1

MICRO

National Library
of Canada

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Canadian Theses Service

Service des thèses canadiennes

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, tests publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30.

Permission has been granted to the National Library of Canada to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author (copyright owner) has reserved other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her written permission.

L'autorisation a été accordée à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de microfilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur (titulaire du droit d'auteur) se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation écrite.

Student Attitudes Toward
Political Corruption in Canada

by

Kenneth Michael Gibbons, M.A.

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of
Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Political Science

Carleton University

OTTAWA, Ontario

July 23, 1984

© Kenneth Michael Gibbons 1984

LICENCE TO CARLETON UNIVERSITY

In the interests of facilitating research by others at this institution and elsewhere, I hereby grant a licence to:

CARLETON UNIVERSITY

to make copies of my thesis:

Student Attitudes Toward Political
Corruption in Canada

or substantial parts thereof, the copyright which is invested in me, provided that the licence is subject to the following conditions:

Only singled copies shall be made or authorized to be made at any one time, and only in response to a written request from the library of any university or similar institution on its own behalf or on behalf of one of its users.

This licence shall continue for the full term of the copyright, or for so long as may be legally permitted.

The Universal Copyright Notice shall appear on the title page of all copies made under the authority of this licence.

This licence does not permit the sale of authorized copies at a profit, but does permit the collection by the institution or institutions concerned of charges covering actual costs.

All copies under the authority of this licence shall bear a statement to the effect that the copy in question "is being made available in this form by the authority of the copyright owner solely for the purpose of private study and research and may not be copied or reproduced except as permitted by the copyright laws without written authority from the copyright owner."

The foregoing shall in no way preclude the granting by the author of a licence to the National Library of Canada to reproduce the thesis and to lend or to sell copies of the same. For this purpose it shall also be permissible for Carleton University to submit the abovementioned thesis to the National Library of Canada.

Betsy Carleton
Signature of Witness

18 SEPT 1984
Date

PH. D.
Degree

Kenneth M. Gibbons
Signature of Student

POLITICAL SCIENCE
Department of Student

The undersigned hereby recommend to
The Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
acceptance of the thesis, submitted by
Kenneth M. Gibbons, B.A., M.A.
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Alan Rickhoff

.....
Chairman, Department of
Political Science

J. B. Rowat

.....
Thesis Supervisor

Kenneth Kernaghan

.....
External Examiner

Carleton University

September 20, 1984

ABSTRACT

The thesis argues that the most appropriate definition of political corruption is based on public opinion and that citizens are capable of making conceptual distinctions between types of corruption and between dimensions of corruption. By making such distinctions, they reveal what kinds of actions they hold to be corrupt, common, undemocratic, relevant to specific levels of government or to specific political parties and so on.

Elite opinion was estimated by a review of existing legislation at the federal and provincial levels in Canada, but public opinion was estimated by the use of a survey of student attitudes at five Canadian universities. The survey revealed that the way people conceptualize corruption is influenced by a number of independent variables common to Canadian attitudinal research: region, party preference, age, knowledge and efficacy were particularly important. Of modest consequence were social class, trust, community size and gender.

The exploratory nature of this analysis and the restrictions inherent in a student sample require caution, but the findings nevertheless suggest that further research on attitudes toward corruption should be encouraged.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are a number of people I would like to thank for their help in completing this dissertation. First and foremost among these is my advisor, Professor Donald C. Rowat, to whom I would like to express my sincere gratitude for his guidance, confidence and extreme patience in supervising this thesis.

I would also like to thank Professors K.Z. Paltiel and Michael S. Whittington for their helpful comments and suggestions on the thesis. My appreciation also goes out to Professor Whittington and Professors Gary Munro, Stewart Hyson, and Raymond Hudon for their time and effort in distributing the questionnaires to their students.

For generous financial support, I would like to thank the Office of the Vice-President (Academic) of the University of Winnipeg. For his assistance in familiarizing me with a new computer system, I am grateful to John Hilton. Madame Brigitte Lenoski's excellent work in translating the questionnaire into French is also acknowledged.

Finally, I am grateful to Karen Bruchanski for her fine work in preparing the final draft of the dissertation, to the Department of Political Science at the University of Winnipeg for its patience and moral support and, most of all, to Betsy Gibbons, for her selfless efforts as my research assistant and her constant encouragement.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES	VII
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER TWO: THE STUDY OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION	10
The Significance of Political Corruption in the Literature	
Problems in Defining the Concept of Political Corruption	
Public Interest and Political Corruption	
An Attitudinal Approach to the Study of Corruption	
The Relevance of the Study	
CHAPTER THREE: TOWARD A DEFINITION AND TYPOLOGY OF CORRUPTION	48
Toward a Definition of Political Corruption	
Dimensions of Political Corruption: Foundations of a Typology	
Types of Political Corruption	
CHAPTER FOUR: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF CORRUPTION	81
Review of the Theoretical Literature	
Synthesizing the Theoretical Literature: Attitudinal Theory	
CHAPTER FIVE: THE PLACE OF CORRUPTION IN CANADIAN LAW	117
The Scope of Legislation: Electoral Activities Campaign Financing	
Bribery, Graft and Influence-Peddling	
Patronage and Nepotism: The "Grey" Ethics of Civil Service Hiring	
Conflict of Interest: Moving From Grey to Black Discussion	

CHAPTER SIX: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON ATTITUDES TOWARD CORRUPTION	158
Canadian Empirical Research: Twenty Years of Gallup Polls	
Canadian Empirical Research: Academic Sources	
Exploratory American Research	
Conclusion: Hypotheses Suggested by Existing Research	
CHAPTER SEVEN: SURVEY METHODOLOGY	210
The Survey Sample and Problems of Generalization	
The Questionnaire	
Statistical Analysis	
CHAPTER EIGHT: THE SURVEY FINDINGS I: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS	234
The Correspondence of the Student Sample to the General Population	
Background Characteristics: Socio-economic and Political Variables	
The Corruption Scenarios	
CHAPTER NINE: THE SURVEY FINDINGS II: ANALYSIS OF BIVARIATE AND MULTIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS	290
Prologue: Effects of Political and Socio-economic Variables on Salience	
Independent Variables and the Dimensions of Corruption	
Epilogue: Multivariate Relationships and the Need to "Control"	
CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION	361
APPENDIX: ENGLISH AND FRENCH SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES	372
BIBLIOGRAPHY	390

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

FIGURE		PAGE
1.	An Attitude Theory of Corruption: Synthesis	111
TABLE		PAGE
I.	Types and Dimensions of Political Corruption	65
II.	Statutes Consulted Relating to Corruption	119
III.	Gallup Poll Released May 29, 1965	165
IV.	Gallup Poll Released November 24, 1973	170
V.	Gallup Polls Released September 24, 1976 and October 2, 1982	174
VI.	Rank-ordering of Corruption Types as to Judgement and Extent of Practice	201
VII.	Distribution of Sample by Region	217
VIII.	Comparison of Student Sample to Gallup Polls on Ranking of Most Important Polls	238
IX.	Comparison of Equivalent Items in Student and National Samples Regarding Rank-orders of Various Groups or Institutions on Trustworthiness, Honesty, Respect, etc.	240
X.	Comparison of Student and National Samples on Efficacy Items	242
XI.	Comparison of Student Sample and National Sample on Awareness of the Watergate Scandal	244
XII.	Distribution of Demographic Variables	248
XIII.	Rank-ordering of Issues According to Their Importance to the Respondent	257
XIV.	Rating of Individual Institutions and Groups in Terms of Their Trustworthiness and Distribution of Respondents on a Composite "Trust" Index	257
XV.	Data on Ethical Standards and Respect, Gallup Polls	260

XVI.	Awareness and Knowledge of Political Events Reported by the Media to Be of Dubious Ethical Character	263
XVII.	Partisanship in the Student Sample	266
XVIII.	Ratings of "Corruption" Scenarios	270
XIX.	Rank-ordering of Corruption Scenarios Comparing Semantic Differentials, According to Means, Standard Deviations and Saliency Scores	277
XX.	Effects of Independent Variables on the Saliency of "Corrupt-Not Corrupt" Continua: Summary	293
XXI.	Knowledge of Corrupt Events (% Answering Correctly or Vaguely Correct, Questionnaire Part One, Item 3) By Campus	299
XXII.	Dimensions of Corruption Which Are the "Most Affected" and "Least Affected" By Independent Variables: Summary	309
XXIII.	Scenarios and Continua Ranked According to the Number of Significant Relationships with Independent Variables: Summary	309
XXIV.	Independent Variables Ranked According to the Number of Dimensions (Scenarios Plus Continua) of Corruption They Affect: Summary	310
XXV.	The Effect of Region (Campus and Province) on Corruption Dimensions	316
XXVI.	The Effect of Federal Party Preference on Corruption Dimensions	327
XXVII.	The Effect of Provincial Party Preference on Corruption Dimensions	329
XXVIII.	The Effect of Belonging to a Social Class on Corruption Dimensions	336
XXIX.	The Effect of Respondent's Subjective Social Class on Corruption Dimensions	336
XXX.	The Effect of Community Size on Corruption Dimensions	337
XXXI.	The Effect of Age on Corruption Dimensions	338

XXXII.	The Effect of Sex on Corruption Dimensions	339
XXXIII.	The Effect of Political Knowledge on Corruption Dimensions	<u>343</u>
XXXIV.	The Effect of Trust on Corruption Dimensions	344
XXXV.	The Effect of Political Trust on Corruption Dimensions	344
XXXVI.	The Effect of Efficacy on Corruption Dimensions	348
XXXVII.	The Effect of Agreement with the Efficacy Item - "Politicians don't care what people like me think" on Corruption Dimensions	349
XXXVIII.	The Effect of Agreement with the Efficacy Item - "Sometimes politics and government are so complicated that a person like me can't understand what is going on" on Corruption Dimensions	351
XXXIX.	The Effect of Level of Study on Corruption Dimensions	353
XL.	The Effect of Number of Political Science Courses on Corruption Dimensions	353
XLI.	Controlling Selected Relationships for Region and Age	357

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The study of political corruption has undergone a recent resurgence in political science. Having shaken its former association with "muckraking" and "yellow journalism", it now takes its place in academic respectability alongside other salient concepts in a way that had been heretofore denied. While the now infamous Watergate scandal in the United States certainly aided in reawakening scholarly interest in the subject both in the U.S. and abroad, the first signs of revival actually predated Watergate. Important works by Carl Friedrich and James Scott were published in 1972,¹ and Rogow and Lasswell's Power, Corruption and Rectitude appeared almost a decade earlier.² Heidenheimer's collection of readings on political corruption, at the time a central sourcebook in a relatively barren field, was published in 1970.³ However, it is apparent that, since Watergate, a sharp increase in academic publishing on this concept can be noted.

These works and others marked the renewal of interest by academics in a subject area which was magnified and made topical by Watergate, by the Lockheed bribery scandals, by various smaller events in Canada, by a case involving royalty in the Netherlands, and even by an event involving a state-run circus in the Soviet Union.⁴ Given this litany of incidents of dubious ethical character, it is noteworthy that political science literature prior to the 1970's seemed to imply that corruption was a problem primarily for third world nations. Yet the current literature, both academic and journalistic, indicates otherwise. Rather than adopting a smug "holier-than-thou" attitude in this regard, we should begin to

understand that corruption does not simply fade away with the advent of an advanced political and economic development. It may alter its appearance or even lessen in scope of intensity, but it is clear that it will not disappear.

The study of political corruption is thus the topic of this thesis in the most general sense. However, in a more specific sense, its purpose is to examine political corruption in terms of the attitudes and opinions expressed by the Canadian public. It will be argued that it is the study of the attitude of the public towards corruption which is, at one and the same time, both personally and academically satisfying. It is academically satisfying because it is the attitudinal or opinion dimension of politics which so well defines what is or is not corrupt or unethical, what is or is not salient to the public regarding such matters as malfeasance, misfeasance, or nonfeasance. The argument advanced by Scott that the legal dimension which is the most appropriate for the study of corruption is unduly restrictive, based as it is on the assumption that laws represent widely held operationalizations of community mores.⁵ Is this sufficient reason for adopting such a notably narrow focus? Not if we accept the argument of Heidenheimer who contends that norms rather than laws are the key to understanding corruption. He cites approvingly the words of Robert Brooks and Joseph Senturia who, in the early 1900's, rejected legalistic definitions as "scarcely broad enough" and "not the essence of the concept."⁶

As will be argued in detail later, how else but through opinions and attitudes do we attempt to explain such phenomena as the defeat of a government at the polls over charges of corruption which do not

result in legal action? How else do we begin to unravel the interrelationship between public officials' unethical behaviour, growing distrust and cynicism among voters, and the decline in state legitimacy? How else do we explain how and why laws change, that legalistic definitions are as mutable in their own way as public opinion? Legalistic definitions are salient but not exhaustive.

It is contended here that insufficient attention has been given to the study of political corruption in Canada, especially public attitudes toward corruption. Thus, this thesis is intended to help fill that gap in Canadian political science literature. Moreover, an effective argument may be made regarding the public policy implications of such a study. It will be maintained later that there is an interesting connection between the public opinion conception of political corruption and some theories or notions of the concept of public interest. Public interest, moreover, is frequently the catchphrase employed by policy-makers in the development of "selling" of their policies. The connection then is that laws, regulations and guidelines on unethical or corrupt behaviour stem from the notion of public interest and that, further, this notion of public interest, or can be, defined by public opinion. Hence, as proponents of a public interest approach to policy-making might argue, public attitudes and opinions regarding political corruption become grist for the policy-making mill. Consequently, the significance of this thesis rests on policy grounds as well as upon strictly scholarly considerations.

The preceding indicates part of the motivation of the basic proposition of the thesis, which follows below. The underlying

assumption of the thesis is that public opinion (the empirical foundation of public interest) is the key to understanding political corruption. This understanding, in turn, is based on the assumption that opinion establishes the definition of corruption and the evaluation of political behaviour which involves this notion of corruption. The basic proposition of this thesis then is as follows:

one can delineate and differentiate between various and sundry political behaviours as to the degree to which they are held to be corrupt by the public, and that, in this sense corruption is defined by public opinion and attitudes.

Given this proposition we may derive further specific hypotheses, of which the following are the most consequential.

1. The manner in which the public "defines" political corruption (in the sense noted in the basic proposition) is influenced, in part, by many of the same factors which influence the general development of political attitudes and opinion. Therefore:
2. There are discernible regional differences in the way people perceive political corruption, regarding what is defined as corrupt, how important that behaviour may be, how common is its occurrence, etc.
3. There are other patterns of differentiation which reflect general political attitude development, including such variables as class background, party affiliation, gender, occupation, rural-urban background and political knowledge, which also influence to some degree one's attitude towards

corruption, its importance, its prevalence, and so on.

4. There is a connection or association to be made between the psychological variable of political efficacy and attitudes towards corruption. Logically, one would expect that efficacy will be associated with more censorious attitudes toward corruption, with the belief that corruption is common, and perhaps even with greater knowledge about corrupt activity in the past.

These central hypotheses, together with narrower and more explicit hypotheses to follow in later chapters, will be tested by means of an opinion and attitudinal survey submitted to nearly 300 university students from five different campuses in five different regions of Canada. While this survey will have certain limitations regarding generalizability, these will be mitigated to some degree by a review of existing empirical research on corruption, both in Canada and elsewhere. The cost of survey research prohibits the use of more elaborate and technically superior methods such as national surveys of the general population.

The limitation noted above will receive elaboration in the chapter on methodology. However, a brief discussion is necessary here to establish this point at least temporarily: attitudinal and opinion surveys conducted on a national scale in Canada have not served the concept of political corruption well to date. Questions have been asked in polls conducted by the Canadian Institute for Public Opinion (Gallup or CIP0 polls) over the years, but the last national election survey was conducted in 1974 by Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc and Panmnett and did not contain a single specific question on the subject. Even the

open-ended question did not register enough mentions of corruption to qualify as a separate issue, distinct from "other specific issues".⁷ While this surely indicates that corruption was not a major issue in the 1974 national election, this does not help us evaluate how corruption is ranked against other issues in importance, or which types of behaviour are deemed corrupt or not, when direct comparison or evaluation is called for. Similarly, the questions in the appropriate Gallup (CIPO) polls are also lacking in sufficient detail to warrant the type of depth required of the subject.

While elaboration of the methodology will occur later, a few remarks about the central, even pivotal, element of the questionnaire should be noted at the outset. The primary tool for eliciting detailed evaluation of political behaviour in this study is the development of hypothetical scenarios to which the student is expected to respond. The response is along a number of dimensions which are suggested through the use of semantic differentials which ask the respondent to indicate whether or not an act designated by the hypothetical scenario is corrupt, important, common, etc., and to what degree. In no other survey of Canadian public opinion has such an extensive series of questions about corruption been proffered, in this or any other form. A method vaguely resembling this approach has been used in an American survey of Congressmen, but while it had a complex series of scenarios, it also had simplistic evaluations and rankings.⁸

The dissertation will be organized in the following manner. Chapter Two will provide an overview of the place of political corruption in the literature of political science, a preliminary discussion of definitional problems, the relevance of the concept of

public interest, and the appropriateness of the attitudinal approach in a general sense. Chapter Three will review the existing political science literature in order to elaborate upon both definitions and to propose a typology of corruption. Chapter Four will discuss the theoretical framework being used in this study by building on past theoretical literature and synthesizing a new perspective. Chapter Five will discuss the current status of political corruption and related ethical issues in Canadian legislation, regulations and guidelines. A review of existing statutes and the like will be presented, referring to both federal and provincial levels of government. Chapter Six will review existing empirical research, thereby going beyond the theoretical and definitional areas treated earlier, as well as the legislative and administrative ones noted in the previous chapter. Specific attention will be given to the meager empirical research on corruption in Canada, some studies done in a comparative context that may suggest interesting hypotheses for the Canadian experience, and a discussion of related social-psychological findings, such as those from efficacy and political trust research, which have bearing on this study. From this will emerge the reasons for a more specific survey such as employed in this dissertation.

The seventh chapter will discuss in detail the methodology of the survey, with particular concern for an elaboration of the questionnaire items, the survey sample, and the statistical techniques to be employed. The results of the survey will be reviewed in chapters Eight and Nine. Chapter Eight will describe the results in general, attempting to arrive at some notion of what the public defines as corrupt. Further, the limitations of the sample for generalization

will be noted, with reference to the methodology chapter. Chapter Nine will proceed to more complex analytical levels, discussing the relationship between attitudes on corruption and various independent variables such as region, party, social class, age, etc. (Certain confounding elements affecting such variables are accounted for in the questionnaire and will be employed in the analysis). The first attempt at verifying the main hypotheses will occur here through simple bivariate analysis. Chapter Nine will also provide further tests of the hypotheses by subjecting them to multivariate analysis by means of controls for intervening variables to ensure that relationships noted in the previous chapter are not spurious. Chapter Ten will be the conclusion. It will discuss the significance of the findings for the study of corruption and the possible public policy implications of the research. The full questionnaire can be found in the appendix.

NOTES

1. Carl J. Friedrich, The Pathology of Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), ch. 8-10; James C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972).
2. A.A. Rogow and H.D. Lasswell, Power, Corruption and Rectitude (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963).
3. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, ed., Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978). First published in 1970 by Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
4. The Watergate and Lockheed scandals (1975-76) are well-enough known to not require documentation. As well, readers have a number of Canadian events from which to choose, examples include the Skyshops and Harbourgate scandals. The other cases mentioned may need clarification. The royalty in the Netherlands was none other than Prince Bernhard, who was implicated in the Lockheed scandal through allegations that he accepted bribes to wield influence. See The Times (London), December 5, 1975, p. 1. The other case illustrated the incidence of corruption in non-capitalist, developed states. The national director of Soviet circuses was charged with illicitly acquiring some 1.4 million dollars (U.S.) in diamonds and foreign currency by misusing his public office. The same person had been linked to the late Leonid Brezhnev's daughter. See Winnipeg Free Press, February 26, 1982, p. 14.
5. Scott, op. cit., p. 4, follows the work of J.S. Nye on this orientation toward legalism.
6. Heidenheimer, op. cit., pp. 6-9. Quotation is on p. 7.
7. See H.D. Clarke, et al., Public Choice in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979). The questionnaire appears in Appendix B and the list of issues referred to appears on p. 246.
8. Edmund Beard and Stephen Horn, Congressional Ethics: The View From the House (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975).

CHAPTER TWO: THE STUDY OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION

It is not unusual to read a scathing attack in the daily newspaper's editorial page concerning an alleged act of political corruption. Moreover, such editorials frequently include the notion that the public is incensed and cries out for new laws or improvements to existing ones. If laws are in place and deemed sufficient, the full weight of said laws is expected to weigh against the perpetrators. Yet such pronouncements from the media beg a host of questions. Is the public alarmed? Does the public see the act as corrupt? Is such an allegation regarded as mere politics? Similar questions abound, since the editorialist renders judgments rather than observations about public attitudes. Moreover, his or her basis for comparison may simply include colleagues and friends. Surely this is an inadequate sampling of public opinion. How then might we assume that corruption is an important issue for the public?

In fact, such a question was put to a random sample of Canadian citizens in the 1965 national election survey conducted by John Meisel et al.¹ The result, disappointing depending on one's viewpoint, was that fewer than one percent of those surveyed felt that the problem of corruption was one of the most important issues facing the country at that time. However, this finding might be compared to another in the same survey which noted that about one third of the sample thought that corruption was very important in deciding how to vote. Another twenty percent said it was fairly important. What then can be made of such responses?

One explanation is that while corruption rarely rates as the most

salient issue for the public (perhaps only during or shortly after a notable incident), it is nevertheless a significant issue. There are many issues of significance to voters which may have more immediate and personal impact than political corruption: unemployment, inflation, war, or what have you. The impact of corruption is less dramatic; it may affect the individual's trust in the system, but it will not take bread from the family's table. However, the salience of corruption clearly can alter due to specific events. Watergate provides just such an example. Over time, with revelations about various misdeeds growing almost incessantly, the attitude of the American public moved from virtual nonchalance to vigorous anger and outrage. The impact of Watergate was by no means immediate; it grew as the revelations grew and as the public began to digest the consequences of the affair for themselves and their country.² Thus, the importance of corruption as a political issue is transitory. When other issues do not crowd it out or when a major scandal or series of scandals takes place, corruption may well become a potent factor in determining public attitudes toward policy-makers.³

Political corruption, then, merits attention for the reasons indicated above. It is incumbent upon the social scientist, moreover, to investigate the nature of the public's attitude toward corruption in a way which goes beyond the useful but nevertheless superficial analysis given the subject by the mass media. In addition, it is necessary to understand whether or not there are long-term effects of corrupt behaviour upon the electorate. That is, to identify whether or not the effects are less transitory than the events. Finally, it might also be asked of the social scientist: what is corruption? And what

do the public identify as corrupt behaviour as they evaluate their political leaders? These types of questions will be given further consideration, but let us first turn to a brief discussion of the attitudinal dimension of the political corruption issue.

The attitudes toward corruption expressed by citizens in any society are the product of a complex interplay of social, psychological, economic and political factors. Social factors might include the level of political awareness in one's family life as a child, the level of cynicism among one's peer group and so on. Psychological factors might include levels of alienation or efficacy within the individual. Economic factors might include one's economic class or the general economic climate of the particular time or the specific region. Political factors might include the political tradition of a given area, the existence of a politically aware and investigative press, or defined rules for ethical conduct. These factors intertwine in a myriad of combinations, though patterns among large numbers of people may well become evident in some general way. Moreover, implied in the listing above is the notion that attitudes are not merely the product of the individual psyche or the pattern of socialization in an individual family. Rather, cynicism toward politics expressed by many people is, in effect, a response to their perception of reality. Thus, a study of children's political attitudes in the Appalachian region of the United States found that the levels of trust toward key political figures were lower and general political cynicism higher than was true of earlier studies conducted in less economically deprived regions of the U.S.*

When a general pattern of attitudes and beliefs about politics is

evident in any culture, we may speak of a certain political culture in a given society. Attitudes regarding political corruption are part of the constellation of attitudes toward politics which make up the general political culture of the society. In a society like Canada, with obvious regional interests and a history of political and economic regionalism, we would expect significant regional variations in political culture, such that one might speak of "regional political cultures". Existing literature on the subject in Canada shows this to be the case.⁵ Similarly, one would expect such variations to be manifested in the case of attitudes toward political corruption, perhaps even to the extent that one might speak of regional political cultures of corruption. This author has argued elsewhere that such, in fact, is the case in Canada. That is to say, that there are significant regional variations in attitudes toward corruption in Canada which might be termed regional political cultures of corruption. Of course, this implies that no single national culture exists, except as an amalgam of the regional attitudes.⁶

Thus, there are now two basic concerns before us. One is the pattern of attitudes toward corruption within the population, representing a mixture of social, psychological, economic and political factors added to individual life experiences (or perceptions of experience). The second is the regional variation in such patterns which one may reasonably expect to find in a society such as ours. Still other concerns, however, must be raised. The first of these concerns is the definition of political corruption.

The definitional problem consists of two major questions. First, how is the term defined by current social science usage? Second, what

types of behaviour are deemed corrupt by the public? In effect, these notions are, or at least can be, intimately intertwined. The reason for this is implied in the reference to political culture made earlier. The first question can be answered through a review of the existing academic literature, but the second requires an analysis of public opinion. While greater elaboration of this point will be made later, a brief discussion should be pursued here.

As previously noted, existing definitions of the term "political corruption" often are based on legalistic criteria. Not all, however, are so defined. Still others proffer a definition which, directly or indirectly, employ attitudinal criteria. The legalistic mode, if one may synthesize from several sources, usually makes reference to the breaking of laws or regulations which have been legitimately established and the like. This means, then, that the test for corruption is in the courts or other tribunals empowered to review allegations of wrongdoing. This is a reasonable approach, to be sure, but it fails to accommodate those actions which are not presently proscribed by law or regulation or which cannot be tested or will not be tested in the courts or tribunals. A large and very meaningful category of actions and tests is thereby ignored.

Attitudinal definitions, whether they refer directly to citizen's attitudes or indirectly to the notion of "public interest",* incorporate a broader range of actions and tests than would be possible under legalistic frameworks. Attitudinal definitions allow us to consider acts which are widely accepted as corrupt but not yet illegal.

* Reference here is only to those definitions of "public interest" which imply a public opinion connection. Elaboration follows.

Prior to the advent of election finance laws in Canada and the United States, for example, there were numerous voices raised about the "corrupt" nature of the political parties' financial dealings with large corporations and wealthy individual donors. As well, there are "tests" of corruption which are of significant interest. In this case, the most fascinating "test" may well be the election process. The victory or defeat of a candidate or party accused of corruption may have greater consequence for the political system than a series of legal battles taking place in the courtrooms. Moreover, the fear of electoral defeat may be as consequential as losing an election itself. For this reason, even if no legal charge may be successful, a cabinet minister may be asked to leave his post and return to the backbenches. Careers can be altered quite drastically by such decisions, even though no case ever went before the courts. Thus, it is clear that the legal definition, while certainly important, is too narrow to stand alone.

Having distinguished between the two definitional types, it is nevertheless important to indicate a basic similarity which requires brief mention at this point. (Further elaboration awaits.) There is a relevant concept which seems to pertain to either type, this being the notion of "public interest". While this concept will receive more comprehensive consideration later, a brief discussion is warranted here.

The term "public interest" is a nebulous one, which probably explains why so few political science texts ever define the notion. Some will mention public interest, but then proceed to dismiss it as vague or, perhaps even worse, assume that it has a meaning that is generally acceptable. For example, the Privy council green paper

entitled Members of Parliament and Conflict of Interest, published by the Canadian government in 1973, frequently uses the term public interest, but never defines it. It proceeds on the apparent assumption that the notion is so widely accepted that it needs no definition.⁷ Others contend that there are, indeed, definitions, but they are unreliable because they differ radically. These differences may be class-based, as Banfield and Wilson suggested in their 1963 study, City Politics, or they may be idiosyncratic as is implied by others such as Steven Wasby who sees the concept as a rationalization for one's own political position.⁸ Whichever the case, public interest still has a great deal of importance attached to it by many political scientists, particularly in the area of political corruption. Eminent writers such as Carl Friedrich and H.D. Lasswell use the concept (or its derivative — common interest) as the criterion for establishing the presence or absence of political corruption.⁹ Nevertheless, the question remains: how is public (common) interest defined? Further analysis of the question must await a later section of this thesis. At this point, the intention is merely to establish the central questions dealing with the notion of corruption.

Finally, as noted earlier, there is concern over the imputed long-term effects of corruption on the political system. On this score one must be somewhat speculative. Unless a longitudinal study is conducted, for example, the effect of corrupt incidents on political attitudes can only be guessed. One is confronted, then, with ample room for deriving impressions but not for drawing concrete conclusions based on hard evidence. Nevertheless, such conjecture does not seem unreasonable, if it is grounded in a solid base of observation as well

as intuition. This study does not purport to be a longitudinal one and, therefore, cannot do more than propose an educated "guesstimate" as to where acts of political impropriety might lead us, based on the inferences drawn from the snapshot of student attitudes collected as part of this research or from data reported elsewhere in the literature.

Having offered the above caveat (i.e., that explanations of long-term effects are necessarily speculative at this time), a brief comment will be made by way of introduction to this notion of long-term effect. It has been argued in the past, by civil service reformers and urban government reformers for example, that certain "vile" practices are not only reprehensible in their own right, but more so for the effect they have on public attitudes toward all government and all those who govern. This objection is at the root of the critiques of functional corruption, wherein critics challenge the functionalist notion that corruption fills gaps that occur in various political systems. The criticism, in part, contends that corruption unchallenged means a spreading of corruption to the point that it becomes legitimized as "the way things are done". Over time such practices become the administrative norm, and they lead from individual to systemic corruption in the long term according to these critics of functionalism. In one brief effort to catalogue the outcome of systemic corruption, Caiden and Caiden suggest the following effects: that corruption leads to (1) closed political systems with restricted patterns of access which favour certain citizens over others; (2) restriction of political opposition, in defence of corrupt income, which may result in violence; (3) the widening of class and social

divisions resulting from the use of wealth to manipulate decision-makers; (4) nonrational responses to policy change, motivated by defence of corrupt income; (5) inducement of administrative delays as a means of creating a "market" for bribery or graft; (6) diversion of public resources, through embezzlement or kickbacks for example, to private hands; and (7) the accumulator effect of such practices upon public perceptions which undermines trust and cooperation far beyond those immediately implicated.¹⁰

In short, the consequences of corruption in public life may be substantial and likely range well beyond the immediate event and its participants to create, analagous to the ripple effect, impacts of far-reaching proportions. The evidence that this is so is not as direct or concrete as one might like, and, to be sure, there are many who argue that (like the aforementioned functionalists) there is too much worry over such matters, but the impression remains: the effect of corruption in the long-term bodes ill for any society which tolerates it for too long and in too great a degree or intensity. Even anti-functionalists or reformers are quick to point out that their goal cannot be elimination of corruption, yet the attempt must be made to restrain it and to condemn it as antithetical to societal interests, lest it becomes the norm rather than the deviant.

Again, it bears repeating that this study cannot do more than to shed some light on some of these questions and issues. The direct answer to the last point is clearly beyond the pale of the thesis presented here, a more defined notion of which will emerge in the remainder of this chapter. In the remaining sections of this chapter will be discussed the significance of the concept of political

corruption in the literature of political science, the definitional problems encountered in the concept, the notion of "public interest" as it applies to this definition, a brief discussion of the attitudinal or culture approach to the subject, and the place of this study in the field.

The Significance of Political Corruption in the Literature

It is a great misfortune that the study of political corruption has, for the most part, been relegated either to journalistic accounts of notorious cases in Western experience or to the more academic (and occasionally condescending?) analysis of corruption in the "Third World". Indeed, it would seem that, for at least a few decades, the "muck-raking" connotation of the study of corruption has perhaps led to topic being virtually ignored by political scientists studying developed Western nations. While this condition is happily changing, the bedrock of literature upon which current studies must build is fraught with impressionistic narratives of single events which fail to provide the deeper analytical generalizability to which social science aspires but are not the "stock and trade" of the journalism profession. Even so, these works, such as Richard Gwyn's The Shape of Scandal and Jonathan Manthorpe's The Power and the Tories, must be applauded for doing what academics have failed to do, particularly in Canada, that being to examine the less savory side of public affairs.¹¹

Nevertheless, there has been a noticeable growth in social science literature devoted to the study of political corruption, especially outside Canada. Even here, there has been increased academic interest

in the subject, though it has not been as broad or as deep as one might have hoped. The concerns of Canadian social scientists seem to relate most frequently to ethical guidelines for civil servants and elected officials and to patronage in Quebec.¹² More widely ranging studies such as published in the United States by Benson and by Berg et al.¹³ are sadly missing from the Canadian scene. The only exception to this observation is the anthology edited by the author and Donald C. Rowat entitled Political Corruption in Canada: Cases, Causes and Cures, published in 1976.¹⁴ The anthology approach is by no means unique to the study of political corruption, as there are excellent examples elsewhere upon which one might rely for introductions to the topic. Two illustrations of this genre are Arnold Heidenheimer's Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis (1970) and the newer collection by Jack Douglas and John Johnson, Official Deviance: Readings in Malfeasance, Misfeasance, and Other Forms of Corruption (1977). Heidenheimer's collection is comparative rather than exclusively American in its focus, and there are examples of comparative studies as well. A prime case of a comparative analysis; other than an anthology, is James C. Scott's Comparative Political Corruption (1972).¹⁵

It is very much worth noting that the past pattern of interest in the subject of political corruption has been directed largely at the third world or, if Western oriented, has been historical treatments of more "traditional" eras when countries like the United States or Canada were in the process of "maturing" politically. The works noted above dispel the illusion that corruption is only relevant to the politically immature nation-state, be it a contemporary developing nation or a past

period in the development of a presently mature, developed nation. It perhaps borders on the simplistic to argue that the American Watergate experience has lifted the veil from the eyes of Western academics who heretofore have disdained dabbling in a netherworld normally reserved for yellow journalism. Gone too is the snobbery that implies that we in the West are beyond the corrupt behaviours of developing nations. It seems that Watergate has changed all that.¹⁶

However, even if one can attribute the renewed interest in political corruption to Watergate, it certainly fails to explain the range of interest apparent in the literature. Indeed, the works by Scott and Heidenheimer preceded the events of Watergate. Thus, the interest must be seen as transcending any single incident and, instead, being the result of other forces. One such force, it might be suggested, was (and is?) the increasing desire of academics and students to make social science more relevant to the "real world". This urge for relevance actually precedes the Watergate era, as it was most prominent in the 1960's. Though the Viet Nam war protests were one form of relevance, certainly other forms were available as well. Socially relevant research and teaching were, thus, hallmarks of a particular educational and scholarly philosophy. The heritage of this philosophy includes a variety of socially relevant issues, one of which is the study of political corruption.

In any case, the study of political corruption proceeds apace. If we draw the term widely, in order to include such topical concerns as ethical guidelines and party financing, we can see a noticeable growth that led Kenneth Kernaghan to remark that, "From an international perspective, the 1970's may aptly be described as 'the ethics decade'".

in the historical development of the study and practice of public administration".¹⁷ There is no reason to limit his observation to one field; clearly the same applies to political science in general.

In part, the need to study political corruption and administrative ethics can be viewed as a result of the increasing scope of such activity, so goes the oft-cited hypothesis, that there is now greater opportunity or temptation to engage in corrupt or unethical acts. Thus, it is not only a desire to be relevant which spurs on the growth of literature on this subject. Rather, it is also the realization that there may be objective reason for concern due to this "opportunity hypothesis", to warrant closer attention to the corruption problem. Add to this a second notion, that modern education for aspiring civil servants (to take but one example) seems to ignore ethical considerations in order to be more "scientific", and a rather receptive atmosphere is conjured up for the less-than-completely-ethical. Modern public policy analysis, it is argued, is either amoral or immoral. Hence how might a future public administrator behave when he or she is confronted by opportunity if the educational process does not provide an ethical foundation?¹⁸

Whatever the reasons, the study of political corruption has emerged as a significant element of the literature in political science. In addition to the works noted above are a number of other works, both general and specific, which constitute the growing body of research and thought on the subject. Much of this literature is a product of the periods previously discussed and, thus, of largely recent origin. The interest in the concept of corruption itself, as well as its many nuances, illustrates a healthy regard for the problems

of modern governance and the ethical issues that are implied by the relationships between state and citizen. That this interest has increased in the last two decades, at least as indicated by the expanding list of available publications, does not mean that academia is beset with mean-spiritedness or that it expects all who govern to be angels. Rather, it reflects what might be said to be a sense of reality and relevance that, though never actually ignored, was somewhat muted previously.

Problems in Defining the Concept of Political Corruption

The concept of political corruption is, like most other social science concepts, marked by a variety of definitions. In fact, defining the concept at times appears to be a cottage industry. There is a lack of agreement about specific definitions, to be sure, but this dissent can be perceived in general definitions as well. This disagreement will be incorporated within the discussion which follows. Despite the above caveat, it is possible to identify a certain commonality in the variety of definitions. All this is not meant to imply that definitions are always explicit. Indeed, particularly in the more popular or journalistic sources, there are times when the definition is completely ignored, perhaps due to the mistaken assumption that the concept has a universally agreed upon definition. This approach is clearly less acceptable than explicitly defining the concept, even when the definition is not entirely consistent with others available in the literature. In other words, the first problem is in being explicit about the meaning employed, the second is to

2

3

6

7

establish some validity through comparison with other definitions.

As intimated earlier, the range of definitions is extensive. Therefore, while a number of these will be discussed here, no attempt to repeat all such definitions thus far encountered will be undertaken. Instead, a sampling should suffice to make the point and to establish the commonality alluded to previously.¹⁹

Among the most interesting discussions of the definition of political corruption is that proffered by Arnold Heidenheimer in the introduction to this collection of readings noted earlier.²⁰ Heidenheimer reviews a number of definitions and places them in one of the following three categories: (1) public-office-centered; (2) market-centered; or (3) public-interest-centered. In the first category are definitions which violate norms of office and which are similar to legalistic definitions as others might classify them. One example is that of J.S. Nye who defines corruption as "behavior which deviates from the normal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (family, close private clique), pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence".²¹ This view is shared by James C. Scott, who argues for a definition based on legal norms and rules which he sees as the most appropriate measuring rods for establishing the existence of corruption.²²

The second category in Heidenheimer's classification consists of market-centered definitions such as that advanced by Jacob von Klaveren, who states that "A corrupt civil servant regards his public office as a business, the income of which he will... seek to maximize.... The size of his income depends... upon the market situation

and his talents for finding the point of maximal gain on the public's demand curve."²³ These definitions conceive of corruption as the outcome of a free market system where allocative mechanisms replace ethical considerations as prime motivators.

The third category, public-interest-centered definitions, differ from both of the earlier approaches by virtue of the stress they place upon the concept of "public interest". The definition of "public interest" is often left implicit, yet it is clear that the intent goes beyond the rather narrow legalistic notion advanced by Nye and Scott and rejects the amorality of the market type of definition. Heidenheimer cites the following examples of this type, the first by Friedrich and the second by Rogow and Lasswell.²⁴

The pattern of corruption can be said to exist whenever a power-holder who is charged with doing certain things, i.e., who is a responsible functionary or office-holder, is by monetary or other rewards not legally provided for induced to take actions which favour whoever provides the rewards and thereby does damage to the public and its interest.

A system of public or civic order exalts common interest over special interest; violations of the common interest for special advantage are corrupt.

To the three categories noted, one might add a fourth. It is one that is built, in part at least, from the third but it makes more critical and explicit the role of public opinion. It can be argued that the concept of public interest is based on some conception of what public opinion may be on the interest in question. As we shall see in the section which follows, this perspective is not without its detractors, yet the role of public opinion in conceptualizing corruption cannot be easily dismissed. Peters and Welch recognize this approach as distinct from the public interest approach.²⁵ Others have also pursued a public opinion definition, though they might not have

described their approaches in those terms. One such example is found in Graeme Moodie's interesting notion that "scandals" be used as the measuring device for corruption. He argues ~~that, given the somewhat~~ relative nature of corruption, the best indicator of whether or not an act is corrupt rests upon the degree to which the citizenry is scandalized. Thus there must be a "hostile and shocked response that a particular type of behaviour is recognized to be scandalous or, if appropriate, corrupt."²⁶ This is not far removed from Heidenheimer's view of the role played by public opinion and to which we now turn.

Heidenheimer contends, as do many others cited in his introduction, that legalistic conceptualizations of political corruption are inadequate to deal with the complexity of the issue. We have noted James Scott's argument that corruption must be perceived in light of legal norms and rules. He objects to public interest definitions as too vague and too contentious to provide a reasonable operationalization of the corruption concept.²⁷ Yet, his concentration on the legal aspect of corruption has an even more problematic consequence to it, one that Heidenheimer has presaged. Indeed, others long before Heidenheimer and Scott took note of the fatal flaw, such as Robert Brooks in 1910 and Joseph Senturia in the early 1930's.²⁸ The flaw is that legalistic conceptualizations ignore the broader questions of judgment, opinion, ethics and the whole range of non-legal and extra-legal issues implied by corruption. Using a strictly legalistic definition means that significant political phenomena, such as the defeat of a scandal-ridden governing party or the long-term decline in political legitimacy of successive "corrupt" governments, must be put aside because the events in question were not legally corrupt.

Heidenheimer does not pretend that legal considerations are unimportant, nor does he suggest that there are no difficulties in operationalizing interest-centered or opinion-centered definitions of corruption. Nevertheless, he introduces a notion of corruption which incorporates an implied opinion definition, as indicated by the following:

Although behavior... could be considered corrupt by some citizen who was particularly conscious of official norms, his interpretations would obviously be shared to a very widely varying degree by his fellow citizens. Indeed, it has been argued that if 99 percent of the community disagrees, then, although one's viewpoint is well-grounded in the applicable legal codes, the action is not considered 'corrupt' in that community.²⁹

He proceeds from this basis to suggest that corruption might best be perceived as having gradations of public opprobrium, ranging from "black" to "grey" to "white", where the degree of public agreement concerning the act in question is the decisive criterion for classification. Add to this the idea that not all opinion is of equal weight in the determination of what constitutes "public opinion" on a given issue, and the second factor of elite or mass opinion becomes apparent. Thus, for Heidenheimer "black corruption" is that which is condemned by a consensus of both elite and mass opinion. "Grey corruption" occupies an ambiguous territory where there is no consensus in the community, but where significant elements, usually elites by Heidenheimer's reckoning, are in favour of proscription. "White corruption" indicates an area free from vigorous opposition within any element of the community and largely tolerated for any one of a number of reasons.³⁰

Clearly, this approach to defining, or at least describing, the

concept of political corruption draws us far beyond the legalistic notions advocated by Nye and Scott. By the same token, there is no mention of the related and nebulous concept of public interest. Are we to assume, then, that these ideas have no place in the understanding of corruption? The answer is no — they are implicit in the public opinion approach preferred by Heidenheimer and Moodie and others. On the legalistic side, there is the realization that public opinion may be converted into legal rules and norms which may be reasonably explicit, operational, and expectation-inducing. Norms and rules indicate, in large part, those areas of corrupt practice for which there is some degree of consensus — the "black corruption" of Heidenheimer's formulation. One such example is the act of bribery, which in Canada is part of the Criminal Code. But laws, rules and norms may not always reflect the desires and values of the "public", however defined, and they may offer little insight into what issues may be emerging on the horizon as new laws, rules or norms are being pondered. Equally problematic is the situation where laws, rules or norms are ignored as no longer relevant to society and thereby unenforced. One who violates such a law may be guilty of "breaking the law" but, if the law in question is thought to be archaic and obsolete, will that person be prosecuted? Until a few years ago, one of Canada's major television networks had a long-running weekly show which drew its humour from such anachronistic legislation still on the books in Canada and elsewhere. Surely the legalistic view is too narrow for our purposes then.

The market approach is equally unsatisfactory. The stress placed upon the notion of exchange, usually within the context of

patron-client relationships, is an interesting and valid one. However, the theory of clientelism seems best suited for those situations where the concept of exchange applies, not where the issue is the corruptibility of a single individual seeking greater personal fortune. Thus, clientelism (the major focus of many market definitions) is somewhat narrow in scope. Further, the language of market or clientele definitions is generally too amoral for many students of corruption. Objectivity, in this sense, may be replaced with insensitivity. While not all the so-called "functionalists" necessarily rely on market definitions, per se, they share similarities which have been the target of much criticism in the corruption literature.³¹ Greater detail will be devoted to this point in the chapter on theories of corruption.

The third approach, public-interest-centered, is perhaps the classical "pre-functional" or "pre-revisionist" position.³² It is less narrowly construed than the strictly legalistic public-office-centered approach though not unrelated to it. By this I mean that the usual conceptualization of public interest will subsume the notion of duty to public office inherent in the first definitional type. Yet, it does not stop at formal duties, arguing that such duties may not always be accurately and completely specified or that even when this is possible, the public interest is not always served well by such official delineations of duty. Thus the third approach challenges the notion that duty, when officially stated, necessarily denotes what is in the public interest. Moreover, duty may be perceived as an internalized norm acquired by a public official rather than an official "list" which, it may be argued, is rather less subjective than one individual's internalized belief system. If this is the case, then

duty can be, potentially at least, far removed from the interest of the public. The critical question, to which we will turn in the next section, is how to define public interest.

The final approach to be discussed here is what we have earlier called the public opinion approach, after Peters and Welch. It is frequently advocated as distinct from the other approaches we have discussed, yet it is fair to surmise that this is not entirely the case. The reason for this is that there are connections between the opinions expressed by members of the public and the notions of duty to public office (legal rules, etc.) or market exchanges or concepts of public interest. The opinion approach does not disregard these other concepts at all, rather they are incorporated into the public's attitudes and perceptions of official behaviour. When Heidenheimer spoke of the various shades of corruption, he did so with an implicit acknowledgement that the agreement of elites and masses (or disagreement, for that matter) was at least in part over what constitutes public duty or public interest or a reasonable or unreasonable exchange in the "free" market. However, the definition based on public opinion is frequently devoid of these other considerations. Peters and Welch, for example, define the public opinion approach quite simply as one where "a political act is corrupt when the weight of public opinion determines it so."³³ Their reference to Heidenheimer indicates that they are aware that this definition is overly simplified, yet it does get to the crux of the matter. That is, even Heidenheimer does not explicitly refer to the subsumption of the first three definition types within his public opinion approach. The only complexity that he adds to the Peters and Welch version is in the

gradations based on elite-mass agreement. While this is to be commended, it is not enough to do justice to the concept. Like the legalistic definition, it is easier to operationalize than, say, the public interest definition. But is that reason enough to simply bypass the more difficult to handle public interest notion? Perhaps, but not without a modest attempt to discover a possible linkage between the two.

Public Interest and Political Corruption

While the public opinion definition of political corruption is broad enough to overcome some of the objections mentioned earlier, it may be too broad in other respects. One area wherein it may result in deficiencies is in consideration of legal questions, as has been previously noted. Legal norms, rules, etc., may form a very important backdrop or context within which to evaluate public opinion, as we shall see in a later chapter. The other respect in which the public opinion definition may be deficient is in regard to the concept of public interest. In order to establish why this should or should not be the case, the concept of public interest itself requires further analysis, especially as it may or may not relate to a valid and workable definition and theory of political corruption.

Public interest has been described as:

"...little more than rationalization for some particular group's interest. The process of rationalization may be the very human and unconscious one of erecting one's personal goals and preferences into universals. Or it may involve the calculated design of propagandizing one's interests in the most pleasing possible light and in the most prestigious semantics."³⁴

The attitude expressed by Sorauf does not stand alone. Clarke E. Cochran has identified this view as part of what he calls the "abolitionist" theory of public interest, a theory associated with Sorauf and with Glendon Schubert. This perspective argues that the concept of public interest has little or no meaning or validity, particularly when viewed through a "scientific" lens.³⁵ The scientific approach to politics requires operational sense, and to such authors, public interest has none.

Still others suggest that public interest is the term that should be applied to the outcome of the conflict and competition between competing interests in a pluralistic society. This, indeed, is the view of such writers as Howard R. Smith, Gerhard Colm and Michael Harmon. We might refer to this approach as a process approach (as does Cochran) or an interest group approach (having its roots in the works of Bentley and Truman).³⁶

Smith argues that, in Cochran's words, "the public interest is identical with the result of the democratic interest-conflict process as long as that result is responsive to the substantive community consensus."³⁷ Clearly then, the process alone is not the determinant of what is or is not in the public interest, even in the process view. Gerhard Colm reaffirms the importance of process, however, by arguing that, "It is through the political 'debate', the vote, and the influence of pressure groups that the public interest evolves as a set of concrete objectives to be pursued by actual policy."³⁸ Colm's position makes no allusion to consensus, and thus can be considered a purer form of the process approach. In both cases, however, the normative sense of a public interest, philosophically arrived at, is

rejected and replaced with a procedural notion which places the emphasis on "how" decisions are arrived at, not what the decisions are. Even so, Smith drops the hint that procedure alone may not satisfy.

An interesting application of the process approach to public administration confirms the view that process cannot stand alone. Moreover, it supports the argument that the abolitionist approach has sacrificed the concept of public interest on the altar of operationalism. Michael Harmon advances the cause of "proactive" administrators who are "actively involved both in removing arbitrary barriers to interest articulation and in facilitating access of client groups ... to the decision process."³⁹ His definition of public interest is clearly a process one, yet the consequence of the process for administrators is that they become responsive to the democratic process (elected officials, interest groups, etc.) and that they advocate policy. But for what reason? To achieve a public interest which changes according to "the public mood."⁴⁰

Process theorists then will, in many cases, agree that public interest goes beyond process alone, although they may argue that the correctness of any policy (in terms of whether or not it meets the public interest) is debatable and nebulous, hence unresolvable. But given closer inspection, the motivation behind their support for democratic processes goes beyond the affinity for that process to the belief that the outcome of the process is "good" or in the public interest. Or, more confounding perhaps, the process is "good" or in the public interest despite the outcome.

A third approach has been subsumed within the preceding arguments and should be made explicit. Normative visions of the public interest

are, in some cases at least, reducible to notions like "spirit of impartiality" or "what ought to be done" or "the genuine interest of the whole community". Impartiality means that the public interest is separate from personal interest. The "ought" intends to ignore the "is" by disregarding the possibility that the common good or public interest is the calculated total of wants and desires in the community — the majority view if you will. The "genuine interest" alerts us to the possibility that the outcome of the process mentioned earlier may result in decisions which are "camouflaged" by self-serving goals of decision-makers.⁴²

However defined, the normative definition of public interest has, in the words of J.E. Hodgetts, been likened to the search for the Holy Grail, a myth.⁴³ Hodgetts is of the process or interest group school of thought and therefore rejects the concept of public interest for the interests of "publics". He is equally disdainful of the notion of consensus being used to identify the public interest, a concern shared by others but not all. Similarly, the normative approach is seen as elitist by some, given that the normative interpretation of public interest need not conform to a majoritarian view of the world. Schubert identifies these theorists as "idealists".⁴⁴ Perhaps absolutist or authoritarian might also fit. In any case, the normative approach has its own problems.

The last approach might be identified by any one of a number of titles: consensual, majoritarian, or public opinion. The basic premise of this school of thought is that the public will determine what is in the public's interest. One way to summarize this school is to cite David Hume's analysis: "... just as a preponderance of opinion

gives us some confidence that snow is white, it enables us to be satisfied that certain actions are wrong, and that certain policies are in the public interest."⁴⁵ Thus it is not moral or normative judgment which decides the public interest, rather it is the weight of public opinion.

It is in this sense that the term consensus is sometimes used, as in the case of Howard Smith earlier or of Stephen Bailey, who maintains that:

- ... the 'public interest' is a verbal symbol for those ties that enable a political community to control pathological centrifugal tendencies. These elemental ties involve some widespread and informed agreement about a limited number of overarching goals.... This means a commitment to regime above a commitment to a program.⁴⁶

This notion of consensus implies agreement on values and beliefs as well as attitudes. In fact, attitudinal differences and opinion differences are less crucial than agreement on basic values which underpin the society as a whole. And yet, how do we keep attitude separate from value or opinion free from belief? The answer is that we do not, at least completely, as they are part and parcel of a continuum of philosophy or psychology, some deep and others shallow and more transitory.

It is the last sense of the term "public interest" that is of the most interest here, i.e., public interest as a consensus. The process approach seems less helpful since the consequences of corruption go beyond interest group relations with government or with each other. The normative view presupposes some "right" answer to what is or is not corrupt which cannot be independently verified as it is idiosyncratic. The abolitionist view seems too cynical to place much emphasis at all

on the significance of corruption or it places corruption in a functionalist context which is widely decried as an explanatory tool (though not as a heuristic one). It is the consensual notion which seems to carry the most utility for the study of corruption and it builds upon the public opinion aspect noted in earlier sections as having, too, some degree of promise. This paper then proceeds on the assumption that consensus (read public opinion) is the tie that binds theories of public interest to theories of political corruption most ably. And, further, the way in which this tie occurs is through some form of public opinion definition of political corruption.

An Attitudinal Approach to the Study of Corruption

Attitudinal approaches to the study of political phenomena are common in the literature, building as they do on concepts such as political culture, political socialization, alienation and so on. The term "attitudinal approach" is being used here as a convenient shorthand for studies which investigate the world of politics through the use of opinions, attitudes, beliefs and values as they pertain to political events, personalities, and ideas. Opinions and attitudes are usually held to be shallower and more transitory than more deeply and strongly held beliefs and values. Additionally, the former are thought to be more specific than the latter, which are considered rather general in comparison, and the more specific opinions and attitudes are often thought to be more easily measured through a variety of devices. These devices include, but are not limited to, public opinion

The attitudes towards, and opinions about, political corruption are what interest us here, yet there are generalized notions about political attitudes in Canada which would seem to be of concern even within the specific arena at issue. Among these concerns, and to be elaborated upon later when we speak of theories of corruption, are the differences in attitudes and opinion held by various groups in Canadian society and the various regions of Canada. In the first case one might refer to Heidenheimer's elite-mass distinction or religious differences or political party differences. The second case may relate to the first in that there may be regional differences within each of the implied relationships, or these regional differences may be of great import in their own right. The dramatic impact of regionalism on Canadian attitudes and opinions is one of the most oft-cited and oft-verified empirical political phenomena in the Canadian experience. The notion of regional political cultures (where culture refers to a common pattern of attitudes, beliefs and values) is well established in the Canadian literature.⁴⁸

Given the preceding discussion of public opinion and public interest as these terms might apply to the concept of political corruption, it is clear that a theory and definition of political corruption might best be served within an attitudinal approach. Attitudes and opinions, influenced by region, class, party, and so on, provide us with the opportunity to research any number of salient questions. What types of behaviour do Canadians hold to be corrupt? Are there behaviours currently thought to be corrupt in law that people see as less heinous? Do attitudes toward political

differences corresponding to the generally held view of Canadian political culture as regionally fragmented? The list goes on and is limited only by the ability to acquire data which will answer the almost bewildering variety of relevant queries, a point that will receive elaboration later.

What the public opinion or attitudinal approach will not tell us is also quite interesting, though not compelling enough to deny the utility of attitudinal studies. As reasoned by those who hold to a normative theory of corruption, an attitudinal study offers no absolute sense of what corruption may be. Rather, seeing the attempt to provide such a finite definition as hopelessly entangled in subjectivity, an attitudinal approach will substitute the idea of consensus of majority will as the appropriate guide to what is or is not considered corrupt. As contended by the abolitionists, who disagree not only with the normative theorists but with those who proffer consensual remedies, we cannot argue empirically that the view of the majority should prevail any more than we can argue that elite views should be disregarded or accepted. These are normative matters requiring normative responses. Further, this approach cannot tell us empirically whether or not notions of law and public duty are correct vis-à-vis corruption, but we can indicate whether or not notions of law and duty are consistent with public opinion. Finally, for the pluralist who sees the public's interest being met by the outcome of the interest group process, the answer does not lie in polls alone, but in politics. Attitudinal studies cannot determine the winner of interest group competition nor the validity of any one group's claims. However, this approach can indicate whether or not the group claim in question is consistent with

2

MicroD

the public view of what is or is not reasonable and legitimate behaviour and whether or not the label of "corruption" is apropos of the event in question.

The Relevance of the Study

This study proposes then to engage in an analysis of the concept of political corruption and its meaning within the attitudinal set of Canadians. It proposes to examine an area of political behaviour, which heretofore has been relatively devoid of academic attention, on the grounds that it constitutes a fascinating and salient feature of Canadian political life about which we know too little. It employs the attitudinal approach because, as we have argued, this approach is consistent with a reasonable definition of what corruption is and how corruption affects the political system. The need to define political corruption in a workable fashion will be the first step in developing an embryonic theory of political corruption in the Canadian political system (or perhaps a general theory which has a more comparative basis).

It is important, however, to place the study of corruption in an even broader context. In this sense this is a study of political attitudes, political awareness and the influence of several socio-economic and political factors on the attitudes of Canadians. The possibility remains that a better understanding of the attitudinal dimension of Canadian politics may come about by investigating one feature of the attitude set (or political culture or cultures) encountered in Canada. That one feature, moreover, is one which is

revised in our collective conscience from time to time, but which has failed to generate, except in very specific ways, serious examination. While there are related studies to be found, most obviously those by Khayyam Paltiel regarding election finance,⁴⁹ the more over-arching aspect of corruption is relatively untouched.

Thus the purpose, and the relevance, of such a study is two-fold: to understand (1) the nature of corruption within the Canadian "attitudinal matrix"⁵⁰ and how it might relate to problems of definition; and (2) the broader implications of attitudinal studies in terms, for example, of regionalism or class. In this sense, this study might appeal not only to the student of political corruption but to the student of Canadian political culture as well.

NOTES

1. See John Meisel and Richard van Loon, "Canadian Attitudes to Election Expenses, 1965-6," in K.Z. Paltiel et al., Studies in Canadian Party Finance, Committee on Election Expenses (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966), pp. 23-46.
2. Hazel Erskine, "The Polls: Corruption in Government," Public Opinion Quarterly, 37 (Winter, 1973-1974), 628-644. See also Gladys Engel Lang and Kurt Lang, "Polling on Watergate: The Battle for Public Opinion," Public Opinion Quarterly, 44 (1980), 530-547. The latter article is interesting for its arguments on the effect of polls on public opinion.
3. The reference to policy-makers should be explained. The literature on political corruption seems to suggest that negative attitudes often attach to the office-holder not the office. Thus, corrupt acts may temporarily tarnish the office in question, but effects on policy-makers is apparently long-term. Consider the public attitude toward Richard Nixon as compared to the office of the President, even as soon as Ford's ascendancy. Further, attachment to the office, in this context, is separate from the blame that is attached to the system in general. See Robert G. Lehnen, "Watergate and the American Public: Assessing the Overt and Latent Effects of Political Events on Mass Political Behavior" (paper presented to the 10th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Edinburgh, Scotland, August, 1976).
4. For example, see the study of political attitudes in the economically deprived Appalachian region of the United States in Dean Jaros et al., "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-culture," in Marian D. Irish, et al., eds., Readings on the Politics of American Democracy (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 120-135.
5. Among the several works on this idea see: Richard Simeon and David J. Elkins, "Regional Political Cultures in Canada," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 7 (September, 1974), 397-437; Michael S. Whittington, "Political Culture: The Attitudinal

Matrix of Politics," in John H. Redekop, ed., Approaches to Canadian Politics (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1978, pp. 138-153; and John Wilson, "The Canadian Political Cultures; Towards a Redefinition of the Nature of the Canadian Political System," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 7 (September, 1974), 438-483.

6. Kenneth M. Gibbons, "The Political Culture of Corruption in Canada," in K.M. Gibbons and D.C. Rowat, eds., Political Corruption in Canada: Cases, Causes and Cures (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Ltd., 1976), pp. 231-250. It is worth noting that Michael Whittington argues in defense of the concept of a national political culture. It is his contention that although the process of aggregating subcultures may be difficult, there are still some attitudes which are common to all regional subcultures and are, therefore, correctly deemed "national". See Whittington, op. cit., p. 149.
7. Canada, Privy Council Office, Members of Parliament and Conflict of Interest (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973). The authors rightly point out that definitions of "private interest" and "public interest" are, in their words, "interpreted in so many ways as to render a general definition ambiguous in terms of legislative expression." (p. 1) However, the issue is simply dismissed without further discussion at that point. Is it not fair to ask that the source and nature of the ambiguity be elaborated upon and the rationale for their reduction of "public interest" to the "exercise of his public duties and responsibilities" be explained? What the green paper does by way of such a reduction is to make public interest conform to a "public-office-centered" definition similar to Nye's definition of corruption noted below, i.e., a legalistic view. The complex matter of the public interest requires amplification and attention to this concept will be expanded later, as noted in the text.
8. Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, City Politics (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), p. 46 and Stephen L. Wasby, Political Science — The Discipline and its Dimensions: An Introduction

9. Cited by Arnold J. Heidenheimer in his "Introduction" to his Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978), p. 6. Unfortunately, Heidenheimer does not take cognizance of the complexity of the concept of "public interest", hence we are left with the feeling that there is nothing contentious about what he calls "public-interest-centered definitions" of corruption. As we shall see later, this is far from the case.
10. Gerald E. Caiden and Naomi J. Caiden, "Administrative Corruption," Public Administration Review, 37 (May/June, 1977), 301-310. The list in question appears on pp. 307-308.
11. Richard Gwyn, The Shape of Scandal (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1965) and Jonathan Manthorpe, The Power and the Tories (Toronto: Macmillan, 1974), especially chaps. 17 and 18. Other works, especially feature articles in popular magazines might also be cited as further examples of this genre. There are also chapters of "popular" biographies that exemplify this literature, such as Peter Newman's The Distemper of Our Times (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968), pp. 389-406.
12. On the first point see any of the several works by Kenneth Kernaghan, e.g., Ethical Conduct: Guidelines for Government Employees (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1975). Also see the Privy Council green paper noted above or O.P. Dwivedi, "A Code of Conduct for Civil Servants," Dalhousie Review, (Winter, 1964-65), 452-458. A recent French language article indicates an interest in ethical issues relating to civil servants amongst Quebec academics. See Roch Bolduc, "Les questions d'éthique dans les années 1980", Canadian Public Administration, 24 (Summer, 1981), 200-215. On the second, i.e. patronage in Quebec, see Raymond Hudon, "Pour une analyse politique du patronage", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 7 (September, 1974), 484-501. This is not to suggest that other provinces have not been the subject of similar studies of patronage, e.g. the work of S.J.R. Noel on clientelism in Newfoundland.

13. George C.S. Benson, Political Corruption in America (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1978) and Larry Berg, Harlan Hahn and John Schmidhauser, Corruption in the American Political System (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1976).
14. Gibbons and Rowat, op. cit.
15. Heidenheimer, op.cit.; Jack Douglas and John Johnson, eds., Official Deviance: Readings in Malfeasance, Misfeasance, and Other Forms of Corruption (New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1977); and James C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972).
16. On the theme of corruption as the domain of developing nations or as part of the maturation process, the literature is replete with examples such as J.R. Shackleton, "Corruption: An Essay in Economic Analysis," The Political Quarterly, 49 (January/March, 1978), 25-37 and Simcha B. Werner, "New Directions in the Study of Administrative Corruption," Public Administration Review, 43 (March/April, 1983), 146-154.
17. "Codes of Ethics and Public Administration: Progress, Problems and Prospects," Public Administration (U.K.), 59 (Summer, 1980), 207.
18. See ibid. as one example of this "opportunity" notion, albeit a brief one. On the second point, Simcha Werner cites Mark Lilla as arguing that modern public policy analysis has, due to its pursuit of "scientific validity", ignored the ethical component of public policy in lieu of rationalism and other analytical tools. See Werner, op. cit., p. 146.
19. This section is based in part on my article, "The Study of Political Corruption in Canada", in Gibbons and Rowat, op.cit., pp. 3-6. However, the section in question has been extensively revised since the time of original publication.
20. Heidenheimer, op. cit., pp. 3-9. See also chapter one which includes several articles dealing with definitional problems. Others have also used Heidenheimer's approach as a jumping off point, e.g., Graeme C. Moodie, "On Political Scandals and

Corruption," Government and Opposition, vol. 15 (Spring, 1980), pp. 208-222. See especially pp. 208-215.

21. Cited in Heidenheimer, ibid., p. 5.
22. Scott, op. cit., pp. 3-4.
23. Heidenheimer, op. cit., p. 5.
24. ibid., p. 6.
25. John G. Peters and Susan Welch, "Political Corruption in America: A Search for Definition and a Theory", American Political Science Review, 72 (September, 1978), 975. The authors' own classification consists of only three types: legalistic, public interest and public opinion. They disregard, without indicating why, the market-centered definitional type of which Heidenheimer wrote. The intention of their work was to "render the 'public opinion' definition more usable." (p. 982) Thus, they were not intent on dismissing this definition and rightly so. However, they did seem to dismiss the public interest definition rather curtly. The possible link between the two types of definition is not discussed.
26. Moodie, op. cit., passim. The quotation is from p. 219.
27. Scott, op. cit., pp. 3-4.
28. Heidenheimer, op. cit., p. 7.
29. ibid., p. 26.
30. ibid., p. 26-28.
31. The use of these terms will be clarified below, but the criticisms in question are fairly common. Examples can be found in Werner, op. cit., who uses the term "post-functionalism" (p. 147) to describe anti-functionalism criticisms, and in Caiden and Caiden, op. cit., who see functionalism as ignoring the serious systemic consequences of corruption (p. 301).
32. Caiden and Caiden, op. cit., p. 301 and passim, use the term revisionist, borrowing in turn from G. Ben Dor.
33. op. cit., p. 975.

34. Frank J. Sorauf, "The Conceptual Muddle," in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., Nomos V: The Public Interest (New York: Atherton Press, 1962), p. 188.
35. Clarke E. Cochran, "Political Science and 'The Public Interest'," Journal of Politics, 36 (May, 1974), 327-355. On this particular point see especially pp. 337-339. See also Glendon Schubert, The Public Interest: A Critique of the Theory of a Political Concept (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960) and Sorauf, op. cit.
36. Smith is cited by Cochran, op. cit., pp. 340-342. See also Gerhard Colm, "The Public Interest: Essential Key to Public Policy," in Friedrich, op. cit., pp. 115-128; and Michael Mount Harmon, "Administrative Policy Formulation and the Public Interest," Public Administration Review, 29 (September/October, 1969), 483-491.
37. Cochran, ibid., p. 341.
38. Colm, op. cit., p. 122.
39. Harmon, op. cit., p. 490.
40. ibid., p. 485.
41. ibid.
42. See Richard Flathman, The Public Interest (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), pp. 58-63; and Edgar Bodenheimer, "Prolegomena to a Theory of the Public Interest," in Friedrich, op. cit., pp. 205-217.
43. J.E. Hodgetts, "Government responsiveness to the public interest: has progress been made?" Canadian Public Administration, 24 (Summer, 1981), 218.
44. Schubert, op. cit., p. 200.
45. Cited in Virginia Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 59.
46. Stephen K. Bailey, "Education and the Public Interest," Public Administration Review, 36 (November/December, 1976), 677.
47. This brief review is synthesized primarily from the works of

Milton Rokeach. See his Beliefs, Attitudes and Values (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969); "The Role of Values in Public Opinion Research," Public Opinion Quarterly, 32 (1968-69), 547-559; and "A Theory of Organization and Change within Value-Attitude Systems," Journal of Social Issues, 24 (1968), 13-33.

48. See footnote number five above.
49. See K.Z. Paltiel, Political Party Financing in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970). See also various contributions in K.Z. Paltiel et al., Studies in Canadian Party Finance, Committee on Election Expenses (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966).
50. Term adopted from Michael Whittington, op. cit.

CHAPTER THREE: TOWARD A DEFINITION AND TYPOLOGY OF CORRUPTION

The study of political corruption is presently marked by what Abraham Kaplan has called "the paradox of conceptualization." By this he meant that, "The proper concepts are needed to formulate a good theory, but we need a good theory to arrive at the proper concepts."¹ We have indicated in the previous chapter that the first step toward understanding political corruption, that is defining the concept, is fraught with disagreement amongst those who have attempted to come to grips with the term. And yet, as Kaplan noted, theory cannot proceed without concepts which are appropriate. The result has been, it could be argued, that theory has not generally proceeded. Where it has, it has done so because writers have offered definitions which, though lacking consensual support in the academic community, have permitted them to stipulate meanings for their theoretical purposes. Were it to be otherwise, that is to say, if consensus regarding definitions were required, all theoretical progress, such as it is, would cease. This would be a most inappropriate happenstance, to be sure.

The solution to this problem is again drawn from Kaplan:

Like all existential dilemmas in science, of which this is an instance, the paradox is resolved by a process of approximation: the better our concepts, the better the theory we can formulate with them, and in turn, the better the concepts available for the next, improved theory.²

Kaplan is, above all else perhaps, a theoretical pragmatist. He argues against the "premature closure" of ideas and meanings, where definitions are, if one may use the term, too definite. Rather, he argues, some openness of meaning is to be expected in the process of inquiry, though it may not be part of the pursuit of dogma. This

openness makes it difficult, if not impossible, to reduce a definition to a single direct statement, though the attempt is surely useful, if not mandatory. In essence, the definition entails a systemic meaning which incorporates the theory into the meaning, in the way that, as Kaplan puts it: "What Marx meant by 'class' or by 'capitalism' is made manifest only in the whole corpus of his writing...."³ In this sense, all definitions of complex social concepts are said to have both an explicit-or specified meaning as well as an unspecified or implicit meaning which emerges from the theory, from inferences, from observations, etc. Thus definitions, in their normal social science usage, are but partial specifications, subject to sharpening or being made more precise. This, argues Kaplan, is part of the process of inquiry itself and strict definition marks not the initiation but the culmination of inquiry.⁴

All of this is not meant to imply that definition or specification of key concepts is to be avoided in the early stages of research. Indeed, the opposite is true. Definition (Kaplan's preference for the term "specification" seems a trifle too esoteric) of the key concept or concepts represents a logical early stage of the process of inquiry, one that provides focus and permits communication. But the full meaning of the concept will normally become apparent only after the theoretical, inferential and observational contexts have been further explored. Additionally, the definition, to avoid premature closure, must remain open enough to permit these contexts to have their impact. In the final analysis, the definition cannot be or should not be terminal. With this lengthy, but necessary, caveat in mind let us move on to the definition of this study's key concept: political

corruption. From the definition, the discussion will turn to dimensions of political corruption as these illustrate and illuminate our understanding of the concept. Finally, an attempt to develop a typology of various politically corrupt (or possibly corrupt) behaviours is made, with the hope that this will also assist our understanding of the concept and provide the basis for theory.

