however, that this was automatic. Toronto's historic "competitor city" had been Montreal. Montreal's precipitous decline has been blamed on the rise of an aggressive and often parochial Québécois nationalism seeking separation from Canada. Alienated English-speakers closed up their businesses and moved to Toronto. However convenient this explanation may be, it is too simplistic. Realizing a confluence of political, social, and economic factors came together to give Toronto pride of place in the post-war Canadian political economy seems to make more explanatory sense than pinning change on a single event, however large that event may have been.

³ William H. Sewell, Jr., "Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology," in *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences*, ed. Terrence J. McDonald (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1996), 246-247.

⁴ Doreen Massey, *Space, Place, and Gender* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 131-134.

⁵ Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 418-432.

⁶ Peter A. Hall, "The Dilemmas of Contemporary Social Science," *boundary 2* 34, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 126.

⁷ Stephen D. Krasner, "Abiding Sovereignty," *International Political Science Review* 22, no. 3 (July 2001): 242.

⁸ Thomas J. Biersteker, "State, Sovereignty, Territory," *Handbook of International Relations*, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: Sage Publications, 2002), 159.

⁹ Linda Weiss, *The Myth of the Powerless State* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998).

¹⁰ Michael Mann, "Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?" *Review of International Political Economy* 4, no. 3 (Autumn 1997).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 494; emphasis in the original.

¹² John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," *International Organization* 47, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 172.

¹³ Darel E. Paul, *Rescaling International Political Economy: Subnational States and the Regulation of the Global Political Economy* (London: Routledge, 2005).

¹⁴ Bob Jessop, *State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1990), 116-121.

¹⁵ Richard Howitt, "Scale," in *A Companion to Political Geography*, eds. John Agnew, Katharyne Mitchell, and Gerard Toal (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004); Andrew E.G. Jonas, "The Scale Politics of Spatiality," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 12, no. 3 (June 1994); Virginie Mamadouh, Olivier Kramsch, and Martin van der Velde, "Articulating Local and Global Scales," *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 95, no. 5 (December 2005); Byron Miller, "Political Action and the Geography of Defense Investment: Geographical Scale and the Representation of the Massachusetts Miracle," *Political*

Geography 16, no. 2 (February 1997); Hilda E. Kurtz, "Scale Frames and Counter-scale Frames: Constructing the Problem of Environmental Injustice," *Political Geography* 22, no. 8 (November 2003).

¹⁶ Andrew Herod and Melissa W. Wright, "Placing Scale: An Introduction," in *Geographies of Power: Placing Scale*, eds. Andrew Herod and Melissa W. Wright (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 2.

¹⁷ Arturo Escobar, *Territories of Difference: Place, Movements, Life, Redes* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 30.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 37, 40.

¹⁹ Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).

²⁰ Ludger Pries, "Configurations of Geographic and Societal Spaces: A Sociological Proposal between 'Methodological Nationalism' and the 'Spaces of Flows'," *Global Networks* 5, no. 2 (April 2005): 173.

²¹ Steven P. Erie, *Globalizing L.A.: Trade, Infrastructure, and Regional Development* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 12.

²² Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies* (New York: Free Press, 1995), 5.

²³ *Ibid.*, 62.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 81.

²⁵ Michael E. Porter, "The Competitive Advantage of the Inner City," *Harvard Business Review* 73, no. 3 (May/June 1995). Also see Michael E. Porter, "New Strategies for Inner-City Economic Development," *Economic Development Quarterly* 11, no. 1 (February 1997).

²⁶ Michael E. Porter, *The Competitive Advantage of Nations* (New York: Free Press, 1990), 131-132.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 132-133.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 155-159.

²⁹ Paul Hirst, *Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994); Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift, "Neo-Marshallian Nodes in Global Networks," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 16, no. 4 (December 1992); Philip Cooke and Kevin Morgan, *The Associational Economy: Firms, Regions, and Innovation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); and David A. Wolfe, "The Emergence of the Region State," in *The Nation State in a Global/Information Era: Policy Challenges*, ed. Thomas J. Courchene (Kingston: John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, 1997).

³⁰ Hirst, *Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance*, 130.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 116-117.

³² *Ibid.*, 117.

³³ Manuel Castells, *The Informational City: Information Technology, Economic Restructuring, and the Urban-Regional Process* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 338-344.

³⁴ Manuel Castells, *The Power of Identity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 243.

³⁵ Ibid., 272.

³⁶ Ibid., 274.

³⁷ Manuel Castells, "European Cities, the Informational Society, and the Global Economy," *New Left Review* 204 (March/April 1994): 20.

³⁸ Ibid., 21.

³⁹ See Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, vol. 2, *The Nation-State and Violence* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987); Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power*, vol. 2, *The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), ch. 3; Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); Charles Tilly, "War Making and State Making as Organized Crime," in *Bringing the State Back In*, eds. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); and Walter C. Opello, Jr. and Stephen J. Rosow, *The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics*, 2d edition (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), ch. 4.

⁴⁰ Manuel Castells, *The Rise of the Network Society* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 386-393.

⁴¹ Michael Storper and Richard Walker, *The Capitalist Imperative: Territory, Technology, and Industrial Growth* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 183.

⁴² Richard Florida and Martin Kenney, *The Breakthrough Illusion: Corporate America's Failure to Move from Innovation to Mass Production* (New York: Basic Books, 1990); Martin Kenney and Richard Florida, *Beyond Mass Production: The Japanese System and Its Transfer to the U.S.* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

⁴³ Richard Florida, "Toward the Learning Region," *Futures* 27, no. 5 (June 1995): 533.

⁴⁴ Richard Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class ... And How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community, and Everyday Life* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 59.

⁴⁵ Richard Florida, *Cities and the Creative Class* (London: Routledge, 2005), 49-50.

⁴⁶ Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class ... And How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community, and Everyday Life*, 221.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 55.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 223.

