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Women and the Appointment Process in Canada

by

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
in Canadian Studies

Carleton University

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ABSTRACT

The role of government in Canadian society has expanded with the centre of power having shifted from Parliament and the legislatures to executives and bureaucracies. Given this shift in power, who serves as regulators and how they are selected becomes increasingly important.

There has been a proliferation of regulatory agencies, boards, and commissions [ABC's] in Canada affording the political elites an ever increasing number of appointments to reward. Political appointments are often denounced on the grounds that they are made more on the basis of partisanship merit, as the arbitrariness surrounding the process suggests.

Males tend to be appointed regularly to ABC's. Limited representation of women on ABC's suggests the problem is regularly addressed, but no real change has occurred. Thus, women are found outside of the arenas of power and unable to determine policy. Strategies for change need to be adopted so that women may achieve greater representation on ABC's.

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Chapter 1

WOMEN AND THE GENERAL ISSUE OF APPOINTMENTS IN CANADA

Evidence suggests that employment patterns for women are changing in the 1990's and will continue to do so in the future. Women have entered the labour force in increasing numbers for more than a generation, with many entering fields and positions where women never were before. For example, the New Democratic Party's 1989 leadership convention resulted in Audrey McLaughlin's election as party leader and the first women leader of a federal political party.

Nevertheless, women appear to have very little power in the decision-making process of the federal government. Nor are women adequately represented in the House of Commons, senior executive positions in the public service or on government boards, councils, and commissions [Champagne, 1980:3]. The appointment of women to boards, commissions, councils and crown corporations is within the power of the federal government. The number of women found on agencies, councils and commissions [ABC's] is thus directly tied to the implicit and explicit desires of the government

in power.

The general issue of appointments and women are necessarily linked. To understand the process of appointing people to federal positions, gender, and its role in the selection of potential appointees needs to be addressed. In this study the under-representation of women on federally appointed agencies, boards and commissions [ABC's] will be taken as a given. Evidence documenting this problem is addressed, but the direction of this analysis is principally concerned with the process of appointments to ABC's and the strategies for change that need to be adopted to modify this process.

The specific focus of this study is the examination of the appointment process currently applied in Canada for selecting candidates to federal agencies, boards and commissions [ABC's] and the relationship between ABC appointment and gender. The main goals are 1] to isolate and clarify the assumptions and propositions central to the selection process, namely how a candidate is chosen for Canada's federally appointed agencies, boards and commissions [ABC's]; and, 2] apply that conceptualization to the overall appointment process, so

as to understand who is chosen and by extension, who is not chosen. This will, 3] help to identify salient factors, such as patronage, that are deemed essential for a candidate, those that are implied as necessary, such as merit, and finally, those that are, in fact, not of value, such as religion. In turn, this will, 4] reveal the role of gender in determining who is included and excluded in the eligibility pool and will identify the importance of elite connections to potential appointees. Furthermore, 5] strategies for change can be identified and recommendations offered for future change in this area.

The goal of this analysis is to attempt to determine who is chosen to represent the public's interests in regulation, how and why. The nature of appointments are such that there are those who appoint and those who are appointed. Those who appoint are elites who control the resources of their organizations, including in the political realm, those of entire nations. They serve as gatekeepers, distributing concrete opportunities and rewards [Chafetz, 1990]. In some cases, elites may be free to overtly use particularistic criteria, such as gender in awarding the

resources and opportunities at their command [Chafetz, 1990]. Given there are no specific guidelines established for the selection of ABC regulators, those who appoint are free to use whatever criteria they like. Chafetz [1990] argues elites will unabashedly give preference to their own kind - mainly males.

In the selection of federal regulators, two important factors are anticipated to be critical. Gender and elite connections play important roles in determining who serves as federal regulators. Power is central to the gender and elite connections. Power is the ability to act effectively on persons or things, to make or secure favourable decisions which are not of right allocated to the individual or their roles [Zimbalist Rosaldo, 1974:21]. The single most important change required to produce a system of gender equality in the political/economic sphere, where women and men are no longer regarded as superior or inferior to one another, is the equitable representation of women among society's elites.

In considering the appointment process, which is the way people are chosen for ABC appointment, we expect

that the process ensures that women are disadvantaged or handicapped, which means they are, for the most part, not chosen. When we look at the faces of those who hold positions of political power and influence in our society, we see mainly men and a small number of women. They have been able to move ahead within the patriarchal hierarchy [Hofmann Nemiroff, 1982:532]. Thus, for the most part, women are not chosen for appointment.

In not being chosen to serve on Canada's federal ABC's, women are kept out of an arena of power and influence. In being kept out of the arena of power, women are both distanced from and denied access to the opportunity to influence, direct and control social and economic behaviour. Furthermore, by being excluded the ranks of powerful regulators, women cannot determine and implement policy, and more importantly, they cannot take action leading, in the short and long run, to social change. Madam Justice Bertha Wilson, of the Supreme Court of Canada, has stated her firm conviction that increasing the number of women judges will make a difference in Canada's judicial system [Wilson, 1990]. The same could be said for more women on ABC's. When

greater in number, women are more likely to support issues important for their future. Without a continued increase in the number of women on ABC's, there is little hope for a different and better future. The men who currently hold power seem reluctant to change the status quo, that is, relinquish any power. As a result, women do not have access to political and economic power.

The power women are denied is substantial. The important decisions made by ABC's at the federal level affect the lives of all Canadians directly, through the regulatory policies they implement and enforce. Thus, the need for more women on ABC's becomes apparent. Given the wide range of areas that fall under the power of ABC's, such as the Canadian Content regulations for radio, who regulators are and why they are chosen becomes increasingly important.

In considering the process of appointment in Canada, the focus is on federal appointments to ABC's. Certainly, women's representation on boards of major corporations and as their representation in management positions in the federal government are of interest and so, will be considered, but only as they relate to women

on federally appointed boards, councils and commissions.

Few women are found on federally-appointed ABC's, which seems to indicate some qualified women are not being appointed. In order to explain the change in the level of gender inequality, we must consider the processes that contribute to changing the gender division of labour.

Chafetz [1990] argues that the efforts and opportunities for women to improve their level of equality relative to men in society, rest on increased access to resource-controlling work. Such access is, however, largely controlled by elites, who are male. Women, therefore, have only limited access to resource-generating work. As a result, women have few opportunities to enhance their status relative to men and thus remain in their disadvantaged position. The impact of their disadvantaged position is evident in the under-representation of women on ABC's. As women struggle to enhance their status, men continue to overlook them for regulatory positions. Since women form only a small part of any elected government in power, they are not able to participate in a significant way to the appointment process and therefore, cannot

change the current situation.

At varying times during the 20th century, groups of women in Canada became full citizens with political rights similar to those of men [Maille,1990:1]. It took several decades, however, before women were found in significant numbers in elected office at all levels of government. Only in the 1980's did the number of women elected to these bodies increase notably [Maille, 1990]. In several major Canadian cities, women now make up over a quarter of the municipal councils and progress has also been significant in provincial legislatures [Maille,1990]. Women are still, however, seriously under-represented in Parliament.

The obstacles contributing to women's under-representation needs to be considered. Women, today, are still emerging from a culture of exclusion from politics. They remain generally under-represented in the political arena and on ABC's and yet, women comprise more than half of the adult population in Canada. Women of various backgrounds face a legacy of exclusion. "Racial and ethnic minority women, women with disabilities, and Aboriginal women are especially under-represented. The legacy of exclusion, experienced on a

historical and cross-cultural basis, is one element that shapes and determines how women fit into today's political institutions" [Maille, 1990:3]. The legacy of exclusion is one of the obstacles women face.

There are a series of other obstacles that explain both women's under-representation in the political process, in general, and specifically women's elected under-representation. There are specific obstacles, such as the belief that women are unwilling to assume responsibilities, which prevent women from entering politics. Such obstacles can have a varying impact on different women and different types of political power. There has been an increase in the number of women elected during the 1980's, but the number of female elected representatives, except for the municipal councils of some major Canadian cities is still far below the 50% mark [Maille, 1990].

There are a number of factors contributing to this under-representation. First, political institutions were set up at a time when women were not considered citizens and they have not been modified to integrate the female point of view although women now have the right to hold office. Within the political process, the

workings of the political sphere do not make any provision for the gender roles and family responsibilities that remain at the heart of women's lives [Maille, 1990]. Women interested in federal or provincial politics find this obstacle to have a greater impact than those interested in municipal politics. For many women, entering active politics only seems possible if the constraints to private life are minimal. Similarly, political parties, which are built on principles derived from political institutions, offer a considerable challenge to women who must still face the persistent "old boys' network".

Second, potential candidates are still assessed based on certain personal characteristics. Criteria such as money, prestige, influence, education, and occupational success still come into play. Women fall behind in this respect because they are rarely part of the elite spheres which men dominate. Furthermore, studies have shown that women running for office tend to base their qualifications not on their professional experience but rather on many years of involvement in volunteer groups or political parties [Brodie, 1985]. As a result of the socio-economic conditions of the

average woman, for example, type of employment, income bracket, and type of educational qualifications, only a very small number of women fit the traditional profile of a politician [Maille, 1990].

Third, the lifestyle demands of political life, which usually involve long hours and unpredictable schedules, particularly at the federal and provincial level, are often incompatible with family responsibilities. Participation in municipal politics does not, however, encroach upon family life as much as federal politics, unless one represents a riding in the Ottawa-Hull area.

Women's participation in municipal politics tends to be higher than that in federal or provincial politics for several reasons. First, extensive travel is required to work in the federal or provincial capital and it is more of a burden for many women because of their family responsibilities. Second, the financial resources required to run for municipal office are lower and thus constitute less of an obstacle to women who generally have less access to financial networks. Third, it is possible that the kinds of issues dealt with in municipal politics interest women more than

those at other levels of politics [Maille, 1990:13-14]. As well, the specific socialization of women does little to prepare them for holding a position of political power [Brodie, 1985]. Children are socialized to accept that females are encouraged to shun political life and be wives and mothers. From a very early stage in a child's political development, the idea that only males should engage in political activity and aspire to public office is reinforced [Brodie, 1985:25]. These obstacles contribute to the under-representation of women in elected office in Canada.

In addition to the above mentioned obstacles, women also face a barrier to their political party involvement. It is the practice, conscious or unconscious, of job-tracking women away from influential political positions [Bashevkin, 1985:158]. Historically, this discriminatory treatment enabled a "pink collar" service corps, which was responsible for social, clerical, and fund-raising activities, and which had little if any role in campaign strategy or internal policy-making, to grow [Bashevkin, 1985:158]. This strategy effectively kept women away from the real sources of power and ensured they were participating in

the process, but not influencing party policy or devising party strategies. As a result, few women had the necessary experience to become more involved and they were not perceived to be on as equal ground as the male participants.

Without exception, studies of political parties find that far fewer women than men become party leaders or are identified by their fellow activists as influential within the organization [Brodie, 1985:58]. Women thus need to pressure for an equitable distribution of both the routine party work, including the pink collar assignments as well as the more challenging tasks of party policy, strategy and leadership [Bashevkin, 1985, 158]. Since women form only a small part of any elected government, they are not able to participate in a significant way in appointment process and, therefore, cannot change the current situation.

If women were found in greater numbers in elected federal governments, one of the reforms they may consider changing is the appointment process. Currently, no specific written guidelines for the appointment process to federal agencies, boards and

councils exist. The implications of this are great. Written, codified guidelines ensure that there is some kind of continuity and consistency in a process. Guidelines further ensure that all participants are working with the same loose connection of rules and expectations as to how they will be judged. Furthermore, those who appoint can operate from the same starting point, easily defining who is and is not eligible.

Without specific requirements for potential appointees, the eligibility pool is wide open. One would expect this to be an advantageous situation for women. Given the dismal number of women found on ABC's, it is not. This would suggest the open process of selection, whereby no specific requirements for ABC service are outlined, has been an unsuccessful method of selection for women seeking board membership. Changes are therefore required.

Some might suggest that changes are not required in the method of selection. It is not the method which is faulty, but that potential women appointees lack the necessary experiences and skills expected of a federal regulator, whether that be party affiliation or merit.

Perhaps time is required for the numbers of women in the eligibility pool to reach an acceptable number from which to choose. More women with varying experiences and educational backgrounds must come up the ranks before any real change can be seen. Or, perhaps, there just are not enough qualified women plain and simple. Are these valid reasons for the under-representation of women on ABC's? Women are gaining the educational prerequisites in ever increasing numbers and they are found in non-traditional jobs, in business and the professions, as well as in politics. There must be qualified women.

If, however, there really are few qualified women, this should not be a hindrance for women under our current selection process. Women would still be eligible for appointment under the current selection process, since patronage not merit is the over-riding factor. This is of course problematic because, given the specialized and complex nature of regulatory boards, it does not seem reasonable to appoint unqualified persons, regardless of how the current process selects regulators. As the current process works, all people are potentially qualified and, as such, more women

should be appointed both because they are qualified under the terms of merit and because they are qualified under the patronage selection guidelines the government uses.

Women are over-looked and they could certainly meet the non-existent qualifications. They are participating in party politics in large numbers and so, some must have the appropriate party connections to ensure their selection under the patronage selection process. And, some are chosen. But, not enough. So, if patronage rather than merit determines selection, why are so few selected? Even with merit as the over-riding method of selection, more women should be appointed because of their qualifications. Thus, something else must be at play, keeping women, except for a handful, out of the regulatory process.

Chafetz [1990] suggests the different kinds of reasons that male elites will tend to favour other males over females in distributing opportunities and rewards. In the case of ABC appointments, the power to appoint lies with the elected government. Men still constitute the majority of federal politicians and so, the selection of regulators falls within their power. If

male elites do, in fact, favour other males over females, and data seem to indicate they do since so few women are ever appointed. Change can only begin with electing more women to the federal government. It is the first step, which needs to be done in conjunction with other measures in order to foster change.

In this chapter, women and the general issue of appointments was addressed. To understand the process of appointing people to federal positions, gender, and its role in the selection of potential appointees needs to be considered. In the following chapter, the relationship between the system of female disadvantage in Canada on women and the impact this system has on the appointment process will be discussed.

Chapter Two

THE SOCIAL POSITION OF WOMEN IN CANADA

In the previous chapter, women and the general issue of appointments to federal regulatory agencies, boards and commissions was discussed. To appreciate the impact of a system of female disadvantage in Canada on women and its consequences in the appointment process in Canada, the wider social position of women in Canada needs to be examined. This will be our task in this chapter.

If women play a secondary role in society, the reluctance to change the current appointment process to one that would be more equitable to women becomes clearer. Women must strive to adopt strategies for change to ensure that the constraints they face in Canadian society can be diminished.

Women in Canadian society experience constraints and these are reflected in their experiences and opportunities in the workforce. This is a common characteristic in the employment of women the world over. There is a relatively small number of women in senior bureaucratic positions at all levels of

government - municipal, provincial and federal, in all countries [Peitchinis, 1989]. Women play a limited role in positions of power and there are many pressures reinforcing this role. In addition to, and partly the result of, being caretakers, women have also been and continue to be subordinates to men in both private and public life. Women's traditional role is in part intended to prepare them for, and is easily misshapen by, powerlessness, just as men's traditional role is in part preparation for, and quickly distorted by, the exercise of power [Ferguson, 1984]. It is necessary to consider women and work in Canadian society, as it provides us with an understanding of the relationship between women's disadvantaged position in the labour force market and their under-representation in positions of power and on ABC's.

Canadian women are in the midst of tremendous change in their work and family lives. The ever-rising number of married, employed women and the steady decline in the birth rate are signs of this revolution [Duffy, Mandell, Pupo, 1989:9]. Marriage and childbirth, for much of this century, has meant a lifelong commitment to unpaid domestic labour [Phillips and Phillips, 1983].

In 1900, the majority of Canadian women in the paid labour force were young and single, and faced job loss when married with children [Wilson, 1986]. In 1931, only 3.5 percent of all married women engaged in paid labour and even at mid-century, only 10% of married women were paid workers [Wilson, 1986:75-98, Phillips and Phillips, 1983:1-15].

In the last three decades, the traditional structures of women's lives has been almost completely reformulated. The patterns of employment for women have changed and will continue to do so in the future, with more women entering the labour force. Paid employment now increasingly dominates many women's adult lives, just as it does men's. The traditional family, with a working father and stay-at-home mother is becoming less common, with only 24% of Canadian families as traditional [Boyd, 1988:87]. Approximately 60 to 75 percent of all women between the ages of 20 and 54 are employed and most adult Canadian women earn some income from employment [Statistics Canada, 1987:87]. In 1987, approximately 57% of married women participated in the labour force [Statistics Canada, 1987:87]. Women have continued to join the labour force in increasing

numbers, with many entering fields and positions where women never were before. For the most part, however, the types of jobs women hold, their remuneration relative to men's and their opportunities for occupational mobility have not changed much. In fact, females in almost every professional field are underemployed and underpaid relative to their male counterparts [Abella, 1984].

