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The Foreign Policy Debate in Russia of the 1990s: An Analysis of Russian Security Discourse
By

Nebojsa Bjelakovic, B.A./M.A.

**A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of**

Doctor of Philosophy

**Department of Political Science
Carleton University
Ottawa, Ontario
October 13, 2000
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**The Foreign Policy Debate in Russia of the 1990s:
An Analysis of Russian Security Discourse**

submitted by

Nebojsa Bjelakovic, B.A., M.A.

in partial fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Chair, Department of Political Science

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Carleton University
October 13, 2000

Abstract

This study represents a culturally sensitive foreign policy analysis (FPA) by focusing on specific Russian theoretical thinking regarding national interests and security dilemmas. The study focused on the discursive part of Russian political space in order to trace and comprehend changes in Russian foreign policy in the 1990-1999 period. Many authors throughout the 1990s noted visible changes in Russian foreign policy from its position as a western ally in 1991-92 toward its more assertive position in 1995-96 and its flexible isolationist position in 1998-99. The shifts in Russian foreign policy behavior that occurred during this period were traced through the changes in the foreign policy debate regarding the examples of unfolding events in “near abroad” and the former Yugoslavia. The basic departing point of the inquiry was built on Philip Lawrence’s approach to the unity between participants and debate. This approach was implemented with reference to the issue of how the change in reality-defining assumptions could be found in the existing political elite discourses – text and speech. The use of discourse analysis allowed the incorporation of the culturally specific foundations of Russian foreign and security policy into a systematic method for evaluation that opens up space for understanding of culture-politics dynamics. The thesis addressed the link between ideas and institutions by presenting how ideas affected Russian foreign policy, or, more specifically, how these ideas were institutionalized. In order to trace the link between ideas and institutions specific attention was placed on the analysis of Russian security discourse through the debate that took place among the various “schools of thought.” In the case of Russia the category of “schools of thought” has a twofold ontological nature – combining ideas and institutions. “Schools of thought” represent the most influential social movements

that shape institutional public policies while at the same time they represent cultural traits and sets of ideas that shape the thinking of those movements. A special emphasis in this thesis was placed on the Russian 19th century heritage of ideas due to its partial neglect in contemporary analysis of Russian foreign policy. Discourse analysis indicated that ideas put forward by the 19th century “schools of thought” had a strong influence on the foreign policy debate and security thinking and public policy choices in contemporary Russia. The core issues of Russian security discourse debated in the 1990s were as those in the 19th century: the aim to situate Russian identity on an East-West scale; the aim to situate the security paradigm on an isolation-integration scale vis-à-vis the West; and the aim to situate prosperity on an individual-collective scale. Thus, the monitoring of “schools of thought,” as indicated in the works of Andrei Tsygankov, proved to be a better indicator of competing concepts of Russian national interest and security concerns than focusing solely on the state institutions or major political parties.

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Transliteration note

For Russian sources was used Library of Congress transliteration style. Exceptions were made to already accustomed transliterations of personal names (Yeltsin instead of El'tsin, etc.).

The Foreign Policy Debate in Russia of the 1990s: An Analysis of Russian Security

Discourse

(Ph.D. thesis)

- Nebojsa Bjelakovic -

INTRODUCTION

One of the most intriguing questions of modern international relations is how to understand the foreign policy changes of states. To that end, analytical tools have usually focused either on domestic institutional frameworks and elite struggle, or on the character of the international regime or the role that the state in question performs in the international system. Foreign policy analysis of the Soviet state represented one of the most attractive case studies for research in the last few decades. After the break-up of the Soviet Union a newly emerged Russian Federation remained to be the object of scholars' and policy makers' close attention.¹ Various authors addressed Russian foreign and

¹ For an analysis of Russian political system and post-communist politics see Joan DeBardeleben, *Russian Politics in Transition*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997) and Stephen White, *Russia's new politics: the management of a postcommunist society* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). For an analysis of changes in Russian society see Wayne Allensworth, *The Russian Question: Nationalism, Modernization, and Post-Communist Russia*, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), and Leo Cooper, *Russia and the World: New State-of-play on the International Stage*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1999). Very insightful overview of the regional issues was offered in Mehdi Mozaffari, ed., *Security Politics in the Commonwealth of Independent States: The Southern Belt*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1997). In this book an excellent institutional analysis of Foreign Ministry's activities was offered in the article by I. Tiouline, "Russian Diplomacy: the Problems of Transition." Regional security was also covered in Lena Jonson and Clive Archer, eds., *Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia*, (Boulder, Colorado:

security policies but two main methods of analysis dominated their scholarship: presentation of Russian foreign policy in a chronological way and presentation of geographical directions of Russian foreign policy activity.² Despite the occasionally descriptive nature of inquiry, the goal of this scholarship remained the same: how to understand Russian foreign policy changes. Many authors throughout the 1990s noted visible changes in Russian foreign policy from its position as a western ally in 1991-92 toward its more assertive position in 1995-96 and its flexible isolationist position in 1998-99.³