⁴⁹ Florida, *Cities and the Creative Class*, 28-29. Also see his more recent and highly popular but non-academic *Who's Your City? How the Creative Economy is Making Where to Live the Most Important Decision of Your Life* (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2008).

⁵⁰ Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class ... And How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community, and Everyday Life*, 215-218, 240-241.

⁵¹ Ibid., 241.

⁵² Ibid., 223-234.

⁵³ Ron Griffiths, "Making Sameness: Place Marketing and the New Urban Entrepreneurialism," in *Cities, Economic Competition and Urban Policy*, ed. Nick Oatley (London: Paul Chapman Publishing, 1998), 56.

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- ⁵⁴ Robert H. Fagan and Richard H. Le Heron, "Reinterpreting the Geography of Accumulation: The Global Shift and Local Restructuring," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 12, no. 3 (July 1994): 266.
- ⁵⁵ Timothy G. Bunnell and Neil M. Coe, "Spaces and Scales of Innovation," *Progress in Human Geography* 25, no. 4 (December 2001): 578.
- ⁵⁶ Florida, *Cities and the Creative Class*, 49.
- ⁵⁷ Peter Hall, *The World Cities*, 3d edition (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986), 2-3.
- ⁵⁸ Martina Heßler, "Science Cities, Creativity, and Urban Economic Effects," in *Creative Urban Milieus: Historical Perspectives on Culture, Economy, and the City*, eds. Martina Heßler and Clemens Zimmermann (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2008), 313-315.
- ⁵⁹ Kurt Hübner, "Spaces of Innovation: Introductory Remarks on the Comparative Analysis of the New Economy," in *The New Economy in Transatlantic Perspective: Spaces of Innovation*, ed. Kurt Hübner (London: Routledge, 2005), 3. Emphasis in original.
- ⁶⁰ The list of creative workers can be found in Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class: ... And How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community, and Everyday Life*, 69.
- ⁶¹ Richard Hull, "Knowledge and the Economy: Some Critical Comments," *Economy and Society* 29, no. 2 (May 2000): 320.
- ⁶² Thomas Osborne, "Against 'Creativity': A Philistine Rant," *Economy and Society* 32, no. 4 (November 2003): 510.
- ⁶³ Robert J. Gordon, "Does the 'New Economy' Measure Up to the Great Inventions of the Past?" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 14, no. 4 (Fall 2000): 59.
- ⁶⁴ Stephen Cohen and Jonathan Zysman, *Manufacturing Matters: The Myth of the Post-Industrial Economy* (New York: Basic Books, 1987), 106.
- ⁶⁵ Allen J. Scott, "The Cultural Economy of Cities," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 21, no. 2 (June 1997): 325-327.
- ⁶⁶ Helga Leitner and Eric Sheppard, "Economic Uncertainty, Inter-Urban Competition and the Efficacy of Entrepreneurialism," in *The Entrepreneurial City: Geographies of Politics, Regime, and Representation*, eds. Tim Hall and Phil Hubbard (Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, 1998).
- ⁶⁷ Christopher Leo and Wilson Brown, "Slow Growth and Urban Development Policy," *Journal of Urban Affairs* 22, no. 2 (Summer 2000).
- ⁶⁸ Edward W. Soja, *Postmetropolis: Critical Studies of Cities and Regions* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), 173.
- ⁶⁹ Alain Lipietz, *Mirages and Miracles: The Crises of Global Fordism* (London: Verso, 1987), 14-15, 31.
- ⁷⁰ Jamie Peck, "Doing Regulation," in *The Oxford Handbook of Economy Geography*, eds. Gordon L. Clark, Maryann P. Feldman, and Meric S. Gertler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 63.
- ⁷¹ Michel Aglietta, *A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience*, new edition (London: Verso, 2000), 138-141.

⁷² Lipietz, *Mirages and Miracles: The Crises of Global Fordism*, 14-15.

⁷³ Joe Painter and Mark Goodwin, "Local Governance and Concrete Research: Investigating the Uneven Development of Regulation," *Economy and Society* 24, no. 3 (August 1995): 340.

⁷⁴ Robert Boyer, *The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 58.

⁷⁵ V.C. Fowke, "The National Policy – Old and New," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 18, no. 3 (August 1952): 271-272.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 275-277.

⁷⁷ Charles P. Kindleberger, *Comparative Political Economy: A Retrospective* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), 117.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 134-141.

⁷⁹ Fowke, "The National Policy – Old and New," 272, 274.

⁸⁰ Susan Howson, *Domestic Monetary Management in Britain, 1919-38* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 10.

⁸¹ Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991* (London: Abacus, 1994), 89.

⁸² Peter Clarke, *The Keynesian Revolution in the Making, 1924-1936* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 79.

⁸³ Bob Jessop, *The Future of the Capitalist State* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), 59-61.

⁸⁴ On the foibles of the term "post-industrial" and the dire need to get more precise with the term, see John Myles, "Post-Industrialism and the Service Economy," in *The New Era of Global Competition: State Policy and Market Power*, eds. Daniel Drache and Meric S. Gertler (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991), 353-356. It may be interesting to note, however, that although Myles's analysis is almost twenty years old, much of what he criticizes about the bequeathed newness of "post-industrialism" continues to pervade thinking in policymaking circles.

⁸⁵ Bob Jessop, "Towards a Schumpeterian Workfare State? Preliminary Remarks on Post-Fordist Political Economy," *Studies in Political Economy* 40 (Spring 1993).

⁸⁶ Jessop, *The Future of the Capitalist State*, 129-131.

⁸⁷ Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, "Neoliberalizing Space," *Antipode* 34, no. 3 (July 2002): 385.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 386.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 392.

⁹⁰ David Harvey, "From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation of Urban Governance in Late Capitalism," *Geografiska Annaler B* 71, no. 1 (1989).

⁹¹ Peck and Tickell, "Neoliberalizing Space," 393.

⁹² Jamie Peck, "Political Economies of Scale: Fast Policy, Interscalar Relations, and Neoliberal Workfare," *Economic Geography* 78, no. 3 (July 2002).