Women's work is characterized by occupational segregation and pink-collar ghettos [Armstrong and Armstrong, 1990]. For example, more women worked as clerical or secretarial support staff in the public service in Canada in 1985 than in 1975 [Peitchinis, 1989]. This is not surprising given that in 1983, 77% of all female employees in Canada worked in one of five occupational groups: clerical [32.6%], service [18.6%], sales [10.4%], medicine and health [9.2%], and teaching [6.2%] [Wilson, 1986]. Furthermore, only 7.4% of employed women in Canada hold professional or managerial positions [Duffy, Mandell, Pupo, 1989:19].

In the public service, in 1989, only 17.1% of women were appointed to the management category, however, women accounted for 83.2% of all appointments to the

category of administrative support. The total number of executive and senior management positions held by women in the federal government is critically low [Table 2.1], particularly given that the federal government is supposed to be committed to appointing women in greater numbers [McDonald, personal interview, PCO, 1990]. Only the Privy Council Office [PCO] has approached a level of representation of women in senior positions [37%] that may be considered respectable [Peitchinis, 1989].

The federal government is the largest single employer in the country. The three levels of government - federal, provincial and municipal - and public institutions, such as schools, colleges, universities, and other educational and research institutes, hospitals, boards and commissions of all sorts, provide employment to more than one-third of the working population [Peitchinis, 1989:70]. Therefore, the public sector and public-sector-related employments can be an important catalyst in the process of change in the employment status of women in Canada [Peitchinis, 1989]. The record, however, of senior management positions in the federal bureaucracy of Canada [Table 2.1] provides little consolation for those trying to create change for

TABLE:1.1
WOMEN IN EXECUTIVE AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT POSITIONS IN
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 1986 [SELECTED DEPARTMENTS]

DEPARTMENT	TOTAL # OF POSITIONS	HELD BY MEN	%	HELD BY WOMEN	%
TREASURY BOARD	65	57	88	8	12
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION	69	53	77	16	23
PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE	77	48	63	29	37
SECRETARY OF STATE	59	44	75	15	25
EMPLOYMENT AND IMMIGRATION	200	183	91.5	17	8.5
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS	455	435	96	20	4
FINANCE	92	85	92	7	8
HEALTH AND WELFARE	143	122	85	21	15
NATIONAL REVENUE	141	135	96	6	4
TRANSPORT	255	244	96	11	4
CONSUMER AND CORPORATE AFFAIRS	75	65	87	10	13
CIDA	113	101	89	12	11
ENVIRONMENT	238	223	94	15	6
ALL DEPARTMENTS	4,351	3,954	91	397	9

SOURCE: Public Service Commission, ANNUAL REPORT, 1986.
[as quoted in Peitchinis, 1989].

advancement of women. Although there is evidence of increasing participation by women in activities at the middle levels of the decision-making process, which gives the impression of change from their long-standing predominance in secretarial and clerical activities, women seem to remain at middle management levels. As one moves higher up the administrative hierarchy, women become fewer and fewer.

The public sector has two characteristics that make for effective introduction of equality measures. Its employment administration and regulation are both centralized and the government exercises budgetary control over public-sector institutions, which therefore makes for effective enforcement of government regulations [Peitchinis, 1989:71]. Nevertheless, women executives in government are few, with most women commonly clustered at the lower and middle levels of most occupations.

In the Public Service, women held only 12.3 % of all management category positions whereas men held 87.7% of these positions in 1989. Furthermore, in the Public Service in 1987, in the \$10,000-14,999 salary group, 63.9% were women and women accounted for 0% of the

persons in the \$80,000 and over category in 1988 [constant dollars] [P.S.C., 1988]. Men, on the otherhand, hold the majority of management positions [87.7%] and highest salary ranges. As the salary range increases, so too does the number of men in higher salary ranges. From \$55,000 dollars onward, men constitute over 90% of the employees found in these ranges [Public Service Commission, Annual Reports, 1989].

In the past two decades, women have entered male-dominated occupations in increasing numbers [Peitchinis, 1989:23]. Historically, the division of labour was the result of perceptions which saw women as inferior, lacking in initiative and unable to lead or hold a position of power. These perceptions placed women and continue to keep women at a disadvantage in competition with men in the marketplace. Similarly, Messing [1987] suggests that there still seems to be a social consensus about what is a man's job and what is a woman's job. These distinctions seems to be vaguely derived from our biology, and from the different "nature" of men and women. Focusing on the structure of the labour force sheds some additional light on the issue of segregation. Employment segregation by sex appears to be a universal

characteristic of modern labour markets, although the types of jobs performed by men and women may vary across different societies. But everywhere, women typically work in low-status jobs for which they receive low pay [Wilson, 1986:118].

Similarly, females in almost every professional field are underemployed and underpaid relative to their male counterparts [Abella, 1984]. Women in elite professions are prominent in the media, depicted as models and superwomen who have it all in the present economic structure [Feree, 1987]. The number of Canadian women in the 20 highest-paid occupations quadrupled between 1971 and 1981 [Peitchinis, 1989:143]. The male-female ratios in the traditional male-dominated professions, however, remain high: physicians 5:1, dentists 11:1, architects 12:1, lawyers 6:1, university professors 3:1 [Peitchinis, 1989:Table 7.4]. Only 7.4 percent of Canadian women in the labour force hold professional and managerial positions [Duffy et al., 1989]. There is no doubt that women fail to advance in the professions as quickly as their male counterparts [Mackie, 1991]. Furthermore, although professional women unencumbered with family responsibilities tend to

be more successful, women lag behind men regardless of their marital status and presence of children [Mackie, 1991].

One important reason is the social organization of professions [Mackie, 1991]. Social control in professional life, as well as access to rewards and learning of informal norms, typically operates through a sponsorship system, an "old boys network" [Mackie, 1991]. Women professionals are often excluded from the advantages of this network which offers mentorship, access to opportunities, information and promotion.

Professional women face difficulties but, women in skilled and semi-skilled trades still have difficulty finding employment [Braid, 1982]. Moreover, the research bleakly suggests that, as women grow more numerous in a particular profession or occupation, its status declines [Touhey, 1974]. For example, coincident with women becoming the majority of the college and university graduating class, a very strong claim has been made that the standards of post-secondary institutions have deteriorated substantially. Over a period when women's participation has risen steeply, a growing clamour asserts that standards have plummeted

[Bercuson, Bothwell, and Granatstein, 1984]. Claims like this can be interpreted to imply that women's work is less valued than men's [Eichler, 1983]. It is important to note that preliminary evidence on both degree attainment and course grades suggests that women out-perform men [Guppy, Balson and Vellutini, 1986].

Despite the fact that women may out perform men, they are, nevertheless, associated with negative characteristics in the workplace. As Wilson [1986:123] argues, it is women, not occupations, that become associated with characteristics such as high turnover, high absenteeism, part-time work and low ambition. By being associated with these negative characteristics, the role of women as unreliable employees is perpetuated. The same could be true of men, but they do not, for the most part, work in low opportunity jobs - women do. Kantner [1977:159] has made a similar observation. She says that lower levels of work aspiration and commitment, observed in women, occur because their jobs carry less opportunity. Kantner argues that "men with low opportunity look more like the stereotype of women in their orientations toward work" [1977,161].

Only minimal improvements have been made because of the almost universal concentration of women into different occupational groups than those into which men have tended to concentrate. The concentration of women into different and often, less rewarding jobs, both financially and emotionally, can be explained by both discrimination and barriers that are in place to limit women.

In corporate Canada and in public enterprises, the efforts of women to reach the top are stifled by discrimination and a effective barriers to access and opportunity [Peitchinis, 1989]. Changes need to begin on many different levels. The federal government, as employer, offers a good starting point for change. However, the barriers in place make resistance to change effective.

Improvements also need to be made to the current make-up of our ABC's. It is difficult for women to gain access to ABC's because they operate largely as an "old-boys network". Like women in the professions, who are often excluded from the advantages of this network, which offers mentorship, access to opportunities, information and promotions, women interested in board

membership are also excluded from the support of this type of network.

In the case of appointments to ABC's, this activity of appointment has been predominantly and almost exclusively male. In Canada, the Prime Minister makes some appointments directly and approves others chosen by cabinet. Since Canada has always had a male Prime Minister and a predominantly male cabinet, and at the same time, had a low representation of women in both cabinet and on ABC's, women have found themselves in the unfortunate position of having to rely on men to appoint women. This is an unlikely occurrence, given that for different kinds of reasons, like maleness, elite connections and patronage, male elites will tend to favour other males over females in distributing opportunities and rewards Chafetz [1990]. Since male elites tend to favour other males over females, few women are members of regulatory boards.

Women are largely excluded from ABC's. The government has the means to adopt change through the use of Governor-in-Council appointments, which would ensure that women are well represented on boards, councils and commissions. Those who appoint also have the power to

alter or maintain the appointment process. Given that women's representation on ABC's has remained low, this would suggest that the government is interested in maintaining the appointment process as it currently operates.

As a senior official at the Privy Council Office pointed out [Personal Interview, 1990], changes to the process are however, limited by the vacancies which come available on each board as well as competing interests, such as the past and current make-up of the board, the re-appointment factor, the eligibility pool, regional representation, ethnicity, language, and minority groups. Certainly, patronage, elite connections and maleness are important factors considered in the selection of ABC regulators, given the make-up of ABC's.

The government would like to suggest that the various competing interests leave gender continuously overlooked as an important factor to consider in board composition. By this they mean "femaleness". If men account for a large number of board members on ABC's, this would suggest that maleness is taken into account by those who appoint. Maleness, it would seem, is an important factor considered in the appointment process.

Ideally, our boards, agencies, commissions and councils should reflect the make-up of our society, however, a great deal of change is still required to achieve this. Change is needed because the appointment process as it currently operates maintains few women on ABC's. The scope of regulators powers and the areas in which they regulate are broad. The regulatory policy process is the entire system of regulatory activity and with the continued concentration of women into different and often, less rewarding jobs, both financially and emotionally, few women will make it up the hierarchical pyramid to ABC appointment.

The secondary position of women in society is reinforced on many levels. Women and men inherit different contexts for actions because of male dominance in many positions of power [Allen, 1987:15]. Male, as opposed to female activities, are always recognized as predominantly important, and cultural systems give authority and value to the roles and activities of men [Zimbalist Rosaldo, 1974]. The political consequences of male dominance are such that women learn the role of the subordinate, and that role can easily become self-perpetuating [Ferguson, 1984:94]. The skills that one

learns in order to cope with the secondary status then reinforce that status. When one considers that everywhere, from those societies we might want to call most egalitarian to those in which sexual stratification is most marked, men are the locus of cultural value, it is easy to see how the secondary status of women can become self-perpetuating [Zimbalist Rosaldo, 1974:20]. Furthermore, some area of activity is always seen as exclusively or predominantly male and therefore, overwhelmingly and morally important, whether that be politics, religion or some other activity.

Related to this notion of male importance is our culture's definition of femininity. Women have largely been spectators rather than participants in public life and "the more firmly they have been integrated into the feminine role the more removed they have been from the public realm" [Ferguson, 1984:95]. Women are not powerless because they are feminine; rather, they are feminine because they are powerless, because it is a way of dealing with the requirements of subordination [Ferguson, 1984]. The feminine role presents women as more responsive and sensitive and yet, one cannot know if she is being successfully feminine unless she has a

response from another person [Ferguson, 1984:96]. Women are expected to provide support for others and offer assurance to members of a group, praise them and raise their status. Most women are well skilled in the art of pleasing others. These are not viewed as leadership qualities. The feminine role is one that requires continued recognition from males as a sign of success [Ferguson, 1984:96]. In fact, "the powerful need not please. It is subordinates who must do so- or at least it is subordinates who are blamed if they do not- and especially subordinates who live at close quarters with their superiors" [Ferguson, 1984:96]. Thus, women will not be liberated by becoming like men, but rather by abolishing the entire system that allocates human potential according to gender. If we could move away from the restraints of gender, with all of the baggage that goes with it, we could allow people to be judged on their merit and their skills, rather than their reproductive abilities, the colour of their skin or the origin of their birth.

During the 1970s and 1980s, large numbers of married women entered the labour force because they were economically compelled to do so [Mackie, 1991]. Changes

in family composition are also responsible for women entering and remaining in the labour force. A large and increasing proportion of women are not in husband-wife family relationships and as a result, women must join the labour force and they find that the employment opportunities for women have increased, particularly in the service-based industries [Mackie, 1991]. The increasing education of women enhances their labour force activity and the educational levels of women who work outside the home are higher than those of male labour force participants [Gaskall, 1988]. Women account for a large portion of the labour force. Societal attitudes have also changed. Society no longer regards negatively the participation of women in work outside the home for pay [Peitchinis, 1989:41]. Nevertheless, women still face discrimination in the labour force.

In Canada, we assume everyone has the opportunity to advance if they have the corresponding talent and ambition. Individuals are believed to create their own chances for upward mobility primarily through hard work [Wilson, 1989]. This is the basis for what I call the Equality Myth. Women and men are equal and so, any

differences in the positions of women or the number of women at a particular level or job can be explained according to time or qualifications. It may be that more time is needed for continued change to occur, while others will argue that not enough women are interested or skilled in a particular area. This may be true. In fact, once women have received professional credentials, it is relatively difficult to keep them out of the high-status occupations [Jacobs, 1988]. As Wilson [1989] suggests, to argue that women face discrimination in the labour force is not well received by those who believe women have made such obvious strides in the past. They have made great strides, however, there is no guarantee that change will continue to move in a direction that is favourable to women.

There is however, an informal social control system, which is the by-product of the lack of congruence between major social institutions, namely the educational system and the occupational structure [Jacobs, 1988]. The dramatic increase in women's labour force participation, especially on the part of more educated women, has posed a serious challenge to men's domination of well-paying jobs. As a result, whereas

education is the main basis for differentiating the occupational status levels among men in the labour force, women with relatively high levels of education have not been given the same access to high status male-dominated occupations [Jacobs,1988]. Women have made little progress in the area of engineering and this would suggest that there are obstacles which are effectively keeping women out of this educational field, as well as out of this occupational field.

The Equality Myth, however, reminds us that equality is recognized and realized. Women need to allow for time and change to occur and, in the mean time, the myth of equality tells women, they should get more job training, experience and work harder. It is true education is the key to women's further advancement but we must recognize the ways in which women are discouraged along the way. Women take the Equality Myth to be true, as it is continuously and powerfully reinforced. Women begin to believe that they are treated the same as men because they are reminded that equality has already been achieved. The reality is that women are not equal to men. In fact, for women in the workplace in Canada, there is lots of talk of equality

in the enlightened 1990's, but the reality fits the 1950's [Marotte, 1992]. For example, in a sample of 255 industrial and public organizations, women accounted for an average of only 13.4 per cent of all executive positions, even though they represented 47.7 per cent of all employees [Marotte, 1992]. Furthermore, the National Action Committee on the Status of Women presented a brief to the federal parliamentary committee describing progress as at a glacial pace [Marotte, 1992].

Achieving equality for women in the workforce is largely a matter of eliminating the still pervasive myths about women, despite the fact that the Equality Myth tells women that they have reached equality. The problem with the Equality Myth is that it leaves no room for the different treatment women face based on gender differences. There is no recognition of the fact that male, as opposed to female, activities are always recognized as predominantly important, and cultural systems give authority and value to the roles and activities of men [Zimbalist Rosaldo, 1974], because women are regularly reminded equality has been reached. The reality is that although women have made strides,

but they have not reached equality with men, as exemplified by the great deal of occupational segregation by gender among men and women with similar levels of educational attainment [Jacobs, 1988].

If some area of activity is always seen as exclusively or predominantly male [Zimbalist Rosaldo, 1974], it follows that everywhere men have some authority over women and a culturally legitimated right to her subordination and compliance. As a result, it is unlikely the current situation of few women on federally-appointed ABC's will change drastically. If men have not been inclined to appoint women in the past, and if there is little indication of the diminishing belief of the male right to women's subordination, then it follows that regardless of the progress women make, they will not be found in any real numbers in positions of power.

At the same time, of course, as Zimbalist Rosaldo [1974] suggests, women are far from helpless and whether or not their influence is acknowledged, they exert important pressures on the social life of the group. But, they do not, for the most part, specifically regulate and participate in public policy, as this is

the function of ABC regulators. By exerting pressure, they are shaping and influencing the directions that policy may take, but they do not have the power of a federal regulator to determine policy, based on loose directives from government.

Nevertheless, while authority legitimates the use of power, it does not exhaust it and so, the actual methods of giving rewards, controlling information, exerting pressure and shaping events may be available to women as well as men [Zimbalist Rosaldo, 1974:21]. The use of power, at least in a regulatory and reward-giving way will not be fully available to women until we find more women elected to the House of Commons and as members of ABC's.

The legitimated right to the subordination and compliance of women is in part related to the different context that men and women inherit. Allen [1987] states that the male context is centred on the man who ought to rule and whose actions ought to be directed towards the public sphere. The female context states that women ought to obey and women's actions ought to be directed towards the private sphere [Allen, 1987]. As Ferguson [1984] suggests, the feminine role is inherently

depoliticizing, in that it requires women to internalize an image of themselves as private rather than public beings. Furthermore, in Canadian society, women as a group tend to experience their social worlds differently than do men as a group. In their relations with parents, in the roles that are available to them both in the family and in the larger public world, in their encounters with others and in their knowledge of themselves, women's experience is institutionally and linguistically structured in a way that is different from that of men [Ferguson, 1984:23]. Regardless of the progress women have made in entering the public sphere, the different contexts of men and women still linger in the minds of many. Particularly since, women have played the role of spectator rather than participant in public life.