Toward a Definition of Political Corruption

Earlier, it was argued that there is a lack of consensus as to how the concept of political corruption should be defined. It is not the intention here to argue that the definition to be employed in this study will end the continuing dispute. Rather, the purpose of this definitional exercise is to establish, as clearly as possible, how the concept will be used in this research, and how this constitutes a reasonable definition or usage. To do so, of course, requires that one establish support for the definition by reference to the existing body of literature.

It has been previously argued that definitions of corruption which stress either narrow legalistic criteria or amoral market or functional criteria are, though important, nevertheless truncated. That is, they are insufficient for understanding the concept of corruption. Legal restrictions do not take into account such nonlegal considerations as political instability in third world nations resulting from allegations of corruption or the defeat of parties and candidates at the polls due to accusations of corruption. Similarly, market and functional definitions also provide a restricted view of political corruption in.

that, for example, they ignore the moral opprobrium attached by many to corrupt actions or, like legalistic definitions, they ignore the attitudinal change which leads to alterations in the "demand" for corruption, or alterations in law and the like. Even those third world nations so often classified as suffering from wide-spread corruption, and therefore indicating a need being served, as functionalists so often put it, nevertheless make frequent efforts to reduce the corruption in their midsts. Even if this were merely a case of "paying lip service" to "clean" government, this still does not tell us why lip service is required. Surely, one reason must be that corruption, functional or not, is simply condemned by the great majority of citizens.

For these and other reasons, the legalistic, market and functional definitions of corruption seem impressionistically at least, to be falling in academic disfavour. In their stead we find definitions which usually incorporate notions of public opinion or the public interest. These are not without their own problems. Public interest definitions, for example, frequently decline to specify the meaning of "the public interest" and, by implication, conjure up the idea that the public interest is to be taken as given. We have contended earlier that this is an error. Conceptions of the public interest are contentious, as are the means for discovering what the conception of public interest might be in the first place. That is, both the content of the public interest and the process of discovering it are subject to debate. However, from this debate emerges one notion which, though lacking universal support, deserves further scrutiny: the public interest as public opinion. That is to say, it is possible to view the

public interest as the interest expressed by the public through its collective opinion, most often as part of the electoral process, but identifiable through other means as well. This view we have identified earlier as consensual, majoritarian or public-opinion oriented, and follows from the writing of David Hume and others.⁵

When this specific approach to the public interest is considered in light of public opinion definitions of corruption such as those advanced by Heidenheimer and Peters and Welch,⁶ there emerges a sense that the concept of political corruption can only be understood, and thus defined, in the context of the public opinion definition of the public interest. This is where the two concepts, public interest and political corruption, meet. It seems difficult to imagine the notion of political corruption, in fact, without reference to the public interest, for how else are we to know when something is politically corrupt if we do not use public interest as the measure? To say that political corruption is any act that violates social norms is, of course, much too broad. Not all norms relate to that which might be identified as "political". By the same token, one must concede that the definition of public interest, as noted above and in Chapter Two, is not without its own disputes. Yet, the definition which holds the most promise, it seems to me, is that which builds upon the notion that the public interest is only to be gauged by, as Hume put it, "...a preponderance of opinion..."⁷ Normative definitions are limited by their possible idiosyncrasy and presume, in authoritarian fashion, that a select few know better than others, what is in the public's interest. Definitions based on the outcome of interest group conflict are equally distressing, as they fail to concede that such competition is anything

but equal. Hence, the public interest, in this conception at least, would be the result of who had more power, more wealth, or more perseverance. Surely, this cannot be seriously advanced as the public's interest, despite claims by followers of Bentley and Truman. Further, it is also to be denied that the concept of public interest is an empty phrase, devoid of meaning, or meaning whatever one wishes it to mean. Certainly, there are those who would couch their positions in the positive light cast by the term public interest, even if the interest of the public was the furthest thing from their minds. It is indeed standard practice for interest groups and politicians alike to argue that their proposals or bills are in the public interest, but this does not make it so. Moreover, the fact that this is done is no reason to eliminate the public interest from the appropriate lexicon of political science, any more than the misuse of the term democracy requires us to remove it from some mythical list of acceptable social science concepts.

The public interest, for whatever problems it may entail, remains a useful concept for several reasons then. First, it indicates a particular concern for what some might call public-regardingness or public-spiritedness. It becomes a shorthand reference to the idea that there are some values, goals, policies or whatever that have as their *raison d'être* something other than crass self-interest. Second, it refers to interests which are more specific than broad social interests — these are public, hence relevant to the political process specifically. Third, if we accept the position of Hume, it becomes a shorthand for the views expressed by the citizenry on matters of political importance. That is, opinion on a range of issues but most

especially on those values which are at the heart of the political system is what this term is most often applied to by its defenders. Thus the term is a symbol, perhaps even a useful semantic tool, which transcends the narrow interests of individuals or groups and which cannot be surmised by pure reason alone.

All this is to say, then, that political corruption must be defined within the context of public interest as that term is measured by public opinion. It is not enough to say that corruption is what the law says it is, or what pure reason dictates. Corruption is what the public interest says it should be. This may be supported by legislation and regulations, as tangible and concrete manifestations of the public interest, but these do not define such interest. This assertion is not without its own problems, however, and the most troubling of these is that posed by the doctor-patient analogy. This analogy argues that assumptions that the public interest can be defined by public opinion is much like the notion that the patient knows better than the doctor how to deal with his or her illness. It is because of this criticism that the public opinion definition of public interest must not be completely unrestrained. It is possible to conceive of issues which may be beyond the experience, knowledge or sensitivity of the general public and for which guidance from specialists (politicians, civil servants, academics, journalists, the "politically active") may be required. How to establish when this is the case and when the views of specialists should carry special weight in comparison to the opinion of the general public is never clear. Should this be established by the courts, by Parliament or by the people themselves through public demonstrations or opinion polls? This brings us back to

the problem of normative definitions of the public interest, and such definitions are replete with their own criticisms, as has been argued earlier.

The concept of public interest then is an especially difficult one to accommodate within the conceptual framework of corruption theory, or any other theory for that matter. Yet, the evocative symbolism of the term is not strictly ethereal, it has substance. This substance rests in the public-regardingness of certain attitudes and opinions which make them distinct from those which are self-regarding. Even these terms are not so easily distinguished, at times, and one man's public-regarding is another's self-regarding, if one might badly paraphrase an old axiom. Is it not possible to identify political views which might be one or the other then? The answer, it seems, is yes. That difficulty in making distinctions is evident does not preclude one from making the attempt. One speaks of democracy as a reasonable concept, and may have applied it to Switzerland in the 1960's, but what of the fact that full universal suffrage did not arrive there until 1971? The upshot here is that ambiguity around the edges of a concept cannot be avoided. Thus attempts to eliminate a useful concept by reference to such ambiguity would eliminate almost all social science concepts, not to mention a large number even in the natural and physical sciences as well.

Returning to the substance of public interest, it becomes apparent that majority wishes may not adequately reflect the concept. Public interest is more complex than majority interest alone, as exemplified by notions of minority rights which are common to literature on liberal democratic states and to civil rights literature in particular.

Virginia Held argues that the public interest and the majority interest are not equivalent terms; majority interest can be determined by empirical means but public interest can be determined only by normative means.⁸ This again begs the normative question and little can be gained by reciting that criticism here. But her objection is based on a further notion which seems more relevant: the polity is the system which validates public interest claims.⁹ This implies that decisions made by the political system in some formal sense represent the validated public interest claims in society. Here, unlike the normative position on public interest, one can again determine the content of public interest by use of an empirical referent. While not a statistical test such as provided by opinion polls, existing legislation and regulations of government may represent this notion of the public interest, and their existence is empirically verifiable by mere reference to statute books, etc.

It is reasonable to assume that not all public opinion is translated into law or regulation and that not all laws represent the preponderance of public opinion. If anything, the latter are just as likely, and in the view of elite theorists more likely, to represent the opinion of a select few within the political system, the political and economic elite.¹⁰ Despite this objection, however, laws and regulations are at least one indicator of what the elite's (or elites') view of the public interest (or the elite's interest?) might be on given matters. Further, this notion of laws and regulations as indicators of elite opinion is consistent, in a way, with legal definitions of political corruption advanced by Nye and others. That is, these laws and regulations may indicate what the elite holds to be

corrupt. Moreover, when combined with a public opinion notion of political corruption, which heretofore had held the legalistic definition to be narrow, a new and more realistic sense of the concept of political corruption emerges. If the public interest consists of both public opinion on issues of public consequence and existing legislation and regulations regarding such issues, then the public interest is not a static notion, nor is it amenable to normative inspection alone. The narrowness of legalistic definitions of political corruption, and likewise the weakness of interest group-based theories of the public interest, can be overcome by the addition of the public opinion element. By the same token, the weakness of the public opinion-based definitions of public interest and political corruption vis-a-vis unrestricted majoritarianism or unfamiliarity with complex issues, is abated somewhat by the inclusion of the legislative dimension.

Thus, what emerges is a synthesis drawn from these perspectives: (1) public-opinion based definitions of political corruption as evident in the work of Heidenheimer and consistent with the public opinion tradition in defining the public interest; (2) the legalistic definitions of corruption advanced earlier by Nye and Scott which are consistent with the tradition of interest group or process based definitions of the public interest. With this synthesis the following objections to previous notions of both the public interest and political corruption can be met. First, the underlying premise of democratic theory that the opinion of the people be taken into account in judging the public interest can be upheld. Second, the premise of representative democracy that the people may at times require the

guidance of specialists, be they elected officials or civil servants or whomever, can also be maintained. Third, the premise of elite theorists that laws represent the will of the powerful and not the people is brought to bear by the rejection of any definition based solely on the outcome of the pluralistic political process, flawed as that process is by unequal distribution of power amongst groups and classes. Fourth, by reference to empirically observable phenomena, public opinion or published laws and regulations, we can avoid the trap of basing our definitions on purely normative grounds. This does not mean that public opinion may not have normative roots, as this is certainly the case. Nor does it suggest that the official pronouncements of government are without normative content, for this too is clearly evident. Further, it is not to deny that there is notable normative content to the discussion which is underway, for this is equally apparent. What it does suggest, though, is that the intention of the definition which follows is to identify terms in a more concrete and empirical fashion than strictly normative approaches permit. Fifth, and finally, by joining the concepts of public interest and political corruption we draw attention to the public-regarding nature of the definition and require that political corruption be based on the violation of public interest for reasons of advancing self-interest. To argue that political corruption represents a violation of social norms is too ambiguous and the reference to public interest allows us to clarify the type of social norm that is to be addressed.

What then is the definition of political corruption that is to be employed by this study? The specification is as follows:

Political Corruption may be defined as the use of public office in such a way that violates the public interest, measured in terms of public opinion or in terms of the formal rules of government (laws, regulations, guidelines) or both, in order that some form of self-interest may be served at the expense of that public interest.¹¹

Let us elaborate on one element of this definition for the moment. The reference to "both" in the definition is a direct consequence of the notions of white-grey-black corruption as advanced by Heidenheimer and discussed earlier. Black corruption, in terms of this definition, would be an act which violates the public interest both in terms of those norms or values expressed by means of public opinion as well as by means of the formal rules of government. Bribery, it would seem, is such an act, violating both legal stricture and the norms embodied in the public opinion concept of the public interest (though this latter point remains to be empirically tested). Other acts may violate the public interest in terms of one measurement or the other, but, not both. These acts would fit Heidenheimer's notion of grey corruption. A possible example would be conflict of interest, which is formalized by statute, regulation, code or guideline in various jurisdictions, but not in all. Further, it is not clear if such acts violate a public opinion ideation of the public interest. This latter conception of conflict of interest remains to be tested empirically as well. White corruption might be exemplified by such acts as patronage or pork-barrelling which, for reasons too complex to be discussed at this point, may not be either illegal (or in violation of regulation, code or guideline) nor necessarily rejected by public opinion. Let us consider the various types of political corruption in light of this definition then, first by indicating what the identifying dimensions of corruption might be and, second, by use of these dimensions and our

definition, distinguish amongst the types in a way which might prove useful to our theoretical pursuits.

Dimensions of Political Corruption: Foundations of a Typology

The definition of political corruption employed here indicates a rather wide range of related yet somewhat distinct activities. These activities are related in that each represents the potential violation of the public interest for the purposes of private gain or self-interest. They are distinct, on the other hand, because each type of corruption is characterized by certain recognizable traits. These traits constitute the dimensions of political corruption.

The scope of social involvement is a dimension of corruption which refers to the number of actors taking part in the act in question. Some activities are narrow in scope, involving only individuals or small groups. Conflict of interest often involves but one person, bribery may involve two. Other activities such as patronage or pork-barrelling, should be considered very broad in scope since these involve large numbers or persons, from dozens of party workers given jobs with the highway department to the thousands who stand to benefit by the offer of a new bridge in a constituency which supported the winning party. The distinction between narrow and broad is not a mechanical one, however, and must be employed in a less than exact fashion. Nevertheless, it is possible to agree as to the location of any act of corruption along a narrow-broad continuum of involvement.

A second dimension to consider is the status of the actor involved in the activity. This dimension includes three bases for

distinguishing amongst the individuals involved. First, the actor may be political or nonpolitical. The term political here is used in the generic sense and includes elected officials, appointed administrative officials, or even judges. In other words, actors who are in some sense officials of the political system. Nonpolitical actors would refer to those of non-official status, i.e., the average citizen. Further, these actors may be described as initiators or targets of corrupt activity. This distinction may be seen in a comparison of bribery, where the official is perceived as the target of corruption, and graft, where the official or political actor is perceived as the initiator. Finally, actors may be distinguished by their competitive or non-competitive status in the system. This distinction is necessary in order to accommodate the notion that corruption may take place during the electoral process, as in the case of illegal campaign financing, when the political actor is not yet an official of government. Moreover, the competitive dimension allows one to identify appointed officials such as civil servants or judges and thereby avoid lumping them with other officials who, from time to time, may have competitive status. Only the latter could be expected to be involved in illegal campaign financing, for example.

A third dimension is the type of reward which forms the motivation for political corruption. There are three reward types that might be considered: power rewards, income rewards, and social rewards. Power rewards include at least two basic reward patterns. First, political actors seek to maintain themselves in public office and the perquisites of that office may be seen as the source of motivation, per se. Second, the nonpolitical actor may seek some form of advantage in terms

of access to the political system, which provides for that person the opportunity to have his or her concerns treated in a fashion that might not be obtained through normal channels of access. Income rewards refer to goods or services which have some recognized value, be it cash, contracts, jobs or (as exemplified by Britain's Profumo scandal or our own Munsinger scandal) sexual favours. The third type of reward is social in nature and is illustrated by the social acceptance one receives from family or friends when one performs an act which enhances one's social ~~status~~ ^{reputation}. Nepotism results in such a reward, particularly in societies where the extended family is still a major social institution. Vote-buying may be cited as an instance where power, rather than income or social acceptance, is the motivating reward. Bribery might illustrate the influence of the income reward.

Another dimension of corruption is the selectivity of inducement, by which is meant the way in which the rewards of corruption are distributed. This may be on a case by case basis, as in nepotism or bribery, or on a more universal scale, such as the entire constituency profiting from a new wharf constructed in return for their support for the victorious party. A selective inducement may be offered or withheld as the initiator sees fit. A diffuse inducement is one which applies to everyone in the relevant community, whether the initiator prefers it or not. Thus a bribe is highly selective, patronage on the other hand is less so. However, even patronage is selective by comparison to pork-barrelling where everyone in the constituency may make use of the new road, whether they supported the victorious party or not.

Next one must consider the arena in which the act of corruption

took place, hence the dimension that might be called the location of corruption. The location of the corrupt act (or allegedly corrupt act) may be electoral, legislative, administrative or judicial or even some combination of these. Conflict of interest may take place in several locations, but vote-buying is by definition an electoral problem.

Lastly, there is the dimension which ultimately defines whether or not the act in question is in reality corrupt: the degree of public condemnation. We have indicated throughout this study that corruption is defined by the public, through public opinion or through existing legislative mechanisms. It is also the case that acts of corruption may differ, as again we have noted previously, in the degree to which they may be seen as offending public opinion, thus Heidenheimer's notion of white-grey-black corruption. The existence of legislative mechanisms (laws, regulations, codes, guidelines) can be determined rather directly, but these are not necessarily accurate indicators of public condemnation. However, they may reflect a degree of elite opprobrium, at least within state elite circles. The measurement of public opinion is a more arduous task, but it does reflect attitudes in a direct, though somewhat imperfect, way. In Table I an attempt has been made at summarizing these dimensions for each type of political corruption to be discussed in the section following. Because the degree of public condemnation is at this stage unclear (indeed, this is the major concern of the thesis), the comments under this column are actually hypotheses. As the study progresses, it is hoped that the information regarding the degree of condemnation will become more empirically evident. Until that time, let us turn to the types of political corruption outlined in the table.

Types of Political Corruption

The dimensions discussed above allow us to differentiate between various types or forms of political corruption.¹³ There is no intention here to close debate as to whether or not certain behaviours are, in any "true" sense, corrupt. That disagreement exists over the inclusion of certain behaviours is not disputed; no typology should be seen as closing such debate. Rather, the intention is to provide a typology which tries to deal with two basic concerns. First, what types of acts are labelled as corrupt in the literature? Second, what acts are viewed as violations of the public interest, in terms of public opinion, legislative mechanisms, or both?

Patronage is the process by which governments award employment or contracts on the basis of partisan support rather than on the basis of a more objective measure of merit. This concept is usually associated with the idea of "political nomination" in the literature, whereby party supporters are given preferential treatment in acquiring government posts and often supporters of the defeated party are removed.¹⁴ In addition, the term is used to cover the letting of contracts for the same reasons, an example of which was noted in 1975 when the federal government used its advertising budget to reward certain political "correct" advertising agencies with lucrative contracts.¹⁵

Whether or not this behaviour is deemed corrupt remains in doubt to some extent. It has its proponents, beginning with the Jacksonian Democrats in the United States during the 1830's and continuing to the present. The defence of the practice rests upon notions such as

TABLE 1: TYPES AND DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION

TYPES OF CORRUPTION	SCOPE OF INVOLVEMENT	STATUS OF ACTORS	TYPE OF REWARD	SELECTIVITY OF INDUCEMENT	LOCATION (ARENA)	LEVEL OF CONDEMNATION
Patronage	broad as a rule, narrow in specific cases	political actors are official and initiators	power for political actors and income for others	moderately selective	legislative, administrative, judicial	mixed or "grey", laws are disregarded
Vote-buying	broad	political actors are official or competitive and are the initiators	mostly power for political actors, income for others	not very selective due to secret ballot	electoral	very strong or "black" both in law and opinion
Pork-barrelling	broad	political actors are competitive or official and initiate	power for political actors, public works with monetary value for constituency	very diffuse	electoral or legislative	weak or "white" in opinion, no laws
Bribery	very narrow	political actors are official and targets	income for officials, income or power for others	very selective	legislative, administrative, or judicial	very strong or "black" in law and opinion
Graft	either broad or narrow	politicals are official and initiate	income for officials, income or power (access) for others	either selective or diffuse	legislative, administrative, or judicial	strong or black
Conflict of interest	very narrow	actor(s) are official and initiate, no target because there is no exchange	income	very selective	legislative, administrative, or judicial	mixed or "grey" both in law and opinion
Nepotism	very narrow in specific case, may be broad as a principle in some cultures	political actor is an official and initiates act though others apply pressure	social for official, income for other	very selective	mostly administrative but with legislative influence	mixed or grey in opinion, black in law though not always applied
Influence-peddling	very narrow	normally, official is target, but can be an intermediary	income for official, income or power for intermediary or initiator	very selective	usually legislative, on occasion administrative	black in principle both in law and opinion, but might be rationalized as systemic in specific case
Corrupt campaign finance	broad	political actor may be competitive or official, may be target or initiator	power or income for either side of exchange	moderately selective except in some cases	electoral	black in law, grey in opinion

N.B. (1) Compare this table to the one developed by Robert Groves in his Institutionalization and Political Corruption in Canada (Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary, 1977) honours B.A. thesis. I have communicated with Mr. Groves regarding his thesis which was based on my earlier work in Gibbons and Rowat, op. cit. While the tables were derived independently, they are quite similar, based as they are on the same typology.

(2) The dimension called "level of condemnation" is at this point a case of hypotheses rather than conclusive classification, as this is what the research of the dissertation is striving to establish. The data to appear later will

"amateur administration", disallowing the creation of a socially isolated bureaucratic class, or providing the mechanism necessary to protect a newly elected government's mandate from the ravages of a politically hostile civil service. Opponents of patronage cite the Weberian ideal of merit, equality of treatment for all, efficiency and the dubious morality of using public money to defend the private interests of a political party. Whatever these arguments may be, there are institutional arrangements which indicate that, at some level, patronage is to be considered an inappropriate activity. These arrangements are normally featured in an agency such as a civil service commission and a merit system which the commission is bound by law to protect. However, as recent public debate in Manitoba illustrates, political parties are sometimes disinclined to accept the principle of a politically neutral and meritorious bureaucracy when they come to power.¹⁶ What makes the corrupt nature of patronage even more nebulous is the lack of public opinion data regarding the degree of condemnation that might exist. Of course, this is true of all the types to be discussed here, but in the case of patronage we have seen reform movements succeed in pressuring governments to create civil service commissions and tendering systems. While the extent of popular support for these reforms is ambiguous, it is clear that there was substantial support in the U.S. among the press elite.¹⁷ There is no apparent reason to think that the situation was otherwise in Canada.

Patronage can be distinguished from other forms of corruption or possible corruption by reference to the following dimensions. First, the scope of involvement is broad, since it is a useful technique only when sufficient numbers are motivated to work for or contribute to the

party's campaign. Second, the actors who are initiators in this activity are political, in that they either occupy elected office or hope to; the targets are non-political. The context of the exchange is competitive in that the political actors may offer rewards when they compete for election, not just when they are victorious. Of course, winning allows one to follow through on the offer. Third, the reward is power for the political actor and income for the nonpolitical actor. It is fair to say that for some political actors, acquiring or retaining office may be motivated by the need for income, but there are a great many in this position who are capable of earning more income outside politics. Fourth, the inducement is moderately selective, being more selective for higher government posts and larger contracts but less so for those of a smaller scale. This is because the connection between the recipient of the reward and the value of that person's contribution to the party effort will not be as carefully scrutinized for lesser posts and contracts. Fifth, the location of the activity is ostensibly electoral. However, the actual promise may be carried out in several locations: in the legislative staff, in the administrative arena with the offer of a civil service job or government contract; or the offer of a judgeship in the court system. Nevertheless, the motivation for patronage is competitive advantage in the campaign, thus the location must be mixed in the final analysis. Finally, the degree of condemnation is unclear in the context of public opinion, though less unclear in the sense of legislative mechanisms. However, in the latter context there is a notable disparity between the intent of legislation and the practical consequence which indicates that elite support is possibly illusory. On an impressionistic level,

to be confirmed or denied by empirical analysis later, this seems to be a grey area, depending perhaps on the qualifications of the appointee or contract winner. Where these qualifications are dubious, greater opposition would seem, on common sense alone, to warrant greater hostility and opprobrium on the part of the public.

A second form of political corruption is vote-buying, the act of soliciting a voter's support in exchange for some reward of monetary value, the classical examples being liquor or even cash. It has been a historical problem in Western democracies and still continues in Canada to some degree today. In 1975, the premier of Nova Scotia admitted in a nationally published interview that vote-buying was a contemporary electoral tool in his province.¹⁸ The identifying characteristics are, in many ways, similar to those of patronage with the following exceptions. The selectivity of the inducement is less rigid in vote-buying since there is no way to insure that the rewarded voter has actually voted for the party in question, given the secret ballot. Second, the arena of the activity is purely electoral, for obvious reasons. Finally, the degree of condemnation places this act in the "black" area of corruption. It is a violation of federal law, along with other nefarious vote-related actions, and the a priori sense that one has of this act is that it engenders direct and intense hostility amongst the great majority of voters.

Pork-barrelling is a somewhat misunderstood term, particular in the journalistic realm, and is frequently left undefined by those who employ it. The academic literature, to the extent that attention is given to this concept, distinguishes between patronage and pork-barrelling.¹⁹ James C. Scott considers pork-barrelling to be a

diffuse inducement to all citizens in the jurisdiction, not just to one's supporters. A new school or bridge, for example, may benefit almost everyone in the constituency, although it is true that the jobs created by the public works project could be distributed as patronage.²⁰ The difficulty with this issue is that, in terms of the degree of condemnation, it seems to occupy the "white" end of Heidenheimer's spectrum. Charges are often made as to the corrupt nature of pork-barrelling incidents, such as those reported by Walter Stewart in the 1972 federal election, but are the charges valid?²¹ The offense is, in theory, that the public interest is violated by the application of non-rational and particularistic criteria to the decision to spend public money. However, constituents frequently argue that their M.P. or M.L.A. must act as a delegate for them and protect their interests, in part by providing public works projects which promote employment. This delegate concept of representation is consistent with American political history in particular and may help to explain what appears to be a high incidence of pork-barrelling in the U.S. Congress.²² Thus, there is little apparent condemnation by public opinion, save from partisan opponents, and there is no legislative rebuke to the practice by means of formal sanctions. This type of activity is distinguished from other forms of corrupt or possibly corrupt behaviour in terms of its diffuse inducement pattern and in terms of the relatively low degree of public condemnation. Its reward is power to the political actor and a broad, socially-based benefit having monetary value for a community or constituency which supports the victorious party in the election.²³

By contrast to the previous case, bribery constitutes an act at

the "black" end of Heidenheimer's scale. It is defined as illegal in the Canadian Criminal Code and carries a heavy sanction with conviction. Section 108 of the code states that ~~any~~ member of Parliament who,

corruptly accepts or obtains, agrees to accept or attempts to obtain any money, valuable consideration, office, place of employment for himself or another person in respect of anything done or omitted or to be done or omitted by him in his official capacity is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for fourteen years.²⁴

It could be argued that this wording covers conflict of interest and graft as well as bribery, but the intent of the legislation seems to be upon the latter two activities. The issuance of conflict of interest guidelines by the federal government in 1973 regarding cabinet ministers is an indication that section 108 was seen as, at best, peripheral to the conflict issue.²⁵ In any case, bribery differs from other types of corruption in several ways. First, the scope of involvement is narrow, perhaps because the stiff penalties ensure secrecy on the part of the actors involved. This in turn means that the number of actors will be kept small, usually a one-to-one exchange. The rewards for both political and non-political actors are very selective and are income related for each. The political actor is usually in the official arena (legislative, administrative or judicial) rather than in the competitive electoral arena, since there is no gain from bribing a candidate who may lose. Thus an incumbent is the target of the bribe attempt. In some cases, the reward for the non-political actor may be power related, in that the initiator seeks preferential access to decision-makers for reasons other than income.

Graft is related to bribery, but in this case the official actor is the initiator in that he or she demands payment, sometimes

explicitly, for rendering a public service which it is otherwise the official's duty to perform. An example would be the attempt of an official to require payment above and beyond that legally necessary for the acquisition of a license or permit. This is the narrower definition; others may use the term in a broader and less specific fashion. Some use the term as the equivalent of corruption or as a general type of corrupt behaviour of which bribery is one element.²⁶ The Criminal Code, like some writers, makes no distinction between bribery and graft, so our discrete categories constitute an analytical rather than legal tool. The only clear distinguishing feature between these two types is that the political actor is the initiator of graft. Less clear, but having some applicability perhaps, is that the scope of graft is likely to be less narrow than is true of bribery, in that the political actor's initiation may signal governmental acceptance of the behaviour to members of the public, hence meaning less reticence in engaging in this activity. Indeed, in societies where such exchanges are frequent, it becomes very difficult to make the distinction between those who initiate and those who are targets. That is, the ubiquity of graft may lead the citizen to offer payment before it is requested, thus moving the act from the category of graft to one of bribery. At this point, the distinction becomes moot. In either case, bribery and graft are held in contempt by both the public and the law in Western societies, though not necessarily so in the developing world.²⁷ Even in the developed world, public opinion may make distinctions between petty graft and serious graft, issuing significant censure to the latter only.²⁸

Another type of potential corruption has been used in very broad

fashion by many writers. Here I refer to conflict of interest. Some would use graft as a synonym for conflict of interest, but this is insufficiently rigorous.²⁹ On the other hand, Kernaghan has defined this type as "a situation in which a public employee has a private or personal interest sufficient to influence or appear to influence the objective exercise of his official duties."³⁰ It is significant that this definition does not include the presence of a second actor and this is, in fact, the distinguishing characteristic of this type of corruption. In conflict of interest there is no exchange or transaction between two or more actors. The rewards for such behaviour go to a single person or group and are derived from the government itself. Hence, we have a conflict of interest if a city councillor votes for the purchase of a piece of land which he or his family may own or if a civil servant uses his or her time on the government's payroll to carry out business for a consulting firm that is owned by that person because the time spent on the outside firm interrupts and interferes with the person's official duties. This type of corruption, then, is marked by these distinctions: a scope of involvement which is reduced to a single actor or group of actors in a non-transactional process; the rewards to this actor or group of actors are income related; the political actor is the initiator given that there are no other actors; the inducement is highly selective; and the arena in which this occurs is anything other than electoral given that one must occupy an official position in order to be involved in such a conflict. On the question of public condemnation, the matter is not terribly clear at this time because the legal status of conflict of interest is currently in a state of flux. There is legislation to deal with this

1

9

issue in Newfoundland and New Brunswick, but in other jurisdictions (except municipalities) the only sanctions provided for stem primarily from guidelines which are less formal than law. However, there appears to be an increasing inclination on the part of legislators to respond to whatever degree of public demand they perceive by bringing conflict of interest under closer scrutiny by any one of a variety of mechanisms.³¹ *

Related to patronage and to conflict of interest is the act of nepotism, meaning the hiring of government personnel or the letting of government contracts on the basis of kinship or friendship rather than on merit. Like patronage then, nepotism deals with hiring and contracting. However, the reward motivation seems quite different in that the initiator of the act, an elected or appointed government official, rarely receives income in return for the job or contract. Rather, the motivation appears to be the reward of social acceptance, i.e., the support of one's family or peer group in return for one's hiring of cousin Fred or friend Bill. Additionally, there may be some power or status reward involved, in that one's control of such jobs and contracts is possibly perceived as a mark of one's influence and authority in the family or at the club. Like conflict of interest, the actor in a case of nepotism has misused his or her office for personal interest, though one would not necessarily call the process involved a transaction or exchange. The degree of public condemnation over this behaviour is again somewhat ambiguous. Like patronage, civil service laws generally forbid hiring on this basis, but the opinion of the public may not be quite so definite. It is not uncommon to hear in the course of normal conversation that one person has been able to secure a

job at their factory through the intercession of a relative, as part of the tradition of the firm perhaps. Whether the public would accept such behaviour in government is less clear, though it is likely that nepotism does raise public hackles if the recipient of a job or contract is demonstrably incompetent. As with other types of corruption or possible corruption, this too must wait further empirical analysis in later chapters.

Influence-peddling has been defined in the past in a way which fails to adequately distinguish it from conflict of interest. I am here referring to the work of Kenneth Kernaghan.³² The two types of corruption seem to differ in that there is a transaction which takes place in the context of influence-peddling which does not apply to conflict of interest. Thus a second actor or group of actors is added to the equation. A proposed definition of influence-peddling which reflects this perspective might read as follows: an act whereby a government employee or other actor associated with the government offers, in return for some type of reward, his or her presumed influence with those in public office to a person or persons who wish to gain a special favour from the government. The reward for peddling one's influence can be of several types: income, power or social acceptance. But to this we may add a confounding element; the reward may be "shared", so to speak, with others. An example may illuminate this point. A recent case in Nova Scotia which culminated in a conviction was based on the peddling of influence within a political party which was to result in the placing of certain products on the shelves of provincial liquor stores. Fund-raisers or bagmen as they are often called, would seek contributions to their party, in turn they

would get the contributors' products listed. While it is not clear if the convicted influence peddlers were rewarded personally, there was no doubt that the party received income from the practice.³³ It is interesting to note that Kernaghan uses this concept of influence-peddling to cover the act of nepotism as well.³⁴

The last type of political corruption to be discussed here is corrupt campaign financing. This activity is not well defined in the literature, though the literature is extensive by comparison to that which exists for other types.³⁵ The reason for this ambiguity is that the dividing line between that which is legitimate and that which is corrupt is very fine. Indeed, until recent legislative actions taken both federally and in the provinces, the dividing line was purely subjective. Now, however, laws define limits on contributions as well as on expenditures, with the consequence that we may now arrive at the determination of what is corrupt in a more objective manner. Nevertheless, a conceptual definition is required to understand the phenomenon and to appreciate the reason behind the legislative actions already taken. We may define corrupt campaign financing then as any contribution received or expenditure made which is perceived, in light of community opinion or legal restrictions, as compromising the integrity of the campaign of any candidate or political party. When broadly interpreted, this definition could absorb such notions as "dirty tricks" in political campaigns, given that expenditures may be necessary to hire tricksters or supply them with goods and services. However, this is a peripheral consideration here. Moreover, vote-buying is excluded as it merits its own category. Distinguishing features of this type of corruption include the location of this act in

the competitive, electoral arena, and rewards which are based, for the most part, on power for the political actor and access which results in power or income for the non-political actor.

This author argued several years ago that the definitions of the various types of corruption were problematic in that so little attention was ever given to this aspect of study at that time.³⁶ Unfortunately, this remains the case today. No attempt is made here to argue that these definitions are definitive or that the basic definition of corruption is in any way consensual. As was noted at the beginning of the chapter, this would force premature closure on the definition of the concept and its subtypes and this would be both presumptuous and unnecessary. While explicit definitions of political corruption abound and therefore render the definitional problem a consensual one, there is no such problem in regards to the typology noted here. Rather, it has been the lack of explicit definitions which has troubled this aspect of the conceptualization of corruption. Hopefully, others may direct more of their energy to this problem. Then one might perceive of the problem as consensual, now it is simply a problem of taking the first few faltering steps of conceptualization. Of course, consensus adds confidence in our concepts, but it is not necessarily the case that one must wait for it to develop. Conceptualizing must proceed, consensus or not, and from it emerges theorizing. This is the problem to which we turn in the next chapter.

NOTES

1. Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler, 1964), p. 53.
2. Ibid., p. 54.
3. Ibid., p. 64.
4. Ibid., chapter II.
5. Virginia Held, The Public Interest and Individual Interests (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 59; Stephen K. Bailey, "Education and the Public Interest," Public Administration Review, 36 (November/December, 1976) 6/7.
6. Arnold Heidenheimer, "Introduction," in Arnold Heidenheimer, ed., Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978), pp. 26-28; John G. Peters and Susan Welch, "Political Corruption in America: A Search for Definition and a Theory," American Political Science Review, 72 (September, 1978) 975.
7. Held, op. cit., p. 59.
8. Ibid., p. 163.
9. Ibid., p. 191.
10. The literature on elite theory, both Canadian and comparative, is vast and cannot be detailed here. However, two Canadian examples should suffice: Wallace Clement, The Canadian Corporate Elite (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975) and Robert Presthus, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics (Toronto: Macmillan, 1973).
11. This represents a modification of my earlier definition in "The Study of Political Corruption," in K.M. Gibbons and D.C. Rowat, eds., Political Corruption in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), p. 5. The modification stems from the need to clarify the means by which elite opinion is measured and to amplify the public interest/self-interest dichotomy discussed in this chapter. The old definition read as follows:

Political corruption is the use of a public office in a way

that forsakes the public interest, measured in terms of mass opinion, elite opinion or both, in order that some form of personal advantage may be achieved at the expense of that public interest.

12. This discussion is taken, with some modification, from my earlier work in ibid., pp. 6-8.
13. The discussion of types is again drawn from my earlier work in ibid., pp. 8-13, with some modification.
14. See J.E. Hodgetts et al., The Biography of an Institution: The Civil Service Commission of Canada, 1908-1967 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972), pp. 9-12.
15. John Gray, "Pork-barrelling still in style for government ads," Ottawa Citizen, March 6, 1975, p. 1.
16. There are any number of newspaper articles which might be cited here, thus the reader is advised to consult the Winnipeg Free Press following the last two provincial elections in October 1977 and November 1972. The general tenor of these was that patronage was less an issue in previous elections and that increasing polarization between the N.D.P. and the Progressive Conservatives accounted for what some called the "politicization" of the civil service.
17. See Ari Hoogenboom, "Spoilsmen and Reformers: Civil Service and Public Morality," in Arnold Heidenheimer, ed., Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978), pp. 276-283.
18. Alden Nowlan, "Passing the time with Gerry Regan," Maclean's, May 1975, pp. 65-68.
19. See John Gray, op. cit., for an example of one newspaper's misuse of this concept. The headline identified patronage incorrectly as pork-barrelling, though the author made the proper distinction.
20. James C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 109-110.
21. Walter Stewart, Divide and Con: Canadian Politics at Work (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), chapter 8.

22. See John A. Ferejohn, Pork Barrel Politics: Rivers and Harbors Legislation, 1947-1968 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1974).
23. An interesting empirical study of this issue can be found in Donald E. Blake, "L.I.P. and Partisanship: An Analysis of the Local Initiatives Program," Canadian Public Policy, 2 (Winter 1976), 17-32.
24. Cited in The Privy Council Office, Members of Parliament and Conflict of Interest (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973), p. 15.
25. See Gibbons and Rowat, op. cit., chapter 23.
26. See, for example, V.O. Key, Jr., "Techniques of Political Graft," in Heidenheimer, op. cit., p. 46 and Alan Phillips, "Modern Manual for Graft in Civic Office: Corruption," Maclean's, March 10, 1962, p. 36. Phillips combines the concepts of graft and conflict of interest in his articles, while we consider these as separate types of corruption.
27. See, inter alia, David H. Bayley, "The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation," in Heidenheimer, op. cit., pp. 521-33.
28. This seems to be the implication, albeit impressionistic, of a public attitude which is summarized in the term "honest graft". See Peter Bruton, John Downing and Fraser Kelly, "Graft Never Hurt a Politician at the Polls," reprinted in Gibbons and Rowat, eds., op. cit., pp. 225-230, and Pierre Berton, "Who Cares About Conflicting Interests in Good Old Renfrew," reprinted in Paul W. Fox, ed., Politics: Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1962), pp. 203-205.
29. See Alan Phillips, op. cit.
30. Kenneth Kernaghan, Ethical Conduct: Guidelines for Government Employees (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1975), p. 13.
31. These statutes were passed in 1973 in Newfoundland and 1978 in New Brunswick. The current debate over pending conflict of interest legislation in Manitoba is both timely and instructive. See

chapter 5 below for details, including bibliographic data, on these statutes and debates.

32. Kernaghan, op. cit., p. 13.
33. This nationally reported case resulted in three convictions with substantial fines and the possible loss of a seat by a Senator from Nova Scotia. The legal context of this case can be found in chapter 5 in connection with the discussion of sections 108 and 110 of the Criminal Code of Canada.
34. Op. cit., pp. 13, 15.
35. See K.Z. Paltiel, Political Party Financing in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970) and the Committee on Election Expenses, Report, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966).
36. In Gibbons and Rowat, op. cit., p. 13.

CHAPTER FOUR: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF CORRUPTION

In a chapter on theory, Vernon Van Dyke's Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis discusses approximately one dozen different usages of the term "theory".¹ This would indicate that theory may carry many different meanings and that agreement regarding any one meaning or usage would be well nigh impossible to achieve. Such an impression, however, is not really accurate. The differences of which Van Dyke speaks are usually differences in the degree of rigor applied, rather than a difference in kind. Thus, the various meanings uncovered by Van Dyke are not mutually exclusive, nor are they only cases of correct or incorrect usages (though some certainly are wrong). Different meanings and usages of the term theory are applicable to different endeavours. One may distinguish between the sort of common sense notion of theory that one might apply to the analysis of a problem in the office. Another type, perhaps the most rigorous, would be hierarchical theories used in the "hard" sciences like physics, an example being Einstein's theory of relativity.² Each theory is relevant to its context and purpose, though the latter type is surely preferable to more impressionistic common sense notions of theory.

Not all theory in the social sciences, or in the natural or "hard" sciences for that matter, is of the most rigorous hierarchical type. The dominant type in the social sciences would seem to be what Kaplan calls concatenated theory, or theory based on patterns and tendency statements. Whatever the type, the function of theory remains more or less the same: to systematize knowledge, to guide the inquiry in its search for data and regularities, and to aid in explanation.³ This is

true not only of rigorous theory, but of the less rigorous theory so common to the social sciences, which rarely builds upon laws. Stephen Wasby argues that, because of the lack of laws, social science theories consist largely of propositions. Thus, in his view, it is more accurate to speak of "frames of reference" or "quasi-theories" than of theory in the sense that Kaplan (but not Van Dyke) uses the term.⁴ It is with this same cautiousness that the term theory is being used in this chapter, though without using Wasby's finer distinctions specifically.

The discussion which follows, then, will be composed of two broad elements. The first will be a review of the theoretical literature on political corruption and the second will be an attempt at synthesizing from this literature a framework for the analysis of corruption which will permit the drawing of several working hypotheses. These will be further detailed at the end of Chapter Six, which deals with a review of empirical literature, as more specific hypotheses consistent with the basic working hypotheses are suggested by this previous research.

Review of the Theoretical Literature

While the literature on political corruption is anything but expansive when compared with the literature on other political science concepts, it is nevertheless fraught with competing theoretical frameworks or approaches. Given the pre-paradigmatic nature of political science as a discipline, this could hardly be otherwise. I have elsewhere identified several frameworks or perspectives of a general nature employed in the analysis of political corruption.⁵

These perspectives will be examined in their general context first, followed by an analysis of the connection between these general perspectives and what I have referred earlier to as the "attitudinal" approach. As we shall see, the attitudinal approach is by no means monolithic, and borrows heavily from the general perspectives that are discussed below.

A. General Perspectives on Political Corruption

It may be useful to separate two basic streams of thought in the political corruption literature. The first of these is the more traditional, the reformist approach. In this stream we find much of the "muck-raking" style of the journalistic world, long on description and moralizing, but short on detailed and sustained analysis. To be sure, there is great need for such approaches, as the media bring to the public consciousness the reports of corrupt behaviour which might otherwise go unnoticed and, hence, unresolved. Moreover, traditional political science, i.e. academia, was not immune to this approach either. Lincoln Steffens' The Shame of the Cities, published in 1904, is frequently cited as an example of this tradition.⁶ However, the reformist tradition has been eclipsed in modern social science, largely because of the development of behavioural social science. In essence, this behavioural approach has challenged the action-oriented moralizing of the traditionalists, arguing that the earlier approach fails to deal adequately with the problem of empirical analysis. That is, the traditionalists were accused of being "soft" on evidence and poor in research discipline. They were impressionistic and exclusively

normative, at least in the eyes of the behaviouralists.⁷ The behavioural-traditional debate is not our concern here. Rather, the issue is the fate of the reformist study of corruption which predominated the late 1800's and early 1900's. The behavioural approach, whatever its perceived deficiencies, did provide the impetus for more rigorous methods of social science investigation. The reformist tradition was perceived, rightly or wrongly, as insufficiently rigorous and thus lost favour among those who thought academic study needed to be distinguished from "yellow journalism". The process of change also meant that normative considerations would give way to empirical ones.

Fortunately, current scholarship in the social sciences seems to have synthesized normative and empirical concerns, indicating that the two dimensions of epistemology are not altogether separate and that the two may, in fact, be entwined in the same scholarly pursuit. While this realization does not place the old reformist tradition back on its prominent pedestal, it does allow the reformist concerns to motivate more empirical and analytical study. Hopefully, the result will be more rigorous and more satisfying than that which went before, and at the same time provide the action-oriented research that strictly empirical work often fails to generate. We should still expect the reformist approach to continue, particularly though not exclusively, in the popular media. Indeed, much academic work can be expected to rely, at least in a minimal way, on this type of writing for background information or case studies, given the popularity of the topic in journalistic circles and the relatively modest amount of scholarly

On the practical side of reformism is the realization that continued effort towards reducing the negative consequences of corruption depends in large part upon the perpetuation of the reformist approach. In this sense, scholarship is a by-product of reformist literature rather than its primary objective. Nevertheless, good scholarship may well result from reformist "crusading". One example would be the federal government's green paper, Members of Parliament and Conflict of Interest, tabled in 1973.⁸ The green paper included an interesting comparative analysis of conflict of interest rules in Britain and the United States as well as a review of Canadian experience on the same matter. While its focus was on legislative reform, scholarship was clearly valued. Similarly, the work of Khayyam Paltiel and others for the Committee on Election Expenses, which resulted in a report issued by the federal government in 1966,⁹ had as its primary goal the reform of election financing, yet it is a major scholarly contribution as well. Thus, the goal of reform is not the distinguishing characteristic of reformist literature. Instead, its defining feature is the "style" of the work: normative, intuitive, impressionistic and analogical.

The second basic stream of thought or theory (I am not attempting to treat these terms as equivalent, but suggesting that there may be disagreement as to which applies in specific cases) is what might be labelled as "analytical perspectives". These are to be differentiated from the reformist approach in their rigor, both theoretical and empirical. Evidence is empirically based rather than impressionistic or analogical. Theory is at last rudimentarily systematic. Normative concerns are not dismissed, but are more likely to be spelled out and

to some extent accounted for. The aforementioned report of the Committee on Election Expenses is a good example of the use of one form of analytical method, i.e. statistical analysis, within the context of a broader normative concern. However, it is not necessarily true that all analytical studies will employ statistical techniques or methods. Empirical or analytical research is sometimes thought to be essentially quantitative, but this is a mistaken position. Surely there is room for qualitative as well as quantitative empirical analysis. The exclusion of non-statistical phenomena also excludes elements of empirical "reality", of which one example might be the existence of laws or regulations. Are these any less empirical than statistics, even if we ignore the triviality that they can be counted? Thus the analytical perspectives included here are not always quantitative. However, in the absence of quantitative data, they are to a large extent systematic and either directly or potentially verifiable by either quantitative or qualitative empirical means.

Among the approaches most often encountered in the analytical vein are several which seem to have generated particular interest in the theoretical literature on political corruption. It is not suggested here that these are the only approaches of value, nor need it be argued that the classification which follows is in any way a consensual view. Further, any study may consist of several approaches in some sense of synthesis. Indeed, it will be suggested that the political culture or attitudinal approach is, in many respects, a composite or synthetic analysis in the best meaning of those terms. We will return to this point anon.

The first of these analytical approaches is also the most

traditional: the "historical" approach. The work of H. Blair Neatby on the Beauharnois scandal, a chapter in his book on Mackenzie King, is an excellent example of this genre.¹⁰ So too are Herbert Quinn's analysis of corruption in Quebec during the Duplessis years and S.J.R. Noel's study of Newfoundland's corruption during the 1920's.¹¹ The need for historical analysis is often summarized in the following fashion: how do we know where we are going unless we know where we have been? Granted this formulation may be rather simplistic. However, it seems to capture the central purpose of historical research. Knowledge of past practice is usually implied by those who, like Richard Gwyn,¹² argue that Canada has been traditionally a relatively "pure" political system regarding political corruption. Yet, in an article published one year prior to Gwyn's assertion of purity, writers for a national magazine charged that Canadian history exhibited direct contradictions of that claim.¹³ It would seem that further historical research is required to resolve such disputes between diametrically opposite points of view. Nevertheless, even if factual disputes of this type can be adequately resolved, the problem of investigating the complexity of the concept of political corruption remains. The reason for this is that the historical method has certain limitations which are only overcome by the application of other research approaches. While the historical method or approach is systematic in discovering the "what", it is less successful at explaining the "why". For this type of question, we must turn elsewhere for our answers.

The second analytical approach to the study of corruption is what might be called the "institutional-legal" approach, of which the

3

Micred

federal government's green paper on conflict of interest and Members of Parliament is a prime example. While it is possible to include some forms of reform-oriented work in this category, this is true only to the extent that the study in question is systematic in its approach and academic, rather than journalistic, in its style. The green paper, discussed earlier, would meet this test and thus may be included as one of this type. To some extent, the Report of the Committee on Election Expenses, also mentioned above, would fit this approach — but only in some of its aspects. That is, to the extent that the report's objective was to reform election financing legislation, it was institutional-legal in its approach and reformist in its motivation. It was, and remains, a systematic study of legislation and institutional arrangements, despite its reformist intent. Moreover, the Studies in Canadian Party Finance,¹⁴ which provide the research support for the report itself, are largely but not exclusively based on opinion research methods and fit the attitudinal or cultural approach to be discussed below. (Here, then, we have a case of a mixture of approaches which confirms the contention made above that many studies combine theoretical strategies). As the name of the approach implies, the focus is on the institutions and legal arrangements (laws, regulations, etc.) of the political system in question, rather than upon the individuals or groups in society or their individual or collective behaviour. This too is a reasonable concern, but like the historical approach, it does not go far enough towards understanding political corruption.

The "functionalist" approach offers another perspective of particular interest to the student of political corruption. The reason

for this interest is that the functionalist approach runs in direct contradiction to the earliest reformist impulses by arguing that there are positive aspects of corruption that must be considered. This perspective draws from the functionalist argument common to most social science that any action which permits the political system to maintain itself is ultimately functional. Actions which impede systemic survival are said, then, to be dysfunctional. Thus, in the literature on corruption, there are those such as Robert Merton and Carl J. Friedrich who contend that corruption may be functional to the system.¹⁵ Friedrich argues, for example, that, "where it helps to adapt an antiquated or obsolete political order to changing conditions and givens, social, technological, convictional, it (corruption) can be said to be functional".¹⁶ This argument is not particularly widespread in the Canadian literature on corruption, though mention of it is made in at least one work on patronage and the civil service.¹⁷ Whatever the reason for the unpopularity of this perspective in Canada, it does lend itself to accusations of anti-moralism or "siding with the devil." Moreover, it carries with itself a tautological limitation, in the sense that if the society survives and action X is performed, that action must be functional. In this sense, any behaviour, institution or process that exists within an ongoing, surviving society can be said to be functional. This is hardly a useful consideration. If there is utility in the functional approach, then, it must come from the questions that this approach asks. Are there beneficial aspects of corruption? In what way are corrupt acts beneficial? Only the functional perspective dares to raise these questions, and unless one is willing to reject the possibility a priori, these questions merit

consideration.

The Marxist approach to the study of corruption has at least one good example in the Canadian literature. Stanley Ryerson's introduction to Gustavus Myers' A History of Canadian Wealth argues that Myer's classic study (originally published in 1914) was set within the context of Marxist analysis of the "reality of class."¹⁸ In this framework, corruption is seen as a manifestation of the power struggle between capitalists and workers to gain control of the political system. Thus capitalists will use their wealth to maintain or influence power, presumably by buying the votes of the ill-paid working class, or by bribery of public officials in return for political support of the business sector; to provide two possible scenarios. The strength of the Marxist perspective, then, is in its highlighting of the relationship between class, money and power in the development of corrupt political behaviour. Its weakness would seem to be the necessity of reducing the explanation of all corrupt behaviour (by oversimplification) to the single class-based cause. Like other perspectives, then, it is useful but limited, because it provides only a partial explanation of the phenomenon.

The last approach to be discussed here is the attitudinal approach, or what I have called elsewhere the political culture approach.¹⁹ There are noteworthy examples of this approach in the Canadian literature on political corruption, though not many. Included in this category is my earlier impressionistic work cited above, "The Political Culture of Corruption in Canada," and the empirical studies conducted for the Committee on Election Expenses which have also been reported in the published work of Khayyam Paltiel.²⁰ In a comparative

vein, there are such works as Beard and Horn's study of Congressional attitudes, Peters and Welch's study of state legislators' attitudes, and the simulation study of student attitudes toward corrupt politicians conducted by Barry Rundquist et al.²¹ These studies are empirical rather than impressionistic analyses and American in their subject matter.

The attitudinal or cultural approach is enjoying a fair degree of popularity in the discipline today and for good reason. The use of survey research methods is an important element of modern political research because it permits the investigator to plumb the depth and breadth of opinion, beliefs and values which together comprise the "attitudinal matrix" which forms the backdrop for political behaviour.²² (The term backdrop is used to avoid the implication that there is a direct and indisputable connection between attitudes, values, etc. and actual behaviour). The attractiveness of discovering this matrix stems from the perceived need to move beyond such notions as legal arrangements, institutions and philosophical argument in order to establish what some have traditionally called "the public will" regarding the nature of corruption of other political issues. It is not that studies of attitudes and opinion replace other forms of investigation. Rather, they supplement these other research approaches by adding another aspect or dimension to our knowledge of political phenomena. The implication, of course, is that the other approaches are, in themselves, insufficient, and that a multi-faceted analysis will prove more useful. This will be shown more clearly as we move from general approaches to more specific theories of corruption.

B. Theories or Theoretical Frameworks for Corruption

The preceding section outlined several common perspectives on political corruption, but these are largely reflective of general patterns of analysis prevalent in political science rather than specific explanations or predictions of corrupt behaviour. For the understanding of any political phenomena, a more exacting analysis is required than that which is provided by the somewhat vague notion of "approach". In the main, however, there will be clear connection between approach and theory, with the former perhaps best conceived as the precursor or inspiration for the latter. In some cases, this connection must be applied ex post facto, as the originator of the theoretical insight may not heed the analytical categorization noted above, whether out of preference for another classification or by merely avoiding the analytical progression from approach to theory for methodological reasons. In these cases, the connection, if detectable, will be applied in the tradition of what Kaplan calls "reconstructed logic".²³ This will be particularly necessary when dealing with popular or journalistic "theories", such as they are.

It is important to note at the outset that much of the theory of political corruption is lacking in methodological sophistication, especially in terms of the lack of specification of basic assumptions or even of the nature of the relationships and how they may be explained. In this, the literature on political corruption is not too unlike political science in general. However, in the research on corruption, the discipline's problem is even more noticeable, especially as the discipline changes toward more rigorous methods. In

any case, there is enough theoretical literature to develop some sense of the progress in this field of inquiry.

In the reformist perspective, the theoretical development is — almost by definition — rather inelegant. Typical of this approach is the argument that the cause of corruption is simple: money. The central theme of The Washington Pay-off, a reformist "exposé" by lobbyist Robert M. Winter-Berger is that direct. Consider the title of his first chapter, "The Name of the Game: Money". Consider further the preface to his book, taken from a David Brinkley newscast in 1971.²⁴

So jobs ... and Washington influence, are in effect for sale. All it takes is money, ... political contributions in election years. If you give enough, Washington's favors can be yours — influence, flattery, social success, invitations to swell affairs ... and even ambassadorships to countries with nice climates and cheap servants. Perhaps more important — influence on domestic policy, such as taxes, affecting your own business and income.

It is not only former Washington lobbyists who ascribe to money the single most significant cause of corruption. An academic text dealing with corruption in the United States, written by Larry Berg et al., frequently cites money as the key factor, as noted in various sections of their book entitled "Money: The Only Continuing Investment in Politics;" "The Role of Money;" and "Lobbyists and Money: The Scene in Even Numbered years."²⁵ However, the authors make no attempt to establish the theoretical underpinnings of corrupt behaviour in terms of economic influence beyond the rather typical and unsystematic recounting of numerous individual episodes of graft, bribery and especially campaign finance. Interestingly, the authors contend that the most significant consequence of the abuse of office for monetary gain is increased public cynicism. "The evidence is clear that a majority of people have lost confidence in their government."²⁶ The

reforms they propose are based on their perceived need to deal with this mistrust in terms of its economic roots. Thus much of their focus is on ways to eliminate these economic influences from lobbying, election campaigns and the like so that confidence can be restored.²⁷ This analysis contains several different approaches, as we have previously outlined them, including the reformist perspective, the institutional-legal, the elitist approach (something like the Marxist interest in class-based economic arguments, but avoiding the ideological "trappings" of that perspective), and even attitudinal. The problem remains, though, that there is no direct effort at systematic theorizing. Hence, these perspectives are combined in an almost casual fashion. Theory must be imposed upon it, not derived from it. Hence, its theoretical insight is accordingly diminished.

Others are less reluctant to consider theory in a more straight-forward fashion. The work of George Benson is an appropriate example of this direction in the literature. Not surprisingly, money figures quite prominently in his analysis.²⁸ While he attempts to establish some semblance of theoretical analysis, the effort ultimately fails. His chapter, "Theories of Corruption" first suffers from being the eleventh of fifteen chapters, thus becoming almost useless for understanding the first ten chapters of his work. Second, while it does examine a variety of theoretical explanations for corruption, it does not satisfy the intended objective of bringing these various theories together to form some more general theory. Rather, the theoretical explanation remains a mere catalogue of narrower explanations woven together in more or less serial, but analytically disconnected, fashion. Says Benson:²⁹

The combination of this bad administrative tradition with the institutionalized corruption of organized crime, even less effective ethical education, lack of continuous central government efforts for honesty, and continued outbursts of ethnic or economic bloc voting regardless of ethics helps explain America's continued corruption.

Certainly one might agree with most of what Benson contends here, but is it a theory or even theoretical framework for the analysis of political corruption? Not in the sense that we have previously used the term.

While other examples of theorizing are not particularly numerous, they are instructive. Lest the reader be misled to think that those which are discussed below represent all known systematic theories of corruption, it should be noted that what follows is but a sampler and that, even then, there is no pretense that each of these is highly systematic or that they are in any way consensual. Some indeed are simply interesting examples, perhaps even somewhat idiosyncratic, of theoretical explanation, intentional or otherwise.

Among those most inclined to develop theories of corruption are economists (or political economists, though some might disagree with their inclusion in this category). One interesting example deals with the ~~issue~~ of patronage specifically, but holds some very interesting possibilities for corruption in general. James Q. Wilson, writing in 1961, argued that patronage in machine politics could be explained in economic terms, in that the machine was (is) a utilitarian organization which "exists primarily to satisfy the individual motives of the participants."³⁰ This satisfaction is economically based, in the sense that economic rewards are the key motivators for political behaviour. It is worth noting that this "Wilsonian" view contrasts with the more classical approach of Anthony Downs, who contended that democratic

parties exist to maximize votes. Wilson contends that vote maximization is but one of several concerns which must be balanced by machine leaders who attempt to use limited resources wisely. "The variety of goals arises from the fact that the boss needs to reward not only voters but ward leaders, precinct workers, and elected officials as well."³¹

Ultimately, Wilson's analysis is not only economic, it is also functionalist. It is predicated upon the notion that patronage serves certain functions for the society (or more accurately the party), the most significant of which is system maintenance. This functionalist perspective, previously outlined in this chapter, will be given further consideration later. For the moment, it is the economic element which is of interest. In this respect, Wilson's concentration on economic motivators is tempered by other values, e.g., the impact of "newspaper wards", which are local (often middle-class?) areas where "civic" values are perceived as important, upon the acceptability of machine techniques. Thus patronage is distributed at the margins of political appointment, because newspaper wards demand services and projects which are only minimally affected by patronage opportunities.³² In this sense, Wilson's analysis is not entirely economic, in that it recognizes the intervening effect of other social values. However, it does attempt to add certain theoretical considerations to our understanding of political corruption, albeit in a seemingly amoralistic fashion, which might otherwise have been ignored.

Another example of an economic-based analysis is found in the work of British economist J.R. Shackleton.³³ Shackleton argues from a perspective built upon classical economic notions of supply and demand,

which create the "temptations" common to a system where competitive market systems are made inoperative. The nature of these temptations is to enter into an obscure negotiation process (analogous to a "black-market") by which established prices are supplemented by offers of "corrupt" inducements. In other words, the entry into the marketplace by government is seen as the source of the temptation to corrupt. For Shackleton, corruption is a rational-economic behaviour which can be altered only by the rational calculation that the costs of corruption are higher than the prospective gains. The means for reducing corruption then must be seen as a product of raising the costs of and limiting the opportunities for temptation. Hence, suggested as strategies are reducing of discretion of both the system (bureaucratic) and the individual (bureaucrat) in making decisions; raising the salaries of those most likely to be targets of corruption (M.P.s, police, bureaucrats), not only to reduce temptation, but also so that the loss — if corruption is detected — becomes too frightful to bear; and increasing the likelihood of conviction and the strength of the penalty, to provide disincentive. The economic base of this approach is the employment of the traditional "rational man" model of economic thinking. Again, it offers some interesting insight into the problem, but as a theory it is partial. It fails to deal with the most significant element of the issue, except in a cursory fashion: what is corruption and who defines it? The definition offered by the author is only minimally aware of the complexity of this question and, thus, it is tossed aside with too little deliberation and explanation.

Our final example of the economic perspective is the political economy approach of Susan Rose-Ackerman.³⁴ Of the various attempts at

theorizing encountered in this research, this is the most rigorous effort. The tome is replete with a number of economic equations and depictions of relationships in terms of various curves and functions, lending the appearance of an extremely formalized theoretical calculation. Unfortunately, while the formulations themselves are precise and rigorous, the assumptions upon which they are based are not beyond criticism. This is not entirely the author's fault, however, as she attempts to establish a "positive" theory of practical application rather than a normative level of discourse. But, again, her explanation is only a partial answer to the question: why corruption? To argue that one is corrupt because the gains outweigh the potential costs (i.e., the loss of office or fines resulting from conviction if conviction is, indeed, likely) ignores the underlying reason for such calculations, economically rational as they may be, taking place in the first instance. Surely not everyone who needs more money to afford their lifestyle will ultimately calculate the risk of being caught and convicted of embezzlement or whatever. In other words, such calculations are restricted to certain types of people holding certain kinds of attitudes or values. Many would not even engage the calculation in the first place. Rose-Ackerman does not adequately deal with this sense of non-economic thinking and therein lies the major weakness of her theory.

Despite the general objections raised regarding Rose-Ackerman's work, there remain useful insights which add to our understanding of political corruption. These constitute what the author called the essential roles of positive theory, roles which aid rather than supplant normative theory: (1) "it (positive theory) can help

economize on virtue by defining institutional structures to give people material incentives to behave ideally," and (2) "at least as important, is the aid economists can bring to the normative analysis of institutional malfunction."³⁵ These roles are put to work in her analysis of lobbying, campaign contributions and bureaucratic corruption, with the ultimate issue being, in part, whether or not there are some political and organizational structures which are less corruption-prone than others. Throughout her analysis, Rose-Ackerman contends that some form of separation of powers (e.g., the American model) maximizes the capability of detection and minimizes the possibility of collusion. Of course, this tends to ignore the generalized acceptance of the notion, common to observers like Benveniste, that corruption is probably greater in the United States than in many other industrial democracies partly because the political system is so fragmented and decentralized and, therefore, abundant in "access points" which may be susceptible to corrupt influence.³⁶ Nevertheless, it stresses the element of rational calculation as a significant, though not the only, motive for corruption. In addressing this subject in a systematic fashion, Rose-Ackerman must be commended for attempting to develop a more rigorous conceptualization, even if within a narrow stream of possibilities. How this might be applied beyond the logical level, i.e. to the empirical level, is not clear, however.

The three economic-based arguments noted here come closer to the concept of theory than the more general perspective discussed in the previous section. Whether they are indeed theories or merely theoretical frameworks is never quite clear. Rose-Ackerman's analysis

perhaps comes closest, yet she does not use the term itself. In any event, whether theory or theoretical framework, these analyses do strive to make more explicit and systematic their theoretical assumptions and relationships, and that is what counts most. If they fail to meet the classic scientific definition of theory, this is not surprising, for as we have previously argued, social science in general and political science in particular are preparadigmatic. Hence, it seems unwise to expect too great a theoretical rigour, even when dealing with one of the more rigorous branches of social science like economics. Having said this, what might be derived from these "theoretical frameworks" then? Clearly, there is in some economic formulations a functionalist subtheme. Like most functionalist arguments, these are tautological in that their necessity is assumed because they exist and thus is not established in any empirical sense. And, and of much greater importance, the economic theories force us to recognize the effect of material incentive (as did the more simplistic reformist arguments with their reference to money) on the possibilities and potentials for corruption. This effect is multifaceted, consisting in part of motivational concerns, and in part of institutional arrangements which either permit or promote temptations for corruption. Finally, the inequality of wealth permits some to use their unequal access to wealth as a means of insuring political influence and others to seek those with wealth for the purpose of trading political decisions or jobs in return for money or other material gain. These observations are by no means startling in their novelty. However, they do systematize notions which, though they existed heretofore, were treated in a more haphazard fashion by earlier

writers. Whether they were treated less well, if we disregard methodological cares, is less obvious.

Other examples of systematic theorizing are uncommon. However, the less systematic form of theorizing most often encountered in the social sciences does go on. Examples of these "softer" attempts at developing theoretical frameworks do occur in the corruption literature, though not as frequently nor as methodically as one might hope. Nevertheless, these efforts often contribute to our understanding of the concept. Some of those examples will be explored here, in order to clarify the earlier discussion of perspectives or approaches.

The functionalist "theories" of corruption are the most common single theoretical framework in the corruption literature. As noted above, examples of this theoretical framework include the now famous commentary of Robert Merton on the function of political machines, as well as more recent work by Carl J. Friedrich, Eric McKittrick, and in some respects, Edward Van Roy and O.P. Dwivedi.³⁷

The writing of Merton and Friedrich has been considered previously, albeit rather briefly, so the contribution of the last three writers on the aforementioned list will be discussed here. First among these is McKittrick, who builds directly upon Merton's sense of functionality. His article (which originally appeared in a 1957 edition of Political Science Quarterly) focusses on such matters as the use of political patronage by the Irish community of New York, in the 1870's and later, as a functional safety valve "for the surplus social energies."³⁸ This functional safety valve notion is not unchangeable; over time the functions of the system may be served in a different

fashion. This explains the relative success of the urban reform movement in the United States, which left as one legacy the notion of civil service examinations and the merit system to replace the old patronage system of the Tammany years. One functionalist explanation for such change is the changing needs of relevant social groups, such that over time the various ethnic communities of urban America acquire social mobility, therefore requiring fewer patronage positions when they move into the professions once reserved for "non-ethnics." This change in the socio-economic status is also functional in that social mobility is perceived as part of the stability function, in that by promoting such mobility one also promotes loyalty to the system among groups which had been previously excluded from the system's benefits. The end result for McKittrick is that he perceives such matters as essentially cyclical, with new ethnic groups (e.g., Blacks and Chicanos) replacing the Irish and Italians as temporary adherents to the patronage politics which enabled others to climb the socio-economic ladder. In the final analysis, it may all be a case of changing values.

The process of change for Van Roy and Dwivedi is less cyclical and more evolutionary than that proposed by McKittrick. In both cases the focus is on third-world nations and their development (Thailand and India respectively). In their present stage of development, third world nations can be expected to suffer from relatively significant corruption because, in part, corruption serves the function of easing the transition from traditional to modern values. The latter are often imposed, either by colonial legacy or by indigenous elites which have been subjected to Western mores through the process of education. The

colonial legacy may have included such notions as favouritism towards Christian ethnic groups at the expense of non-Christians, thus creating the example of favouritism which remains in the post-colonial period. In this sense, the colonial legacy is then not only one of adherence to Weberian norms of administration which form the formal kernel of Western thought, but also the notion that the formal is frequently overshadowed by the informal, i.e., favouritism. Thus, even the Western values themselves lead to value dislocation, even if one disregards the indigenous values.³⁹ But the Western-indigenous value conflict nevertheless must be accounted for, hence one encounters a series of traditional ascriptive norms co-existing, albeit tenuously, with the Western achievement norms which exist on at least a formal level. The result is the use of corruption as a means of resolving the conflict between traditional and Western values, in that corruption permits traditional values (e.g., favouritism or gift-giving) to flourish within a formal Weberian (and therefore Western) value system.

This explanation has its attractiveness. It does force one to consider the possibility that Western values do not necessarily have universal applicability. It also suggests, perhaps even more clearly than the economic theories noted earlier, that corruption may have a function which might not be supplied to the system in any other way. But it fails to show, in any empirical fashion, that the needs being served by corruption could not be met more effectively by other means. It fails to show how the squandering of limited resources on a few elites, who in turn place their resources in Swiss banks, is a "functional" exercise of political acumen. Is it not possible that these are in fact dysfunctions? However, in the final analysis, the

issue may be one of values. Behaviours which we might call corruption may do more good than harm if they help avoid the very unsettling consequences of the value conflicts noted earlier. Confidence in that assertion, though, is limited by the awareness that many are the governments that have fallen in the third world over allegations of rampant corruption. It would seem that there are limits to toleration of even functional corruption, should such a thing exist.

A third example of theorizing in the literature on corruption may be summarized as structural theories, which fit almost neatly under the rubric of "legal-institutional" approaches discussed earlier. Amongst the examples of this theoretical framework, which is not unrelated to the discussion just concluded, are the writings of Edward Banfield and William Chambliss.⁴⁰ Banfield's analysis is similar to that of Rose-Ackerman's political economy theory, except that organization or structure is the primary concern and material gain as motivation the secondary one. It is interesting to note that separation of powers as the basic form of American government is perceived as part of the problem for Banfield, whereas it was part of the cure for Rose-Ackerman.⁴¹ Fragmentation of authority, in other words, provides many incentives for corruption because of the lack of unity of direction, openness to interest group pressures along a number of veto points, lack of administrative controls over independent bodies and over civil servants covered by legislative safeguards, etc. Add to this increased government regulatory activity (the need for 40 - 50 building permits for one project in New York City is proffered as an example) and we can see the structural antecedents for corruption.