⁹³ Bob Jessop, *State Power: A Strategic-Relational Approach* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), 193.

⁹⁴ The best *Régulation* statement on this can be found in Michel Aglietta, "Capitalism at the Turn of the Century: Regulation Theory and the Challenge of Social Change," *New Left Review* 232 (November/December 1998).

⁹⁵ See, for example, Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, "Unravelling the Central State, but How? Types of Multi-level Governance," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 2 (May 2003).

⁹⁶ Jan Kooiman, "Societal Governance: Levels, Modes, and Orders of Social-Political Interaction," in *Debating Governance*, ed. Jon Pierre (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 144-145. Kooiman, it should be noted, does not employ scalar terminology.

⁹⁷ Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, *Politics: Authority, Identities, and Change* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1996), 411.

⁹⁸ Neil Brenner, *New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 77-79.

⁹⁹ Neil Brenner, "Global Cities, Glocal States: Global City Formation and State Territorial Restructuring in Contemporary Europe," *Review of International Political Economy* 5, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 13.

¹⁰⁰ This is derived from the idea of positionality that was presented in Eric Sheppard, "The Spaces and Times of Globalization: Place, Scale, Networks, and Positionality," *Economic Geography* 78, no. 3 (July 2002): 308.

¹⁰¹ Edward W. Soja, *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory* (London: Verso, 1989), 148-150.

¹⁰² Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, "Searching for a New Institutional Fix: The After-Fordist Crisis and the Global-Local Disorder," in *Post-Fordism: A Reader*, ed. Ash Amin (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).

¹⁰³ Lipietz, *Mirages and Miracles: The Crises of Global Fordism*, 28.

¹⁰⁴ Georges Benko and Alain Lipietz, "From the *Régulation* of Space to the Space of *Régulation*," in *Régulation Theory: The State of the Theory*, eds. Robert Boyer and Yves Saillard (London: Routledge, 2002), 191.

¹⁰⁵ This point developed from Lipietz's critique of theories of underdevelopment that compartmentalized spaces: "If we regard the dominant strata within dominated countries simply as puppets of foreign powers or if we make a broad distinction between the 'world bourgeoisie' and the 'peoples of the world', we will be unable to analyse the infinite number of divergent interests which, intellectually, we group into force fields, but which are in fact simply pursuing local or locally materialized needs." See Lipietz, *Mirages and Miracles: The Crises of Global Fordism*, 22.

¹⁰⁶ Painter and Goodwin, "Local Governance and Concrete Research: Investigating the Uneven Development of Regulation," 343.

¹⁰⁷ Boyer, *The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction*, 37-42.

¹⁰⁸ Alain Lipietz, "From Althusserianism to 'Regulation Theory'," in *The Althusserian Legacy*, eds. E. Ann Kaplan and Michael Sprinker (London: Verso, 1993), 133-134.

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- ¹⁰⁹ Frank Moulaert, Erik Swyngedouw, and Patricia Wilson, "Spatial Responses to Fordist and Post-Fordist Accumulation and Regulation," *Papers of the Regional Science Association* 64 (1988): 14-15.
- ¹¹⁰ Andrew Sayer, *Realism and Social Science* (London: Sage Publications, 2000), 113.
- ¹¹¹ Boyer, *The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction*, 28.
- ¹¹² Mustafa Kemal Bayırbağ, "Local Entrepreneurialism and State Rescaling in Turkey," *Urban Studies* 47, no. 2 (February 2010).
- ¹¹³ Jessop, *The Future of the Capitalist State*, 181.
- ¹¹⁴ Bob Jessop, "The State and the Contradictions of the Knowledge-Driven Economy," in *Knowledge, Space, Economy*, eds. John R. Bryson et al (London: Routledge, 2000), 71-72.
- ¹¹⁵ Bob Jessop, for example, has shown how framing strategies prove "especially important in economic and political upheavals that create opportunities for new regional projects and programmes and encourage disputes over the *representation* of appropriate territories and scales for public action." See Bob Jessop, "The Political Economy of Scale," in *Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-Border Regions*, eds. Markus Perkmann and Ngai-Ling Sum (London: Palgrave, 2002), 30; emphasis in the original.
- ¹¹⁶ Neil Brenner, "Between Fixity and Motion: Accumulation, Territorial Organization and the Historical Geography of Spatial Scales," *Environment and Planning D: Space and Society* 16, no. 4 (May 1998): 461.
- ¹¹⁷ Martin Jones, "Spatial Selectivity of the State? The Regulationist Enigma and Local Struggles Over Economic Governance," *Environment and Planning A* 29, no. 5 (May 1997): 832.
- ¹¹⁸ Neil Smith, "Homeless/Global: Scaling Places," in *Mapping the Futures: Local Cultures, Global Changes*, eds. Jon Bird et al (London: Routledge, 1993). 90.
- ¹¹⁹ Neil Smith, "Dangers of the Empirical Turn: Some Comments on the CURS Initiative," *Antipode* 19, no. 1 (April 1987): 63-65.
- ¹²⁰ Neil Smith, "Scale Bending and the Fate of the National," in *Scale and Geographic Inquiry: Nature, Society, and Method*, eds. Eric Sheppard and Robert B. McMaster (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).
- ¹²¹ Byron Miller, "Modes of Governance, Modes of Resistance: Contesting Neoliberalism in Calgary," in *Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers*, eds. Helga Leitner, Jamie Peck, and Eric S. Sheppard (New York: Guilford Press, 2007), 236.
- ¹²² Wendy Larner, "Neoliberalism?" *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 21, no. 5 (October 2003): 509.
- ¹²³ Colin Hay, "Re-Stating Politics, Re-Politicising the State: Neo-liberalism, Economic Imperatives and the Rise of the Competitive State," *The Political Quarterly* 75, no. s1 (August 2004): 47.
- ¹²⁴ Neil Smith, "Geography, Difference and the Politics of Scale," in *Postmodernism and the Social Sciences*, eds. Joe Doherty, Elspeth Graham, and Mo Malek (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 72-76.
- ¹²⁵ William H. Sewell, Jr., "Space in Contentious Politics," in *Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics*, ed. Ronald R. Aminzade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 56.
- ¹²⁶ See, for example, the arguments put forward in David McNally, *Bodies of Meaning: Studies on Labor, Language, and Liberation* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001).