The dominance of men in the public sphere is exemplified by the frequency with which we find men in the positions of power of major institutions. One example is their use of the law to achieve their own goals, while insisting the law serves most people and that it is an outgrowth of a natural phenomena [Fuchs Epstein, 1988]. For example, many groups who object to

new laws granting women greater rights do so on the grounds that these laws are contrary to nature. They fail to understand that the existing laws were no more "natural", that such matters as the distribution of property rights and restrictions in marriage and divorce reflected the choices of those who devised and passed the laws to suit their benefit and beliefs [Fuchs Epstein, 1988:126]. Women were, and are kept in place by laws. To establish laws more favourable to women, women need to gain power so they will be in a position to alter the current situation and bring their own agenda to the forefront.

The strength of the "Male Context" in Canadian society, both the notion of rule and public sphere [Allen, 1987], is reflected in the reality there is no constitutional right of representation of women in the Senate, the Supreme Court and on government boards and commissions [Charter, 1981]. This is an obvious use of laws in the interest of a particular group, not most people. If laws are enacted, changed or withdrawn in keeping with the current ideology [Fuchs Epstein, 1988], the lack of a constitutional guarantee of the right of representation for women in the Senate, the Supreme

Court and on ABC's, suggests women's access and opportunities are held back by the interests of those who control the law-making process in Canada. This is the strength of the "Male Context" in Canadian society. The impact of the lack of a constitutional guarantee is apparent on our federally-appointed ABC's. Few women are found. Thus, despite the regularity with which this "problem" is addressed and recognized by government, there is no real support for change, as reflected by the current legislation in this area.

We cannot achieve the desired common goal of society, which is to move toward shared authority, whereby authority is shared by men and women in all areas of life, when women lack full recognition of their equal rights to authority. Women gain power and a sense of value when they are able to transcend domestic limits, either by entering the men's world or by creating a society unto themselves [Zimbalist Rosaldo, 1974]. It is difficult however, for women to enter the men's world or to create a society unto themselves as women's position in society reflects various constraints. They may have access to the men's world, but not necessarily the opportunity or legal backing to

demand full participation. They may not be excluded, but they certainly are not necessarily included.

In this chapter, women and the general issue of appointments in Canada was discussed. Women and work and the social position of women in Canada will be discussed in the following chapter.

Chapter 3

REGULATION AND REGULATORY TRIBUNALS

In the previous chapter, women in Canada and their place in the workforce was described. In this chapter, regulation and the regulatory policy process will be examined.

The regulatory policy process is the entire system of regulatory activity, ranging from the definition of a specified policy to its administration [including when necessary, adjudication] and continuing to its enforcement and evaluation of impact [Brown-John, 1981: 8]. The regulatory process is that set of government activities constraining or coercing individuals and enterprises irrespective of the intent and means whereby such constraint is brought into existence, administered and enforced [Brown-John, 1981:8]. Regulatory agencies, which are government bodies charged with the administration of a specified policy area [Brown-John, 1981:8], have emerged in recent years as a primary means by which governments seek to influence, direct and control social and economic behaviour [Schultz, 1984:434].

To the government, regulatory boards or the semi-independent public agencies have a number of attractive features. First, it can give the appearance of being a politically independent corporate body allowed to operate in the manner of the allegedly efficient profit maximizing private corporation [Silcox, 1973]. This structure also has the advantage of making it easier to give interested groups a partnership role in the government's work [Silcox, 1973:117]. Silcox [1973] further suggests that governments favour these types of boards because, regardless of the reality behind the form, the use of ABC's does appear to the public to depoliticize the government's role and, also, to some extent, conceal the overall expansion of its power and influence.

Regulatory agencies operate under the authority of a statute for the purpose of issuing regulations which have the effect of law. Appreciable power resides in the hands of these regulatory agencies. Some of the best-known of these federal bodies include the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission [CRTC], the National Energy Board [NEB], and the Canadian Transport Commission [CTC] [Canada Year Book,

1988:14-2]. The government retains considerable control of the ABC's activities by its decisions concerning the general size and shape of the administrative structure and also as they are created and given policy goals by the government [Silcox, 1973].

The making of regulations has become one of the major functions of government and as a result, regulatory tribunals, those agencies, boards, councils, and commissions [ABC's] that are responsible for regulating behaviour, have seen considerable growth in both their numbers and functions. The continuous growth of regulatory agencies in both their numbers and functions has resulted in a greater reliance on regulatory agencies by government as a means of developing policy in a wider range of areas. One measure of the increasing importance of regulation is its phenomenal growth. In the period between 1974 and 1984, the federal government passed more pieces of regulatory legislation than it had in the previous thirty year period [Schultz, 1984:434].

The ever-increasing number of regulatory tribunals is the result of the steady growth of government, both at the federal and provincial levels. This growth has

been one of the most distinctive and important developments in Canadian history during the twentieth century [Dwivedi, 1982:1]. As the role of all levels of government in Canadian society expands, power has shifted from Parliament and the legislatures to the executives and bureaucracies [Dwivedi, 1982:1]. This is a great deal of power for order-in-council appointees to hold, particularly since voters are under the impression that elected officials and not federally appointed regulators are directing, influencing and shaping policy.

As Dwivedi [1982] states, we now have public servants wielding substantial discretionary powers of regulation, due to the political decisions made by our elected representatives to create these delegated powers. Free from the electorate and sufficiently distanced from government, the regulators have a great deal of power. This is part of the problem with ABC's. The problem of regulation lies not with the government's need for such forms, but with the process by which the government fills these boards: it regularly overlooks women and it often chooses patronage appointees who have limited knowledge or experience in the given policy

area. This is problematic when one considers that the government relies heavily on ABC's to assist them in both the development and implementation of public policy.

Governments rely on advisory units, consisting of both advisory agencies and regulatory agencies to assist them in the development and implementation of public policy. Public policy can be defined as a course of action or inaction chosen by public authorities to address a given problem or interrelated set of problems [Pal, 1989:4]. These advisory units are publicly appointed and funded and relatively autonomous. Their relative autonomy extends to the tenure of appointees, who can only be dismissed for "just cause", to the independent research agenda, research publication and hiring. The complexity of modern government often results in authority delegated to agencies and entities charged with working out the details of governmental policy [Pal, 1989:5].

There are several reasons governments adopt this form for addressing public policy. Pal [1989] suggests that a government may need advice grounded on a wider perspective than its own internal analysts can

realistically provide. Second, a policy area may cut across departmental boundaries and thus, may be fragmented rather than coherently addressed. Finally, such an organizational form can help build consensus in public opinion or among interested groups [Pal, 1989: 79].

Schultz [1984] also offers several general explanations as to why governments increasingly turned to independent agencies. First, the type of regulation involved required specialized regulators. This is similar to Pal's notions, however, rather than just needing a wider perspective, governments also needed specialized assistance. The tasks were considered to be particularly complex, requiring technical training, expertise and continuous attention. Neither politicians, nor the public service, nor the courts were deemed capable of performing such functions.

The second major requirement was that regulation was to be impartial. Although necessary, regulation was considered to entail interference with the freedom of private economic decision makers. As a result, the goal was that it should not be affected by partisanship or favouritism and, to meet this objective, required

delegation to regulators who would be insulated from political pressures by their independence [Schultz, 1984]. This was the thinking behind establishing advisory units. Unfortunately, the role of partisanship and favouritism has come to play a significant part in the selection of ABC members and therefore, in the decisions made by ABC members regarding policy.

The three types of advisory units the government relies upon are: advisory councils, regulatory boards and agencies, royal commissions and/or task forces [Pal, 1989]. The first two are on-going institutions with a stable mandate, the latter two are appointed for a specific investigation for a limited period. In the case of the royal commissions and the Commissions' Reports, all of the findings and research are made available to the public by law. In the case of task force findings, they are not made public. "This effectively removes task force findings and recommendations from public discourse, except in the case of 'leaked' reports [McFarlane, 1992]". Our area of interest, however, covers the first two quasi-government policy advisory groups. The manner in which each of the organizational types fulfills its functions

varies. Some hold public hearings, while others publish their research to stimulate public debate.

Public policies are issued by authorities which wield coercive power, or legitimate authority over private behaviour [Pal, 1989]. Not all government agencies have this general rule-making power or responsibility. Commercial state enterprises such as Petro Canada, implement public policy, but can not make rules which other actors in their policy field must obey [Pal, 1989]. Petro Canada cannot, for example, make policies which its competitors must follow. The National Energy Board would be responsible for policies in this area.

To understand the impact appointees can have, it is first necessary to understand the powers that regulatory agencies have. The first and the original power is an adjudicative power. ABC's have the power to judge specific cases involving the granting, denial or removal of licences, the approving of rates or fares and the censuring of failure to comply with terms of licences. Secondly, an agency may have legislative powers which enable it to formulate general rules or regulations applicable to classes or categories subject to the

agency's regulatory authority. Finally, an agency may be empowered to administer governmental programs involving subsidies or research grants.

Previously, regulation was used to police or prohibit particular forms of behaviour or promote or create an environment within which an activity could flourish [Schultz, 1990]. Regulation is still used for these purposes, but it is joined and often superseded by a planning function whereby regulation is used to direct private activities toward the attainment of publicly established social and economic objectives [Schultz, 1980]. The added functions that ABC's have gained makes the need for more women participating as members all the more critical. Because of the change in the role of regulation, as well as its' growth, the politics of regulation and specifically the appointment process needs to be changed, as the public is currently not well served by the process.

Regulation imposes restrictions on the behaviour of individuals, yet it is imposed in the name of the individual citizen and collectively, "the Public". From this perspective, the public has a right, if not a duty, to participate in the process of regulation [Kane, 1980:

1]. The public needs to participate to make known their views and wishes to the regulators on what behaviour should be restricted, how and why. One of the most important issues confronting the regulatory process is establishing a more reasonable balance, so that all relevant interests are effectively represented [Kane,1980:14]. One way to encourage a more reasonable balance on ABC's is to establish a more balanced gender composition of members. Although gender may not guarantee a different outlook necessarily, it is not until we find more women on a variety of boards, that this can be determined. All relevant interests need to be represented, since the government relies so heavily on regulatory agencies to affect the public's behaviour.

Regulatory agencies enjoy a relative autonomy from the governments that create them. This allows those operating within the regulatory policy process a considerable amount of room to direct and determine the outcome of policy in a given area. The autonomy of ABC's is, for several reasons, considered to be beneficial to policy making, but it also provides ABC members with considerable power. The Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission

[CRTC] offers a good example of the latitude members have in determining policy from the broad goals set out by the government.

The CRTC was established in 1968 to implement the broad goals enunciated in the Broadcasting Act [CRTC, Annual Report, 1988] which were to foster Canadian content on radio and television, and to manage the allocation of broadcasting licences, since at the time the over-air broadcasting spectrum allowed only a limited number of frequencies. These goals were intended to ensure that Canadians received balanced, acceptable programming which reflected Canadian values and Canadian themes. The CRTC then determined how these goals would be carried out. Limits were placed on the proportion of foreign programming, the number of advertising minutes in an hour of broadcasting, and the advertisement of spirituous liquors was absolutely prohibited [Broadcasting Act, 1968]. These regulations and others administered by the CRTC represent the specific means whereby policy is implemented. They are the details which make sense of the general formulae of policy statements issued by ministers. Given the general nature of the policy statements issued by

ministers, a great deal of latitude exists for members in creating the specific policies and so, who they are and the experience they bring to the board becomes increasing important.

Ministers issue general statements on policy which are then taken by regulatory agencies and adapted into specific policy. The task of the board is to use its specialist knowledge to run the day-to-day activities in an efficient manner and to make decisions within the general policies laid down by the minister, with the public interest in mind and without reference to any political considerations [Silcox, 1973:120]. Political considerations are, however, a reality. Marjory LeBreton, chief of appointments under the Mulroney government states that "we would be encumbered by naming to agencies, boards and commissions people who do not support us" [Kennedy, 1990]. Thus, the suggestion that public interest outweighs political considerations is hopeful. To protect the public interest, the minister concerned has the responsibility to lay down publicly the general role the government envisages for the agency and thus, the general line of policy it must follow.

The government outlines the general line of policy, which results in an increasing amount of authority given to appointed persons who are able to determine policy relatively autonomously from government. Given the power members wield and the level of autonomy from the government under which they operate, who serves as regulators and the manner in which they are selected becomes more important, particularly when the make-up of any random board is considered and few women are found to be participating in determining policy in Canada. Furthermore, as elected representatives are responsible for creating delegated powers to ABC's, they are also involved in the selection of appointed regulators. Women are greatly un-represented in the House of Commons and so, it should come as little surprise that few women are appointed to ABC's.

The government uses regulatory tribunals to direct or control economic and social behaviour and offers them relative autonomy from the government [Schultz,1984]. As there has been a shift of power from Parliament and legislatures to the bureaucracies and executives, who serves as regulators, as well as the manner in which regulators are selected becomes important, particularly

since these choices have an impact on regulation. The current appointment process for ABC's ensures that women are seldom chosen. In not being regularly chosen, women are kept out of this arena of power, which is growing in its power and influence. As a result, women are left to make their interests known before the regulatory boards' hearings, instead of on the boards themselves. Since accessibility to board hearings requires resources which may not be available to women, their interests may not be considered at all.

As more regulatory agencies are created and the scope of their activities is broadened, the call for established guidelines which indicate the basis of selection for regulatory members is further understood, particularly as it relates to women. Presently, there are few women on ABC's and given the range of functions and the relative autonomy that regulatory agencies enjoy, the need for more women contributing to policy making is real.

In this chapter, the growth and growing importance of regulatory agencies were described. With the shift of power from Parliament and legislatures to the bureaucracies, the need for a greater understanding of

who our regulators are becomes apparent. In the following chapter, the appointment process, that is, the way regulators are selected, will be described.

Chapter 4

APPOINTMENTS TO REGULATORY AGENCIES

In the previous chapter, the growth and growing importance of regulatory agencies were described. In this chapter, the appointment process to the Boards of the regulatory agencies will be examined.

In considering women and the appointment process in Canada, we are operating from the acknowledgment that women are under-represented [Table 4.1]. The under-representation of women on ABC's is taken as a given. Some examples of the few women in regulatory positions will be considered, but the main thrust of this paper is to examine the process of appointments and the strategies for change that need to be adopted in order to encourage more women to be appointed to boards.

The under-representation of women on ABC's has drawn attention since it was first considered by the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in 1970. The reality of few women on boards, councils, commissions, crown corporations and committees was addressed in the Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women [Bird Commission] tabled in 1970, which recommended that

the federal government increase significantly the number of women in federally appointed positions. The Bird Commission recognized the inadequate number of women on ABC's and this problem was addressed through a series of recommendations the Commission made. The insight of the Bird Commission moved beyond the immediate problem of few women on ABC's. It also recognized the need to establish pathways for women seeking these positions, so as to facilitate their advancement. From the list of recommendations made by the Bird Commission, number 44 through to number 50 stress the need to establish pathways for women.

The federal Crown corporations and agencies were recommended to develop transfer and promotion measures which would encourage women to move out of traditionally female occupations into other occupations [Recommendation #44]. Adopting this measure is a step in the right direction. It is a move toward reducing the gender association made with a particular occupation and it enables both women and men to move more freely into all occupations. Federal Crown corporations and agencies were also encouraged to emphasize on recruitment programs that all occupations are equally

open to men and women. This is a natural extension of Recommendation #44 and is a reinforcement of it. If transfers and promotions of women occur and if occupations are emphasized as applicable to both men and women, the expected outcome is that slowly the association of jobs with gender will be diminished and eventually eliminated. As more women gain board membership, the more likely women will be seen as capable of succeeding in the job, as well as belonging in the job.

We do see women in increasing numbers in non-traditional occupations and all government recruitment programs state that they are equal opportunity employers. Nevertheless, women are consistently located in a strata below men of their own social group and so, we find at the institutional level, in the majority of Canadian offices, the managers and decision-makers are mostly men, while the typists and cleaning people are mostly women [Peitchinis, 1989]. Segregation in the workplace based on gender reflects the different status of men and women, since women's jobs tend to be subordinate to men's and typically offer less prestige and less pay [Fuchs Epstein, 1988:136].

This may be because the most serious obstacle to women's advancement is probably the fact that many employers believe that senior positions are for men [Bird Commission, 1970]. The problem is circular. Few women are found in senior positions and so, women generally are perceived as not interested or capable of holding senior positions since, men tend to occupy senior positions. Consciously or unconsciously, these employers attribute to women as a group characteristics that result in their elimination from consideration. This seems to be the main problem that women face in their attempts to gain ABC appointment. They are simply not chosen. The Bird Commission reports of an experiment in the Federal Public Service to determine whether or not employers considering job applicants are influenced by their gender. Officers were asked to rate paper qualifications of a number of candidates and the results, given the same qualifications, were that given a male name, one candidate was rated first 86% of the time. With a female name, the same candidate was rated first only 58% of the time. Since qualifications remained the same, the rating was clearly based on gender. When they thought the candidate was female, the

raters scored against her characteristics they apparently ascribed to women [Bird Commission, Paragraph 313:1970]. This experiment was reported in the Bird Commission which was tabled in 1970, and although women have made progress, it has been slow. This would suggest that ratings still differ on the basis of gender.