Chambliss highlights bureaucratic discretion as the essential

problem confronting those who seek to reform corrupt government. Says Chambliss:⁴²

Since discretionary decisionmaking is recognized as inevitable, all bureaucratic decisions become subject to the discretionary will of the office-holder. Moreover, if one has reason to look, vagueness and ambiguity can be found in any rule, no matter how carefully stipulated. And if ambiguity and vagueness are not sufficient to justify particularistic criteria being applied, contradictory rules or implications of rules can be readily located which have the same effect of justifying the decisions, which, for whatever reason the office-holder wishes, can be used to enforce his position.

Of course, there remain the unanswered, yet ultimate questions such as why do some manipulate the rules for their own self-interest while others do not? Or why do we object so strongly to some forms of rule manipulation for self-interest, while other forms are regarded as trifling if they are condemned at all? These types of questions lie at the heart of our understanding of political corruption, yet they are not amenable to investigation under the theoretical frameworks spoken of here. The only perspective which lends itself directly to this concern is the attitudinal approach.

Synthesizing the Theoretical Literature: Attitudinal Theory

○ If the impression is created in the previous section that the attitudinal approach is unrelated to the approaches or theories already discussed, this is far from the intended meaning. In fact, an attitudinal theory permits one to synthesize much of theoretical literature already discussed in this chapter. If we examine these perspectives and theories, the connections will become readily apparent.

The reformist approach, for example, makes certain assumptions

about the distribution of public attitudes concerning the concepts of democracy and public interest. Often the reformist arguments assume widespread support for their view of what is or is not corrupt political behaviour, making exception for the few who are motivated by material gain regardless of its ethicality. These are sometimes seen as "deviants" amongst an otherwise moral population. Of course, these assumptions are rarely tested empirically.

The historical approach may center on the analysis of past incidents of corruption, but one of the recurring themes of such analyses is the ~~dominant~~ opinion of the day and how it may have differed with previous patterns of attitudes or with current attitudes. The history of civil service reform is an excellent example of the consequence of changing social values and attitudes.

The institutional-legal approach, and with it the structural theories which derive from that approach, certainly direct their energies toward such questions as separation of powers or bureaucratic discretion and the like. But underlying their focus on the structural antecedents of corruption in government is an unstated notion that people will take advantage of such arrangements to serve their own self-interest. Hence, the crucial question is once again a matter of values. Some citizens will pursue their self-interest if structures permit or promote such behaviour, but others will not. Some will condemn the abuse of discretion, but some will not. One's attitudes build upon certain values which are held dear. The question then is what are these attitudes and values and in what ways do people differ in regard to them? Not that questions of structure are not important, for clearly they are, but that is but part of the analysis.

The functionalist approach, both at the general level and in terms of specific theories, has as one major focus the clash of traditional and modern values or of indigenous and immigrant values. The function of corruption, in systems where these values are in conflict, is to reduce the potential for major social upheaval. Disregarding the criticism of this approach noted earlier, it is still noteworthy that this analysis is based on the concept of values and attitudes (culture to some). Most often cited, for one example, is the clash between the impersonal Weberian bureaucratic values and the value that citizens place on being treated as people rather than as cases. This conflict establishes a medium for the growth of corruption. Once again, the key to understanding is in the values and attitudes of the citizenry.

While we have not concentrated on the Marxist approach thus far, it too presents us with the basis for an attitudinal theory. The source of public attitudes, in Marxist theory at least, is the class structure of society. As such, the bourgeois class aspires to maintain its values of social and economic dominance by, amongst other methods, using its wealth to exert influence and power over the political system. The political elite, which overlaps with the corporate elite but is not identical to it, shares most of the same bourgeois values and thus is receptive to manipulation by those who have wealth or its own manipulation of others through political means so that it (the political elite) can acquire its own wealth. In any case, the values of the proletarian class are ignored, except to the extent that they must be appeased for the sake of legitimacy. The attitudes manifested by the working class will differ significantly in this calculation from the attitudes held by the bourgeois. The former are expected to

perceive the system as cynical exploitation. Corruption becomes then a means of further exploitation of the masses. The argument ultimately rests on the attitudinal patterns or matrices of all classes, though these are seen to be the product of one's own class experience.

The economic theories discussed earlier tend to build on both economic and non-economic values. (Structure too is important, but we have discussed that previously). While structures promote or retard the opportunities for temptation, it is the maximization of material gain which motivates some to use those opportunities to pursue self-interest. It is indeed self-interest which becomes the focal value in the economic analysis, though most are careful to qualify that focus with the recognition that other non-economic values will be weighed against self-interest. Measuring the impact of such values, however, is usually cited as beyond the economic theory's capacity. Again these theories raise the value and attitude questions consistent with the other approaches, but with a twist. They force us to consider the impact of economic self-interest in a direct fashion, as well as in the more generalized concept of class interest noted earlier. This economic self-interest is thus another significant value which must be included in the analysis of the attitude matrix.

The consequence of this review of the various theoretical approaches and frameworks for the study of political corruption is to discover the linkage between them and the theoretical framework to be used in this analysis, i.e., the attitudinal approach. Together, these approaches and theories may be synthesized into what might be called, tenuously perhaps, an attitudinal theory of political corruption. The purpose of this theory is to suggest that understanding political

corruption requires an understanding of the attitudinal matrix which underlies the concept of corruption. This notion is not novel. Many political scientists have argued for an attitudinal or cultural approach to the study of any number of political phenomena. Moreover, I have suggested in earlier chapters that this approach is the most useful of those available on this subject. The effort of this chapter has been directed at establishing that assertion more concretely and to suggest, additionally, how other approaches may actually fit the attitudinal approach in some important ways. The end result is a theoretical framework (theory is probably overstating the case) which blends together many of the value premises of the various approaches to establish a more realistic matrix. The ultimate question will remain unanswered, however, because the methodology is not readily available to provide a conclusive argument. That question is, of course: to what extent do attitudes and values dictate actions? Or, put another way, how do we know that studying attitudes and values provides us with an understanding of behaviour? The connection is obviously assumed, but assumption is not proof.

What does this attitude matrix look like then, after the connections to the other approaches have been applied? Figure 1 indicates graphically what these connections are, as they have been discussed above, by way of summary. What emerges from the synthesizing effort, then, is an attitudinal matrix which consists of the following elements or, as they are termed here, components:

1. a moral component, derived from the reformist approach, which includes the notion of condemnation. It may have some element of the "public interest" in its normative content.

2. a component consisting of value changes, taken from the historical perspective. These changes, when considered across space rather than time, are noted as differences based on such things as tradition and regionalism. In fact, the regional differences are said to be differences of either tradition or of political development within a single nation-state.⁴³
3. a component which subsumes a variety of interests which are not public, but are highly valued. These are the self-interest and class interest values which are an integral part of the economic perspectives, including the Marxist approach. This component, then, is comprised of the notion that self-interest motivates corruption or that the interest of the business class is best served by the use of techniques which promote favouritism in exchange for financial rewards. But this component does not stop there, for to it we might add the idea that institutional, legal or structural arrangements promote certain corrupt behaviours by permitting or encouraging self-interest values to be manifested.
4. The functionalist approach contributes another component. This component argues for the attitude that certain behaviours which are said to be corrupt are nonetheless necessary, as a means of providing functions which are not otherwise provided for in non-corrupt ways. In this sense it may contradict the first component. One of the functions provided for is the stabilization of society in the face of competing value systems: traditional-modern, indigenous-immigrant, or business class-working class.

FIGURE 1: AN ATTITUDE THEORY OF CORRUPTION: SYNTHESIS

*These approaches may be seen as elements of the same value component.

5. The last component is provided by the attitudinal approach itself and brings to the fore the myriad of attitudinal assumptions common to the literature. These assumptions may help establish, for example, why some people are motivated by self-interest where the opportunity permits but others are not, or whether some frequently cited determinants of those attitudes and values which distinguish one as self-interested or public-interested include such considerations as education, age, sex, partisan affiliation, efficacy and the like. These determinants will receive further attention in Chapter Six.

The product of this theoretical review, then, is a theoretical framework built on the earlier discussion of the attitudinal approach, but which takes into account several other perspectives of particular significance in the development of the study of political corruption. If we return to the concerns raised in earlier chapters, that is, the need to identify clearly how the public defines what is and is not corrupt and how differences between people on this score can be explained, the attitudinal theory or theoretical framework noted here offers the needed foundation. But the questions raised by the other components (and the approaches from which they are derived) must also be given thought. Thus we have the need to establish the context in which the attitudes are established. Here I refer specifically to the institutional-legal-structural issues, of which the most important would seem to be the legal status of corruption in Canada. It is to that question that our attention must now turn.

NOTES

1. Vernon Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960), ch. 9.
2. Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler Publishing, 1964), pp. 298-299.
3. Ibid., pp. 298-303.
4. Stephen L. Wasby, Political Science - The Discipline and its Dimensions: An Introduction (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970), pp. 62 and 72.
5. See the author's "Conclusion" and his chapter 20, "The Political Culture of Corruption in Canada," in Kenneth M. Gibbons and Donald C. Rowat, eds., Political Corruption in Canada: Cases, Causes and Cures (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976).
6. Lincoln Steffens, The Shame of the Cities (New York: McClure, Phillips and Co., 1904). Segments of this book are widely reprinted in contemporary anthologies on political corruption.
7. W.J.M. Mackenzie, Politics and Social Science (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1967), pp. 52-53, 67-69. See also Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics (New York: Random House, 1963) and Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, "The 'Behavioral-Traditional' Debate in Political Science," in L.D. Hayes and R.D. Hedlund, eds. The Conduct of Political Inquiry (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 45-55.
8. Canada, The Privy Council, Members of Parliament and Conflict of Interest (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973).
9. Note also that besides the Committee's report complete with the "official" recommendations, the Committee also issued the studies which were the background for the report, including the appropriate citations for the authors of each research study in the volume. See Report of the Committee on Election Expenses and also, K.Z. Paltiel et al., Studies in Canadian Party Finance, Committee on Election Expenses, both (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1966).

10. H. Blair Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1924-1932 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), pp. 369-385.
11. Herbert F. Quinn, The Union Nationale (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963) and S.J.R. Noel, Politics in Newfoundland (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971). Some relevant sections of each are reprinted in Gibbons and Rowat, op. cit.
12. Richard B. Gwyn, The Shape of Scandal: A Study of Government in Crisis (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1965), p. 4.
13. P. Bruton, J. Downing and F. Kelly, "Graft Never Hurt a Politician at the Polls," in Gibbons and Rowat, op. cit., p. 225. Reprinted from Maclean's, January 25, 1964.
14. Committee on Election Expenses, Report, op. cit., and K.Z. Paltiel et al., Studies..., op. cit.
15. Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957), pp. 71-81 and Carl J. Friedrich, The Pathology of Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), ch. 10.
16. Ibid., p. 171.
17. J.E. Hodgetts et al., The Biography of an Institution: The Civil Service Commission of Canada, 1980-1967 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University, 1972), pp. 14-19.
18. Stanley Ryerson, "Introduction" in Gustavus Myers, A History of Canadian Wealth (Toronto: James Lewis and Samuel, 1972), pp. vii-xxx.
19. Gibbons, "Political Culture ...", op. cit.
20. Ibid.; Paltiel et al., Studies..., op. cit.; Khayyam Z. Paltiel, Political Party Financing in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970) and especially his "Contrasts among the Several Canadian Political Finance Cultures," in A.J. Heidenheimer, ed., Comparative Political Finance (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1970), pp. 107-134.
21. Edmund Beard and Stephen Horn, Congressional Ethics: The View from the House (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,

- 1975); Susan Welch and John G. Peters, "Attitudes of U.S. State Legislators Toward Political Corruption," Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2 (November, 1977), 445-464; and Barry S. Rundquist, Gerald S. Strom and John G. Peters, "Corrupt Politicians and Their Electoral Support: Some Empirical Observations," American Political Science Review, 71 (September, 1977), 954-963.
22. The term is taken from Michael S. Whittington, "Political Culture: The Attitudinal Matrix of Politics," in J.H. Redekop, ed., Approaches to Canadian Politics (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1978), pp. 138-153.
23. Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 3-11.
24. Robert N. Winter-Berger, The Washington Pay-off: An Insider's View of Corruption in Government (Seacaucus, N.J.: Lyle Stuart Inc., 1972), p. 9.
25. Larry L. Berg, Harlan Hahn and John Schmidhauser, Corruption in the American Political System (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1976).
26. Ibid., p. 162.
27. Ibid., ch. 7.
28. George C.S. Benson, Political Corruption in America (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1978), ch. 11.
29. Ibid., p. 238.
30. James Q. Wilson, "The Economy of Patronage," Journal of Political Economy, 69 (August, 1961), 380.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., pp. 378-379.
33. J.R. Shackleton, "Corruption: An Essay in Economic Analysis." The Political Quarterly, 49 (January/March, 1978), 25-37.
34. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy (New York: Academic Press, 1978).
35. Ibid., p. 229.

36. Guy Benveniste, Bureaucracy (San Francisco; Boyd and Fraser, 1977), chs. 6 and 9.
37. Merton, op. cit.; Friedrich, op. cit., Eric L. McKittrick, "The Study of Corruption," in S.M. Lipset and R. Hofstadter, eds., Sociology and History: Methods (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 358-370; Edward Van Roy, "On the Theory of Corruption," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 19 (October, 1970), 86-110; and O.P. Dwivedi, "Bureaucratic Corruption in Developing Countries," Asian Survey, (April, 1967), 245-253.
38. McKittrick, op. cit., p. 362.
39. Dwivedi, op. cit., pp. 246-247.
40. Edward C. Banfield, "Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization," Journal of Law and Economics, 18 (December, 1975), 587-605; William J. Chambliss, "Vice, Corruption, Bureaucracy and Power," Wisconsin Law Review, (1971), 1150-1173; see also Benveniste, op. cit.
41. Compare Banfield, ibid., pp. 595-598 with the earlier discussion of Rose-Ackerman's work noted above.
42. Chambliss, op. cit., p. 1156.
43. Raymond Wolfinger, "Why Political Machines Have Not Withered Away and Other Revisionist Thoughts," Journal of Politics, 34 (May, 1972), 365-398.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE PLACE OF CORRUPTION IN CANADIAN LAW

While we have shown that legal definitions of political corruption cannot stand alone in the conceptualization process, it is nevertheless imperative to assess the legal dimension of the concept. This view is in keeping with the argument presented in Chapter Two, that legal definitions are significant to the extent that one can assume that legislation and the "lesser" legal remedies of regulations and guidelines reflect prevailing elite opinion concerning the public interest. As such, the study of legislation (and, to a lesser extent, regulations and guidelines) is an important adjunct to the study of public opinion.

The focus of this chapter will be largely directed at legislative statutes, though brief discussion will ensue regarding the use of regulations and guidelines as well. The need to concentrate on legislation is based on the perception that statutes constitute the more dramatic and public dimension of the legal arena. Indeed, it may even be misleading to conceive of guidelines as being part of the legal arena at all, though the place of regulations in this regard is much clearer. However, even regulations suffer from a lack of public content in the sense that, unlike statutes, they are rarely debated on the floor of the House of Commons or the provincial legislatures. Surely the impact of this reality is consistently noted in the literature of administrative theory, wherein the argument is frequently proffered that regulations are almost insidious in their absence of public review (directly or indirectly through the parliamentary process). Thus, they may be said, at least by some critics, to be even

more problematic for governance than the sheer weight of their numbers and scope would alone warrant.¹ It is in this sense that legislation constitutes the most interesting aspect of the legal dimension of corruption.

The analysis which follows is drawn from a review of 68 pieces of legislation on the statute books of the federal government and the ten provinces. While not all of these are statutes which focus solely on matters of corruption as outlined in the typology in Chapter Two, even those statutes which make only minimal mention of corruption are worthy of inclusion in that they provide a glimpse of the scope of the problem as perceived through legislators' eyes. Also, such minor provisions illustrate, at least at times, the rather selective treatment of corruption where it is arguable that more sweeping and inclusive arrangements might have been required.

It is quickly realized, when one scans the statutes listed in Table II, that there are significant similarities and significant differences among the eleven governments' approaches to the problem of corruption. These differences and similarities exist not only in the detailed elements of their respective legislative remedies, but also in regard to whether or not the remedy even exists. Others have reviewed statutes quite successfully, particularly Kenneth Kernaghan and Khayyam Paltiel.² However, these contributions were published in 1976 and require updating. Moreover, each defined a narrow area of specialization which, together, meant that the ethical conduct of elected officials and municipal officials (elected or appointed) was ignored. This gap in the literature, then, becomes the prime concern here.

TABLE II: STATUTES CONSULTED RELATING TO CORRUPTION

CANADA

Canada Elections Act, R.S.C., 1970, c. 14 (1st supplement),
s. 62-90
Corrupt Practices Inquiries Act, R.S.C., 1970, c. C-33.
Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1970, c. C-34, s. 107-114.
Dominion Controverted Elections Act, R.S.C., 1970, c. C-28.
Election Expenses Act, 21-22 Elizabeth II, 1973-74, c. 51.
Public Service Employment Act, R.S.C., 1970, c. P-32, s. 32.

ALBERTA

Election Act, R.S.A., 1980, c. E-2, s. 102-105, 129-130, 150-198.
Election Finances and Contributions Disclosure Act, R.S.A., 1980,
c. E-3. (Amended S.A., 1982, no. 2, c. 17).
Legislative Assembly Act, R.S.A., 1980, c. L-10. (Amended S.A.,
1983, c. L-10.1).
Local Authorities Election Act, S.A., 1983, c. L-27.5, s. 116-159.
Municipal Election Act, R.S.A., 1980, c. M-25, s. 11-12, 146-190.
Municipal Government Act, R.S.A., 1980, c. M-26, s. 29-35, 94.
Public Service Act, R.S.A., 1980, c. P-31, s. 23-34.

BRITISH COLUMBIA

Constitution Act, R.S.B.C., 1979, c. 62, s. 25-33.
Election Act, R.S.B.C., 1979, c. 103, s. 10, 31, 32, 161-280.
Financial Disclosure Act, R.S.B.C., 1979, c. 130.
Municipal Act, R.S.B.C., 1979, c. 290, s. 39, 194-207.

MANITOBA

Civil Service Act, R.S.M., 1970, c. C110, s. 24-31, 44.
(Incorporating amendments to September 1978).
Controverted Elections Act, R.S.M., 1970, c. C210.
Election Act, R.S.M., 1970, c. E30, s. 123-169.
Legislative Assembly Act, R.S.M., 1970, c. L110, s. 18-22, 42-45.
Legislative Assembly and Executive Council Conflict of Interest
Act, S.M., 1983, c. 27. (Not yet proclaimed).
Municipal Council Conflict of Interest Act, S.M., 1983, c. 44.

.... continued

TABLE II: continued

NEW BRUNSWICK

Conflict of Interest Act, S.N.B., 1978, c. C-16.1.
Controverted Elections Act, R.S.N.B., 1973, c. C-21.
Corrupt Practices Inquiries Act, R.S.N.B., 1973, c. C-27.
Elections Act, R.S.N.B., 1973, c. E-3, s. 106-121.
Municipalities Act, R.S.N.B., 1973, c. M-22, s. 64-66.
(Amendments added regarding conflict of interest, S.N.B., 1981, c. 52, s. 90.1-90.91).
Political Process Financing Act, S.N.B., 1978, c. P-9.3.

NEWFOUNDLAND

Civil Service Act, R.S.N., 1970, c. 41, s. 16, 47-(3).
Conflict of Interest Act, S.N., 1973, no. 113. (Amended by S.N., 1978, c. 20 and S.N., 1982, c. 23).
Election Act, R.S.N., 1970, c. 106, s. 103-158.
House of Assembly Act, R.S.N., 1970, c. 159, s. 11(d).
Local Government (Elections) Act, R.S.N., 1970, c. 217, s. 62-103.
Municipalities Act, S.N., 1979, c. 33, s. 585, 610-611, 622-628.
Revenue and Audit Act, R.S.N., 1970, c. 338, s. 87-88.
Schools Act, R.S.N., 1970, c. 346, s. 10(2).

NOVA SCOTIA

Controverted Elections Act, C.S.N.S., 1982, c. C-42.
Elections Act, C.S.N.S., 1982, c. E-5, s. 6A-68, 164A-189.
House of Assembly Act, C.S.N.S., 1982, c. H-21, s. 22, 24.
Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, C.S.N.S., 1982, c. M-42.
Municipal Elections Act, C.S.N.S., 1982, c. M-28, s. 16-19, 35, 92
109, 135-143.

ONTARIO

Election Act, R.S.O., 1980, c. 133, s. 40, 66-70, 136-165.
Election Finances Reform Act, R.S.O., 1980, c. 134.
Legislative Assembly Act, R.S.O., 1980, c. 235, s. 10-16, 40-43.
Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, R.S.O., 1980, c. 305.)
(Substantially amended by S.O., 1983, c. 8).
Municipal Elections Act, R.S.O., 1980, c. 308, s. 96-121.
Public Service Act, R.S.O., 1980, c. 418, s. 11-16.

.... continued

TABLE II: continued

PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND

Civil Service Act, R.S.P.E.I., 1974, c. C-9, s. 22, 51, 64-65.
Controverted Elections (Provincial) Act, R.S.P.E.I., 1974,
c. C-20.
Elections Act, R.S.P.E.I., 1974, c. E-1, s. 120, 128-138.
Legislative Assembly Act, R.S.P.E.I., 1974, c. L-11, s. 19.
School Act, R.S.P.E.I., 1974, c. S-2, s. 15(3)(4)(5).
Town Act, R.S.P.E.I., 1974, c. T-4, s. 19(b), 65-66.

QUEBEC

Cities and Towns Act, R.S.Q., 1977, c. C-19, s. 116(4), 208,
242-288, 307-317.
Civil Service Act, S.Q., 1978, c. 15, s. 25, 47, 99-104.
Election Act, S.Q., 1979, c. 56, s. 193, 199, 214-229 (294-307
amend c. F-2).
Financing of Political Parties Act, R.S.Q., 1977, c. F-2.
Legislative Assembly Act, R.S.Q., 1977, c. L-1, s. 36, 59, 61-67.
Municipal Bribery and Corruption Act, R.S.Q., 1977, c. F-6.

SASKATCHEWAN

Controverted Elections Act, R.S.S., 1978, c. C-32.
Controverted Municipal Elections Act, R.S.S., 1978, c. C-33.
Education Act, R.S.S., 1978 (Supplement), c. E-0.1, s. 35-36.
Elections Act, R.S.S., 1978, c. E-6, s. 2, 9, 48, 164-193, 203-231.
Local Government Election Act S.S., 1982-83, c. L-30.1, s. 147-159
Members of the Legislative Assembly Conflict of Interests Act,
S.S., 1979, c. M-11.2.
Public Service Act, R.S.S., c. P-42, s. 50-51.
Urban Municipality Act, S.S., 1978, c. U-10, s. 40-41, 129.

The chapter will also go beyond statute law to incorporate — if only briefly — consideration of regulations and guidelines. In addition, attention will be given to the nature of the legislative debate over proposed courses of action in order that some finer sense of the complexity of elite opinion may be acknowledged. However, this element must, for reasons of space and time, be necessarily attenuated. Thus, the emphasis of the chapter remains clearly on statutes, but not exclusively.

The Scope of Legislation: Electoral Activities

The term "corruption", as defined for the purposes of this thesis, cannot be equated with definitions of corruption found in law, for reasons previously explained. However, it is also necessary to understand that certain actions which might generally be considered corrupt may merely be considered "offences" under statute. These offences will be aggregated with actions deemed corrupt in law under the rubric of corrupt actions, at least for the purposes of this analysis. There is no need to distinguish between the two if the underlying concern is to identify actions which, in legislative terms, are offences against law and thus unethical. The distinction, for one example, between corruption defined as "bribery or treating" in New Brunswick's Controverted Elections Act and the absence of the term in the same province's Conflict of Interest Act is not the issue here. It suffices for our purposes that various acts, with or without the legal label of corruption, remain corrupt in the broader sense that we have used the term earlier, if they can be said to be offences against

law. (Offences against social norms are not at issue here).

Given the above caveat, what then are the types of actions which are deemed "corrupt" in this broader sense? Amongst the most obvious examples are acts which attempt to illegitimately affect the outcome of elections as these are defined in various election acts or controverted elections acts. The federal government and five of the provinces have distinct acts of the latter type which cover activities proscribed by law in the conduct of elections. The remaining five provinces include controverted elections as part of a broader, all-inclusive elections act. In either case, the typical prohibition includes bribery and "treating" (or what we have defined elsewhere as vote-buying). The ubiquity of legislation in this area, in that it appears in one form or another of acts regulating election behaviour in all provinces and the federal government, indicates that there is a certain "blackness" or blanket condemnation of this activity. This is not to suggest that there is unanimity in the specific definition of these behaviours as corrupt or not corrupt or that this condemnation is necessarily so complete that one would not dare to contravene the sanctions which are provided by all eleven governments. Indeed, we have noted in Chapter Two that one former provincial premier (and current federal cabinet minister) has publicly proclaimed that vote-buying or treating is still practiced in Nova Scotia. However, as we shall soon see, provisions regarding "greyer" areas of ethical behaviour are less widely included in legislative prohibitions. Perhaps this reflects the symbolic sanctity of the electoral process within a democratic society.

The bribing or treating of electors includes such acts as defined in the Canada Elections Act, a rather typical example, as follows:

Every one who corruptly, by himself or by any other person, during an election, directly or indirectly offers, procures or provides or promises to procure or provide money, valuable consideration, office, employment, food or drink to induce any person to vote or refrain from voting, and every one who corruptly accepts or receives or agrees to accept or receive any such money, valuable consideration, office, employment, food or drink, is guilty of an offence against this act."

Other subsections of the same section (66) of the Elections Act provide that light refreshment be excluded from prohibition (subsection 2) but that the offer of alcoholic beverages or indemnifying loss of wages be included (subsection 3) if intent to influence voting or not voting is shown. In any event, the concern is clear. There is a distinct need, amongst legislators at least, to fend off any attempt to reduce elections to mere "market exchanges" which demean the symbolic significance of the electoral process. Elections are to be fought on other grounds, it seems, though these other grounds are occasionally sources for disquieting claims of ethical anxiety as well. We shall return to this question later.

The prohibitions regarding bribery and treating are not the only electoral offences that fit our rubric of corruption. Other actions, often with long if dishonorable traditions in the political arena, include personation and a variety of other nefarious campaign practices. Personation includes a number of possible variations (specified in the Canada Elections Act, section 68): taking the name of another whether they be living, dead, or fictitious, in the attempt to be placed on the election list; being listed on two different election lists in different electoral districts; voting twice and so on. The other offences alluded to may include intimidation (section 69), removing or defacing a candidate's election advertisements (s. 73) or disrupting election meetings (s. 71). One might also add to this

list those acts which are deemed offences relating directly to the balloting process itself as specified in the same act, section 65. Among these prohibited actions are forging ballot papers; altering or destroying ballot papers or the deputy returning officer's signature thereon; opening, destroying or taking a ballot box without authority; printing more ballot papers than are authorized to be printed; or marking ballots by a deputy returning officer which permits the elector to be identified.

The Dominion Controverted Elections Act establishes the judicial process by which charges of corruption, if substantiated, may lead to an election being declared void.⁵ Section 2 of this act defines corrupt practices as "acts in reference to elections that are declared to be corrupt practices by the Canada Elections Act, or any other Act of the Parliament of Canada, or recognized as such by the common law of Parliament." Thus, this act generally adds nothing to those corrupt practices noted earlier, except for one notable entry. Section 78 raises the issue of a corrupt withdrawal of an election petition (i.e., a petition alleging corrupt practices), though the sanction involved is nothing more than a report of that opinion to the Speaker of the House of Commons. What transpires from that point is not the subject of further elucidation by the act.

Acts regarding corrupt practices in elections are essentially similar in the provinces, particularly if one disregards the rather superficial distinction between those provinces with a separate controverted elections act and those which merely include such considerations as part of the elections act itself. The Manitoba Election Act, for example, adds specific mention of loans as a type of

valuable consideration and applies these prohibitions to any person who permits himself to be nominated, or refuses to permit himself to be nominated or withdraws after nomination in exchange for any of the benefits previously noted.⁶ The only distinction of significance regarding the Manitoba counterpart of the federal government's controverted election act is that there is no specific proviso regarding a corrupt withdrawal of an election petition.⁷ Thus, the differences in this area of legislation seem minor indeed, at least between the federal government and the Manitoba government.

The distinctions in law among the other provinces are likewise inconsequential except for whatever curiosity factor one might wish to apply to the occasional inclusion or omission. Saskatchewan has included a specific reference to the use of public address systems on election day. It has also disallowed the defence of treating as an habitual activity unrelated to elections. It prohibits wagering on elections by candidates and others and similarly legislates against candidates hiring people to convey voters to the polls (though this does not preclude the provision of food and fuel costs to said conveyors).⁸ On this latter point, Newfoundland permits conveyances to be "procured" and transportation by these hired conveyances to thus be provided. Food and non-alcoholic drink may be provided under the same section of the act if the voter cannot reach the polling place otherwise than by crossing the sea or a branch or arm of the sea.⁹ This aspect of the Newfoundland law clearly reflects the impact of geographical imperatives upon seemingly unrelated legislation and represents, therefore, a most fascinating example of matching law to local needs and peculiarities.

The listing of a variety of minor variations amongst the provinces need not be pursued further, as it is the purpose here to indicate that, except for such curiosities, the legislation in regard to misconduct in the election process is nearly standardized within the eleven governments. These prohibited activities, moreover, seem to reflect an untested yet obvious consensus as to what is or is not ethical. Despite the occasional variant, elite opinion (as distinct from elite action) seems quite clear and unequivocal on this matter, thus placing these activities at the "black" end of Heidenheimer's continuum in terms of statute law. But it is nevertheless necessary to point out that, as noted earlier, some of the practices clearly prohibited by legislation for all governments occur despite existing sanctions. We have already noted the admission of Gerald Regan that treating continued in Nova Scotia even when he was premier. Moreover, recent events leading up to the national Progressive Conservative leadership convention of 1983 indicate that, while not covered by legislation regulating federal or provincial elections, treating was notably employed by at least two leading contenders for the party's nomination.¹⁰ One of the two was the past party leader, Joe Clark, and the other the current leader, Brian Mulroney. The question raised by this behaviour, then, is not one of illegality, since clearly statutes do not apply to the nomination process which is perceived as strictly an intra-party affair. However, interesting questions are raised beyond the confines of the legal element, and these relate directly to the application of morality in the absence of constraining legislation. Further, might one be concerned that any candidate or party engaging in such activities during the nomination process might also be receptive

to pleas to continue such tactics when pursuing the larger plum of national rather than party leadership?

Campaign Financing

The subject of campaign financing has been addressed in terms of legislative arrangements as well as broader considerations in the work of K.Z. Paltiel.¹¹ Since the publication of two pieces expressly devoted to election financing laws, both federally and provincially, in 1976, changes to election finance laws have not been dramatic. Rather, piecemeal amendments have been made in the intervening period which do not radically alter the position of government decision-makers at either level. Indeed, even the two provinces cited by Paltiel as having no specific legislation regarding this issue remain without such acts at present. The provinces in question, Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island apparently felt the issue is not worthy of legislative attention. While this may still be the case in P.E.I., matters are changing in Newfoundland, where a select committee of the province's House of Assembly has recommended in its report that substantial changes be made to the province's election law, originally passed in 1913. The committee has drawn up a model bill, 159 pages in length, which is patterned after federal and Ontario laws. It includes, inter alia, that campaigns be publicly subsidized and that party finances be audited and made public.¹² Greater detail, particularly as to what kind of behaviour was deemed as "corrupt" in the model bill was not available to the author at the time this thesis was written. However, we might assume that this too might follow from the federal and Ontario

experience, at least in some general fashion.

Generally speaking, literature on campaign finance includes discussion of both the revenue and expenditure sides of the issue. Part of the expenditure question, however, has already been discussed in the context of vote-buying and the like under the rubric of electoral activities in the preceding section. Thus these types of problems can be put aside here. However, there are other questions relating to expenditures which need illumination as to their ethicality. One of these is the requirement for publicity of party and candidate expenditures. While all provinces other than Prince Edward Island require candidates to provide expenditure statements which are made available to the public, this degree of uniformity does not apply to parties. Thus, it is possible for party expenditure to be ignored altogether, rendering the issue of campaign ethics in this regard irrelevant. Some provinces regard party expenditure a problem only within the election context and not for periods outside the campaign.¹³ The pattern of legislative attitudes, then, is that candidates' expenditures not being publicized is a violation of norms, but not necessarily so in the case of parties. In some cases, parties are not viewed as unethical if they fail to do what is nevertheless required of the parties' candidates. In the federal government's case, candidates' expenses and party expenses, both campaign and inter-campaign, are to be made public.¹⁴

Publicity is but one concern, however. A further consideration is the limitation of campaign expenditures. It is one thing to publicize expenditures in the hope that the inequality of campaign spending may be perceived by the public as a detriment or restriction in the

democratic process. But this may not be enough to remove the impediment of unequal competition, in that it requires a sophisticated public to render the analysis and it requires knowledge before or during the fact, rather than a post-mortem when the election has already been settled. Hence, some have argued for limitations on the amounts to be spent by parties or their candidates. Again, the way this might be handled differs from one jurisdiction to another.¹⁵ In some cases, overall spending limits are imposed. Such is the case federally and in the provinces of Manitoba, Nova Scotia, Quebec and Saskatchewan. Interestingly, Ontario provides spending limits only for advertizing. These limits are 25 cents per elector for the provincial party and 25 cents for each elector in the constituency for local candidates in the provincial election. The limit for the provincial party is doubled in the case of by-elections, but then only those constituents relevant to the by-election are counted. These limits have been described as "extremely generous" by Paltiel and "high enough ... to wage lavish media campaigns" by Rand Dyck.¹⁶

Three provinces have brought in new legislation regarding party and election financing since the Paltiel articles of 1976: New Brunswick, Quebec and Alberta. (This number would be higher if we were to include amendments to pre-1976 legislation, but these were largely uneventful additions or modifications in any case). New Brunswick places limits on both election expenditures and inter-election expenses. Quebec places limitations on election expenses only, while Alberta provides no limit in either regard.¹⁷ Thus, the increase in legislation illustrates continued interest in the issue, but the specific provincial responses indicate no particular trend as to how

the issue might best be resolved.

Expenditures are but one half of the campaign finance problem. The other half is the issue of contribution limitations and/or disclosure. In this aspect of campaign finance, some progress has also taken place since 1976. At that time Paltiel noted that only three provinces had made "a serious effort to require the reporting of party and candidate income and their control as to source and amount."¹⁸ (The source in question related only to provincial policies and therefore excludes an assessment of the federal law in place at that time). The provinces cited at the time as providing this serious effort were Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Ontario. However, to that total one must add also (as cited earlier) Ottawa's Election Expenses Act, though it is unclear if it merits the label of "serious effort" attributed by Paltiel to the three provinces previously mentioned. Nevertheless, federal legislation does provide for disclosure of amounts and identities of donors of contributions exceeding \$100. This disclosure rule applies both to the federal party and the individual candidate. No limit on contributions were established.¹⁹ The reason behind this "disclosure-but-no-limit" approach is that disclosure is felt to be sufficient in itself to dissuade any contributor from donating so much money as to cast the public's doubt about propriety toward either the contributor or the party. This argument fails to offer substantiation however, in that it is not altogether clear that the public is fully aware of the enormity of some contributions, let alone the consequence — potential or real — of such donations. While it is true, that the media may become the conduit through which such awareness might eventually flow, this further assumes public awareness

of such media revelations or trust in the media's neutrality. The concern for neutrality may stem from either a partisan concern or from the perception that the media are part of the corporate world most likely (in some minds at least) to abuse the campaign finance process. These realizations underline the need for both disclosure and limits. If they were insufficient cause, one might return as well to the "ex post facto" argument discussed in an earlier context, where it was argued that legislation which essentially works after the fact may not be very useful, though it may be better than nothing at all. By this I refer to the problem that disclosure's only penalty is an after-the-fact public contempt. This means that, firstly, the contributor and the contributee are both unaware of what level of contribution will spark public opprobrium and, secondly, once this opprobrium is detected there is no specific recourse other than holding the offending party accountable in the next election. Given that the election may be four to five years away, and given the old maxim that voters have short memories, how effective is this in dealing with the issues raised?

Some provinces have taken issue with the federal approach by including in their legislation limits on the contributions that can be made. Ontario is one such case where contributions by any person, corporation or trade union are limited to \$2000 to each party and \$500 to each constituency association (to an aggregate of \$2000) for any one year and, in addition, identical limitations during a campaign period. By this calculation a grand total of \$6000 is permitted in an election year from any one source.²⁰ Alberta also limits contributions, though limits are considerably higher than in Ontario. They may reach as high as \$25,000 in an election year, when combining both provincial and

constituency contributions.²¹ Both require disclosure, but again there is a significant difference as to amounts subjected to disclosure. In Ontario, contributions exceeding \$100 are disclosed, but Alberta requires disclosure for amounts exceeding \$250. Other provinces may require disclosure above certain amounts, but limitations are not established, as in the case of Manitoba and Saskatchewan.²² In both provinces, the legislation is similar to that of the federal government.

Another aspect of election finance reform will be glossed over here, since its connection to corruption is rather tenuous at best. I am here speaking of subventions, subsidies or grants from public coffers to assist parties in the conduct of their election campaigns. While the rationale behind such programs is certainly laudable, it seems somewhat far-fetched to argue that the absence of such subsidies is somehow corrupt. It would seem more useful to pursue other avenues of analysis, and for this reason we may now turn to another area of concern which is very clearly included in current legislation.

Bribery, Graft and Influence-Peddling

Bribery has been described as the "most extreme form of fiduciary violation."²³ This appraisal seems quite on the mark, for the legislative attitude toward this type of behaviour is clearly outlined in law. Section 108 of the Criminal Code of Canada covers not only M.P.'s but also members of provincial legislatures and members of the judiciary. It declares that everyone of the aforementioned who (a) corruptly:

- (i) accepts or obtains,
- (ii) agrees to accept, or
- (iii) attempts to obtain

any money, valuable consideration, office, place or employment for himself, or another person in respect of anything done or omitted or to be done or omitted by him in his official capacity, or

- (b) gives or offers corruptly to a person who holds a judicial office, or is a member of the Parliament of Canada or of a legislature, any money, valuable consideration, office, place or employment in respect of anything done or omitted or to be done or omitted, by him in his official capacity for himself or another person, is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for fourteen years.²⁴

Section 109 of the Criminal Code provides for a similar penalty for every "justice, police commissioner, peace officer, public officer, or officer of a juvenile court, or being employed in the administration of criminal law" who corruptly accepts the aforementioned benefits for the purpose of interfering with the administration of justice, etc. The same penalty, of course, applies to the person who gives such benefits.

The Criminal Code also establishes a penalty of five years imprisonment for "frauds upon the government" in section 110. Many of these frauds are what we have previously defined as bribery or graft in our earlier discussions and differ from the provisions of section 108 only in terms of the severity of the corrupt act, for the most part. Examples of such offences are offering to a public official (or a public official accepting) "a loan, reward, advantage or benefit of any kind as consideration for cooperation, assistance, exercise of influence or an act or omission" regarding government business. It also includes certain prohibitions regarding the tendering of government contracts, wherein there is an attempt to have someone withdraw their competing offer in return for some proffered benefit. Interestingly, it is this section of the Criminal Code which is used in the prosecution of what we have previously defined as

influence-peddling was returned in Nova Scotia, the penalty provided was a fine and two years in prison. The prison term is less than that stated in section 110 itself, and no mention is made of fines. The case, alluded to in Chapter Two, involved the practice of "toll-gating" as it is called in Nova Scotia, where companies pay a fee to political bagmen in exchange for getting their liquor products listed in the provincial liquor stores. One of the defendants was a Senator whose continuation in that position was brought into doubt by the decision. At the time of this writing, the retention or loss of the Senate seat remained in doubt.²⁵

A separate section (111) of the Criminal Code is applied to the concept of breach of trust, though the section in question is quite vague as to a workable definition. It does indicate, however, that breach of trust may be different for officials than it is for "private persons." Like section 110, the penalty is imprisonment for five years. Again, recent cases indicate that the maximum penalty need not be meted out and that fines may also be imposed though not directly provided for in the legislation.²⁶ For our purposes, such actions can normally be subsumed under the rubric of bribery, graft or influence-peddling.

It is worthwhile to note also that, while municipal government remains a creature of the provinces, municipal corruption is included in the Criminal Code under its own section (112). The offences listed in this section are not unlike those noted in other sections already examined. However, the penalty for violation is limited to only two years. It is possible that the authors of the legislation agree with the assertion of James Scott and Peter Bruton et al. that local

corruption is of lesser consequence than national corruption because only the national government is seen as the ultimate protector of the system's democratic basis. Thus, there appears to be a greater tolerance of unethical behaviour at the local level because there remains a higher level of government which is free from such considerations. When the national government is tainted by unethical behaviour, it is likely to be treated with less tolerance.²⁷

In Chapter Two it was argued that there were distinctions to be made between types of corruption according to the level of condemnation directed at the various unethical behaviours. This section of the chapter illustrates this degree of condemnation in terms of legislative stricture. If one compares the penalties for bribery, graft and influence-peddling to those established in the legislation regarding campaign financing, the sense of outrage seems much stronger for the former than for the latter. The distinction lies in the use of imprisonment as punishment for bribery (in conjunction with fines) compared to fines alone, for the most part, in violations of campaign finance laws. It is in this sense that one can argue that the level of legislative condemnation for campaign finance violations is "black", but for bribery and the like it is even "blacker" yet. Both find specific reference in the legislative statutes of the country and incur stiff penalties, in theory if not in regular practice, but the penalties are more severe in the case of bribery, graft and influence-peddling. Nevertheless, while each of the two types of corrupt behaviour discussed to this point have such provisions detailed in statute law, the same does not hold so true for other types of behaviour that have yet to be considered in their legislative context.

4

In terms of the theoretical discussion in previous chapters, this would indicate a "greyer" area of opinion amongst legislative elites, though one that has a certain flux.

Patronage and Nepotism: The "Grey" Ethics of Civil Service Hiring

Despite the creation of a Civil Service Commission in 1908 dedicated to the promotion of the merit system and the demise of patronage, party preference remains an integral part of current civil service hiring procedures. While it is true that the scope and intensity of patronage may have been significantly reduced at the federal level since then, it is clear that the practice continues on a reduced scale and in a somewhat different form. In earlier years, patronage was often applied throughout the public service, from clerical levels to the highest administrative positions.²⁸ Now, it is surely the case that patronage, benign or otherwise, occurs largely at the higher levels of the bureaucracy and in positions which, though administrative in nature, are specifically excluded from the guidelines of normal civil service hiring. By this I refer to the large number of advisors and the like which support cabinet ministers and, in a sense, create a buffer between the bureaucracy and the politician. In the case of such positions the motivation is rather straightforward and, for the most part, ethical: the necessity of the governing party to maintain control over a non-elected bureaucracy in order to advance the mandate they are given by the voters. The only issue that might be raised about ethics in this regard is whether or not the hiring which takes place in this context is excessive and directed mainly at the

CONFIDENTIAL

goal of rewarding faithful party supporters at the public trough, rather than the necessity of their employment for the maintaining of political control over the bureaucratic machine. Unfortunately, the decision of whether the activity is ethical or not is, for all intents and purposes, a judgement call. The information required to make such a judgement is rarely available to outsiders.

There is another dimension of this question, however, which reduces the judgemental aspect considerably. This is the notion that patronage is held to be acceptable for certain types of public employment only. Hence, it is a kind of "rule of thumb" that is applied by various governments, federal and provincial alike, that determines at what level of government service the "cut-off" between civil service hiring procedures being applied and political considerations being applied. At the federal level, this distinction is said to occur at the assistant deputy minister level, with all levels below ADM subjected to normal standards of civil service merit. In provincial governments, these levels vary. For Manitoba, for example, the level of distinction is said to be considerably lower than in the federal case. A review of legislation indicates no specification which is altogether helpful, for the designations are generally inconsistent with government practice. The reason for this appears to be that while certain officials are said to serve at pleasure of the cabinet or minister (deputy minister in the federal government or minister's secretary in Manitoba, to take two examples), provisions are common to all statutes regarding the various provincial or federal civil services that permit exceptions to civil service procedures at other levels through delegated authority given to

ministers and their departments.²⁹

Patronage, then, becomes an issue when the political or partisan appointment is made at levels lower than those accepted as common practice for the given government. But this is not all, for the issue of ethics will also be raised when an appointment is made to a post normally excluded from civil service commission review if that appointment is perceived as lacking any merit other than partisan motivation. Indeed, the federal Public Service Commission is empowered by the Public Service Employment Act, section 6(2) to revoke such an appointment. The probabilities of it doing so, of course, are rather remote. At most, such an appointment will engender boisterous attacks on the governing party by members of the opposition, with the effect of scoring political debating points even if retraction of the appointment is not a realistic expectation.

Related to patronage appointments is the equally vexing issue of the partisan political rights of civil servants. While analytically distinct, this issue is closely tied to patronage, especially in terms of the motivation of some civil service reformers who first proposed limitations on the political activities of public servants. The concern was that if limitations on partisan activity were not established, the resulting "politicking" would severely damage the public perception (correct or otherwise) that the public service was a neutral administrative body committed to serving the public in an unbiased fashion. This argument can be viewed as an extension of the classical Weberian concept of public bureaucracy, one which has been central to the study of western administrative theory for decades and which was further advanced by the Wilsonian notion of a

CONFIDENTIAL

politics/administration dichotomy.³⁰ This dichotomy, which assumed that politics could be separated from the administrative requirements of the public service in order to pursue efficiency rather than partisanship, was seen by civil service reformers in both the United States and Canada as requiring the "de-politicizing" of the bureaucracy. This meant that patronage would be replaced by merit as the civil service hiring criterion and that political activities, which were traditionally associated with patronage, would have to be minimized, even if this led to a diminution of public servants' rights.

The current practice in Canada denies the connection between political activities for civil servants and the concept of patronage, at least in large degree. Certain political activities are seen as legitimate and fundamental to the basic rights of civil servants as citizens, though there are the expected distinctions in specific provisions among the eleven different governments.³¹ The civil servant who is excluded from the formal merit system, such as a deputy minister, may nevertheless be expected to refrain from political activity once appointed. In any case, whether or not the appointment is patronage-based, a range of limitations exists for the political activity of all civil servants at both the federal and provincial levels. Regardless of the different provisions, the intent of this legislation in general remains the perceived necessity of maintaining the neutrality of the civil service, even in the incongruity of patronage appointments being so restricted. Moreover, some of these limitations are seen as unnecessary infringements of the public servants' political rights and are resisted by the public servants'

unions.³² The result of this confluence of factors is a sense of confusion or ambiguity as to what is truly required by way of legislation restricting such political activities. While neutrality may be seen as useful to the consumer of public services (i.e., the citizen seeking fair treatment), such neutrality flies in the face of some patronage realities as well as posing a restriction on the democratic rights of public employees. The solution, if indeed there is one, would seem to lie in the question of levels. Where political control and the necessity to carry out a mandate are significant factors, i.e. for senior civil servants and ministerial staff, then patronage may be acceptable. However, these positions, especially senior civil service positions, should otherwise be seen as restricted in their political activity. Where patronage is not defensible for control and mandate reasons, such as for technical staff or clerical staff, and where direct contact with citizens is required, then patronage should be viewed as anathema to the civil service. Hence, since administrators in these categories are in neutral positions, they could be afforded the fuller range of democratic rights implied by political activity. This would be similar to the British practice regarding political activity for their civil servants.³³

For the reasons discussed, patronage and the related issue of political rights for civil servants remain a grey area of ethicality. The existence of merit systems and agencies devoted to protecting these merit systems indicates, not the death of patronage, but its limitation. In effect, these provisions can be seen as establishing, however vaguely, the boundaries within which patronage may legitimately operate. The question of ethics arises from those cases where the

boundaries have been exceeded, either because the position is "out-of-bounds" or because the appointment itself denies any semblance of merit even for a patronage position. As noted above, even the legislation which provides the appropriate commission the opportunity to overturn an appointment which is otherwise beyond the commission's review, fails to specify in clear language when this must be done. In essence, in such cases it is judgement which reigns supreme, and this judgement rarely includes the forcing of the governments hand where the position is not directly under civil service hiring or promotion rules.

The concept of nepotism is only slightly less clear than that of patronage, and then only because the various civil service acts do not specify exceptions to merit for nepotistic reasons as they do for patronage concerns. (Even regarding patronage, the acts never employ such descriptive terminology). The defence of nepotism is rarely promoted in Canadian administrative literature, though it may receive favourable review in societies where the extended family and traditional values still hold sway. Yet, there is a folkloric acceptance that nepotism still counts in public service hiring, and not just in terms of higher level policy-relevant positions normally beyond the scope of civil service commission controls. Such sayings as "it's not what you know, but who you know that counts" are part of Canada's employment mythology. (The term "mythology" is not used here to indicate falsehood. Rather, it indicates a supposition which has been neither verified nor falsified). The existence of cases at the higher levels of government are not unknown, though there is clear room for debate as to whether the adjective "nepotistic" would be appropriate. These cases occur in Canada and elsewhere. Prime Minister Trudeau's

CONFIDENTIAL

chief PMO advisor was also the brother of the Minister of Transport. President Kennedy's Attorney-General was also his brother. Former CPSU party chief Yuri Andropov's son was also a high level diplomat for the Soviet Union. In the rarefied atmosphere of policy-level appointments, it may be possible to make reasoned and rational arguments for such appointments. But what of lower level positions, unrelated to policy-formulation?

None of the statutes consulted regarding the civil service made specific exceptions to the merit system for relatives and/or friends of current civil service employees, yet the folklore remains. The reality is by no means clear, as it may be the case that friendship or kinship may offer an aspiring entrant into the civil service an advantage. However, this advantage is largely one of having been informed of a position that others may not be aware of, and perhaps some advantage in the final selection if all else is equal. Even this latter point remains rather conjectural, as it assumes that ceteris paribus is a likely situation and that there is some empirical evidence that this condition does indeed apply. Neither is necessarily the case. However, even if the mythology could be substantiated, the likelihood is that these events would be seen as typically isolated and unsystematic. If they were not isolated and unsystematic, there would be even greater cause of alarm. Such was the case in two recent allegations. In 1981, Manitoba Hydro was accused by its employees of promoting nepotism, when management was said to be hiring only the children of senior staff for the filling of summer vacancies. In 1982, a minor political debate revolved around nepotism in Canada Post, where it was charged that a telex message instructed officials to hire summer

replacements from amongst the families of the Letter Carriers' Union of Canada.³⁴ Interestingly, when charges of nepotism in the Quebec Department of Welfare were substantiated by a Public Service Commission investigation, Manpower Minister Pauline Marois indicated that charges were not laid because no law had been broken. The result was to be no more than a tightening of hiring and promotion procedures.³⁵

The conclusion that one might draw from this discussion, then, is that nepotism remains a grey area of legislative intent. Along with patronage, it is implicitly prohibited by the existence of civil service legislation which promotes the merit system. Unlike patronage, there is no implicit exception for its application unless one wishes to incorporate it as part of the ambiguous exception which is applied to cases of partisan appointment. Both patronage and nepotism, despite current legislation, continue to exist within the Canadian administrative apparatus. If change is to occur, it will probably do so only if there is either increased public pressure or increased elite sensitivity such as that which has promoted conflict of interest legislation or guidelines in recent years. It is to that topic that our attention now turns.

Conflict of Interest: Moving from Grey to Black?

Thanks largely to two publications of the mid-1970's, academic awareness of the conflict of interest issue has heightened and perhaps even spilled over into the political arena. These are the green paper on Members of Parliament and Conflict of Interest and Kernaghan's Ethical Conduct: Guidelines for Government Employees, both cited

CONFIDENTIAL

above. Of course, this sense of awareness was also promoted by a perceived, if not empirically verified, public concern for the ethical questions raised by a number of cases during this same period. It is possible that public sensitivity has increased, even in Canada, as a direct result of the disclosure of Watergate. This is not because Watergate was a conflict of interest case, but because it may have caused many to adopt a more cynical view of politics. This, in turn, could be seen as relevant to a more questioning attitude toward the past financial practices, amongst other things, of politicians and officials of the administrative process. In any event, concern for conflict of interest appears to be greater than ever before.

Resulting from this concern are a number legislative statutes, regulations and guidelines intended to help alleviate the fears of the public and to provide effective benchmarks against which officials, elected or appointed, might measure their own behaviour. We have argued in the introduction to this chapter that while regulations (and to a lesser extent, guidelines) have a legislative foundation, these instruments of policy lack the public nature and the direct stamp of legislative authority that is implied by statute law. Hence, the focus of this chapter has been on legislation itself. Nevertheless, regulations and guidelines do come into play, and we will address this matter in the next section, albeit briefly.

In terms of legislative statute, there has been progress over the past dozen or so years. Several provinces, but not the federal government, have produced legislation specifically directed at this issue alone. (That is to say, statutes which are not subsumed under some broader consideration such as a more omnibus Civil Service Act or

CONFIDENTIAL

the like). Table II illustrates the number of provinces which have passed such specialized legislation, for both provincial or municipal conflict of interest or for one or the other only. British Columbia has a Financial Disclosure Act which applies to both levels, though it relates to disclosure alone and not prohibition. Manitoba has passed separate legislation for municipal councils and the Legislative Assembly, though it has curiously avoided similar legislation for its civil service. The latter could be achieved through regulation, as permitted in the Civil Service Act, but little is provided even in that vein. Other provinces make various provisions, including New Brunswick, where there is a specific act for the provincial level but municipalities are covered by amendments to the Municipalities Act; Nova Scotia and Ontario,³⁶ which concentrate on municipal conflict of interest but are not impressed with "what's good for the goose is good for the gander" arguments being applied to the provincial government itself; Newfoundland, Saskatchewan and, if one stretches the point, Quebec. The provision of a distinct statute may not be a requirement of conflict of interest reform, but it does assist in promoting the awareness of the issue that advocates of reform often contend is needed.

The content of the legislation is a different matter. One content problem has already been alluded to: disclosure versus prohibition. The British Columbia Financial Disclosure Act³⁷ does not prohibit certain financial interests, but simply requires that these financial interests be made known to the public through the records maintained by the appropriate disclosure clerk. The assumption at work in this case is that disclosure provides sufficient incentive for the provincial or

CONFIDENTIAL

municipal official or employee to avoid financial interests which the public may perceive as detrimental to the fair and just conduct of the respective offices. For an elected official, this may mean that a dubious disclosure could result in electoral defeat. This assumes that an issue can be made of the conflict of interest and that it may override other issues in the campaign, including party loyalty amongst the voters. As a deterrent, it leaves something to be desired. Of course, it leaves open the question of the deterrent for employees, other than public embarrassment.

Other provinces provide prohibitions in addition to disclosures. For example, Manitoba's Municipal Council Conflict of Interest Act³⁸ prohibits direct or indirect pecuniary interest from being reflected in council votes, as it demands withdrawal from meetings where that interest is relevant and forbids the attempt to influence the matter. Penalty for ignoring this prohibition is disqualification from office and possible restitution of the pecuniary gain to the municipality. The deterrent effect of such provisions is generally accepted to be of greater value than mere disclosure, as it takes the judgement out of the electoral arena where many issues compete for attention, and places it in the judicial arena where the issue stands on its own.

Though it is difficult to accurately summarize the kinds of behaviour generally prohibited or, at least, requiring disclosure in existing legislation, some patterns are apparent. Among these are the notions that pecuniary interest in companies which have contracts with given governments is to be prohibited, or interest in real estate which may be involved in government actions (e.g., farmland which might be used to build a new school, etc.). The interests need not be so

MANITOBA MUNICIPALITY
COUNCIL
CONFlict of Interest Act

directly related to investment. Other examples are prohibitions against persons having civil service employment from later joining firms which have dealings with the same department in which that civil servant was employed, in order to avoid the perception that decisions made while in the employ of government might have been influenced by that person's future job prospects. Kernaghan's treatment of these individual conflict questions is comprehensive and need not be repeated here.³⁹ Suffice it to say that the upshot of these prohibitions is to minimize the public perception that decisions taken by the civil service or by elected officials do not stem from any personal financial stake in the matter. Whether that perception is correct or not will depend, in large degree, not only on the existence of conflict of interest laws, regulations or guidelines, but on the degree to which these provisions are enforced and are seen to be enforced.

The enforcement question raises the point that, like other areas of ethical concern, Canada has experienced a number of cases where conflict of interest has required public discussion, if not something even more substantial. Perhaps the most recent and one of the most publicized was the so-called Gillespie affair wherein Alistair Gillespie, a former member of the Liberal cabinet in Ottawa, later joined a firm in Nova Scotia which had direct dealings with his old ministry, Energy, Mines and Resources. The dealing in question was the application for a grant worth about \$1 million, from which Mr. Gillespie would stand to profit directly because of the increased share value of his company. Demands from a variety of sources were voiced that not only the grant be rejected but that the then minister of EMR, Marc Lalonde, step down as minister because of his role in the apparent

CONFIDENTIAL

conflict of interest. The end result was, of course, nothing of the kind. Indeed, Prime Minister Trudeau publicly argued that he could not force former Cabinet ministers to comply with the 1980 guidelines. Moreover, there was no indication that he was willing to enforce the guidelines with current cabinet members either.⁴⁰

Lest one begin to believe that only the federal Liberals have such problems, consider Manitoba's so-called "McKenzie Seed affair."⁴¹ In this case the offenders were senior executives of a provincial crown corporation who leased the company's computer from a computer firm they owned and rented buildings from a company in which at least one senior officer was a minority shareholder. The persons in question were fired by the NDP government, though not before much debate challenged the competence of the minister responsible for being so unaware of the conflicts of interest within the corporation in the first place. However, the fact that the officials were fired compares interestingly with the Gil case, where demands for Mr. Lalonde's resignation went unheeded. Perhaps the reason for this disparity is that in one case the persons involved were officials, while in the other it was a minister whose career was at stake. Or, perhaps it displays a different attitude toward the issue by two different parties. In reality, such conclusions are impossible since the cases are quite different.

Discussion

Conspicuous in its absence from the preceding pages is the problem of pork-barrelling. The reason for this is rather straight-forward:

CONFIDENTIAL

there are no laws which apply to this type of behaviour. While accusations of pork-barrelling tactics are common, the use of this tactic is apparently well-accepted by political elites.⁴² While it might be assumed that the general public is less warmly disposed toward this behaviour, there is no empirical evidence that this is so. The evidence that political elites are unconcerned is the absence of legislation. However, even if legislation did exist that might theoretically prohibit pork-barrelling, the discussion in this chapter indicates the possible futility in the actual application of such laws. This does not deny the symbolic importance played by such legislation, either in terms of providing guidelines to voters or to officials or both, but it does suggest one reason why the public may not be dramatically demonstrative in their demands for legislative change in this or other ethical issue areas.⁴³

Pork-barrelling reflects an important dimension of the corruption problem: the greyness of the condemnation which is directed to these types of behaviour, due in part to the perceived systemic nature of the offences. While bribery and graft may be black in law and perhaps even in public opinion, a certain greyness remains in that such activities are often shrugged off as being systemically induced. In other words, in the idiom of the man or woman in the street — that's the way the game is played. At times it seems that condemnation is offered as much for the person's incompetence in being caught as for the nature of the act itself. Further, there are arguments for many of these activities being treated as positive rather than negative. For pork-barrelling the defence that is offered is that each MP is expected to look after the interests of his or her own constituency, regardless of whether the

decisions taken are rational in some broader economic or national sense. The MP who dismisses the opportunity to provide a pork-barrel project for his or her constituency or region is likely to be condemned for failing the voters rather than cheered for upholding some ethereal ethical principle. The same argument can be applied to other "corrupt" actions. For example, there are those who contend, not without some justification, that patronage protects the party system by enabling parties to motivate supporters to work for the party and candidates to stand for nomination, especially in areas of low likelihood of success. These are the functionalist arguments discussed in earlier chapters, and they do have a certain attractiveness to them that should not be too easily dismissed. Pork-barrelling seems to be particularly susceptible to this type of justification.

In the final analysis, legislation is useful for delineating current elite and/or mass attitudes (though more clearly the former), for establishing guidelines for both officials and the public, for exhorting ethical behaviour, and (when enforced) acting as a deterrent. All of these functions can be provided, though less effectively, by regulations or guidelines. Indeed, this is already the case. A number of governments have guidelines and regulations already in place, for example, regarding conflict of interest.⁴⁴ Most Civil Service Acts make provision for either the respective commissions or for deputy ministers to make such regulations or guidelines as they deem necessary to maintain the proper conduct of the public service. The weakness of this arrangement has been previously alluded to, and that is the relative lack of public awareness of the nature of the guidelines and regulations, which limits their effectiveness in terms of some of the

CONFIDENTIAL

functions noted above. Moreover, the enforcement procedures also occur outside public purview and therefore may create the image that civil servants or elected officials are being "tried" by other civil servants or elected officials. A sense of "protecting one's own" may take hold in the public mind, rightly or wrongly, and thereby limit the cathartic effect of enforcement. When legislation is used, it is not always provided that an independent body like the courts will be employed, but regulations and especially guidelines are almost guaranteed to avoid such procedures. In this sense, legislation may be seen as potentially more authoritative, fair and just.

In any event, whether we are speaking of legislative statutes, regulations or guidelines, the central questions remain. Will they be enforced consistently and fairly? Do they reflect community values?⁴⁵ Do they establish clear measuring devices for both the public and the officials? Are the penalties sufficient? The answers to these questions are especially problematic in the "grey" areas of corruption and must await further research.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTES

1. See, for example, J.R. Mallory, "Curtailling Divine Right: The Control of Delegated Legislation in Canada," in O.P. Dwivedi, ed., The Administrative State in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), pp. 131-149.
2. See especially their comparative analyses of provincial legislation in D.J. Bellamy, J.H. Pammett and D.C. Rowat, eds., The Provincial Political Systems (Toronto: Methuen, 1976). Kernaghan's article, "Ethics of Public Servants" can be found at pp. 357-368, while Paltiel's contribution, "Election Expenses," is found on pp. 161-176.
3. R.S.N.B., 1973, c. C-21, s. 1 and S.N.B., 1978, c. C-16.1 respectively.
4. R.S.C., 1970, (1st Supplement), c. 14, s. 66(1).
5. R.S.C., 1970, c. C-28. See also an early study of controverted elections legislation by Norman Ward, "Electoral Corruption and Controverted Elections," Canadian Journal of Political Science and Economics, 15 (February, 1949), 74-86.
6. R.S.M., 1970, c. E30, s. 123.
7. Controverted Elections Act, R.S.M., 1970, c. C210.
8. The Elections Act, R.S.S., 1978, c. E-6, s. 166, 169-171. This is not intended to imply that Saskatchewan is unique in this regard. For instance, New Brunswick also prohibits the use of public address systems specifically (Elections Act, R.S.N.B., 1973, c. E3, s. 117) and Alberta makes specific reference to the prohibition of wagering also (Election Act, R.S.A., 1980, c. E-2, s. 166).
9. Election Act, R.S.N., 1970, c. 106, s. 117.
10. The activities in question took place in Quebec and included the offer of food and drink to residents of a men's hostel and food to supporters aged 15 to 17, who were clearly too young to vote in a general election. Widely reported in both the print and

CONFIDENTIAL

electronic media, these actions were generally seen as at least temporarily damaging to Mulroney's image. For a summary, see "A rough-and-ready delegate fight," Maclean's, April 11, 1983, pp. 25-26.

11. K.Z. Paltiel, Political Party Financing in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970), chap. 7; "Improving Laws on Financing Elections," in K.M. Gibbons and D.C. Rowat, eds., Political Corruption in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), pp. 295-299; and "Election Expenses," op. cit.
12. "Election changes proposed in Newfoundland," Winnipeg Free Press, November 30, 1983, p. 31.
13. Paltiel, "Election Expenses," op. cit., pp. 161, 164-166.
14. The Election Expenses Act, S.C., 21-22 Elizabeth II (1973-74), c. 51, s. 6.
15. This discussion is drawn from ibid., s. 4 and 7, and from Paltiel, "Election Expenses," op. cit., pp. 166-169.
16. Election Finances Reform Act, R.S.O., 1980, c. 134, s. 39. The act was passed in 1975 with a few minor amendments since. Paltiel's comment is from "Election Expenses," ibid., p. 167. Rand Dyck's observation can be found in his "Electoral Reform," in D.C. Macdonald, ed. The Government and Politics of Ontario (revised edition; Toronto: VanNostrand Reinhold, 1980), p. 321.
17. S.N.B., 1978, c. P-9.3; R.S.O., 1977, c. F-2; and R.S.A., 1980, c. E-3 respectively.
18. Paltiel, "Election Expenses," op. cit., p. 170. His article "Improving Laws on Election Financing," op. cit., does not comment on the federal provisions either.
19. Paltiel's unpublished paper entitled "Canadian Election Expense Legislation: A Summary and Appraisal of Recent Developments," presented to the 10th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Edinburgh, Scotland, August, 1976 does compare federal and provincial legislation in this area but

it does not indicate whether the federal effort was to be considered "serious" or not.

20. Election Finances Reform Act, R.S.O., 1980, c. 134, s. 19.
21. Election Finances and Disclosure Act, R.S.A., 1980, c. E-3, s. 15.
22. Paltiel, "Election Expenses," op. cit., p. 170.
23. Canada, Privy Council, Members of Parliament and Conflict of Interest (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973), p. 15.
24. Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1970, c. C-34, s. 108(1). While the code is quite comprehensive in the range of offices and levels of governments it covers, there are gaps. These are usually filled by specific reference in provincial legislation. For example, Newfoundland's Revenue and Audit Act, R.S.N., c. 338, s. 87-88, specifically prohibits fraud and bribery for "every officer or person acting in any office or employment connected with collection or management of the revenue."
25. See, for instance, "Jury Convicts N.S. Liberal bagmen," Winnipeg Free Press, May 12, 1983, p. 1 and "Liberal bagmen fined \$25,000 in N.S.," Winnipeg Free Press, May 13, 1983, p. 13. Conviction for influence-peddling is not unknown in Canada, as evidenced by another widely reported case in New Brunswick three years earlier. See "N.B. Tory guilty of corruption," Winnipeg Free Press, July 29, 1980, p. 12.
26. There are a number of examples of cases of breach of trust to be found in newspaper reports. One of the most publicized was part of the Montreal Olympic scene. A former Montreal Executive Committee chairman who received a mansion in exchange for his influence in distributing construction contracts was fined \$75,000 and jailed for one day. See "Free house ruled breach of trust," Winnipeg Free Press, February 9, 1984, p. 25.
27. James C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 156 and Peter Bruton et al., "A Little Honest Graft Never Hurt a Politician at the Polls," Maclean's, January 25, 1964, p. 32.

CONFIDENTIAL

28. For a discussion of pre-1908 patronage in Canada, see J.E. Hodgetts et al., The Biography of an Institution: The Civil Service Commission of Canada, 1908-1967 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972), ch. 1.
29. For example, Canada Public Service Employment Act, R.S.C., 1970, c. P-32 and Manitoba, Civil Service Act, R.S.M., 1970 (incorporating amendments to 1978), c. C110, s. 13.
30. Max Weber, "Essay on Bureaucracy," reprinted in F.E. Rourke, ed. Bureaucratic Power in National Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), pp. 3-14; Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration," Political Science Quarterly, LVI (December, 1941), 481-506. Originally published in 1887.
31. See Kenneth Kernaghan, Ethical Conduct: Guidelines for Government Employees (Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1975), ch. 3; also his more detailed comparison of provincial legislation in "Ethics of Public Servants," op. cit., pp. 362-366.
32. Bill Brassington, "Political Rights for Public Servants," Civil Service Review, (May, 1980), 36-39.
33. Kernaghan, Ethical Conduct..., op. cit., pp. 32-33.
34. Cecil Rosner, "Hydro management accused of nepotism," Winnipeg Free Press, 30 July 1981, pp. 1, 4; Margot Gibb-Clark, "Canada Post directive is nepotism, Tory says," Toronto Globe and Mail, February 27, 1982, p. 11.
35. "Nepotism dismissed as 'nothing illegal'", Winnipeg Free Press, December 3, 1983, p. 16.
36. See Michael J. Smither, "Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, 1983," Municipal World, March, 1983, pp. 66-68 and Nanci-Jean Waugh, "Conflict of Interest in the Cities," in D.C. Rowat, ed. Urban Politics in Ottawa-Carleton (Ottawa: Department of Political Science, Carleton University, 1983), pp. 159-182. Waugh also discusses a City of Ottawa by-law on conflict of interest.
37. R.S.B.C., 1979, c. 130.

38. S.M., 1983, c. 44, s. 5, 18 and 21(2).
39. See Kernaghan, Ethical Conduct..., op. cit., pp. 53-54 and appendix B which reprints a number of guidelines and regulations.
40. This issue gained nationwide attention in early 1983. See for example Jeff Sallot, "Countdown to conflict-of-interest debate," Toronto Globe and Mail, February 24, 1983, p. 7 and "Difficult to enforce guidelines, PM says," Toronto Globe and Mail, March 19, 1983, p. 12.
41. Arlene Billinkoff, "Auditor's report revives McKenzie seed issue," Winnipeg Free Press, November 8, 1983, p. 7.
42. Recent examples include the national furor over a federal employment program cited in "Tories press Trudeau for job-creation 'pork-barrel' list," Winnipeg Free Press, February 9, 1984 and the regional debate over one minister's attempt to create jobs in his home province cited in the editorial "L. Axworthy's pork barrel," Winnipeg Free Press, July 31, 1981, p. 6.
43. For instance, "Conflict-of-interest hearing draws no public response," Winnipeg Free Press, June 18, 1980, p. 16.
44. See Kernaghan, Ethical Conduct..., op. cit., appendix B for examples of guidelines and regulations. There are also regulations specific to given departments, such as those respecting the Manitoba Horse Racing Commission Act, R.S.M., 1970, c. H90. The regulations forbid members of the commission, which is responsible for regulating the racing industry, from owning (in whole or in part) a race horse or from placing a bet on a race.
45. Even with the change of attitudes toward conflict of interest legislation, debate continues as to its appropriateness, with fears that such legislation violates privacy rights and will discourage people from seeking office. See "Conflict law violates basic right, P.C. says," Winnipeg Free Press, April 28, 1983, p. 15.