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- ¹²⁷ Anne Haila, "The Neglected Builder of Global Cities," in *Cities in Transformation – Transformation in Cities: Social and Symbolic Change of Urban Space*, eds. O. Källorp, I. Elander, O. Ericsson, and M. Franzén (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997).
- ¹²⁸ David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 171.
- ¹²⁹ Erik Swyngedouw, "Neither Global nor Local: 'Glocalization' and the Politics of Scale," in *Spaces of Globalization: Reasserting the Power of the Local*, ed. Kevin R. Cox (New York: Guilford Press, 1997), 140.
- ¹³⁰ Swyngedouw, "Reconfiguring Citizenship, the Re-scaling of the State and the New Authoritarianism: Closing the Belgian Mines," 1504.
- ¹³¹ Bob Jessop, "The Entrepreneurial City: Re-imagining Localities, Redesigning Economic Governance, or Restructuring Capital?" in *Transforming Cities: Contested Governance and New Spatial Divisions*, eds. Nick Jewson and Susanne MacGregor (London: Routledge, 1997), 29-32.
- ¹³² Lipietz, *Mirages and Miracles: The Crises of Global Fordism*, 14-15.
- ¹³³ The classic but still influential piece which sees "capital" as the culprit for restructuring built environments without considering that capital is shattered into many fractions with highly diverged interests is Neil Smith, "Toward a Theory of Gentrification: A Back to the City Movement by Capital, not People," *Journal of the American Planning Association* 45, no. 4 (October 1979).
- ¹³⁴ M. Gottdiener, *The Social Production of Urban Space*, 2d edition (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1994), 223.
- ¹³⁵ Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society: An Analysis of the Western System of Power* (New York: Basic Books, 1969), 171-173, 175.
- ¹³⁶ Jessop, "The Entrepreneurial City: Re-imagining Localities, Redesigning Economic Governance, or Restructuring Capital?" 39.
- ¹³⁷ Erik Swyngedouw, "Globalisation or 'Glocalisation'? Networks, Territories and Rescaling," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 17, no. 1 (April 2004): 34.
- ¹³⁸ Aram Eisenschitz and Jamie Gough, *The Politics of Local Economic Policy: The Problems and Possibilities of Local Initiative* (London: Macmillan, 1993), 143.
- ¹³⁹ David Delaney and Helga Leitner, "The Political Construction of Scale," *Political Geography* 16, no. 2 (February 1997): 94-95.
- ¹⁴⁰ Glyn, Hughes, Lipietz, and Singh point out that a full political assault had to be mounted against the Golden Age's arrangements if it was ever to be gotten rid of. See Andrew Glyn, Alan Hughes, Alain Lipietz, and Ajit Singh, "The Rise and Fall of the Golden Age," in *The Golden Age of Capitalism: Reinterpreting the Postwar Experience*, eds. Stephen A. Marglin and Juliet B. Schor (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 115-116.
- ¹⁴¹ Bob Jessop, "Liberalism, Neoliberalism, and Urban Governance: A State-Theoretical Perspective," *Antipode* 34, no. 3 (July 2002): 461-464.
- ¹⁴² A.A. den Otter, *The Philosophy of Railways: The Transcontinental Railway Idea in British North America* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 200-201. Also see Patricia K. Wood, "Defining

"Canadian": Anti-Americanism and Identity in Sir John A. Macdonald's Nationalism," *Journal of Canadian Studies* 36, no. 2 (Summer 2001).

¹⁴³ Michael Bliss, *Northern Enterprise: Five Centuries of Canadian Business* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987), 109, 215-216.

¹⁴⁴ Andrew Smith, *British Businessmen and Canadian Confederation: Constitution-Making in an Era of Anglo-Globalization* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008), 134. For an elaboration on the cringing debt situation of the Grand Trunk Railway, see Ann M. Carlos and Frank D. Lewis, "The Creative Financing of an Unprofitable Enterprise: The Grand Trunk Railway of Canada, 1853-1881," *Explorations in Economic History* 32, no. 3 (July 1995). On the fiscal calamity of coming to terms with the age of steel and coal, see A.W. Currie, *The Grand Trunk Railway of Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), 118-122.

¹⁴⁵ Vernon C. Fowke, *The National Policy and the Wheat Economy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957), 4.

¹⁴⁶ W.T. Easterbrook and Hugh G.J. Aitken, *Canadian Economic History* (Toronto: Macmillan Company of Canada, 1956), 367.

¹⁴⁷ Michael Hart, *A Trading Nation: Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002), 57.

¹⁴⁸ Hart, *A Trading Nation: Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization*, 66-67.

¹⁴⁹ Indeed, Canada was entirely founded as a reaction to the USA. The preference had always been to avoid the liberalism that so strongly took root and triggered the American Revolution of 1776. Preserving Britishness meant rejecting liberalism and accepting the kinds of political conservatism associated with Edmund Burke.

¹⁵⁰ John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, *Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy* (London: Routledge, 1995), 31-32.

¹⁵¹ Lance E. Davis and Robert A. Huttenback, *Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of British Imperialism, 1860-1912* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 43.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 43, 56.

¹⁵³ Mike Davis, *Prisoners of the American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History of the U.S. Working Class* (London: Verso, 1986), 12.

¹⁵⁴ Bliss, *Northern Enterprise: Five Centuries of Canadian Business*, 252.

¹⁵⁵ R.T. Naylor, *The History of Canadian Business 1867-1914*, vol. 1, *The Banks and Finance Capital* (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1975), 35-57.