Certainly, some women do not and will not have equality of opportunity so long as characteristics traditionally attributed to them as a group are attributed to them as an individual. Women risk being automatically eliminated from consideration or being put to tests not required of male candidates. In the case of ABC appointments, we see that decisions must be made, in part, on the basis of gender. Female candidates are selected less often. The appointment process as it currently works, is not favourable to women.

Despite the regularity with which the problem of few women on ABC's has been addressed, little has changed. In July 1973, the CACSW called for equal representation of women on federal bodies however, two years later, a study commissioned by the CACSW revealed that only 12.8% of the appointments to 121 federal

organizations were filled by women. Furthermore, a 1980 study commissioned by CACSW reported only minimal improvements in the five years preceding the study [Champagne, CACSW, 1980:4]. Table 4.1 outlines women's representation on ABC's in 1988-89. The low representation suggests that little has changed since this problem was first addressed in 1970.

Women themselves are often blamed for not reaching senior level positions or appointments. Many employers think women are "until" workers - short term employees who are working until they marry, until they have a family or until they reach a short term economic goal [Wilson, 1986]. Other employers are convinced that women are unwilling to assume responsibilities and it is for these reasons so few women apply for senior positions [Bird Commission, Paragraph 321:1970].

The senior appointment process, whereby people are selected for an office or position, is a process whose criteria and considerations are, for the most part, unclear. The process of appointments is unclear because of the lack of written guidelines for those who appoint to follow. The appointment of agency members seems to

TABLE: 4.1

WOMEN ON FEDERALLY APPOINTED BOARDS, COUNCILS
AND COMMISSIONS, 1988-89

AGENCY	TOTAL # OF POSTIONS	TOTAL BY MEN	TOTAL HELD BY WOMEN
NSERCC	24	19	5
CACSW	30	28	2
NFB	8	4	4
NFB	10	9	1
LAW REFORM COMMISSION	5	4	1
ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL BOARD	5	4	1
CANADIAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL	34	32	2

SOURCE : ANNUAL REPORTS, 1988-9

proceed as follows. The senior appointments process is administered by a secretariat within the Privy Council Office that reports to the Assistant Secretary to Cabinet responsible for Machinery of Government. This secretariat has come into operation within the last decade, which is an indication of how great the proliferation of agencies has been in recent years. When a new agency is created, nominations are made to

this Secretariat [McDonald, personal interview, PCO, August, 1990].

The specific appointment process under the Mulroney government is coordinated by Marjory LeBreton, chief of appointments. A computer stores the names of nearly 3,000 people filling federal positions at agencies, boards and commissions. Six months before a vacancy, work begins on deciding whether to re-appoint the incumbent or find a replacement. A political minister, the caucus chairman and the campaign director recommend potential candidates, although LeBreton also consults departments, the heads of agencies involved, and interested parties from outside government. Once a decision is made, biographies are prepared and salaries determined. Two days before a cabinet meeting, the list of appointments are sent to the Prime Minister. The list is then brought to cabinet and usually quickly approved, with the occasional dispute between ministers quickly resolved [Kennedy, 1990; McDonald, personal interview, PCO, August, 1990]. This is an effective and highly organized process through which the government tracks vacancies and appoints new members to the ABC's.

The appointment process is an effective and highly

organized process, which suits the government's needs. It should, therefore, be easy to establish specific guidelines for appointments, beyond the current ones used by the government, which better suit the public. The qualifications and expectations for candidates could and should be made public, thereby ensuring a level of expertise for all board members. It is unfortunate that the effective internal process that the government uses for appointments is not opened to the public. If the list of vacancies that the government considers was also available to the public, along with what the job entails, then perhaps more members appointed to ABC's would be better qualified. They would also be beneficial to women because they would have access to these appointments in a greater way than they currently do, as they are, for the most part not appointed under the selection process as it operates today. It is within the government's powers to make appointments, however these are made without any general written guidelines which specify the basis of selection for federally-appointed positions.

The Law Reform Commission recommended in a report on ABC's that for each member appointed, there should be

general written guidelines indicating the desired qualities or expertise an appointee to a given board should possess. Written guidelines are necessary and would be beneficial as they would provide all interested parties with some basic criteria which needs to be met, both for the appointer and appointee. With the desired qualities and expertise explicitly spelt out, the eligibility of candidates becomes clear.

Those who do not possess the required expertise would simply not be eligible. Guidelines would also provide other basic similarities between all chosen members on different boards, commissions and councils rather than just party affiliation and maleness. They would all have identifiable credentials and expertise relating to the board on which they serve. The public could have more belief in the appointed members, as their eligibility would be more easily identifiable. Certainly, some of the concerns of the public, as to the quality of expertise of the appointees, would be eased -provided the guidelines were straightforward enough to ensure that this was not another method of solely appointing political party supporters. This is not to say that those who are affiliated with the party in

power are immediately ineligible. They must however, meet the same basic requirements as other potential appointees. Guidelines also provide credibility to the position and the board, since those who shape regulation must be more than patronage appointments. Their tasks and the repercussions are far too important.

Some argue that the Canadian public has not been well served by the present process of making appointments to regulatory agencies. Naturally, this is a sensitive subject, as it necessarily reflects on some of the people who have been appointed to and presently serve on regulatory tribunals [Kane, 1980:90-90]. Appointments to administrative agencies, are informal and often subject to continuing abuse and criticism since they lack any kind of systemized structure whereby appointments are made. In fact, the only guideline that we have is the mandate of each agency which specifies the length of tenure and number of positions. As reported in the Law Reform Commissions report on ABC's, this operation has been described by one Privy Council official as a process "done on the back of an envelope". It is an effective patronage process for any government in power, but it is not in the public's best

interest. If the process was changed, with more steps taken to make it more accessible, a more equitable representation would be likely. Under these conditions, gender would be a consideration in the appointment of regulators, but this is not to suggest that gender should necessarily become an over-riding factor.

With so few women on ABC's, the need for a more equitable appointment process, which would address the role of gender in board composition is required. The handful of women who regulate need to be joined by other women, so that women's perspectives on public policy areas are expressed and considered.

WHO IS CHOSEN: For a full understanding of women and the appointment process in Canada, it is necessary to consider who is chosen to regulate. We know that patronage is an important factor and that the process sits mostly in the hands of male political actors. Who do they choose as regulators? If we can identify who is chosen, we can also gain insight into who is not and can then, make recommendations so that those presently excluded may be included.

The regulators are those persons charged with the responsibility of implementing a policy area through the

institutional device of a regulatory agency [Brown-John, 1981]. To shed some light on who regulators are, one must look at the background and personal characteristics of the members of a group of federal regulatory agencies. It is important to examine the regulators because information on the regulators can increase our knowledge of cabinet decision-making. Similarly, we can learn more about the cabinet and its views on the criteria for government service by seeing who is chosen by the cabinet to fill the positions on regulatory agencies. Furthermore, knowing the background and personal characteristics of the people who make up the membership of the agencies can suggest relationships with the way they make decisions and with the kind of decisions that are made [Andrew and Pelletier, 1978: 147].

Before determining who the regulators are, the way in which regulators came to be considered for appointment needs to be addressed. We know the official selection process, whereby the cabinet approves each potential appointee, but it is interesting to consider the appointment process from the perspective of the potential appointee. Brown-John [1981] questioned

regulators and found that 73% had not considered appointment to their agency before being informally approached about the possibility. This is an important finding. If almost three-quarters of the appointed members had not considered appointment to their agency before being informally approached, the whole notion of qualifications needs to be considered. Certainly, not having thought of appointment to a board does not necessarily indicate that the regulator is unqualified. It does, however, force one to question the role of merit and patronage in their selection.

ABC's are viewed as a means with which the government pays back its political I.O.U.'s. There is a direct link between appointment and patronage in many instances. Those appointees that do not appear to have this explicit relationship, do however, have a great deal of experience and qualifications. The reason for their appointment is obvious - they are experts in a particular field, and the government requires their expertise. Many people working in a particular field, which the government regulates through ABC's have probably considered the notion of ABC membership, as a way to direct and influence the area.

Those who have a direct link to the party in power at the time of their potential appointment, and who do not have an interest or knowledge of a given area of policy, would not expect to be appointed. They may expect some appointment -but not in any given area. They may not expect an appointment in a given area because they do not see themselves as qualified for any given particular board membership. Those with the qualifications probably account for part of the 27% who would have considered appointment prior to their informal selection. This would however, not eliminate the possibility that the situation could in fact be the reverse. Perhaps those with expertise had limited party affiliation and so, thought it unlikely that they would be selected. On the other hand, the 27% of members who had considered appointment might be those expecting a partisan appointment. However, when one considers a survey of appointments, we find that a large number of appointees had party affiliation. A list of more than one hundred federal appointments passed by cabinet and released June 29, 1990, suggests that patronage is a large part of the selection process [Kennedy, 1990]. For example, the National Parole Board, which routinely

makes decisions that could mean the difference between an innocent citizen's life or death was mostly filled with patronage appointments in 1990 [Kennedy, 1990]. For years, the board has been notorious as a dumping ground for patronage appointments, with the Liberals and Conservatives both shamelessly using it as a haven for the party faithful [Kennedy, 1990].

In its investigation of the June 1990 appointments, the Ottawa Citizen discovered the government still regards the Parole Board as a favorite spot for patronage plums, with at least 12 of the 17 appointments to the board consisting of Conservative patronage. Among the Conservatives rewarded were: four defeated candidates; the daughter of a former Tory premier; a former Tory MP; and the campaign manager of a former Tory cabinet minister [Kennedy, 1990]. This would suggest that more likely than not, patronage had a large part to play in their selection and they had not considered a particular appointment, but were waiting for a "payback" nonetheless.

Andrew and Pelletier [1978], in a study of regulators, considered work experience and education to provide them with a sense of what kind of criteria was

considered important by cabinet and to indicate from which sectors of the community regulators were from. After gathering information on 134 members of 12 federal regulatory agencies through the study of curricula vitae and interviews, they determined that the number of people whose immediate past experience was in the private sector was roughly equal to those coming from the public sector. They found that of all the regulators, 61 came from the private sector and 55 from the public [Andrew and Pelletier, 1978].

Slightly more than half [52.6%] did claim to have an interest in the areas of regulation encompassed by the agency of which they were a member. Some [18.4%] indicated they had no prior interest while others [28.9%] expressed somewhat of a prior interest [Andrew and Pelletier, 1978]. Why then, were members appointed if a substantial percentage had a marginal, if any, interest in the area of regulation? Although they might bring a new perspective to the area of regulation, their overall input would be limited by their lack of expertise in the area. Patronage would seem to explain why those with little interest in a given area of regulation would find themselves as a regulator in the

area. They were awaiting political payback and received it in the form of ABC appointment.

Brown-John [1981], in his study of ABC regulators, was interested in determining who regulators were, their characteristics, self-perceived qualifications and the impact of gender. He found that Canadian regulatory agencies usually have members who are in their mid-to-late careers. They usually bring to their position experience in a profession, which frequently is law [Brown-John, 1981]. They also often have experience in an area within which they function as a regulator. Brown-John [1981] found considerable enthusiasm among agency members with an important reason for the enthusiasm being their sense of security and of having received a career reward.

Almost two-thirds of respondents were over 50 years of age, while the remainder were between 30 and 49 years of age [range: 30-75 years]. These are largely people in their mid-to late career who see their position as one of responsibility, involving considerable prestige. Among the older group, 24 per cent expected to retire at the end of their term in office. Moreover, almost three quarters of the respondents expected to have their

positions renewed at the end of their current term. Only two respondents expected to be forced to abandon their position due to a change in government. This would suggest that partisanship played a more subtle role in the appointment of members than currently, as Brown-John's findings were published in 1981. Or perhaps, only two explicitly admitted to the role of patronage in their appointment.

If, as Brown-John [1981] found, regulators come from both public and private industry and they tend to be professional, there would seem to be few reasons why women would be not appointed in greater numbers. With many women achieving professional degrees, one would expect to find more women as appointees. Based on these qualifications, many women would be eligible for selection. This would suggest that women are overlooked for membership for other reasons.

One way in which more women could be appointed to ABC's would be through the use of some kind of affirmative action program. Affirmative action means giving preference in hiring, promotion or university admission to the member of a disadvantaged group [Hurka, 1990]. It can be carried out in three ways. The

mildest form is a tie-breaking scheme. If two candidates are judged to be equally well qualified, the woman would be selected over the man. The second form is an extra-points scheme in which a candidate gets extra credit, over and above her normal qualifications, for being a woman. This means she can be hired ahead of a man who would otherwise be judged more qualified. The final way in which affirmative action is applied is through the establishment of quotas [Hurka, 1990]. Certain places are set aside for women and men cannot compete for them.

Hurka [1990] suggests that Americans and Canadians perceive affirmative action differently. In discussions of affirmative action in the United States, someone who is hired because of affirmative action is therefore, less qualified and will do less well on the job on a day-to-day basis. In Canada, affirmative action is seen as necessary so as to ensure that the most qualified person is, in fact, hired. Through affirmative action, a talented woman is not prevented from advancing as they should because of systemic barriers [Hurka, 1990].

It is interesting to consider the three forms of affirmative action, as well as the positive official

view of affirmative action in Canada, and apply it to the current appointment process in Canada. There currently exist no set guidelines for ABC appointment. There also is a small number of women found on ABC's. Given the important role in determining public policy that regulators play, it would be in women's best interest to achieve ABC membership.

Hurka [1990] suggests that the official Canadian viewpoint on affirmative action is that it is needed. This would suggest that the government in power recognizes that systemic barriers exist and are maintained. As these barriers are maintained, it is difficult for qualified women to reach positions of power and so, some kind of government intervention is necessary to remedy the situation.

Women may face a variety of barriers. Conscious sexism, a belief that women are inferior or should not have important jobs, can impede women's progress. They may also face subconscious sexism or the subconscious use of sexist stereotypes. Women may be seen as inferior and this picture of women is applied to women candidates and so, they are found to be less qualified.

The relative absence of women from the higher

echelons of business, government and institutions will persist as long as women continue to be discriminated against in the allocation of work functions at the lower levels of the hierarchical structure. The essential criterion for accession to high-level positions is work experience and close associations with decision-makers at the higher levels of the structure. Therefore, the nature of work responsibilities assigned to individuals over time, the breadth of work responsibilities undertaken, the committees on which individuals collaborate in their work, the people in the higher echelons to whom individuals report, and the degree of initiative individuals are allowed will all determine the progress up the hierarchical pyramid.

To allow more women up the hierarchical pyramid of ABC appointment, women need to be supported and encouraged in the workplace so that they may gain the necessary experience and recognition to be considered eligible for ABC regulation. As no specific written guidelines for the appointment process to federal agencies, boards and councils exist, the difficulty in moving up to ABC appointment is enhanced. Aside from patronage, male gender and some room for merit, women

find the doors to this type of work generally closed. The implications of this are great. Written, codified guidelines ensure that there is some kind of continuity and consistency in the process. Guidelines further ensure that all participants are working with the same loose connection of rules and expectations as to how they will be judged.

The eligibility pool is theoretically open to all, if there are no specific guidelines used to determine ABC regulators. Without a defined, established pathway already in place, women, who may come to positions of power by different directions than men, might have a better chance of selection. Perhaps they have been greatly involved in municipal politics or volunteer organizations and fundraising. The leadership that they exercise in these positions may be considered ample experience for ABC service. We see however, that many women with varied experiences, political and educational backgrounds are not appointed as federal regulators. This would suggest that the open process of selection, whereby no specific requirements for ABC service are outlined, has been an unsuccessful method of selection for women seeking board membership.

Some might suggest that changes are not required in the method of selection. Perhaps, potential women appointees lack the necessary experiences and skills expected of a federal regulator or they are not interested in participating in regulation at this level. This could be true, however no clear guidelines exist which outline expected requirements and therefore, few could be excluded based on merit. Furthermore, given the impact of the decisions made by federal regulators on the lives of Canadians, it is certain that some women would be very interested in having an impact on regulation at the federal level.

If all experiences and skills are considered in selecting ABC members, one would expect that more women would be currently selected. We see, however, that there is not, nor has there been a substantial number of females on ABC's. This would suggest that women are overlooked for membership for other reasons than merit. We need to consider the role of patronage and merit in contributing to the selection process. As political appointments are divided mainly into patronage and merit, the need for a greater blending of these two types of appointments is clearer. They do not have to

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be seen as wholly incompatible. The problem occurs when patronage outweighs merit. If merit is the over-riding selection factor, it allows for better appointments and better regulation. It also leaves more room open for women to be selected, as it still remains difficult for women to break into the "old boys network" of party politics and therefore, patronage appointments. In considering the role of patronage and merit in the selection process, a better understanding of the impact political actors, who are elites responsible for bestowing rewards, have on the appointment process is gained. This enables one to consider strategies for change in the process so that we may reach a more equitable balance among ABC members.