CHAPTER SIX: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON ATTITUDES TOWARD CORRUPTION

It has been argued throughout this thesis that empirical research on attitudes toward political corruption has been deficient in producing anything other than a rather superficial understanding of the concept. This is not to say that there are no examples of interesting and substantial research, for there are some. In the main, these examples are American studies or studies that have a narrower focus than this thesis. An example of the latter is K.Z. Paltiel's study of citizen and candidate attitudes toward campaign finance,¹ while the American examples will be discussed briefly below.

National voting studies in Canada have not given a prominent role to the study of corruption, nor have decades of Gallup Polls conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion. Treatment of corruption has been, for the most part, a peripheral matter. Nevertheless, peripheral does not mean unimportant or absent. In part, as we shall see below, this peripheral interest is due to the fact that when citizens are asked what issues are important to them, corruption rarely rates mention as a key issue. But this does not account completely for the lack of attention to the concept when investigators prompt their respondents; for example, they may ask respondents "which of the following issues is important to you?" or some variation of this theme. The consequence of this is that very little attitudinal or opinion research has thus been done on the concept in Canada, given that the bulk of attitudinal or opinion research comes from national elections surveys (such as those by John Meisel or by Harold Clarke et al.²) or Gallup polls (such as the work of Mildred Schwartz³).

CONFIDENTIAL

While there are empirical sources other than such national election surveys in Canada, they are relatively few and far from ideal for our purpose. Yet, within their limitations, largely regarding problems of generalization from non-national samples, such studies can offer interesting insights. One such example is the study of one British Columbia constituency by Jean Laponce, which is notable because it detected an interest in "scandals" amongst voters even when they were not prompted about that issue. Another is Michael Stein's analysis of Quebec's Creditiste leadership, conducted in 1967, in which 50% of his small sample saw Canadian politics as corrupt. Finally, and most importantly, there is Maureen Mancuso's study of the attitudes of Canadian Members of Parliament toward political corruption.⁶ This is the only existing example of a full-blown treatment of attitudes toward corruption in Canada, but its focus on legislators, important as it may be, does not provide us with information of direct relevance to our study of public attitudes.⁴

Regardless of the examples chosen, be they specific to the study of corruption or not, the overall effect remains one of uncharted territory awaiting full mapping. While this view is perhaps over-dramatized, much more could be learned and, even more important, should be learned. American research has offered some gratifying exceptions to the Canadian rule of benign neglect, and it is consistent with past patterns of social science dissemination that we consider the prospects offered by such research for application to the Canadian scene. This is not without its own problems, however, and the biggest of these problems lies in the methodological complications inherent in any cross-cultural transference of social science. Nevertheless, to

CONFIDENTIAL

the extent that one can consciously defend against the negative implications of cross-cultural transference, recent American research can offer a more sophisticated appreciation of the concept of corruption.

With the above prefatory comments having been made, the plan of this chapter is as follows. First, we will review Canadian data on corruption and, where appropriate, on related concepts such as trust and cynicism. These data will be drawn from national election surveys, including secondary analysis by authors other than those engaged in the original survey and from surveys other than on a national scale. The data will be organized into two sections or parts; the first to be presented will be data from Gallup Polls taken over the past 20 years, while the second part will be devoted to academically-based opinion analysis from both national and sub-national samples. Second, a review of American research which may suggest more comprehensive or substantial analyses of corruption will be undertaken. In this review, only those studies which offer any sort of departure from rather standard means of analyzing corruption data will be considered, as these may provide insights into the study of Canadian attitudes which may not be forthcoming from existing Canadian studies. Third, a concluding discussion will attempt to bring this disparate data-base together in order to arrive at hypotheses, directly or indirectly, that may be examined within the context of our own survey of Canadian students.

Canadian Empirical Research: Twenty Years of Gallup Polls

If one examines Gallup Polls (conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion) that have been published since 1963, the first thing that strikes a researcher interested in the concept of political corruption is that attention, while never frequent or intense, has been given to the concept from time to time. The second thing that strikes one is the almost cursory or shallow treatment the concept receives when it does receive Gallup's consideration. The reason for this is, at least in part, due to the fact that respondents rarely mention corruption as one of the political issues which concern them, when they are not "cued" or prompted by a list from which they might choose. In answering the question, "What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?", corruption has never registered in more than 30 polls.* There have been occasional vague references to "government" as a problem, but such a response can mean almost anything. Further, it is possible that corruption may have been subsumed under the miscellaneous rubric of "other problems", but this would then indicate that the issue of corruption has never exceeded perhaps three or four per cent of the responses. Interestingly, even in 1965 and 1966, when Gallup was in the process of conducting specific questions about the Munsinger and Rivard scandals, the issue of corruption did not register in an unprompted way, at least in terms of federal politics.

That corruption should register either not at all or so lowly that

* The wording has undergone several minor alterations over time.

it did not merit specific mention by the Gallup Poll is not necessarily surprising (except perhaps given Gallup's interest in the 1965 scandals). It has not been contended here that corruption is by any means the single most important issue confronting Canadian citizens, when they are confronted by the urgency of unemployment or inflation or national unity. Rather, it is argued that corruption is an issue of some importance, though not necessarily foremost on any given list. Nevertheless, there have been very few exceptions to the general pattern previously noted, though these have resulted from responses to rather different questions having more specific purposes than the question in the last paragraph. One exception was in a 1974 survey which asked, "What would you say is the greatest single problem facing the provincial government in ... today?" (The blank was to be filled by the respondent's province of residence). Fourth on a list, following energy, inflation, and unemployment, was a category which "lumped" together (arguably in a rather indiscriminate fashion) "government dissatisfaction, graft, waste, policies." The fact that graft is mentioned at all, regardless of the confounding nature of the "grab-bag" category, indicates some small measure of interest in it as an issue. However, despite ranking fourth, the entire category was chosen by only eight per cent of the sample.⁵ There is no indication as to what portion of that eight per cent focused directly on graft, but the category as a whole outranked other notable issues such as welfare, education, housing transportation and industrial strife.

Other references to corruption or related terms have been made by the Gallup Poll, most notably during the 1965-66 period as an aftermath of the Munsinger scandal. This scandal was referred to by respondents

CONFIDENTIAL

when they were asked, first, if their opinion of Prime Minister Pearson and Opposition leader Diefenbaker had gone up or down and, second, for what reason. The reasons cited for the decline of both Pearson and Diefenbaker included mention of scandals, particularly Munsinger's. Unfortunately, Gallup did not report the percentage for either leader, thus we are left only with the vague impression that scandals did affect some voters' opinions of both men.⁶ A few weeks later, Gallup published the response to the following question: "If you were asked to criticize the present Liberal government (Conservative opposition) in Ottawa, what would your main criticism be?" Scandal, especially the Munsinger affair, again rated attention. It was ranked as the fifth leading criticism of the Liberal government (lumped together with "only concerned with politics and vote-getting, not with welfare of the country," an incongruous combination to be sure) as it was specified by six per cent of the sample. When dealing with the Conservative opposition, scandal was ranked third, specified by eleven per cent of the sample. Interestingly, the view of the electorate seems to have been one of tolerance of the government and disdain for the opposition, as the category included "too much mud-slinging, petty scandals, too much fighting, not concerned with important things."⁷ This is not inconsistent with some impressionistic accounts of "lenient" attitudes toward corruption on the part of citizens, especially if the cases in question are popularly perceived as petty. This attitude may even be translated into disdain for the accuser, as the "mud-slinging" remark indicates.⁸

Other polls were conducted in the 1965-66 period during which the Munsinger and Rivard scandals took place, and these too were unable to

CONFIDENTIAL

detect more than a minor interest on the part of the public. When only 29% of the sample favoured a new election within six months of a poll released in May, 1965, only five per cent of those felt that an election should be called "because of all the scandals; should clear up all the scandals." This placed scandals in a tie for sixth place amongst the reasons given for needing a new election.⁹ In another poll later in that year, more than 30% of respondents were dissatisfied with Prime Minister Pearson, yet only six per cent cited "too much scandal and corruption, tries to cover up mistakes, bad image for Canada," among their reasons. This ranked corruption fourth, along with two other reasons.¹⁰ Indeed, these observations were confirmed by a July, 1965 poll which showed, in Gallup's words, "the public's belief, in the main, that recent scandals have not affected Government forces seriously." The national standings displayed absolutely no change in party standings from March to May to July of the same year, with the Liberals commanding a 16 point margin over their nearest rivals, the Conservatives.¹¹

What makes this last poll fascinating is that a poll released only two months earlier had indicated that 26% of the national sample felt that charges of scandal during this period would seriously affect voters' support for the Liberal party. Table III, taken from the Gallup Report, illustrates not only the national feeling on this point but the fact that there was concern even within the Liberal camp.¹² Yet, despite these findings (note also that only 15% of the entire sample felt that the scandals would have no effect at all), the July, 1965 poll showed no change whatever over the poll results from the previous two polls. The reason for this apparent contradiction might

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE III: GALLUP POLL RELEASED MAY 29, 1965

"What effect do you think the recent charges of scandal within the Liberal party will have on their support among voters — will it affect them seriously, not too seriously, or not at all?"

	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>CONS.</u>	<u>LIBS.</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Affect seriously	26%	36%	21%	26%
Not too seriously	48	44	52	49
Not at all	15	9	18	13
Qualified	1	2	1	1
Cannot say	<u>10</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>11</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%

be bound up in two Gallup releases made about one year later. In May, 1966 Gallup reported the responses to the following question: "In general, do you approve or disapprove of the way the Liberal government (Conservative opposition) handled the Munsinger affair?" The overall response was surprisingly similar for both parties, with the Liberals receiving an approval from 20% and disapproval from 47% and the Conservatives an approval from only 16% and disapproval from 47%.¹³ Certainly there were grounds for the similarity of opinion, as it was clear during this period that both Liberals and Conservatives had reason to be seen as culpable in several notorious cases in recent years. The Liberals had their Rivard case and the Conservatives their Munsinger case, thus the public may have thought that neither was in a position to cast the first stone. Nevertheless, the Munsinger affair was clearly tied to the Conservatives and the Liberals were merely in a position to initiate the investigation into the scandal, though some would say that this was done with "political" timing in mind.¹⁴ In any event, neither party gained popularity in the eyes of the electorate

CONFIDENTIAL

for their handling of this particular case. Gallup pointed out that disapproval applied to all age groups, though the under 30 group was less disapproving than all others over 30, especially regarding the Liberal government. Breakdowns were not given for other socio-economic categories such as region or class.

The 1965-66 period is the only period during the last 20 years for which references to specific scandals or references to the scandal problems of specific parties or governments is mentioned in the Gallup polls. However, there are other polls which address a more generic aspect of the problem of corruption, either by reference to a general attitude towards increasing or decreasing honesty or corruption, or by reference to specific attitudes toward theoretical considerations such as party financing or conflict of interest. As such, what emerges is a veritable pot-pourri of data, of varying utility to the social science researcher, which interestingly cites Watergate but no Canadian event other than those mentioned above that might even be remotely connected to the concept of corruption.

Among the most recurring themes of Canadian Gallup polls is a concern for campaign finance. This may take the form of questions (1) about federal government subsidization of campaigns for the House of Commons accompanied by a prohibition of private financing; (2) about laws which would limit the amount of money to be spent on campaigns; and (3) about the requirement that parties should make public the sources of their funds.¹⁵ In terms of the first question or issue, a substantial majority of Canadians have felt, over three polls during a ten year period, that federal subsidies and prohibition of private contributions are a good idea. However, the percentage of the

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

* This question became moot after 1974 with the passing of federal legislation that year which limited expenses. See Chapter Five.

little difference between Liberal and Conservative supporters, with 74% and 75%, respectively, favouring publishing of sources. But the "other" category, which included N.D.P. supporters, registered an 89% favourability towards this measure. In 1972, the difference between Liberals and Conservatives grew (75% to 81% respectively), but support amongst the N.D.P. dropped somewhat to 86%, though still enough to make them the most favourable towards publishing sources of funds once again.*

The data on party finance, treated in this study as one component of the study of political corruption, indicate several potential hypotheses that might be applied to a more generalized notion of political corruption, and this will be discussed below. But the Gallup data tend to have application only to rather narrow questions. True, the socio-economic analyses that are missing from the various Gallup Reports could be rectified by simply doing a secondary analysis of Gallup data, for these data include, at least in raw unpublished form, references to region or education or the like, even if these variables do not appear in Gallup's releases. Nevertheless, this is not really the problem, as it is not the independent variables which are the essential issue. It is the dependent variable which persists in a less than satisfactory form. Questions dealing with party finance are actually considerably more informative than questions dealing with other aspects of corruption. There are at least three dimensions which have been subjected to Gallup's scrutiny over the years, as has already been noted. Even then, there is no indication if the reason for

* Again, see Chapter Five, as federal legislation now requires publicity.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

supporting publicity rules of expenditure limitation rules is based on some notion that the absence of these is conducive to corrupt influence in the election process, or that prior to the legislative changes, corruption flourished without such rules, and so on. The information provided by these polls, then, is suggestive, but lacking in comprehensiveness.

Two other Gallup polls, taken during the past two decades, have directed attention towards other aspects or dimensions of political corruption, though one of these does so only through a fairly generous interpretation of the question. The other is direct and to the point and concerns the issue of conflict of interest. The first was a rather general question: "It has been said that what counts today is not what you can do, or how hard working you are, but whom you know and how much influence you have. Do you agree or disagree with this statement?"¹⁷ 60% of the sample agreed with the statement, 32% disagreed, and 8% had no opinion. Comparison was made only between males and females, and there was essentially no difference between the two groups. No other socio-economic breakdowns were used and no reason was given as to why the gender distinction was thought to be important. Now, by loosely interpreting this question, it would be possible to argue that the public seems to think that there is an environment conducive to influence-peddling existing in Canada. It would be over-interpretation to insist that the poll shows widespread influence-peddling per se, but given that a substantial majority of Canadians agree with the statement (even with the typical four per cent error margin — not mentioned in the original Gallup Report — the majority would run to 56%), it seems likely that such belief patterns support the notion of a receptive

environment. In any event, the point and the data are simply suggestive, once again, and by no means conclusive.

The second of the polls to direct its attention to a specific dimension of political corruption (other than party finance) dealt with conflict of interest.¹⁸ The poll, released in 1973, asked whether conflict of interest was a very serious, quite serious or not too serious problem among federal government representatives. The poll was somewhat unusual in that it analysed the responses in terms of three types of variables: party preference, education and mother tongue. Table IV illustrates this analysis.

TABLE IV: GALLUP POLL RELEASED NOVEMBER 24, 1973

"... Do you think this 'conflict of interest' problem is very serious, quite serious or not too serious among federal government representatives?"

	<u>VERY SERIOUS</u>	<u>QUITE SERIOUS</u>	<u>NOT TOO SERIOUS</u>	<u>DON'T KNOW</u>
NATIONAL	27%	35%	22%	16%
WOULD VOTE:				
Liberal	24	37	25	14
Conservative	30	33	23	14
N.D.P.	41	36	15	8
Other, undecided	20	35	22	23
EDUCATION:				
Elementary	24	36	15	25
High School	30	33	22	15
University	18	41	31	10
MOTHER TONGUE:				
English	30	33	25	12
French	25	39	14	22
Other	18	35	24	23

The data indicate, most significantly, a very strong concern about conflict of interest, at least in 1973. More than three out of five

2

Canadians felt the issue was a serious one. Perhaps more interesting than this rather straightforward point is that there are strong patterns of differences between various groups, most notably among the various party supporters. There is a range of 21 percentage points in the "very serious" column, ranging from 20% for "other, undecided" to 41% for the N.D.P. If one considers only the three leading parties, the range is still conspicuous at 17%. The ordering of the three party supporters is also interesting, with the Liberals feeling the problem is less serious than the Conservatives, who in turn were less concerned about conflict of interest than N.D.P. supporters. Further, it is also worth noting that those respondents who classified themselves as supporters of other parties or undecided voters were also much more undecided about the seriousness of the conflict of interest problem. A fascinating conceptual observation might emerge on this point, depending upon the looseness of one's interpretation of the "other, undecided" category. If the category includes nonvoters as well as supporters of minor parties or those who are truly undecided or "independent," and depending upon one's acceptance of the untested assumption that most of those in such a category are either nonvoters or independents (undecideds), certain hypotheses may be reasonable. These hypotheses are based on two fundamental propositions which are commonly accepted in the literature on political behaviour, and a third which is not especially well known. All three are drawn from the work of Lester Milbrath, and include the following:¹⁹

- a. that nonvoters have less knowledge about politics than voters;
- b. that less partisan (i.e., independent) voters have less political knowledge than partisan voters; and
- c. that nonvoters are less likely to be concerned about corruption than voters.

The above propositions, drawn from American voting behaviour research for which there is no clear Canadian equivalent, suggest hypotheses which will be discussed in the concluding section of this chapter. Suffice it to say at this point that the November 1973 poll offers some stimulating possibilities, especially if we note (in addition to party differences) differences due to education and mother tongue noted in Table IV.

There are still other polls for the past twenty or so years which related, with varying degrees of directness, to the concept of political corruption. However, they are less immediate to our concerns here, for a variety of reasons, than those already discussed. Nevertheless, brief mention of these polls, their content and their lesser salience should be noted for comparative purposes and for a clearer understanding of the available data. This exercise might permit a few minor points to be made that have not emerged from the polls previously noted.

The first of these secondarily important polls deals with the public's perception of whether "favouritism and corruption" were increasing in Ottawa when the polls were taken in 1966 and 1974.²⁰ The 1966 poll found that 36% of Canadians thought corruption was increasing, while only 10% felt it was decreasing. The remainder were either undecided or felt the level of favouritism and corruption was about the same as before. Two interesting points can be drawn from the 1966 poll: first, Gallup provided a comparison with American data which showed Canadians to be less cynical (with or without good reason) than their counterparts to the south and, second, occupational data they provided permits the conclusion that there were noticeable

9-1-1974 11:11 AM

differences between occupational groupings which corresponded to the rank ordering of the groups according to socio-economic status. I.e., the higher the status of the occupational group, the less cynical the group's response. The major problem with this poll, and the 1974 poll which showed an overall increase in cynicism, is that the basic research question (that is, "do you think political favouritism and corruption in Ottawa are increasing or decreasing?") simply fails to provide useful information. What was the level of corruption before? What is it now? What does the respondent think is corrupt? Is favouritism merely providing a grant to a firm to encourage it to settle in the economically depressed Maritimes? The survey item, in effect, raises far more questions than it answers. Nevertheless, the poll suggests that there are interesting Canadian-American differences and interesting social class differences that might be pursued in research such as the student survey which forms a fundamental part of this thesis. Moreover, the 1974 poll suggests possible regional differences as well, though these may not be especially great. The most cynical region in the 1974 poll was the Prairies, followed by, in descending order, Quebec, the Atlantic provinces, Ontario and British Columbia. Again, though the polls' central question is, in itself, problematic, it does seem that the polls provide some potentially illuminating suppositions.

Another series of polls having at least peripheral importance to the concept of corruption deal with "ethical standards" and "respect". The latter is problematic in its ambiguity, but offers confirmation of the data dealing with the former. The question relating to respect, asked in 1974 and 1979, read as follows: "Would you tell me how much

respect and confidence you, yourself, have in — a great deal, quite a lot, some or very little?" The blank was to be filled in by the name of a group or institution.²¹ Clearly, the question stands remote from the issue of corruption, but the results support findings made by Gallup when they asked a more immediately relevant question in 1976 and 1982.²² "How would you rate the honesty and ethical standards of the people in these different fields — very high, high, average, low or very low?" The results are provided in Table V, which combines the findings of the two polls, for comparison.

TABLE V: GALLUP POLLS RELEASED SEPTEMBER 24, 1976 AND OCTOBER 2, 1982

"How would you rate the honesty and ethical standards of the people in these different fields — very high, high, average, low or very low?"

	<u>% saying high or very high - 1982</u>	<u>% saying high or very high - 1976</u>
Doctors	59%	60%
Police Officers	52	49
Engineers	43	38
University Teachers	40	39
Psychiatrists	28	28
Lawyers	28	26
Journalists	21	18
Business Executives	18	17
Building Contractors	18	14
Members of Parliament	14	16
Advertising Executives	13	9
Labor Union Leaders	12	10

Again, as in the last case, it is difficult in the extreme to be sure what respondents have in mind when they consider terms like honesty or ethical standards. Would the failure to follow through on a campaign promise be dishonest or unethical? Or would alleging

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

impropriety on the part of one's opponent be seen as dishonest or unethical? These types of questions cannot be answered by such polls. Nevertheless, the polls remain interesting in their own right. First, the ranking of MP's has declined in the period of 1976 to 1982 (leaving aside the four per cent error margin), making MP's one of only two groups to so decline, the other being doctors. Second, the ranking of MP's has also declined, from ninth to tenth in a field of only twelve groups. Third, as is painfully evident from the first two points, the honesty and ethical standards citizens ascribe to politicians, or at least specifically MP's, are extremely low even in absolute terms. There is little joy to be taken from the fact that MP's are rated only one percentage point higher than advertising executives, though advertising executives might disagree, and that they trail building contractors by four points. (To be fair, it might also be noted that my own profession — university teachers — does not rate as highly as I might have thought, though it does well above average).

No other variables were provided in the Gallup release which might be used to analyze these data, though the changes over time which apply to these polls, as well as others previously discussed, could be used in such a fashion. However, changes over time are beyond the scope of this dissertation, as they would require a panel study, ideally, to effectively discover what changes time might illuminate. In any event, the main point to be gleaned from these polls is that, on a comparative basis at least, the ethics of MP's are not held in high esteem by members of the public. Even if the reason for this low esteem, or the standards by which MP's are being evaluated by the public, are not known, this conclusion is, in itself, an enlightening confirmation of

CONFIDENTIAL

what might be thought to be a journalistic impression of politicians in general.

Finally, lest one think that the occasional reference to the impact of Watergate on the study of corruption, even in Canada, is overstated, it is noteworthy that five poll releases relating to Canadian opinions about Watergate were made in 1973 and 1974.²³ While these polls do not relate directly to corruption in Canada, they do provide some insight into Canadian attitudes about corruption. The first of these asked a question which was perhaps more important for showing what Canadians thought political "reality" might be than what they thought should happen. The question was, "If something like Watergate happened in Canada, do you think that the Prime Minister would have been forced to resign or not?" 52% said yes, the PM would be forced to resign, while only 29% said no. Note that the wording of the question is significant in that it uses the word "would" (empirical) rather than the word "should" (normative). Nevertheless, the vast majority felt that the PM would be forced to resign. While differences in terms of party preference were minimal, major differences occurred between linguistic groups, with the English saying yes more frequently than the French or "others", and in terms of education, where the more highly educated were more likely to say yes. It is quite possible that one could argue that, given the reality of party discipline in Parliament, the negative responses are possibly the more accurate. This point makes the interpretation of these data quite difficult.

The second of the Canadian Watergate polls (December 1973) asked if media coverage of Watergate was perceived as fair. In reply, 52%

CONFIDENTIAL

said it was fair or very fair, only 27% said not too fair or very unfair. While there was little difference between age groups, there were some noticeable differences based on region. First, Quebecers were far more likely to be undecided than others, perhaps because Watergate was more an English media phenomenon. Second, when only considering those with an opinion, Quebec was far more likely to see media coverage as unfair. Where the fair to unfair ratio was generally two-to-one or higher in English-dominated regions, it was barely more than one-to-one in Quebec. Whether this signifies a greater disenchantment with the adversarial nature of the media or a measure of sympathy for the accused cannot be determined from these data. Nevertheless, the distinction is fascinating.

The third poll (August 1973) asked respondents if they had heard of the Watergate affair and if the respondent thought that President Nixon knew about the bugging in advance. The Watergate affair is clearly an unusually significant case, given the unprecedented media coverage it received. Thus, it may not be a reasonable test of Canadians' awareness of "corrupt" events in the world of politics. Also, it is doubtful if the second question provides anything more than some vague sense of the level of public cynicism or the level of understanding of the Watergate case. In any event, the results merit some attention. Firstly, while 89% of Canadians indicated that they were aware of the Watergate affair, there were interesting comparisons to be made on three fronts. (1) While there was essentially no difference between supporters of the three major parties, those who were classified as undecided or as supporters of other parties scored ten per cent lower on awareness. This would accord to some degree,

2011-07-11 11:11:11

with proposition "b" on page 171 above. (2) There were dramatic differences between English and French speaking Canadians, with the former scoring 24% higher than the latter. This may indicate the selectivity of the English and French media, more so than differences between attitudes in the two groups, but the data are insufficient to safely argue that point on empirical grounds. However, it is likely that Watergate received much more attention by the English media.

(3) There were strong differences in terms of educational differences. Awareness scores were 78% for those with public school education, 91% for those with high school and 100% for those with university education. While our student survey relates only to university students, we should then expect that they are more aware about politics than the general public and that there may be distinctions amongst these students in terms of their level within university. The literature on political behaviour is so replete with this type of observation that it seems almost trite to raise it here.

Secondly, regarding whether respondents thought Nixon knew about the bugging in advance, the same three factors can be accounted for: language, party and education. Francophones were less critical of Nixon than were Anglophones. NDP supporters were much more critical than were Liberals, Conservatives or supporters of other parties or undecideds. They were also more likely to hold opinions on the matter than supporters of the other parties or undecideds (i.e., including Liberals and Conservatives). Those with university education were more likely to hold an opinion on the issue than were persons with high school education. The latter in turn were more critical and more opinionated than those with only elementary education.

The August 1973 poll release then proffers several interesting possibilities which support some of the points already made: that language, party and education can have an important effect on attitudes and awareness (knowledge) about political corruption and that these patterns of attitudes can be seen as part of a larger, more generalized pattern of political behaviour for which the issue of corruption is but one interesting subset. Despite this observation, drawn from both the Gallup polls and from the existing literature on political behaviour,²⁴ there is a gap in the Gallup data which is troublesome. The Gallup polls rarely address themselves to nonvoters and their attitudes, whether these attitudes are directed toward corruption or other political issues. Yet, to ignore these nonvoters is to ignore a significant element of the political arena, in that political behaviour literature suggests rather strongly a connection between nonvoting, or apathy, and alienation. Moreover, it is widely suggested in political corruption literature, and this argument has been noted in earlier chapters, that there is thought to be a strong relationship between corruption, alienation and cynicism.²⁵ Thus, Gallup's data leave us short of the information one might need to make this connection empirically clearer. At best, the Gallup polls allow us to surmise or presume that corruption has great consequences for the system as a whole, largely through the link to alienation. But because the alienation linkage must remain ambiguous, due to the nature of Gallup data, this point can be taken only so far.

Consider, as an example, the last of the Canadian Watergate polls released in October 1974. The poll asked if people thought that Watergate affected only Nixon's image or if it affected the prestige of

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

the United States. The latter represents a more systemic concern and, for that reason, is probably of greater consequence to the growth of alienation and cynicism than the decline of one person's image. Respondents felt that U.S. prestige was damaged by a nearly two-to-one margin. Corruption, then, is apparently viewed as something of systemic consequence, more so by the better educated than the less educated, but consistently so across educational groups. It might be conjectured that if corruption is seen as systemic problem, and not just a problem of isolated unethical individuals, the alienating consequences will probably be more significant. What is needed then is a clearer sense of the systemic vs. personal or idiosyncratic nature of political corruption in the attitude set of Canadians.

The overall impact of the Gallup data is, despite drawbacks and shortcomings already mentioned, the provision of some very intriguing information about attitudes toward corruption. But intrigue turns to enigma because of these drawbacks and shortcomings, as the information tends to be suggestive rather than conclusive. Profundity, if it is to be achieved, must come from another source of social data. But this does not dismiss the utility of Gallup data for two purposes: one, to establish a basis upon which one might compare a survey population and, two, to provide (as has already been noted) potentially fruitful hypotheses about attitudes on corruption. These hypotheses will be summarized at the end of this chapter.

Canadian Empirical Research: Academic Sources

If the success of empirical research is measured by quantity

1970-1971

alone, then the contribution of academic sources to the study of corruption would necessarily fail. If it is measured by quality, the decision would be more difficult. The reason for this assessment is that most of the substantial work on Canadian attitudes toward corruption or its various dimensions has been devoted largely to one sub-field, party finance, and has been the product of one leading political scientist, K.Z. Paltiel. To be sure, other Canadian political scientists have addressed themselves to the issue of, or issues related to, political corruption, among them O.P. Dwivedi, Kenneth Kernaghan, Norman Ward and so on. But of these academics, only Paltiel has specifically focussed his research on matters of attitudes.²⁶

Paltiel's work, however, is not limited to attitude studies, but incorporates other elements as well, for example, reviews of the history of party finance and party finance legislation. Nevertheless, it is the attitudinal aspect of his research that is of interest here, and it provides some useful insights into the issue of corruption. The discussion which follows does not exhaust the literature on attitudes on party finance, it merely highlights a few insights from Paltiel's work as well as a major research piece by Meisel and Van Loon which was part of Paltiel's Studies in Canadian Party Finance done for the 1966 Committee on Election Expenses in Ottawa.²⁷ (Those seeking anything more than the following brief, perhaps even cursory, review should pursue the original sources).

The first point which strikes the reader of the literature on campaign finance (or party finance in general) is that the public seems extremely uninformed about the traditional process by which parties have raised, and to an extent continue to raise, funds for elections or

CONFIDENTIAL

for interim periods. Though the data are almost 20 years old, it is still instructive to find that only 20% of Canadians were aware of party fund-raising activities. The effect of regionalism was notable in this instance, as awareness increased in a more or less East to West pattern. The lowest levels of awareness were in the Atlantic provinces, with increasing awareness in Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan, which scored highest. Alberta broke the pattern by scoring lower than Ontario, but British Columbia had the second highest level of awareness.²⁸

A second striking aspect of these data is that there is a very great difference between the attitudes of candidates (elites) and the attitudes of the public (masses), on at least one major party finance issue: should tax deductions be permitted for contributions to parties or candidates? While 65% of the public said no, 64% of the candidates said yes.²⁹ Given that only one-fifth of the public was aware of party funding activities, it could be claimed that the position of the candidates was a leadership role on this issue. Yet, the point remains that there are issues upon which agreement between masses and elites will be absent. Thus, we might expect the student sample to disagree with the legislation brought down by political elites in matters of political corruption.

A third point that catches one's attention is the volatility of public opinion on party finance. The data from the 1965-66 period, which Paltiel cites from the original work of Meisel and Van Loon, shows a sharp contrast to contemporary and later data which is drawn from Gallup polls on the question of publicizing sources of party contributions. Earlier, it was noted that Gallup polls released in

CONFIDENTIAL

1964 and 1972 showed 79% of the public supporting such publicity of sources. Yet the 1965-66 data showed opposite results. Those opposed to disclosing names of contributors outnumbered supporters of that position by 48% to 42%. Those opposed to disclosure of amounts held sway by a margin of 50% to 40%.³⁰ The change from 1965-66 to 1972 is not necessarily surprising, but the change from 1964 to 1965-66 is quite fascinating indeed. Whether this direct contradiction is the result of a true shifting of public attitudes or simply an artifact of either the research questions or methods cannot be determined here. However, if the former applies, then attitudinal volatility must indeed be considered as a constraining element in any conclusions to be drawn from survey data in this field. The axiom that surveys are but a single snapshot in time should well be remembered.

Clearly, there are other questions relating to party finance which might be addressed here, but other dimensions of corruption must also be considered. It is on these other dimensions that academic research fails. At best, what one can glean from existing research are questions and analyses not unlike those available from Gallup polls. Indeed, the most fruitful of the remaining research tends to be in areas which, though related, are somewhat peripheral to the concept of corruption. I refer particularly to studies of concepts such as trust, cynicism or alienation which will be discussed below. The first order of business, however, remains an analysis, albeit necessarily brief, of research which is more central to our basic research issue.

As has been argued above, the national election surveys of recent years have not provided much evidence (at least in published form) of a concern for corruption or its various dimensions. Meisel's analysis of

SECRET

the 1968 federal election did attend to the issue of corruption to a degree, though his published analysis, appearing as Working Papers on Canadian Politics, renders only a portion of that which was contained in the raw form of his codebook.³¹ The book relates only indirectly to corruption by virtue of its inclusion of concepts such as cynicism, efficacy and honesty, while the raw data available in Meisel's codebook supply more direct evidence. However, the codebook (or codebooks, if we include the 1965 national election survey) is not as widely available as Working Papers... and, thus, must be discounted somewhat in terms of its contribution to the Canadian literature. Even so, the information contained in a raw form from the 1968 survey adds little or nothing to the Gallup poll material already discussed.

The raw information from Meisel's 1965 survey codebook is a slightly different matter. In this case, one of the curiosities noted earlier in this chapter comes to bear once again on the conceptualization of corruption. As with the Gallup polls which reflect the "invisibility" of the corruption issue when respondents are asked what issues are most important to them, the 1965 Meisel survey's first question asked what the most important problem and less than one per cent said corruption and scandal, i.e., enough to rate a mention among the issues but hardly a significant proportion. But when asked how important was corruption in government as an issue in deciding how to vote, 37.8% said it was very important and another 20.4% said it was fairly important.³² This sentiment echoes the Gallup poll released on May 29, 1965 (see Table III above) which showed more than a quarter of Canadians believing that scandals would seriously affect the Liberal's voter support. Once again, we have evidence that

201-104-1111-1111

corruption is an important issue, even though it is rarely the most important issue.

A third question in the 1965 survey asks respondents how many people "running the government" are "a little crooked" and the results were as follows: 24.0% said quite a few, 38.6% said not very many, 27.6% said hardly any, and the remaining 9.7% did not know or gave no response.³³ Compared to the Gallup polls (release dates: April 6, 1966 and May 8, 1974) discussed earlier about increasing favouritism and corruption, this question permits some snapshot sense of the absolute level of corruption at one given point in time, rather than an indefinite sense of the degree of change when the starting point is unknown. Moreover, confirmation of the Gallup poll released November 24, 1973 on conflict of interest is indirectly provided (disregarding for the moment the eight year hiatus from 1965 to 1973) in a striking, if methodologically suspect, comparison between the percentages noted here and those noted for the national response in Table IV above.

These questions from the 1965 survey are not repeated in the 1968 survey, hence the opportunity for comparison over time is lost. However, other questions worthy of brief mention were included. First, one might consider the question of cynicism.³⁴ It is interesting to note that cynicism scores were higher for Conservatives and NDP supporters than for Liberals. This finding, combined with the conclusions drawn earlier about party differences in some Gallup polls, indicates the connection between these two variables without indicating the appropriate explanation (the why?). Are these connected because cynics naturally are attracted to the NDP and Conservatives? Or does consistent support for these two parties, traditionally the "outs"

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

5

Microl

compared to the Liberals who are the "ins", create cynicism? Is the cynicism based on objective or subjective evaluations of the workings of the government, when the party in power is other than their own? There is a need to separate, if possible, the effect of party allegiance from the assessment of corruption if we are to understand how the concept is defined.

The other question worth noting relates to Meisel's "honest-dishonest" continuum of party image.³⁵ This continuum was one of many employed by Meisel, others included such word pairs as left-wing/right-wing, working class/middle class, good/bad and so on, based on the concept of semantic differentials. The respondents were to rate each of the three major parties in terms of their honesty, and in 1965 they rated the NDP the most honest, followed in order by the Conservatives and then the Liberals. In 1968, the Liberals scored highest with the remaining two parties tied for second. The differences between parties were small in 1965 and even smaller in 1968. It is interesting to note that in a series of tables where these continua were evaluated in terms of a number of socio-economic variables, the only variable to show any impact on the honesty ranking of the respondents hypothetical "ideal" (1968) party was region. All other variables displayed no impact of consequence on the image of the ideal party, an image which can be said to measure expectations. Of the five Canadian regions, Quebec and British Columbia had the highest expectations of their ideal party and Atlantic Canada had the lowest expectation. Ontario and the Prairies were in the middle of these extremes.³⁶

When these various socio-economic variables were applied to the

real parties, some differences stood out in the 1968 data. For example, while there were no sex differences regarding the two largest parties, women were more inclined to diminish the honesty of the NDP. While there were small differences between age groups in the case of the NDP and Liberals, age had a dramatic impact on the honesty rating of the Conservatives, with an increase in age leading to a kinder evaluation of the PC's. Education tended not to figure except for the NDP, who scored lower among elementary education and college educated respondents, but higher among those with high school education. Religion was a particularly effective influence on the honesty scale, though in various ways. Liberals were given high honesty scores by Catholics, somewhat lower by Anglicans, and lowest by United Church members and "others." PC's were rated highest by Anglicans and lowest by Catholics, and the NDP highest by the "others" and lowest by Catholics with Anglicans and Uniteds tied in the middle. Thus religion is closely tied to partisan identity in the case of honesty. So too is the case of ethnicity, with the highest rating for Liberals coming from the French, the highest for the PC's coming from the British and for the NDP the highest rating came from the "others". Regional variations went as expected with the strongest ratings for Liberals coming from Quebec, for the PC's from Atlantic Canada, and for the NDP from British Columbia. The distinctions based on class and on immigration (born in Canada, immigrant prior to 1945 or after) showed the least variation, yet the importance of class requires at least brief mention of its impact. The Liberals scored best among the upper class, the Conservatives best among both upper and middle and the NDP best among upper and lower. Again the differences were not as striking as in some

1968-1971

variables.³⁷

All these data are interesting and suggestive, but they are tied so closely to the notion of partisanship that it is impossible to determine if the citizen has some less subjective imagery of corruption separate from the issue of party preference. Meisel's work, then, is simply an added layer of sophistication to the Gallup polls; useful, perhaps necessary, but nevertheless insufficient for our purposes.

The 1974 election survey by Harold Clarke, Jane Jenson, Lawrence LeDuc and Jon Pammett unfortunately fails to provide much information on political corruption. This is not intended to be a criticism, since the focus of the authors was directed elsewhere, but it is merely an observation or assessment based on the needs of the literature on corruption. As in other surveys, the reason for the lack of attention may stem from the "invisibility" of the concept in the context of the issues central to the study. The respondents were asked what was the most important issue (and if any other issue was important) and corruption failed to make the list of the eleven key issues (excepting "other specific issues").³⁸ With this as a starting point, it is not surprising that corruption is ignored. Interestingly, in a comparison of respondents' key issues to those reported in the newspapers, it was noted that the newspapers mentioned patronage as a key issue three per cent of the time and election expenses two per cent of the time. Thus, while such issues may trouble the news media and political scientists, they do not seem to rank among the two most important issues for the public.³⁹ This would seem to raise a question about the influence of newspapers on the agenda-setting function of the policy process in Canada. Other than this, the Clarke study offers little to the student

of attitudes on corruption, even indirectly.

Other studies have provided some clues, however meager. Jean Laponce's survey of one British Columbia constituency in both the 1963 and 1965 federal elections showed that "scandal" can become a factor in elections from time to time and confirms some of the observations made by Gallup polls during the same period which were discussed above. Laponce found that, in the 1963 federal election, the issue of corruption or scandal simply did not register. But in the 1965 election, the issue of "scandals" came to the fore, with more than 14% of all respondents mentioning it as an important issue. Conservatives were the most likely to mention scandal as an issue, followed in descending order by Social Credit, NDP and Liberal supporters. Even Liberals were concerned, however, with 10% of them naming scandals as important in the campaign. Indeed, the issue of scandals superseded all international problems, unemployment, and taxes in public concern. It ran "neck-and-neck" with the "issue" of French Canada and only trailed such issues as medicare, pensions, majority government and education, despite the fact that the question did not prompt or cue respondents on any issue.⁴⁰ This last point is particularly unusual in Canadian research.

Another interesting facet of Laponce's survey is that the 1965 poll reflects a similar change in the attention given to scandal by the print media, a direct contrast to the 1974 national survey by Clarke et al. Disregarding the size of headlines, scandals ranked first in the number of headlines devoted to it as an issue in one Vancouver newspaper and third for another. It failed to rank in the top five for either newspaper in the 1963. When weighted for size, the scandal

headlines failed to rate in the top five for either newspaper. Thus, we have conflicting evidence of the effect of newspapers in the placing of corruption on the policy-agenda for voters, though it should be said that even in Laponce's study, media emphasis seemed to outweigh public emphasis.⁴¹

In the scarce literature on Canadian attitudes toward corruption, it is sometimes necessary to rely on peripheral concepts to provide clues. Such is the case in a study of regional political cultures in Canada done by Richard Simeon and David J. Elkins, published in 1974.⁴² Simeon and Elkins employed data drawn from the 1965 and 1968 election studies by Meisel to develop some important observations about the place of the concept of trust in our cultural attitude sets. The concept of trust, as operationalized by Simeon and Elkins, included one question specifically directed at the "crookedness" of politicians, though other elements included such considerations as fairness, trusting government to do what is right, trusting the intelligence of members of government, etc. The first conclusion of relevance to this thesis is that the authors found (in the 1968 data) trust to be differentiated between regions (provinces), with trust scores lowest in the Maritimes, Quebec-French, non-Quebec French and Alberta. British Columbia and Manitoba scored highest. This pattern persisted even when the question about "crookedness" was isolated from the more peripheral elements of the trust scores. Moreover, region was not the only factor which led to differential trust scores; class, education and party each had their effect. Working class respondents were more likely to have low trust scores, higher education meant higher trust scores, and Social Credit supporters scored lowest on trust as well, while Liberals

scored highest. These relationships held, to a great extent, across all provinces.⁴³

One author of the 1974 study, Elkins, joined with Donald Blake and Richard Johnston to undertake a survey of British Columbians which resulted in a conference paper presented in 1980 entitled, "Who Trusts Whom To Do What?"⁴⁴ This study added two new dimensions to our understanding of attitudes toward corruption which, except for the province-by-province breakdown, cannot be said of the 1974 study. First, the 1980 British Columbia survey found that nearly 86% of respondents (if the authors' data is recalculated to eliminate missing or undecided answers) identified no difference between politicians in Ottawa and those in Victoria. Of the remainder who did perceive differences, about 10% favoured Victoria and about 4% favoured Ottawa. Given the rhetoric of provincialism in Canada (to use a "loaded" term), one might have expected an even stronger pro-Victoria attitude. A second feature of this research is that those respondents described as having more severe ratings on a moral rectitude scale were more trustful of government than those whose rating was listed as flexible in moral rectitude. One might have expected the opposite relationship, unless one believes that governments have objectively warranted trust even amongst those with the most severe moral standards. Even if this were so, why would those with flexible standards be less trusting in government? The authors had no answer to this apparent paradox, though they wrote of it and attempted to examine it through a connection to the more stringent moral attitudes of Social Credit supporters who also supported the government in power in Victoria. The analysis showed this to be an inappropriate explanation.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, these two

facets of the attitudinal dimension of corruption are quite intriguing in that they suggest one path for future research, perceived differences of federal and provincial levels, and one path that might not bear fruit and to be avoided, a connection to some generalized notion of moral rectitude.

The overall impact of the academic studies referred to in this section is again, like the data from Gallup polls, to raise a number of interesting possibilities, suggestive of further research directions. Hypotheses emerge, but the knowledge that one can glean from these data is spotty and unsystematic. Certainly, the fact that corruption has not been a major focus of empirical, attitudinal research has meant that what we have now is a scattered, piecemeal collection of largely unrelated observations. From such a background many interesting questions remain unanswered. How does the public define corruption? What kinds of corruption does the public feel are common? Are certain kinds of corruption more important than others, etc.? Despite able efforts, unless corruption receives more direct and complete attention of researchers, the situation will remain as is. But breakthroughs, even if largely exploratory and experimental, are beginning to emerge in American political science. To these few examples of comprehensive and substantial explorations into attitudes toward corruption we will now turn our attention.

Exploratory American Research

By referring to the exploratory nature of American research in this field, I do not mean to argue that all American research consists

of this rather inconclusive approach to understanding attitudes toward corruption. Indeed, there have been some more or less "standard" research efforts which mirror some of the Canadian research already discussed. However, in the main, it is the more exploratory or experimental research that is of interest here, as the standard American studies will basically use the same approaches and variables as are used in Canadian studies; using different samples from different populations would be the most interesting element in a review of these less exploratory analyses.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, interesting observations can be made from these studies, and they confirm either the conclusions or the suspicions raised by Canadian data. The effect of corruption (usually Watergate) seems to be to reduce political trust among both adults and children, hence an increase in cynicism. Trust in authority declines in reaction to corrupt events of special notoriety. The impact of corrupt events may have only temporary impact and reflect largely on the perpetrators rather than be generalized to the entire system. The list of findings goes on, and the discussion of Watergate alone — in terms of empirical studies of attitudes — could constitute a chapter in itself. It suffices to say that Watergate spurred a great deal of American research, some of which was novel and may have application to research into Canadian attitudes.

From the comparatively vast literature on attitudes toward corruption in America, five studies seem to have particularly interesting aspects that might be useful to a Canadian study. One of these does not measure attitudes in any direct sense, but through indirect means it offers very forceful evidence that charges of corruption do not necessarily change the attitudes of voters toward

those candidates alleged to be guilty of corruption. Peters and Welch⁴⁷ found, in a study of the impact of corruption charges on partisan votes and on voter turnout, that those who were so charged were disinclined to resign (only 2 resigned out of 80 such cases in U.S. House of Representatives elections from 1968 to 1978). Only 10% chose not to run again, 6% were defeated in a primary, 20% were defeated in the general election and the remaining 61% were victorious in the general Congressional election.⁴⁸ To be sure, the authors were able to discover some impact of corruption on voter support, but when analyzed in terms of other variables such as seniority, the effect of the overall election result, etc., the results were inconsistent. In those cases where "serious" corruption was charged, the negative effect of these charges depended on the type of charge (i.e., morals charges had a very negative effect but conflict of interest charges had a positive effect) and the party represented (Democrats were negatively affected by all types of charges except conflict of interest while Republicans fared much more successfully). Even seniority in the House seemed to be able to restrain the effectiveness of a corruption charge, with more senior Congressman showing a greater "cushion" against the negative effects of such charges.⁴⁹ The impact of such charges on voter interest was reflected in an overall increase in turnout, especially for those cases deemed "serious" by the authors.⁵⁰ It would seem that corruption does have the ability to spur interest in elections, a point which might cause some satisfaction for those we have identified as "functionalists" earlier.

Peters and Welch caution readers, however, about the tentative nature of their data, consisting as it does of a very small number of

cases (N=81). Yet, the data are suggestive. The intuitive sense that charges of corruption may be weighed against other positive attributes of a candidate would seem to be supported by these findings. Yet, this weighing process does not necessarily offset the entire negative impact of the charges, as lack of seniority (a crucial political variable in American Congressional politics) or party preference (e.g., the "coattail" effect of the presidential candidate) might be a constraining factor. The effect of party preference has once again emerged as a key consideration, and one which clouds one's sense of how corruption is conceptualized by the public. Do they see this concept only in partisan terms? Can they separate partisan considerations from the concept, itself? Peters and Welch cannot answer this type of question from their data source, but they do show, in a novel and graphic way, the practical consequences of the partisanship factor in attitudes on corruption — the effect on elections.

The remaining four studies do, in fact, attend to the study of attitudes in direct, albeit in some unconventional, ways. One underlying thread which seems to wind its way through each of these pieces of research is that conventional research sources and research data failed to provide sufficient understanding of the concept of corruption, its attitudinal dimensions and implications. Three of the four concentrate on the attitudes of public officials and only one addresses the attitudes of the public. Yet, each has something of consequence to offer students of public attitudes.

The one study which investigates public (as opposed to officials') attitudes is perhaps the most experimental in that it examines a very restricted sample of undergraduate students at one American university

by means of a computer-based election simulation.⁵¹ The experiment included information about corruption among other types of information which were supplied for each of two hypothetical candidates. The other types of information included party, experience, issue stance on business and the Vietnam war, and even a hypothetical poll showing one or the other candidate in the lead. The researchers concluded that there is a trading process at work in the minds of the voter which helps to account for support received by corrupt candidates. That is, if the candidate shares the same issue position as the voter, the candidate's alleged corruption is more likely to be overlooked. Party preference, unlike issue agreement (with agreement on Vietnam the more important influence of the two tested issues), seemed to have little effect however. The overall result, then, was that corruption is but one factor in the voting decision, but an important one. And, it was part of a calculus of voting in which it became more significant as issues were less clear and less able to differentiate voters. The upshot of this research for our purposes is that the importance of corruption, as one of several key issues, is confirmed. Further, its importance among issues apparently will increase as issue differences become less salient or clear. Hence, its significance seems conditional.

The remaining three studies, published between 1975 and 1982, relate to public officials, be they elected or appointed. Common to each is the use of scenarios, of varying complexity and specificity, to establish what attitudes might be regarding specific types of corruption and whether any of a number of variables might be useful in helping to explain why people (i.e., officials) hold these attitudes.

CONFIDENTIAL

The most grandiose of these scenarios may be found in a methodologically inelegant study by Sheldon Steinberg, directed at local administrative officials.⁵² To be fair, Steinberg's purpose was not to provide a methodologically refined research article, but to use the scenarios as an educational device for instructing meetings of local public officials. Nevertheless, the pedagogical device has research value. The scenarios were "discriminating", i.e. they provoked varying degrees of agreement, such that there were some responses which could be said to display a "consensus", while others showed a noticeable split in opinion. Four scenarios recorded agreements of 82% or more, that is where 82% or more had taken the same yes or no position compared to 18% or less opposing. In four other cases, agreement was much less complete, with ratios of 57/43 or less, indicating a lack of consensus. The complex scenarios, consisting of two to three paragraphs and perhaps 150 words, had only one-dimensional responses — yes or no. But they seem to suggest that the use of such devices is salient to respondents, though the author presented no indication of a failure to respond rate. (A high no response rate would indicate a possible lack of salience). Using these data for comparative purposes would be difficult because of the unusually detailed scenario descriptions, yet where it is possible to do so with great caution, the results could be instructive.

The last two studies to be considered take a decidedly more academic approach than has Steinberg, yet each employs a series of scenarios (sometimes called items, but normally consisting of at least one sentence) in order to examine a number of aspects of the concept of corruption. A 1977 study, again by Welch and Peters,⁵³ used brief,

one-sentence items or scenarios and asked over 400 state legislators in the United States to evaluate each item in terms of three dimensions. These were: (1) whether the respondent thought the described act was corrupt, (2) whether the respondent felt most other public officials would condemn the act, and (3) whether the respondent thought the act would be condemned by the public at large. As in the case with Steinberg's study, the scenarios, brief as they were, were able to delineate varying degrees of consensus or dissensus, but this time along three dimensions. Interestingly, the respondents felt the public would be more likely to condemn these events (promising an ambassadorship in return for campaign donations, a mayor having a city crew pave his driveway, etc.) than they would themselves. They also tended to think that other officials would be more permissive than themselves.⁵⁴

Welch and Peters examined a number of variables for their impact on an overall "corruption score" which indicated the respondent's level of tolerance or intolerance for corruption. They found differences due to region, size of hometown, sex, previous office held, years of legislative service, and ideology. Given that the study proposed in this thesis does not have legislators as its relevant population, clearly not all of these factors have application to the Canadian students survey. Nevertheless, the findings of the Welch and Peters study do confirm some of our earlier observations. (The Mancuso thesis, mentioned earlier, applies the Welch and Peters study to the Canadian context, but this author received a copy of it too late for analysis here. It appears to be a significant contribution to the field.) Unfortunately, Welch and Peters did not pursue finer points,

leaving the reader to speculate as to what might have been done with the legislators' data. In the final analysis, we have yet another case where the data and the method are suggestive, but anything more substantial must come from elsewhere.

One study which does devote great time and energy to the topic of corruption, and builds on the concept of scenarios as a useful methodological tool, predates the other American research to which references have been made thus far. It is another example of research focussed on public officials, analyzing the attitudes of United States Congressmen. Edmund Beard and Stephen Horn employed a small sample of 43 Congressmen in a study which presented to the respondents a total of 44 scenarios or items describing events or behaviours of dubious ethical propriety.⁵⁷ For each of these scenarios, the respondents were to indicate the degree to which they felt the described behaviour was ethical or unethical and whether the behaviour was practised by most, many, few or none of the members of Congress. The items concerned, for the most part, what we have defined elsewhere as conflict of interest, though other dimensions such as nepotism are also included. The data were not analyzed in terms of independent variables, hence the treatment by Beard and Horn is, for all intents and purposes, purely descriptive. However, there has been enough of this type of bivariate analysis done in other studies, notably by Welch and Peters, to enable one to overlook this weakness.

The fascinating aspect of the Beard and Horn study, then, is not in the analysis so much as in the nature of the methodological tool. An example of the scenarios used includes the following: "A major industry located in the constituency makes available at no charge its

private plane and pilot whenever the legislator has speaking engagements in the state."⁵⁸ The response to the scenario was in terms of the two previously mentioned dimensions (ethicality and frequency), both of which were based on modifications of a typical Likert scale. The modified form consisted of only four points rather than the normal five, with the natural mid-point being eliminated. That is, for the judgment of the practice the possible responses were: (1) clearly unethical, (2) probably unethical, (3) probably ethical, or (4) clearly ethical. For the extent of the practice, another four-point scale was employed.

With 44 different scenarios and two dimensions of responses to each, a great deal of differentiation and gradation is possible. It is unfortunate that more effort at analysis was not undertaken by the authors, yet there are still enough data to permit interesting comparisons and, more importantly, to inspire others to incorporate scenarios and scales as means for developing a more complex understanding of the concept of corruption. The Beard and Horn study, like the other American studies already discussed, is notable for what it suggests and inspires, especially in regard to method, rather than for the conclusive nature of its findings. Nevertheless, the findings are not without their own interest, as it is this study which first begins to sort out a sense of "ranking" amongst various forms of corruption in terms of both the ethical judgment of the practice and the extent of the practice, as shown in Table VI. The scenarios were grouped into eight different types of items. The ranking of each form or group permits a comparison which tests one's intuitive understanding of the concept of corruption, though the authors seemed to have missed

TABLE VI: RANK-ORDERING OF CORRUPTION TYPES AS TO JUDGMENT AND EXTENT OF PRACTICE (Adapted from Beard and Horn)

TYPE OF UNETHICAL BEHAVIOUR	RANK, MOST UNETHICAL	RANK, LEAST COMMON
Use of staff for partisan purposes	1	3
Personal use of campaign funds	2	2
Favours from private interests	3	4
Nepotism	4	1
Insertions in Congressional Record favouring campaign contributors*	5	5
Promoting personal interests that coincide with constituent interests	6	7
Ties with law firms	7	6
Use of campaign funds for constituent service	8	8

Note: * Refers to Congressmen mentioning contributors in a speech to render free publicity.

this opportunity. The intuitive conceptualization which springs to mind, given the nature of the data, is that those activities which are thought to be the most unethical would also be the least commonly practised. Beyond a visual comparison of the data in Table VI, one can apply a rank order correlation to these data. By calculating Spearman's rho ($r_s = .81$) one discovers that there is a very strong correlation between the two rankings, thus confirming intuition.⁵⁹

The Beard and Horn study gives us perhaps the best indication of what could be done to explore the notion of dimensions of corruption. If we add this simple conclusion to points made earlier, the overall effect is that the existing literature is, in the Canadian experience, descriptive, and in the American experience, analytical but very exploratory. In the final analysis, the lack of conclusive findings or

methods leaves the researcher with the necessity of amalgamating previous research for both suggested hypotheses and potentially useful methods. The methodology that appears in the following chapter, then, represents some degree of this amalgamation or synthesizing process. In the final section of this chapter, the hypotheses which are suggested by the foregoing discussion (and that are relevant within the constraints of this research effort) will be delineated.

Conclusion: Hypotheses Suggested by Existing Research

The preceding review of empirical research suggests a number of hypotheses having varying degrees of relevance to this study. Those which are the most appropriate and for which some analysis is made possible within the constraints of this modest research effort are listed below. The only significance to the order of presentation is that it is roughly consistent with the order in which these appear in some form in the discussion above. Since there is a degree of overlap between some of the aforementioned studies, this ordering cannot be exact.

1. Except for unusual circumstances, corruption is not the major issue or even one of the four or five key issues for the public, though it may be an issue of secondary importance.
2. Various socio-economic and political variables help to differentiate people in terms of their response to the issue of corruption, and the following variables are linked with differences in perceptions of corruption: party preference, age, levels of participation (e.g., nonvoting), degree of

partisanship, level of knowledge or awareness, education, socio-economic, class, region, and mother tongue.

3. There are a number of dimensions to corruption (distinct from the types of corruption) which seem to be present in the thinking of citizens. There seems to be some distinction as to levels of government, political parties, and even different political systems (e.g., U.S. versus Canada) in terms of the degree to which actions may be seen as corrupt.
4. There is implicit in any evaluation of actions as corrupt a calculation based on trade-offs, meaning that many people might tolerate corruption in order to realize some other social or personal benefit. For example, those who prize action on unemployment or other such issue may be less willing to condemn corrupt behaviour, not because they do not feel it is unethical, but because they have higher priorities.
5. There are dimensions to corruption that are understood by respondents and which allow one to differentiate between types of corruption, the rank-ordering of these types in terms of their degree of corruption, the frequency of their occurrence, etc. Moreover, it is possible to establish whether any sort of consensus exists in these evaluations.

Having presented these hypotheses, let us now turn to a detailed discussion of the methodology to be employed in our survey. At the same time, let us keep in mind the exploratory level at which research into attitudes toward corruption currently exists and the need for more complex information to delineate some of the concerns underlying the hypotheses noted above.

NOTES

1. K.Z. Paltiel, "Contrasts Among the Several Canadian Political Finance Cultures" in A.J. Heidenheimer, ed. Comparative Political Finance (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1970), pp. 107-132.
2. John Meisel, Working Papers on Canadian Politics (2nd enlarged edition, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1975); Harold D. Clarke et al., Political Choice in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979). Meisel's study was based on a national election survey of the 1968 election, while the study by Clarke et al. took place at the time of the 1974 federal election. These are the last two national election surveys conducted in Canada by political scientists. Of course, polling organizations such as the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO) or le Centre de Recherche d'Opinion Publique (CROP) have continued their polling during national elections, but these are much less elaborate than academic surveys.
3. Mildred A. Schwartz, Public Opinion and Canadian Identity (Scarborough, Ont.: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1967).
4. J.A. Laponce, People vs. Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), ch. 5; Michael B. Stein, The Dynamics of Right-Wing Protest (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), ch. 5; and Maureen Mancuso, "Attitudes of Canadian Legislators Toward Political Corruption: An Empirical Analysis" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Carleton University, 1984).
5. Gallup Report, February 23, 1974. (All Gallup polls will be identified by the release date of the Gallup Report).
6. Gallup Report, October 8, 1966 and October 15, 1966.
7. Gallup Report, November 19, 1966 and November 23, 1966. An earlier poll (Gallup Report, June 12, 1965) placed a category identified as "too many scandals, corruption" third in the overall ranking with nine per cent of the respondents specifying this criticism, with the same question being used. However, this

question was not applied to the Conservatives.

8. On Canadian attitudes see Peter Bruton, John Downing and Fraser Kelly, "Graft Never Hurt a Politician at the Polls," Maclean's, (January 25, 1964), pp. 18-19, 31-32, also reprinted in K.M. Gibbons and D.C. Rowat, eds., Political Corruption in Canada: Cases, Causes and Cures (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), pp. 225-230. A similar pattern is said to exist in the United States, in the view of one author, as a result of a societal attitude which places blame for corruption on the nature of "system" rather than on the individual who commits the unethical act. See Robert Lane, Political Ideology (New York: The Free Press, 1962); ch. 21, "The Lost Sense of Evil: Low-Tension Morality and Low-Tension Politics."
9. Gallup Report, May 22, 1965.
10. Gallup Report, October 13, 1965.
11. Gallup Report, July 28, 1965.
12. Gallup Report, May 29, 1965.
13. Gallup Report, May 7, 1966 and May 11, 1966.
14. See Peter C. Newman, The Distemper of Our Times (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968), pp. 389-406. An abbreviated version of Newman's work appear in Gibbons and Rowat, op. cit., pp. 104-106.
15. Regarding the first issue see Gallup Report, March 29, 1984; March 29, 1978; and March 20, 1974. On the second issue there is Gallup Report, January 16, 1974; May 27, 1972; and November 6, 1968. For the third issue see Gallup Report, May 24, 1972 and September 2, 1964.
16. Gallup Report, May 24, 1972 and September 2, 1964.
17. Gallup Report, November 14, 1964.
18. Gallup Report, November 24, 1973. The full question read as follows:

The federal government recently prepared guidelines for

cabinet ministers to clarify and prevent conflict of interest — that is personal profit or gain resulting from private government information or plans. Do you think this 'conflict of interest' problem is very serious, quite serious or not too serious among federal government representatives?

19. These propositions are drawn from the work of Lester Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 66, 65 and 72 respectively. Milbrath's book is a compendium of social science research on political behaviour. Canadian studies have, as a rule, paid relatively little attention to nonvoters or independents, at least in a way that would apply here.
20. Gallup Report, April 6, 1966 and May 8, 1974. A similar series of polls released December 1, 1982; October 26, 1977 and September 4, 1968 asked a more generalized question: "do you think that (morals/honesty/happiness/peace of mind) are improving or deteriorating?" The morals and honesty aspects are peripherally related to our main theme, but cannot logically be said to specify political morals or honesty. However, it is interesting to observe that cynicism increased over the three polls and that, in 1968, Canadians were less cynical than the British and the Americans, who were the most cynical of the three. Similarly, in response to a question which asked respondents how satisfied they were with the "honesty and standards of behaviour" in the country (released December 15, 1975 and March 11, 1964), Canadians showed a slight decrease over time. Again, they were more satisfied than citizens of the U.K. or the U.S. and ranked third highest in satisfaction among eight north Atlantic countries. There were mild differences in the Canadian poll between community sizes with rural respondents the least satisfied, small town residents the most satisfied and large city residents (cities over 100,000) in the middle.
21. Gallup Report, August 4, 1979 and September 21, 1974. Some of the groups and institutions in the 1979 poll were similar to those in the 1976 and 1982 polls, ibid.

22. Gallup Report, September 29, 1976 and October 2, 1982.
23. Gallup Report, August 11, 1973; December 15, 1973; August 8, 1973 and October 5, 1974. A poll referred to as taken in May 1974 by the October 5, 1974 release was itself never released.
24. There are, of course, many works other than Milbrath's that might be cited here, but space permits only a few examples. Robert Lane, Political Life (New York: Free Press, 1959); Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (Abridged edition, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964); and Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, Participation in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).
25. Milbrath, op. cit., pp. 71-72, 78-81.
26. K.Z. Paltiel, "Contrasts...", op. cit.; Paltiel, Political Party Financing in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970), ch. 6, titled, "Public Attitudes and Candidates' Reactions"; Paltiel, Jill McCalla Vickers and Raoul Barbe, "Candidate Attitudes Toward the Control of Election Expenses," in K.Z. Paltiel et al., Studies in Canadian Party Finance, Committee on Election Expenses (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966), pp. 459-594.
27. John Meisel and Richard Van Loon, "Canadian Attitudes to Election Expenses," in K.Z. Paltiel et al., Studies..., ibid., pp. 23-146. This is a very comprehensive study from which Paltiel draws several of his key observations.
28. Meisel and Van Loon, cited in Paltiel, Political Party Financing..., ibid., p. 95.
29. Ibid., pp. 106-107.
30. Ibid., p. 106.
31. Meisel, Working Papers..., op. cit. The codebooks for both the 1968 and the 1965 election surveys are available. Reference will be made to them when items which they contain are not found in Meisel's book.
32. Codebook of the 1965 national election survey, questions 1 and 7-F (variables 0008 and 0031 respectively).
33. Ibid., question 11-A (variable 0037).

34. Meisel, Working Papers..., op. cit., appendix, Table VII.
35. Ibid., pp 68-114.
36. See Table III and Chart I, pp. 70-71, on the ranking of all continua by all respondents, as well as Table XVIII, p. 106. I am using differences of greater than 0.1 as consequential.
37. See Tables VI, VIII, X, XII, XIV, XVIII and XX, pp. 85-109.
38. Clarke et al., op. cit., pp. 246, 408-409.
39. Ibid., p. 285.
40. Laponce, op. cit., pp.. 79-80.
41. Ibid., p. 17.
42. Richard Simeon and David J. Elkins, "Regional Policial Cultures in Canada," Canadian Journal of Political Science 7 (September, 1974), 397-437.
43. Ibid., Table IV, p. 410; Table XI, p. 422; Table XII, p. 423.
44. David Elkins, Donald Blake and Richard Johnston, "Who Trusts Whom To Do What?," a paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association meetings, Montreal, June, 1980. The observation about Social Credit supporters is also confirmed to a degree by Stein, op. cit., p. 140.
45. Ibid., Table 1, p. 3; Table 14, p. 21 and discussion on pp. 21-22.
46. By comparison to Canada, the American literature on attitudes is quite vast, even if Gallup polls are excluded. A few examples might suffice: Gladys Lang and Kurt Lang, "Polling on Watergate: The Battle for Public Opinion," Public Opinion Quarterly, 44 (1980), 530-547; Richard Josly, "Adolescent Attitudes toward the Political Process: Political Learning in the midst of Turmoil," Polity, 9 (Spring, 1977), 373-383; Jack Dennis and Carol Webster, "Children's Images of the President and of Government in 1962 and 1974," American Politics Quarterly, 3 (October, 1975), 386-405.
47. John G. Peters and Susan Welch, "The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections," American Political Science Review, 74 (September, 1980), 697-708.

48. Ibid., adapted from Table 1, p. 703.
49. Ibid., Tables 3 and 4, pp. 705 and 707; and on seniority, p. 704.
50. Ibid., Table 5, p. 707.
51. Barry S. Rundquist, Gerald S. Strom and John G. Peters, "Corrupt Politicians and their Electoral Support: Some Empirical Observations," American Political Science Review, 71 (September, 1977), 954-963.
52. Sheldon Steinberg, "Are You an Ethical Employee?" Public Management (May, 1982) 20-22. About seven of his ten scenarios could be described as conflict of interest under our typology.
53. Susan Welch and John G. Peters, "Attitudes of U.S. State Legislators Toward Political Corruption: Some Preliminary Findings," Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2 (November, 1977), 445-463.
54. Ibid., Table 1, p. 453.
55. Ibid., Table 3, p. 457.
56. Maureen Mancuso, op. cit.
57. Edmund Beard and Stephen Horn, Congressional Ethics: The View from the House (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975).
58. Ibid., Table 3-5, p. 39.
59. Ibid., adapted from Table 2-2, p. 10.

CHAPTER SEVEN: SURVEY METHODOLOGY

The inadequacy of existing empirical data in Canada regarding the concept of political corruption was discussed in the preceding chapter. It is clear, then, that a reasonable understanding of public attitudes toward corruption requires greater depth and breadth of information than is currently available through the secondary analysis of existing research. Hence, a survey was designed to probe these attitudes in a more direct and more complex fashion. The methodology of this survey will be outlined in this chapter, with attention to the following aspects: first, the survey sample and the accompanying problem of generalization from it; second, the questionnaire design; and, third, the statistical analysis to be employed.

The Survey Sample and Problems of Generalization

Clearly, the most effective sample for most social research is a probabilistic (random) sample along the lines employed in national election surveys such as the 1974 National Election Survey conducted by Clarke, Jenson, LeDuc and Pammett, and published as Political Choice in Canada in 1979. The Gallup Polls published periodically in daily newspapers by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion are another example of probabilistic national surveys. What both of these surveys have in common, among other things, is heavy cost in time and especially money. Samples of this type require substantial resources which are not, as a rule, readily available. The lack of support for such massive and costly samples is shown by the lack of any national

election study for the 1979 election. Thus, the social science researcher is confronted by financial reality, which means that less elegant and scientifically rigorous research strategies must be pursued. This gives rise to terms such as convenience samples, accidental samples or availability samples. Each of these terms refers to a non-random or non-probabilistic sample which creates certain questions about the sample's representativeness and, hence, its generalizability.

In essence, non-probabilistic samples require certain trade-offs, the most critical of which is trading off some confidence in one's generalizations in exchange for either convenience (cost or time) or, as Selltiz et al. put it, developing "ideas".¹ The notion of an idea survey is an interesting one and argues that some samples might be pursued in a non-probabilistic fashion because the general population is either inappropriate due to a lack of knowledge about a subject (say, neurosurgery) or because the research is exploratory and, hence, we need to determine whether or not the research instrument in question is interesting enough to warrant an expensive and time-consuming national probabilistic sample. Thus, such surveys are "purposive", even though non-probabilistic, in that they seek out those with appropriate experience (hence the term "experience surveys") or tread relatively new ground and require a novel approach. In the latter case, where the research is exploratory or formulative, less rigorous samples may be employed, but with caution and with an eye to future research.

For this dissertation, a sample of university students enrolled in undergraduate and graduate political science courses was used. This

sample was admittedly chosen, in large part, for its convenience or availability. However, it must also be added that university students in political science courses were also chosen because they might provide "ideas" or "experience", given their interest in politics. The assumption at work, then, is that these students should be more knowledgeable about politics and more sensitive to issues raised in the questionnaire than average members of the public. This means that if the measures (techniques) included in the questionnaire are insufficient to elicit interesting reactions from these students, they would be even less likely to do so with a less educated and less politically-oriented sample. Given the almost novel technique used here for discerning attitudes toward corruption, this consideration was given considerable weight as well.