¹⁵⁶ On the first two points, see T.W. Acheson, "The National Policy and the Industrialization of the Maritimes, 1880-1910," *Acadiensis* 1, no. 2 (Spring 1972) and Daniel Glenday, "Rich but Semiperipheral: Canada's Ambiguous Position in the World-Economy," *Review* 12, no. 2 (Spring 1989). On the last point, see Philip Resnick, "From Semiperiphery to Perimeter of the Core: Canada's Place in the Capitalist World-Economy," *Review* 12, no. 2 (Spring 1989), Wallace Clement, *Continental Corporate Power: Economic Elite Linkages between Canada and the United States* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), and Kari Levitt, *Silent Surrender: The Multinational Corporation in Canada* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1970). It should be noted that works like Levitt's and Clement's tend to have an air of disdain for the American presence in Canada. The same cannot be said of other countries' capitalists. This keeps in lockstep with

the historical theme of anti-Americanism present in discussions by Left as well as Right Canadian nationalists.

¹⁵⁷ Glen Williams, "The National Policy Tariffs: Industrial Underdevelopment Through Import Substitution," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 12, no. 2 (June 1979): 336.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 347.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 352-354.

¹⁶⁰ David Coates, *Models of Capitalism: Growth and Stagnation in the Modern Era* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 141.

¹⁶¹ On the Canadian state's relaxed approach to industrial policy, see Michael M. Atkinson and William D. Coleman, *The State, Business, and Industrial Change in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989).

¹⁶² Glen Williams, *Not for Export: The International Competitiveness of Canadian Manufacturing*, 3d edition (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1994), 46.

¹⁶³ Neo-classical economics, of course, will see this as a process whereby all spaces, places, and scales will benefit. In this sense, and to put a twist on the famous line from George Orwell's *Animal Farm*, all spaces are equal but some are more equal than others.

¹⁶⁴ Jim Simmons and Larry McCann, "The Canadian Urban System: Growth and Transition," in *Canadian Cities in Transition: Local Through Global Perspectives*, 3d edition, eds. Trudi Bunting and Pierre Filion (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2006), 41.

¹⁶⁵ Rianne Mahon, "The "New" Canadian Political Economy Revisited: Production, Space, Identity," in *Production, Space, Identity: Political Economy Faces the 21st Century*, eds. Jane Jenson, Rianne Mahon, and Manfred Bienefeld (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 1993).

¹⁶⁶ Easterbrook and Aitken, *Canadian Economic History*, 428-430.

¹⁶⁷ den Otter, *The Philosophy of Railways: The Transcontinental Railway Idea in British North America*, 164.

¹⁶⁸ Currie, *The Grand Trunk Railway of Canada*, 220-298.

¹⁶⁹ Wallace Clement, *The Canadian Corporate Elite: An Analysis of Economic Power* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), 62-71.

¹⁷⁰ John A. Eagle, *The Canadian Pacific Railway and the Development of Western Canada, 1896-1914* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1989), 212-231.

¹⁷¹ J.M.S. Careless, *Frontier and Metropolis: Regions, Cities, and Identities in Canada before 1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 91.

¹⁷² Michael J. Piva, *The Borrowing Process: Public Finance in the Province of Canada, 1840-1867* (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1992), 94-95.

¹⁷³ den Otter, *The Philosophy of Railways: The Transcontinental Railway Idea in British North America*, 160.

¹⁷⁴ Davis and Huttenback, *Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of British Imperialism, 1860-1912*, 43, 47.

¹⁷⁵ M.C. Urquhart, "New Estimates of Gross National Product, Canada, 1870-1926: Some Implications for Canadian Development," in *Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth*, eds. Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 35.

¹⁷⁶ Paul Craven and Tom Traves, "Canadian Railways as Manufacturers, 1850-1880," in *Perspectives on Canadian Economic History*, ed. Douglas McCalla (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1987); Alan G. Green, "Growth and Productivity Change in the Canadian Railway Sector, 1871-1926," in *Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth*, eds. Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).

¹⁷⁷ Jane Errington, *The Lion, the Eagle, and Upper Canada: A Developing Colonial Ideology* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987), 180.

¹⁷⁸ Douglas McCalla, *Planting the Province: The Economic History of Upper Canada, 1784-1870* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 232.

¹⁷⁹ S.J.R. Noel, *Patrons, Clients, Brokers: Ontario Society and Politics, 1791-1896* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 27.

¹⁸⁰ Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh, *The Political Economy of Canada: An Introduction* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1992), 160-163, 170-172.

¹⁸¹ Melville H. Watkins, "A Staple Theory of Economic Growth," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 29, no. 2 (May 1963); Acheson, "The National Policy and the Industrialization of the Maritimes, 1880-1910."

¹⁸² Donald V. Smiley, "Territorialism and Canadian Political Institutions," *Canadian Public Policy* 3, no. 4 (Autumn 1977).

¹⁸³ Donald Swainson, "Ontario on the Rise," in *Readings in Canadian History*, vol. 2, *Post-Confederation*, 3d edition, eds. R. Douglas Francis and Donald B. Smith (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada, 1990), 156.

¹⁸⁴ Garth Stevenson, *Ex Uno Plures: Federal-Provincial Relations in Canada, 1867-1896* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), 50.

¹⁸⁵ John McCallum, *Unequal Beginnings: Agriculture and Economic Development in Quebec and Ontario until 1870* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 53.

¹⁸⁶ Naylor, *The History of Canadian Business 1867-1914*, vol. 1, *The Banks and Finance Capital*, 6.

¹⁸⁷ Above all, see the principal article of Alan C. Cairns, "The Judicial Committee and Its Critics," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 4, no.3 (September 1971).

¹⁸⁸ Robin Neill, "The Politics and Economics of Development in Ontario," *Ontario History* 70, no. 4 (December 1978): 282-283.

¹⁸⁹ J.E. Hodgetts, *From Arm's Length to Hands-On: The Formative Years of Ontario's Public Service, 1867-1940* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 93-94.