In this chapter the appointment process to the Boards of the regulatory agencies was examined. Included in the discussion of the appointment process was a description of who is chosen for board membership on Canada's federal regulatory agencies, boards, councils and commissions. In the following chapter, two often competing factors considered for appointment will be discussed. Patronage and merit and the role they

play in the selection process of federal regulators will be considered.

Chapter 5

PATRONAGE AND MERIT

In the previous chapter, appointments to regulatory agencies was discussed. In this chapter, the focus will be on two factors of considerable importance to the selection of board members for ABC's in Canada. The factors considered will be patronage and merit, which often seem to be competing interests.

The appointment process, as it currently operates, is inherently political. The federal government uses ABC's as a dumping ground for patronage appointments. Patronage is an important factor considered in the appointment of federal regulators. Under the present process, patronage also seems to play a role in excluding women from ABC appointment. Patronage is defined here as the power of putting people into advantageous positions and bestowing privileges. Because of the limited pool from which regulators are chosen and the frequency with which these appointees are partisan, many suggest that the Canadian public is not well served by the appointment process [Kane, 1980].

Political appointments may be divided into two main

types of appointments: merit and patronage. A blending of the two would be a change in a more positive direction, as appointees seem to be either one or the other extreme. Patronage appointments are those instances in which political loyalty or longevity outweigh merit [Simpson,1990]. Political appointments are often denounced on the grounds that they are made more on the basis of partisanship than merit and recent appointments seem to suggest that charge [Table 5.1].

According to Kernaghan and Siegel [1987], merit appointments are the practice whereby public servants are appointed and promoted on the basis of merit rather than of party affiliation or contribution, whereas political patronage involves the appointment of persons to government service on the grounds of contributions, financial and otherwise, to the governing party [Kernaghan and Siegel,1987:276].

A steady stream of patronage appointments, much like the ones outlined in Table 5.1 threatens the independence of important agencies and commissions and leads to an erosion of public confidence in them [Bindman, 1990]. During his nine months in office, Joe Clark made about 150 partisan appointments, including

TABLE: 5.1

SELECTED PATRONAGE APPOINTMENTS

PERSON & APPOINTMENT	AFFILIATION
HUGUETTE PAGEAU CITIZENSHIP COURT JUDGE	MANAGER-MULRONEY'S LEADERSHIP CAMPAIGN
RON HUNTINGTON CHAIRMAN -CANADA PORTS CORP.	FORMER TORY MP
RICHARD HOLDEN MONTREAL MEMBER & VICE-CHAIRMAN RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES COMMISSION	QUEBEC TORY & LAWYER
IRVING R. GERSTEIN DIRECTOR- CANADA POST	PRESIDENT- PEOPLE'S JEWELLERS MAJOR TORY FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTOR
PIERRE BLOUTIN CHAIRMAN-TRUSTEES OF NATIONAL ARTS CENTER	QUEBEC CITY INSURANCE BROKER & CONSERVATIVE SUPPORTER
HELEN HUNLEY ALBERTA'S LIEUTENANT- GOVERNOR	FORMER PROVINCIAL TORY CABINET MINISTER
JEAN PIGOTT CHAIRMAN- NATIONAL CAPITAL COMMISSION	FORMER TORY MP
WILLIAM HAWKINS OF FORD MEMBER- CLOTHING & TEXTILES BOARD [OAKVILLE]	RETIRED V.P. AND G.M. REGIONAL MOTORS' SALES DIVISION & TORY PARTY ACTIVIST

SOURCE: Claire Hoy. FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES, 1988.

ten senators [Hoy, 1988]. This is not to say that appointees may not have had other qualifications, but the over-riding basis of selection was links to the government in power. Perrin Beatty, a Conservative MP stated that using patronage as a "reward for party members could adversely affect the quality of members of boards and commissions" [Hoy, 1988]. Too often appointments are made with little attention to whether board members have had any experience in the industry involved or have ever served on a company board before. Consider the following examples from the National Gallery of Canada, outlining two recent appointees biographies: Name: Louise Lamarre Title: Trustee Term: 2 years Resume: Member of the Montreal Museum of Fine Arts and the New York Metropolitan Museum. She is the wife of Bernard Lamarre, chairman of Lavalin Inc., a Quebec engineering and consulting firm. Marcel Masse, who was Communications Minister responsible for the gallery at the time of appointment, was an employee at Lavalin before entering politics in 1984 [Kennedy, 1990]. Name: Jean Monty Title: Chairman Term: 2 years Resume: President and Chief Executive Officer of Bell Canada. The Montreal businessman has worked in

telecommunications finance for 17 years. He admits to having no specific interest in art and that he had never been to the National Gallery until named chairman [Kennedy, 1990]. It is interesting that Mme. Lamarre's credentials seem suited to the appointment, whereas Mr. Monty's experience in this area seems lacking. This would seem to suggest that when a women is appointed, she must have elite connections and expertise, whereas the same may not be true for men.

The current appointment process is unsuitable because of its "secrecy, arbitrariness and susceptibility to abuse" [Bindman, 1990]. There is no difficulty in confirming that a very real and persistent problem exists. Patronage rules the process and is sprinkled with appointments based on merit. Although many well-qualified people are appointed, there is no reason why the level of patronage appointments should be tolerated, given the problems created by unqualified, inexperienced and often intemperate appointees [Bindman, 1990].

There are thousands of tribunals operating in Canada that profoundly influence the lives of Canadians. The government, however, although recognizing the

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important role fulfilled by ABC's, regards membership and therefore, the boards themselves, with shifting independence. The notion of independence is forgotten when, for example, a new government decides to abolish a tribunal and replace it with a new one in order to make its own patronage appointments [Simpson, 1990]. From the most cynical perspective, this frees a government from having to wait out the terms of the patronage appointments made by the previous governments. It also greatly impedes the work of ABC's and exemplifies the greatest abuse of the power to appoint. Critics of the current appointment process believe it is shrouded in an unhealthy cloak of mystery that creates the temptation to use appointments as a political reward [Bindman, 1990]. Perhaps with a less arbitrary system, the government would rely less upon party supporters for ABC appointment.

Currently, there is no way to find out when vacancies occur, what qualifications are needed and no formal mechanism to find the best people to serve on these tribunals. This is particularly frustrating to women, who may be interested in applying for one of the vacancies. By not releasing to the public what is

vacant, the government does not have to even consider qualified applicants, as they receive names from only within their own channels. This means that no one can break into the process. This is the inherent problem in the process, particularly for women, as it relies upon patronage for its vacant positions.

It would be advantageous to the ABC's themselves, in terms of their effectiveness and perception in the eyes of the public to have the vacancies accessible. Similarly, it would be advantageous to have specific qualifications, as well as a job description made available. The cabinet has the authority to appoint deputy ministers, heads and members of agencies, boards, councils and commissions, high commissioners, ambassadors, consuls general, and certain other diplomatic representatives and federal judges. All of these appointments are exempt from the appointing power of the Public Service Commission and except for high-profile appointments go unnoticed by the public. With vacancies made available and job qualifications expressed, the process would be greatly improved.

The Senate is another area where patronage rules appointment. The Senate offers a good example of the

limitations of patronage appointments because, as Simpson [1990] suggests, even if it were to continue to be an appointed body, it could function better as a chamber of sober second thought if the best people, as opposed to the most acceptable partisans, were appointed. The same observation could be made of our citizenship courts, and many boards, agencies and commissions. Given the nature of ABC appointment and the scope of policy that regulators in a given area are responsible for, the need for qualified appointments becomes apparent. Furthermore, in our system, people stay on for long periods of time in appointed positions and so, if they are not qualified their participation can prove to be detrimental, as they have a great influence on Canadian affairs and receive remuneration that is often considerable [Simpson, 1990:3]. Certainly, board members do learn on the job, however, there is a time frame involved in this on-the-job learning. Decisions may be required before a member is completely comfortable with the job.

Many appointees can thank political loyalty or longevity rather than merit for their position. Although governments in power rely upon ABC appointment

for party support, it is necessary to demand not the elimination of patronage in the selection process, as it is too much a part of government to be eliminated but, its role must be diminished. In the period following the 1972 general election, more than two-thirds of the 38 retired or defeated Liberal politicians were appointed as heads or members of government agencies, contract employees in government departments, judges, or assistants to the Prime Minister or to ministers [Kernaghan and Siegel, 1987:278]. Currently, the government has the authority to make appointments like these on whatever basis it deems appropriate. Unfortunately, merit plays a diminished role in selection and as a result, the quality of board members is questionable.

Kernaghan and Siegel [1987] suggest that a measure of merit is achieved with respect to the most senior posts because the government is not usually willing to bear the embarrassment that the appointment of an incompetent partisan may bring. This is positive, but the problem lies in the fact that, according to Kernaghan and Siegel [1987], party supporters are more likely to find their reward in appointments to Crown

agencies, boards, and commissions than to regular departments of government. Given the shift of power away from Parliament and the legislatures to the executives and bureaucracies, it is not enough to have some areas of regulation met with merit appointees and others crammed with inexperienced, patronage appointments. Furthermore, if appointments are made only from amongst supporters of the government in power, there may be a perception that the tribunal is neither independent nor indifferent when it is called to adjudicate cases in which the government appears as a party [Bindman, 1990]. As well, when an appointment is made solely or indeed largely as a reward, there may be a perception on the part of the person receiving the appointment that he or she is not under any obligation to work hard.

Although party supporters are more likely to find their reward in appointments to Crown agencies, boards and commissions, this is a need for concern. If many appointees are not selected primarily on the basis of merit, this suggests that they were selected for other reasons and these reasons may not serve the commission well. As Kane [1980] suggests, one of the

justifications for the establishment of regulatory tribunals is the need for a body which has the sufficient expertise to deal with the specialized nature of the industry being regulated. With expertise recognized as an important factor in the effectiveness of commission members to contribute to regulatory tribunals, it becomes clear why many critics dislike appointments made on the basis of patronage, rather than merit.

Patronage can be viewed in different lights. To some, like Simpson [1990], patronage is normal and even desirable means by which the party in power can encourage change partly by appointing new people to administer parts of the governmental apparatus. Furthermore, Simpson [1990] sees some truth to the argument that if the politicians did not make choices, the bureaucrats would, "for there is something called bureaucratic patronage, evidence of which is not so easily apparent but nevertheless exists" [Simpson, 1990: 3]. Others, however, group patronage with other types of political corruption. To them, patronage falls under the larger problem of political corruption.

To Gibbons [1976], political corruption is the "use

of a public office in a way that forsakes the public interest...in order that some form of personal advantage may be achieved at the expense of that public interest" [Gibbons, 1976:5]. Certainly, the current appointment process forsakes the public interest, as it not only appoints on the basis of patronage, it also regularly overlooks merit and often excludes women. Gibbons [1976] suggests that the type of reward refers to the motivation for corruption, which can be broadly grouped into power rewards and income rewards. The "selectivity of inducements" relates to the degree to which rewards can be distributed on a case by case basis or conversely, where everyone in a particular constituency benefits from the reward. A selective inducement can be offered or withheld as the initiator of corrupt behaviour sees fit. For example, patronage is only offered to party supporters. A "diffuse inducement" applies to everyone, regardless of the whims of the initiator. Pork-barrelling represents such a circumstance, where all residents of a riding can benefit from a public works project, regardless of the way they voted.

Patronage can be distinguished from other types of

corruption by the following:

- 1] It is a broad scope activity, since it can only achieve results when a number of persons are indebted to the government for jobs or contracts.
- 2] It can be administered selectively, that is, on a case by case basis.
- 3] The rewards involved are power for the political actor or actors [retention of office] and money in the form of contracts or jobs for the non-political actor.
- 4] Only a political actor holding official status [elected or appointed] has the resources necessary to carry out patronage.
- 5] The political actor is usually the initiator of such activity, though certainly she/he will react to the demands of others.
- 6] Patronage can occur in any political arena, but it is more prevalent in electoral and legislative processes [Gibbons, 1989:126-7].

If we consider these distinctions from other forms of corruption, we see the power held by elected and appointed persons to distribute rewards. Gibbons states that only political actors have the available resources to carry out patronage and by extension, corruption. It

is for this reason, that women must work toward greater elected representation, as it is very difficult to encourage change solely from outside. Once inside, women then have the necessary resources, both to re-define the process and to use it.

Gibbons also states that political actors usually are the initiators. In the case of ABC appointment, we see this to be true. Brown-John [1981] found that many regulators had never considered board appointment, prior to being informally approached. This makes the appointment process an even more disadvantageous system for women, as it is secretive and so women can not apply for vacancies. It is also arbitrary, which means qualifications vary depending on the political actor in charge. Furthermore, as the political actor tends to be the initiator, which means that for the most part he is male, women are largely kept out.

When potential appointees are selected on the basis of their political affiliation to the party in power, merit comes to play a secondary role. The political appointees tend to represent the greatest area of abuse and have inspired the greatest criticism, particularly from consumer groups. The party in power uses the

appointments to regulatory boards as a political reward for its deserving and dedicated supporters. This is, however, disadvantageous to the public, given the impact of the policy choices on the public. The Law Reform Commission has commented on this issue as follows:

In the majority of cases, highly competent individuals are appointed to agency member-ship. Even so, isolated cases persist of appointments of individuals totally un-suited to the tasks required. More objectionable than these isolated cases is the negative public perception generated by this unstructured system of political appointments. It gives rise to the appearance of partisan government reward to "politically helpful" individuals rather than appointment for intrinsic merit. It also has the effect of creating the impression that the agencies are used to assist loyal but feckless individuals who are having job placement or career maintenance problems elsewhere. This perception hampers agencies because their effectiveness can be impeded if, whatever may be the truth of the situation, members are believed to have insufficient professional qualifications [Ministry of Supply & Services, 1980:162].

We need to open the appointment process for examination, so that some of the secrecy and arbitrariness is eliminated. In so doing, the ease with which the government uses patronage would become apparent and perhaps the potential for abuse is

lessened. This would hopefully encourage change in this area. One of the justifications for the establishment of regulatory tribunals is the need for a body which has sufficient expertise to deal with the specialized nature of the industry being regulated. With expertise recognized as an important factor in the effectiveness of commission members to contribute to regulatory tribunals, the need for qualified regulators is apparent.

As more power is shifted to regulatory boards and the range and scope of the areas they cover increase, so too must the requirements for suitable candidates. Merit becomes increasingly important as the specialized nature of the boards continues. If the appointment process is opened up to public scrutiny, beginning with the publication of vacancies, merit could become more important as people apply for the positions. Obviously the government would resist this change, as these appointments are seen as earned by party supporters. The nature of regulation and the areas over which boards regulate over continue to become increasingly complex and ABC's can no longer afford to be hindered by unqualified persons. Opening up the system would also

allow for more women to become involved, as they are currently left waiting to be appointed on the whim of political actors. Thus, women must work toward more elected representation for their own access to power and they must lobby the government for change in this process because as it currently operates, women are at a disadvantage.

This chapter focused on two factors considered in the appointment process. Patronage and merit each play an important role in the selection of federal regulators. In the following chapter, strategies for changing the current process of appointments will be discussed.

Chapter 6

STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE

In the previous chapter, patronage and merit, which are two competing factors considered in the appointment of regulators, were described. The following chapter discusses strategies women can adopt to foster change. The initial focus of the chapter is on political elites, those who have the power to appoint. Discussion moves to specific changes women can work toward achieving.

Elites: In modern industrial societies, political and economic organizations constitute the dominant social institutions, with religious, educational and other culture-producing organizations constituting secondary, but still important ones. In gender-stratified societies, elite roles are and have been overwhelmingly filled by men. Elite incumbents may have other common attributes in given societies, such as racial, religion, class background, but, their maleness is historically and cross-culturally nearly uniform [Chafetz, 1990].

Chafetz [1990] argues that women's collective opportunities to enhance their status, relative to men

in their society, rest on increased access to resource-generating work. Such access is, however, largely controlled by elites, who are male, and it changes primarily in response to forces outside the control of women.

Elite roles, according to Chafetz [1990], are those whose incumbents control the resources of their organizations, including in the political realm, those of entire nations. They serve as gatekeepers, distributing concrete opportunities and rewards. In some cases, elites may be free to overtly use particularistic criteria in awarding the resources and opportunities at their command. In the case of federal ABC's, the elites are those elected politicians, the ministers and Prime Minister who are free to recommend and appoint whomever they choose to participate on these boards. Claire Hoy writes of Brian Mulroney, Prime Minister of Canada, that "power is a function of rewarding people, what he can do for his friends instead of what he can do for his country, and of what power can do for him" [Hoy, 1987].

They may, therefore, unabashedly give preference to their own "kind", which, among other attributes includes

maleness. Most often though, especially in contemporary industrial societies, elites need to justify and legitimate the criteria used for distributing the rewards. In the case of ABC's, despite continuous demands for change in the way regulators are selected, governments have managed to maintain its secrecy, arbitrariness and susceptibility to abuse. Because of the way in which the process currently operates women are disadvantaged.

Rosabeth Kantner [1977] is one of a small number of theorists that look to organizational structures to understand why women are disadvantaged. She determined three variables to explain work behaviour and motivation of people in organizations. First, the extent to which employees are in a position from which further upward mobility is possible versus being stopped or blocked. Second, the extent to which employees possess the power necessary to accomplish their goals; and, third, the relative number of people in a work peer group of one's own social type [in this case women] versus some other type [men] [Kantner, 1977 as quoted in Chafetz, 1990]. Kantner found that worker commitment and productivity, as well as future opportunities for mobility and

empowerment, are enhanced when they are empowered, have mobility, opportunity and are not viewed as "tokens".