Student surveys, as well as other types of convenience surveys, have played a traditional role in the development of social science research, especially for exploratory research dealing with notions such as attitude and opinion development where the process (e.g., complexity, intensity, range, etc.) is more important to the study than the survey sample's representativeness of the total population. Clearly, some studies require students by definition, examples being rife in political socialization research. Consider Hess and Torney's The Development of Political Attitudes in Children, where the authors employed a non-probabilistic sample. They argued, "Our aim was to examine the process of political socialization rather than to obtain precise estimates of the level of already identified attitudes in the elementary school population."²

Another example of a non-probabilistic student sample can be found

in Jon Pammett's work on the political socialization of school children in Kingston, Ontario. While Hess and Torney's American study did draw from eight different cities in various regions of the country, Pammett's focus on a single city raises a more pressing problem regarding its generalizability. However, Pammett did rightly caution against both over-generalizing and, its reverse problem, assuming no generalizability at all. He contended:

It is not the intention here to claim that the sample of Kingston children is representative of Canada as a whole.... Nevertheless, from time to time in this analysis inferences are drawn about patterns in Canada as a whole. These inferences should be treated as hypotheses for debate and future study and not as definite conclusions in themselves.³

With Pammett's caveat in mind, we can see the value in studies drawn from populations which do not necessarily reflect the entire society we wish to generalize about or for which we wish to draw inferences. Such generalizations are, at best, tentative or suggestive and constitute imprecise, though important, evidence for our current hypotheses. Additionally, as noted above, this evidence may lead to further research hypotheses which could be tested with more rigorous samples. This approach is common to political science research, as the following examples illustrate.

The classic American voting study The People's Choice, first published in 1944 and still reprinted a generation later, was based on a probabilistic sample. However, it was a sample of one Ohio county. As the authors said, concerning the lack of representativeness, "we were studying the development of votes and not their distribution."⁴ (Italics in original.) This did not dissuade the authors from drawing inferences for all American voters, though these were apparently meant to be less than definitive conclusions. Unfortunately, the book could

be clearer on this point. Similarly, Harmon Ziegler's study of American teachers uses a restricted, though random, sample of teachers from a single state, Oregon, from which he then generalizes to all American teachers.⁵ However, Ziegler is not trying to estimate population parameters, as one might in a pre-election opinion poll which attempts to predict electoral outcomes. Instead, he is concerned with perceptions, experiences, and predispositions. He is not unaware of the generalization issue, but resolves it for his purposes by comparing his sample to a national sample devised by another political scientist, M. Kent Jennings.

Canadian examples of non-probabilistic or restricted samples also abound; Pammett's is not the only study to use this approach. Socialization research frequently employs this "availability" technique. A massive survey of more than 5000 children conducted by Carroll, Higgins and Whittington used classroom samples in 1971, though they were careful to provide samples from all regions of Canada.⁶ Similarly, we have the example of Jean Pierre Richert's study of socialization among Quebec school children, where a nonprobabilistic sample drawn from three school districts was used to generalize to "most Canadian children".⁷ In this case, caution was thrown to the wind and the data limitations were not taken into account in the analysis of his findings, at least not as directly as they should have been.

A final example is of particular interest because it relates directly to the subject of political corruption and to the problem of non-representative samples. A recent study by Runquist, Strom and Peters employed a computer-based experiment (a simulated public opinion

poll) to determine whether or not voters make trade-offs when confronted by candidates who are charged with corruption.⁸ That is, do voters excuse corrupt behaviour if the politician in question shares their issue-orientations? The answer noted in earlier chapters was yes — voters may disregard corruption if the candidate can be supported on other policy grounds. The sample utilized by these authors is more directly the concern here: students in introductory political science courses at a single institution, the University of Illinois. Essentially, no attention at all was given to the limitations of generalizability, yet the research was significant enough to warrant publication in the American Political Science Review because of its novel and ground-breaking nature, or so it would seem. Exploratory studies of this nature, then, are not necessarily subjected to the most rigorous standards for generalization.

The argument supporting the use of non-probabilistic samples is clearly not made from preference, for probabilistic samples are obviously superior. The supposition that such samples are to be avoided at all costs, however, is demonstrably extreme. Less rigorous methods may, of necessity, be utilized if certain conditions pertain: the research is novel or exploratory, the estimation of population parameters (e.g., election predictions) is not at issue, and if one is diligent in being cautious in generalizing from the evidence (e.g., by comparing one's convenience sample to broader samples.) Care must be taken to avoid over-generalization, and certainly there is special reason for prudence when attempting to generalize from a non-random student survey to the general population. By exercising care one can use such a sample to discern the potential for further testing of

hypotheses which are tentatively supported here. In this context statistical analysis does not require probabilistic sampling. In a non-probabilistic sample statistical techniques become a means, not for definitive conclusions of causality or association, but for provisional comparisons (of central tendencies, correlations, etc.) suggesting future research possibilities. Selltiz et al. refer to the use of statistics such as significance tests, in this case of nonrandom sampling, as "guidelines" for the evaluation of one's findings. They urge caution, to be sure, but not "a spirit of agnosticism that would prohibit anyone from coming to any conclusions."⁹

The sample itself is, as noted earlier, a student sample consisting of persons enrolled in political science courses at five different universities in Canada. The courses range from first year to graduate courses, in order to introduce a broad age span, and were chosen by each participating professor.¹⁰ The five universities were chosen to represent each of the five major regions of Canada: The Atlantic Provinces (Memorial), Quebec (Laval); Ontario (Carleton), the Prairies (Winnipeg) and British Columbia (U.B.C.). This permits the investigation of regional differences which are crucial to the hypotheses thus far generated. The questionnaires were administered in the spring of 1982. The number of responses from each university is listed in the chart below.

TABLE VII: DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE BY REGION

<u>REGION</u>	<u>UNIVERSITY</u>	<u>RESPONDENTS</u>	<u>% OF TOTAL</u>
Atlantic Provinces	Memorial (Nfld.)	68	22.9
Quebec	Laval	33	11.1
Ontario	Carleton	72	24.2
Prairies	Winnipeg	84	28.3
British Columbia	U.B.C.	40	13.5
		297	100.0%

The questionnaires were administered in a group situation; thus certain advantages and disadvantages pertain. The advantages include: low cost, high return rate, high control of the response situation, relative ease for lengthy questionnaires. Open-ended questions are moderately successful under such conditions. The anonymity perceived by the respondents is better than under face-to-face interview situations, hence frankness is thought to be more readily forthcoming. The drawbacks are also notable: the need to be temperate in generalizing because of the representativeness problem in this particular sample (and not uncommon to other group surveys) and the inability to probe for further clarification or elucidation of respondents' answers. This is of obvious consequence in open-ended questions, though for this survey only the occupation item was noticeably in need of occasional probing.¹¹

The Questionnaire

The student questionnaire employs a number of standard items, common to many attitude and opinion surveys. In addition, a somewhat novel and innovative element has been designed specifically for this study. The questionnaire is reprinted in its entirety in the appendix. English

and French versions of the questionnaire were produced, the latter being sent to Laval University. Because the provincial party systems are not identical, changes were made in one item in the questionnaires for Laval and U.B.C. to reflect the regionalized importance of the Parti Quebecois and the Social Credit party. Except for these very minor adjustments, the appendix represents the exact questionnaire answered by nearly 300 university students. Each section of the questionnaire will be discussed below, in terms of its characteristics and purpose.

The first question in part one is a standard rank-order item which asks the respondents to rate given political issues from one to ten. Corruption is one of the ten issues in the list. The reason for using such an item for evaluating issue-orientation is that previous open-ended questions in existing national election surveys have shown a very low salience for corruption as an issue. This provides too little sensitivity, then, for analysing the attitude matrix within which political corruption operates. Meisel's 1968 election study and the 1974 election study both employed open-ended items and both showed very low interest in the corruption issue, such that neither study mentions the issue.¹² This may be due to lack of public interest or to biases in coding responses, though the former is more likely. However, it is worth noting that the Meisel study listed only five cued issues, in addition to his uncued open-ended questions, and none concerned corruption. Earlier studies make it difficult to assess whether or not there is any interest in corruption, shall we say, in a secondary level or how it would rank against other major issues. If, for example, it is not mentioned by respondents to these earlier surveys as one of the three most important issues, does that mean that it (corruption) is not

at all important or does it mean that it is not one of the three most important issues to face Canadians? Moreover, has the relative importance of corruption as an issue increased since the 1974 survey, given that the effects of Watergate were continuing even in 1975? Thus, we have the purpose of the question. It is important to note that this question appears first, before later questionnaire items could sensitize the respondents to the significance of this issue in the survey.

The second item in part one is a "trustworthiness" scale where respondents are asked to rate various institutions or individuals according to their degree of trust in them. A Likert-type scale is used, employing five points from "very trustworthy" to "very untrustworthy." These ratings are applied not only to politicians and political institutions, but to others as well (such as lawyers, doctors, clergymen) for the purpose of comparison. Additionally, the inclusion of non-political items permits the assessment of cynicism or distrust as generalized to all social institutions or specific to the political system. The trust items also permit evaluations of individual trust ratings and the creation of an overall trust index. Items of this type have been employed by past Gallup polls in Canada, and may be considered as standard.¹³

The third item in part one is a series of political awareness questions which, when combined with question 4, permit one to assess the respondents knowledge of a variety of "affairs" or scandals. The respondent is asked in question 3 if he or she has heard of any or all of the events listed and to indicate yes or no for each. The subsequent item proceeds to probe for information which allows the

coder to determine whether the respondent has any knowledge of the incident or whether the previously noted awareness is without cognitive support. There is a tendency familiar to survey researchers where respondents will be reluctant to admit ignorance and, therefore, will say "yes" to almost anything. Probes to draw out knowledge are thus critical. Moreover, these two questions allow us to incorporate a cognitive dimension that is so central to the study of political attitudes.¹⁴

Part two of the questionnaire features the innovative aspect of this study and constitutes the heart of the research effort. Here, nine different hypothetical scenarios are described which respondents are asked to evaluate in terms of a series of semantic differentials (13 or 14 depending on provincial party systems.)¹⁵ These differentials are seven point scales which range between two word pairs or polar concepts. The respondent places an X on the point of the scale which best reflects how close he or she feels toward either end of the continuum and the word at that end. Hence, if a scenario is thought to be very corrupt by one, an X is placed at the "CORRUPT" end of the differential. If it is perceived as not corrupt, an X is placed toward the "NOT CORRUPT" end of the scale. In this way, one may evaluate both direction and intensity of the respondents attitude toward the activity in the scenario.

The scenarios attempt to illustrate actions which might be defined as corrupt in political science literature or in law. The intent of this section of the questionnaire, then, is to discern whether or not the public (as approximated by our sample of university students) sees these events as corrupt, common, necessary, important and so on. The

activities portrayed in the scenarios include: (1) nepotism, (2) patronage, (3) pork-barrelling, (4) bribery, (5) illegal campaign contributions, (6) legislative conflict of interest — stock ownership, (7) influence-peddling or legislative conflict of interest over publicity, (8) use of financial inducements to maintain party solidarity, and (9) bureaucratic conflict of interest — the use of inside information.

While a number of other scenarios were possible, these were chosen in order to provide a range of behaviours which would likely be sensitive to a variety of potential responses, from outright condemnation to total acceptance. Thus, these scenarios were judged to be sensitive to a wide range of attitudes. There would be little to gain if all scenarios were of the "black" variety, as we have used this term. A mixture of black, grey and white was thought to be required. One might contend that the eighth scenario is not even white corruption, and on this point the author might agree, but its inclusion reflects the need for measures which discriminate rather than homogenize. The expectation, then, is that the respondents will find this to be a legitimate, not corrupt, behaviour.

The seventh scenario is one which occupies a white or grey position in the literature on corruption. In fact, its inclusion as a conflict of interest has come to attention in only one source, this being Beard and Horn's study of U.S. Congressional attitudes toward corruption.¹⁶ With its rather low profile, it seemed to be a particularly useful device to test the sensitivity of respondents to behaviours which, thus far, have been deemed borderline in their ethicality. Interestingly, the authors cite a case where a bribe to a

Maryland Congressman resulted in his giving a speech in the House of Representatives that the bribing company then used as advertising! The Congressman, T.L. Johnson, was not convicted, but a colleague pleaded guilty in the same case and paid a \$10,000 fine in 1963.¹⁷ Whether this could be condemned as influence-peddling or by some other term is not altogether clear, though it is certainly part of the more generalized concept of conflict of interest. The narrower term, however, seems slightly more precise and thus preferable for our purposes.

A few words about scenarios which have been omitted. Clearly, the length of the questionnaire became a concern in terms of respondents' fatigue and this meant, in turn, that scenarios meeting each type described in earlier chapters were not possible. This led to the excluding of some possibilities on practical grounds. One example was a scenario on graft. Since this type of corrupt behaviour resembles bribery in every way except in terms of who initiates the act, it was thought reasonable that it could be excluded without great harm. Other possible scenarios were rejected for much the same reason. A pretest conducted at Carleton University several years prior to the actual survey indicated some resistance by respondents against nine scenarios. Anything more would probably be seen as an imposition.

Finally, part two employs the aforementioned semantic differentials to allow respondents to evaluate each scenario in a number of dimensions. These differential scales (see appendix for questionnaire, part two) attempt to elaborate upon similar but restricted efforts by Beard and Horn and by Peters and Welch.¹⁸ The formers' attempt at analyzing attitudes toward corruption was limited

to a four point Likert-type scale which had but two dimensions: was the practice in question ethical? Was the practice in question common to many of their Congressional colleagues? Quite clearly, these are probably the two most significant questions that might be asked, but we have argued earlier that the concept of corruption is far too complex for this rather confined approach. The Peters and Welch analysis is almost as narrow, asking only if the activity is judged to be corrupt and to what degree, and whether colleagues and the public would agree.

Thus for each of this study's scenarios, a series of 13 or 14 semantic differentials are employed requiring evaluations along a variety of dimensions. The first four of these differentials (or continua, if one prefers) concern more or less general reactions to the described scenarios: is the act corrupt, common, necessary or important? The individual respondent thus defines each activity along these continua for himself or herself. They indicate whether the act is corrupt or not. They define it as common or uncommon, etc. The necessary continuum seeks out the "system-blaming" reaction that Robert Lane discerned in his 1962 study of the political thinking of the "common man", Political Ideology.¹⁹ If a corrupt act is necessary, we may be able to identify this strain of popular thought so well described by Lane. By the same token, if an act is thought corrupt but unimportant, we may have identified behaviour which might be considered as "petty" or "white" corruption, as did John Gardiner in his study of civic and police corruption in the United States.²⁰

Other continua attempt to uncover other features or dimensions of attitudes toward corruption. Items 5 through 7 in the continua seek out a sensitivity to the notion that corruption may be more readily

associated with one level of government or another, be it federal or provincial or local.²¹ The eighth continuum asks whether the activity identified in the scenario is democratic or not. This item reflects the democratic "functionalist" thesis often employed in the literature, which argues that corruption fulfills a need not elsewhere satisfied in the democratic political system.²² The ninth differential examines the contention that the American political system is seen, subjectively or objectively, as more corrupt than our own. This view is not entirely chauvinistic, as American writers have been known to ascribe to the United States a particularly acute case of unethical politics.²³ The tenth through twelfth (or thirteenth in the case of British Columbia or Quebec) continua attempt to elicit a partisan bias to the view put forth by the public regarding acts that might be deemed corrupt. There is another commonly held notion in the literature on corruption that political parties are not equal in their pursuit of unethical means. Frequently, patronage is thought to be the product of non-ideological parties and, thus, less practised by the more ideologically oriented. Within the Canadian context this may mean that the N.D.P., at times perceived in the literature as the most ideological of the three major national parties, could be seen as the least prone to unethical behaviour. This perspective can be seen, for example in the work of James C. Scott,²⁴ though it is adapted here for the Canadian arena. Scott argues that political machines, by definition corrupt, virtually exclude ideology and class politics. Lastly, the final continuum attempts to test the proposition that French-Canadians may be perceived as more corrupt than English-Canadians, at least among English-speaking students. As seen earlier, this proposition stems from the specific

observations of Pierre Trudeau, in his book Federalism and the French Canadians, which advance the assumption that since democracy was imposed upon the Quebecois, respect for the non-corrupt rules of the game never fully developed.²⁵ Of course, Trudeau also contended that English-Canadians were somewhat hypocritical on this score. This observation, if valid, fits the more general proposition that corruption may be used by groups who are "outside" the establishment to gain access to political power in a non-violent way. Though this notion is usually associated with immigrant groups, it would seem to have possibilities within this context.²⁶ Moreover, given the widely acknowledged French-English cleavage in Canada, one might offer a modification of the aforementioned expectation by arguing that either group might perceive the other as more corrupt if only because they are the "others", i.e., a communal "ins" versus "outs" hypothesis. In any case, this continuum shows promise.

Part three contains a number of questions which deal with fairly common and straightforward background information. Items on social, political, economic and psychological variables are found in this section of the questionnaire. These items include age, sex, province of residence, urban or rural residence, subjective social class, parents' occupations and education, federal and provincial party support and intensity of support, a series of Likert-type items on efficacy and partisanship, year in university and, finally, the number of political science courses taken.

Two of these items require elaboration, even though they are standard background questions. First, the items on parents' occupation will be transformed into measures of objective socioeconomic class by

use of Blishen and McRoberts' revised socioeconomic index for occupations in Canada.²⁷ This index ascribes a value to each of 500 occupations, based on a combination of income levels, education levels and prestige levels. This index is widely used in Canadian social research; for example, see the 1974 national election study by Clarke et al. The second item of interest is the efficacy index, consisting of questions 14 a, c and d in part three. Item 14 b is a measure of partisanship, though not unrelated to efficacy. However, as it is not a standard efficacy item, it will be used separately as well as in concert with the more standard efficacy items to create a second efficacy scale. The three other items will form a standard efficacy measure again widely used in the analysis of political attitudes.²⁸

Statistical Analysis

The fact that the sample upon which this study is based is not a truly representative probabilistic sample engenders some concerns for statistical analysis. Tests of significance, for example, are based on the assumption of a probabilistic sample, and are thus not intended for nonprobabilistic samples. However, there is a convention employed in statistical analysis which allows one to meet this objection, though it requires the researcher to alert his or her readers to the statistical "fiction" created by this convention. Selltiz et al. refer to the concept of quasi-probabilistic samples where one generalizes to a hypothetical population. In this case the sample may be said to be a quasi-probability sample of a population of university students enrolled in political science courses. However, it is clear that one

does not intend to generalize to such a population alone. Hence, one must pursue more rigorous samples if one wishes to generalize with confidence beyond any convenience sample. Yet, this does not mean that the results drawn from such nonprobabilistic samples are to be ignored or discarded. Rather, they provide evidence or inferences that may suggest further research possibilities. They provide statistical evidence which does not confirm but stimulates. Our statistical tests then allow one to compare relationships within the study and to compare relationships to those found in other samples in other studies. Certainly this is less rigorous than direct confirmation through representative probabilistic samples, but it is often the first step in opening up research in an area largely devoid of prior empirical study. To argue that such research is to be jettisoned because it is based on a less than ideal sample is to be guilty of:

...preaching a paralyzing spirit of agnosticism that would prohibit anyone from coming to any conclusions. The progress of science and the scientific tenability of conclusions at any point in time are, after all, based on the coherence and consistency of many bits of fallible evidence, the articulation of theory, and the interlocking of the individually fallible bits of evidence with theory.²⁹

Thus, the significance of statistical tests on these data rests on the useful insights that the data may generate for purposes of comparison.³⁰ Comparisons may be made with existing data or with data that will be generated by future studies of this type. If we find, over time and over several study samples, that inferences found here continue to hold, then confidence in our evidence will surely increase.

The data will be analyzed in contingency tables, both for bivariate and multivariate situations. In the latter case, where the purpose is to control for the influence of a third intervening

variable, physical controls provided by contingency tables permit the discovery of conditional as well as spurious relationships. Moreover, the data generated by this study are largely at the ordinal and, to a lesser degree, nominal level. This precludes the application of higher order statistical methods such as regression analysis, except under certain conditions. One of these conditions is the use of dummy variables, but this method can be less informative and appropriate than the contingency approach, as it reduces variables to only two values. It should be used sparingly and for specific purposes.³¹

The statistical tests to be employed include Cramer's V and phi for nominal level data, where phi is used in two-by-two contingency tables and Cramer's V for all others. Both of these measures of association or correlation are based on the chi-square test of significance, which will also be used. However, given the population assumptions of tests of significance referred to earlier, this measure is included for comparative purposes only. For ordinal level data, gamma will be used as the measure of association or correlation, along with the chi-square test of significance for which the previous caveat again applies. Where data are of mixed levels, the lowest appropriate measure will be employed. Indexes will be created at the ordinal level; the use of more sophisticated scaling techniques permitting analysis at the interval level seem inappropriate for this study, partly because of the convenience sample and partly because of the exploratory nature of this research.

All statistics and conclusions derived from them are applied in the spirit of the earlier caveat about evidence, inference and confirmation. These analyses are intended to reveal evidence or

inferences, but they will not confirm. Therefore, they will be used for comparison purposes, and when it is argued that a hypothesis has been supported or rejected by the data, this is by no means a definitive statement. Rather, the intention is to convey the notion that our hypothesis is supported or rejected for this sample alone. It may be possible to offer, by way of conjecture or educated intuition, the argument that such an assessment would likely hold for the population at large. This is certainly one purpose of this research. But it is not the purpose here to imply that the results of our survey hold conclusively or definitively for the whole population.

NOTES

1. C. Selltitz, et al., Research Methods in Social Relations, (revised one-volume edition, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1959), pp. 55-59 and 537-545.
2. Robert D. Hess, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 260.
3. Jon H. Pammett, "The Development of Political Orientations in Canadian School Children," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 4 (March, 1971), 132-140.
4. P. Lazarsfeld, B. Berelson and H. Gaudet, The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up his Mind in a Presidential Campaign (3rd ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 3. This work was first published in 1944.
5. Harmon Ziegler, The Political Life of American Teachers (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), pp. 6-7.
6. Jon H. Pammett and Michael S. Whittington, "Introduction: Political Culture and Political Socialization," in J.H. Pammett and M.S. Whittington, eds., Foundations of Political Culture: Political Socialization in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1976), pp. 18-25. See also articles by H.D. Forbes and M. Gunther in the same volume.
7. Jean Pierre Richert, "Political Socialization in Quebec: Young Peoples' Attitudes toward Government," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 6 (June, 1973), 303-313.
8. B.S. Rundquist, G.S. Strom and J.G. Peters, "Corrupt Politicians and Their Electoral Support: Some Experimental Observations," American Political Science Review, 71 (September, 1977), 954-963.
9. Selltitz et al., op. cit., pp. 543-544.
10. I would like to thank the following professors for their very kind assistance in distributing the questionnaires to their respective university classes in political science: R.V. Stewart Hyson at Memorial University, Raymond Hudon at L'Université Laval, Michael

Whittington at Carleton University, and Gary Munro at the University of British Columbia. The questionnaires at the University of Winnipeg were, of course, distributed by myself.

11. See E. Terrence Jones, Conducting Political Research (New York: Harper and Row, 197), pp. 70-73 for an excellent summary of the characteristics of the various questionnaire techniques.
12. The last two national election studies in Canada were conducted for the 1968 and 1974 elections, respectively, and are published as follows: John Meisel, Working Papers on Canadian Politics (2nd ed.; Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1975), and H.D. Clarke, et al., Political Choice in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979). The later study by Clarke et al. makes no reference to corruption in government at all, either as a response to open-ended questions or in cued, closed-ended questions. The earlier Meisel study does include two questions of interest. The first is a semantic differential regarding party images, employing an honest-dishonest word pair. The second is one item in a cynicism scale. Honesty, of course, is not equivalent to corruption, so even these inclusions are insufficient for our purposes. See Chapter Six above.
13. This item is similar to one employed by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion in their Gallup Poll published September 29, 1976. See also Sellitz et al., op. cit., for an explanation of Likert-type scales, pp. 366-370.
14. Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 64 and Kenneth P. Langton, Political Socialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 92.
15. Because the party systems are not identical in all provinces, some changes must be made to make questionnaires regionally relevant. See, for example, Clarke et al., op. cit., pp. 424-427. Thus, for this study, an extra continuum was added to the items in part two for the provinces of Quebec and British Columbia. For the first,

a continuum with the word-pair Liberal and Parti-Quebecois was added. For B.C., the word-pair N.D.P. and Social Credit was added. These pairs would not be relevant to other provinces. It should be added, as well, that all semantic differentials, these additional ones included, had their word-pairs (poles) reversed from time to time in order to avoid any response set bias.

16. Edmund Beard and Stephen Horn, Congressional Ethics: The View from the House (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 28-30.
17. Ibid., p. 29.
18. See ibid., passim, and John G. Peters and Susan Welch, "Political Corruption in America," American Political Science Review, 72 (September, 1978), 974-984.
19. Robert E. Lane, Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does (New York: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 325-335.
20. John A. Gardiner, "Ticket-Fixing in Massachusetts," in A.J. Heidenheimer, ed. Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978), pp. 176-178.
21. This is an adaptation of the argument of James C. Scott in his Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 156.
22. This view has been discussed in earlier chapters, but see the approach of Robert K. Merton in "Some functions of the political machine," in J.D. Douglas and J.M. Johnson, eds., Official Deviance: Readings in Malfeasance, Misfeasance and Other Forms of Corruption (New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1977), pp. 339-349. This is a reprint of Merton's famous discussion of functional corruption first published in 1957. See also Carl J. Friedrich, The Pathology of Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), especially chapter 10.

23. For an American perspective on this notion see George C.S. Benson, Political Corruption in America (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1978), pp. 3-5. From a Canadian perspective see Richard Gwyn, The Shape of Scandal: A Study of Government in Crisis (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1965), p. 4, and Maurice Cutler, "Watergate: Could it Happen Here?" Business Quarterly, 38 (September, 1973), 11.
24. Scott, op. cit., pp. 150-151. The supposition that the N.D.P. is a more ideological and class-conscious party is not uncommon in political science. For an interesting empirical discussion of this point see Clarke et al., pp. 107-119 and 194-201. Interestingly, while the N.D.P. scored as most honest in the 1965 election survey, the Liberals did so in the 1968 survey. See Meisel, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
25. Pierre Elliott Trudeau, "Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 24 (August, 1958), 297-311.
26. This is consistent with the functionalist approach to political corruption as stated by Merton, Friedrich and Scott, noted in Chapter Four.
27. Bernard Blishen and Hugh McRoberts, "A Revised Socioeconomic Index for Occupations in Canada," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 13 (1976), 71-79.
28. See for example: Clarke et al., op. cit., p. 402; Langton, op. cit., p. 94; and Richard Simeon and David J. Elkins, "Regional Political Cultures in Canada," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 7 (September, 1974), 404.
29. Selltiz et al., op. cit., pp. 541-544, quotation on p. 544.
30. See Hubert M. Blalock, Jr. Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972). Blalock's position is apparently more rigorous than that of Selltiz et al., yet at p. 528 he argues that, even though such tests are not ideally applied to such data, they do generate "useful insights" by comparing.
31. Ibid., pp. 498-502.

CHAPTER EIGHT: THE SURVEY FINDINGS I: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

Given the exploratory nature of attitudinal research regarding political corruption, it is important that the first stage of data analysis, the description of single variables or univariate descriptive analysis, be given full attention. In the study of other, more widely analyzed, concepts there is less need for dwelling on purely descriptive elements. Hence, one can move rather quickly and directly to the analysis of relationships between two or more variables, i.e., bivariate and multivariate analysis. Moreover, given a sample which is clearly not intended to be representative of the entire population, some connection must be made between the sample and the population which would indicate that some correspondence between the two is possible. Hence, the findings would then be suggestive of what might be discovered in the population at large if a more representative sample could be obtained. This chapter deals with these two questions, then: (1) To what degree is there any correspondence between the student sample and the general population? and (2) what was the response of the sample as a whole to the survey? Once these questions are resolved, we will turn in Chapter Nine to the analysis of the relationships between variables.

For the moment however, we will focus on the two aforementioned questions and will organize the discussion in the following way. First, a brief discussion of the correspondence of the student sample to the general population will take place. Second, there will be an analysis of "background" characteristics of the sample, i.e., those socio-economic and political variables such as party preference, socio-

6

1.0

1.1

1.25

1.4

1.6

2.0

2.2

2.5

2.8

3.2

3.6

4.0

2.5

2.2

2.0

1.8

MICRO

economic class, community size, intensity of partisanship, etc. Third, the "heart" of the study will be described in an analysis of responses to items on the subject of political corruption itself.

The Correspondence of the Student Sample to the General Population

It was argued in the previous chapter that the sample chosen for this study was selected for reasons other than its representativeness. Hence, there are expected to be a number of ways in which this sample will fail to correspond to the general population. Clearly, the sample will be younger than the general population. The students will have lower individual incomes but higher socio-economic class backgrounds than the population. They will be better educated and, one assumes because of this, more knowledgeable than the population at large. Our general knowledge about university students makes it possible for any social science investigator to make these assumptions with a high degree of confidence. Thus these assumptions are rarely if ever challenged in the course of survey research. It is simply more productive to acknowledge the assumptions and move on to matters which are more likely to be interesting, controversial or whatever. This is the attitude employed in this study. It behooves us to direct our attention to points where correspondence, despite the acknowledged unrepresentativeness of the sample, can be detected.

There are four types of questions in the survey questionnaire which may be used as points of comparison with previously published data drawn from national samples. These questions deal with the rank-ordering of issues, the rating of the trustworthiness of certain groups

or institutions in society (including political groups or institutions), efficacy and trust scales (sometimes referred to in the literature as alienation scales) and a question on awareness of one event which we have included in a list of "possibly corrupt" events, i.e., Watergate. The comparisons will not be exact, largely because the questions or the time periods during which the questions were asked will not correspond perfectly. Nevertheless, the comparisons should be helpful in suggesting the degree to which the student sample approximates a national sample in terms of conceptualization of complex political questions.

The comparison of the rank-orderings of issues is problematic because of the tendency of researchers to employ open-ended items. This, in itself, is not a problem in that it is suggested that such items permit respondents to "define their own reality-world", i.e., to indicate which issues are important to themselves rather than to indicate which in a list of issues presented to them by others should be ranked as important. In the latter case, it may well be that there are issues which interest the respondent but which do not appear on the questionnaire's list. In this case, the reality-world has been partially defined by the researcher for the respondent.¹ However, we have already seen that while corruption is an important political issue for some, it rarely rates mention as one of the most important issues. This is partly due to the fact that researchers rarely code more than three issues per respondent, hence what we see in the calculations of issue interest in polls or surveys are, at best, what voters consider to be among the three most significant issues only. Thus, a number of important, but secondary issues will be ignored in such analyses. The

way around this problem is to provide the respondent with a list of issues which he or she can then rank-order in terms of the issues' importance to themselves.

Since the techniques employed by the Gallup polls are of the open-ended variety, the comparison between these polls and our data is to be considered cautiously. Moreover, since Gallup often amalgamates a number of minor issues into "catch-all" or miscellaneous categories, only the first two issues in importance seem to have consistently comparable meaning. That is to say, categories as nebulous as "government" or, even worse, "other" occasionally find their way into the third most important ranking. For our purposes, a comparison is made between the student sample (conducted in Spring, 1982) and two national polls taken by the Gallup organization in a period which corresponded closely in time to the student survey, in one case, and which followed the survey by about half a year in the second case. The latter was included on the assumption that university students in the political science discipline are likely to be leading, rather than following, public opinion on policy issues. Thus, if this assumption was reasonable, students might be more closely aligned with the subsequent poll than with the concurrent poll. However, the assumption is just that — an assumption, and the comparison does not hinge on its acceptability. Table VIII shows this comparison, with the dates indicated referring to the times when the polls were conducted and not to when they were actually released for publication.

The conclusion to be drawn from this table is that the student sample is not unlike the population as a whole. The students, like the national samples, rank inflation and unemployment as the two most

TABLE VIII: COMPARISON OF STUDENT SAMPLE TO GALLUP POLLS ON RANKING OF MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES.²

<u>SAMPLE</u>	<u>INFLATION</u>	<u>UNEMPLOYMENT</u>	<u>BOTH INFL. & UNEMP.</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
Student - Spring, 1982	35.3%	39.0%	74.3%	25.7%
Gallup Poll - Dec., 1982	44	39	83	17
Gallup Poll - June, 1982	54	26	80	20

Sources: Student survey questionnaire, Part One, item 1; Gallup Report, February 7, 1983.

important issues, though their ordering of these two issues reverses that which is seen in the national sample. However, the December poll showed a movement toward the position occupied by the students on the part of the general population, as the gap between the two issues closed dramatically. Moreover, the absolute level of concern for these two issues combined (i.e., absolute as opposed to relative, as is implied by rank-ordering) is quite similar between the national and student samples. It is interesting to note that no other issue besides inflation or unemployment was thought to be most important by more than eight per cent of the respondents in any of the three samples.

A second basis for comparison of the student and national samples is in terms of the "trustworthiness" of various groups and institutions in Canadian society. Again, though the questions are not identical, there is sufficient room for comparison due to the similarity of the questions. The Gallup data are drawn from two polls with somewhat different perspectives. One poll, conducted in August, 1982 (and therefore contemporaneous to our student survey), asked respondents to rate "the honesty and ethical standards" of people in various fields of

political and economic life. An earlier poll, conducted in July of 1979, asked respondents "how much respect and confidence" they had in various groups in Canadian society. Data from both are included, as each of these questions contributed to the creation of a new question in the student survey. The new question (see questionnaire in appendix) asked how trustworthy the listed institutions or groups were. For the student survey, a total of 14 groups or institutions were listed, while the 1982 Gallup poll listed 12 and the 1979 poll listed only eight. The Gallup poll lists overlapped considerably, especially if equivalence is accepted, e.g., considering House of Commons (1979) equivalent to Members of Parliament (1982). Neither of the Gallup questions, it should be noted, was considered adequate for this study, as neither addressed the honesty of or respect for the Senate or bureaucracy or the difference between levels of government. Moreover, the terms "honesty", "respect" and "confidence" did not seem to be precisely what was needed in this context. "Ethical standards" may have been, except that this term has potentially different connotations when applied to political institutions or to doctors and clergy. Indeed, no one term seemed especially precise, so the word "trustworthy" was employed as equally applicable to the context and because it fits well with the concept of efficacy in terms of its usage in the literature. The results of the comparison appear in Table IX.

In interpreting these data, it was thought that comparisons of actual percentages would be hampered by the difference in the respective questions, thus only the rank-ordering for those items which have equivalence between the student survey and one or the other of the Gallup polls are used. Hence, there are seven items which are

TABLE IX: COMPARISON OF EQUIVALENT ITEMS IN STUDENT AND NATIONAL SAMPLES REGARDING RANK-ORDERS OF VARIOUS GROUPS OR INSTITUTIONS ON TRUSTWORTHINESS, HONESTY, RESPECT, ETC.³

A. GROUP/INSTITUTION	STUDENT SURVEY	GALLUP (1982)
Doctors	1	1
Professors/Univ. Teachers	2	3
RCMP/Police Officers	3	2
House of Commons/M.P.'s	4	6
Lawyers	5	4
Unions/Union Leaders	6	7
Media/Journalists	7	5

B. GROUP/INSTITUTION	STUDENT SURVEY	GALLUP (1979)
Clergymen/Church, Org. Religion	1	1
Courts/Supreme Court	2	2
House of Commons	3	3
Unions	4	5
Media/Newspapers	5	4

Spearman's rho for rank-order correlation:

for correlation of ranks in A: $r_s = .79$

for correlation of ranks in B: $r_s = .90$

Sources: Student survey questionnaire, Part One, item 2; Gallup Report, August 4, 1979 and October 2, 1982.

equivalent between the 1982 Gallup poll and the student survey (out of 12 and 14 respectively) and these then have been separated from the non-equivalent items to create a rank-ordering of seven items. All those for which there is no equivalence are dropped from this new rank-order. Similarly, only five items are equivalent between the 1979 poll and the student survey (out of 8 and 12 respectively), and only these are employed in a new rank-order of five items. The terms which appear before the slash in the column marked group/institution (e.g., Media/Journalists) are taken from the student survey, while those which follow are taken from the respective polls. When there is but one term, there was no difference in the term used by the respective

7.

sources.

Even if one did not understand rank-order correlation statistics such as Spearman's rho, mere perusal of the rank-orders indicates a high degree of correspondence between the student sample and the two national samples. However, by employing Spearman's rho and calculating results of .79 and .90 for each of our two comparisons, the correspondence is even more clear. The relationship between the rank-orders is quite strong indeed. Once again, the student sample, as was indicated in the comparison of issue-rankings, seems quite close to the patterns of political beliefs expressed by national samples and thereby strengthens the assumption that students do not necessarily present a radical departure from the values and attitudes of the public at large. Of course, there are some interesting differences, such as the tendency of students to rate unemployment somewhat more highly than inflation as an issue or their propensity to rate university professors as somewhat more trustworthy, honest or respected than is the case with the general public, but these may be considered in light of their experience (or expected experience in the case of the unemployment question) and surely do not represent a major alteration from national norms.

Just as the argument can be made that the student sample is (in some ways) not radically different from the national sample, it must be admitted that the comparison of equivalent questions and the like does turn up the occasional discrepancy. Such is the case with the concept of efficacy, though to say that political science students are more efficacious than the average population should not be surprising. While the data upon which the comparison is drawn are not

contemporaneous, the difference between the general population and the student sample is of such a magnitude that it is unlikely that the hiatus between the 1974 national election survey and the 1982 student survey is the root cause of the discrepancy between the two samples. The discrepancy in question relates to the finding that the students displayed a much higher confidence in their understanding of the complicated world of politics than did the general sample. However, on two other dimensions of efficacy there was great similarity between the student and general samples. The results of the efficacy comparisons appear in Table X.

TABLE X: COMPARISON OF STUDENT AND NATIONAL SAMPLES ON EFFICACY ITEMS.⁴

<u>EFFICACY ITEM (Student version)</u>	<u>STUDENT SAMPLE</u>	<u>1974 ELECTION SURVEY</u>
Sometimes politics and government are so complicated that a person like me can't understand what is going on. (% disagree)	56.2	33
So many people vote that it doesn't matter if I vote or not.	84.7	84
Politicians don't care what people like me think.	48.8	52

Sources: Student survey questionnaire, Part Three, item 14; H.D. Clarke et al., Political Choice in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979), p. 32.

The efficacy item which has the most obvious connection to knowledge as opposed to attitude, is the one item in this rather standard efficacy series which displays a significant distinction between the two samples. The remaining efficacy items are very similar. Again we have evidence of the similarity between samples on equivalent or nearly equivalent questionnaire items, with another

discrepancy which seems explainable in terms of the nature of the student sample itself. The discrepancies indicated in the three types of questions already discussed seem to follow an understandable pattern, for the most part, if the nature of the student sample is accounted for. The unemployment item, the slightly higher regard for university professors and the greater confidence in their knowledge of the complicated political process all reflect the students' special differences from the general population. If this pattern is recognized, it is possible to surmise the differences which might be expected if a student sample is to represent, in a vague fashion at least, the general population. Thus, the degree to which one might generalize from this sample is affected by this consideration.

The last type of question upon which a more or less direct comparison between the two types of samples can be made is a straight question of knowledge or awareness. In this case, there is one such comparison for which data exists and for which some sense of correspondence might be said to apply, and that is awareness or knowledge about the Watergate affair. Of all the scandals or affairs included in the student survey's item about awareness and knowledge of given political "events", only Watergate has been used as the basis for a question in a national sample. This occurred in a Gallup poll released in August, 1973 and, therefore, there is some problem in the time differential between the taking of the two samples. The data, shown in Table XI, indicate that the students are more aware of Watergate than was a national sample in 1973. This need not be explained solely by the higher education of the student sample nor by reference to the fact that they are students in political science, for

it is altogether possible that the general population's awareness of Watergate may have grown since 1973, since it was not until 1974 that Nixon resigned, almost a year to the day after the Canadian Gallup poll was released.

TABLE XI: COMPARISON OF STUDENT SAMPLE AND NATIONAL SAMPLE ON AWARENESS OF THE WATERGATE SCANDAL

<u>AWARENESS/KNOWLEDGE</u>	<u>STUDENT SAMPLE</u>	<u>GALLUP (1973)</u>
Yes, have heard of Watergate	98%	89%
Correct or vague description of Watergate (applies only to student sample)	87	NA
Incorrect or no description of Watergate given (applies only to student sample)	11	NA

Sources: Student survey questionnaire, Part One, items 3 and 4; Gallup Report, August 8, 1973.

It is quite possible, then, that the difference between the two samples is even less than indicated here. (The inclusion of data on the knowledge, as opposed to mere awareness, of Watergate is designed to alert readers to the distinction between these two terms and to the structure of the questionnaire item. Unfortunately, the Gallup item made no reference to knowledge per se).

The conclusion to be drawn from the above analysis then is that, while the student sample may differ in some very obvious ways from a national sample, students nevertheless are not always radically different from the general population in terms of their basic attitudes toward politics.⁵ Hence, while the representativeness of a student sample (vis-a-vis a national population) cannot be argued, it is fair to propose that the student sample corresponds to a national sample in

some ways and that this makes it possible to use such a sample to suggest that certain observations made about the students might be fruitfully applied to a more representative sample. Further, knowing some of the socio-economic and political characteristics of students permits one to be somewhat more educated about how or why certain observations made about a student sample might be applied to a national sample. In other words, as long as caution is maintained, the student sample can provide a number of insights which might be tested at a later time against a less restricted sample. As was argued in Chapter Seven, this is, in itself, a very useful exercise.

Background Characteristics: Socio-economic and Political Variables

As we have already stated, there is no assumption that the student sample can accurately reflect the socio-economic and political characteristics of the population at large. Nevertheless, it is useful to know how these characteristics are distributed amongst the sample, even if comparisons are not going to be made directly. It is assumed that, except for those comparisons made in the previous section, the reader can judge these data without such explicit connections being provided. On occasion, rather indirect and implicit comparisons will be offered to assist such judgements or to direct one's attention to interesting findings, but explicit analyses do not seem necessary here.

While we have previously cited the region from which the universities were drawn and from which, it follows, the student respondents were drawn (see Chapter Seven), it is clear that some of the students at the respective universities were not residents of the

same province in which the university was located. Thus it was necessary to include province of residence amongst the demographic variables to be considered. Given concern for the length of the questionnaire, both in terms of respondent reaction to an earlier pretest of the survey instrument and in terms of expected reaction by colleagues interested in submitting the questionnaire to their students, and given the central interest in the scenarios and their many dimensions, it was decided that the number of background variables that could be included would be smaller than we would have preferred. Hence, demographic variables were limited to the following: age, sex, province of residence, size of "hometown" community, social class (subjective and objective, respondent's, parents'), parent's education, and respondent's educational level as well as experience in political science courses (i.e., the number of political science courses taken). Of these, only province of residence has been previously discussed, albeit indirectly through the aforementioned reference to the region from which the universities were drawn. By comparing the data in Table XII below with those data in Table VII, Chapter Seven, one can observe a rather small difference between the regions as symbolized by the universities and the actual province of residence indicated by the students. Indeed, when a crosstabulation of region (i.e., university) and province of residence was done, all five universities had 90% or more of their students drawn from the province in which the university was located, thus indicating that the university is a good estimate of the region or province of residence. By the same token, using only five universities from five different provinces causes some provinces to be almost totally neglected (e.g., New Brunswick, Saskatchewan and

Alberta) or neglected altogether (e.g., Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and the territories).. However, if we continue to use the concept of five regions, each region is amply represented.

As one might expect from a university student sample, the distribution of ages is quite young compared to a normal population. The distribution of gender is also quite different from the general population, and reflects past patterns of enrollment in political science which have traditionally shown the discipline to draw more male than female students. If anything, the proportion of the sample which is female is probably higher than one might expect for students in political science courses, but this is likely because many of the students (42.6%) were taking their first political science course at the time of the survey.⁶ Interestingly, the student sample proved to be split along urban/rural lines in much the same way as the general population, with 24.3% declaring themselves as having come from a "rural" hometown. The proportion of the Canadian population living in rural areas is currently 24.5%.⁷ In any case, the students designated themselves as such, thus there is no way to be sure that they use the same conception of rural as do government statistical agencies.

The social class variables cannot be compared to the published results of the 1974 national election survey by Clarke et al., as the data for that study did not include any descriptive analysis of the relevant variables, i.e., the authors proceeded directly to the analysis of relationships in most cases. However, the 1968 national election survey, published in the work of John Meisel, does offer opportunities for comparison, though they are not as useful as one might like. (Both the Clarke and Meisel materials have been discussed

TABLE XII: DISTRIBUTION OF DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES*

AGE (N=293)**	17-19 23.2%	20-21 28.3%	22-24 16.0%	25-29 16.0%	30 and over 16.4%
------------------	----------------	----------------	----------------	----------------	----------------------

SEX (N=293)	MALE 61.8%	FEMALE 38.2%
----------------	---------------	-----------------

PROVINCE OF RESIDENCE (N=293)	NFLD 23.2%	NB 0.3%	QUE 11.9%	ONT 22.2%	MAN 25.4%	SASK 0.3%	ALTA 1.0%	BC 12.6%
-------------------------------------	---------------	------------	--------------	--------------	--------------	--------------	--------------	-------------

(N.B.: 2.4% listed residence as outside Canada)

SIZE OF HOMETOWN COMMUNITY (N=293)	RURAL 24.3%	URBAN-UNDER 100,000 19.5%	URBAN-100,000 AND OVER 56.2%
--	----------------	---------------------------------	------------------------------------

DOES RESPONDENT FEEL HE/SHE BELONGS TO A SOCIAL CLASS? (N=291)	YES 72.5%	NO 27.5%
---	--------------	-------------

RESPONDENTS' SUBJECTIVE SOCIAL CLASS (N=288)	UPPER CLASS 1.0%	UPPER MIDDLE 22.6%	MIDDLE CLASS 48.3%	LOWER MIDDLE 19.4%	WORKING CLASS 8.7%
--	------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------

SUBJECTIVE SOCIAL CLASS OF RESPONDENTS' PARENTS (N=291)	UPPER CLASS 4.1%	UPPER MIDDLE 22.8%	MIDDLE CLASS 43.8%	LOWER MIDDLE 18.3%	WORKING CLASS 11.0%
---	------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	--------------------------	---------------------------

FATHERS' S.E.S. (BLISHEN SCALE) (N=285)	"UPPER" (70 & more) 13.3%	"U. MID." (60-69) 26.0%	"MIDDLE" (50-59) 18.6%	"L. MID." (40-49) 20.4%	"WORKING" (39 & less) 21.4%
---	---------------------------------	-------------------------------	------------------------------	-------------------------------	-----------------------------------

TABLE XII - CONTINUED

MOTHERS' S.E.S. (BLISHEN SCALE) (N=163)	"UPPER" (70 & more)	"U. MID." (60-69)	"MIDDLE" (50-59)	"L. MID." (40-49)	"WORKING" (39 & less)
	5.5%	16.6%	42.3%	17.2%	18.4%

(N.B.: 6.1% were missing data, 39.1% were listed as housewives or the like for which Blishen has no ranking.)

PARENTS' EDUCATION	PRIMARY	SOME SECONDARY	FINISHED SECONDARY	SOME POST-SECONDARY	UNIVERSITY GRADUATE
FATHERS (N=286)	14.7%	22.7%	19.9%	17.5%	25.2%
MOTHERS (N=288)	13.9%	20.8%	29.2%	21.2%	14.9%

RESPONDENTS' UNIVERSITY LEVEL (N=293)	FIRST YEAR	SECOND YEAR	THIRD YEAR	FOURTH YEAR	GRADUATE SCHOOL
	20.5%	32.1%	22.5%	11.3%	13.7%

NUMBER OF POLITICAL SCIENCE COURSES (N=289)	ONE COURSE	TWO COURSES	THREE TO FIVE	SIX OR MORE
	42.6%	20.4%	18.0%	18.7%

Notes: * Totals may not always add up to 100% due to rounding

** The N equals the total number of respondents (297) less the number of missing cases for that variable, except for MOTHERS' S.E.S., for which all those listed as housewives have also been deleted.

in earlier chapters). Other studies will also be used.

First among the social class considerations is whether or not the respondent feels that he/she belongs to any social class. While Canadian comparisons are not available on this question, one study of

American voters raised this notion of class-identification in a 1956 election survey. Angus Campbell et al. found that about one third of their respondents felt that they belonged to no social class at all, even though they were more than willing to place themselves in a class category when it was requested.⁸ Our student sample showed that more than one quarter did not feel they belonged to any social class, yet only about three per cent refused to categorize themselves into one of the several classes when asked to do so. If, on the other hand, we compare subjective social class results (i.e., where students were to place themselves and their parents on a social class scale) to the findings of the 1968 election study, the comparison is somewhat more problematic. While the passage of time since 1968 may or may not create any problems, the categorization employed by Meisel does. The 1968 survey asked respondents to subjectively classify themselves as upper, middle or lower class. The results were 8.2%, 47.7% and 44.1% respectively. Of course, categorization used in our student survey does not follow this same pattern, as can be seen in Table XII. Indeed, the categorization follows from the 1974 election study. The problem is that one must collapse our categories to compare the students' responses to the national sample in 1968, a procedure which is fraught with methodological problems regarding the equivalence between the two categorizations even after the collapsing has been done. Recognizing this, the comparison must be viewed with caution. By collapsing our five categories into three, the result is (in terms of Meisel's upper, middle, lower categories) 23.6%, 48.3% and 28.1% respectively for parents' social class. This would seem reasonable, given the known bias of university enrollment toward upper and middle

class families (given costs of tuition, etc.).

Subjective social class is not without its own problems of interpretation. Thus, it is normal practice to include along with subjective measures, objective measures based on occupation. As noted in Chapter Seven, Canadian researchers have generally employed the so-called "Blisshen" index for this purpose.¹⁰ (Such was the case in the 1974 national election survey, though the major publication to be drawn from that study does not indicate what the breakdown of the national sample was). The Blisshen index is properly called the revised socioeconomic index for occupations in Canada and ranks approximately 490 Canadian occupations in terms of status, income and education. The result is not only a rank-ordering but an index with values ranging from a low of 19.2430 for newsboys (who rank 497th) to a high of 75.2846 for administrators in teaching and related fields who, of course, rank first among the occupational groups. The index scores then are used to compute the objective socioeconomic class for the students' parents. The classifying of these scores into 70+, 60-69, 50-59, etc. is consistent with the approach of Blisshen and McRoberts, except that we have collapsed the two lowest categories into a 39 and less category. Blisshen and McRoberts do not suggest that 70+ be equated with upper class or 50-59 be equated with middle class as we have done here. Instead, the comparative terminology is used only for illustrative purposes when comparing the objective to the subjective data. In addition to the occupations noted as relevant to the 70+ and 39 and less categories, a few more examples might be of some assistance in visualizing the Blisshen index. In the 60-69 category we find such occupations as producers and directors in the visual arts or industrial

engineers. In the 50-59 group we find medical technologists or radio and television announcers. In the 40-59 category there are railway conductors and general office clerks. Joining educational administrators in the 70+ group are dentists and physicians, with the 39 and less group also including labourers in manufacturing and service station attendants. Obviously, with more than 490 occupations listed, these are but a smattering.

Since data on the distribution of the national population in terms of the Blisshen index are not readily available, no comparison is possible which might indicate the degree to which the student sample is inconsistent with the general population. However, it is interesting to note that the students' subjective view of their parents' social class is not wholly consistent with the objective measure. There is nothing strange in this observation, as it is largely because it was long thought that subjective class-identification was so inconsistent with objective considerations that such measures as the Blisshen index were first devised. If we compare subjective social class to fathers' socioeconomic status in Table XII, it is clear that, on the whole, the students are more likely to see themselves as middle class and less likely to see themselves as either upper or working class than occupational measures would otherwise have us believe. (When parents' subjective social class was correlated with the objective indexes for occupation, $\gamma = .52$ with father's occupation and $.40$ with mother's occupation). The question has often been debated, and ultimately unresolved, as to whether it is the subjective or objective class or status which affects political behaviour. While this author leans to the assumption that it is one's perception of oneself, rather than

another's perception of oneself, which is more likely to motivate behaviour, enough doubt lingers to ensure that both measures be employed in any analysis of the effects of class on political attitudes, values, behaviour and so on. This ambivalence is apparently shared with other social science researchers, as in the case of the 1974 national election survey by Clarke et al.¹¹

As a check against whatever biases that might exist in either the subjective or objective measures of class (consider the low ranking of farmers in the Blishen index, for example, and how it fails to take into account assets as well as income), parents' education may also be used in analyzing student attitudes. (Gamma for subjective social class = .44 with father's education and .47 with mother's education) Comparison problems exist for this variable as well, given the complexity and variety of educational systems from province to province in Canada. Rather than employ a measure based on years of education as employed by Meisel, it was thought that reference to levels of education might transcend the difficulty which arises from secondary schools which have grade thirteen in Ontario, grade twelve in most other provinces and grade eleven in Quebec, etc. Comparison to current enrollment data is also problematic in that enrollment patterns change over time, as in the case of university enrollment in the post-1960 period during which university expansion was great in Canada. Thus, on this latter point at least, comparison should be made to educational levels of adults in the general population and not to the current enrollment figures. One estimate of these education levels is found in Meisel's work where he indicates that his national sample revealed that 32.4% of Canadians (in 1968) had 0-8 years education, 53.7% had 9-13

years and 14.0% had 14 years or more.¹² The latter category would constitute at least some university of other post-secondary education in all provinces. By examining Table XII, we can see that the parents of our student sample were more highly educated than the general population.

The last factor that we will take into account relates to the respondents' educational level, measured in two ways. One is the level, or year, in the university. The expectation here is that political learning of a general sort will be acquired by students regardless of whether or not the learning takes place in political science courses per se. Second is the focus on the number of political science courses as distinct from the level of university education, with the expectation being that specific, rather than general, learning will take place in these courses which will make students more knowledgeable about political events and which may also teach political values which are different from those held by persons with less formal political education. While it is clear these variables have limited, if any, application to the general population, they may nevertheless suggest something of the impact of political learning upon attitudes toward corruption. For example, does advanced study in political science correlate with greater or lesser censoriousness? Or does advanced study in general correlate with greater awareness of political events? While these questions are clearly related, it must be noted that not all advanced students have had large numbers of political science courses in their backgrounds. For instance, some advanced undergraduate students may have enrolled in first-year political science courses in order to fulfill certain degree requirements. Even

Some graduate students, for example those in the Master of Public Affairs program at the University of Winnipeg, may have had little or ~~no~~ political science experience due to the interdisciplinary perspective of the program's admissions policy. In any event, given a sample consisting of university students, these two variables (see Table XII) seem to be the most appropriate for differentiating educational background in an otherwise undifferentiated population.

Demographic, or socioeconomic variables are but part of the background focus needed here. Before turning to the analysis of responses to the various scenarios, certain political variables must also be examined in terms of their distribution in the sample. Tables XIII to XVII summarize the results of the survey in this respect. The variables included under the rubric of "background political variables" include: issue-ranking, ratings of individual trust items, three trust indexes based on the individual ratings, awareness and knowledge of individual "corrupt" political events, an overall index of political knowledge based on the individual events, federal party support and its intensity, provincial party support and its intensity, scores on individual efficacy questions and two efficacy indexes based on the individual efficacy items.* Each of these constitutes a potential independent variable in the analysis of the corruption scenarios.

Table XIII shows the ranking of the ten cued or prompted issues according to their mean ranking. Also shown are the percentages of respondents ranking each issue first or last and the standard deviation

* Data for the basic versions of the trust and efficacy indexes only are presented in these tables. Variations on these indexes will be included in the discussion as required.

of the mean rankings. The latter is included to allow readers to assess the degree of consensus that exists for each issue ranking. We have previously noted that the strength of unemployment and inflation as issues in this sample corresponds closely, though not exactly, to the ranking of the same issues by the general public. What previous national samples do not generally show is the degree of variance in the responses of their samples. Hence, it is interesting to note there that, by reviewing each of the three measures listed in Table XIII, we can see that there are differences between issues in terms of their mean rankings and their ranking in the first position. For example, corruption ranks seventh in importance as an issue when using mean rankings, but only eighth when one employs the percentage of respondents ranking the issue first in importance. The degree in variation of rankings for corruption and all other issues can be seen in this way and is even clearer when the standard deviation scores are also used. Thus, for corruption, we find a relatively strong degree of variation in responses as it has the fifth highest standard deviation. By comparison, abortion ranks at the bottom of the list of issues in terms of mean ranking, yet slightly more people rank it first than do those who rank corruption first. The reason for the lower mean ranking is clearly the variation in responses, in that not only is the standard deviation for abortion higher than that for corruption, but this is even more dramatically clear if we note that for more than one third of the sample, abortion was the least important issue out of ten. Table XIII then confirms our notion that corruption constitutes an issue of secondary, rather than primary, importance. That it should rank ahead of such emotional issues as abortion and bilingualism, both of which

TABLE XIII: RANK-ORDERING OF ISSUES ACCORDING TO THEIR IMPORTANCE TO THE RESPONDENT (Questionnaire: Part One, Item 1).

ISSUE	MEAN SCORE	% RANKING ISSUE FIRST	% RANKING ISSUE LAST	STANDARD DEVIATION
Unemployment	2.203	39.0	0.0	1.505
Inflation	2.432	35.3	0.3	1.658
Energy	4.693	3.8	0.7	2.078
Environment	5.154	4.8	4.5	2.306
Crime	5.545	5.9	2.8	2.451
Nationalism	6.111	5.5	9.7	2.594
Corruption	6.593	2.4	6.9	2.246
Separatism	6.611	1.0	10.8	2.339
Bilingualism	7.754	0.3	26.0	2.061
Abortion	7.844	2.8	37.7	2.466

TABLE XIV: RATING OF INDIVIDUAL INSTITUTIONS AND GROUPS IN TERMS OF THEIR TRUSTWORTHINESS AND DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ON A COMPOSITE "TRUST INDEX" (Questionnaire: Part One, Item 1).

GROUP/ INSTITUTION	MEDIAN RANK	MEAN RANK	STANDARD DEVIATION	TRUST- WORTHY	% NEUTRAL	UNTRUST- WORTHY
Clergymen	1.917	2.064	1.033	72.5%	18.0%	9.5%
Courts	2.117	2.271	1.021	67.1	19.3	13.6
Doctors	2.157	2.312	0.968	66.8	19.9	13.4
Univ. Professors	2.240	2.347	0.819	63.6	28.2	8.2
Senate	2.593	2.570	0.840	45.7	46.1	8.2
RCMP	2.681	2.912	1.220	47.1	15.9	36.9
House of Commons	2.797	2.848	0.946	38.2	39.9	21.9
Municipal Gov't	2.816	2.915	0.960	39.0	34.9	26.1
Provincial Gov't	2.839	2.942	0.979	39.2	31.7	29.0
Prime Minister	2.966	3.068	1.188	38.3	25.1	36.7
Lawyers	3.028	3.096	1.051	30.8	36.3	32.8
Bureaucrats	3.199	3.261	0.898	19.7	43.4	37.0
Unions	3.237	3.232	1.000	26.6	31.7	41.6
Mass Media	3.551	3.476	1.041	20.7	27.6	51.7

TRUST INDEX: (very trustworthy = 1, very untrustworthy = 5; minimum index score = 14, maximum = 70)

14-28: 4.0%; 29-35: 26.0%; 36-42: 41.0%; 43-49: 20.9%; 50-70: 8.1%

have received much contemporary media attention, strikes this author as surprising.

Table XIV illustrates the ratings of various groups and institutions in Canadian society in terms of the students' perceived trust in those groups and institutions. To some extent, this point has already been discussed earlier in the chapter when the focus was on the correspondence between this sample and national samples. However, that discussion was brief and less detailed. Here, a comparison of the full range of groups and institutions is possible, along with more complex data analysis than that which was possible in the comparison to Gallup data earlier.

While it is not our foremost concern, some might find it interesting that the ranking of the Senate is fifth in a group of fourteen and higher than this author would have expected from university students in political science. This would seem to result, at least in part, from the largest percentage of neutral responses ("neither trustworthy nor untrustworthy") among the fourteen items. Nevertheless, among those who hold a definite opinion, those who say it is a trustworthy institution outnumber those who say the opposite by nearly six to one. Apparently, these students are unimpressed by the oft-heard arguments that the Senate has become a "rest home for political bagmen" or that it is a "lobby from within" in the sense that Senators often hold corporate directorships which become the basis for corporate lobbying in Parliament.¹³

The above discussion is part of the overall concern raised by such issues, i.e., do people have trust in their political institutions? Gallup polls released on October 2, 1982 and August 4, 1979 have shown

that political institutions tend to fare well against some social groups and poorly against others. The data in Table XV, drawn from these two polls, can be compared to Table XIV. The poor showing of M.P.'s, as compared to building contractors as one example, is reason enough for concern in the first half of Table XV. However, the second half shows the House of Commons faring slightly better than large corporations on a related but distinct question. Given the lower rating given to political parties in the second half, it is possible to conclude that respondents make conceptual distinctions between the institution of the House of Commons and the parties which occupy the House. This might account for the poor showing of M.P.'s in the first half; they are seen more as party members than as member of a respected institution. By the same token, the difference between the House of Commons and M.P.'s in the two halves of the table might just as easily reflect the respondent's distinction between respect and confidence on the one hand and honesty and ethical standards on the other.

The ranking of the various political (or quasi-political in the case of, e.g., the media) institutions is also of interest, particularly though not exclusively, for public policy reasons. By this is meant that the relative honesty, confidence or trust in an institution may have an effect on the way the public reacts to proposed policy remedies. For example, it would seem that remedies employing the courts will be better received than remedies which rely on committee investigations in the House of Commons or on publicity or disclosure in the relatively less trusted mass media. Also of policy consequence is the possibility that repeated offences against social norms regarding ethical political behaviour may be linked to the low

TABLE XV: DATA ON ETHICAL STANDARDS AND RESPECT, GALLUP POLLS

"How would you rate the honesty and ethical standards of the people in these different fields - very high, high, average, low or very low?"

	HIGH OR VERY HIGH	AVERAGE	LOW OR VERY LOW	CAN'T SAY
Doctors	59%	33%	7%	1%
Police Officers	52	41	7	1
Engineers	43	49	4	4
University Teachers	40	50	7	3
Psychiatrists	28	52	14	6
Lawyers	28	48	23	2
Journalists	21	51	25	3
Business Executives	18	61	18	3
Building Contractors	18	59	20	3
Members of Parliament	14	46	39	1
Advertising Executives	13	56	29	2
Labour Union Leaders	12	34	52	2

"Would you tell me how much respect and confidence you, yourself, have in ... (name group) — a great deal, quite a lot, some or very little?"

	GREAT DEAL, QUITE A LOT	SOME	VERY LITTLE	NO OPINION
Church, organized religion	60%	27%	12%	2%
Supreme Court	57	21	8	14
Public Schools	54	29	12	4
House of Commons	38	36	15	11
Newspapers	37	38	22	3
Large Corporations	34	35	24	8
Political Parties	30	43	22	5
Labour Unions	23	34	36	7

Sources: Top: Gallup Report, October 2, 1982; Bottom: Gallup Report, August 4, 1979.

levels of trust exhibited towards some of the political institutions. For this reason, the trust index noted in Table XIV (a composite of the scores for all 14 items) will be supplemented by data on individual items and by two variations of the trust index (one political, one

6.

general) in the analysis of bivariate relationships to take place in the next chapter, in order to discover whether or not the concept of trust can be applied to single institutions or if it is a generalized concept which applies to all social institutions. While the latter is clearly quite possible, the former seems, at first glance, to be the more common pattern of attitudes. It is this potential for transference of the effects of individual events to either specific institutions or to all political institutions in general which must also be given due policy consideration.¹⁴

Political knowledge can be measured in a variety of ways, for example, by asking respondents to identify the holders of certain political offices or to describe the nature of such offices. For a study of political corruption, a more useful measure of political knowledge might be awareness of, and especially knowledge about, events that have been identified, largely by the mass media, as scandals or corrupt affairs. A list of 13 such items was drawn up (though one was a "phony" case, used to identify those who might say they are aware of almost any political event in order to avoid appearing ill-informed), and students were asked if they had heard of any of the events and, further, if they could identify any names places, etc. which would indicate some knowledge about these events. Except for the comparison of the student sample to national samples on Watergate discussed earlier in this chapter, no other such comparisons are possible as there are no data on these events (or any other such events) from national samples. The results of the student sample are shown in Table XVI, with a breakdown in terms of those who said they had heard of the event and had a correct, or at least vague, knowledge about the event;

those who had heard of the event but gave incorrect information or no information at all about the event; and those who said they had not heard of the event or gave no answer at all. At the bottom of the table is a composite measure called a knowledge index, which consists of the number of "yes, correct" (score 2 points) or "yes, vague" (score 1 point) answers given on 12 items (13, less the one "phony" item used as an honesty check). The range of possible scores is thus 0-24 for the knowledge index. It should be noted at the outset that while there are a number of events which had national prominence, some can be seen as having only regional significance. This bias was expected to affect scores on the knowledge index.

It is not surprising, given the vast literature on the ubiquity of the American media in Canada, that the event to be the most widely known in this country is the infamous American Watergate. However, amongst the Canadian cases, the RCMP scandal is the most widely known. It is worth noting here that the RCMP scandal does not really fit the definition of corruption used in this thesis and that there is no way to know from these data whether the students felt that the scandal was a case of corruption or that it was some other type of problem (perhaps "non-corrupt" abuse of power?).

Overall, awareness and knowledge about such incidents does not seem very widespread. Nevertheless, there is evidence of a lasting impression being left by some of the historic cases such as the Munsinger affair, the Rivard scandal and the Pacific Railway scandal, such that knowledge of these events outstrips knowledge of more recent events like the Fidinam affair, Hydrogate and Harbourgate.

Knowledge of these "corrupt" events, summarized in the knowledge

TABLE XVI: AWARENESS AND KNOWLEDGE OF POLITICAL EVENTS ALLEGED BY THE MEDIA TO BE OF DUBIOUS ETHICAL CHARACTER.
(Questionnaire, Part One, items 3 and 4).

EVENT OR "AFFAIR"	YES, CORRECT OR VAGUE	YES, INCORRECT OR NO INFO.	NO OR NO ANSWER
Watergate	86.2%	10.8%	3.0%
R.C.M.P.	64.4	17.9	17.8
Skyshops	33.3	28.9	37.7
Munsinger	21.6	16.2	62.3
Pacific Railway	12.5	28.3	59.3
Churchill Forest Ind.	12.1	18.2	69.7
Harbourgate	10.4	8.4	81.1
Rivard	9.5	9.5	81.1
Jødges	3.7	15.1	81.2
Hydrogate	2.0	8.8	89.3
Beauharnois	1.3	7.1	91.6
Fidinam	0.0	0.6	99.3

KNOWLEDGE INDEX: (Two points for a "yes" response if correct, one point for a "yes" response if vague but not incorrect. Maximum = 24, minimum = 0).

0-2: 32.3%; 3-4: 30.0%; 5-7: 21.5%; 8+: 16.2%

index, might engender three conceivable effects on attitudes toward corruption. First, this knowledge could lead to disenchantment or cynicism toward the system, manifested as censoriousness towards the kinds of activities depicted in our scenarios and a lack of political trust and efficacy. Second, a dramatically different reaction could be one of veritable nonchalance, in that such events might be seen as a necessary evil. Third, there could be no overall effect at all because points one and two cancel each other out, i.e., there might be relatively equal distributions of each attitude in the population. Further discussion awaits Chapter Nine.

We have suggested previously that party preference and, by extension, partisan intensity, might also affect attitudes toward

corruption. This would not be solely because certain allegations might be seen as biased political attacks on one's own party, though this is clearly one possible reaction to charges in specific cases. Rather, it is suggested here that, even when people are able to make the distinction between corruption as a concept and as an attack on their own political party, they will exhibit differences in the conceptualization of corruption. Perhaps this is tied to a kind of "ins-vs.-outs" attitude; this cannot be discerned by the means employed in this study. But we are capable of separating the partisan from the conceptual elements of the students' understanding of corruption by use of the scenarios and their attendant semantic differentials in concert with the data drawn from questions 10 through 13 in Part Three of the questionnaire. These questions ask respondents to indicate the federal and provincial party they "usually support" and the intensity of strength of that support. The results of these questions are to be found in Table XVII.

The data in Table XVII are of two types: the first is simply the breakdown of party support at either level of politics; the second adds the dimension of strength of party support to party preference. Because the strength question was not answered by all party supporters, the percentages in that part of the table do not necessarily equal those in the first part, i.e., some party supporters were reluctant or unable to assess their strength of support for their party at one or both levels.

Though party choice is generally rather fluid, questions 10 and 12 attempted to reduce the fluidity of party support by asking students which party they usually support in federal or provincial elections. Hence, the question of support in the next election, or support if an

election were held today, is not asked. Since predicting the university students vote in future elections was never the purpose of this thesis, this line of questioning was perceived as unnecessary.

Given that the survey was conducted in the spring of 1982, the distribution of party preferences is somewhat outside the range one would expect from the general population. Liberal support is much higher, NDP support somewhat higher, and PC support considerably lower federally. While it is more difficult to make comparisons in terms of a composite provincial party support, the results seem not too out of line with the general population, except for the support for the Parti Quebecois. The PQ received support from more than one might have expected from the general population (about 3/4 of the Laval sample) in Quebec, but this is might be consistent with expectations for university students in that province. When other campuses were considered in light of the distribution of party preferences, no other major anomalies appeared.

With the data on party preference, we have completed the analysis of the sample on demographic and political variables. To this point the sample seems to correspond roughly to expectations that might be derived from a general population. Partisanship is one major divergence from these expectations; parents' class background is another. Other variables are more consistent with general population patterns, e.g., political trust, issue-ranking, and (to an extent) political efficacy. This, of course, disregards the obvious lack of comparability on variables such as age or education. Nevertheless, almost all of the variables discussed thus far are independent variables which will be used to help explain variations which occur in

TABLE XVII: PARTISANSHIP IN THE STUDENT SAMPLE

"WHICH PARTY DO YOU USUALLY SUPPORT IN FEDERAL (PROVINCIAL) ELECTIONS?"
(Questionnaire, Part Three, items 10 and 12)

<u>PARTY</u>	<u>FEDERAL</u>	<u>PROVINCIAL</u>
Liberal	37.4%	16.6%
Progressive Conservative	31.5	33.9
New Democrat	22.6	27.7
Social Credit	0.0	4.4
Parti Quebecois	0.0	10.0
Other	1.9	1.1
None or Don't Know	6.8	6.3
	(N=270)	(N=271)

STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTITY (Questionnaire, Part Three, combines items 10 and 11 and items 12 and 13)

<u>PARTY AND STRENGTH*</u>	<u>FEDERAL</u>	<u>PROVINCIAL</u>
Strong Liberal**	14.3%	6.3%
Moderate-Weak Liberal**	23.8	11.2
Strong Progressive Conservative	17.0	18.3
Moderate-Weak Progressive Conservative	15.1	16.0
Strong New Democrat	11.7	15.7
Moderate-Weak New Democrat	11.3	12.3
Strong Social Credit	0.0	1.9
Moderate-Weak Social Credit	0.0	2.6
Strong Parti Quebecois	0.0	4.9
Moderate-Weak Parti Quebecois	0.0	5.2
None or Don't Know (independents)	6.8	6.3
	(N=265)	(N=268)

Notes: * Support for "other" parties was dropped from this part of the table because the numbers were too small to be useful.