¹⁹⁰ Christopher Armstrong and H.V. Nelles, "Private Property in Peril: Ontario Businessmen and the Federal System, 1898-1911," *Business History Review* 47, no. 2 (Summer 1973): 175.

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- ¹⁹² H.V. Nelles, *The Politics of Development: Forests, Mines and Hydro-Electric Power in Ontario, 1849-1941* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1974), 53-55.
- ¹⁹³ *Ibid*, 118-119.
- ¹⁹⁴ Gregory S. Kealey and Bryan D. Palmer, *Dreaming of What Might Be: The Knights of Labor in Ontario, 1880-1900* (Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1987), 36-44.
- ¹⁹⁵ Kenneth Norrie, Douglas Owram, and J.C. Herbert Emery, *A History of the Canadian Economy*, 3d edition (Toronto: Thomson Nelson, 2002), 298-299.
- ¹⁹⁶ Currie, *The Grand Trunk Railway of Canada*, 278-280.
- ¹⁹⁷ Norrie, Owram, and Emery, *A History of the Canadian Economy*, 232-233.
- ¹⁹⁸ D.G. Paterson, *British Direct Investment in Canada, 1890-1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), 51, 53-54.
- ¹⁹⁹ Craig Heron, "Factory Workers," in *Labouring Lives: Work and Workers in Nineteenth-Century Ontario*, ed. Paul Craven (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 487, 494.
- ²⁰⁰ Norrie, Owram, and Emery, *A History of the Canadian Economy*, 272.
- ²⁰¹ Bliss, *Northern Enterprise: Five Centuries of Canadian Business*, 244.
- ²⁰² Janine Brodie, *The Political Economy of Canadian Regionalism* (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Canada, 1990), 101.
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- ²⁰⁴ Christopher Armstrong, "The Mowat Heritage in Federal-Provincial Relations," in *Oliver Mowat's Ontario*, ed. Donald Swainson (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1972), 95.
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²⁴⁹ Ibid, 29.

²⁵⁰ Michael Goldrick and H. Roy Merrens, "Waterfront Changes and Institutional Stasis: The Role of the Harbour Commission, 1911-1989," in *Port Cities in Context: The Impact of Waterfront Regeneration*, ed. B.S. Hoyle (Southampton: Transport Geography Study Group, Institute of British Geographers, 1990), 131-132. Goldrick and Merrens go on to describe how this resulted in embarrassing the Board of Trade since parklands were a key component of gaining the Toronto electorate's support for the THC in the 1911 referendum. As a result, the Board of Trade became disinterested in supporting the THC publicly.

²⁵¹ The THC document announcing this is Toronto Harbour Commissioners, *A District Created for Manufacturers* (Toronto: Toronto Harbour Commissioners, 1915).

²⁵² James Lemon, *The Toronto Harbour Plan of 1912: Manufacturing Goals and Economic Realities* (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1990), 20-21.

²⁵³ Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, *Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations*, Book I, *Canada: 1867-1939* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1940).

²⁵⁴ Ibid, 187-188.

²⁵⁵ Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, *Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations*, Book II, *Recommendations* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1940).

²⁵⁶ Doug Owsam, *The Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and the State 1900-1945* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 223.

²⁵⁷ Richard Simeon, *Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 23.

²⁵⁸ W.A. Mackintosh, "The White Paper on Employment and Income in Its 1945 Setting," in *Canadian Economic Policy Since the War*, ed. S.F. Kaliski (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1965), 19-21.

²⁵⁹ Donald V. Smiley, *Canada in Question: Federalism in the Eighties*, 3d edition (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980), 173.

²⁶⁰ Keith G. Banting, *The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism*, 2d edition (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1987), ch. 7.

²⁶¹ P.E. Bryden, *Planners and Politicians: Liberal Politics and Social Policy, 1957-1968* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), 139-140.

²⁶² Rianne Mahon, "The Never-Ending Story: The Struggle for Universal Child Care Policy in the 1970s," *Canadian Historical Review* 81, no. 4 (December 2000): 597.

²⁶³ See Donald V. Smiley, *The Federal Condition in Canada* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1987), 177. Here, Smiley points out that Macdonald's conception of Canada was embodied in the National Policy to deal with the burdens of national unity: create French-English amity, stimulate a national market, and realize a national state *contra* the USA. Becoming "American" had been the least of Canadians' and Ottawa's worries. There was no national market during the Depression because of unemployment. French-English amity fell by the wayside. Besides, English-English amity could not even be accomplished! Pronounced regionalism was the cause here.

²⁶⁴ Robert Skidelsky, *Keynes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 109.

²⁶⁵ Robert Skidelsky, "The Decline of Keynesian Politics," in *State and Economy in Contemporary Capitalism*, ed. Colin Crouch (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 63.

²⁶⁶ Reginald Whitaker, *The Government Party: Organizing and Financing the Liberal Party of Canada, 1930-58* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), 143-152. To further add to this, elitism had been endemic in the federal bureaucracy – and I would argue that the case still holds today – for appointments depended on having attended Ivy League or Oxbridge schools. Cliquishness was present. On this matter, see J.L. Granatstein, *The Ottawa Men: The Civil Service Mandarins, 1935-1957* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1982).

²⁶⁷ Richard Simeon and Ian Robinson, *State, Society, and the Development of Canadian Federalism* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 193-194.

²⁶⁸ David A. Wolfe, "The Rise and Demise of the Keynesian Era in Canada: Economic Policy, 1930-1982," in *Modern Canada 1930-1980's*, eds. Michael S. Cross and Gregory S. Kealey (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1984), 48.

²⁶⁹ Michael Hart, *Fifty Years of Canadian Tradecraft: Canada at the GATT, 1947-1997* (Ottawa: Centre for Trade Policy and Law, 1998), 9-10.