Kantner [1990] argues that regardless of personal attributes, including gender, people respond in a similar way when their employment situations are similar.

Men and women, argues Chafetz [1990], do not typically enjoy similar levels of opportunity and power. Furthermore, in responsible, prestigious and high-income jobs, it is women who are likely to be tokens.

Therefore, the work behaviour and commitment of women and men differ as a result of their different positions within an organization. In turn, differential outcomes reinforce stereotypes about gender and work, helping to maintain a system that places men and women in different organizational positions [Chafetz, 1990].

Chafetz [1990] argues that the differences in men's and women's attitudes and behaviour are produced by the fact that they play different and unequal social roles. The differences produced in this way in turn, enhance the likelihood that roles will be distributed on the basis of gender, to the continuing disadvantage to women. Numerous examples exist of the unequal social

roles women play. It is particularly noticeable in the appointment process for ABC's. Women are continuously denied access to this regulatory policy process. Without power, women are not in a position to overturn the current composition of ABC membership. Power requires resources superior to those controlled by compliers [Chafetz, 1990]. Power wielders must have at their command something that compliers value and need or want and cannot otherwise get in sufficient quantity. In this case, women are kept off the Boards of ABC's because they are not able to grasp enough political power in elected government to do otherwise. Thus, women are in a position of power inequity. All systems of stratification are, by definition, systems of power inequity, although they do vary according to the basis and degree of power inequity [Chafetz, 1990]. By definition, a system of gender stratification implies superior power for men. This is the system women need to organize to change, as they currently lack power and authority.

Elites are those who control the resources of their organizations and in the political realm, this includes the entire nation. The power of all positions which

offer resources and rewards like those of political leaders, judges, high-level managers and officers of economic and professional organizations, tend to be primarily, if not exclusively held with people who are male. That is, some men will get to decide who gains access to various educational and training opportunities, who gets to fill vacant positions, and who is promoted into yet more highly rewarded positions. Political elites, who tend to be men, have the advantage in Canada of the availability of thousands of ABC appointments which can be rewarded at their discretion.

Elites play a disproportionately strong role in sustaining old and establishing new social definitions, in their roles as decision makers of powerful organizations and institutions. It is for this reason that women strive to be included into the institutional arenas of power, as elite individuals currently define the world and are in a position to impose those definitions on others, from their own perspective. That perspective is masculine, regardless of what else it might be and therefore, excludes the feminine perspective.

It is difficult to integrate the feminine

perspective because elite males tend to favour other males over females. Chafetz [1990] argues that for at least three different kinds of reasons, male elites will tend to favour other males over females in distributing opportunities and rewards. She argues that especially in situations of uncertainty or risk, and I will contend that in positions of great influence and power, elites think that they need to be able to personally trust their immediate subordinates and peers. Most organizations and elected governments as well, operate in an environment of chronic uncertainty and so, trust is most likely extended to those most similar to oneself. Because elites are overwhelmingly male, one fundamental trait, but not the only one, in which they feel similarity is maleness.

Chafetz's [1990] third reason why male elites will favour male elites over females relates to the psychology of men as described by Chodorow. Chodorow [1978] argues that, for males, the major results of the fact that their primary love object is female are misogyny and the need to dominate women. If psychological traits are widespread among men in a gender-stratified society, then male elites would

presumably restrict women to low level positions over which they clearly dominate.

Elite men may justify their exclusion of women from well-rewarded positions of power by referring to women's different social definitions, but, a more basic cause may be a deep-seated largely unconscious need to dominate and devalue women. For any or all of these reasons, male elites can be expected to distribute opportunities and rewards unequally on the basis of gender.

Having outlined why elite men favour other men over women, it is important to consider the outcome of selection if gender stratification is overcome. The corollary of males favouring other males over females is that if material resources are proportionately distributed amongst men and women, women may also distribute rewards and opportunities unequally on the basis of gender. As Kantner [1977] indicated, regardless of personal attributes, including gender, people respond in a similar fashion when their employment situations are similar. Perhaps women would not reward unequally based on gender, but there is no guarantee. They may reward unequally, but for different

reasons. Female elites, it is contended would favour female elites over male elites for at least three different kinds of reasons. Just as males favour males because of their maleness, the same may occur with female elites. As more females join the ranks of the powerful, they will need to establish and maintain alliances and one of the easiest and most natural would be based on gender. Certainly those with similar attitudes, goals and values would be selected.

Secondly, gender social definitions would prove to create a similar scenario with women as elites. Just as women are stereotyped as weaker than men and more emotional, men are viewed as aggressive, oppressive in their use of power and threatening. As a result, women may want to forge alliances with some men, but to equalize the potential abuse of power that is often attributed to men, women may look to other women, who share their views and therefore, choose them over men, so as to maintain their own power threshold.

Finally, in the case of the psychology of men, who need to dominate women, perhaps after being kept out of the arenas of power for so long by men, women will choose to dominate men, if given the chance. They may,

therefore, choose to restrict men's access to positions of power because of their past abuses and instead, establish their own unequal distribution of opportunities and rewards based on gender. Thus, it is possible that for the same reasons that male elites chose other males, female elites would do the same. Perhaps it is for these reasons that so much time is spent debating whether or not it is worthwhile to become part of the larger institutions.

The problem then, with gender and representation on ABC's is not necessarily that men will continue to prefer other men over women, the problem is that women are not in a position to choose likewise. The problem extends to the fact that barriers are created to keep women out of positions of power. If both women and men held an relatively equal share of power positions, several things could happen. In the first place, the need for equal representation would be met and so, the next concern would be maintaining it. However, if women had fair access to power positions, the need for an equitable balance would not necessarily be as critical. It would not be as critical because with an open pathway, women could choose to participate or not.

Currently, women have access but not the opportunity to participate, as it is continually being blocked or hampered by barriers in place. If both access and opportunity were available, it would also allow candidates to be considered more regularly on the basis of merit because it would not be a process directed at keeping a large group who want in, out. This is not to suggest that patronage would disappear, as it is inevitable that one who appoints would pick her/his own candidate. This may, however, have less to do with gender and more to do with personally maintaining one's powerful position by surrounding oneself with allies. This is, of course, only speculation, as the likelihood that elite males will allow for more than just a handful of women to participate in well-rewarded work is almost non-existent.

This leaves women with the goal of achieving both the access and opportunity to participate wherever they desire. In order to do so, women must adopt a variety of strategies to create change, which will enable them to work toward their own economic empowerment. This means that they will face considerable resistance to their efforts, but they must continue to forge ahead.

The kind of resistance that women face is the accusation that when women or women's organizations, like the CACSW, stress that the lack of female representation in politics or other positions of power and success, they are participating in feminist male-bashing which is offensive to men and to a growing number of women who are succeeding. They "point to the token over-achievers as an example for the rest of the group's members who are struggling merely to survive... and then having applauded the token, the majority can turn their backs on the rest" [Kantner, 1990:11].

Resentful men suggest that part of the problem is that enough women do not want to be politicians and they cannot be forced. This is suggested without any recognition of the role of power as oppressive, barriers that discourage women from running or from winning when they run may play in keeping women out of the political realm. In order to create change, women will continue to meet considerable resistance to their efforts.

Resentful people suggest that part of the problem is that enough women do not want to be politicians and they cannot be forced. This is suggested without any recognition of the role that obstacles may play in

keeping women out of the political realm. The obstacles they face are barriers that discourage women from running for political office or from winning when they run for office. These barriers keep women out of the political realm and by extension, out of ABC appointments and are reinforced by the desires of elite roles. They control the resources and serve as gatekeepers to ABC appointment by distributing board member to their desired candidates. In the case of the current ABC appointment process, the political players are free to overtly use patronage in awarding ABC appointments. In so doing, the political elites give preference to their own kind, which are the party faithful and mostly male candidates. Most often, as Chafetz [1990] suggests, elites need to justify and legitimate the criteria used for distributing the rewards. In the case of the appointment process, this is not necessary. Aside from assuring the public that the appointees are qualified, there is no further justification given and since the process lacks any formal guidelines, the criteria used is not legitimated. Instead, the process is shrouded in secrecy, arbitrariness and susceptibility to abuse. In order to

create change, women will continue to meet considerable resistance to their efforts.

Women will continue to meet considerable resistance to their efforts to create change because they strive to move beyond the current levels of women's representation on ABC's and in public office. There is no guarantee that change will continue to move in a way that is positive for women and so, the need for more women in positions of power becomes critical. To guarantee more women will move up the hierarchical pyramid, it is critical that the relationships between how regulators are chosen [HOW CHOSEN], who chooses regulators for ABC's [WHO CHOOSES], the factors considered in the selection of board members [FACTORS CONSIDERED], who is found in the eligibility pool from which regulators are selected [WHO IN E. POOL] and who is appointed as a regulator [WHO CHOSEN] are explicitly identified.

The relationship between these different components in the selection process is outlined in Diagram 1.1. The diagram is structured with WHO CHOOSES at the top of the diagram. The placement of WHO CHOOSES in this position is in recognition of the power those who appoint have. WHO CHOOSES consists mostly of ministers,

DIAGRAM 1.1

Appointments to ABC's

the caucus chairman and the campaign director, although others are consulted [Simpson, 1988].

How regulators are chosen [HOW CHOSEN] is the next part of the relationship between each of these linked components to be discussed. The way in which regulators are chosen must be seen on two levels. First, HOW CHOSEN represents the entire selection process. The process is administered by the Privy Council Office and reports to the Assistant Secretary to Cabinet [McDonald, personal interview, PCO, August, 1990]. The appointment process also encompasses all of the mandates for all of the ABC's. For example, this would include the

guidelines for selection, the rules which outline the length of appointment, the number of members on a given board and other considerations. HOW CHOSEN is the appointment process in its most broad sense. It is established according to the federal government's goals and it is within the power of the federal government to reform or maintain the appointment process.

HOW CHOSEN also applies to the specific process used by the federal government in selecting regulators. This would include the decisions made by the government as to how they would like the process carried out. Under the current government, this process is coordinated by Marjory LeBreton, chief of appointments. Specifically, the manner in which the government selects regulators refers to HOW CHOSEN. The computer used by the government can "spit out some three thousand, five hundred order-in-council positions, with the name of the incumbent, a brief description of the position's responsibilities, and the duration and expiration date for the term [Simpson, 1988:26]. In fact, the data base enables the government to know month by month how many positions fall vacant, the salary level, and the probable regional, linguistic or occupational background

of the required replacement [Simpson, 1988:26].

HOW CHOSEN is linked to each of the other components. Although HOW CHOSEN is the selection process, WHO CHOOSES is placed above the selection process. It is above the selection process because WHO CHOOSES determines what the process of selection will entail and how it will operate. WHO CHOOSES has the power to direct and change the process. WHO CHOOSES also has the power to appoint and so, it is at the top of the pyramid. It is important to recognize the significance of WHO CHOOSES to the system as a whole. WHO CHOOSES determines each of the other components: HOW CHOSEN, WHO CHOSEN, FACTORS CONSIDERED, and WHO IN E. POOL.

All components are linked to WHO CHOOSES, but a change in any one would result in a change in the other components. For example, WHO CHOOSES is a group of mostly male political elites who are facing considerable criticism for patronage appointments. As a result of the negative publicity, WHO CHOOSES agrees in caucus to change HOW CHOSEN for the next round of appointments to gain favourable publicity. A change in HOW CHOSEN would result in a change in the other

components. HOW CHOSEN would consider the public's perception and so, candidates would be chosen with media attention and the voters in mind. As a result, WHO CHOSEN would be candidates who would reflect positively on the government. FACTORS CONSIDERED would move away from candidates with links to the party in power to those whose qualifications would be widely recognized. Finally, WHO IN THE E. POOL would no longer consist of potential appointees whose basis of selection would be patronage. Merit, regional representation or gender might be considered. An example of appointments used to deflect criticisms of his partisan approach, Prime Minister Mulroney appointed two high-profile non-Tories to jobs: -the former Ontario NDP leader Stephen Lewis was named as ambassador to the United Nations and former Commons Speaker Lloyd Francis was named ambassador to Ireland [Hoy, 1987:276]. Although these are not appointments to ABC's, they were regularly used to support Mulroney's claim that his government "has appointed more nonpartisans than any government in our history [Hoy, 1987:276]". ABC appointments were not held up as an example of nonpartisan appointments because they are consistently used for that very reason.

Any changes that WHO CHOOSES might make would be very short-term. These changes would be short term, as ABC's are a considerable source of "payback" for the party faithful. Patronage dispensers endure frustration, as they always try to reconcile the limited number of available positions with the greater number of aspirants [Simpson, 1988:31]. Furthermore, each appointment, once made, risks alienating all the disappointed supplicants [Simpson, 1988].

As appointments to ABC's are largely based upon patronage, this would suggest that who is in the eligibility pool, as well as who is actually appointed, are often appointees with direct links to the party in power. Since WHO CHOOSES determines HOW CHOSEN, FACTORS CONSIDERED, WHO IN E. POOL and WHO CHOSEN, then it follows that elite connections, patronage and maleness provide the basis for selection. Table 4.1 outlines the low representation of women on ABC's in 1988-89. The low representation of women suggests that little has changed since this problem was first addressed in 1970 and furthermore, that maleness must be a FACTOR CONSIDERED in WHO CHOSEN. If the low representation of women is a problem that has been addressed repeatedly

since 1970, and if few women are still found on ABC's, then in selecting regulators, WHO CHOOSES must consider maleness to be important in most cases.

If WHO CHOOSES are political elites, then it follows that WHO CHOSEN will often have connections to these elites. Elite connections certainly assist a potential appointee in guaranteeing consideration for an appointment to an ABC, particularly if they also are male and have been active in supporting the party in power.

WHO CHOSEN are selected from the eligibility pool. WHO IN E. POOL depends on HOW CHOSEN and WHO CHOOSES. If WHO CHOOSES has an appointment process based largely on patronage, then it follows that FACTORS CONSIDERED and by extension WHO IN E. POOL and WHO CHOSEN from the eligibility pool would reflect this basis of selection. FACTORS CONSIDERED would likely include elite connections, maleness and patronage. Other factors are taken into consideration, although these three factors seem to be the most important. So, potential candidates would likely have links to the party in power, whereas opposition supporters would probably not be considered for appointment, in most cases.

WHO IN E. POOL is a fairly consistent group. Currently, the majority in the eligibility pool are party supporters who expect some kind of "payback". Many probably have elite connections and maleness in common with WHO CHOOSES. Some may have additional FACTORS CONSIDERED, like regional representation or experience. At times, WHO IN E. POOL shifts. Those with other party affiliations might be considered or perhaps women are included depending on the government's needs.

There is a natural link between elite connections [WHO CHOOSES] and patronage [FACTOR CONSIDERED], particularly for men. The party leaders, campaign organizers and political candidates are mostly men [Brodie, 1985]. This is the same group, once in power, who select regulators [WHO CHOOSES].

Involvement in party politics does not, however, guarantee access to WHO CHOOSES, particularly for women who often "perform the routine 'housekeeping' chores of party organization [Brodie, 1985:57]. Many people believe that few women are elected to legislative office because few women move up within political parties [Brodie, 1985:58]. Similarly, few women are chosen to

serve on ABC's because they do not have the elite connections, since they do not move up within political parties. They may not be selected on the basis of patronage for the same reason.

Since there seems to be a vital link between party activism and legislative recruitment [Brodie, 1985], women must be encouraged to get involved in political parties. Involvement in political parties can include the routine housekeeping chores, but must move beyond that. Women need to move up within political parties to gain legislative recruitment and ultimately, included in WHO CHOOSES. If women are included in WHO CHOOSES, they also influence HOW CHOSEN and the other related components. It is important for women to move in this direction, since the impact of WHO CHOOSES on the rest of the process is great. It is within their power to alter the process or to maintain it. This would suggest to women that the difficulties they face in achieving board membership will continue, unless there is a change in the make-up of WHO CHOOSES.

Creating Change: The change at issue is the one governing the shift in the alliance between men and women. For the last century, but more insistently during the last twenty years, women have pressed their objections against the routine abuses of power, [social, political, economic] with which the society holds in check their freedom of thought and action. It can be argued that the Canadian government in the late twentieth century regards the prospect of social change [any social change] as both an insult and a nasty surprise. We will address problems in our society such as the need for women's equality, pay equity and more day care facilities, but in reality, the problems will not move much beyond talking and thinking about how to promote and encourage women rather than actually promoting and encouraging women. For example, the problem of the representation of women on ABC's and in other positions of power merits studies and commissions, but not the implementation of any concrete recommendations which would foster change.

It is true that identifying and solving a problem are two distinct steps but identifying a problem, as we see in the case of women's ABC appointment, is not a

guarantee that the solutions will be implemented. In order to create change, it is first necessary to recognize that women face a range of issues and they are not all the same for all women. Differences such as ethnicity, minority status and sexual orientation create different ways of seeing. Furthermore, the labour market and therefore, women's prospects vary throughout the country. Women face various concerns. Thus, to create change it is important to recognize that the strategies to be applied must be both issue-specific and location-specific [Kantner, 1990:11].