** "Strong" equals very strong or somewhat strong and "Moderate-Weak" equals moderate or somewhat weak or very weak in items 11 and 13.

the dependent variables, which are the responses to the corruption scenarios found in Part Two of the questionnaire. While political knowledge or trust or other variables might be employed at times as dependent, or at least intervening, variables, the scenarios and the data they generate are the central concern of this study.

The Corruption Scenarios

There are nine corruption scenarios, eight of which correspond to types of corruption discussed and categorized in Chapter Three. One of the scenarios was generated to analyze a type of political behaviour which, while not widely cited as corrupt in Canadian political science literature, has been treated as such by many of my undergraduate political science students. I refer here to an oft-voiced objection to the enforcing of party discipline by means of the party withdrawing organizational and financial support from a "maverick" legislator. Thus, it may be useful to employ a scenario (Part Two, item 8) which reflects this sense of corruption because it may indicate that the way people (students) use the word "corrupt" differs significantly from the way the same word is employed in academic circles. Further, some types of corruption, most notable among them is vote-buying, have been excluded from the series of scenarios because pre-tests uncovered a degree of resistance amongst respondents to the length and repetitiveness of the questionnaire.¹⁵ This objection was raised both towards the scenarios and, more strenuously, toward the number of semantic differentials. The result of the pretesting was a series of nine scenarios on the following types of events or behaviours: (1)

nepotism, (2) patronage, (3) pork-barreling, (4) bribery, (5) campaign financing, (6) legislative conflict of interest, (7) influence-peddling, (8) party discipline of a maverick legislator, and (9) bureaucratic conflict of interest. These scenarios can be found in their full form in Part Two of the questionnaire in the Appendix. As one might discover, care was taken to ensure that the scenarios were not uniformly "black" or uniformly serious examples of a given type of behaviour. On the latter point, influence-peddling — as one example — may have more serious dimensions than that which is included in our scenario, as the example given has received a neutral, i.e. neither ethical nor unethical, rating in the past.¹⁶

The scenarios are accompanied by thirteen (or, in the case of Quebec and British-Columbia, fourteen) semantic differentials asking respondents to rate the scenarios according to their closeness to either of two polar concepts. These include such examples as "corrupt-not corrupt" and "common-rare", among others, and are intended to elicit various dimensions of the conceptualization of corruption. The responses to these scenarios and their attendant semantic differentials can be found in Table XVIII. In this table, responses have been summarized in terms of mean scores, standard deviations, "salience" scores, and percentage of responses on the left side (e.g., corrupt) and right side (e.g., not corrupt) of the respective continua. Neutral responses are excluded.

The first two measures in the table, means and standard deviations, are not normally applied to ordinal data such as that provided by the semantic differentials. However, we are following the approach of Beard and Horn in this matter and they employ these

measures for their own ordinal "scales", though no discussion of the appropriateness of these measures is offered.¹⁷ It is suggested here that the need to understand the degree of variation in attitudes toward corruption and the lack of useful measures of variance based on the more appropriate median statistic are sufficient reason for using the less appropriate and less rigorous approach employed here. This less rigorous method is frequently applied in studies using Thurstone, Likert and Guttman scales even though intervalness is not accepted by all statisticians.¹⁸ While it is not argued that the scales used here are as rigorous as Guttman scales, etc., the cautious, exploratory use of interval level statistics in this regard is not seen as problematic. The third measure, a salience score, is not included as relevant to this type of argument and need not be covered by a caveat such as that already directed at the use of means and standard deviations.

The three measures in Table XVIII, then, are intended to measure (even if statistically approximate) three elements in the respondents' attitudes: average position on the differentials, the variation in these attitudes, and the "salience" of these concepts and scenarios for the respondents. While the first two measures are standard statistics, the third is a novel statistic designed by the author especially for this study. The issue of salience was thought to be of concern because it was unclear if, given the novelty of the scenarios and their differentials, the measures of attitudes toward corruption would be meaningful to the respondents. By this is meant that if the measures were not meaningful, if they did not impart meaning to the respondents, then large numbers of respondents would either register a neutral (neither A nor B) response or they might omit any response whatsoever.

TABLE XVIII: RATINGS OF "CORRUPTION" SCENARIOS

SCENARIO #1: NEPOTISM (Questionnaire, Part Two, item 1).

<u>POLAR CONCEPTS (1-7)*</u>	<u>MEAN**</u>	<u>STAND. DEV.**</u>	<u>SALIENCE***</u>	<u>%L*</u>	<u>%R*</u>
Corrupt-Not Corrupt	2.140	1.323	.919	86.0	7.2
Common-Rare	2.868	1.633	.892	73.2	16.6
Necessary-Unnecessary	6.052	2.307	.855	5.6	82.6
Important-Unimportant	2.773	1.627	.791	69.2	12.9
Provincial-Federal	3.629	1.229	.370	28.9	10.4
Federal-Local	4.454	1.578	.569	19.0	40.5
Local-Provincial	3.348	1.437	.566	46.1	13.5
Undemocratic-Democratic	1.877	1.136	.872	88.4	2.5
American-Canadian	3.722	1.144	.303	24.2	7.8
PC-NDP	3.642	1.154	.343	28.3	8.2
Liberal-PC	3.722	1.205	.327	24.2	10.3
NDP-Liberal	4.262	1.136	.350	10.3	26.6
Liberal-PQ (Laval only)	3.310	1.312	.424	41.4	6.9
Social Credit-NDP (UBC only)	3.405	1.142	.375	35.1	5.4
English Can.-French Can.	4.060	1.018	.249	11.4	14.9

SCENARIO #2: PATRONAGE (Questionnaire, Part Two, item 2).

<u>POLAR CONCEPTS (1-7)</u>	<u>MEAN</u>	<u>STAND. DEV.</u>	<u>SALIENCE</u>	<u>%L</u>	<u>%R</u>
Corrupt-Not Corrupt	3.702	1.877	.815	50.3	32.5
Common-Rare	2.169	1.296	.939	87.5	6.8
Necessary-Unnecessary	3.841	1.812	.808	46.9	35.9
Important-Unimportant	2.756	1.362	.822	75.3	9.8
Provincial-Federal	4.182	1.341	.421	17.9	26.8
Federal-Local	3.535	1.521	.630	44.7	21.6
Local-Provincial	4.484	1.423	.593	18.4	43.8
Undemocratic-Democratic	3.215	1.675	.731	56.0	20.4
American-Canadian	3.720	1.327	.377	26.2	13.5
PC-NDP	3.689	1.073	.333	27.6	7.4
Liberal-PC	3.867	1.080	.306	20.4	12.2
NDP-Liberal	4.358	1.038	.316	5.7	27.7
Liberal-PQ (Laval only)	3.897	0.772	.242	17.2	10.3
Social Credit-NDP (UBC only)	3.514	1.044	.300	27.0	5.4
English Can.-French Can.	4.011	0.876	.199	10.0	11.0

NOTES: All notes can be found at the end of the table.

TABLE XVIII: (CONTINUED): RATINGS OF "CORRUPTION" SCENARIOS

SCENARIO #3: PORK-BARRELING (Questionnaire, Part Two, item 3).

<u>POLAR CONCEPTS (1-7)*</u>	<u>STAND.</u>		<u>SALIENCE</u>	<u>%L</u>	<u>%R</u>
	<u>MEAN</u>	<u>DEV.</u>			
Corrupt-Not Corrupt	3.793	1.915	.764	45.5	32.8
Common-Rare	2.264	1.261	.912	84.8	6.8
Necessary-Unnecessary	4.266	1.794	.761	35.6	42.6
Important-Unimportant	3.021	1.495	.768	66.0	13.2
Provincial-Federal	3.521	1.404	.492	38.9	13.2
Federal-Local	3.996	1.587	.566	31.0	28.8
Local-Provincial	4.425	1.494	.556	19.3	39.6
Undemocratic-Democratic	3.642	1.690	.673	44.3	26.6
American-Canadian	3.911	1.003	.276	17.9	11.4
PC-NDP	3.627	1.024	.337	29.4	6.5
Liberal-PC	3.986	1.009	.259	14.7	12.9
NDP-Liberal	4.357	0.981	.310	4.6	28.2
Liberal-PQ (Laval only)	3.897	0.976	.303	24.1	10.3
Social Credit-NDP (UBC only)	3.432	1.119	.325	29.7	5.4
English Can.-French Can.	4.018	0.667	.155	7.6	9.0

SCENARIO #4: BRIBERY (Questionnaire, Part Two, item 4).

<u>POLAR CONCEPTS (1-7)</u>	<u>STAND.</u>		<u>SALIENCE</u>	<u>%L</u>	<u>%R</u>
	<u>MEAN</u>	<u>DEV.</u>			
Corrupt-Not Corrupt	1.274	0.757	.987	97.6	1.4
Common-Rare	3.586	1.734	.828	56.2	28.1
Necessary-Unnecessary	5.818	1.456	.832	8.4	78.0
Important-Unimportant	2.592	1.697	.825	72.9	13.4
Provincial-Federal	3.713	1.231	.404	30.8	12.2
Federal-Local	4.277	1.515	.529	20.5	36.0
Local-Provincial	3.613	1.404	.515	37.3	17.6
Undemocratic-Democratic	2.163	1.379	.771	77.7	3.5
American-Canadian	3.444	1.097	.357	35.0	3.2
PC-NDP	3.604	0.868	.266	26.3	2.2
Liberal-PC	3.841	0.998	.242	16.6	9.4
NDP-Liberal	4.361	0.876	.239	2.2	23.5
Liberal-PQ (Laval only)	3.483	1.122	.364	20.7	3.4
Social Credit-NDP (UBC only)	3.541	1.043	.225	21.6	2.7
English Can.-French Can.	4.054	0.734	.162	8.0	9.4

TABLE XVIII: (CONTINUED): RATINGS OF "CORRUPTION" SCENARIOS

SCENARIO #5: CAMPAIGN FINANCE (Questionnaire, Part Two, item 5).

<u>POLAR CONCEPTS (1-7)*</u>	<u>MEAN</u>	<u>STAND. DEV.</u>	<u>SALIENCE</u>	<u>%L</u>	<u>%R</u>
Corrupt-Not Corrupt	4.706	1.983	.825	30.4	54.3
Common-Rare	2.512	1.671	.912	78.5	14.0
Necessary-Unnecessary	3.523	1.820	.747	52.6	25.3
Important-Unimportant	3.035	1.737	.785	63.4	18.7
Provincial-Federal	4.477	1.378	.448	11.5	36.2
Federal-Local	3.021	1.519	.620	55.2	10.3
Local-Provincial	4.873	1.376	.572	8.3	53.3
Undemocratic-Democratic	4.100	1.804	.653	31.9	37.6
American-Canadian	3.399	1.157	.401	37.7	5.4
PC-NDP	3.278	1.218	.451	43.3	5.1
Liberal-PC	4.094	1.003	.290	11.2	19.9
NDP-Liberal	4.711	1.175	.434	3.6	43.0
Liberal-PQ (Laval only)	3.310	1.285	.364	37.9	3.4
Social Credit-NDP (UBC only)	3.108	1.242	.450	45.9	2.7
English Can.-French Can.	3.790	0.692	.152	14.5	1.8

SCENARIO #6: LEGISLATIVE CONFLICT OF INTEREST (Questionnaire, Part Two, item 6).

<u>POLAR CONCEPTS (1-7)</u>	<u>MEAN</u>	<u>STAND. DEV.</u>	<u>SALIENCE</u>	<u>%L</u>	<u>%R</u>
Corrupt-Not Corrupt	2.667	1.688	.875	75.3	14.1
Common-Rare	2.918	1.380	.815	71.2	11.6
Necessary-Unnecessary	5.071	1.627	.707	14.1	60.1
Important-Unimportant	2.687	1.481	.798	74.3	9.2
Provincial-Federal	4.082	1.351	.424	22.1	22.9
Federal-Local	3.383	1.510	.515	40.8	14.4
Local-Provincial	4.685	1.365	.515	11.1	43.7
Undemocratic-Democratic	2.780	1.599	.727	65.2	11.3
American-Canadian	3.556	1.012	.347	31.9	5.0
PC-NDP	3.384	1.106	.407	39.1	4.3
Liberal-PC	3.932	1.089	.327	17.9	16.8
NDP-Liberal	4.611	1.088	.391	3.2	38.2
Liberal-PQ (Laval only)	3.586	1.296	.394	37.9	6.9
Social Credit-NDP (UBC only)	3.081	1.140	.450	48.6	0.0
English Can.-French Can.	3.902	0.667	.141	12.0	3.3

TABLE XVIII: (CONTINUED): RATINGS OF "CORRUPTION" SCENARIOS

SCENARIO #7: INFLUENCE-PEDDLING (Questionnaire, Part Two, item 7).

<u>POLAR CONCEPTS (1-7)*</u>	<u>MEAN</u>	<u>STAND. DEV.</u>	<u>SALIENCE</u>	<u>%L</u>	<u>%R</u>
Corrupt-Not Corrupt	3.804	1.730	.751	44.3	32.3
Common-Rare	2.986	1.501	.855	70.6	16.0
Necessary-Unnecessary	4.547	1.705	.764	28.6	50.5
Important-Unimportant	3.624	1.623	.754	51.9	26.1
Provincial-Federal	3.796	1.302	.421	28.7	16.1
Federal-Local	4.014	1.528	.542	28.3	30.1
Local-Provincial	4.110	1.492	.508	24.9	28.8
Undemocratic-Democratic	3.560	1.461	.630	45.0	21.3
American-Canadian	3.825	0.962	.279	20.7	8.9
PC-NDP	3.525	1.030	.350	32.5	4.6
Liberal-PC	4.125	0.963	.293	11.8	19.3
NDP-Liberal	4.466	0.988	.340	3.9	32.3
Liberal-PQ (Laval only)	3.741	1.059	.273	25.9	7.4
Social Credit-NDP (UBC only)	3.676	1.082	.250	21.6	5.4
English Can.-French Can.	3.917	0.462	.098	7.9	2.5

SCENARIO #8: PARTY DISCIPLINE (Questionnaire, Part Two, item 8)

<u>POLAR CONCEPTS (1-7)</u>	<u>MEAN</u>	<u>STAND. DEV.</u>	<u>SALIENCE</u>	<u>%L</u>	<u>%R</u>
Corrupt-Not Corrupt	3.194	1.903	.828	62.6	22.5
Common-Rare	2.426	1.348	.882	83.5	6.5
Necessary-Unnecessary	4.187	1.972	.838	40.1	46.0
Important-Unimportant	2.471	1.387	.842	78.9	7.6
Provincial-Federal	4.421	1.331	.374	8.9	30.7
Federal-Local	2.867	1.477	.626	59.1	7.5
Local-Provincial	4.968	1.462	.599	8.9	54.6
Undemocratic-Democratic	2.849	1.713	.774	65.8	15.1
American-Canadian	4.484	1.392	.428	13.0	32.9
PC-NDP	3.594	1.021	.354	30.2	7.1
Liberal-PC	3.705	1.106	.330	24.9	10.0
NDP-Liberal	4.427	1.113	.350	6.1	31.2
Liberal-PQ (Laval only)	3.786	1.258	.333	28.6	10.7
Social Credit-NDP (UBC only)	3.838	0.727	.275	21.6	8.1
English Can.-French Can.	3.957	0.617	.125	8.3	5.0

TABLE XVIII: (CONTINUED): RATINGS OF "CORRUPTION" SCENARIOS

SCENARIO #9: BUREAUCRATIC CONFLICT OF INTEREST (Questionnaire, Part Two, Item 9).

<u>POLAR CONCEPTS (1-7)*</u>	STAND.		<u>SALIENCE</u>	<u>%L</u>	<u>%R</u>
	<u>MEAN</u>	<u>DEV.</u>			
Corrupt-Not Corrupt	2.907	1.723	.879	64.6	26.8
Common-Rare	3.498	1.523	.785	50.0	26.8
Necessary-Unnecessary	5.261*	1.469	.724	15.0	60.0
Important-Unimportant	2.912	1.560	.791	62.0	19.0
Provincial-Federal	4.057	1.226	.394	25.0	12.5
Federal-Local	3.532	1.399	.508	33.7	17.5
Local-Provincial	4.311	1.349	.498	23.7	27.5
Undemocratic-Democratic	3.057	1.458	.657	62.5	6.2
American-Canadian	3.745	0.860	.263	20.3	6.3
PC-NDP	3.543	0.956	.327	35.4	5.1
Liberal-PC	3.971	1.040	.279	8.9	27.8
NDP-Liberal	4.402	0.977	.290	2.5	31.6
Liberal-PQ (Laval only)	3.857	1.044	.242	21.4	7.1
Social Credit-NDP (UBC only)	3.405	1.013	.275	29.7	0.0
English Can.-French Can.	3.913	0.602	.148	15.2	5.1

NOTES FOR TABLE XVIII:

* Polar concepts refers to the concepts found at either end of the semantic differentials for each scenario. The term on the left is valued at one, the term on the right has a value of seven. A neutral response is coded as four. (The higher the mean, the closer the average response is to the term on the right. The lower the mean, the closer the average is to the term on the left. Neutral averages approach 4.0). Thus, "%L" refers to the % judging the scenario closer to the term on the left, "%R", closer to the right. Neutral responses are omitted.

** While means and standard deviations are not normally appropriate for ordinal data, semantic differentials have come to be treated in this way as a matter of practice. (see, e.g., Beard and Horn, op. cit., passim). The standard deviation is provided so that the reader may appraise the degree of consensus or dissensus on a particular concept. The lower the standard deviation, the greater the consensus.

*** Saliency measures the degree to which the concepts noted elicit meaningful responses from the respondents. I.e., meaningful responses are those which take a position, pro or con, and exclude all responses which are neutral or missing.

$$\text{Saliency} = \frac{N - (\text{neutral} + \text{missing responses})}{N}$$

The higher the saliency (maximum = 1.0), the more meaningful the concept was to the respondents.

Thus, as this study is quite exploratory, the meaningfulness of the questions was not supported by previous research. It would be possible then to find that the questions (or, more accurately, the scenarios and their differentials) drew only a few respondents into the process of differentiating between the various concepts under each scenario. If so, could one then argue that — out of those having an opinion — so many thought a scenario was corrupt and so many thought it was not? This would be acceptable, but only if more than a handful of respondents could be said to have an opinion which permits some differentiation. Thus the salience score was conceived as the total number of meaningful responses divided by the total number of responses. Or, to put it in another way, salience equals the total number of responses minus the combined number of neutral and missing (i.e., no answer) responses, divided by the total number of responses. As one can see, and we shall come back to this point soon, there was an expectedly wide range in the scenario scores.

With the above methodological points behind us, let us examine the data themselves. (In order to facilitate comparisons of data in Table XVIII, rankings of means, standard deviations and salience scores for each scenario and each differential are provided in Table XIX). First among our concerns are the ways in which the various scenarios compare in terms of the mean ratings (as opposed to rankings) on their appropriate scenarios, which might be seen as a summary or "average" rating accorded to the differentials by the respondents. Discussion of variation and salience follows.

Table XIX indicates clearly which scenario is perceived as the most corrupt and which is perceived as the least. However, the

absolute ratings are of equal concern. It is clear, for example, that bribery is thought to be the most corrupt scenario, an observation which accords with our earlier expectations noted in Chapter Three. Nepotism ranked second in this regard and so on. It is interesting to note that, of the nine scenarios, only one was thought to be — on the average — not corrupt. This scenario dealt with campaign finance. All scenarios were thought to be relatively common occurrences however, though a glance at Table XIX would indicate impressionistically that there is an inverse relationship between corruptness and common occurrence. This is clearly to be expected, e.g., if bribery is seen as the most corrupt of the behaviours mentioned, it is likely too that it is not the most frequently perpetrated given widespread legal and attitudinal opprobrium. Of course the relationship is not perfect, but it is nevertheless a reasonably strong one with Spearmans rho = $-.48$.

Of the nine scenarios, only two are seen as moderately necessary. The most necessary of these, and thus a candidate for a functionalist argument, is campaign finance. Still necessary, though less so than campaign finance, is patronage. Like the former, patronage too seems to be viewed through the eyes of the functionalist argument. As noted in Chapter Four, the functionalist approach to corruption proceeds from the assumption that certain activities are necessary to the proper functioning or survival of the social system. The students apparently feel this notion applies to campaign finance activities and patronage activities such as those described in the scenarios. The overall picture is rather like that of the common-rare continuum in that the necessity of the activity is inversely related to the activity's corrupt nature (as defined by the students). I.e., the more corrupt

TABLE XIX: RANK-ORDERINGS OF CORRUPTION SCENARIOS COMPARING SEMANTIC DIFFERENTIALS, ACCORDING TO MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND SALIENCE SCORES.

COMPARING MEANS	SCENARIOS:	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>
Corrupt-Not Corrupt		2	6	7	1	9	3	8	5	4
Common-Rare		5	1	2	9	4	6	7	3	8
Necessary-Unnecessary		9	2	4	8	1	6	5	3	7
Important-Unimportant		5	4	7	2	8	3	9	1	6
Provincial-Federal		2	7	1	3	9	6	4	8	5
Federal-Local		9	5	6	8	2	3	7	1	4
Local-Provincial		1	6	5	2	8	7	3	9	4
Undemocratic-Democratic		1	6	8	2	9	3	7	4	5
American-Canadian		5	4	8	2	1	3	7	9	6
PC-NDP		8	9	7	6	1	2	3	5	4
Liberal-PC		2	4	7	3	8	5	9	1	6
NDP-Liberal		1	3	2	4	9	8	7	6	5
Liberal-PQ (laval only)		1+	8+	8+	3	1+	4	5	6	7
Socred-NDP (UBC only)		3	6	5	7	2	1	8	9	3
English Can.-French Can.		9	6	7	8	1	2	4	5	3

Note: Rank-order is in terms of the mean score closest to the term on the left side of the differential. E.g., on the "corrupt-not corrupt" differential, scenario number 4 was scored as the most corrupt by the respondents.

COMPARING STANDARD DEVIATIONS	SCENARIOS:	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>
Corrupt-Not Corrupt		2	6	8	1	9	3	5	7	4
Common-Rare		7	2	1	9	8	4	5	3	6
Necessary-Unnecessary		1	7	6	2	8	4	5	9	3
Important-Unimportant		7	1	4	8	9	3	6	2	5
Provincial-Federal		2	6	9	3	7	8	4	5	1
Federal-Local		8	6	9	4	5	3	7	2	1
Local-Provincial		6	5	9	4	3	2	8	7	1
Undemocratic-Democratic		1	6	7	2	9	5	4	8	3
American-Canadian		6	8	3	5	7	4	2	9	1
PC-NDP		8	6	4	1	9	7	5	3	2
Liberal-PC		9	6	4	2	3	7	1	8	5
NDP-Liberal		8	5	4	1	9	6	3	7	2
Liberal-PQ (laval only)		9	1	2	5	7	8	4	6	3
Socred-NDP (UBC only)		8	4	6	3	9	7	5	1	2
English Can.-French Can.		9	8	4+	7	6	4+	1	3	2

Note: A ranking of 1 means that, on the given differential, the scenario showed the highest level of consensus.

TABLE XIX: (CONTINUED): RANK-ORDERINGS OF CORRUPTION SCENARIOS

COMPARING SALIENCE	SCENARIOS:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Corrupt-Not Corrupt		2	7	8	1	6	4	9	5	3
Common-Rare		4	1	2+	7	2+	8	6	5	9
Necessary-Unnecessary		1	4	6	3	7	9	5	2	8
Important-Unimportant		5+	3	8	2	7	4	9	1	5+
Provincial-Federal		9	4+	1	6	2	3	4+	8	7
Federal-Local		4	1	5	7	3	8	6	2	9
Local-Provincial		4	2	5	6+	3	6+	8	1	9
Undemocratic-Democratic		1	4	6	3	8	5	9	2	7
American-Canadian		6	3	8	4	2	5	7	1	9
PC-NDP		5	7	6	9	1	2	4	3	8
Liberal-PC		2+	4	8	9	6	2+	5	1	7
NDP-Liberal		3+	6	7	9	1	2	5	3+	8
Liberal-PQ (Laval only)		1	8+	6	3+	3+	2	7	5	8+
Sacred-NDP (UBC only)		3	5	4	9	1+	1+	8	6+	6+
English Can.-French Can.		1	2	4	3	5	7	9	8	6

Note: + For all parts of the table (+) indicates a tie in rank.

the activity is in the students' perception, the less necessary it is. (Spearman's $\rho = -.82$). Thus, from the viewpoint of our sample at least, the functionality of any dubious activity, ethically speaking, is dependent upon that activity being only marginally corrupt or even not corrupt. This might project a chicken-and-egg argument, as it may be the case that part of the student's thinking as to what constitutes corruption may be bound up in the activities' perceived necessity.

The ratings on the "important-unimportant" continuum produced a mild surprise: the party discipline scenario was perceived as the most important scenario, even though it ranked only fifth in terms of its corruptness. The surprise is mild only because, as mentioned earlier, party discipline has been a source of continuing complaint and irritation among my own undergraduate students in political science

and, apparently, among the general public as well. Indeed, the general public might also consider such discipline to be corrupt. However, discussions of party discipline in Canadian political science literature rarely use the word corruption to describe this type of behaviour. The overall picture of the ratings finds that there is a mild positive relationship between the scenarios' ratings on corruption and those on importance, in that those which are seen as more corrupt are also seen as more important. The relationship, though, is not especially strong, with Spearman's $\rho = +.30$.

Of the remaining differentials, only three have a salience which is consistently .500 or higher. This means that only these have more than half of their responses in the meaningful range as we have earlier defined it, and that all other differentials have more than half their responses in the "neutral or neither one or the other" category or in the missing category (i.e., no response given). This lack of salience does not preclude an assessment of these aspects of corruption, but it does indicate that great care be employed in an analysis of these aspects. For this reason, they should receive separate consideration. Of the three which remain to be considered among the more salient aspects of corruption, two are related to one which is in the less salient category. The reference here is to the "federal-local" dimension or differential and to the "local-provincial" dimension. (The "provincial-federal" dimension had a salience of less than .500 in every scenario). The other more salient dimension is the "undemocratic-democratic" differential.

The undemocratic nature of these scenarios is borne out by the collective opinion that eight of the nine activities are so classified.

The only scenario to be described as democratic is the one dealing with campaign finance. The most undemocratic scenario is nepotism, followed by bribery and legislative conflict of interest. That the concept of corruption is possibly defined in large part by the respondents' conception of what is or is not democratic is reflected in the extremely strong rank-order correlation between the corrupt and undemocratic dimensions, with Spearman's $\rho = +.95$. I.e., the more corrupt the scenario, the more undemocratic it is said to be. This observation makes the public interest element of the earlier definition discussion (Chapter Three) particularly interesting, especially if one is willing to accept the notion that the public opinion theory of public interest can be seen as a "democratic" element. This does not mean that the application of the term democratic makes definitions of corruption culture-bound, for democratic could easily be replaced with another adjective of equally central significance to other political systems for which democratic is a peripheral cultural concept. But in a Western democracy such as Canada, democracy has at least mythical or symbolic centrality which is apparently seen as violated by corrupt acts. Democracy, and perhaps by extension public interest, become key aspects in the defining of activities as corrupt. This connection has not been so clearly made in previous research. Further, this connection conjures up images of potential damage to the legitimacy of the state, and of the state's public policy process, when that legitimacy is based at least partly on the state's democratic nature. Policies made by regimes thought to be corrupt, hence undemocratic, may be perceived as lacking in legitimacy and thus resisted in attitude, if not in action. The connection between corruption and democracy, even

if some of the logical leaps described here are too tenuous, stands out in bold relief.

The two remaining differentials having a salience of at least .500 are intended to draw out a recognition, justified or not, that corruption is more readily associated with one level of government or another. As implied above, the distinction between federal and provincial was not particularly relevant to the students. Salience on this dimension never rose above .500 on any of the nine scenarios, and the average salience for all nine was only .416. Moreover, there was no clear pattern of pro-federal or pro-provincial responses, with four scenarios being seen as more provincial and the remainder more federal. In none of these cases was the "leaning" in either direction particularly acute. Nevertheless, it is interesting to find that students thought that pork-barreling was more closely related to provincial matters (perhaps due to the scenarios' reference to highways?) and the campaign finance scenario to the federal level. Nepotism, bribery and influence-peddling were also seen as more closely related to the provincial level. The two remaining continua which dealt with distinctions in the levels of governments were considerably more salient to the students. On the federal-local scale, six scenarios were seen to be more relevant to the federal level and only three to the local level. These three were nepotism, bribery and influence-peddling. It is interesting to note that the notion advanced by James Scott and Peter Bruton et al. seems to be somewhat relevant here. If bribery and nepotism are seen as the most corrupt activities, the expectation would be that the federal government, as the ultimate guarantor of democracy, would be seen as the most free from these forms

of corruption. Indeed, they are. However, the federal government is not seen as free from other, less vile, forms of corruption. There is, then, a hierarchy which applies to the two most corrupt, for bribery and nepotism are also seen as more local than provincial. Again, the hierarchy does not apply across the board, but on the two most "vile" forms of corruption, there is greater association of these behaviours at the lower levels of government. Spearman's rho for each differential was less than $\pm .50$.

The remaining scenarios were particularly lacking in salience. While the number of missing cases for even the least salient of differentials, the "English-French" continuum, was only about six per cent on average, the number of salient or meaningful responses averaged from about 35% on the PC - NDP differential to only 16% on the English-French scale. This does not mean that neutral responses are not of interest. Rather, it signifies that the remaining differentials did not differentiate concepts well for most respondents. For example, on the English-French question, more than three-quarters of the students could not perceive a difference between these linguistic groups in terms of the scenarios, thus rendering any observation about whether or not a given activity is seen as more closely related to one or the other group very problematic. Indeed, the majority of respondents could not differentiate between the two polar concepts in most of the cases which we have left aside to this point. The comments about which side the respondents lean toward must therefore be taken as very cautious and lacking in salience in these cases.

The "American-Canadian" differential, suggested by Canadian reaction to Watergate, does indicate some generalized support for the

notion that American politics are perceived as more corrupt, at least among those who have an opinion in this regard. The scenarios are perceived as more closely related to the American end of the continuum in eight of the nine scenarios, with the party discipline issue being the only exception. For about 60% of the sample, however, this distinction cannot be made. Likewise for the party scales, there are at least 60% who cannot distinguish between parties. Among those who have an opinion, Liberals are seen as more corrupt than Conservatives, and they in turn as more corrupt than the NDP. (Perhaps this is the result of "ins-vs.-outs" thinking, but that cannot be resolved here). Campaign finance, bribery, and legislative conflict of interest are the most "American" of the scenarios. None of the scenarios is seen as closer to the NDP end of the continuum, even in the case of the comparison of Social Credit and the NDP in British Columbia. In contradistinction, in all comparisons but two (both with the Conservatives) the differentials are seen as closer to the Liberals. The two exceptions in the comparison against the PC's are campaign finance and influence-peddling. In all of these cases, i.e. all the party differentials and the American-Canadian differential, the caveat must be repeated: only about one-third of the respondents had an opinion on these matters. Yet, having said this, it is important that we do not dismiss these opinions too lightly, for the opinion of one-third of the public can be a powerful opinion. Elections are won and lost on shifts of opinion by much fewer than one-third of the electorate.

The English-French continuum has been saved for last because it is by far the least salient dimension of all. Whereas all those discussed

7

1.0

1.1

1.25

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

2.2

2.5

2.8

3.2

3.6

4.0

4.5

5.0

5.6

6.3

7.1

8.0

9.0

10

NEC

Yet, in contrast, - though bribery is one of the most salient of scenarios, it is also among those with the lowest variations in attitude. These data on salience and variation, then, are not only to be applied to the differentials but to the scenarios as well. The varying importance of the measure of variation can be exemplified by reference to bribery, wherein there is very little variation in the attitude that bribery is corrupt. But the lack of variation which occurs on the English-French continuum under influence-peddling indicates that, rather than the significance of the consensus on bribery, what we see is a lack of significance which is more or less consistent among the vast majority of respondents. In other words, one should consider both the standard deviation and the salience in analyzing the data in Table XVIII.

The data presented in these two tables allows us then to "hone-in" on the definition of corruption employed by ordinary citizens (to the extent that our sample is a reasonable approximation thereof). The most glaring feature of this definition is that it is bound up in the respondents' concept of democracy. Corruption is undemocratic activity. Second, it is considered to be unnecessary activity, yet relatively common in its occurrence. Individual types of activities can be seen to be more or less corrupt, more or less common and more or less necessary. The same might also be said of the importance of the acts illustrated in the scenarios. Different types of corruption are most closely identified with some levels of government than with others, and with certain political parties rather than with others. To some extent, corruption is seen as more closely associated with American politics than Canadian, but there is little association made with

either major linguistic group. The consensus and salience regarding some types of corruption are higher than for others. In the final analysis, some types of corruption are by interpretation of these data, certainly more "black" (to use Heidenheimer's phrase again) than others. Moreover, we have at least one example of an activity which is becoming increasingly black in law though the survey indicates that the activity is not corrupt and is democratic. The reference is, of course, to limits on campaign finance, which — though thought not to be corrupt — revealed the greatest degree of variation in opinion of any scenario or any differential. We have another example of an activity the public (or at least our student sample) would like to define as corrupt for which there is not existing legal sanction and for which no such sanction has been seriously contemplated by Canadian governments, to the author's knowledge. The reference in this case is to the scenario on party discipline.

In the concluding chapter (Chapter Ten), broader reference to these aspects of the conceptualization of corruption will be made. At this point, it seems enough to say that the data on the corruption scenarios are enlightening and interesting and that they may have consequence not only for academic research, but for public policy as well. In order to make this argument in greater detail, however, further analysis is required before one can say with sufficient confidence that what we have found at this juncture is not merely an artifact of our research methods, but meaningful data which will help our understanding of corruption.

NOTES

1. See Hadley Cantril, The Patterns of Human Concern (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1965). It should be noted that research has shown that many respondents are unable to cite even three issues when confronted by an open-ended question. Indeed, in the 1974 national election survey, 30% could not even name one issue. See Harold D. Clarke et al., Political Choice in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979), pp. 244-246.
2. The wording of the Gallup polls was as follows: "What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?" While the question uses the word "problem" (Gallup Report, February 7, 1983), the brief analysis in the release uses the word "issue". The exact wording in the student survey can be found in the Appendix, questionnaire Part One, item 1.
3. Gallup Report, August 4, 1979 and October 2, 1982. For the purposes of rank-order correlations, only those items which are equivalent can be used. For a complete listing of all groups and institutions, see Tables XIV and XV below. One might note the similarity in actual percentages saying trustworthy or very trustworthy (or the equivalent) in the two Gallup polls and the student survey. The students tend to give higher trust ratings (keeping in mind the rather rough nature of the equivalences), but give much lower ratings to the mass media, than the general population. Rank orders in Table IX are based on the percentages saying "high or very high" or the equivalent.
4. Clarke et al., op cit., p. 32; see Appendix below, Part Three, item 14. Wording in Table X is taken from the student survey, but is roughly equivalent to that in the Clarke study.
5. To the extent that one can generalize on this point, the political socialization literature of the 1960's seemed to confirm the popular notion of a "generation gap" between university students and their parents (or at least their parent's age cohort) in terms of political attitudes. However, it can be argued that this

- analysis is either illusory or temporary as it was affected by the rather unusual circumstance of the Vietnam war protest movement. On this debate see Seymour M. Lipset, "Youth and Politics," in Robert K. Merton and Robert Misbet, eds., Contemporary Social Problems (3rd edition; New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1971), pp. 743-791.
6. Data on gender breakdowns in political science enrollment in Canada are not readily available, and American data from which extrapolation can be made are, at best, indirect, relating as they do to gender differences in political science degrees earned. For example, in 1982, 32.4% of all Ph.D. recipients and 36.7% of all Ph.D. recipients in the social sciences were women. But in political science only 21.8% of Ph.D. degrees were awarded to women. See Robert J.-P. Hauck, "Political Science Degrees Awarded: 1983 Update," PS, 16 (Fall, 1983), 769-770.
 7. The World Almanac: 1984 (New York: Newspaper Enterprises Association, 1983), p. 484.
 8. Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (abridged edition; New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), p. 190.
 9. John Meisel, Working Papers on Canadian Politics (2nd enlarged edition; Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1975), p. 109 and appendix, Table II.
 10. Bernard R. Blishen and Hugh A. McRoberts, "A revised socioeconomic index for occupations in Canada," Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 13 (1976), pp. 71-79.
 11. Clarke et al., op. cit., pp. 107-119.
 12. Meisel, op. cit., appendix, Table II.
 13. See, for example, John McMenemy, "Influence and Party Activity in the Senate: A Matter of Conflict of Interest?" in Paul W. Fox, ed., Politics: Canada (4th ed.; Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1977), pp. 454-461 and Colin Campbell, The Canadian Senate: A Lobby From Within (Toronto: Macmillan, 1978).

14. The "jury" is still out on this question. See for instance, Richard A. Joslyn, "Adolescent Attitudes toward the Political Process: Political Learning in the Midst of Turmoil," Polity, 9 (Spring, 1977), 373-383.
15. Pretesting of the questionnaire took place at Carleton University in 1978 and at the University of Winnipeg, the University of Alberta and Carleton University in 1980.
16. Edmund Beard and Stephen Horn, Congressional Ethics: The View from the House (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 10, ranks this type of behaviour fifth out of eight types in descending order of ethicality. It was the second highest in variation of opinion. Congressmen gave the equivalent scenario a slightly ethical rating, unless the business contributions came from outside the constituency. See also p. 30.
17. Ibid., chapter 2.
18. Regarding this "cautious flexibility" see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr. Social Statistics (second edition; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), pp. 15-25; Claire Sellitz et al., Research Methods in Social Relations (revised edition; New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1959), pp. 195-197; and G. David Garson, Handbook of Political Science Methods (Boston: Holbrook Press, 1971), chapter 7.

3

CHAPTER NINE - THE SURVEY FINDINGS II: ANALYSIS OF BIVARIATE AND MULTIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS

The analysis in the previous chapter permits us to make observations about what people believe, or at least what students believe, about corruption and related concepts. But a descriptive analysis does not allow us to discover which "types" of people, i.e., people sharing certain characteristics, feel that nepotism is corrupt or that patronage is common. These kinds of questions require analyses which move beyond the description of single variables to the analysis of the relationship between two, and sometimes more, variables. Relationships between variables, then, are the concern of this chapter. Foremost among these are the relationships which exist (or do not exist) between what we might call the "corruption" variables generated by the scenarios and their respective continua and the various socio-economic and political variables described in Chapter Eight. Other relationships which may help us understand the nature of the aforementioned relationships will be included as needed. Further, those relationships which appear to be among the most promising will be treated to control techniques to reduce the risk of spuriousness. Before moving to these concerns, however, further analysis of the concept of salience is required if we are to understand the "meaningfulness" of our corruption dimensions.

Prologue: Effects of Political and Socio-economic Variables on Salience

We have previously described, in Chapter Eight, the salience of

various scenarios and their differentials (or continua) and found some to have relatively high salience and others considerably less. We found that there were differences in the saliences of the same continua for different scenarios and differences between the saliences of the various continua for the same scenario. In any event, certain continua were consistently higher in salience, regardless of which scenario one chose as an example. Among these consistently salient continua, and the most important from the perspective of the attempt to define corruption, are the continua based on the "corrupt-not corrupt" word or concept pair. Because of the large number of possible combinations and permutations of variables, only this one key continuum was chosen for the purpose of identifying relationships between salience and the various political and socio-economic variables which are included in this survey. The intention of this exercise is to identify those variables which most clearly affect salience and which might aid in our understanding of how people conceptualize corruption.

The technique employed in this analysis is cross-tabulation of dependent variables (the saliences of individual "corrupt-not corrupt" continua from each of the nine scenarios) against independent variables (the individual political and socio-economic variables), and the application of chi-square tests of significance and either Cramer's V or gamma as the appropriate measure of association. (V applies to nominal data, gamma to ordinal). The test of whether or not an independent variable has an effect on salience is based on a significance level of .05 or less and either a V (or in the case of 2 x 2 contingency tables, Phi) of at least .15 or a gamma of at least +/- .15. Strict adherence to the .05 significance level is required by the

"less-than-representative" sample used in the survey.

A summary of those relationships found to be statistically relevant can be found in Table XX. The range of variables to be included as independent variables consists, in essence, of those items in the questionnaire in Parts One and Three. For the issue item (Part One, item 1), only the ranking of the issue of corruption was analyzed. Surprisingly, it had no statistically significant impact on the salience of the corrupt-not corrupt continua.

The individual trust items (Part One, item 2) were analyzed in terms of their individual impact, if any, on the salience of the corrupt-not corrupt continuum. Moreover, these same items were combined into three indexes: (1) TRUST — which consisted of the scores for all fourteen items added to each other and recoded into high, medium and low trust; (2) POLTRUST — which was an index based on the eight political items (a, b, c, g, i, k, l, m); and (3) GENTRUST — based on the six remaining "general" trust items. None of these three indexes of trust had any statistically significant impact on the corrupt-not corrupt continua.

However, certain individual trust items did display significant effects. Trust in clergymen was very strongly and positively associated with salience of the nepotism scenario's corrupt-not corrupt differential. A significance level of less than .005 is especially interesting, in a statistical sense, and when combined with the strong value for gamma ($\gamma = .39$) indicates the possibility that salience may be connected with some underlying and generalized moral rectitude. This would seem to contradict the notion advanced by Elkins, Blake and Johnston which we discussed in Chapter Six.¹

TABLE XX: EFFECTS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ON THE SALIENCE OF "CORRUPT-NOT CORRUPT" CONTINUA: SUMMARY

"CORRUPT" CONTINUUM FOR	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE*	% SALIENT**		ASSOC- IATION***	SIGNIFI- CANCE
Nepotism	Campus	Memorial	94.1	Y = .29	.0001
		Laval	69.7		
		Carleton	95.8		
		Winnipeg	94.0		
		U.B.C.	95.0		
	Trust in Clergy	Trust	95.7	Y = +.39	.005
		Neither	83.0		
		Distrust	82.1		
	R's social class	U. Middle	92.6	Y = +.28	.05
		Middle	94.2		
		L. Middle	91.1		
		Working	76.0		
	# of Poli. Sci. Courses	1	92.7	Y = -.25	.05
		2 - 4	96.0		
		5 & more	84.9		
Patronage	Efficacy index (A)	High	72.0	Y = -.20	.05
		Medium	87.4		
		Low	83.0		
	Prov. Party Preference	Liberal	71.1	Y = .20	.05
		PC	90.2		
		NDP	84.0		
		Other	73.8		
		None	88.2		
	Knowledge of Harbourgate	Yes	96.8	Y = +.78	.05
		No	78.9		
Pork-Barreling	Knowledge of Rivard scan.	Yes	50.0	Y = -.59	.005
		No	79.4		
	Parent's social class	U. Middle	85.9	Y = +.32	.05
		Middle	77.2		
		L. Middle	67.9		
		Working	62.5		
	Age	up to 20	82.9	Y = -.28	.05
		21-29	75.0		
		30 & over	65.4		

TABLE XX: (CONTINUED): EFFECTS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ON THE
SALIENCE OF "CORRUPT-NOT CORRUPT" CONTINUA:
SUMMARY

"CORRUPT" CONTINUUM FOR	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE*	% SALIENT**		ASSOC- IATION***	SIGNIFI- CANCE
Pork-Barreling (continued)	Campus	Memorial	85.3	V = .18	.05
		Laval	57.6		
		Carleton	77.8		
		Winnipeg	73.8		
		U.B.C.	80.0		
Campaign Finance	Knowledge of Munsinger	Yes	68.8	Y = -.49	.005
		No	86.6		
	Age	up to 20	92.3	Y = -.42	.005
		21 - 29	76.6		
		30 & over	75.0		
	Federal party preference	Liberal	88.1	V = .24	.005
		PC	89.4		
		NDP	70.5		
		None	66.7		
	Campus	Memorial	88.2	V = .22	.005
		Laval	75.8		
		Carleton	69.4		
		Winnipeg	86.9		
		U.B.C.	92.5		
	# of Poli. Sci. courses	1	88.6	Y = -.36	.01
		2 - 4	83.2		
		5 & more	71.2		
	Knowledge of Skyslips	Yes	73.7	Y = -.41	.01
		No	87.0		
	Trust in RCMP	Trust	88.5	Y = +.28	.05
		Neither	80.9		
		Distrust	75.2		
	Level of Study	1st/2nd	89.0	Y = -.37	.05
		3rd/4th	78.8		
		Graduate	67.5		

TABLE XX: (CONTINUED): EFFECTS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ON THE SALIENCE OF "CORRUPT-NOT CORRUPT" CONTINUUM: SUMMARY

"CORRUPT" CONTINUUM FOR	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE*	% SALIENT**		ASSOC-IATION***	SIGNIFI-CANCE
Party Discipline	Knowledge of Skyshops	Yes	74.7	Y = -.39	.05
		No	87.0		
	Community Size	Rural	88.7	Y = -.35	.05
		Urban, <100,000	91.2		
		Urban, >100,000	78.7		
Bureaucratic Conflict of Interest	"Politics are are too complicated..."	Agree	81.6	Y = -.28	.05
		Neither	79.2		
		Disagree	95.2		

NOTES: * Three scenarios are omitted here. Bribery has too few nonsalient cases on this continuum to be subjected to this analysis. Legislative conflict of interest and influence peddling were not affected significantly by any of the independent variables in this survey.

** Salience was coded into two values only, salient and nonsalient. There is no neutral category for this variable. Thus, if one wishes to calculate nonsalience, they need only subtract the percentage saying salient from 100%.

*** Cramer's V is used for nominal data, with a minimum strength of .15 required. Gamma (Y) requires a minimum strength of +/- .15, as ordinal data assumes a direction of association as well as strength. Significance must meet a minimum of .05 or lower in either case.

Reviewing Table XX indicates that no other individual trust item had such a strong impact on the salience of the corrupt-not corrupt continuum for nepotism or on any other scenario. Yet, one other relationship does warrant some attention in this regard. Trust in the RCMP was strongly and positively associated with the salience of the campaign finance corrupt-not corrupt continuum. This relationship was also statistically significant at the .05 level. For the relationship

between trust in the RCMP and the salience of the campaign-finance corrupt-not corrupt continuum, the implication is unclear. Perhaps trust in the national police force can be seen as part of a general moral rectitude which includes the aforementioned trust in the clergy. Even if this were so (and perhaps there is an underlying political conservatism implicit in this vague sense of "general moral rectitude"), it does not explain why trust in the RCMP should be related to the salience of the corrupt-not corrupt continuum of campaign finance or why trust in the clergy should relate to the salience of the corrupt-not corrupt continuum of nepotism. That is, why do these trust items not relate to the salience of other corrupt-not corrupt continua? The connection with the RCMP and clergy items could have been reasonably expected along other dimensions as well. Perhaps the general moral rectitude associated with the clergy item came to the fore in the case of nepotism because nepotism was regarded as the second most corrupt scenario. (Bribery was so consistently rated as corrupt that it did not permit the type of analysis undertaken here). By the same token, the RCMP item seems to relate best to the scenario thought least corrupt. Perhaps this suggests that the speculation made earlier about connecting the clergy and the RCMP items as part of a generalized moral rectitude simply fails to hold.

The knowledge items which appear in Part One (item 3) were also evaluated individually and as part of a knowledge index. The knowledge index basically consists of the total number of correct or vague answers to the individual items. As noted in Chapter Eight, two points were given for a correct answer, one point for a vague answer and the totals then recoded into high, medium and low knowledge scores. This index did

not correlate (measures of association are also correlations if the data and appropriate statistic are ordinal-level) with any of the corrupt-not corrupt differentials. The reason for this becomes clear when one notes that the individual items which did relate to our corrupt-not corrupt continua often related in opposite ways. Hence, knowledge of the Rivard affair, the Munsinger affair, and the Skyshops affair correlated negatively with salience. Those who were knowledgeable about these events found the corrupt-not corrupt differentials of several scenarios to be less salient than those who did not have this knowledge. Perhaps this indicates the cynicism implied by the adage "familiarity breeds contempt" and it is certainly consistent with the same argument made in reference to Milbrath's work cited in Chapter Six.² There, Milbrath noted the relationship between the incidence of corruption and higher levels of cynicism. It is possible then, to argue that the lack of salience constitutes another form of cynicism in that acts of "alleged" corruption seem to be unable to engender either positive or negative responses from respondents who are knowledgeable (i.e., are aware of the incidence of) about corrupt events in contemporary or historic Canadian politics.

The above interpretation is limited by the fact that knowledge of some events has a positive effect on salience. This reference is to knowledge about Harbourgate and the Churchill Forest Industries (C.F.I.) scandal. Both of these are very strongly and positively correlated with salience on the patronage and legislative conflict of interest corrupt-not corrupt continua respectively ($Y = +.78$ for the first and $+.71$ for the second, though the latter is not significant at the .05 level and therefore not included in Table XX). This lack of a

consistent pattern of either positive or negative relationships between these continua and the individual knowledge items causes the overall knowledge index to reflect an inconclusive relationship with the various corruption continua.

The variation between individual knowledge items suggests that there is another variable at work, intervening in the relationship between the knowledge of "corrupt" events and the salience of the individual scenario's differentials. One striking possibility is suggested in Table XXI, where it is clear that knowledge is regionally based (as the campus is used here as a microcosm of its own region). For example, knowledge of the C.F.I. affair is highest at the University of Winnipeg because this scandal was Manitoba based. The Rivard scandal was one of national stature in its day, but persists (apparently) as a regionalized memory in Quebec and Ontario. On the other hand, the RCMP affair can be seen as a "national" event, while others are "national" only because they are recalled by so few respondents. When these data are considered in light of the data in the second half of the table, it becomes clear that one possible explanation for the lack of a consistent positive or negative correlation between knowledge and salience (for corrupt-not corrupt continua) is that lack of salience is also related to region (or campus in the sense used here). For example, the most knowledgeable students in the case of the Rivard scandal are those from Laval University, yet they are also the least salient on the scenario of pork-barrelling. Thus, it is not surprising that salience on the corrupt-not corrupt differential for pork-barrelling is negatively correlated with knowledge of the Rivard case as seen in Table XX.

The result of this aspect of the impact of the knowledge variables

TABLE XXI: KNOWLEDGE OF "CORRUPT" EVENTS (% ANSWERING CORRECTLY OR VAGUELY CORRECT, QUESTIONNAIRE PART ONE, ITEM 3) BY CAMPUS

EVENT	% CORRECT OR VAGUELY CORRECT AT:					CRAMER'S V	SIGNI- FICANCE
	WINN.	MEM.	LAVAL	CARL.	UBC		
Harbourgate	11.3	3.6	0.0	26.7	2.7	.20	.0005
Railway	8.6	19.0	21.2	11.4	11.1	.11	ns
Hydrogate	2.5	0.0	3.0	4.3	0.0	.14	ns
Judges	2.5	1.8	0.0	8.6	5.2	.12	ns
Beauharnois	1.3	0.0	6.0	1.5	0.0	.12	ns
Munsinger	13.9	11.9	24.3	48.6	7.9	.23	.0001
RCMP	66.6	61.9	63.7	70.4	62.5	.15	ns**
Rivard	7.6	0.0	27.3	18.4	0.0	.22	.0001
C.F.I.	37.8	3.5	0.0	4.4	0.0	.28	.0001
Watergate	89.3	81.6	93.9	86.2	87.5	.10	ns
Skyshops	30.9	26.7	45.5	43.0	32.4	.18	.005

NOTES: * The Fidnam affair is not included because no respondent answered that item correctly or even vaguely correctly.

** While the relationship of Campus to knowledge of the RCMP affair is not significant at the .05 level, it is significant at the .06 level. Thus, while it does not meet our rigorous criterion for significance, it only misses by the narrowest of margins.

% SALIENT REPONSES TO "CORRUPT - NOT CORRUPT" CONTINUA BY CAMPUS

SCENARIO						CRAMER'S V	SIGNI- FICANCE
	WINN.	MEM.	LAVAL	CARL.	UBC		
Nepotism	94.0	94.1	69.7	95.8	95.0	.29	.0001
Patronage	85.7	89.7	69.7	75.0	80.0	.18	ns**
Pork-barrel.	73.8	85.3	57.6	77.8	80.0	.18	.05
Bribery	100.0	100.0	90.9	98.6	100.0	.24	.005
Campaign fin.	86.9	88.2	75.8	69.4	92.5	.22	.005
Leg. conflict	89.3	94.1	87.9	80.6	85.0	.15	ns
Influence-ped.	78.6	80.9	72.7	68.1	72.5	.11	ns
Party discip.	82.1	89.7	81.8	76.4	85.0	.12	ns
Bur. conflict	89.3	89.7	87.9	84.7	87.5	.06	ns

NOTE: ** As in (**) above.

is that when we turn to the attitudes toward corruption, per se, we will need to understand to some extent the interaction of the knowledge and campus (region) factors. At this point, the cynicism notion advanced earlier must be held in abeyance until we proceed with our analysis of the multivariate relationship between attitudes toward corruption, knowledge and region (as represented by the variables province and campus).

Other variables have some effect (though not always statistically significant) on the salience question, including the respondent's social class, efficacy³, sex, community background, parents' social class, age, party preference (both federal and provincial), father's and mother's occupation, the level of study and the number of political science courses. The social class (subjective) and occupational (objective socio-economic status based on the Blishen scale discussed in Chapter Seven) variables are interesting because the subjective and objective class variables lead to opposite kinds of relationships with the salience issue. Subjective social class seems to be positively related to salience (i.e., the higher the class, the more salient), while objective social class has the opposite effect. This would reflect a long-standing debate about the measurement of social class and is the reason why most researchers seem to employ both subjective and objective measures, as is implied by the respective designations of social class and socio-economic status or SES.⁴ However, the typical pattern rarely shows such diametrically opposed results using the two different measures. Perhaps this is due to some sense of status inconsistency or fluctuation in student status vis-a-vis their parents. The correlation between the students' subjective social class and their parents'

subjective social class is high and exceptionally significant, with $Y = +.68$. Nevertheless, even with such a high correlation, more than 38% of the students see themselves as at least of a marginally different class than their parents (e.g., moving from lower-middle to middle class). Further, the correlation between the students' subjective perception of their parents social class and the objective SES measure based on occupation is a bit lower at $Y = +.52$, indicating a discrepancy between the subjective and the objective. The interaction of these relationships may account for the opposite effects of subjective and objective class on salience, but the analysis required to firmly establish this point is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Efficacy was measured by two indexes; (A) included the item on whether respondents agreed with the statement, "It doesn't matter much which party wins," while the (B) index omitted this item. The efficacy (A) index had a significant impact on one corruption continuum, patronage, and a strong though not significant effect on a second, party discipline. The efficacy (B) index had an effect in only one scenario, pork-barrelling, but it was not statistically significant at the .05 level either. In each of these cases, whether significant at the acceptable .05 level or not, the direction of the relationship remains the same. Efficacy is negatively correlated with the salience of corruption, i.e., the higher one's efficaciousness, the lower one's salience on certain corrupt-not corrupt continua. This would indicate that, as one might expect from the earlier discussion of cynicism, efficacious students manifest more ambivalent reactions to the concept of corruption because they feel "a part of the political system" or they feel "closer" and less alienated from the system. It is not surprising

that those who are less efficacious seem to be more opinionated about corruption and less willing to equivocate. In a later section of this chapter we will see if this translates to a greater censoriousness as well. It is also interesting to note a contradiction, in that one of the individual efficacy items did have an effect on the salience of corruption, in the specific case of bureaucratic conflict of interest. In this case, agreement with the statement "Sometimes politics and government are so complicated that a person like me can't understand what is going on" (that is, the efficacious response would be disagreement with this statement) was negatively correlated with the salience of the scenario and it was significant at the .05 level. In other words, high efficacy correlates with high salience, in this case. Given that this item is a common element of efficacy indexes in attitudinal research, it raises a question about the possibility that efficacy has a knowledge element that is separate from the power element implied especially by items 14(a) and (d) in Part Three of the questionnaire. That is, one could well be knowledgeable about politics and still feel powerless. Indeed, Marxist theories of democratic capitalism promote such an argument regularly. Why this knowledge element should exert influence on the bureaucratic conflict of interest item alone is unclear, but it does suggest that stronger relationships between efficacy and other variables in any attitudinal study might be affected by the duality of the efficacy concept.

The only other political variable to have impact on the salience of corruption was party preference. Federal party preference affected both the salience of campaign finance and patronage corruption continua, though only the former was statistically significant. The campaign

finance corrupt-not corrupt differential was most salient to those who preferred the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives, and a similar pattern emerged on the patronage scenario's continuum. Interestingly, the provincial Liberals were the least salient of the party supporters on the patronage question. The fact that NDP supporters did not emerge as particularly salient on any scenario's corrupt-not corrupt continuum is cause for speculation. It is possible, for example, that NDP supporters may find the corruption issue less salient because the party has generally focussed, it is often said, on the bread-and-butter economic issues and on social issues. Indeed, while Liberals and Conservatives, at both the federal and provincial levels, ranked corruption "low" (i.e., eighth, ninth or tenth out of ten issues) in 30 to 40 per cent of the cases, NDP supporters ranked the issue low in 50 to 58 per cent of the cases.

Several variables which might be labelled as socio-economic (or demographic) also had some impact. Age was related to the salience of both pork-barrelling and campaign finance in a strong but negative fashion. Older students, especially 30 years and over, found these corrupt-not corrupt continua to be less salient than younger students. The ranking of corruption amongst the ten issues does not account for this difference, as there was essentially no difference in the rankings by the age groups. Knowledge may be the underlying factor, however, as the older students were more knowledgeable. Following from our earlier discussion, knowledge seems to be related to lower salience on corrupt-not corrupt continua. Sex, or gender if one prefers that term, had strong if insufficiently significant effects upon patronage and bureaucratic conflict of interest, with males being more salient in both

cases. Why age or sex affected these specific dimensions is unclear. In the case of campaign finance, we have an event which in years past was thought to be legally and socially acceptable. Legislation controlling campaign finance is largely a creation of the late 1960's and the 1970's, thus older students' lower salience in this area might reflect a state of "value-flux" which has transpired during their lifetime. This explanation would not apply to pork-barreling or to the variable of gender, however.

Community size correlated with three corrupt-not corrupt continua: nepotism, patronage, and party discipline. While only the latter was significant at the .05 level, each had a strong, negative relationship to community size, whereby "urban - 100,000 and over" showed the least salience of the three community size categories. This pattern had been suggested earlier by Gallup poll data reported in Chapter Six, and it would also be consistent with the notion that general moral rectitude is stronger in smaller population centres.

The next demographic variables to have an effect on these corruption dimensions are educational variables relative to the student population itself: level of study and the number of political science courses taken. Only the latter is ever statistically significant at at least a .05 level. In each case, however, there is a strong negative relationship between these education variables and the corrupt-not corrupt continua of nepotism, patronage and campaign finance. (The two measures of student education are strongly, but not perfectly, related to each other). It appears as though education, related as it is to the knowledge variable ($Y = +.17$ for level, $+.27$ for courses), also manifests the cynicism notion noted above. That is, the more

educationally advanced students, by reference to their level in university or to the number of political science courses, seem to consider corruption a less salient and less important issue. Indeed, by either measure, advanced students were more likely than their less advanced counterparts, to rank corruption as one of the three least important of ten issues. ($Y = -.25$ for level, $-.16$ for courses). It is discouraging, at least for this author, to think that prolonged contact with political science not only makes students wiser in both theory and practice of politics, but would also lead students to accept nefarious practices as a non-issue.

The most important independent variable, at least in terms of the number of differentials it affects, is that of campus. Because almost all students in this sample are drawn from the same province in which their respective universities are located (see Chapter Eight), this variable is also used here as an approximation of what would otherwise be called "region".⁵ The campus variable is associated with four continua on corruption, more than any other independent variable. Three of the four are significant at the .05 level or less, and the values for Cramer's V are reasonably strong to very strong in each case. In three of the four cases, salience is lowest for Laval University, while the fourth case shows low values for Laval and for Carleton University. Consistent with our earlier discussion of Table XXI, these two universities also have the highest knowledge scores (which, admittedly, may reflect a regional bias in knowledge items). Thus, the previous discussion about the possible connection between knowledge and cynicism reflected in the lack of salience for the corrupt-not corrupt continua is thought to apply here as well. This connection between salience and

cynicism is advanced cautiously, however, as it is possible that knowledge causes respondents to take neutral positions on the continua because they learn that the concept is too complex for the types of distinctions required in this survey. Thus, salience is at best a crude measure or indicator of cynicism, if it is such an indicator at all.

Before turning to the question of who thinks what is corrupt, common, undemocratic, etc., a final note on salience. Some of the scenarios and certain of their respective continua engendered greater differences between independent variables than did other scenarios. Clearly, since bribery had so few cases of non-salient responses on the corruption continuum, no differences or impacts of note emerged. But on other continua, interesting relationships did occur when we tested these against the campus variable, the most frequently "effective" variable in Table XX. Five bribery continua displayed significant differences between campuses. If we put aside the corrupt-not corrupt continua, other scenarios manifested different patterns with the campus variable. Nepotism showed only two continua with significant differences on the campus variable. The same was true with campaign finance and bureaucratic conflict of interest. On the other hand, pork-barreling had six continua in which significant variations occurred in terms of campus. Other scenarios ranged between these two figures. If one speaks of the continua themselves, the three which relate to the different levels of government provided the greatest variation in salience between the various campuses, with each being significant in at least seven of the nine scenarios. Others, like the American-Canadian continuum or the English Canadian-French Canadian continuum registered

no significant variations in terms of the campus variable at all. On the party continua, only the PC-Liberal continuum showed any variation in salience between campuses.

While every scenario, continuum and independent variable could be analyzed in terms of the preceding discussion, this section should suffice to illustrate some of the intricacies of the concept of salience. The scenarios and their respective continua are salient at different levels for different people and with patterns of differences which make analytical sense in most cases. But this information does not tell us who thinks what is corrupt, common, undemocratic, etc. This is the purpose served by the next section of the chapter.

Independent Variables and the Dimensions of Corruption

Once the salience of the "measurement device" for determining students attitudes toward corruption is accepted, we know only that there are definite, pro-and-con attitudes expressed in response to those devices (scenarios and continua). What direction do these attitudes take for different people? We know, from the discussion in Chapter Eight, what directions the entire sample took on these questions, but what differences emerge when one examines the impact of the various independent variables (i.e., the political and socio-economic or demographic characteristics of the sample) upon these scenarios? The analysis in this section of the chapter will proceed by examining the effects of independent variables on the dependent variables, i.e., the continua or differentials for the various scenarios. As in the case with Table XX, only those variables, independent and dependent, which

display statistically significant relationships will be included. The reason for employing this method of data organization is that the number of variables derived from the series of scenarios and their respective differentials is quite large; 117 variables, even when the Social Credit-NDP continuum specific to British Columbia and the Liberal-Parti Quebecois continuum specific to Quebec are eliminated due to too few cases for contingency table analysis. Rather than exclude, a priori, certain types of dependent variables from the analysis altogether, it was thought that reference could be made only to those relationships which merit attention as statistically significant at the generally accepted level of .05 or less, as in the case of Table XX above. Because of the number of variables involved, those relationships with significance levels higher than .05, regardless of how intuitively interesting they may be, will be summarily excluded from this discussion. In addition, a relationship must meet a second criterion (again, as in Tables XX and XXI): a minimal strength of association of .15 for Cramer's V or of $\pm .15$ for gamma (Y).

Before addressing our attention to the bivariate relationships between the corruption dimensions and the various independent variables, let us consider the following summary of these relationships, presented in Tables XXII to XXIV. Table XXII summarizes the corruption dimensions (i.e., dimension equals scenario plus continuum) that are the "most affected" and "least affected" by the independent variables generated by this survey. Table XXIII shows the rank-order of both scenarios and the types of continua in terms of the number of significant relationships they exhibit vis-a-vis the independent variables. Table XXIV illustrates the relative "effectiveness" of the

TABLE XXII: DIMENSIONS OF CORRUPTION WHICH ARE THE "MOST AFFECTED" AND "LEAST AFFECTED" BY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: SUMMARY

<u>"MOST AFFECTED" DIMENSIONS</u>			<u>"LEAST AFFECTED" DIMENSIONS</u>		
<u>Scenario</u>	<u>Continuum</u>	<u>Sig. Rel.*</u>	<u>Scenario</u>	<u>Continuum</u>	<u>Sig. Rel.*</u>
Bribery	Common-Rare	9	Nepotism	Important-Unim	0
			"	Eng.-French	0
Cam. Finance	PC-NDP	8	Patronage	Local-Prov.	0
			"	NDP-Liberal	0
Party Disc.	Corrupt-Not C.	6	Pork-Barrel	Liberal-PC	0
Cam. Finance	Corrupt-Not C.	6	"	Eng.-French	0
			Bribery	Corrupt-Not C.	0
Patronage	Corrupt-Not C.	5	"	Undemocratic-Dem	0
Pork-Barrel	Amer.-Can.	5	Cam. Finance	Important-Unim.	0
Cam. Finance	Local-Prov.	5	"	Liberal-PC	0
"	NDP-Liberal	5	"	Eng.-French	0
Leg. Conflict	PC-NDP	5	Leg. Conflict	NDP-Liberal	0
Party Disc.	Federal-Local	5	Influence	Liberal-PC	0
"	Local-Prov.	5	Party Disc.	Common-Rare	0
Bur. Conflict	Corrupt-Not C.	5	Bur. Conflict	Amer.-Can.	0
			"	Eng.-French	0

NOTE: * "Sig. Rel." stands for significant relationships - i.e., the number of significant and strong ($V = .15$ or $Y = +/- .15$, as minima) bivariate relationships between the dimension noted and the various independent variables in the survey.

TABLE XXIII: SCENARIOS AND CONTINUA RANKED ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIPS WITH INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: SUMMARY

<u>SCENARIO</u>	<u>SIG. REL.*</u>	<u>CONTINUUM</u>	<u>SIG. REL.*</u>
Party Discipline	38	Corrupt-Not Corrupt	31
Campaign Finance	34	Common-Rare	27
Bribery	29	PC-NDP	27
		Local-Provincial	24
Influence	27	American-Canadian	23
Patronage	26	Federal-Local	22
Legislative Conflict	26	NDP-Liberal	18
		Important-Unimportant	17
Bureaucratic Conflict	25	Provincial-Federal	15
Pork-Barreling	23	Necessary-Unnecessary	14
Nepotism	22	Undemocratic-Democratic	12
		English Can.-French Can.	9
		Liberal-PC	8

NOTE: * As above, in Table XXII.

TABLE XXIV: INDEPENDENT VARIABLES RANKED ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF DIMENSIONS (SCENARIOS PLUS CONTINUA) OF CORRUPTION THEY AFFECT: SUMMARY

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	SIG. REL.*	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	SIG. REL.*
Campus	43	Community size	5
Province of residence	40	Level of study	5
Federal party preference	31	Number of Poli. Sc. courses	5
"Politicians don't care"	21	Parents' social class	4
Provincial party pref.	19	Prov. partisanship strength	4
Knowledge index	16	"Vote doesn't matter"	4
Age	16	General (nonpolitical) trust	3
Political trust index	7	Rank of corruption as issue	3
Efficacy index (A)	7	Fed. partisanship strength	3
Efficacy index (B)	7	Mother's education	2
Belong to social class?	7	"Party doesn't matter"	2
Respondent's social class	7	Father's education	1
Trust (overall) index	6	Father's occupation	0
Sex	-6	Mother's occupation	0
"Politics too complicated"	6		

NOTE: * As above, in Tables XXII and XXIII.

independent variables themselves in terms of the number of dimensions they affect. There were other relationships which were intuitively interesting but which failed to meet one of the two criteria and thus had to be omitted. Nevertheless, even with reasonably rigorous criteria, we can see a number of interesting patterns summarized. In Table XXII, of the 117 dimensions (nine scenarios times thirteen continua or differentials), sixteen do not correlate with any of our 29 independent variables. These 29 independent variables, all suggested by the review of theoretical and especially empirical literature in Chapters Four and Six, provide no clues to the variation in responses to those sixteen dimensions. For example, there is no significant pattern of variation in terms of any independent variable (such as age, sex efficacy, etc.) regarding the importance of nepotism or campaign finance. By the same token, the commonness of bribery displays a variation in response which is affected by nine of the 29 independent

variables (including: campus, knowledge, efficacy (A), efficacy (B), rank of corruption as an issue, age, federal party preference, level of study and the efficacy item — "politicians don't care"). The corruptness of bribery, on the other hand, shows no such variation, as no independent variable affects this perception. Of course, this is largely because only one per cent of the sample thought bribery was not corrupt. (There was variation in terms of how corrupt it was thought to be, however).

Table XXII provides the reader with a condensed view of those dimensions which offer the most interesting and the least interesting possibilities for further examination. Those dimensions which relate statistically to none of the independent variables, that is, they are not influenced by these variables, are essentially of no interest to us at this point in the analysis. Four of these are English Canadian-French Canadian continua, thus affirming the point made in Chapter Eight that the low salience of this dimension indicated a general disregard for the distinction implied by these continua. Nonetheless, while not among the "most affected" dimensions, two dimensions of the English-French continua did register some connection to the independent variables: influence-peddling and patronage. Four independent variables affected the former and three the latter. This would indicate that the English-French continua are affected in certain cases, even if, in the overall picture, they are low in salience.