²⁷⁰ John Agnew, "Globalization Has a Home Address: The Geopolitics of Globalization," in *Globalization's Contradictions: Geographies of Discipline, Destruction and Transformation*, eds. Dennis Conway and Nik Heynen (London: Routledge, 2006), 132-134. For a nuanced, liberal perspective on the development of American power, see John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982). On the spread of American production techniques through the Marshall Plan exercise, see Mark Rupert, *Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). On the political outcomes seeded by the post-war ideological consensus amongst capitalist democracies that led to "the Western state" as a distinct centre of global power, see Martin Shaw, "The State of Globalization: Towards a Theory of State Transformation," *Review of International Political Economy* 4, no. 3 (Autumn 1997).

²⁷¹ Hart, *A Trading Nation: Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization*, 198.

²⁷² Hart, *Fifty Years of Canadian Tradecraft: Canada at the GATT, 1947-1997*, 9-10. Old habits, of course, die hard. Close to fifteen years after World War II ended, Canadian governments tripped over themselves to maintain ties that London really did not want. Sadder still, appeals to empire held strong. The starkest example is Prime Minister John Diefenbaker who, like a spurned lover unable to understand why the other party would not return, doggedly – and one might even say embarrassingly – pursued London's favour. On this, see J.L. Granatstein, *Canada 1957-1967: The Years of Uncertainty and Innovation* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986), 45-55.

²⁷³ Lawrence Aronsen, "From World War to Cold War: Cooperation and Competition in the North Atlantic Triangle, 1945-1949," in *The North Atlantic Triangle in a Changing World: Anglo-American-Canadian Relations, 1902-1956*, eds. B.J.C. McKerder and Lawrence Aronsen (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996); Andrew Cohen, *While Canada Slept: How We Lost Our Place in the World* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2003), ch.1.

²⁷⁴ Eric Helleiner, *States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), chs. 2-3.

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- ²⁷⁵ Dimitry Anastakis, "Multilateralism, Nationalism, and Bilateral Free Trade: Competing Visions of Canadian Economic and Trade Policy, 1945-1970," in *Creating Postwar Canada: Community, Diversity, and Dissent, 1945-75*, eds. Magda Fahrni and Robert Rutherford (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 146.
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- ²⁷⁷ Martin Shaw, *Dialectics of War: An Essay in the Social Theory of Total War and Peace* (London: Pluto Press, 1988), 89.
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- ²⁷⁹ Matthew J. Bellamy, *Profiting the Crown: Canada's Polymer Corporation, 1942-1990* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005).
- ²⁸⁰ J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975), ch. 5.
- ²⁸¹ The best statement on this matter can be found in Jill Vickers, "Why Should Women Care About Federalism?" in *Canada: The State of the Federation 1994*, eds. Douglas M. Brown and Janet Hiebert (Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 1994).
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- ²⁸³ Pierre Hamel and Lizette Jalbert, "Local Power in Canada: Stakes and Challenges in the Restructuring of the State," in *State Restructuring and Local Power: A Comparative Perspective*, eds. Chris Pickvance and Edmond Preteceille (London: Pinter, 1991), 176-179. On cities providing social provisions before the Keynesian-Fordist paradigm, see the case study of Montreal provided by Michèle Dagenais, "A Model for the Emerging Welfare State? Municipal Management in Montreal During the 1930s," in *Municipal Services and Employees in the Modern City: New Historic Approaches*, eds. Michèle Dagenais, Irene Maver, and Pierre-Yves Saunier (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003).
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- ²⁸⁸ Armstrong, *The Politics of Federalism: Ontario's Relations with the Federal Government, 1867-1942*, 212-227.
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- ²⁹¹ Robert M. Campbell, *Grand Illusions: The Politics of the Keynesian Experience in Canada, 1945-1975* (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 1987), 16-17.
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- ⁴⁰⁷ Brownsey and Howlett, "Ontario: Class Structure and Political Alliances in an Industrialized Society," 159.
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⁵⁰⁷ Timothy Lewis, *In the Long Run We're All Dead: The Canadian Turn to Fiscal Restraint* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003), 150-152.

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⁶⁵³ Personal interview, Telesat, November 24, 2006. The Telesat representative had pointed out that TEDCO was not forthcoming with their plans in that section of the Port Lands. Only a visit to TEDCO's offices enabled negotiations to proceed because a Telesat representative noticed a model of the area sitting on a table.

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⁶⁶⁸ Personal interview, Gooderham and Worts Neighbourhood Association, October 4, 2006.

⁶⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁰ For example, Waterfront Action's members include Community AIR and Port Lands Action Committee. The former focuses on protecting the waterfront from "inappropriate uses," contending that the Toronto Port Authority's Toronto City Centre Airport hampers waterfront redevelopment. The latter steers its attention to matters related to the development of the Port Lands section of the waterfront.

⁶⁷¹ Personal interview, Waterfront Action, August 31, 2006. Although the race's location was far from the TWRC's mandated jurisdiction, it was part of the original and much more ambitious redevelopment zone encompassing the TWRC's public space framework.

⁶⁷² Personal interview, Toronto Islands Community Association, November 24, 2006.

⁶⁷³ Peter Newman and Andy Thornley, *Planning World Cities: Globalization and Urban Politics* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 95-99.

⁶⁷⁴ Lehrer and Laidley, "Old Mega-Projects Newly Packaged? Waterfront Redevelopment in Toronto," 796.

⁶⁷⁵ Personal interview, West Don Lands Committee, August 22, 2006.

⁶⁷⁶ Desfor, Keil, Kipfer, and Wekerle, "From Surf to Turf: No Limits to Growth in Toronto?" 150-151.

⁶⁷⁷ Joanne Wolfson and Frances Frisken, "Local Responses to the Global Challenge: Comparing Local Economic Development Policies in a Regional Context," *Journal of Urban Affairs* 22, no. 4 (Winter 2000): 373.

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⁶⁷⁹ John Sewell, "Helping the Public to Participate in Planning," in *Citizen Engagement: Lessons in Participation from Local Government*, eds. Katherine A. Graham and Susan D. Phillips (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1998), 82-83.

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⁶⁹³ Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation, *East Bayfront Precinct Plan* (Toronto: Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation, 2006), 19; Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation, *West Don Lands Precinct Plan* (Toronto: Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation, 2006), 31.