As we sit in 1992, with perhaps more women in positions of power than ever previously, the need to move beyond our current levels of representation on ABC's becomes all the more critical. Women have realized from our past that we cannot become complacent about social progress for women [Batcher, 1987], as there is no guarantee that change will continue in a positive way for women. If we take change to be the passing from one form to another, we see that in 1992, despite recommendations for the need to change the current form of appointing regulators, there is still the virtual exclusion of women from public office and on

ABC Boards. Many years after their formal admission into the politics of liberal democracies, women remain outside the corridors of political power [Brodie, 1985]. Furthermore, more than one-half of the country's population is denied the opportunity to formulate public policy [Brodie, 1985]. Women, however, understand that social progress is slow to happen. The early naivete that assumed the recommendations of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women would be implemented quickly and that women would easily achieve equality in Canadian society is long gone [Hosek, 1987:494]. In fact, many of those recommendations which are crucial to women have yet to be enacted and further political debate and research have since discovered and articulated new goals [Hosek, 1987:494].

The single most important change required to produce a system of gender equality is the equal representation for women among society's elites. Women's economic empowerment allows for greater representation among society's elites, and this brings women increased power. Power can be defined as the ability to act effectively on persons or things, to make or secure favourable decisions which are not of right

allocated to the individual or their roles [Zimbalist Rosaldo, 1974:21]. If we define power in the general case as a person's ability to influence another person or persons to carry out orders [Parsons, 1951], and consider Zimbalist Rosaldo's [1974] further distinction of power, which implies that power is able to create favourable decisions at the expense of another, we can understand why women are apprehensive to use power.

Vickers [1988] suggests, that as outsiders, women have come to see the exercise of power as an oppressive force and so, most are reluctant to now occupy positions of power, if it means becoming implicated in the oppression [CACSW, Fine Balances, 1988:5]. Hofmann Nemiroff [1982] suggests in her discussion of power that in our culture, power is customarily coupled with the words "over" and "of", which further indicates why women often debate about the use of power, as they often may have neither the right nor the duty to make decisions, although they often have a systematic influence on decisions that are made [Zimbalist Rosaldo, 1974]. Without more women in positions of power, we are unable to determine whether or not women become implicated in the oppression. This is dependent on the ways in which

power is used. Power does not necessarily have to imply "over" or "of", it could be replaced by "with", which would imply a less oppressive and hierarchical type of power. "With" implies that two or more persons are together, near each other, in agreement. "Power with" would be a more broad-based type of power, implying greater agreement in both how it is used and where it is used. It also suggests the notion of accompaniment, as in power with representation. If power is the ability to make an impact or to get others to do what one wants them to do, one needs access to certain resources that can be used to back one up. In order for a person or group to exert power "over", there must be reasons, such as fear, respect, admiration, greed, or loyalty for others in the environment to cooperate or comply [Lips, 1987:408]. To exert power "with", there must be a collaborative effort based on agreement rather than fear, which will enable the empowered group to move toward initiating change.

Women must however, strive for power "with". If women feel uncomfortable with seeking and exerting power because of its negative implications, then they must strive to use it "with". This will enable them to move

beyond influencing the decisions that are made, to become the makers of decisions.

More power for women means two things: increasing women's access to resources and to the positions which these resources are controlled; and increasing women's impact on the formation of policy about how our institutions function [Lips, 1987:403]. Women play a limited role in positions of power and there are many pressures reinforcing this role. Women are concentrated into different occupational groups than those into which men have tended to concentrate. The efforts of women to reach the top are stifled by discrimination and effective barriers to access and opportunity [Peitchinis, 1989]. More power for women is critical.

Increasing women's access to resources and positions and increasing women's ability to influence and formulate policy are important aspects of power. These are two critical aspects of power which open a wide range of possibilities for women. Resources and their linked positions offer room for women to redefine, direct and influence a variety of issues. Power for women also ensures that the formation of policy, the way it is interpreted and carried out can encompass the

goals of the group. Furthermore, power begets power and so, people who are thought to have power already and to be well placed in hierarchies of prestige and status, may also be more influential and more effective in getting people around them to do things [Kantner, 1977: 168]. As a result, women with power can be more effective in bringing together more people for creating change, using power "with".

Even if power is translated from "over" to "with", many women will still not necessarily want to become part of system within which both power "over" and power "with" operate. Faced with power, all women, whether feminists are not, are confronted with three possible strategies, suggests Pacquerot [1983]. They can become part of the existing structure of political power and find a position of equality within it. Women can challenge the existing power structure through parties whose goal is to pre-empt such power in order to transform it. Finally, they can remain on the fringes of the established structures in order to engage in pressure tactics and subversion [Pacquerot, 1983:59-60]. What is needed is all three strategies must be organized, as they each have a part to play in

redefining power. Some can continue to trickle-up into the structure of political power, as this forces some adjustments to be made within the structure. These adjustments are not transformative, but they do create a crack within the structure for those who wish to work within the system to foster change. They also provide access to the other structures and people which have the power to foster or hinder change. In the case of women in politics and on ABC's, we can strive to elect more women, who can potentially appoint more women.

Women can challenge the existing power structure and redefine power within the structure, so as to transform it. This is the goal behind establishing power "with". It can be done through new parties, whose foundation is agreement on transforming power and the system, but this is done in conjunction with the first strategy, in the sense that the new party still strives to enter the system, with change occurring once acceptance is gained into the system. There is however, room for both of these strategies to fail, or at least experience resistance. There is no guarantee that even with a different vision and definition of power that these can be introduced into the system. It is likely

to be resistant to the change and the basis for transforming power from "over" to "with" many stall or prove to be difficult to maintain as a goal, as efforts are coopted into the larger system.

Because of the difficulties of using power, in whatever form, as well as the oppressive nature of the system, others will prefer to remain on the fringes and pressure for change from a distance. This is an important function which needs to be done in conjunction with the two other strategies, as it provides a watchdog function for both of the other efforts trying to transform the system and for the system itself. This is the least aggressive way to create change, but it is also the most pure, in the sense that its message is not taken over, watered down or changed through efforts to enter the system. Remaining on the fringes provides both a safety to the message and an obscurity to its acceptance.

Regardless of the strategy that a group chooses to use, Kantner [1990] provides a blueprint that can be used for specific strategies for change. Societal change is the goal and it means that every institution, from education to business to government to the family

is the focus. Different groups will focus on different institutions, all with the goal of transforming the current ones.

Kantner [1990] suggests that to create strategies for societal change, we must create new organizations, both permanent and temporary alliances, as well as change the policies of existing ones. It is important to see ways of creating change as fluid and requiring flexibility. Power "with" different groups and organizations will be necessary to move change forward. Groups interested in moving change forward must apply two steps, which are especially significant. These are defining a vision and building a coalition [Kantner, 1990].

A vision is essential because it enables one to challenge conventional wisdom, like who is eligible for ABC membership, and it also offers new possibilities. Defining a vision enables a group to begin to work on establishing power "within" and "with" other groups. Kantner [1990] further suggests that dissatisfaction with the status quo is not enough to trigger change. Awareness of problems may create readiness for mobilization among the disadvantaged, as was the case

with the recommendations in the 1970 Royal Commission on the Status of Women, but, she argues, it may also drain much of people's energy, so that their ability to fight for change is dulled. Thus, a vision of new possibilities is essential to keep people focused not only on the problems, but the resolutions as well. It also enables the group to define the directions it will take and the methods it chooses to use.

The second significant approach to achieving women's economic empowerment is what Kantner describes as the ability to sell the vision to supporters and to make alliances with those who have power to move the idea forward or leave it where it is [Kantner, 1990:13]. This is establishing power "within" and "with". To establish power within, the group needs to build a coalition, consisting of a core group, who can rally around the vision. Those that are initiating the change need to function as a team, so as to be able to then identify the support that will be essential to making change. This is how power "with" is created. Upon getting power with, the group then needs to identify how to get them involved or get them to invest in the change effort.

After establishing a strong base of both power within and power with, the group must work towards overcoming resistance to change. Kantner [1990] recognizes that resistance to change is inevitable. She suggests that it must be overcome to initiate something new and to forge ahead in a different direction. Other times, it must be overcome so as to ensure that changes already made will remain in place. These strategies for change offer a concrete direction that can be taken to improve the current low level of representation of women on federally-appointed ABC's.

Combined with Pacquerot's [1983] strategies for change and Kantner's [1990] blueprint for action, women can direct their efforts toward the whole system, with different groups working on various institutions, both within the system and on the fringes. We must move beyond the token achievers and strive to create a means for all women to gain more than just access to economic empowerment.

Access is the first step, but it is not enough, as access does not guarantee acceptance for all. Although some women are gaining acceptance in municipal politics, on school boards, they still constitute a tiny minority

of any nations elites. Internationally, only one of the twenty-two powerful executive directors at the World Bank is a woman and the situation is exactly the same at the International Monetary Fund [Lindgren, 1990]. Also, despite its' fifteen year-old pledge to fill 30 percent of professional jobs with women by 1990, the United Nations failed to meet this goal. Women accounted for twenty-eight percent of these positions in 1990 and there were only two women among the forty-three people in the most senior positions [Lindgren, 1990]. Despite the so-called efforts to bring more women into these positions, little has changed.

The dismal number of women found in positions of power suggests that there must be barriers restricting women's access. St. Claire [1989] suggests that women are handicapped by their gender. A woman is handicapped by her gender when beliefs about her gender, and not her gender per se, account for limited opportunities and performances [St. Claire, 1989:130]. The few women found on federally-appointed ABC's would suggest that women may be limited in their opportunities to participate as regulators because of their gender. A handicap, in this sense, is defined as a socially

constructed disadvantage which limits, prevents, or devalues a given outcome in the handicapped person's life [St. Claire, 1989:130]. Women, it would seem, suffer a disadvantage in the appointment process which seems to ensure that few are found on ABC's.

St. Claire [1989] suggests that three factors, namely physical differences between men and women, inadequacies in women's performances, and women's failures to fulfill roles are frequently [mis]attributed to unchangeable biological givens and these [mis]attributions are beliefs that are disadvantageous to women. Physical differences between men and women are held up as a implicit reason to not hire, promote or appoint women, as they are likely to leave work to start a family. As long as women are perceived to have full responsibility for home and family, they will not be perceived equal to men in employment opportunities and pay [Peitchinis, 1989].

Inadequacies in women's performance might be the result of the perpetuation of gender-based stereotyping of occupations such as surgeon or cashier [Peitchinis, 1989:59]. If women are thought to be incompetent as regulators, plumbers, doctors or in any other "non-

traditional occupation for women, their performance will be more harshly judged and the coaching and support for the job would probably be withheld. Women's failures would also be used as examples of what happens when women take on jobs they were not meant for. These factors handicap women and are disadvantageous to their economic empowerment.

St.Claire outlines the ways in which women are handicapped. Women are handicapped if social psychological processes restrict women's access to roles, or put another way, if social psychological processes operate to restrict their potential social identities. For example, women's roles in our society frequently exclude occupations that are seen as more complex, difficult, strenuous and demanding. These include the higher levels in public office, management and academic professions and sport. These exclusions are generally attributed to the common sense view that men and women differ fundamentally and that these differences involve objective female deficiencies [or impairments] and, such differences and deficiencies have even been rarefied by past psychological research [St. Claire, 1989].

St. Claire further suggests that such exclusions are frequently based on beliefs about gender and are therefore instances of handicap rather than objective, gender-related inadequacies. This is most clearly revealed by cross-cultural and historical variation in access to roles in spite of a universal constancy in women's biology [St. Claire, 1989:137]. It is clear, argues St. Claire, that "women's exclusion from roles in our society, although attributed to their inherent weakness, is frequently an instance of handicap - that, is constructed by social psychological processes, fuelled by economic or political interests and purposes [St. Claire, 1989:138].

St.Claire's idea of women and handicap needs to be considered in relation to the limited number of women found on ABC's. Although the selection process is recognized as contributing significantly to the limited numbers of women found on ABC's, there must be other factors operating, which impede women's advancement prior to arriving at the eligibility pool as well as ensuring that even if found in the eligibility pool, the likelihood of selection is diminished.

St.Claire's concept of handicap affects women in

several different ways. For many, they are handicapped by their gender in trivial everyday disadvantages imposed by sexist assumptions. These assumptions affect women in their personal and public lives. For example, many people believe that women are not committed to employment in the marketplace, that their commitment is to family and home. Yet, of the 4,977,000 women in paid employment in 1986, almost 29 per cent had worked at their jobs 1-5 years, about 20 per cent had their jobs 6-10 years, 16 per cent were at their jobs 11-20 years and 5 per cent had their jobs over 20 years [Peitchinis, 1989]. The belief that women are not interested in work outside the home limits the opportunities available to women.

If we consider the appointment process for membership to ABC's, we see examples of women handicapped by their gender, as beliefs about their gender account for limited opportunities. The same could be said of federally-elected female politicians. Since women's first appearance in the House of Commons in 1921, they have only increased their representation to 13 per cent of elected members [Matas, 1990]. Judging by the rate of increase in women's

representation in federal politics, equality of the sexes is unlikely in the short term unless corrective measures are implemented. The rate of progress remains very slow and random , in part because the political parties have not instituted any mandatory measures to increase women's participation. If women continue to increase their number of seats at the same rate as between 1984 and 1988, the number of MPs remains constant at 295, it will take nine elections, or nearly 45 years, until an equal number of women and men are elected to the House of Commons [Maille, 1990:10]. This scenario is based on continuity of growth and in reality, some steps backward will likely occur unless specific measures are taken to increase the number of women elected [Maille, 1990].

Kantner [1990] states that the "whole social system must be changed if women in general, not just a hardy, pioneering few, are to gain economic power" [Kantner, 1990:11]. Each woman has to feel that she herself can do it and then she needs the coaching, education, opportunity, the support, the time, and the tools to do it [Kantner, 1990:11]. This kind of assistance and support, as well as the tools to do so, are not

individual matters, they are social system issues. They have to do with patterns in a society that have systematically made it harder for women than men to attain economic independence and economic power [Kantner, 1990:11]. Because of the pervasiveness of the patterns in society limiting women, women find it difficult to get help with the coaching and support necessary to achieve economic independence. Furthermore, women's socialization often leads them away from economic power.

In order to create change for women who strive for economic independence and economic power, we need to first identify the different areas where change is required. One area which needs to be considered is the current nature of women's and men's career patterns. How can we explain the ways in which men's and women's career patterns are different, similar and becoming more alike. A fuller understanding of career patterns is necessary, as it gives us insight into the ways in which career patterns could be adapted so as to enable more women to be seen as able to fulfill the demands of ABC appointment.

As Powell [1988] suggests, career patterns are

mostly determined by the actions of individuals about which career opportunities to pursue and how to prepare themselves for these opportunities and by the decisions of organizations about them. The actions of individuals needs to be considered within the framework of gender segregation. Gender segregation plays an important role in determining different career patterns for men and women. Jacobs [1989] suggests that gender segregation is maintained by a lifelong system of social control. He argues that gender segregation depends on the differential socialization of young men and women, sex-typed tracking in the educational system, and gender-linked social control at the workplace, at the hiring stage and beyond. Social control, he suggests, is operative at each stage of life. The maintenance of gender segregation depends on a lifelong system of social control because of the marked lack of continuity in values and behaviour from one life stage to another [Jacobs, 1989:48].

Jacobs [1989] further suggests that gender role socialization helps to initiate occupational segregation by gender, but the values and beliefs learned by individuals at young ages are constantly reinforced and

without constraints on opportunity, socialization by itself would not be sufficient to channel women into female-dominated occupations [Jacobs, 1989:48]. Thus, as St. Claire [1989] suggests, women are handicapped by their gender and this is continuously reinforced at all stages of life and in various different ways. Powell [1988] argues that there are many factors influencing career patterns and they are influenced indirectly by organizational practices and by personal and family factors, which in turn are influenced by social factors. Each of these types of factors may contribute to or alleviate a gender difference in career patterns. Factors are also likely to differ in the stage of career at which they have the greatest influence. Nevertheless, as Jacobs [1989] argues, the factors reinforcing gender segregation are maintained by a lifelong system of social control.

The gender segregation of occupations influences individuals career patterns by sending a message about which occupations are more appropriate for males and which are more appropriate for females. Although the similarity in educational levels between men and women allows for a degree of mobility between female-dominated

and male-dominated occupations, the social control perspective maintains that the pressure for women to pursue female-dominated positions does not end in early childhood [Jacobs, 1989:48]. Engineering is an example of an appropriate male occupation. Fewer than 3 per cent of all engineers were women in 1990, which is up from about 1 per cent twenty years ago, but unfortunately, women have been stuck at the 3 per cent plateau since 1986 [Dayton, 1990]. Furthermore, since 1986, only 11 per cent of engineering school graduates have been women [Dayton, 1990]. That showing is particularly poor considering that in other formerly male-dominated fields, there are signs of real progress. For example, in 1986, women comprised 48 percent in law; in commerce, 44 per cent; in medicine, 45 per cent; and in biological sciences, nearly 50 percent of the graduates were women [Dayton, 1990].