Table XXIII summarizes the cumulative pattern of interrelationships between the scenarios and continua, on the one hand, and the independent variables on the other. Party discipline is the scenario which shows the highest degree of interaction, as this scenario (for which, like all

others, there are 13 continua being analyzed) has 38 significant relationships with the various independent variables. Nepotism, by comparison, relates to the independent variables in only 22 cases. These figures illustrate the degree to which these scenarios are treated differently by different aspects of the sample. There is less differentiation regarding nepotism, then, than for party discipline. To use an example from a more concrete plane, it is worth noting that while sex influences two of the party discipline continua (the American-Canadian continuum and the PC-NDP continuum), it has no significant effect on any of the nepotism continua. This type of comparison between scenarios as a whole, rather than between individual dimensions as in the previous table, permits the reader to recognize which scenarios elicit the greatest degree of effect due to the independent variables as a whole.

Table XXIII also provides a ranking of the types of continua in terms of the number of significant relationships between them and the independent variables. As with the scenarios, this indicates the degree to which variations in these types of continua are influenced by the independent variables. Thus, the corrupt-not corrupt continuum is the one which elicits the most numerous interrelationships, while the Liberal-PC continuum is the one least affected by the independent variables. The latter point reflects earlier observations about the lack of salience for the continuum. However, the undemocratic-democratic continuum was quite salient, yet it elicits an effect vis-a-vis the independent variables in only twelve cases. While salient then, this continuum displays consistency rather than variation. That is, while there may be strong, non-neutral, opinions on the

democratic or undemocratic nature of any given scenario, these opinions do not vary much or do not vary in any specific pattern. The latter point is especially important for ordinal variables, where association is required to be linear (i.e., the higher A, the higher B, etc.) if it is to be strong. By contrast, the PC-NDP continuum is not especially salient, yet it does relate well to a number of independent variables. For example, in the case of legislative conflict of interest, which at least superficially has little to do with party support, the PC-NDP continuum was associated with five different independent variables - (knowledge, political trust, federal party preference, provincial party preference and "politics are too complicated"). In other words, while many took neutral positions on this continuum, those who did not were influenced by the aforementioned variables in significant and relatively strong ways.

Finally, Table XXIV illustrates the relative propensity for the independent variables to affect the dependent variables, i.e., the dimensions of corruption. Campus is the independent variable with the most frequent effect, followed closely by province of residence. (The former has been described earlier, in Chapter Eight, as an approximation of the latter). Given past attitudinal research in Canada, it is not surprising that this is so. Federal party preference ranks third in the frequency of its effect upon the corruption dimensions, and so on. At the other end of the scale, mother's occupation and father's occupation (objective measures of socio-economic status based on the Blisshen index) were not associated with a single dimension of corruption. The discrepancy between various independent variables, in terms of the number of dependent variables they affect, provides us with clues as to

which variables might best be considered as potential candidates for control-variables in multivariate analysis. Further, these frequently "effective" variables are more likely than their less frequently "effective" counterparts to be meaningful sources of influence on the corruption dimensions. Those which are effective in only one or two cases seem to run the risk of being so merely by the chance of an aberrantly significant relationship, a kind of "significant-by-accident" possibility. While this does not mean that such single-occurrence associations are inherently suspicious, it does mean that we have greater confidence in those which show a consistent pattern of interaction.

The overall effect of these three tables, then, is to suggest which of the 146 variables (117 dependent corruption dimensions and 29 independent socio-economic and political variables) merit special attention. In addition, some variables have theoretical, as well as statistical, importance. For example we have cited past research which highlights the significance of region as an independent variable in Canadian attitudinal studies. This research leads one to expect that region will be one of the most important, if not the most important, independent variable in the study of political attitudes. If the frequency of significant statistical relationships is one measure of that importance, we have found this to be the case in the study of attitudes toward corruption as well. Let us turn our attention, then, to the specific nature of the bivariate relationships between the independent variables and our dependent variables: the dimensions of corruption. We consider only those independent variables which relate to at least five dimensions, beginning with the most "effective" (i.e.,

affecting the most dimensions) variable: region.

A. The Effect of Region on Attitudes toward Corruption

We have employed two variables to measure the concept of region in this study: campus and province of residence. We have stated earlier that campus is an excellent estimate of province of residence, though it is not perfect. Nevertheless, despite the lack of an exact matching of these two variables, the campus variable is used as our primary operationalization of the concept of region. The nature of the survey sample seems to require some acknowledgement of the university background shared by the respondents, and this might also help one guard against the subconscious tendency to assume that students are representative of the general population to a greater degree than we have allowed thus far. However, the province of residence variable will be employed as a "check" on the campus variable.

Region (alias campus) affects all nine scenarios. Moreover, it affects every type of continuum except the PC-NDP differential, though obviously not for each scenario. Its most consistent effect is upon those continua dealing with differences between levels of government and scenarios dealing with party discipline and patronage. If region is operationalized as province of residence, this pattern remains largely the same for the differentials, but changes somewhat regarding the scenarios. For the latter, province is most often associated with the campaign finance scenario. The minor variation between campus and province thus requires some recognition if we wish to employ campus as the measure of region. This means, then, that for

TABLE XXV: THE EFFECT OF REGION (CAMPUS AND PROVINCE)* ON CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS

<u>NEPOTISM:</u>	<u>MEM</u>	<u>LAV</u>	<u>CAR</u>	<u>WPG</u>	<u>UBC</u>	<u>ASSOC.</u>	<u>SIGNIF.</u>
%Corrupt**	83.8	64.5	95.8	86.9	87.2	V=.18	.005
%Not Corrupt	10.3	9.7	1.4	7.1	10.3		
%NDP	6.0	6.9	7.5	18.3	8.1	V=.17	.01
%Liberal	29.9	51.7	32.9	14.7	16.2		

PATRONAGE:

%Corrupt	66.1	48.4	38.6	46.4	53.8	V=.17	.01
%Not Corrupt	23.5	25.8	38.6	39.3	28.2		
%Common	80.9	81.9	90.3	90.4	92.3	V=.15	.05
%Rare	11.8	3.0	7.0	3.6	7.7		
%Provincial	16.6	10.0	16.2	24.3	15.8	V=.21	.001
%Federal	42.5	10.0	29.4	10.3	42.1		
%Federal	56.7	20.6	39.1	40.1	62.2	V=.17	.01
%Local	19.4	20.7	20.2	26.3	18.9		

PORK-BARRELING:

%Provincial	40.0	13.7	36.8	40.1	57.9	V=.16	.05
%Federal	21.5	6.9	10.3	16.3	2.6		
%Federal	44.0	24.1	25.0	27.6	31.6	V=.17	.01
%Local	31.8	6.9	25.0	32.5	39.4		
%Local	22.8	3.4	23.9	18.8	18.4	V=.20	.001
%Provincial	59.1	20.6	25.3	35.1	55.3		
%NDP	3.0	0.0	6.0	6.3	5.4	V=.16	.05
%Liberal	40.9	36.7	25.4	17.5	27.0		

BRIBERY:

%Common	75.0	53.1	62.0	43.3	42.1	V=.17	.01
%Rare	19.1	28.2	25.3	37.3	28.9		
%Provincial	36.3	10.3	28.3	35.1	32.4	V=.17	.05
%Federal	22.8	13.8	4.5	11.3	8.1		
%Federal	37.9	17.9	10.5	16.3	18.9	V=.19	.001
%Local	36.4	21.4	29.9	41.3	45.9		
%Local	36.4	31.0	27.3	42.0	51.4	V=.19	.001
%Provincial	31.9	13.7	7.6	16.1	16.2		

TABLE XXV: (CONTINUED): THE EFFECT OF REGION (CAMPUS AND PROVINCE)* ON CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS

CAMPAIGN FINANCE:	MEM	LAV	CAR	WPG	UBC	ASSOC.	SIGNIF.
%Corrupt	25.4	53.3	20.5	32.1	35.0	V=.16	.05
%Not Corrupt	64.2	30.0	53.0	54.8	57.5		
%Necessary	58.2	23.4	56.2	50.6	46.1	V=.16	.05
%Unnecessary	22.4	40.0	13.2	28.4	33.4		
%Provincial	12.3	0.0	9.0	14.8	16.2	V=.16	.05
%Federal	44.6	31.0	32.8	33.3	37.8		
%Federal	63.7	36.7	47.7	50.6	78.4	V=.16	.05
%Local	10.6	10.0	10.5	13.6	2.7		
%Local	9.1	10.7	9.3	10.0	0.0	V=.19	.005
%Provincial	68.1	21.5	46.1	46.3	78.4		

LEG. CONFLICT:

%Provincial	20.9	7.2	16.1	28.8	32.4	V=.18	.005
%Federal	35.8	17.8	16.1	23.8	13.5		
%Federal	56.1	18.5	26.8	40.0	56.7	V=.19	.005
%Local	13.6	11.1	16.4	17.6	8.1		
%Local	7.5	18.5	10.3	16.3	2.7	V=.19	.001
%Provincial	59.7	11.1	30.9	45.0	59.4		
%Undemocratic	70.2	63.0	53.8	75.3	56.7	V=.17	.001
%Democratic	18.0	3.3	15.0	7.4	8.1		
%Liberal	23.9	32.1	13.5	13.8	13.5	V=.16	.05
%PC	16.4	7.1	6.0	26.3	24.3		

INFLUENCE-PEDDLING:

%Common	73.5	71.9	61.4	77.2	67.5	V=.17	.05
%Rare	11.8	3.1	27.1	12.0	22.5		
%Federal	36.4	18.5	22.4	25.3	37.8	V=.17	.05
%Local	33.3	14.8	22.4	38.0	32.4		
%Local	27.9	14.3	17.7	30.0	29.7	V=.17	.05
%Provincial	42.6	10.7	26.4	23.8	32.4		

TABLE XXV: (CONTINUED): THE EFFECT OF REGION (CAMPUS AND PROVINCE)* ON
- CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS

PARTY DISCIPLINE:	MEM	LAV	CAR	WPG	UBC	ASSOC.	SIGNIF.
%Necessary	29.4	23.4	41.4	41.5	66.7	V=.17	.005
%Unnecessary	58.8	60.0	38.6	43.9	30.8		
%Provincial	13.6	3.6	10.3	7.4	5.4	V=.17	.05
%Federal	37.8	21.5	23.6	23.4	54.0		
%Undemocratic	78.0	66.7	63.2	65.4	48.6	V=.19	.001
%Democratic	11.7	3.3	11.7	18.5	29.7		
%American	24.6	10.7	16.5	6.3	2.7	V=.20	.0005
%Canadian	20.0	17.9	29.8	38.8	59.4		

BUR. CONFLICT:

%Provincial	20.9	7.2	17.3	25.1	16.2	V=.16	.05
%Federal	35.9	14.3	18.8	12.5	32.4		
%Liberal	19.4	22.2	16.2	8.8	10.8	V=.15	.05
%PC	13.4	0.0	7.1	27.8	16.2		

NOTES: * Region is represented by the campus variable. However, given that campus and province of residence are not quite equivalent, only those relationships for which both campus and province have similar patterns are included. Of the 43 significant relationships relevant to campus noted in Table XXIV, ten were dropped from consideration here because they did not also hold for the province variable.

** For all continua, unless otherwise noted, the responses are divided into those on the left of the continuum (e.g. "corrupt") and those on the right ("not corrupt"). Though the original continua in the questionnaire had seven values, for ease of reading, these values have been collapsed to two. The upper value in this table equals values 1, 2 and 3 combined. The lower (or right) value equals the original 5, 6 and 7. The neutral value of 4 is omitted, but can be calculated by subtracting the total of the displayed values from 100%. Association and significance are based on uncollapsed data, however.

Table XXV, only those relationships which are not contradicted by the province variable are included in the list of significant relationships between campus and the various dimensions of corruption.

Region (or campus) does have impact on the definition of three scenarios as corrupt or not corrupt. Most notable of these impacts is on the scenario of campaign finance. In this case, there is sharp disagreement between Quebec students and the students of all remaining regions, in that only the Quebec students saw this scenario as predominantly corrupt. Students from all regions agree that nepotism is corrupt, but the proportion of Laval students taking this position is markedly lower than that for any other campus. By the same token, all regions agree that patronage is corrupt except the Ontario students. The Carleton students are ambivalent, with equal numbers saying patronage is corrupt and not corrupt. A cynic might argue that Carleton's location in the national capital suggests an insensitivity based on "knowing on which side one's bread is buttered", but three of the remaining four universities are located in provincial capitals where the same adage might also be applied to one's assessment of patronage. The difference between Laval students and the others on the corruptness of campaign finance is also without an obvious explanation. However, the fact that about 3/4 of the Laval sample identifies itself as supporting the Parti Quebecois, and that the PQ is frequently perceived as less favourably disposed towards the business community than its opponents, might be seen as one reason for the difference. Further, the two universities which score the second and third most censorious responses are also those with the strongest support for the NDP.

Variation on the corrupt-rare continuum occurs in three cases also: patronage, bribery and influence—peddling. The differences between campuses on the patronage scenario are relatively minor, with all five campuses indicating that they believe the practice to be common. However, the differences which provide for a significant relationship are somewhat hidden by the collapsing of values into the two shown in the table. In the original form, the questionnaire item consisted of a seven-point scale. Due to the relatively small number of cases, statistical analysis by means of contingency tables required some collapsing of the differential to a five-point scale, with the value of three recoded to equal two and the value of five recoded to equal six. This five-point scale was further reduced to a three-point scale in order to enhance the readability of the tables. (The middle value or "neutral" is implied, and can be obtained by subtracting the total of the two percentages in any column from 100%, with the remainder equalling the percentage of neutral responses). This arrangement will apply to all tables in this section, unless otherwise specified. However, such collapsing "hides" certain relationships, and the common-rare continuum for patronage illustrates this well. If we compare the campuses in terms of the response to the extremely common rating, the source of the significant difference between campuses emerges: at Memorial, 20.6% rated patronage as extremely common; at U.B.C. the figure was 28.2%. However, the percentages saying extremely common at the three other universities were considerably higher: 36.4% at Laval, 44.0% at Winnipeg and 48.6% at Carleton.

Recognizing such differences is one thing, explaining them is yet another. In this case, little in the existing literature prepares one

for the distribution noted. However, as party preference may be a potential intervening factor in the relationship between region and the corrupt-not corrupt continua, so too may knowledge be an intervening variable in the relationship between region and the common-rare continua. The two campuses which had the lowest proportions saying patronage was "extremely" common are also the campuses with the lowest scores on the knowledge index. The variables of party preference and knowledge, as we have alluded to earlier for different reasons, could be included in control relationships.

The differences between regions on the common-rare continua for bribery and for influence-peddling, though significant, do not suggest even indirect explanations. There is no pattern in Table XXV whereby one region is significantly and consistently inclined to rate the scenarios as more corrupt than do other regions. Some elements of the literature on political culture suggest that the Atlantic provinces are, as John Wilson has suggested, "underdeveloped" political cultures.⁶ By extension, our earlier discussion of theories of corruption (Chapter Four) links notions such as machine politics and other dubious types of political activity to the underdeveloped nature of the political system's political culture. Perhaps, then, a belief that corruption is common is consistent with this sense of an underdeveloped culture. Yet, Newfoundland does not consistently rate the scenarios as more common than the other regions unless one includes those cases where the differences are not statistically significant. U.B.C., on the other hand, rates these scenarios less common than any other campus.

The necessary-unnecessary continua are significant in two scenarios: campaign finance and party discipline. These are relatively

contentious scenarios, as we saw in Chapter Eight, but the reason this is so is due, in part, to the differences between regions. Laval is quite inconsistent with the others in the case of campaign finance. Party Discipline exhibits a broader range of differences, from very unnecessary to somewhat ambivalent to very necessary, to somewhat ambivalent to very necessary, across the five regions. Thus, the pattern is inconclusive.

The continua relevant to the three levels of government are particularly sensitive to the impact of region. The distinctions between federal and provincial levels tend to be resolved in favour of the provinces for the patronage, campaign finance, party discipline and bureaucratic conflict of interest scenarios. On the other hand, the federal government is seen more positively on the pork-barreling and bribery scenarios. The result is mixed in the case of legislative conflict of interest. Laval students tend to be the most noncommittal on these scenarios, yet those with opinions on these continua are not unlike students from other regions. On pork-barreling, all regions agree that the provinces are the most relevant. (We have remarked earlier that this may result from the example of a highway used in the scenario, thus students may be assessing the responsibility for highways as much as they are assessing the pork-barreling aspect). The same does not apply to the scenario on bribery, where the Laval students contradict the others. But on those scenarios seen to be more federal than provincial, Laval students are not the source of contradiction, for only the Winnipeg students break the pattern of pro-provincial responses. This break occurs in the assessment of patronage. The continuing public debate on patronage between successive government

parties in Manitoba may have something to do with this contradictory evaluation.

In the comparison between federal and local levels of government, only Memorial students consistently favour the local level. This even applies to the bribery scenario, which all other regions see as more local in nature. Perhaps this reflects an often assumed isolation for residents of "the rock", though isolation from the rest of Canada would not explain why these same students are, along with U.B.C. students, more favourable to the local rather than the provincial government as well.

The undemocratic-democratic continua come into play only twice, for legislative conflict of interest and party discipline. In the case of the former, all regions agree the activity is corrupt, but there is a clear difference in degree apparent in the range of nearly twenty percentage points difference on the undemocratic end of the continuum between students at Carleton and Winnipeg, or the fifteen point difference on the democratic end of the continuum between Laval and Memorial. A similar pattern of agreement exists on the party discipline scenario, with U.B.C. students being the most divided in this case.

The American-Canadian differential is associated with region in only one scenario (party discipline), but the relationship is fascinating. As one moves from east to west, the stronger is the identification of the scenario with Canadian politics. The pattern is even linear, increasing step-by-step, from one university to the next. There is reason to argue that given the long and widely noted history of discipline in Canadian parties, knowledge could be the reason why there are such dramatic differences in this assessment. Yet U.B.C. students are second lowest on the knowledge index. In this case, a control for

the intervening influence of knowledge is not needed.

The only other continua to merit attention relate to differences between parties on four different scenarios. In the case of nepotism, only Winnipeg students disagree with their compatriots elsewhere, by associating nepotism more with the NDP than with the Liberals. The strong association with the Liberal end of the continuum for Memorial, Laval and Carleton also is noteworthy when compared even to U.B.C. The pattern of "more liberal than NDP" is maintained by the B.C. students, but somewhat weakly. The results, overall, hint at the possibility that there is a tendency to evaluate the party dimensions, at least in part, in terms of the relevance of the party to the region. But this is only a hint, and it is not upheld by the response to the pork-barreling scenario, where differences are a matter of degree rather than direction. It is further clouded by the response to the legislative conflict of interest scenario where easterners say the Liberals are more closely related to this type of conflict, while westerners are more likely to identify Conservatives so. Yet, both parties are equally relevant to students at Memorial and, though the Liberals are not in power provincially, they are nevertheless seen as the most closely linked to this scenario.

The bureaucratic conflict of interest scenario exhibits the same pattern as that for legislative conflict of interest. What is most interesting about this scenario, however, is that it is not ostensibly a question which is discussed in the literature as having a partisan basis. In essence, the students seem to say, by identifying this scenario with Liberals (Memorial, Quebec and Ontario) or the Conservatives (Winnipeg and U.B.C.), that even officials who are

formally unrelated to partisanship can be seen to be affected by partisan influences. Perhaps these influences are based in certain ideological or philosophical assumptions about material gain, since the scenario is very rarely seen by the students to apply to the NDP.

In summary, region seems to generate, as most Canadian social scientists might expect, the most widespread effect upon the students' attitudes. While the interaction of region with other variables such as party or knowledge must await later discussion, the importance of this variable seems, for the moment, quite clear. Attitudes on corruption are affected by region. While the attitudes most frequently affected concern distinctions between levels of government, region also has impact on how acts are defined as corrupt, common, necessary, undemocratic and party-based.

B. The Effect of Party Preference

Second only to region in terms of the scope of its effect on the dimensions of corruption is party preference. Federal party preference is especially effective, but provincial party preference is also a major contributor to the matrix of attitudes toward corruption. In contrast, the strength of intensity of one's partisanship, federally or provincially, has only occasional impact upon these attitudes. For this reason, data concerning partisanship strength is omitted from this discussion. However, data on the relationship between party preference and attitudes toward corruption can be found in Tables XXVI (federal) and XXVII (provincial).

The degree of overlap, i.e., the number of dimensions of corruption

both variables affect in similar ways, is surprisingly small. Only ten dimensions are affected by both federal and provincial party preference. Yet, despite this lack of overlap, there are some basic similarities, as well as basic differences, in the way these two variables affect the dimensions.

In terms of similarities, one is struck by the evidence that party preference of either type is generally unrelated to the perception of corruption as being common or rare. Only once is this continuum affected by either type of preference, that being the case of bribery. Even then, the difference is one only of degree, as supporters of all federal parties agree that the act is more common than rare. Similarly, the undemocratic continua are significantly affected only in two cases, once with each type of party preference. Federal party preference has an impact upon the perception of the undemocratic nature of bureaucratic conflict of interest, with federal NDP supporters most censorious. Provincial party preference affected the undemocratic dimension of campaign finance, with PQ supporters standing alone in condemning the scenario as corrupt. Provincial NDP supporters leaned to the not corrupt end of the continuum, but less strongly than Liberals or Conservatives. Other similarities can be gleaned from the tables by the readers.

One glaring difference between the effects of the two variables can be noted in the case of the scenario on bribery. While federal party preference has an impact on five of bribery's continua, provincial party preference affects none. In a similar vein, while federal party preference affects four of the corrupt-not corrupt continua, provincial party preference affects only one. In the latter case, the campaign

TABLE XXVI: THE EFFECT OF FEDERAL PARTY PREFERENCE ON CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS

<u>NEPOTISM:</u>	<u>LIB</u>	<u>PC</u>	<u>NDP</u>	<u>OTH.*</u>	<u>ASSOC.***</u>	<u>SIGNIF.</u>
%Provincial	36.9	29.2	20.4	21.1	V=.16	.05
%Federal	8.4	12.2	11.9	15.8		
%Local	54.1	39.1	33.3	40.0	V=.18	.01
%Provincial	6.3	23.2	11.9	15.0		
%American	22.9	20.9	33.3	26.3	V=.17	.05
%Canadian	5.2	12.3	1.7	5.3		
%PC	27.4	17.3	52.6	21.1	V=.19	.005
%NDP	6.4	14.8	3.4	5.3		
%NDP	9.5	15.6	3.4	10.0	V=.17	.05
%Liberal	23.2	22.9	47.5	15.0		

PATRONAGE:

%Corrupt	44.0	55.4	51.6	52.4	$V = .17$	.05
%Not Corrupt	40.0	30.5	25.0	33.3		
%Liberal	17.0	34.9	15.5	5.3	$V = .17$	.05
%PC	17.0	3.6	15.5	21.1		

PORK-BARRELING:

%PC	30.6	21.9	50.9	11.1	V=.17	.01
%NDP	6.3	11.0	1.7	11.1		

BRIBERY:

%Common	57.6	62.4	50.8	40.9	V=.17	.05
%Rare	28.3	25.8	28.5	36.4		
%Important	79.6	77.1	66.7	70.0	V=.17	.05
%Unimportant	12.2	8.4	12.3	20.0		
%Local	39.6	32.9	41.4	50.0	V=.16	.05
%Provincial	15.6	24.4	12.0	16.7		
%American	34.4	35.1	43.1	33.3	V=.19	.005
%Canadian	5.2	2.5	0.0	5.6		
%PC	21.9	20.7	45.6	38.9	V=.16	.05
%NDP	2.1	4.9	0.0	0.0		

TABLE XXVI (CONTINUED): THE EFFECT OF FEDERAL PARTY PREFERENCE ON
CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS

CAMPAIGN FINANCE:	LIB	PC	NDP	OTH.*	ASSOC.***	SIGNIF.
%Corrupt	33.0	22.6	38.6	23.8	V=.16	.05
%Not Corrupt	50.0	67.9	36.9	47.6		
%Necessary	58.7	61.5	35.6	40.0	V=.17	.05
%Unnecessary	24.7	15.6	42.3	20.0		
%PC	33.0	45.8	66.6	50.0	V=.21	.005
%NDP	6.4	7.2	1.8	0.0		
%NDP	4.2	2.4	5.4	5.6	V=.20	.005
%Liberal	28.4	50.6	64.3	44.4		

LEG. CONFLICT:

%Corrupt	78.2	77.1	72.9	60.9	V=.17	.05
%Not Corrupt	13.9	14.4	13.6	26.1		
%Necessary	12.3	12.2	12.1	40.0	V=.19	.005
%Unnecessary	64.3	62.2	56.9	30.0		
%PC	35.1	29.2	66.7	44.4	V=.21	.0005
%NDP	3.1	9.7	0.0	0.0		

INFLUENCE-PEDDLING:

%Federal	23.9	29.3	29.3	35.3	V=.16	.05
%Local	34.3	29.3	31.0	29.4		
%PC	28.2	26.2	56.9	35.3	V=.17	.05
%NDP	6.2	7.2	0.0	0.0		
%NDP	6.2	2.4	1.8	5.9	V=.18	.05
%Liberal	22.7	32.5	57.9	35.3		
%English Can.	6.3	4.9	15.3	11.8	V=.19	.01
%French Can.	4.2	1.2	0.0	0.0		

PARTY DISCIPLINE:

%Important	79.8	86.9	73.4	70.0	V=.17	.05
%Unimportant	9.1	4.8	5.0	15.0		
%Federal	55.3	61.5	51.8	52.9	V=.19	.005
%Local	5.1	4.8	10.7	17.6		
%NDP	7.2	9.4	3.5	0.0	V=.18	.01
%Liberal	22.7	26.5	54.4	41.2		

TABLE XXVI (CONTINUED): THE EFFECT OF FEDERAL PARTY PREFERENCE ON CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS

BUR. CONFLICT:	LIB	PC	NDP	OTH.*	ASSOC.***	SIGNIF.
**(%Very Corrupt)	(23.8)	(18.1)	(40.0)	(28.6)		
%Corrupt	75.4	71.1	73.3	76.2	V=.20	.0005
%Not Corrupt	22.7	21.7	16.7	19.0		
**(%Very Federal)	(7.2)	(6.1)	(14.0)	(21.1)		
%Federal	36.1	42.7	36.8	42.1	V=.16	.05
%Local	17.5	15.8	17.5	15.8		
**(%Very Undem.)	(14.4)	(12.2)	(35.6)	(15.8)		
%Undemocratic	54.6	61.0	64.4	52.6	V=.17	.05
%Democratic	12.4	12.2	10.2	10.5		
%NDP	2.0	4.9	1.0	5.9	V=.16	.05
%Liberal	23.5	22.9	26.9	50.9		

NOTES: * OTH. indicates supporters of "other" parties or those who support no party. It does not include those ineligible to vote.

** Where the collapsing of data for readability obscures the source of the association, extra data are given.

*** Given that the dependent and independent variables are nominal level variables, Cramer's V applies.

TABLE XXVII: THE EFFECT OF PROVINCIAL PARTY PREFERENCE ON CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS

NEPOTISM:	LIB	PC	NDP	PQ	SC	NONE	ASSOC.	SIGNIF.
%Provincial	48.9	30.7	25.0	15.3	0.0	28.6	V=.21	.005
%Federal	2.3	14.8	7.0	23.1	25.0	0.0		
%PC	34.9	16.0	38.5	48.0	8.3	42.9	V=.21	.001
%NDP	9.4	12.6	4.1	0.0	25.0	0.0		
%NDP	18.6	12.4	1.4	4.0	25.0	13.3	V=.20	.01
%Liberal	26.7	23.6	30.1	56.0	16.7	26.7		

PATRONAGE:

%English	4.9	6.7	12.4	3.8	8.3	40.0	V=.20	.05
%French	9.7	18.0	8.2	7.7	0.0	0.0		

PORK-BARRELING:

%Local	20.5	22.7	20.5	16.0	16.7	23.1	V=.20	.01
%Provincial	45.4	48.7	41.1	12.0	58.3	30.8		

TABLE XXVII: (CONTINUED): THE EFFECT OF PROVINCIAL PARTY PREFERENCE ON CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS

CAMPAIGN FINANCE:	LIB	PC	NDP	PQ	SC	NONE	ASSOC.	SIGNIF.
%Corrupt	29.5	22.0	36.5	60.0	16.7	33.3	V=.17	.05
%Not Corrupt	56.8	66.0	44.6	28.0	75.0	46.7		
%Local	7.0	9.2	5.6	20.8	0.0	7.7	V=.18	.05
%Provincial	46.5	58.6	58.3	20.8	83.4	61.6		
%Undemocratic	23.2	28.1	40.2	64.0	8.3	15.4	V=.20	.01
%Democratic	46.5	47.2	30.6	16.0	50.0	38.5		
%NDP	7.0	2.3	1.4	16.7	4.2	7.7	V=.18	.05
%Liberal	39.5	39.5	43.2	25.0	50.0	38.5		
<hr/>								
LEG. CONFLICT:								
%Important	84.1	76.4	74.3	68.0	75.0	42.9	V=.18	.05
%Unimportant	4.6	11.2	1.4	16.0	16.7	14.5		
%PC	46.5	26.9	54.2	52.0	33.3	30.8	V=.19	.05
%NDP	4.6	7.8	0.0	0.0	8.3	0.0		
<hr/>								
INFLUENCE-PEDDLING:								
%Local	19.0	29.7	27.0	16.7	50.0	14.8	V=.18	.05
%Provincial	45.3	28.6	27.0	8.3	25.0	30.8		
%PC	42.5	23.3	50.0	29.2	16.7	30.8	V=.20	.005
%NDP	9.5	6.7	2.7	0.0	0.0	0.0		
%English Can.	7.3	5.6	9.6	16.0	8.3	7.7	V=.19	.05
%French Can.	0.0	4.5	1.4	0.0	0.0	0.0		
<hr/>								
PARTY DISCIPLINE:								
%Important	90.7	82.4	78.7	79.1	75.0	60.0	V=.20	.005
%Unimportant	7.0	7.7	4.0	7.7	16.7	13.3		
%Local	11.9	8.9	4.1	29.1	0.0	0.0	V=.19	.05
%Provincial	61.5	60.0	57.5	16.7	75.0	57.2		
<hr/>								
BUR. CONFLICT:								
%Important	53.5	70.0	70.3	84.0	83.3	57.1	V=.19	.05
%Unimportant	25.6	13.3	10.9	8.0	8.3	14.3		
%Provincial	28.6	17.8	20.6	8.3	0.0	40.0	V=.20	.005
%Federal	11.9	27.8	21.9	16.7	50.0	6.7		
%NDP	7.3	3.4	0.0	4.3	0.0	7.7	V=.18	.05
%Liberal	26.8	22.5	46.0	34.7	16.6	15.4		

finance scenario's corrupt-not corrupt continuum is affected by both variables, though there is some difference in the way each independent variable affects the continuum. For example, while federal NDP supporters believe the scenario to be corrupt, provincial NDP supporters (nearly 72% of federal NDPers also support the NDP provincially; this figure is about 70% for PC's and 37% for Liberals) take the opposite view. However, in both cases, NDPers are more censorious than Liberals or Conservatives.

Two continua are especially sensitive to party preference and both relate to perceived differences between the parties in various scenarios. These continua are PC-NDP and NDP-Liberal and, except for provincial Social Credit supporters on the nepotism scenario, the NDP is seen as the least relevant (i.e., in most cases, the least corrupt) of the three major parties by all party supporters. Even when supporters of the Liberals or Conservatives had to compare their own party to the NDP, they uniformly associated the scenario with their own party and not with the NDP. NDPers agreed with the others as they too felt that the scenarios were more closely related to the other parties in comparison with their own. This finding suggests two explanations. First, the NDP could be uniformly thought to be less corrupt than the two largest national parties, even by partisans of the other parties. Given that NDP attitudes towards business and the aggrandizement of wealth are generally held to be to the left of both the Liberals and Conservatives, this view is not especially surprising. However, it may also be the case that, as we have alluded to before, the association of the two largest parties with these scenarios may reflect "ins-vs.-outs" phenomena, in that the NDP is seen as not having held office and,

consequently, not relevant to patronage or the like. This perspective receives some support from the realization that Social Credit supporters, essentially based in British Columbia, seem to have no difficulty in ascribing such behaviour to the NDP, who have previously formed governments in that province. Two points contradict this interpretation, however, one being that Manitobans did not respond so despite their having a recent tradition of NDP governments. The second point of contradiction is that the Social Credit supporters do not point their collective fingers at the NDP in any of four other scenarios in Table XXVII. The first explanation seems to have more to recommend it.

A final remark on the impact of party preference on the party continua: significant differences on the Liberal-PC continuum occurred only once, that being on the patronage scenario and related to federal party preference only. That significant differences did not occur in other cases is instructive enough, illustrating that most respondents do not perceive major differences between the two largest parties, at least in terms of our dimensions of corruption. However, in the case of patronage, the difference is statistically significant for federal party preference. The PC supporters and those in the residual "other" category both see patronage as closer to the Liberals. NDP and Liberals see no difference between the PC's and the Liberals on this score. Given recent clamour about patronage appointments during the transition from Trudeau to Turner in the office of the Prime Minister, it is also interesting that, while supporters of all parties saw patronage as corrupt, the least censorious of these supporters were Liberals.

The continua dealing with levels of government were also

considerably affected by the two party variables. The overall pattern on these items was a leaning towards the higher levels of government as more corrupt, or at least as more relevant to the corrupt scenarios, on the part of federal Conservatives. Federal Liberals generally saw the scenarios as more relevant to the lower levels. Federal NDP supporters were similar to the Liberals in this regard, though somewhat more inclined to cite the federal level as more closely related to the scenarios than were Liberals. These patterns also held for provincial counterparts of these three groups. However, at the provincial level, one must also consider the attitudes of Social Credit and PQ supporters. Social Credit supporters were much like those PC supporters just discussed. PQ supporters, on the other hand, while more likely to relate the scenarios to the federal level like the PC's, were also more likely to accuse local government like Liberals and NDPers. In their case, the provincial government was the least relevant to corruption scenarios, generally speaking. The only exception to this, resulting in equal proportions saying local and saying provincial, applies to the campaign finance scenario.

The American-Canadian continua were of consequence on two occasions vis-a-vis the federal party preference, and both times supporters of all parties related the scenarios to American politics. The variation which was manifested was mostly of degree, with Conservatives somewhat less prone to lean to the American end of the continua. Though statistically significant, the English-French continua were not especially useful, as differences between parties were exaggerated by the small number of relevant cases.

In summary, party preference seems to be a reasonably strong

8

Metric

influence in the development of attitudes toward corruption. This is especially true in terms of how corruption is viewed by reference to political parties, but also considerably important on other dimensions as well. In a comparative vein, it is also interesting to note that while nepotism and bureaucratic conflict of interest were the continua least affected by region, they were among those most affected by party preference. It is clear then that, while region and party preference are associated, these two variables do not have the same effects relative to the corruption dimensions.

C. Social Class, Community Size, Age and Sex

Among the most widely employed demographic variables in attitudinal research are social class (subjective and objective), community size, age and sex. We have discussed the place of these variables in attitudinal research in general, and in empirical studies of attitudes toward corruption specifically, in Chapter Six. They have been separated from that most significant of Canadian demographic variables — region — because region occupies almost a special place in Canadian social research. This special quality has already been borne out by the findings discussed above. It is the other demographic variables that are of interest now.

Social class can be measured in at least two basic ways: subjectively and objectively. We have previously discussed these two methods of measurement. Here, the question is, how do these measures relate to the corruption dimensions. The answer is two-fold. The objective measures of parents' social class, based on occupation ranked

according to the "Blisshen" index, were largely ineffectual. Not once did either mother's occupation or father's occupation correlate with any corruption dimension. Moreover, mother's and father's education, frequently used as an objective indicator of social class, were significantly related to only three continua between them. Each of these measures has thus been cast aside as inconsequential. Instead, the subjective measures of social class were the most influential in this analysis. These include the respondent's subjective ranking of his/her social class (but not his/her parents' social class), and whether or not the respondent thinks of himself/herself as belonging to a social class at all.

Class belongingness affected seven continua, as indicated in Table XXVIII. Strongest among these effects was the relationship between belonging to a class and seeing bribery and nepotism as more Liberal than Conservative. Those having a sense of class belongingness were also noticeably more inclined to see these continua as more relevant to the local level of government than those who had no sense of class identity. This sense of class identity, however, had no significant effect on corrupt-not corrupt, common-rare, or undemocratic-democratic continua. These are among those continua which seem most central to how one "defines" corruption as a concept.

Respondent's social class, like the sense of class belongingness, has a modest impact on attitudes toward corruption, as seen in Table XXIX. The impacts are less strong than in the case of class belongingness and, interestingly, are predominantly relevant to the party discipline scenario. Most notable among the party discipline continua is that of the necessary-unnecessary continuum. The difference

TABLE XXVIII: THE EFFECT OF BELONGING TO A SOCIAL CLASS ON CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS

NEPOTISM:	BELONG TO CLASS?		ASSOC.	SIGNIF.
	YES	NO		
%Liberal	26.6	16.3	Y=+.31	.05
%PC	7.9	16.3		

PATRONAGE:				
%English Canadian	10.4	9.5	Y=+.18	.05
%French Canadian	8.9	16.3		

PORK-BARRELING:				
%Federal	26.4	42.7	Y=-.15	.005
%Local	30.3	26.7		

BRIBERY:				
%Local	38.3	32.5	Y=+.24	.01
%Provincial	13.9	28.4		
%Liberal	18.6	10.9	Y=+.45-	.005
%PC	5.0	20.3		

LEG. CONFLICT OF INTEREST:				
%Local	13.6	2.7	Y=+.31	.05
%Provincial	39.2	56.0		

INFLUENCE-PEDDLING:				
%Federal	25.0	38.3	Y=-.15	.05
%Local	31.0	26.0		

TABLE XXIX: THE EFFECT OF RESPONDENT'S SUBJECTIVE SOCIAL CLASS ON CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS

<u>PATRONAGE:</u>	<u>U. MID.*</u>	<u>MID.</u>	<u>L. MID.</u>	<u>WORK.</u>	<u>ASSOC.</u>	<u>SIGNIF.</u>
%Provincial	13.6	21.5	22.5	8.0	Y=-.20	.05
%Federal	36.4	28.1	6.0	16.0		

<u>PORK-BARRELING:</u>						
%American	20.7	24.6	5.9	4.0	Y=+.19	.05
%Canadian	6.4	14.9	7.9	4.0		

TABLE XXIX (CONTINUED): THE EFFECT OF RESPONDENT'S SUBJECTIVE SOCIAL CLASS ON CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS

LEG. CONFLICT:	U. MID.*	MID.	L. MID.	WORK.	ASSOC.	SIGNIF.
%Local	9.1	11.4	11.8	13.6	Y=-.26	.01
%Provincial	53.1	50.7	27.4	18.2		

PARTY DISCIPLINE:						
%Necessary	61.2	34.4	28.3	36.0	Y=+.26	.01
%Unnecessary	28.3	50.4	56.6	52.0		
%Federal	62.6	66.7	47.1	43.5	Y=+.17	.05
%Local	6.2	6.8	9.8	8.7		
%Local	6.2	9.1	11.5	8.4	Y=-.20	.05
%Provincial	57.8	62.8	38.5	41.7		
%Undemocratic	57.0	64.2	72.7	64.0	Y=-.15	.05
%Democratic	20.0	17.9	5.8	12.0		

NOTE: * Upper class and upper middle class were collapsed into one category, "U. MID.", due to the low number of cases in the upper class category.

TABLE XXX: THE EFFECT OF COMMUNITY SIZE ON CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS

PATRONAGE:	RURAL	S. URBAN*	L. URBAN*	ASSOC.	SIGNIF.
%Common	80.3	87.8	90.8	Y=+.19	.05
%Rare	15.5	3.5	4.3		

PORK-BARRELING:					
%American	8.7	28.9	18.6	Y=+.22	.005
%Canadian	21.7	5.8	7.7		

CAMPAIGN FINANCE:					
%Federal	68.1	52.9	51.0	Y=-.20	.05
%Local	8.6	11.7	9.5		
%Local	11.7	10.0	5.8	Y=+.18	.01
%Provincial	66.2	52.0	49.0		

INFLUENCE-PEDDLING:					
%Federal	41.1	26.9	22.7	Y=-.17	.05
%Local	27.9	23.1	33.1		

NOTE: * S. URBAN refers to urban, under 100,000 population while L. URBAN refers to urban, population of 100,000 or more.

TABLE XXXI: THE EFFECT OF AGE ON CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS

NEPOTISM:	UP TO 20	21 - 29	30 & OVER	ASSOC.	SIGNIF.
%Common	79.5	73.0	55.4	Y=-.21	.05
%Rare	12.0	14.8	34.0		

PATRONAGE:					
%Federal	56.6	42.9	20.9	Y=-.23	.01
%Local	19.1	20.7	30.3		
%PC	34.8	19.6	30.3	Y=-.15	.05
%NDP	6.1	7.7	11.6		

PORK-BARRELING:					
%Local	22.8	13.4	28.9	Y=+.16	.005
%Provincial	48.2	40.0	16.3		
%American	16.7	14.9	30.9	Y=+.31	.01
%Canadian	18.4	8.3	0.0		

BRIBERY:					
%Common	62.6	56.3	41.3	Y=-.15	.05
%Rare	20.9	34.4	30.5		

CAMPAIGN FINANCE:					
%Corrupt	28.4	28.5	41.3	Y=+.16	.0005
%Not Corrupt	64.6	51.2	39.2		
%PC	49.1	43.3	28.6	Y=-.19	.01
%NDP	3.6	3.3	14.2		

PARTY DISCIPLINE:					
%Important	77.4	77.8	89.6	Y=+.17	.05
%Unimportant	8.7	8.7	2.3		
%Provincial	9.7	7.4	9.5	Y=-.18	.05
%Federal	40.7	25.7	21.4		
%Local	7.2	9.7	9.5	Y=+.18	.05
%Provincial	62.5	55.3	33.4		
%Liberal	24.6	23.2	30.3	Y=+.22	.0001
%PC	17.6	6.7	0.0		
%English Can.	11.4	6.7	4.9	Y=-.27	.05
%French Can.	4.4	3.3	12.2		

BUR. CONFLICT:					
%Corrupt	68.4	61.9	89.4	Y=+.20	.05
%Not Corrupt	21.9	25.4	6.4		
%Necessary	9.7	13.0	4.5	Y=-.15	.01
%Unnecessary	65.5	61.8	75.0		
%Important	64.9	66.9	81.8	Y=+.26	.01
%Unimportant	19.3	12.1	6.8		

TABLE XXXII: THE EFFECT OF SEX ON CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS

<u>BRIBERY:</u>	<u>MALE</u>	<u>FEMALE</u>	<u>ASSOC.</u>	<u>SIGNIF.</u>
%American	40.2	4.8	Y=+.17	.005
%Canadian	25.8	1.0		

<u>CAMPAIGN FINANCE:</u>				
%Local	8.3	8.8	Y=-.22	.05
%Provincial	57.4	46.6		

<u>INFLUENCE-PEDDLING:</u>				
%NDP	3.0	5.8	Y=-.26	.05
%Liberal	36.3	24.0		

<u>PARTY DISCIPLINE:</u>				
%Corrupt	56.5	73.1	Y=-.29	.05
%Not Corrupt	28.2	12.9		
%American	10.1	18.3	Y=-.33	.05
%Canadian	39.6	21.2		
%PC	28.9	31.7	Y=-.19	.05
%NDP	11.0	1.0		

between the upper middle class respondents and the others is intense, representing as it does an almost complete turn-about of the attitudes of the remainder of the sample. Perhaps the most notable of the remaining observations is the somewhat consistent pattern of neutral responses among those identifying themselves as working class. Overall, the impact of social class is rather more modest than this author expected, though sufficient to claim that the relevant hypothesis in Chapter Six is upheld.

Community size (Table XXX) is even more modestly associated with attitudes toward corruption, being significantly related to only five dimensions of corruption (the minimum for inclusion in this discussion). Three of the five relationships deal with levels of government, and in

each of these cases the rural students are more inclined to relate the scenarios to the higher level of government. They are also somewhat less cynical about the frequency of the occurrence of patronage and more likely to see pork-barreling as a Canadian, rather than American, activity. The sense that campaign finance is less local and more relevant to provincial or federal governments does not mean that the rural students necessarily take a Jeffersonian view that cities are corrupt, for campaign finance was not seen as corrupt by most students.

The most influential demographic variable in this section is age (Table XXXI). It is important to note, however, that age was highly correlated with knowledge ($Y=+.28$), thus presenting a justification for the inclusion of the interaction between age and knowledge as a control variable in the last section of this chapter. Nevertheless, it is age which is of interest now, and it has consequence for 16 dimensions of corruption.

Age influences two scenarios on the corrupt-not corrupt continuum: campaign finance and bureaucratic conflict of interest. In the former, only those 30 years and over (as a group) define the scenario as corrupt, even if marginally so. In the latter case, the older students agree with the corrupt rating given to the scenario, differing only in that they see the scenario as even more corrupt than the younger students. Where the common-rare continua are significantly related to age, older students see the scenarios as less common. They see pork-barreling as more American and party discipline as more French Canadian. They see party discipline and bureaucratic conflict of interest as more important, and generally perceive the scenarios as more closely related to lower levels of government than the younger students

do. They are also somewhat less censorious towards the Conservatives on three different scenarios than their younger colleagues, though this is largely a question of degree given that they share the same basic position with the others. In the final analysis, age seems to be an important factor in the understanding of attitudes toward corruption.

The last of the demographic variables to be considered here is sex or gender. It is probably fair to say that social science literature has recorded a decline in sex-related or gender-related influences on attitudes. A prime example would be in the research on political participation and related attitudes, where activism and the like have been seen to increase on the part of women, such that old gender gaps in participation and efficacy have declined. Yet, it is part of current political perception that the gender gap has not disappeared altogether. Rather, the focus has been on gender differences in terms of issues instead of basic beliefs and attitudes about the nature of the political system itself. In light of increasing political awareness and activity by women in recent decades, expectations for large numbers of gender-relevant differences in the corruption dimensions were not high. The result was consistent with that expectation, though there were enough differences to warrant a very modest acceptance of the relevant working hypothesis in Chapter Six. The distinctions between sexes were largely minor, even if statistically significant. Women were somewhat more censorious on the party discipline scenario and, perhaps most dramatically, exceptionally more prone to neutral responses to the American-Canadian continuum for bribery. Other than that, differences were not especially interesting.

The overall picture for the demographic variables, then, is that

age had a particularly effective impact, that class was a modest source of influence (though not for corrupt-not corrupt continua), and that community size and sex (gender) were of only minimal interest.

D. Knowledge and Trust

Underlying the assumption that acts of corruption lead to a decline in public trust, or an increase in public cynicism or alienation, is the notion that knowledge of corrupt acts leads to less trust, or more cynicism or alienation. Clearly, there would be no connection between corruption and cynicism if the corrupt act was not detected or made public so that citizens could become aware of it. Indeed, when knowledge is tested against trust, the relationship is as expected in terms of direction, but it is weak and lacking significance ($Y = -.11$, i.e., the greater one's knowledge, the lower one's trust). When knowledge was further tested against the individual trust items, of which there were 14, it correlated strongly and significantly with only one, low trust in municipal government ($Y = -.22$). Nevertheless, while no other relationships were statistically significant, they were fairly consistent in reflecting the general pattern of high knowledge leading to low trust. However, our aim here is to assess the effect of knowledge and trust on the corruption dimensions, not knowledge and trust on each other.

Knowledge affects three corrupt-not corrupt continua: legislative conflict of interest, party discipline and bureaucratic conflict of interest. On both scenarios dealing with conflict of interest, knowledge correlates with greater censoriousness. However, higher

TABLE XXXIII: THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE ON CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS

NEPOTISM:	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	ASSOC.	SIGNIF.
%American	35.4	25.7	12.2	Y=+.25	.005
%Canadian	7.4	8.3	7.8		

BRIBERY:					
%Common	46.5	59.8	60.7	Y=-.20	.05
%Rare	41.9	21.5	23.4		
%American	49.5	33.3	23.8	Y=+.30	.01
%Canadian	1.2	5.6	2.2		
%English Canadian	5.0	9.1	9.2	Y=-.24	.05
%French Canadian	16.3	6.5	6.8		

CAMPAIGN FINANCE:					
%American	48.1	35.5	30.7	Y=+.21	.05
%Canadian	2.5	6.5	6.8		
%PC	56.1	39.8	35.6	Y=+.23	.05
%NDP	4.8	6.5	3.4		
%NDP	3.4	5.6	1.2	Y=-.29	.05
%Liberal	34.1	37.1	60.5		

LEG. CONFLICT:					
%Corrupt	83.7	69.1	75.0	Y=+.18	.01
%Not Corrupt	4.5	15.9	20.6		
%Common	66.3	66.4	81.8	Y=-.17	.01
%Rare	19.8	10.6	5.4		
%PC	48.7	37.3	32.2	Y=+.24	.05
%NDP	1.2	3.7	7.7		

INFLUENCE-PEDDLING:					
%American	26.5	20.4	15.7	Y=+.17	.05
%Canadian	8.4	7.4	11.2		

PARTY DISCIPLINE:					
%Corrupt	46.4	63.7	85.5	Y=-.27	.05
%Not Corrupt	35.4	19.4	14.9		

BUR. CONFLICT:					
%Corrupt	83.7	65.5	59.8	Y=+.23	.05
%Not Corrupt	10.5	23.0	27.2		
%Necessary	7.3	7.2	17.8	Y=-.28	.005
%Unnecessary	81.7	60.7	55.6		
%Important	86.6	63.0	57.6	Y=+.29	.01
%Unimportant	6.1	15.3	20.6		
%PC	48.7	37.3	32.2	Y=+.24	.05
%NDP	1.2	2.8	7.8		

TABLE XXXIV: THE EFFECT OF TRUST* ON CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS

PATRONAGE:	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	ASSOC.	SIGNIF.
%PC	32.7	28.8	24.6	Y=+.16	.05
%NDP	2.0	4.8	11.5		

PORK-BARRELING:					
%American	18.4	13.5	21.2	Y=-.19	.01
%Canadian	20.4	10.6	8.6		

CAMPAIGN FINANCE:					
%Common	66.1	67.6	84.3	Y=-.28	.05
%Rare	24.5	13.1	10.5		

LEG. CONFLICT:					
%Common	55.8	72.9	75.9	Y=-.29	.05
%Rare	17.3	10.3	10.5		
%American	28.6	26.2	37.8	Y=-.23	.05
%Canadian	10.2	6.8	1.6		

BUR. CONFLICT:					
%Corrupt	53.0	70.7	74.1	Y=-.28	.05
%Not Corrupt	31.4	21.1	16.1		

NOTE: * Trust is an index formed by the aggregation of responses to items 2 (a) to (n), inclusive, in Part One of the questionnaire.

TABLE XXXV: THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL TRUST* ON CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS

NEPOTISM:	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	ASSOC.	SIGNIF.
%PC	17.9	28.2	37.0	Y=-.16	.05
%NDP	6.0	7.6	11.1		

PORK-BARRELING:					
%NDP	11.9	1.6	3.6	Y=+.17	.05
%Liberal	25.4	26.7	32.9		

CAMPAIGN FINANCE:					
%PC	35.4	43.5	49.4	Y=-.20	.05
%NDP	7.7	4.6	3.7		

TABLE XXXV CONTINUED: THE EFFECT OF POLITICAL TRUST* ON CORRUPTION

	DIMENSIONS				
LEG. CONFLICT:	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	ASSOC.	SIGNIF.
%Common	62.0	70.8	80.0	$Y = -.29$	.005
%Rare	14.1	13.2	7.1		
%PC	33.8	36.7	47.6	$Y = -.16$	.05
%NDP	4.4	2.3	7.6		
<hr/>					
BUR. CONFLICT:					
%Corrupt	61.5	70.8	72.7	$Y = -.24$	.01
%Not Corrupt	25.8	19.7	17.9		
%Undemocratic	50.0	59.6	59.0	$Y = -.20$	.005
%Democratic	16.2	13.7	6.0		

NOTE: * Political Trust is an index formed by the aggregation of responses to items 2-(a), (b), (c), (g), (i), (k), (l) and (m), in Part One of the questionnaire.

knowledge leads to less censoriousness on the party discipline scenario, perhaps reflecting greater awareness of the concept of parliamentary democracy as opposed to congressional democracy. The reaction to the conflict of interest scenarios suggests further that these concepts may be somewhat more sophisticated than other dimensions of corruption and therefore more likely to be affected by differences in knowledge.

More knowledgeable students see bribery and legislative conflict of interest as less common than other students (though this is again a matter of degree rather than direction). They also see the scenarios as more American than their less knowledgeable colleagues. Party differentials elicit some statistically significant differences, especially in that more knowledgeable students see these scenarios as more Conservative, but less Liberal, than others. There is little difference in their perception of the NDP on these scenarios. Perhaps most fascinating of all is that not a single continuum regarding the levels of government is affected by knowledge.

Trust, which we have broken down into three indexes, has some impact on the attitudes toward corruption. One of the three indexes, general trust (consisting only of non-political elements in the series of trust items) had little impact. It affected only three dimensions of corruption and has been omitted here. However, the two remaining indexes were sufficiently effective to warrant detailed attention. Trust (an overall index aggregating all 14 trust items in Part One, item 2 of the questionnaire) was significantly correlated with six continua. Political trust (consisting of the eight political items in the series of trust items in Part One of the questionnaire) correlated significantly with seven continua. Interestingly, there was overlap in only two cases: the common-rare continuum for legislative conflict of interest and the corrupt-not corrupt continuum for bureaucratic conflict of interest. The relationships are very similar in each case.

One general pattern to emerge from the impact of trust and political trust is that those who are high in trust (either type) see corruption as less common than others. Another pattern is that those who are high in trust see conflict of interest as less corrupt than those less trustful. While the explanation for the first relationship seems self-explanatory, the second relationship does not fit so clearly. It is possible that those who are higher in trust are so partly because they have somewhat lower levels of censoriousness. If one perceives certain acts as not being corrupt, then trust in those who commit such acts will not be tarnished. Yet, the difference in censoriousness is a matter of degree rather than kind, with those high in trust still finding conflict of interest to be corrupt in the final analysis. One area in which a pattern does not clearly emerge is in the evaluation of

the party continua, where high trust means corruption is more relevant to the PC's in one case and less relevant in three others, etc. Also, like knowledge, trust was not significantly correlated with any item on levels of government.

In summary, knowledge and trust (both overall and political trust) have an impact on attitudes toward corruption, with the latter somewhat modest compared to the former. Knowledge shows up one interesting peculiarity in that more knowledge of allegedly corrupt events still results in the belief that corruption (particularly conflict of interest) is less common. On the same corruption scenarios, however, higher knowledge also meant more censoriousness. Higher trust apparently means less censoriousness and a belief that corruption is less common.

E. Efficacy

Two efficacy indexes were employed, one including an unconventional item statement with which respondents were to agree or disagree ("It doesn't matter much which party wins"); the other consisting of three more traditional items (see questionnaire, Part Three, items 14 (a), (c) and (d)). Moreover, two items were thought to be useful on an individual basis as well. One of these ("Politicians don't care what people like me think") was especially effective, the other ("Sometimes politics and government are so complicated that a person like me can't understand what is going on") only modestly so. The results of the analysis of these variables vis-a-vis the corruption dimensions can be found in Tables XXXVI to XXXVIII.

TABLE XXXVI: THE EFFECT OF EFFICACY* ON CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS

	EFFICACY (A)*				
	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	ASSOC.	SIGNIF.
BRIBERY:					
%Common**	52.6	56.3	58.7	Y=-.15	.05
%Rare	33.8	29.1	22.9		
%American	44.9	33.7	28.7	Y=+.19	.05
%Canadian	2.6	5.2	2.0		

CAMPAIGN FINANCE:					
%PC**	57.2	41.4	34.7	Y=+.26	.05
%NDP	1.3	9.1	4.0		
%NDP**	1.3	7.0	2.0	Y=-.22	.05
%Liberal	56.6	39.4	36.2		

INFLUENCE-PEDDLING:					
%Corrupt	43.2	38.2	50.9	Y=-.18	.0005
%Not Corrupt	34.5	38.2	25.0		
%Important	62.6	52.9	42.8	Y=+.19	.05
%Unimportant	15.1	26.4	34.3		

PARTY DISCIPLINE:					
%Corrupt**	46.3	61.0	76.2	Y=-.26	.05
%Not Corrupt	31.3	24.0	14.7		

	EFFICACY (B)*				
	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	ASSOC.	SIGNIF.
CAMPAIGN FINANCE:					
%Corrupt	22.6	34.2	32.7	Y=-.17	.05
%Not Corrupt	61.3	50.9	52.6		

PARTY DISCIPLINE:					
%Federal	69.3	61.6	47.2	Y=+.20	.05
%Local	2.6	7.2	12.3		

BUR. CONFLICT:					
%Common	38.6	60.9	62.4	Y=-.25	.05
%Rare	34.6	24.3	14.0		

NOTES: * Efficacy (A) is an index formed by the aggregation of items 14 (a) to (d) in Part Three of the questionnaire. Efficacy (B) differs only in the omission of 14 (b).

** These items also hold for efficacy (b), hence they are not repeated for that variable.

1

TABLE XXXVII (CONTINUED): THE EFFECT OF AGREEMENT WITH THE EFFICACY
ITEM — "POLITICIANS DON'T CARE WHAT PEOPLE
LIKE ME THINK" ON CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS

INFLUENCE- PEDDLING:	AS*	AM*	N*	DM*	DS*	ASSOC.	SIGNIF.
%Corrupt	68.6	44.7	32.2	40.8	39.3	Y=+.18	.005
%Not Corrupt	8.6	36.5	35.7	33.9	39.3		
%Common	86.5	83.2	55.5	67.3	70.3	Y=+.18	.05
%Rare	8.1	11.6	18.5	18.9	25.9		
%Necessary	14.7	21.2	25.9	33.3	51.8	Y=-.21	.01
%Unnecessary	55.9	55.2	48.1	50.0	33.3		
%Important	50.0	43.5	40.7	56.1	74.0	Y=-.18	.005
%Unimportant	23.5	36.5	25.9	20.1	22.2		
%English Can.	9.1	11.0	7.4	4.5	11.5	Y=+.15	.05
%French Can.	6.1	1.2	0.0	0.9	11.5		
<hr/>							
PARTY DISCIPLINE:							
%Corrupt	82.9	67.0	74.1	59.1	25.9	Y=+.36	.0001
%Not Corrupt	5.8	18.8	14.8	26.1	48.1		
%Necessary	8.8	37.6	51.8	47.4	44.4	Y=-.28	.005
%Unnecessary	70.6	51.7	40.7	38.8	33.3		
%American	11.4	13.6	7.4	15.6	7.7	Y=+.15	.05
%Canadian	26.5	24.7	22.2	42.2	38.4		
<hr/>							
BUR. CONFLICT:							
%Corrupt	88.9	71.8	51.8	67.3	59.2	Y=+.17	.005
%Not Corrupt	5.6	17.6	25.9	22.4	37.0		
%Common	80.0	61.2	53.8	52.1	35.7	Y=+.34	.0001
%Rare	8.6	18.8	11.5	33.0	32.1		

NOTES: * Key: (AS) Agree Strongly; (AM) Agree Moderately; (N) Neither;
(DM) Disagree Moderately; (DS) Disagree Strongly.

** Where the collapsing of data for readability obscures the
source of the correlation, extra data are given.

TABLE XXXVIII: THE EFFECT OF AGREEMENT WITH THE EFFICACY ITEM —
 "SOMETIMES POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT ARE SO COMPLICATED
 THAT A PERSON LIKE ME CAN'T UNDERSTAND WHAT IS GOING ON"
 ON CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS

BRIBERY:	AS*	AM*	N*	DM*	DS*	ASSOC.	SIGNIF.
%Provincial	32.3	24.6	27.5	27.0	40.0	Y=-.18	.05
%Federal	13.0	18.0	6.9	15.4	6.3		
%PC	23.3	21.6	6.9	32.9	31.3	Y=-.16	.01
%NDP	0.0	0.0	10.3	1.3	2.6		
%NDP	6.7	0.0	6.9	0.0	2.5	Y=+.21	.05
%Liberal	16.6	18.4	10.3	29.1	29.3		

CAMP. FINANCE:							
%PC	22.6	40.7	24.1	50.6	53.2	Y=-.29	.01
%NDP	9.7	5.1	6.8	2.5	5.0		

LEG. CONFLICT:							
%PC	31.0	33.3	13.8	47.5	46.8	Y=-.23	.005
%NDP	0.0	6.6	17.2	1.2	2.6		

BUR. CONFLICT:							
%PC	26.6	21.6	6.9	40.7	38.4	Y=-.25	.005
%NDP	3.3	5.0	13.8	1.2	2.6		

NOTES: * As in Table XXXVII above.

Students who scored high on the two efficacy indexes tended to see the scenarios as less corrupt than others did; they also saw the scenarios as less common. Both of these patterns were differences in degree only. No other continua appear more than once in Table XXXVI, thus it is difficult to speak of trends in other dimensions.

It is interesting to note that of the individual efficacy items, one was significantly related to the corruption dimensions in 21 cases, another in six cases, a third in four cases and the last in only two cases. (See Table XXIV earlier). The latter two items are omitted from this discussion because of their limited impact. The most effective of these items (abridged here to "Politicians don't care") influenced five corrupt-not corrupt continua and six common-rare continua. In these

cases, the patterns were strikingly consistent. Agreement with the item (i.e., the less efficacious response) was consistently and somewhat strongly related to assessing the scenarios as more corrupt and more common. In contrast, the party differentials came into play only once and the levels of government continua, likewise, were relevant only once. On the latter, it is interesting to note that lower efficacy was associated with seeing nepotism as more closely related to the federal government. The less efficacious were also more likely to view the scenarios as unnecessary and undemocratic.

Noteworthy too are the different dimensions tapped by the second efficacy item (abridged here as "Politics are too complicated"). Where the first of our two individual items related to the party dimensions only once (out of 21 significant relationships), this second item, affects party continua in five of its six significant relationships. Four of these relate to the PC-NDP continua, and in each of these cases, the less efficacious are less likely to assess the scenarios as closer to the Conservatives.

The closing word on efficacy is that the individual items seem to measure different aspects of efficacy and that each elicits different relationships with the corruption dimensions. The item "Politicians don't care" is the most interesting element in this section of the analysis, due to its rather direct and consequential effect on the most important of our continua: the corrupt-not corrupt continua. Moreover, it raises an interesting intuitive (as opposed to statistical) point: that corruption can be seen in terms of political inequality. This efficacy item seems to build upon the concept of equality and fairness. Thus, the preceding analysis suggests that corruption damages these

notions of equality and fairness. Efficacy is often tied to a related concept (sometimes the two concepts are treated as equivalent) called anomie or powerlessness or even alienation. Incidents of corruption, then, cannot but increase this sense of alienation, if we are to accept the connections made here.

F. Level of Study and the Number of Political Science Courses.

The last of our independent variables to be considered related specifically to the nature of our sample, university students in political science courses. While these could have been considered in concert with the knowledge index earlier, they have been left to this point because they are variables which are peculiar to our sample and not applicable to a general population. Nevertheless, a brief word is in order, for student samples can be of interest in their own right.

Each of the two variables, level of study and number of political science courses, are indirect measures of knowledge (indicators if one prefers). Yet, they measure two different aspects of knowledge; one is general knowledge, the other is knowledge specific to a discipline relevant to the attitudes under investigation. Yet, while there are five significant relationships affected by each, only one of these is the same for both: the corrupt-not corrupt continuum for patronage. The relationship is similar in both cases, with advanced study correlating with lower corruption ratings.

Since no other dimensions appear more than once in Tables XXXIX and XL, it is again difficult to establish any basic tendencies. On the federal-local continua, however, one trend is apparent and consistent

TABLE XXXIX: THE EFFECT OF LEVEL OF STUDY ON CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS

PATRONAGE:	1ST	2ND	3RD	4TH	GRAD	ASSOC.	SIGNIF.
%Corrupt	69.5	51.6	42.4	40.6	42.1	Y=-.23	.005
%Not Corrupt	23.8	32.3	33.3	43.8	34.3		
<hr/>							
PORK-BARRELING:							
%American	20.0	17.4	10.9	16.1	31.4	Y=+.15	.05
%Canadian	18.2	10.9	14.0	9.7	0.0		
<hr/>							
BRIBERY:							
%Common	71.1	53.2	56.1	56.2	38.5	Y=-.18	.05
%Rare	25.4	26.0	30.3	28.1	35.8		
<hr/>							
INFLUENCE-PEDDLING:							
%PC	18.6	30.1	40.7	35.5	44.5	Y=+.27	.05
%NDP	11.1	5.4	0.0	3.2	2.8		
<hr/>							
PARTY DISCIPLINE:							
%American	24.1	16.3	7.9	3.3	5.8	Y=-.24	.05
%Canadian	16.7	37.0	34.4	40.0	40.0		

TABLE XL: THE EFFECT OF THE NUMBER OF POLITICAL SCIENCE COURSES ON CORRUPTION DIMENSIONS

PATRONAGE:	1	2-4	5+	ASSOC.	SIGNIF.
%Corrupt	55.8	53.0	36.8	Y=-.18	.05
%Not Corrupt	30.9	31.0	37.1		
%Federal	55.1	42.4	31.7	Y=-.25	.05
%Local	13.8	26.2	26.6		
<hr/>					
LEG. CONFLICT:					
%Federal	45.6	46.9	25.4	Y=-.17	.05
%Local	9.6	13.2	23.7		
%NDP	1.8	7.0	0.0	Y=-.26	.05
%Liberal	29.8	37.4	54.1		
<hr/>					
INFLUENCE-PEDDLING:					
%Important	42.0	57.0	61.3	Y=+.21	.05
%Unimportant	37.8	17.0	17.7		

with the earlier observation about the knowledge index: students with more political science courses see corruption as less federal and more local than other students.

In the final analysis, the knowledge index is a more useful measure of knowledge, not only because it is a direct measure rather than an indicator, but also because it was more successful in delineating relationships with the corruption dimensions.

Epilogue: Multivariate Relationships and the Need to "Control"

The purpose of multivariate analysis is to control the relationship between two variables for the effect of a third. Should the act of control eliminate the original relationship, that relationship would be said to be spurious. If the relationship is unaffected, it would be said to be a "true" (statistically speaking, at least) relationship, insofar as that one variable was concerned. The relationship may even be revealed as conditional, where it holds for certain values of the control variable (e.g., for certain campuses or regions or certain age groups) but not for others. It is only the spurious relationship which is problematic, for conditional relationships still provide useful data. Spurious relationships, by contrast, indicate that the relationship is an artifact of one's analytical methods, in that the effect of A on B is actually caused by a third variable, C. Thus the "true" relationship is that C (not A) affects B. In more concrete terms, using variables we have discussed earlier as relevant to this notion of control it may be that the influence of an efficacy item such as "politicians don't care" on the perception of bureaucratic conflict of interest as common, is due

instead to the effect of region (campus) on the assessment of this conflict of interest. Or, using another example, the relationship between knowledge and the assessment of party discipline as corrupt could result from the "truer" impact of age on the assessment of party discipline.

In order to establish some sense of the interplay of variables in the context of multivariate control techniques, several key variables were selected for investigation. These were selected on the basis of the relative effectiveness of the variables on the corruption dimensions (see Table XXIV) and association of these measures to each other. The effect of these key variables on selected dimensions of corruption will be subjected to controls for a third variable to establish whether the relationship holds, whether it is conditional or whether it is spurious. The key variables in question are campus (as a measure of region), federal party preference, age, knowledge, and one efficacy item — "politicians don't care". These independent variables are among the most frequently effective in our preceding discussion. They are also associated with each other in the following way. Campus, which is the variable chosen as the control is associated with federal party preference ($V=.18$, significant at the .05 level), knowledge ($V=.20$, significant at .005), age ($V=.45$, significant at .0001) and "politicians don't care" ($V=.16$, significant at .05). Further, age constitutes a second control variable relevant to knowledge ($V=+.28$, significant at .0005). The relationship of each of these to the respective corruption dimensions was discussed extensively in the previous section. The corruption dimensions were chosen according to their relationship with the independent variables just noted, with special attention paid to

TABLE XLI: CONTROLLING SELECTED RELATIONSHIPS FOR REGION AND AGE

AGE by Patronage (federal-local); $Y = -.28$, significance: .005.

Control for CAMPUS: MEM: -.31 LAV: -.54 CAR: -.09
WPG: -.31 UBC: -.06

POLITICIANS DON'T CARE by Bureaucratic Conflict of Interest
(common-rare); $Y = +.31$, sig.: .005.

Control for CAMPUS: MEM: +.41 LAV: -.32 CAR: +.45
WPG: +.21 UBC: +.43

KNOWLEDGE by Bureaucratic Conflict of Interest (important-not
important); $Y = +.38$, sig.: .001.

Control for CAMPUS: MEM: +.32 LAV: +.07 CAR: +.45
WPG: +.35 UBC: +.57

FEDERAL PARTY PREFERENCE by Campaign Finance (corrupt-not corrupt)
 $V = .19$, sig.: .005

Control for CAMPUS:		MEM	LAV	CAR	WPG	UBC	TOTAL
Lib.:	%Corrupt	25.0	80.0	22.6	50.0	21.4	33.0
	%Not Corrupt	70.8	20.0	58.1	34.6	78.6	56.0
PC:	%Corrupt	29.6	50.0	21.1	9.1	20.0	22.6
	%Not Corrupt	66.7	50.0	63.2	77.3	70.0	67.9
NDP:	%Corrupt	22.2	50.0	10.0	47.4	57.1	38.6
	%Not Corrupt	33.3	41.7	20.0	47.4	28.6	36.9
OTH.:	%Corrupt	33.3	50.0	0.0	12.5	25.0	23.8
	%Not Corrupt	66.7	0.0	50.0	62.5	50.0	47.6
ASSOC.:		V = .35	.43	.31	.31	.32	

KNOWLEDGE by Party Discipline (corrupt-not corrupt); $Y = -.35$, sig.: .005.