⁶⁹⁴ Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation, *Port Lands Implementation Strategy: Proposed Final Draft 7.0*.

⁶⁹⁵ Tom Slater, "The Eviction of Critical Perspectives from Gentrification Research," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 30, no. 4 (December 2006): 751.

⁶⁹⁶ Personal interview, West Don Lands Committee, August 22, 2006.

⁶⁹⁷ Personal interview, Gooderham and Worts Neighbourhood Association, October 4, 2006.

⁶⁹⁸ Personal interview, Labourers International Union of North America 183, October 2, 2007.

⁶⁹⁹ Gene Desfor and Roger Keil, "Every River Tells a Story: The Don River (Toronto) and the Los Angeles River (Los Angeles) as Articulating Landscapes," *Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning* 2, no. 2 (2000).

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⁷⁰⁷ Personal interview, West Don Lands Committee, August 22, 2006.

⁷⁰⁸ Personal interview, Waterfront Action, August 31, 2006.

⁷⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁷¹⁰ Nico Calavita and Amador Ferrer, "Behind Barcelona's Success Story: Citizens Movements and Planners' Power," *Journal of Urban History* 26, no. 6 (September 2000); Han Meyer, *City and Port: Urban Planning as a Cultural Venture in London, Barcelona, New York, and Rotterdam* (Utrecht: International Books, 1999), 131-173; Donald McNeill, "Barcelona as Imagined Community: Pasqual Maragall's Spaces of Engagement," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 26, no. 2 (2001).

⁷¹¹ Donald McNeill, *Urban Change and the European Left: Tales from Barcelona* (London: Routledge, 1999), 145-146.

⁷¹² Donald L. Gutstein, "Vancouver," in *City Politics in Canada*, eds. Warren Magnusson and Andrew Sancton (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983); but compare Kris Olds, *Globalization and Urban Change: Capital, Culture, and Pacific Rim Mega-Projects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) with John Punter, *The Vancouver Achievement: Urban Planning and Design* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2003). Punter's *The Vancouver Achievement* takes a more accepted view of waterfront projects. He pins the internationalization of Vancouver on Expo '86 which was sited on the False Creek section of Vancouver's waterfront (p. 192). Kris Olds's more critical analysis accepts this perspective, but he situates it in a short-term time horizon. Moreover, Olds notes capital flowing into Vancouver predominantly originated in the Pacific Rim rather than from all over the world, thus making its internationalization much more limited in spatial scope. He writes, "Expo '86 took place at a time when immigration flows between Vancouver and Hong Kong were just about to increase at an historically unprecedented rate, primarily because of changes in federal government immigration regulations in association with strengthening fears about the 1997 transfer to China, and the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. While Expo '86 did manage to focus the attention of some investors on Vancouver for a period of time, broader processes of change were the primary factors underlying flows of capital and people from Hong Kong to the city" (p. 106).

⁷¹³ Personal interview, Gooderham and Worts Neighbourhood Association, October 4, 2006.

⁷¹⁴ Ibid; Personal interview, West Don Lands Committee, August 22, 2006.

⁷¹⁵ Personal interview, TEDCO, October 7, 2005. This did not prevent TEDCO from evicting Cinespace Film Studios in the East Bayfront in January 2007, creating a shortage of film space in Toronto.

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⁷¹⁷ Claus Offe, "Fifty Years After the 'Great Transformation': Reflection on Social Order and Political Agency," in *The Changing Nature of Democracy*, eds. Takashi Inoguchi, Edward Newman, and John Keane (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1998), 39.

⁷¹⁸ John Engeland, Roger Lewis, Steven Ehrlich, and Janet Che, *Evolving Housing Conditions in Canada's Census Metropolitan Areas, 1991-2001* (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2005), 70.

⁷¹⁹ David Ley and Heather Frost, "The Inner City," in *Canadian Cities in Transition: Local Through Global Perspectives*, 3d edition, eds. Trudi Bunting and Pierre Filion (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2006), 199.

⁷²⁰ Personal interview, South Riverdale Community Health Centre, October 11, 2006.

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⁷²⁵ David Harvey, "The Political Economy of Public Space," in *The Politics of Public Space*, eds. Setha Low and Neil Smith (London: Routledge, 2006).

⁷²⁶ Ira Katznelson, *City Trenches: Urban Politics and the Patterning of Class in the United States* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981), 194-209.

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⁷²⁹ Transport Canada, *Straight Ahead: A Vision for Transportation in Canada* (Ottawa: Transport Canada, 2003), 57-66.

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Interviewee List

Cherry Beach Sound, October 3, 2006.

CIMCO, November 24, 2006.

Eastern Marine Systems, October 11, 2006.

Ex-RCFTW, February 22, 2006.

Gooderham and Worts Neighbourhood Association, October 4, 2006.

Harbourfront, August 31, 2005.

Labourers International Union of North America 183, February 10, 2007.

Metronome Corporation, October 11, 2006.

Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal, September 8, 2005.

Office of the federal riding of Toronto Centre, March 20, 2007.

Ontario Realty Corporation, August 30, 2005.

PS Productions, November 22, 2006.

South Riverdale Community Health Centre, October 11, 2006.

South Riverdale Environmental Liaison Committee, December 21, 2006.

Telesat, November 24, 2006.

Toronto Economic Development Corporation, October 7, 2005.

Toronto Island Community Association, November 24, 2006

Toronto and Region Conservation Authority, August 28, 2006.

Toronto Transit Commission, January 27, 2007.

Toronto Waterfront Reference Group, August 30, 2005.

Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Corporation, August 30, 2005 and December 19, 2006.

Toronto Waterfront Revitalization Initiative, November 9, 2006.

Ward 30 Office, February 19, 2007.

Ward 32 Office, January 27, 2007.

Waterfront Action, August 31, 2006.

West Don Lands Committee, August 22, 2006.

York Quay Neighbourhood Association, October 4, 2006.