In seeking an understanding of those changes, I will argue, in this thesis, that an inquiry about ideas and debates that were taking place among Russian foreign policy agents represents useful avenue because the ideas exemplify a natural foundation for policy concepts and worldviews. That is, in words of Celeste A. Wallander, “ideas are also likely to affect policies most insofar as they serve as stable focal points in an environment of unstable political competition.”⁴ The validity of the research into the link between ideas and foreign policy was already established in the work of Goldstein and

Westview Pres, 1996) and the articles of particular relevance for this thesis were: Alexander A. Pikayev, “The Russian Domestic Debate on Policy Towards the “Near Abroad,” and Pavel Baev, “The Influence of the Balkan Crisis on Russia’s Peacekeeping in its “Near Abroad.” For an assessment of Russian foreign policy in the early 1990s see Teresa Pelton Johnson and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Russian Security after the Cold War: Seven Views from Moscow*, (Washington: Brassey’s (US), 1994) and Victor A. Kremeneyuk, *Conflicts in and around Russia: National-building in Difficult Times*, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1994).

² See Leszek Buszynski, *Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War*, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1996); Mike Bowker, *Russian Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War*, (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth, 1997); Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Nogee, *The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing Systems, Enduring Interests*, (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998).

³ See Roger E. Kanet and Alexander V. Kozhemiakin, eds., *The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1997); Kubicek, P., “Russian Foreign Policy and the West,” *Political Science Quarterly*, 114, 4 (Winter 1999) 547–568; Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Alison and Margot Light, *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy*, (Oxford: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996).

⁴ See Celeste A. Wallander, ed., *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), 213.

Keohane.⁵ Wallander applied research into the link between ideas and foreign policy to the Russian case in her book, but the selection of ideas was the area where my thesis is differing. Wallander's book emphasized the influence that nationalism and Soviet era ideas had on contemporary Russian foreign policy while my thesis will shift the focus on 19th century theoretical thinking in order to present foundations of current foreign policy thinking. The reason for such a choice is to bring to fore the entirety of Russian culture of which the 19th century scholarship is the most defining element. Judith Devlin offered a very relevant book on modern Russia by focusing on the link between 19th century ideas and contemporary Russian politics.⁶ But her book emphasized only one portion of 19th century thinking, namely *Slavophiles*, tying it with contemporary political figures on Russian political scene, primarily those from reform-communist and nationalist ranks. In contrast my study will offer a somewhat different view. I would argue that rather the entire Russian 19th century theoretical heritage influenced contemporary Russian politics, than that selected Russian heritage influenced selected segments of Russian politics. The scholarship that is closest to what I intend to do in my thesis is an effort by Henrikki Heikka to understand Russian foreign policy through the application of discourse analysis.⁷ This rich and insightful article is applying Lacan's psychoanalysis to a discourse analysis of Sergei Kortunov's, Russian president's aide for international issues, texts and speeches in order to understand changes in Russian foreign policy until 1996. My study will complement Heikka's on three accounts: I will focus not only on one

⁵ See Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

⁶ See Judith Devlin, *Slavophiles and Commissars: Enemies of Democracy in Modern Russia*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1999).

⁷ See Henrikki Heikka, "Beyond Neorealism and Constructivism: Desire, Identity, and Russian Foreign Policy," *Understandings of Russian Foreign Policy*, ed. Ted Hopf (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999) 57-109.

person's discourse but on the intelligentsia's foreign policy debate; my thesis will cover larger period (1991-2000); also my discourse analysis will not rely on psychoanalysis approach but on the link between culture and politics, ideas and institutions.

To gain a better understanding, one must inquire how ideas affected Russian foreign policy, or, more specifically, how these ideas were institutionalized. In order to trace the link between ideas and institutions specific attention will be placed on the analysis of Russian security discourse through the debate that took place among the various "schools of thought." This thesis will focus on the discursive part of Russian political space in order to trace and comprehend changes in Russian foreign policy in the 1990-1999 period.

The foreign policy debate will be defined as a dominant discourse on concepts (such as national interests, security objectives and worldviews) and events within one state. The secondary goal of this paper is to seek for the origins and foundations of the debate of ideas among the Russian foreign policy "schools of thought" that have recently emerged. These "schools" represented theoretical traditions of Russian political and philosophical thought while at the same time "schools of thought" were mediums for political life (i.e., expression and participation). In the 19th century Russian politics did not exist as a public affair, so the cultural sphere became a surrogate medium for the expression of different political concepts and ideas. The informal debates as well as publishing activity of the intelligentsia that developed around cultural journals gave rise to different "schools of thought." In late 20th century Russia, political parties were not based very much on specific platforms or programs but on the resurrected use of culture and ideas. The main avenue of their activity was debate, such that discourse emerged as