Control for AGE: UP TO 20: -.32
21 - 29: -.40
30 & OVER: -.29

their potential when collapsed. The number of cases necessary for physical control by contingency tables requires that further collapsing be done, thus each of the corruption dimensions were reduced to three values, one "left", one neutral and one "right". The result of this controlling process can be found in Table XLI.

Given the preeminence of region (measured by campus) in the previous section of this chapter, it was felt that this was the variable most likely to affect relationships between other independent variables and the corruption dimensions. As can be seen, region did have some effect, but this was largely conditional. The impact of age on the federal-local continuum for the patronage scenario is consistent in its direction, though not in its intensity. The original relationship whereby increased age was associated with a less federal rating remains for each campus (region). However, only Winnipeg and Memorial maintain similar intensity, while for Laval this relationship is intensified and for Carleton and U.B.C. the relationship is weakened considerably. The effect of region on the relationship between the efficacy item "politicians don't care" is even more noticeably conditional in that the positive relationship is maintained strongly for four regions, but reversed for students at the Quebec university. Thus, this efficacy item works differently for students at Laval than it does for others. The relationship between knowledge and the attitude that bureaucratic conflict of interest is important resembles the first control situation in that the direction of the relationship remains unchanged. However, in this case Laval students exhibit a much weaker correlation than students at the other universities. The relationship between party preference and the attitude that campaign finance is corrupt is the most

problematic of the control analyses. There are strong associations registered for each campus, but the nature of the association is inconsistent. Liberals at Laval and Winnipeg differ from similar partisans elsewhere, but PC supporters are somewhat more consistent (i.e., not favouring the corrupt end of the continuum in any region, though ambivalent at Laval). NDPers are perhaps the least consistent between regions. Note also that, with collapsed data, Memorial and Carleton show little difference between parties. The result is a conditional relationship with rather complex conditions. Lastly, the relationship between knowledge and the belief that party discipline is corrupt is essentially unaltered by the use of age as a control.

In summary, while controls for all significant relationships are not examined here, the sampled relationships hold up at least conditionally. This suggests that, in general, the previously discussed bivariate relationships are not spurious and that we can pursue further research with some confidence.

NOTES

1. David Elkins, Donald Blake and Richard Johnston, "Who Trusts Whom To Do What?" a paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association meetings, Montreal, June, 1980.
2. Lester Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 71-81.
3. The efficacy indexes detailed below are very highly correlated, with gamma (γ)=+.95. Efficacy (B) is reasonably consistent with generally accepted efficacy scales, except that it employs only three of the standard four items. See Milbrath, ibid., pp. 156-157. Efficacy (A) uses the same three items, but adds a fourth ("It doesn't matter much which party wins") in an attempt to incorporate a sense of voting futility which differs from that implied in the more traditional item ("so many people vote that it doesn't matter if I vote or not"). The latter implies a mathematical futility, as in "one vote in a million." The former implies that even if numbers of votes were not a problem, it still would not matter who won. Since efficacy (A) is unconventional, the more traditional efficacy index was also used.
4. See, for example, Harold D. Clarke et al. Political Choice in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979), pp. 107-119.
5. The association between campus and province of residence was $V=.98$, significant at the .0001 level, if we exclude all students resident outside the five provinces where the universities are located. If we include all students, the association is $V=.96$, significant also at the .0001 level. When analyzing salience, there was no difference in the effect of either on the dependent variables.
6. John Wilson, "The Canadian Political Cultures," Canadian Journal of Political Science, 7 (September, 1983), 438-483.

CHAPTER TEN - CONCLUSION

In a discussion of Ontario's political culture, John Wilson observed:

One of the most intriguing aspects of Ontario political history is the extent to which charges of corruption, in one form or another, seem always to have been associated with the defeat of a government.¹

However, Wilson also noted that there were numerous occasions when, despite serious charges of corruption, governments went on to retain or even increase their majorities. The conclusion he drew from this apparent contradiction is that the political culture of Ontario consists of values and beliefs which are not necessarily violated by corruption, though corruption may be an added element of condemnation against a government which is found lacking for other, more crucial reasons.²

The position advanced by Wilson seems consistent with the findings of this study, especially if one accepts the presumption that his perspective could be applied to Canada as a whole. Corruption is an important issue, but it is not the crucial issue in the political arena. It has a secondary role to play, as an adjunct consideration in a world where unemployment and interest rates have far more immediacy. But this adjunct role is nonetheless important, for the incidence or perception of corruption is tied to attitudes about the political system. Do politicians care about the average citizen? Are certain of their actions inherently undemocratic? Can we trust the system? These are questions which relate to public perceptions of fairness, and they would seem to be relevant to one's underlying sense of what the system stands for, in other words, the system's legitimacy. Legitimacy may be more noticeably

affected by protracted and excessive unemployment, but it is not unaffected by corruption. Either may be seen as an affront to the "public interest", the latter because it rewards the few at the expense of the many.

This, then, is the general sense that emerges from this research. At a finer level, what might be said of our hypotheses found at the end of Chapter Six? The first of these suggested that corruption was of secondary, rather than primary importance as an issue. We have already alluded to the confirmation of this point above. In Chapter Eight we found that, in a list of ten issues, corruption was ranked seventh, well behind unemployment and inflation but ahead of three other issues. Moreover, we found that the ranking of corruption as an issue was so infrequently related to evaluation of the dimensions of corruption that it was omitted from the bivariate analyses in Chapter Nine. Despite this, all nine corruption scenarios were rated important by the student sample.

The second hypothesis in Chapter Six, that people could be differentiated in their orientations toward corruption by a number of socio-economic and political variables common to the literature on political attitudes, was also confirmed. Region, often described as the most important of independent variables in Canadian attitudinal and opinion research, was also the most important independent variable in the influencing of attitudes toward corruption. Party preference, age, knowledge and efficacy (especially the single efficacy item abbreviated as "politicians don't care") were frequently consequential as well. Subjective social class, gender, general and political trust, community size and respondent's education (level of study and number of political

science courses) were related to the dimensions of corruption in only a modest degree. Parent's objective social class and education, strength of partisan identity and the aforementioned ranking of corruption as an issue had very little impact. If there was a surprise in this study, this last point was surely it. One would have thought the relative ranking of corruption as an issue (separate from the question raised in the discussion of the first hypothesis) would have great bearing on whether certain activities were seen as corrupt or common or at least important. As it was, the issue-rank for corruption related significantly to only three dimensions, one of which was the common-rare continuum for bribery. In this case, a higher ranking for corruption as an issue was connected to a more common rating for bribery. Nevertheless, significant relationships were too few and far between to merit special attention.

The third hypothesis posited that the dimensions (i.e., continua for the various scenarios) of corruption would be relevant to the sample, such that respondents could make meaningful distinctions, for example, between what was corrupt and what was not, what was common or rare, what was more relevant to one level of government or one political part than another, and so on. This too was confirmed, though not with uniform success. The distinction between English Canadian and French Canadian was salient to only a few. Distinctions between the political parties were generally modestly successful, except in the comparison between Liberals and Conservatives. The distinction between American and Canadian politics was also lacking in salience, but those who did make distinctions generally saw the scenarios (except for that on party discipline) as being far more American than Canadian. Whatever else

Canadians might envy, rightly or wrongly, about the United States, political ethics are not among them. The dimensions, then, are seen here as useful in general, though of varying success in specific cases. Only one might be discarded altogether (the English-French continuum), while the others seem to merit further attention in future research.

The notion of trade-offs was raised in the fourth hypothesis and, though the evidence is indirect, it too seems confirmed. While the ranking of issues was thought to be the "triggering" mechanism for this trade-off notion, this was not the case in the final analysis. It was suggested that those who rank such issues as unemployment or inflation high might be willing to "accept" some level of corruption as a trade-off for fulfilling demands in more crucial issue areas. The ranking of issues did not provide much help in assessing this possibility. However, by comparing the evaluations of the dimensions of corruption with party preference, it was clear that many respondents were willing to support a party they thought was more corrupt than others. Indeed, both federal Liberals and Conservatives thought the NDP was less closely related to corrupt activities, even those as nefarious in their assessment as bribery and nepotism, than their own party was. How then do we explain the fact that these respondents identified themselves with the "more corrupt" parties? The answer, it is surmised here, is that these respondents made trade-offs, with support given to the party which, despite some failings in the area of ethics, met other, more pressing concerns. Perceptions of the ethical character of a political party may be associated with party support when all else is equal, but ceteris paribus is rarely the case for many voters.

Types of corruption, as well as dimensions of corruption, are

distinguished by the student sample in such a way that we can even rank-order these types in terms of their perceived corruptness, commonness, necessity and the like. This would confirm the fifth and final hypothesis in Chapter Six. However, we have found that the evaluation of types of corruption, like dimensions of corruption, are distinguished in different ways by different people. Students at Laval felt that the campaign finance scenario was corrupt, but students at English language universities did not. Supporters of the NDP thought campaign finance was corrupt, but supporters of the remaining two major federal parties did not, and so on. Differences in the evaluation of types and dimensions (i.e., the scenarios and the continua) of corruption were most noticeable between regions, between supporters of different parties, between students of different age and knowledge, etc. In the final analysis, however, the types of corruption were apparently meaningful to most aspects of the sample.

Whether these five hypotheses could be confirmed in a sample taken from the general population cannot be determined here. It is hoped that the discussion of the sample's characteristics and its correspondence with the general population in certain ways will dispell the fear that the generalizability of this research is limited strictly to university students studying political science. It is fair to argue that a sample such as that employed in this study is more politically aware and more competent in the analysis of political concepts than would be a sample from the general public. Yet, more than 40% of the sample were taking their first political science course at the time of the survey, thus it may be stretching a point to assume conceptual sophistication applies to the entire sample. In any event, the data collected in this survey

warrant further investigation with a more representative sample. If our sample is reasonably representative of the general population, the main relationships uncovered here should also apply to the public at large. If, on the other hand, this sample is to some extent unrepresentative because of its relative political sophistication, then we will have learned something useful in any case. I suspect that the former is more likely than the latter.

Lest it be thought that this exercise is intended to satisfy mere academic curiosity, it should be noted that underlying the motivation for conducting such research is a concern for the public policy process in democratic systems. At times, the concepts of legitimacy and public interest have been used in this analysis. These terms have meaning in this author's lexicon of public policy. Legitimacy relates to the sense of purpose exhibited by the policy system and is thought to be relevant to the expectations of the population at large. Democratic systems, then, should be perceived as democratic if they are to retain their legitimacy. In the absence of legitimacy, policy is instituted and maintained by force. Even those systems which use the term democracy in ways which would be inconsistent with commonly held beliefs in Western "procedural" democracies, nevertheless must provide for a sense of legitimacy. Failing this, they must effectuate policy through force or threat of force. In the long term, force is an exhausting mechanism. Thus, the legitimizing factor may be procedural democracy in the North Atlantic countries or a more egalitarian distribution of wealth in countries of the Eastern bloc. For either, corruption is of consequence for legitimacy.

The concept of public interest is not inconsistent with the sense

of legitimacy just described, though it is not identical. The concept of public interest used in Chapter Two suggests that a democratic system may be seen as legitimate to the extent that the public interest is met. Public interest theory (or, more accurately, theories) do build, at times, on a sense of procedure. But the perspective employed here has been a majoritarian one to a large, but not exclusive, degree. In other words, the public interest has been seen in this study as reasonably consistent with, though not necessarily identical to, the concept of majority will. In this context, a democratic system retains its legitimacy not only because the democratic process works as it was intended to do in a procedural sense, but also because the results of those procedures are reasonably, though not necessarily identically, consistent with the majority will.

Corruption has consequence, then, for both legitimacy as process and legitimacy as public interest. To be fair, these notions are, at times, inextricably intertwined and thus conceptually inseparable. Nevertheless, the attitudes detected in this study suggest that both these aspects of democratic legitimacy may be of consequence in light of political corruption, for the following reasons.

First, there is the sense that corrupt activities are also undemocratic activities. Once a government is perceived as undemocratic, it is possible that a spillover effect may cause resistance to other government policies unrelated to the corrupt act. This notion has been attributed to a sense of paralysis in Washington during the Watergate era, and is cited in many third world nations when corruption is claimed to have made it impossible for the incumbents to continue to govern. Undemocratic may be seen, in the context of student

responses, as either procedurally-based or public interest-based. In the latter eventuality, the concern might also be translated into the sense of fairness or equity inherent in the distribution of government (policy) outputs. Unfortunately, the data do not permit us to make this distinction.

Second, agreement with the efficacy item, "Politicians don't care what people like me think," indicates a strong sense that the public interest is not being met. That is, legitimacy is threatened, for those respondents agreeing with the statement, because the outputs and inputs of the system are inconsistent with their perceived wants and needs. If politicians don't care what one thinks, they will not listen to "the average person" (procedural illegitimacy) and they will not provide outputs relevant to those persons (public interest or majoritarian illegitimacy). It is not surprising that agreement with this item correlates quite well with higher corrupt ratings and more common ratings for our scenarios.

Third, all scenarios in this study are seen as more common than rare, and this evaluation is true for almost every breakdown of socio-economic and political variables. Even the most corrupt of scenarios, bribery, is seen as more common than rare. Thus, our sample perceives the manipulation of policy decisions due to bribery and conflict of interest to be a common phenomenon. Since the number of people to benefit from such activity is necessarily small, it could hardly be consistent with the public interest for decisions to be made in this fashion as long as the public interest contains some element of majoritarianism, fairness and equity.

Other connections could also be made, but the point is nonetheless.

clear: corruption is unlikely to benefit the policy process in terms of legitimacy (though patronage and campaign finance are seen as somewhat necessary) and more likely to damage that legitimacy by promoting the sense that the process and its outputs are undemocratic and that politicians do not care what the average citizen thinks. But these are somewhat ethereal thoughts. Are there consequences for public policy that are more direct or tangible that can be drawn from this study?

On a more concrete level, we have found that there are attitudes which hold some behaviours to be corrupt which are not regarded as such in law or in political science theory (party discipline). Other behaviours are thought not to be corrupt which are held to be corrupt in theory or, in some provinces at least, in law (campaign finance). We have contended from the outset of this thesis that a major reason for adopting a public opinion-based definition of political corruption is that public opinion may either lead or follow legislation, thus legislation is not always a good measure of what is corrupt in the broader sense of that term. This viewpoint seems to be substantiated by this research. However, the likelihood of making the party discipline scenario corrupt in law is very low indeed, even if it were theoretically desirable to do so. It is clear that the public (or, to be more precise, the students) are unimpressed with the theoretical justifications for party discipline. From a "party" policy perspective, it may be necessary to educate the public as to the nature of party discipline and its purpose. We did see less censorious attitudes on this scenario among those with the higher knowledge scores but, even then, the majority of non-neutral responses saw the activity as corrupt. The campaign finance scenario also suggests that an effort may be

required to educate the public as to the nature and purpose of campaign finance legislation. In either case, the prescription for education belies a bias on this author's part which holds party discipline to be ethical and the campaign finance scenario to be unethical. Whether the disagreement between "experts" and the "public" suggests the need for something less than a pure majoritarian sense of public interest is a matter, in the final analysis, for personal assessment.

In addition, by comparing student attitudes to existing or impending legislation, regulation and guidelines, we can identify what Heidenheimer has called "black", "grey" and "white" corruption. For example, as suggested in Chapter Three, bribery is seen as "black" corruption, both in terms of legislation and public opinion. Campaign finance and party discipline are perceived as "white" corruption, in the sense that neither generates condemnation from both elites and the public. Patronage, influence-peddling (at least, of the type summarized in the scenario) and pork-barreling seem to represent "grey" areas in the degree of opprobrium they generate legislatively and attitudinally, i.e., both in elite and mass (public) terms.

In closing, the data generated by this survey were extensive and the temptation to include as much as possible was only partially resisted. Yet, from these data come interesting ideas and insights about how Canadians think about corruption, which were not available before. These data suggest that the understanding of attitudes toward corruption could progress if we were to extend this type of research to samples of the general population. Until that time, the student sample will suffice to provide some basic building blocks in the attempt to conceptualize corruption.

NOTES

- 1. John Wilson, "The Red Tory Province: Reflections on the Character of the Ontario Political Culture," in The Government and Politics of Ontario, ed. by Donald C. Macdonald, (rev. ed.; Toronto: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1980), pp. 215-216.
2. Ibid., pp. 217-218.

APPENDIX: ENGLISH AND FRENCH SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRES

*** POLITICAL AWARENESS SURVEY ***

The purpose of this survey is to find out what you think about different kinds of political activity and whether or not you are aware of various political events, both recent and historical. We are interested only in your opinions, therefore this is not a test! There are no right or wrong answers. We merely want to know how you feel about these various topics or whether you recall certain political episodes.

The first part of the questionnaire is devoted to the events mentioned above plus some basic political issues and certain institutions and groups in society. The second part deals with a number of hypothetical activities which we would like you to rate in several different ways. Part three, finally, is a more general section which asks questions about yourself and some general feelings about politics.

It is important for the reliability of this survey that you answer every question as best you can and that your answers really reflect how you feel. If you think a question is unclear, merely write "don't know" in the appropriate place on the questionnaire. In addition, you should not sign the questionnaire. It is meant to be anonymous.

If you have any comments about this survey, please feel free to write them on the back of the last page. Thank you for your cooperation.

PART ONE:

- (1) Below there is a list of ten issues that some people believe are important. We would like you to rank these issues in order of their importance to you personally. The issue which is most important to you should be given the number "1", the second most important should be given the number "2", etc.

a. inflation	_____	f. crime	_____
b. unemployment	_____	g. separatism	_____
c. bilingualism	_____	h. energy	_____
d. corruption	_____	i. environment	_____
e. abortion	_____	j. nationalism	_____

- (2) Listed below are a number of institutions or groups that are well-known to many people. How trustworthy would you say each of these institutions or groups are? Circle the appropriate number next to each item, using the following key as a guide.

1 = very trustworthy, 2 = somewhat trustworthy, 3 = neither trustworthy nor untrustworthy, 4 = somewhat untrustworthy, 5 = very untrustworthy

a. The Senate	1 2 3 4 5	h. Clergymen	1 2 3 4 5
b. The R.C.M.P.	1 2 3 4 5	i. Bureaucrats	1 2 3 4 5
c. Municipal Government	1 2 3 4 5	j. University Professors	1 2 3 4 5
d. The Mass Media	1 2 3 4 5	k. Provincial Government	1 2 3 4 5
e. Unions	1 2 3 4 5	l. The Prime Minister	1 2 3 4 5
f. Doctors	1 2 3 4 5	m. The House of Commons	1 2 3 4 5
g. The Courts	1 2 3 4 5	n. Lawyers	1 2 3 4 5

- (3) Listed below are the names of a number of recent or historical events. Could you indicate (by marking an X in the appropriate column) whether or not you have heard of any or all of these events?

		Yes	No
a. The Harbourside Affair		_____	_____
b. The Fiddlers Affair		_____	_____
c. The Pacific Railway Affair		_____	_____
d. The Hydrogate Affair		_____	_____
e. The Judges Affair		_____	_____
f. The Cunningham Affair		_____	_____
g. The Beauharnois Affair		_____	_____
h. The Munro Affair		_____	_____
i. The R.C.M.P. Affair		_____	_____
j. The Rivard Affair		_____	_____
k. The Churchill Forest Industries Affair		_____	_____
l. The Watergate Affair		_____	_____
m. The Sky Shops Affair		_____	_____

- (4) If you answered YES to any of the above events, could you indicate some of the people, things, or incidents associated with these events, without referring to those items mentioned in the name of the event? Write your answer on the appropriate line on the next page.

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

d. _____

e. _____

f. _____

g. _____

h. _____

i. _____

j. _____

k. _____

l. _____

m. _____

PART TWO:

In this section several imaginary situations are described and following each of these situations is a set of rating scales. We would like you to indicate how you feel about these situations by marking an "X" at the point on the scale which best reflects how you feel. For example, if you think a situation is common, place an X near the 'common' end of the scale. If you feel the situation is very rare, place an X closer to the 'rare' end of the scale. If you are not sure, place an X somewhere near the middle. The closer your X is to either end, the stronger you should feel about the pairs of words on the scale.

1. A civil servant is in a position to hire a new worker in his office. He decides to give the job to his relative rather than to another person who is better qualified. How do you feel about this, is it:

CORRUPT	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	NOT CORRUPT
COMMON	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	RARE
NECESSARY	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	UNNECESSARY
IMPORTANT	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	UNIMPORTANT
PROVINCIAL	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	FEDERAL
FEDERAL	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	LOCAL
LOCAL	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	PROVINCIAL
UNDEMOCRATIC	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	DEMOCRATIC
AMERICAN	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	CANADIAN
PROG. CONSERVATIVE	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	N. D. P.
LIBERAL	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	PROG. CONSERVATIVE
N. D. P.	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	LIBERAL
ENGLISH CANADIAN	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	FRENCH CANADIAN

2. When Party A won the last election it removed a number of people from their government jobs and replaced them with loyal Party A supporters. How do you feel about this, is it:

NOT CORRUPT	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	CORRUPT
RARE	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	COMMON
UNNECESSARY	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	NECESSARY
UNIMPORTANT	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	IMPORTANT
FEDERAL	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	PROVINCIAL
LOCAL	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	FEDERAL
PROVINCIAL	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	LOCAL
DEMOCRATIC	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	UNDEMOCRATIC
CANADIAN	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	AMERICAN
N. D. P.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	PROG. CONSERVATIVE
PROG. CONSERVATIVE	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	LIBERAL
LIBERAL	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	N.D.P.
FRENCH CANADIAN	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	ENGLISH CANADIAN

3. During a recent election Candidate X announced that the government would build a new highway in the riding that the constituents had wanted for years, but only if the party and Candidate X win the election in the ridings. Is this:

NOT CORRUPT	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	CORRUPT
RARE	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	COMMON
UNNECESSARY	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	NECESSARY
UNIMPORTANT	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	IMPORTANT
FEDERAL	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	PROVINCIAL
LOCAL	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	FEDERAL
PROVINCIAL	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	LOCAL
DEMOCRATIC	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	UNDEMOCRATIC
CANADIAN	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	AMERICAN
N. D. P.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	PROG. CONSERVATIVE
PROG. CONSERVATIVE	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	LIBERAL
LIBERAL	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	N. D. P.
FRENCH CANADIAN	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	ENGLISH CANADIAN

4. Mr. X, an average citizen, wants to get a favourable ruling from a civil servant in the government, so he offers to buy the official a television. Is this:

CORRUPT	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	NOT CORRUPT
COMMON	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	RARE

NECESSARY

IMPORTANT

PROVINCIAL

FEDERAL

LOCAL

UNDEMOCRATIC

AMERICAN

PROG. CONSERVATIVE

LIBERAL

N. D. P.

ENGLISH CANADIAN

UNNECESSARY

UNIMPORTANT

FEDERAL

LOCAL

PROVINCIAL

DEMOCRATIC

CANADIAN

N. D. P.

PROG. CONSERVATIVE

LIBERAL

FRENCH CANADIAN

5. A wealthy man, Mr. Y. donates \$50,000 (dollars) to the campaign fund of Candidate B and B accepts. Is this:

NOT CORRUPT

RARE

UNNECESSARY

UNIMPORTANT

FEDERAL

LOCAL

PROVINCIAL

DEMOCRATIC

CANADIAN

N. D. P.

PROG. CONSERVATIVE

LIBERAL

FRENCH CANADIAN

CORRUPT

COMMON

NECESSARY

IMPORTANT

PROVINCIAL

FEDERAL

LOCAL

UNDEMOCRATIC

AMERICAN

PROG. CONSERVATIVE

LIBERAL

N. D. P.

ENGLISH CANADIAN

6. A legislator owns \$25,000 (dollars) worth of stock in a large mining company. He votes for a bill giving tax concessions to the mining industry. Is this:

CORRUPT

COMMON

NECESSARY

IMPORTANT

PROVINCIAL

FEDERAL

LOCAL

UNDEMOCRATIC

NOT CORRUPT

RARE

UNNECESSARY

UNIMPORTANT

FEDERAL

LOCAL

PROVINCIAL

DEMOCRATIC

AMERICAN	_____	CANADIAN
PROG. CONSERVATIVE	_____	N. D. P.
LIBERAL	_____	PROG. CONSERVATIVE
N. D. P.	_____	LIBERAL
ENGLISH CANADIAN	_____	FRENCH CANADIAN

7. Mrs. X, a legislator, often makes reference in the legislature to businesses in her constituency while speaking during question period. These businesses contribute to her campaign fund. Is this:

NOT CORRUPT	_____	CORRUPT
RARE	_____	COMMON
UNNECESSARY	_____	NECESSARY
UNIMPORTANT	_____	IMPORTANT
FEDERAL	_____	PROVINCIAL
LOCAL	_____	FEDERAL
PROVINCIAL	_____	LOCAL
DEMOCRATIC	_____	UNDEMOCRATIC
CANADIAN	_____	AMERICAN
N. D. P.	_____	PROG. CONSERVATIVE
PROG. CONSERVATIVE	_____	LIBERAL
LIBERAL	_____	N. D. P.
FRENCH CANADIAN	_____	ENGLISH CANADIAN

8. Mr. X who has made known his intention to vote against his party on an upcoming bill is told by his party caucus to vote with the party or lose its support for his nomination and campaign funding at election time. Is this:

CORRUPT	_____	NOT CORRUPT
COMMON	_____	RARE
NECESSARY	_____	UNNECESSARY
IMPORTANT	_____	UNIMPORTANT
PROVINCIAL	_____	FEDERAL
FEDERAL	_____	LOCAL
LOCAL	_____	PROVINCIAL
UNDEMOCRATIC	_____	DEMOCRATIC
AMERICAN	_____	CANADIAN
PROG. CONSERVATIVE	_____	N. D. P.
LIBERAL	_____	PROG. CONSERVATIVE
N. D. P.	_____	LIBERAL
ENGLISH CANADIAN	_____	FRENCH CANADIAN

9. A group of officials in a government department use their knowledge and contacts to establish a part-time consulting firm which gives advice to private clients. The officials are still employed by the government. Is this.

CORRUPT	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	NOT CORRUPT
COMMON	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	RARE
NECESSARY	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	UNNECESSARY
IMPORTANT	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	UNIMPORTANT
PROVINCIAL	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	FEDERAL
FEDERAL	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	LOCAL
LOCAL	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	PROVINCIAL
UNDEMOCRATIC	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	DEMOCRATIC
AMERICAN	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	CANADIAN
PROG. CONSERVATIVE	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	N. D. P.
LIBERAL	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	PROG. CONSERVATIVE
N. D. P.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	LIBERAL
ENGLISH CANADIAN	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	FRENCH CANADIAN

PART THREE:

In this section we would like to ask you some general questions about yourself and about some other areas of politics.

- What is your age, in years? _____
- Sex: male/female (circle one) _____
- What is your province of residence (when not in school)? _____
- Which of the following communities best describes your hometown:
_____ rural, _____ urban - under 100,000, _____ urban-100,000 or over.
- Do you think of yourself as belonging to a social class? _____ YES _____ NO
- Regardless of your answer to the previous question, could you indicate which social class you feel you belong to or are closest to in the column marked "yourself". In the column marked "parents" indicate what you think their social class is or was.

YOURSELF

PARENTS

_____ upper class
 _____ upper middle class
 _____ middle class
 _____ lower middle class
 _____ working class

7. What is (was) your father's occupation (be specific)?

8. What is (was) your mother's occupation (be specific)?

9. Using the following list, indicate the highest level of education attained by each of your parents. Use an 'F' to indicate father's education, an 'M' for mother's.

☐ primary school only ☐ some university or post-secondary
☐ some secondary school ☐ graduated from university
☐ finished secondary school

10. Which political party do you usually support in federal elections? _____

11. How strong is your support for that party? ☐ very strong ☐ somewhat strong
☐ moderate ☐ somewhat weak ☐ very weak

12. Which party do you usually support in your provincial elections? _____

13. How strong is your support for that party? ☐ very strong ☐ somewhat strong
☐ moderate ☐ somewhat weak ☐ very weak

14. Below are several statements about politics with which you might agree or disagree. Please circle the letter which shows to what extent you agree or disagree with each statement, using the following key: A = agree strongly; a = agree mildly; ? = neither agree nor disagree; d = disagree mildly; D = disagree strongly.

a. Politicians don't care what people like me think. A a ? d D

b. It doesn't matter much which party wins. A a ? d D

c. Sometimes politics and government are so complicated that a person like me can't understand what is going on. A a ? d D

d. So many people vote that it doesn't matter if I vote or not. A a ? d D

15. Which of the following best describes the level you are at in your university studies? ☐ first year ☐ second year ☐ third year
☐ fourth year ☐ graduate school.

16. How many political science courses have you taken, including any currently enrolled in? (Indicate full year and half year courses). _____

*** QUESTIONNAIRE SUR LA CONNAISSANCE ***

DES FAITS POLITIQUES

Le but de ce questionnaire est de découvrir ce que vous pensez de différentes sortes d'activités politiques et si, oui ou non, vous êtes au courant de divers événements politiques, à la fois récents et historiques. Nous nous intéressons seulement à vos opinions, donc ceci n'est pas un examen. Il n'y a pas de réponse juste ou de réponse fausse. Nous désirons seulement savoir ce que vous pensez de ces différents sujets, ou si vous vous souvenez de certains épisodes politiques.

La première partie de ce questionnaire est consacrée aux événements mentionnés ci-dessus ainsi qu'à quelques issues politiques de base, certaines institutions et groupes de la société. La deuxième partie traite d'un nombre d'activités hypothétiques que nous voudrions vous voir évaluer de plusieurs manières différentes. La troisième partie, enfin, traite de faits plus généraux qui incluent des questions sur vous et quelques commentaires généraux sur la politique.

Pour que ce questionnaire soit le plus exact possible, il est important que vous répondiez à chaque question de votre mieux et que vos réponses soient le reflet véritable de vos sentiments. Si vous trouvez qu'une question n'est pas claire, écrivez simplement "sais pas" à l'endroit approprié dans le questionnaire. De plus, ne signez pas ce questionnaire. Il doit rester anonyme.

Si vous avez des commentaires à faire sur ce questionnaire, veuillez les ajouter en toute confiance au dos de la dernière page. Nous vous remercions de votre coopération.

PARTIE UN:

- (1) Ci-dessous, se trouve une liste de dix sujets que certains jugent importants. Nous voudrions que vous les classiez selon l'importance que vous, personnellement, leur donnez. Le sujet qui vous paraît le plus important devra recevoir le numéro "1", le deuxième sujet le plus important le numéro "2", etc.

a. inflation	_____	f. crime	_____
b. chômage	_____	g. séparatisme	_____
c. bilinguisme	_____	h. énergie	_____
d. corruption	_____	i. environnement	_____
e. avortement	_____	j. nationalisme	_____

- (2) Ci-dessous, vous trouverez un certain nombre d'institutions ou de groupes qui sont connus de beaucoup. Quel degré de confiance pensez-vous que chacun de ces groupes ou institutions ont? Entourlez le numéro qui convient, à la suite de chaque énumération, en vous servant de la gamme suivante comme guide.

1 = très honnête, 2 = assez honnête, 3 = ni honnête ni malhonnête, 4 = assez malhonnête, 5 = très malhonnête

a. Le Sénat	1 2 3 4 5	h. Le Clergé	1 2 3 4 5
b. La G.R.D.C.	1 2 3 4 5	i. Bureaucrates	1 2 3 4 5
c. Gouvernement municipal	1 2 3 4 5	j. Professeurs d'université	1 2 3 4 5
d. Les mass media	1 2 3 4 5	k. Gouvernement provincial	1 2 3 4 5
e. Syndicats	1 2 3 4 5	l. Le Premier ministre	1 2 3 4 5
f. Docteurs	1 2 3 4 5	m. La Chambre des Communes	1 2 3 4 5
g. Les cours de justice	1 2 3 4 5	n. Avocats	1 2 3 4 5

- (3) Ci-dessous sont les noms d'un certain nombre d'événements récents ou historiques. Indiquez (en marquant d'un X la colonne appropriée) si oui ou non vous avez entendu parler d'un ou de tous ces événements?

	Oui	Non
a. L'Affaire Harbougate	_____	_____
b. L'Affaire Fidinam	_____	_____
c. L'Affaire des Chemins de Fer Pacifique	_____	_____
d. L'Affaire Hydrogate	_____	_____
e. L'Affaire des Juges	_____	_____
f. L'Affaire Cunningham	_____	_____
g. L'Affaire Beauharnois	_____	_____
h. L'Affaire Munsinger	_____	_____
i. L'Affaire G.R.D.C.	_____	_____
j. L'Affaire Rivard	_____	_____
k. L'Affaire des Industries Forestières de Churchill	_____	_____
l. L'Affaire du Watergate	_____	_____
m. L'Affaire Sky Shops	_____	_____

g of /de g

Micro-**ED**

- (4) Si vous avez répondu OUI à n'importe lequel des événements ci-dessus, pouvez-vous indiquer quelques personnes, choses, ou incidents associés à ces événements, sans faire référence aux éléments mentionnés au nom de l'événement? Ecrivez votre réponse sur la ligne appropriée ci-dessous.

a. _____

b. _____

c. _____

d. _____

e. _____

f. _____

g. _____

h. _____

i. _____

j. _____

k. _____

l. _____

m. _____

PARTIE DEUX:

Dans cette section, plusieurs situations imaginaires sont décrites, et à la suite de chacune de ces situations, se trouve une série d'échelles d'évaluation. Indiquez ce que vous pensez de ces situations en marquant d'un "X" le point de l'échelle qui reflète le mieux vos sentiments. Par exemple, si vous pensez qu'une situation est commune, mettez un "X" à l'extrémité 'commune' de l'échelle. Si vous croyez que la situation est très rare, mettez un "X" plus près de l'extrémité 'rare' de l'échelle. Si vous n'êtes pas sûr, mettez un "X" quelquepart au centre. Plus votre X est proche d'une des deux extrémités, plus vous ressentez de sentiments forts pour les paires de mots situés sur l'échelle.

1. Un employé des Services Publics est dans la situation où il doit embaucher un nouveau travailleur pour son bureau. Il décide de donner cet emploi à un de ses parent plutôt qu'à une autre personne mieux qualifiée. Qu'en pensez-vous, est-ce:

CORROMPU _____

COMMUN _____

NECESSAIRE _____

IMPORTANT _____

PROVINCIAL _____

FEDERAL _____

LOCAL _____

NON DEMOCRATIQUE _____

AMERICAIN _____

NON CORROMPU _____

RARE _____

PAS NECESSAIRE _____

PAS IMPORTANT _____

FEDERAL _____

LOCAL _____

PROVINCIAL _____

DEMOCRATIQUE _____

CANADIEN _____

PROG. CONSERVATEURS _____
LIBERAL _____
N. P. D. _____
LIBERAL _____
CANADIEN-ANGLAIS _____

N. P. D. _____
PROG. CONSERVATEURS _____
LIBERAL _____
PARTI QUEBECOIS _____
CANADIEN-FRANCAIS _____

2. Quand le Parti A a gagné les dernières élections, il a éliminé un certain nombre de personnes des postes gouvernementaux et les a remplacées par des supporters loyaux. Qu'en pensez-vous, est-ce:

PAS CORROMPU _____
RARE _____
PAS NECESSAIRE _____
PAS IMPORTANT _____
FEDERAL _____
LOCAL _____
PROVINCIAL _____
DEMOCRATIQUE _____
CANADIEN _____
N. P. D. _____
PROG. CONSERVATEURS _____
LIBERAL _____
PARTI QUEBECOIS _____
CANADIEN-FRANCAIS _____

CORROMPU _____
COMMUN _____
NECESSAIRE _____
IMPORTANT _____
PROVINCIAL _____
FEDERAL _____
LOCAL _____
NON DEMOCRATIQUE _____
AMERICAIN _____
PROG. CONSERVATEURS _____
LIBERAL _____
N. P. D. _____
LIBERAL _____
CANADIEN-ANGLAIS _____

3. Durant une élection récente, le Candidat X a annoncé que le gouvernement allait construire une nouvelle route nationale dans la circonscription où les électeurs l'avaient réclamée pendant des années, mais seulement si le parti et le Candidat X gagnent les élections dans cette circonscription. Est-ce:

PAS CORROMPU _____
RARE _____
PAS NECESSAIRE _____
PAS IMPORTANT _____
FEDERAL _____
LOCAL _____
PROVINCIAL _____
DEMOCRATIQUE _____
CANADIEN _____
N.P.D. _____
PROG. CONSERVATEURS _____
LIBERAL _____

CORROMPU _____
COMMUN _____
NECESSAIRE _____
IMPORTANT _____
PROVINCIAL _____
FEDERAL _____
LOCAL _____
NON DEMOCRATIQUE _____
AMERICAIN _____
PROG. CONSERVATEURS _____
LIBERAL _____
N. P. D. _____

PARTI QUEBECOIS
CANADIEN-FRANCAIS

LIBERAL
CANADIEN-ANGLAIS

4. M. X, citoyen moyen, veut obtenir un jugement favorable d'un fonctionnaire du gouvernement, alors il offre de lui acheter un poste de télévision. Est-ce:

CORROMPU
COMMUN
NECESSAIRE
IMPORTANT
PROVINCIAL
FEDERAL
LOCAL
NON DEMOCRATIQUE
AMERICAIN
PROG. CONSERVATEURS
LIBERAL
N. P. D.
LIBERAL
CANADIEN-ANGLAIS

PAS CORROMPU
RARE
PAS NECESSAIRE
PAS IMPORTANT
FEDERAL
LOCAL
PROVINCIAL
DEMOCRATIQUE
CANADIEN
N. P. D.
PROG. CONSERVATEURS
LIBERAL
PARTI QUEBECOIS
CANADIEN-FRANCAIS

5. Un homme riche, M. Y verse une souscription de 50,000 dollars pour la campagne du Candidat B et B accepte. Est-ce:

PAS CORROMPU
RARE
PAS NECESSAIRE
PAS IMPORTANT
FEDERAL
LOCAL
PROVINCIAL
DEMOCRATIQUE
CANADIEN
N. P. D.
PROG. CONSERVATEURS
LIBERAL
PARTI QUEBECOIS
CANADIEN-FRANCAIS

CORROMPU
COMMUN
NECESSAIRE
IMPORTANT
PROVINCIAL
FEDERAL
LOCAL
NON DEMOCRATIQUE
AMERICAIN
PROG. CONSERVATEURS
LIBERAL
N. P. D.
LIBERAL
CANADIEN-ANGLAIS

6. Un législateur est propriétaire d'une valeur de 25,000 dollars en actions dans une grande compagnie minière. Il vote pour un projet de loi qui accorde des privilèges de taxes à cette industrie minière. Est-ce:

CORROMPU	_____	PAS CORROMPU
COMMUN	_____	RARE
NECESSAIRE	_____	PAS NECESSAIRE
IMPORTANT	_____	PAS IMPORTANT
PROVINCIAL	_____	FEDERAL
FEDERAL	_____	LOCAL
LOCAL	_____	PROVINCIAL
NON DEMOCRATIQUE	_____	DEMOCRATIQUE
AMERICAIN	_____	CANADIEN
PROG. CONSERVATEURS	_____	N. P. D.
LIBERAL	_____	PROG. CONSERVATEURS
N. P. D.	_____	LIBERAL
LIBERAL	_____	PARTI QUEBECOIS
CANADIEN-ANGLAIS	_____	CANADIEN-FRANCAIS

7. Mme X, législatrice, fait de fréquentes références dans la législature à des entreprises dans sa circonscription alors qu'elle parle pendant la période des questions. Ces entreprises contribuent aux souscriptions pour sa campagne électorale. Est-ce:

PAS CORROMPU	_____	CORROMPU
RARE	_____	COMMUN
PAS NECESSAIRE	_____	NECESSAIRE
PAS IMPORTANT	_____	IMPORTANT
FEDERAL	_____	PROVINCIAL
LOCAL	_____	FEDERAL
PROVINCIAL	_____	LOCAL
DEMOCRATIQUE	_____	NON DEMOCRATIQUE
CANADIEN	_____	AMERICAIN
N. P. D.	_____	PROG. CONSERVATEURS
PROG. CONSERVATEURS	_____	LIBERAL
LIBERAL	_____	N. P. D.
PARTI QUEBECOIS	_____	LIBERAL
CANADIEN-FRANCAIS	_____	ANGLAIS-CANADIEN

8. M. X qui a fait connaître son intention de voter contre son parti pour un projet de loi prochain apprend que le caucus du parti désire qu'il vote avec le parti; dans le cas d'un refus, M. X perdra tout support pour sa nomination et les souscriptions de sa campagne au moment de la campagne électorale. Est-ce:

CORROMPU	_____	PAS CORROMPU
COMMUN	_____	RARE
NECESSAIRE	_____	PAS NECESSAIRE
IMPORTANT	_____	PAS IMPORTANT
PROVINCIAL	_____	FEDERAL
FEDERAL	_____	LOCAL
LOCAL	_____	PROVINCIAL
NON DEMOCRATIQUE	_____	DEMOCRATIQUE
AMERICAIN	_____	CANADIEN
PROG. CONSERVATEURS	_____	N. P. D.
LIBERAL	_____	PROG. CONSERVATEURS
N. P. D.	_____	LIBERAL
LIBERAL	_____	PARTI QUEBECOIS
CANADIEN-ANGLAIS	_____	CANADIEN-FRANCAIS

9. Un groupe de fonctionnaires d'un ministère du gouvernement utilise ses connaissances et ses contacts pour établir une firme de consultation à temps partiel qui donne des conseils à des clients privés. Ces fonctionnaires sont toujours employés par le gouvernement. Est-ce:

CORROMPU	_____	PAS CORROMPU
COMMUN	_____	RARE
NECESSAIRE	_____	PAS NECESSAIRE
IMPORTANT	_____	PAS IMPORTANT
PROVINCIAL	_____	FEDERAL
FEDERAL	_____	LOCAL
LOCAL	_____	PROVINCIAL
NON DEMOCRATIQUE	_____	DEMOCRATIQUE
AMERICAIN	_____	CANADIEN
PROG. CONSERVATEURS	_____	N. P. D.
LIBERAL	_____	PROG. CONSERVATEURS
N. P. D.	_____	LIBERAL
LIBERAL	_____	PARTI QUEBECOIS
CANADIEN-ANGLAIS	_____	CANADIEN-FRANCAIS

PARTIE TROIS:

Dans cette section, nous voudrions vous poser quelques questions générales sur vous et sur d'autres domaines de la politique.

1. Quel est votre âge, en années? _____ 2. Sexe: h/f (encerclez la réponse)
3. Dans quelle province résidez-vous? (Quand vous n'êtes pas à école)? _____
4. Parmi les communautés suivantes, quelle est celle qui décrit le mieux votre ville natale:
 _____ rurale; _____ urbaine- en-dessous 100,000; _____ urbaine - 100,000 ou plus.
5. Avez-vous le sentiment d'appartenir à une classe sociale? _____ OUI _____ NON
6. Sans tenir compte de votre réponse à la question précédente, pouvez-vous indiquer la classe sociale à laquelle vous avez l'impression d'appartenir ou pour laquelle vous avez le plus d'affinités dans la colonne marquée "vous-même". Dans la colonne marquée "parents", indiquez ce que vous croyez être ou avoir été leur classe sociale.

<u>VOUS-MÊME</u>		<u>PARENTS</u>
_____	haute société	_____
_____	haute bourgeoisie	_____
_____	bourgeoisie	_____
_____	petite bourgeoisie	_____
_____	classe ouvrière	_____

7. Quel est (a été) l'emploi de votre père (détaillez)?

8. Quel est (a été) l'emploi de votre mère (détaillez)?

9. En utilisant la liste suivante, indiquez le plus haut niveau d'éducation atteint par chacun de vos parents. Utilisez un "P" pour l'éducation du père, un "M" pour celle de la mère.
 _____ école primaire seulement _____ université ou post-secondaire
 _____ école secondaires _____ diplômé(e) de l'université
 _____ école secondaire complétée
10. Quel parti politique soutenez-vous en général lors des élections fédérales?

11. Quel est le degré de votre soutien pour ce parti? _____ très fort; _____ assez fort;
 _____ modéré; _____ assez faible; _____ très faible.
12. Quel parti soutenez-vous en général dans les élections provinciales? _____
13. Quel est le degré de votre soutien pour ce parti? _____ très fort; _____ assez fort;
 _____ modéré; _____ assez faible; _____ très faible.

14. Ci-dessous vous allez trouver plusieurs affirmations sur la politique avec lesquelles il se peut que vous soyez d'accord ou pas d'accord. Veuillez encircler la lettre qui montre jusqu'à quel point vous êtes d'accord ou pas avec chacune des affirmations. Utilisez la gamme suivante: A = assentiment très fort; a = assentiment modéré; ? = ni d'accord ni pas d'accord; d = désaccord modéré; D = Désaccord très fort.

a. Les Politiciens se moquent de ce que des gens comme moi pensent. A a ? d D

b. Cela n'a pas d'importance que n'importe quel parti gagne. A a ? d D

c. Quelquefois la politique et le gouvernement sont tellement compliqués qu'une personne comme moi ne peut pas comprendre ce qui se passe. A a ? d D

d. Tant de gens votent que c'est indifférent si je vote ou non. A a ? d D

15. Quel terme, parmi la liste qui suit, décrit le mieux votre niveau d'études universitaires actuelles? _____ 1ère année _____ 2ème année
_____ 3ème année _____ 4ème année _____ études graduées.

16. Combien de cours en sciences politique avez-vous suivis, y compris celui/ceux dans le(s) quel(s) vous êtes actuellement inscrit? (Indiquez les cours complets et les demi-cours). _____

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. CANADIAN

- Abella, Irving Martin. "The 'Sydenham Election' of 1841." Canadian Historical Review, 47 (December, 1966), 326-343.
- Berton, Pierre. "Who Cares About Conflicting Interests in Good Old Renfrew." Politics: Canada. 4th ed. Edited by Paul W. Fox. Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1962, pp. 203-205.
- Blake, Donald E. "L.I.P. and Partisanship: An Analysis of the Local Initiatives Program." Canadian Public Policy, 2 (Winter, 1976), 17-32.
- Blishen, Bernard, and McRoberts, Hugh. "A Revised Socioeconomic Index for Occupations in Canada." Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 13 (1976), 71-79.
- Bolduc, Roch. "Les questions d'ethique dans les années 1980." Canadian Public Administration, 24 (Summer, 1981), 200-215.
- Brassington, Bill. "Political Rights for Public Servants." Civil Service Review, (May, 1980), 36-39.
- Bruton, Peter; Downing, John; and Kelly, Fraser. "Graft Never Hurt a Politician at the Polls." Political Corruption in Canada: Cases, Causes and Cures. Edited by Kenneth M. Gibbons and Donald C. Rowat. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976, pp. 225-230.
- Camp, Dalton. "The Decline in Public Morality." Saturday Night, January, 1981, pp. 26-31.
- Campbell, Colin. The Canadian Senate: A Lobby From Within. Toronto: Macmillan, 1978.
- Canada. Privy Council Office. Members of Parliament and Conflict of Interest. Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973.
- _____. Report of the Commission on Election Expenses. Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1966.
- Clarke, Harold D.; Jensen, Jane; LeDuc, Lawrence; and Pammett, Jon H. Political Choice in Canada. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979.
- Clement, Wallace. The Canadian Corporate Elite. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975.
- Cutler, Maurice. "Watergate: Could it Happen Here?" Business Quarterly, 38 (September, 1973), 11 et passim.

Dawson, Robert MacGregor. The Civil Service of Canada. London: Oxford University Press, 1929.

Dwivedi, O.P. "A Code of Conduct for Civil Servants." Dalhousie Review, (Winter, 1964-1965), 452-458.

_____. "Ethics and Public Policy: Reflections." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, May 30, 1979.

Dyck, Rand. "Electoral Reform." The Government and Politics of Ontario. 2nd ed. Edited by Donald C. MacDonald. Toronto: Van Nostrand Reinhold Ltd., 1980, pp. 314-334.

Elkins, David; Blake, Donald; and Johnston, Richard. "Who Trusts Whom to do What?" Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Montreal, Quebec, June, 1980.

Freeman, Bill, and Hewitt, Marsha, eds. Their Town: The Mafia, The Media and The Party Machine. Toronto: James Lorimer, 1979.

Gibbons, Kenneth M. "The Political Culture of Corruption in Canada." Political Corruption in Canada: Cases, Causes and Cures. Edited by Kenneth M. Gibbons and Donald C. Rowat. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976, pp. 231-250.

_____. "The Study of Political Corruption." Political Corruption in Canada: Cases, Causes and Cures. Edited by Kenneth M. Gibbons and Donald C. Rowat. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976, pp. 1-14.

_____, and Rowat, Donald C., eds. Political Corruption in Canada: Cases, Causes and Cures. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976.

Gwyn, Richard. The Shape of Scandal. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1965.

Heintzman, Ralph. "The Political Culture of Quebec, 1840 - 1960." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 16 (March, 1983), 3-60.

Hewitt, Marsha. "Hamilton Harbour: Politics, patronage and cover-up." City Magazine, 2 (November, 1976), pp. 25-42.

Hill, Robert A. "A Note on Newspaper Patronage in Canada during the late 1850's and early 1860's." Canadian Historical Review, 49 (March, 1968), 44-59.

Hodgetts, J.E. "Government responsiveness to the public interest: has progress been made?" Canadian Public Administration, 24 (Summer, 1981), 216-231.

_____, and Dwivedi, O.P. Provincial Governments as Employers: A Survey of Public Personnel Administration in Canada's Provinces. The Institute of Public Administration of Canada. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1974.

- _____, et al. The Biography of an Institution: The Civil Service Commission of Canada, 1908 - 1967. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972.
- Hudon, Raymond. "Pour une analyse politique du patronage." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 7 (September, 1974), 484-501.
- Kernaghan, Kenneth. "Codes of Ethics and Public Administration: Progress, Problems and Prospects." Public Administration (U.K.), 59 (Summer, 1980), 207-223.
- _____. Ethical Conduct: Guidelines for Government Employees. Toronto: Institute of Public Administration of Canada, 1975.
- _____. "Ethics of Public Servants." The Provincial Political Systems. Edited by D.J. Bellamy, J.H. Pammett, and D.C. Rowat. Toronto: Methuen, 1976, pp. 357-368.
- Kerr, D.G.G. "The 1867 Elections in Ontario: The Rules of the Game." Canadian Historical Review, 51 (December, 1970), 369-385.
- Laponce, J.A. People vs. Politics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969.
- Lemieux, Vincent, and Hudon, Raymond. Patronage et politique au Quebec, 1944-1972. Quebec: Boreal-Express, 1975.
- Mallory, J.R. "Curtailling Divine Right: The Control of Delegated Legislation in Canada." The Administrative State in Canada. Edited by O.P. Dwivedi. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982, pp. 131-149.
- Mancuso, Maureen. "Attitudes of Canadian Legislators Toward Political Corruption: An Empirical Analysis." Unpublished M.A. thesis, Carleton University, 1984.
- Manthorpe, Jonathan. The Power and the Tories. - Toronto: Macmillan, 1974.
- McKenna, Barbara A. "Farmers and Railwaymen, Patronage and Corruption: A Volatile Political Mix in Turn of the Century Elgin County." Ontario History, 74 (September, 1982), 206-233.
- McNeney, John. "Influence and Party Activity in the Senate: A Matter of Conflict of Interest?" Politics Canada. 4th ed. Edited by Raul W. Fox. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1977, pp. 454-461.
- Meisel, John. Working Papers on Canadian Politics. 2nd ed. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1975.
- _____, and Van Loon, Richard. "Canadian Attitudes to Election Expenses, 1965-6," in Khayyam Z. Paltiel et al. Studies in Canadian Party Finance, Committee on Election Expenses. Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1966, pp. 23-146.

Munro, John A. "Highways in British Columbia: Economics and Politics." Canadian Journal of Economics, 8 (1975), 192-204.

Myers, Gustavus. A History of Canadian Wealth. Toronto: James Lewis and Samuel, 1972.

Neatby, Blair H. William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1924-1932. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962.

Newman, Peter. The Distemper of Our Times. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968.

Noel, S.J.R. "Leadership and Clientelism." The Provincial Political Systems: Comparative Essays. Edited by D.J. Bellamy, J.H. Pammett, and D.C. Rowat. Toronto: Methuen, 1976, pp. 197-213.

_____. Politics in Newfoundland. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971.

Oliver, Peter N. "Howard Ferguson, The Timber Scandal and the Leadership of the Ontario Conservative Party." Ontario History, 62 (September, 1970), 163-178.

Paltiel, Khayyam Z. "Campaign Financing in Canada and its Reform." Canada at the Polls: The General Election of 1974. Edited by H.R. Penniman. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975, pp. 181-208.

_____. "Canadian Election Expenses Legislation: A Summary and Appraisal of Recent Developments." Paper presented at the 10th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Edinburgh, Scotland, August, 1976.

_____. "Contrasts among the Several Canadian Political Finance Cultures." Comparative Political Finance. Edited by Arnold J. Heidenheimer. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1970, pp. 107-134.

_____. "Election Expenses." The Provincial Political Systems. Edited by D.J. Bellamy, J.H. Pammett, and D.C. Rowat. Toronto: Methuen, 1976, pp. 161-176.

_____. "Improving Laws on Financing Elections." Political Corruption in Canada: Cases, Causes and Cures. Edited by Kenneth M. Gibbons and D.C. Rowat. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976, pp. 295-299.

_____. Political Party Financing in Canada. Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1970.

_____, et al. Studies in Canadian Party Finance, Committee on Election Expenses. Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1966.

- _____, Vickers, Jill McCalla; and Barbe, Raoul. "Candidate Attitudes Toward the Control of Election Expenses." Studies in Canadian Party Finance, Committee on Election Expenses. Edited by K.Z. Palfiel et al. Ottawa: The Queen's Printer, 1966, pp. 459-494.
- Pammett, Jon H. "The Development of Political Orientations in Canadian School Children." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 4 (March, 1971), 132-141.
- _____, and Whittington, Michael S. "Introduction: Political Socialization." Foundations of Political Culture: Political Socialization in Canada. Edited by Jon H. Pammett and Michael S. Whittington. Toronto: Macmillan, 1976, pp. 1-33.
- _____, eds. Foundations of Political Culture: Political Socialization in Canada. Toronto: Macmillan, 1976.
- Phillips, Alan. "Modern Manual for Graft in Civic Office: Corruption." Maclean's, March 10, 1962, pp. 13 et passim.
- Presthus, Robert. Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics. Toronto: Macmillan, 1973.
- Quinn, Herbert F. The Union Nationale. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963.
- Richert, Jean Pierre. "Political Socialization in Quebec: Young Peoples' Attitudes toward Government." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 6 (June, 1973), 303-313.
- Rickwood, Roger, and Dua, Bhagwan D. "The Code of Ethics Question in Alberta Government and Politics." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, May 30, 1979.
- Robin, Martin, ed. Canadian Provincial Politics: The Party System of the Ten Provinces. 2nd ed. Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1978.
- Ryerson, Stanley. "Introduction," in Gustavus Myers, A History of Canadian Wealth. Toronto: James Lewis and Samuel, 1972, pp. vii - xxx.
- Schwartz, Mildred A. Public Opinion and Canadian Identity. Scarborough, Ont.: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1967.
- Sexton, Edgar. "Conflict of Interest of Municipal Politicians." Municipal World, (August, 1974), 199-208.
- Simeon, Richard, and Elkins, David J. "Regional Political Cultures in Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 7 (September, 1974), 397-437.

Smither, Michael. "Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, 1983." Municipal World, (March, 1983), 66-68.

Spafford, Duff. "Highway Employment and Provincial Elections." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 14 (March, 1981), 135-142.

Spector, David. "The 1884 Financial Scandals and Establishment of Business Government in Winnipeg." Prairie Forum, 2 (November, 1977), 167-178.

Stewart, Walter. Divide and Con: Canadian Politics at Work. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973.

Swainson, Donald. "Thomas Mayne Daly and Patronage as Welfare." Ontario History, 62 (March, 1980), 16-26.

Tennyson, Brian D. "Mackenzie King and patronage in the public service: an historical footnote." Journal of Canadian Studies, 6 (February, 1971), 56-60.

Tindal, C.R., and Tindal, S. Nobes. Local Government in Canada. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979.

Ward, Norman. "Electoral Corruption and Controverted Elections." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 15 (February, 1949), 74-86.

"Hon. James Gardiner and the Liberal Party of Alberta, 1935-40." Canadian Historical Review, LVI (September, 1975), 303-322.

"Money and Politics: The of Democracy in Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 5 (September, 1972), 335-347.

Waugh, Nanci-Jean. "Conflict of Interest in Three Cities." Urban Politics in Ottawa-Carleton. Edited by Donald C. Rowat. Ottawa: Department of Political Science, Carleton University, 1983, pp. 159-182.

White, Graham. "Review Article: The Life and Times of the Camp Commission." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 13 (June, 1980), 357-375.

Whittington, Michael S. "Political Culture: The Attitudinal Matrix of Politics." Approaches to Canadian Politics. Edited by John H. Redekop. Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1978, pp. 138-153.

Wilson, John. "The Canadian Political Cultures: Towards a Redefinition of the Nature of the Canadian Political System." Canadian Journal of Political Science, 7 (September, 1974), 438-483.

. "The Red Tory Province: Reflections on the Character of the
Ontario Political Culture." The Government and Politics of
Ontario. 2nd ed. Edited by Donald C. MacDonald. Toronto: Van
Nostrand Reinhold Ltd., 1980.

Winnipeg. Report of the Commission on Conflict of Interest. City of
Winnipeg, Manitoba: 1977.

B. COMPARATIVE AND THEORETICAL

- Adamany, David. "Money, Politics, and Democracy: A Review Essay." American Political Science Review, 71 (March, 1971), 289-304.
- Appleby, Paul H. Morality and Administration in Democratic Government. New York: Greenwood Press, 1952, 1969.
- Bailey, Stephen K. "Education and the Public Interest." Public Administration Review, 36 (November/December, 1976), 675-679.
- Banfield, Edward C. "Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization." Journal of Law and Economics, 18 (December, 1975), 587-605.
- _____, and Wilson, James Q. City Politics. New York: Vintage Books, 1963.
- Bayley, David H. "The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation." Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis. Edited by Arnold J. Heidenhimer. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978, pp. 521-533.
- Beard, Edmund, and Horn, Stephen. Congressional Ethics: The View From the House. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975.
- Benson, George C.S. Political Corruption in America. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1978.
- Benveniste, Guy. Bureaucracy. San Francisco: Boyd and Fraser, 1977.
- Berg, Larry; Hahn, Harlan; and Schmidhauser, John. Corruption in The American Political System. Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1976.
- Bishop, George F. "Resolution and Tolerance of Cognitive Inconsistency in a Field Situation: Change in Attitudes and Beliefs Following the Watergate Affair." Psychological Reports, 36 (1975), 747-753.
- Blalock, Hubert M., Jr. Social Statistics. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1972.
- Bodenheimer, Edgar. "Prolegomena to a Theory of the Public Interest." Nomos V: The Public Interest. Edited by Carl J. Friedrich. New York: Atherton Press, 1962, pp. 205-217.
- Caiden, Gerald E., and Caiden, Naomi J. "Administrative Corruption." Public Administration Review, 37 (May/June, 1977), 301-309.
- Caiden, Naomi J. "Shortchanging the Public." Public Administration Review, 39 (May/June, 1979), 294-298.

Campbell, Angus; Converse, Philip E.; Miller, Warren E.; and Stokes, Donald E. The American Voter. Abridged ed. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964.

Cantril, Hadley. The Patterns of Human Concern. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1965.

Chambliss, William J. "Vice, Corruption, Bureaucracy and Power." Wisconsin Law Review, (1971), 1150-1173.

Cochran, Clarke E. "Political Science and 'The Public Interest'." Journal of Politics, 36 (May, 1974), 327-355.

Colm, Gerhard. "The Public Interest: Essential Key to Public Policy." Nomos V: The Public Interest. Edited by Carl J. Friedrich. New York: Atherton Press, 1962, pp. 115-128.

Cornwell, Elmer E., Jr. "Bosses, Machines, and Ethnic Groups." Politics in the Metropolis: A Reader in Conflict and Cooperation. Edited by Thomas R. Dye and Brett W. Hawkins. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, 1967, pp. 272-288.

Dennis, Jack, and Webster, Carol. "Children's Images of the President and of Government in 1962 and 1974." American Politics Quarterly, 3 (October, 1975), 386-405.

Douglas, Jack, and Johnson, Jack, eds. Official Deviance: Readings in Malfeasance, Misfeasance, and Other Forms of Corruption. New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1977.

Dwivedi, O.P. "Bureaucratic Corruption in Developing Countries." Asian Survey, (April, 1967), 245-253.

Erskine, Hazel. "The Polls: Corruption in Government." Public Opinion Quarterly, 37 (Winter, 1973-1974), 628-644.

Eulau, Heinz. The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics. New York: Random House, 1963.

Ferejohn, John A. Pork Barrel Politics: Rivers and Harbors Legislation, 1947-1968. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1974.

Flatham, Richard. The Public Interest. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966.

Friedrich, Carl J., ed. Nomos V: The Public Interest. New York: Atherton Press, 1962.

_____. The Pathology of Politics. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.

Gardiner, John A. The Politics of Corruption: Organized Crime in an American City. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970.

- . "Ticket-Fixing in Massachusetts." Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis. Edited by Arnold J. Heidenheimer. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978, pp. 176-178.
- Garson, G. David. Handbook of Political Science Methods. Boston: Holbrook Press, 1971.
- Gwyn, William B. Democracy and the Cost of Politics in Britain. London: The Athlone Press, 1962.
- Hampshire, Stuart. "Public and Private Morality." Public and Private Morality. Edited by Stuart Hampshire. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 23-53.
- Harmon, Michael Mount. "Administrative Policy Formulation and the Public Interest." Public Administration Review, 29 (September/October, 1969), 483-491.
- Hauck, Robert J.-P. "Political Science Degrees Awarded: 1983 Update." PS, 16 (Fall, 1983), 769-770.
- Heidenheimer, Arnold J. "Introduction." Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis. Edited by Arnold J. Heidenheimer. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978, pp. 3-28.
- _____, ed. Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978.
- Held, Virginia. The Public Interest and Individual Interests. New York: Basic Books, 1970.
- Hess, Robert D. The Development of Political Attitudes in Children. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1967.
- Hoogenboom, Ari. "Spoilsmen and Reformers: Civil Service and Public Morality." Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis. Edited by Arnold J. Heidenheimer. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978, pp. 276-283.
- Jaros, Dean; Hirsch, Herbert; and Fleron, Frederic, Jr. "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-Culture." Readings on the Politics of American Democracy. Edited by Marian D. Irish, et al. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969, pp. 120-135.
- Jones, Terrence E. Conducting Political Research. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
- Josephson, Eric, and Josephson, Mary, eds. Man Alone: Alienation in Modern Society. New York: Dell Publishing, 1962.

- Joslyn, Richard. "Adolescent Attitudes toward the Political Process: Political Learning in the Midst of Turmoil." Polity, 9 (Spring, 1977), 373-383.
- Kaplan, Abraham. The Conduct of Inquiry. Scranton, Pa.: Chandler, 1964.
- Key, V.O., Jr. "Techniques of Political Graft." Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis. Edited by Arnold J. Heidenheimer. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978, pp. 46-53.
- Lane, Robert E. Political Ideology: Why The American Common Man Believes What He Does. New York: The Free Press, 1962.
- _____. Political Life. New York: The Free Press, 1959.
- Lang, Gladys Engel, and Lang, Kurt. "Polling on Watergate: The Battle for Public Opinion." Public Opinion Quarterly, 44 (1980), 530-547.
- Langton, Kenneth P. Political Socialization. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Lazarsfeld, Paul F.; Berelson, Bernard; and Gaudet, Hazel. The Peoples Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Election. 3rd ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968.
- Lehnen, Robert G. "Watergate and the American Public: Assessing the Overt and Latent Effects of Political Events on Mass Political Behavior." Paper presented to the 10th World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Edinburgh, Scotland, August, 1976.
- Lipset, Seymour M. "Youth and Politics." Contemporary Social Problems. 3rd ed. Edited by Robert K. Merton and Robert Nisbet. New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1971, pp. 743-791.
- Lowi, Theodore J. "Machine Politics: Old and New." The New Urban Politics: Cities and the Federal Government. Edited by Douglas M. Fox. Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1972, pp. 7-16.
- Mackenzie, W.J.M. Politics and Social Science. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1967.
- Madgewick, P.J. American City Politics. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970.
- McKittrick, Eric L. "The Study of Corruption." Sociology and History: Methods. Edited by S.M. Lipset and Richard Hofstadter. New York: Basic Books, 1968, pp. 358-370.

McMullan, M. "A Theory of Corruption." The Sociological Review (Keele), 9 (July, 1961), 181-201.

Merton, Robert K. Social Theory and Social Structure. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957.

_____. "Some functions of the political machine." Official Deviance: Readings in Malfeasance, Misfeasance and Other Forms of Corruption. Edited by Jack D. Douglas and John N. Johnson. New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1977; pp. 339-349.

Milbrath, Lester W. Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965.

Moodie, Graeme C. "On Political Scandals and Corruption." Government and Opposition, 15 (Spring, 1980), 208-222.

Murphy, James T. "Political Parties and the Porkbarrel: Party Conflict and Cooperation in House Public Works Committee Decision-Making." American Political Science Review, 68 (March, 1974), 169-185.

Ouchi, Minoru. "Toward a Theory of the Mechanism of Political Corruption: With Special Reference to Political Donations in Japan." Paper presented at the Conference on Political Money and Election Reform; Comparative Perspectives, Davidson Conference Center, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, Calif., Dec. 1977.

Peters, John G., and Welch, Susan. "Political Corruption in America: A Search for Definition and a Theory." American Political Science Review, 72 (September, 1978), 974-984.

_____. "The Effects of Charges of Corruption on Voting Behavior in Congressional Elections." American Political Science Review, 74 (September, 1980), 697-708.

Richards, Peter G. Patronage in British Government. London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1963.

Rogow, A.A., and Lasswell, Harold D. Power, Corruption and Rectitude. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963.

Rokeach, Milton. "A Theory of Organization and Change within Value-Attitude Systems." Journal of Social Issues, 24 (1968), 13-33.

_____. Beliefs, Attitudes and Values. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1969.

_____. "The Role of Values in Public Opinion Research." Public Opinion Quarterly, 32 (1968-1969), 547-559.

Rose-Ackerman, Susan. Corruption: A Study in Political Economy. New York: Academic Press, 1978.

Rundquist, Barry S.; Strom, Gerald S.; and Peters, John G. "Corrupt Politicians and Their Electoral Support: Some Experimental Observations." American Political Science Review, 71 (September, 1977), 954-963.

Schubert, Glendon. The Public Interest: A Critique of the Theory of a Political Concept. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960.

Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. 3rd ed. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.

Scott, James C. Comparative Political Corruption. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972.

Selltiz, Claire; Jahoda, Marie; Deutsch, Morton; and Cook, Stuart W. Research Methods in Social Relations. Revised one-volume ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1959.

Shackleton, J.R. "Corruption: An Essay in Economic Analysis." The Political Quarterly, 49 (January/March, 1978), 25-37.

Smelser, Neil J. "Stability, Instability, and the Analysis of Political Corruption." Stability and Social Change. Edited by Bernard Barber and Alex Inkeles. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971, pp. 7-29.

Somit, Albert, and Tanenhaus, Joseph. "The 'Behavioral-Traditional' Debate in Political Science." The Conduct of Political Inquiry. Edited by L.D. Hayes and R.D. Hedlund. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970, pp. 45-55.

Sorauf, Frank J. "The Conceptual Muddle." Nomos V: The Public Interest. Edited by Carl J. Friedrich. New York: Atherton Press, 1962, pp. 183-190.

Steffens, Lincoln. The Shame of the Cities. New York: McClure, Phillips and Company, 1904.

Steinberg, Sheldon. "Are You an Ethical Employee?" Public Management, (May, 1982), 20-22.

Van Dyke, Vernon. Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1960.

Van Roy, Edward. "On the Theory of Corruption." Economic Development and Cultural Change, 19 (October, 1970), 86-110.

Verba, Sidney, and Nie, Norman H. Participation in America. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.

Wasby, Stephen L. Political Science - The Discipline and its Dimensions: An Introduction. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970.

Weber, Max. "Essay on Bureaucracy." Bureaucratic Power in National Politics. Edited by F.E. Rourke. Boston: Little, Brown, 1965, pp. 3-14.

Welch, Susan, and Peters, John G. "Attitudes of U.S. State Legislators Toward Political Corruption." Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2 (November, 1977), 445-464.

Werner, Simcha B. "New Directions in the Study of Administrative Corruption." Public Administration Review, 43 (March/April, 1983), 146-154.

Wilson, James Q. "The Economy of Patronage." Journal of Political Economy, 69 (August, 1961), 369-380.

Wilson, Woodrow. "The Study of Administration," Political Science Quarterly, LVI (December, 1941), 481-506. Originally published in 1887.

Winter-Berger, Robert N. The Washington Pay-off: An Insider's View of Corruption in Government. Seacaucus, N.J.: Lyle Stuart, 1972.

Wolfinger, Raymond. "Why Political Machines Have Not Withered Away and Other Revisionist Thoughts." Journal of Politics, 34 (May, 1972), 365-398.

Ziegler, Harmon. The Political Life of American Teachers. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967.

LIBRARY

CARLTON UNIVERSITY

Manuscript Thesis

Unpublished theses submitted for degrees and deposited in the University Library are open for inspection, but are to be used only with due regard for the rights of the authors. Bibliographical references may be noted, but passages may be copied only with the permission of the authors, and proper credit must be given in subsequent written or published work. Extensive copying or publication of the thesis in whole or in part requires also the consent of the Chairman of the appropriate department.

Theses may be reproduced on microfilm for use in place of the manuscript itself provided the rules listed above are strictly adhered to and the rights of the author are in no way jeopardized.

This thesis by GIBBONS, K. M. has been used by the following persons, whose signatures attest their acceptance of above restrictions.

A library which borrows this thesis for use by its patrons is expected to secure the signature of each user.

Name and address

Date

END

31.08.88

FIN