The gender segregation of occupations particularly affects the occupational aspirations and expectations of adolescent girls and boys and their initial decisions to pursue careers in some occupations and not others [Powell, 192, 1988]. Jacobs [1989] argues, however, that social control pressure is continually reinforced

and recreated through young adulthood, and continues during the years in the labour market and that it is therefore, not occupational specific. It may also affect men and women when they later decide to change occupations [Powell,1988]. Although many internalize the social control values, others successfully challenge the constraints imposed on them. Nevertheless, many stereotypes are applied to those who violate gender-role norms, with women managers often seen as pushy and aggressive [Jacobs, 1988:49]. Thus, given a system that labels women's employment in male-dominated occupations as deviant, it is not surprising that women also face continuous subtle and overt barriers to successful competition for employment, selection, promotion or appointment in male-dominated settings, as well as barriers to effective performance, once that employment is secured. Unfortunately, there is no easy way to eliminate the obstacles women face, as they are the result of complex social, historical and economic conditions.

Although there is no easy way to eliminate the obstacles women face, change can be encouraged through the organizational practices carried out. Powell [1988]

suggests four types of organizational practices. First, the programs and techniques that organizations use to meet their own staffing needs, such as human resource forecasting, succession planning and job posting could be implemented in a way that offers opportunities to women. As well, training and development programs that organizations offer to or mandate for employees could address women's needs within the organization. Third, career planning services that organizations provide for individuals, such as personal career counselling and career planning workshops could also be used as a way to eliminate sex segregation by assisting women in the planning of their careers, so as to overcome the barriers in place to their advancement. Finally, other organizational practices, such as availability of alternative work patterns and child care support would prove effective in assisting both men and women manage their careers [Powell, 1988]. These changes could potentially enable women to overcome the subtle and overt barriers to effective employment that they face and perhaps, allow more women to enter into positions of power within organizations.

Career patterns need to be considered, as do the

barriers women face in their careers, as they provide us with a sense of the impact of social control on women's occupational choices. [Powell, 1988] suggests that past work experience often differ according to gender. Women tend to have careers that begin later and are interrupted more often than men, although these differences are diminishing. Demographic factors such as age, education and race also affect an individuals' career pattern, according to Powell [1988]. Powell [1988] found that in a study of the career patterns of women over age thirty, those between thirty and thirty-five years of age were the most likely to have uninterrupted career patterns, while another study found that education had a similar positive effect on the level achieved in the same organization for women and men, but that age had a more positive effect for men than women [Powell, 1988:195].

Past work experiences have a strong influence on an individuals' present and future career success. As Jacobs [1989] suggests, however, attrition begins before women are employed, in the period during which values are developing and educational choices are being made. Social control is not restricted, he argues, to early-

life socialization or to employment settings, but is a constant feature of social life that steadily reinforces occupational segregation by gender [Jacobs, 1989:49].

Gender roles are rooted in our history, as they are defined by our religions, delineated by our legal systems and reinforced by our cultures [Colwill, 1987]. Sex roles have varied from time to time and from place to place, but with one consistent feature: in virtually every society throughout history women and all things feminine have been seen as inferior to men and all things masculine [Colwill, 1987:99]. Furthermore, gender roles are a classic case of the enforcement of social definitions of deviance, with unfeminine behaviour by women resulting in sharp signals of social disapproval [Jacobs, 1989:48]. One result of the reinforced definition of feminine behaviour, whereby things feminine are seen as inferior, is that in many situations, for example, meetings, women are often more tentative and less direct in making their points. In a mixed sex group they are less likely to speak at all [Lips, 1988]. She further suggests that another reason women do not express themselves forcefully in group situations is that they have learned to be sensitive to

men's reactions, while men have learned to be insensitive to women's voices, by interrupting and not pursuing a topic once it is broached. Lips [1988] felt this learned attitude begins in childhood, is fostered in schools and continues in adult life [Lips, 1988:10]. Colwill [1987] also argues that sex role socialization, the process whereby we learn our sex roles, continues from birth to death, at home, at school, at work, and in all social settings.

Russell [1986] found examples of these learned sex role attitudes in girls in school. Through an analysis of the education process, she found that girls in school are the focus of pressures to encourage them to accept subordinate positions in both the labour force and the family [Russell, 1986]. They are encouraged to believe that their exclusive role is or ought to be childbearing or childrearing, and that work that they take on in the labour force is secondary to their role in the family [Russell, 1986]. Wilson [1986] also recognizes the potency of the expectation that women will have a major commitment to domestic and family life, an expectation that "begins to affect women when they are very young" [Wilson, 1986:99]. Its impact is

great as even women who have been in the labour force for many years define their work as temporary [Wilson, 1986].

School personnel exert domestic role pressures through job counselling and through undermining the academic ability of girls while focusing on their domestic futures [Russell, 1986]. "It is under these pressures that the vast majority of girls sail through school and assume their subordinate roles in the domestic sphere and in the labour force" [Russell, 1986: 343]. The theme of subordinate roles for women continues throughout women's educational experiences.

As women have gradually and reluctantly been admitted into the mainstream of higher education, they have been made participants in a system that prepares men to take up roles of power in a man-centered society, that asks questions and teaches "facts" generated by a male intellectual tradition, and that both subtly and openly confirms men as the leaders and shapers of human destiny both within and outside academia" [Rich, 1979 as quoted in Dagg and Thompson, 1988:1].

With the gradual and reluctant admission of women into mainstream higher education has also come differential enrollment patterns in school. These differential enrollment patterns in school tie women closely to the gender-segregated labour market. Girls are still under-

represented in physical science courses, in mathematics, computer science and industrial arts. They are, however, over-represented in business courses, in home economics, in languages and in the humanities [Gaskell et al, 1989]. By the time students are enrolled in community colleges and universities, the differences become more pronounced and obvious. Nevertheless, receiving an education has become an increasingly important component of modern life, as schooling has often been touted as a means for various social groups, including women, to attain equal representation in all areas of life [Guppy et al, 1988].

The attainment of equal representation in all areas of life is believed to be achieved through education and yet, it is educational process that participates in sex segregation. In 1970, the Royal Commission on the Status of Women concluded that the school curriculum underplayed or ignored a woman's creative and intellectual potential in the education of children from their earliest years. Changes have been made but in 1988, the Federation of Women Teachers of Ontario published a study of elementary readers in use in Ontario, and they showed that the stereotyping that had

been documented in 1970 was still prevalent in Ontario texts [Russell, 1988:36]. This suggests that education plays an important part in maintaining women's disadvantaged position in society.

If education is the route women must take to overcome barriers they face and yet, education participates in reinforcing barriers for women, then this is an institution which needs to be targeted by women to transform it, so that it becomes one which is supportive of both men and women. Kantner [1990] offers the steps which women can take to organize for change and these need to be carried out both in the socialization process and in the institutions of education, so that these two areas, which participate in the social control of women by exerting pressure to pursue female-dominated positions can be transformed. In doing so, both men and women will look to the workplace and their own private lives, hopefully with a different and more positive perspective on women and their abilities. With the transformation of these two areas, change will then move to the workplace and government.

We cannot hope and wait that changes in

socialization processes and in education will result in greater power for women in society. In the immediate, we need to begin by working toward equal access to elite roles, particularly in government and on ABC's, as access to elites roles "constitutes the most difficult and intractable problem in achieving gender equality [Chafetz, 1990:221]. Elites are usually vitally concerned with protecting, if not enhancing, their own positions and given the organizational resources at their disposal, they will usually be able to guard their status from perceived threat by non-elites of all kinds [Chafetz, 1990]. Furthermore, as the equitable sharing of elite roles clearly involves the redistribution of power, it is most likely to experience the greatest amount of hostility and resistance to change. Furthermore, as Chafetz [1990] recognizes, equal access to elite roles is the most difficult problem to achieve and the most important since "without it, all other improvements in women's relative status remain incomplete, fragile, and easily lost" [Chafetz, 1990: 221].

To create change in the appointment process in Canada, so as to ensure greater representation of women

on ABC's, several steps need to be taken. First, more women need to run for political office. There are numerous barriers which women face in trying to run and succeeding, but it is an important starting point that needs to be encouraged. Women can run either with current, established political parties or in newly-formed ones. As more women run, more will be elected. With an ever-increasing number of women elected, women will be able to bring their own agendas to the forefront. This is the first step in creating change, as it is contended that as more women are elected to the federal government, more women will be appointed to ABC's and therefore, will have access to public policy, both in government and in quasi-government agencies.

It is, of course, important for those women within the current structure to look back and see the women behind them and encourage and assist them. Also, women in the system need to use the tools available to them to foster change. Those who decide to remain on the fringes must continue to influence from outside of the sources of power, reminding everyone of the changes that are necessary and the commitments that have been made. It is only by getting people and organizations to

collaborate that change can move across boundaries. These strategies can be implemented and change, despite the resistance can be created.

Chapter 7

CONCLUSION

This has been a study of the federal government's appointment process as it pertains in Canada to the regulatory agencies, boards and commissions [ABC's]. It was undertaken to try and account for the relatively small proportion of women among these government appointments, hence, the relative lack of women's perspective on the policy areas in which the ABCs are concerned. This small representation exists despite the fact that women have been making considerable progress in other facets of social life in Canada, for example, in the professions. That is, while they have increased their participation rate at some levels they have been excluded from the centres of power in our society. The exclusion of women from positions of power offers them a challenge to foster change in Canadian society.

The struggle to transform society as a whole, offers women a substantial challenge. Some women may be important, powerful and influential, but relative to men of their age and social status, women everywhere lack generally recognized and culturally valued authority [Zimbalist Rosaldo, 1974]. The lack of social power for

women is a core problem. Males are situated in the highest stratum of every social institution - the economic system, the political and legal systems, the family, the military, the educational and religious systems. The differences in men's and women's attitudes and behaviour are produced by the different and unequal social roles they play. The differences enhance the likelihood that roles will be distributed on the basis of gender to the continuing disadvantage of women. This is the case with ABC appointments. Women are continuously denied access to this regulatory policy process. Women are not in a position to change the current process because of their lack of social and political power.

The struggle for power by women has focused on not being excluded from voting, rights, jobs, organizations and full legal status as persons. This has taken up much of women's collective energy for decades [Lips, 1987]. The power to change requires resources superior to those controlled by compliers. Power wielders must have at their command something that compliers value and need or want and cannot otherwise get in sufficient quantity. In this case, women are kept off of ABC's

because they are not able to grasp enough political power in elected government to do otherwise. The power of all positions which offer resources and rewards like those of political leaders, judges, high-level managers and officers of economic and professional organizations and ABC appointment, tend to be primarily, if not exclusively held with people who are male. That is, some men will get to decide who gains access to various opportunities, who gets to fill vacant positions, like ABC appointment, and who is promoted into yet more highly rewarded positions. Political elites, who tend to be men, have the advantage in Canada of the availability of thousands of ABC appointments which can be awarded at their discretion.

Few women are found on ABC's, but they should no longer be excluded, according to the law. Legislation is supposed to guarantee women's access access. Because of guaranteed access, there has been the appointment or election of women in Canada to such positions as Governor General, Supreme Court Justice, national political party leader, general and astronaut. There also are women journalists, lawyers, and physicians. Guaranteed access does not ensure inclusion, whether

that be to ABC appointments or high paying professional occupations. Most Canadian women remain segregated into relatively few, mostly low-skilled, poorly paid occupations [Armstrong and Armstrong, 1984].

The problem with access is that it does not guarantee opportunity. Furthermore, the right to not be excluded does not ensure women are included. In fact, the result of "non-exclusion" legislation is that society in general is no longer tolerant of women's new demands, which are "inclusion". Women continue to point out the barriers that are still in place and keep them from well-rewarded jobs. Women's work brings fewer rewards and opportunities for advancement [Mackie, 1991]. Society, however, sees women's demands for equality as a nasty surprise, since equality has already been achieved, with time for catch-up, the only remaining constraint. The media regularly depict women in elite professions as models and superwomen. This kind of focus suggests that equality has been achieved. In fact, many Canadians see women's groups who demand equality as tiresome, like television sitcoms. Their plots are always the same and the ending predictable. The theme is usually women are under-paid, they face

barriers to their advancement and changes must be adopted to improve women's conditions. These are all valid points and true, but often go unheard. As a result, Canadians have become bored with women's efforts at economic empowerment and with the boredom, comes indifference.

Women's reality is that, in almost every professional field, they are underemployed and underpaid relative to their male counterparts [Abella, 1984]. In Canada, they are paid less, have fewer real opportunities and face more barriers to their advancement in the workplace. Work is a central dimension of individuals lives, determining people's daily activities. Some men get to decide who gains access to various educational and training opportunities and vacant positions and promotions [Chafetz, 1990]. Men tend to favour other men for these rewards.

Work is a central dimension of individuals lives, determining people's daily activities. Moreover, work largely defines people's class as status in the social structure. The increasing education of women enhances their labour force activity. "The more educated a woman, the more likely she will be in the labour force

continuously, and the more likely she will remain in the labour force over a lifetime of work [Peitchinis, 1989: 43]". Nevertheless, women in Canadian society experience constraints and these are reflected in their experiences and opportunities in the workforce. In fact, there is only a relatively small number of women in senior bureaucratic positions at all levels of government, in all countries [Peitchinis, 1989]. The connection between women and work in Canadian society offers insight into the relationship between women's disadvantaged position in the labour force market and their under-representation in positions of power and on ABC's. The efforts of women to reach the top are still stifled by discrimination and effective barriers to access and opportunities [Peitchinis, 1989].

The sharp increase in women's labour force participation, as well as the publicity given to female pioneers in non-traditional occupations such as truck driving and construction work, convey the impression that numerous changes have taken place in women's work situations. Indeed, they have. Many women are entering non-traditional occupations in greater numbers. Many

women, however, have not seen any changes in the nature of the work they do. This is probably due to the fact that the growth of women's paid employment has occurred in a strongly gender-segregated labour market. In fact, women are still overwhelmingly slotted into specific industries and occupations characterized by low pay, low skill requirements, low productivity, and low prospects for advancement [Armstrong and Armstrong, 1984:18]. As women are under-represented in positions of power in the labour force, they have little power to change their position. They are also under-represented on ABC's because of the barriers they face in the the selection process.

The appointment process, as it currently operates guarantees most women will be "excluded". Exclusion ensures women are kept out of this arena of power. In being kept out of the regulatory role as an ABC member, women are not able to influence, determine and implement policy. If women cannot effect regulation, they cannot create change from within. This ensures the maintenance of the current system unless women struggle for change in other ways.

One of the ways in which women are limited in their

participation on ABC's is the reliance on patronage [FACTOR CONSIDERED] as an important method of selection [HOW CHOSEN]. To diminish the role of patronage in the selection process, the process needs to be opened up, so that some of the secrecy and arbitrariness is eliminated. This would allow for more women to become involved [WHO IN E. POOL], as they now must rely upon the whim of political actors [WHO CHOOSES] to gain appointment [WHO CHOSEN].

The political actors serve as gatekeepers, distributing opportunities and rewards in the form of ABC appointments. They give preference to their own kind, which among other attributes, includes maleness. The male elites play a dominant role in social institutions possessing power and authority. The goal for women is to strive for greater access and opportunity to participate wherever they desire.

Women want to participate in the area of regulation. Regulation is complex, requiring specialized regulators who have technical training and expertise [Schultz, 1984]. A major requirement in the establishment of regulatory boards was they should not be affected by partisanship or favouritism. To meet

this objective required the delegation of regulation to regulators who would be insulated from political pressures [Schultz, 1984]. ABC's are not run by regulators independent from political pressures. They are mostly filled with people who have direct links to the elected government. The steady stream of patronage appointments threatens the independence of ABC's. Partisan appointments also lead to an erosion of public confidence in ABC's. Many appointees thank political loyalty or longevity rather than merit for their position. Although, the government in power relies upon ABC appointments for party support, it is necessary to demand not the elimination of patronage in the selection process, as it is too much a part of government and human nature to be eliminated, but, its role must be diminished.

The current selection process of ABC regulators will not change without consistent effort to foster change. Women need to take steps to organize for change. These steps need to be carried out in both the socialization process and in the institutions of education. This will encourage these two areas to be transformed. With the transformation of these two

areas, change will then move to the workforce and government. We cannot, however, hope and wait for these changes to occur. Women must work toward equal access to elite roles, particularly in government and on ABC's. Elite roles are the most difficult and intractable problem women face in achieving gender equality [Chafetz, 1990].

To create change in the appointment process in Canada, more women need to run for political office. Women can join established political parties or join newly formed ones. As more women run, more will be elected. With an ever-increasing number of women elected, more will be part of [WHO CHOOSES] and as a result, new agendas will be brought to the forefront. As more women are elected to the federal government, more will be appointed to ABC's. Women, therefore, will have access to public policy, both in government and in quasi-government agencies. This may encourage changes in the appointment process, whereby merit is used as the basis of selection. By getting people and organizations working together, with a shared vision, change can move across boundaries. We know that favourable change will not inevitably continue and so, to improve their

position in society, women must continue to strive for increased access to the major institutions. Increased access to resources and positions of power would enable women to impact on policy and define how institutions function. The challenge is to use the strategies for change to re-invent the vision in a way that is new and fresh for those that must be brought into the fold for change to continue.

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