the main indicator of the predominant ideas that could consequently influence state institutions and result in a change of foreign policy behaviour. Thus, in the case of Russia the category of “schools of thought” has a twofold ontological nature – combining ideas and institutions. “Schools of thought” represent the most influential social movements that shape institutional public policies while at the same time they represent cultural traits and sets of ideas that shape the thinking of those movements. The core issues of Russian security discourse debated in the ‘90s were as those in the 19th century: the aim to situate Russian identity on an East-West scale; the aim to situate the security paradigm on an isolation-integration scale vis-à-vis the West; and the aim to situate prosperity on an individual-collective scale. What also seemed to link the old “schools of thought” with those of the 20th century was the search for a policy solution that would reconcile the impact of modernity/globalization with the maintenance of the identity and strength of the nation (state).

The link between “schools of thought” and Russian foreign policy could be explained as the relationship between society’s cultural currents and public policy choices. Cultural aspects, here represented as the cultural currents of rivalling “schools of thought,” play a significant role in determining the foreign policy of every state. Analysis of Russian foreign policy could be more enriched if attention is placed equally on the institutional and cultural side of how policy choices were aggregated. Specific to Russia was that the socialization was achieved more through the shared and transmitted country-specific cultural heritage and sets of ideas than through the often-changing institutional features, political ideologies or civil society participation. Thus, this thesis will address

the link between specific national culture and public policy choices by focusing on foreign policy debate in Russia.

The shifts in Russian foreign policy behavior that occurred during this period will be traced through the changes in the foreign policy debate regarding the examples of unfolding events in “near abroad” and the former Yugoslavia. The choice of these two focus areas is based on their relevance for and impact on the Russian foreign policy debate of the ‘90s. These two issues were the most influential events that shaped Russian security discourse and contributed, as reference points, to the creation of the reality-defining assumptions or worldviews among the Russian intelligentsia. The wars in the “near abroad” generated debates on how to deal with instability in the post-Soviet countries as well as on how to manage ethnic conflicts on Russian soil. Thus, they shaped the debate on the issues of Russian security and identity. The war in the former Yugoslavia generated a debate on the ‘new world order’ and Russia’s role in the international system. Both focus areas were more instrumental in shaping perceptions about Russia’s relationship with the West than were Russia’s participation either in multilateral frameworks of UN and OSCE or bilateral relations with the US or EU. At the same time both focus areas were indicating better than any other international issue what were the limits of Russia’s implemented or desired power projections in its interaction with Western countries.

The thesis’ question is how to understand and explain these changes in Russian foreign policy behavior. The changes represented a move from a position of unconditional compliance with the West’s standards, expressed by the slogan “Cooperation with the West”, toward the position of assertion and occasional coercion

vis-à-vis the West, with an emphasis on Russian needs, expressed by the slogan "Russia first," and then followed by the subsequent fragmentation of "Russia first" and the emergence of "reluctant realism" and their policies of flexible isolation by the end of 1990s.

The explanation for this shift offered by traditional foreign policy analysis (FPA) is limited to the argument that concessions by the Russian President to pressures made by the nationalist political parties made this shift possible. In that case the focus is centered on a pure decision-making mechanism and the belief system of the top foreign policy bureaucrats. The traditional FPA explanation would truly account for the result but this would not help us to understand the reason and nature of this change and its dynamic, since institutions and not ideas would be seen as the primary mechanism. The relevance of my thesis is in its attempt to reach beyond this explanation by offering the culture-sensitive understanding of how the change occurred. My tentative conclusion is that changed foreign policy assumptions and worldviews resulted in changing policy prescriptions. Furthermore, I argued that the change of reality defining assumptions could be searched for in the existing political elite discourses – text and speech. Once the changed discursive content became predominant, it consequently influenced the state institutions by becoming a discourse of institutions and resulted in the change of foreign policy behavior. The methodological relevance of this study is in its innovative approach. This approach represents the link between behaviorist scholarship (in attributing the role of agency to the elite – in Russian case to the intelligentsia) and post-modern scholarship (in using the discourse as medium of change and discourse analysis as research method). I will argue that by the use of discourse analysis, and analysis of ideas represented in the

debate, an understanding of the shift in Russian foreign policy could be attained.

Graphically, this process had the following trajectory:

Events=>Debates=>Redefinition of national interest=>Change in foreign policy behavior

This graph represents already established findings of behaviourist FPA about the causal mechanism of foreign policy changes. The contribution of my thesis is in the focus on the phase of Debates where the analytical lenses will be placed on the culture sensitive theory of ideas that govern the competing elite worldviews. While for many other countries it would make more sense to analyse the phase of Debates through institutional analysis of foreign policy consensus making or bureaucratic elite surveys, in the case of Russia the focus on ideas would be more beneficial. In the case of Russia, as opposed to other countries, ideas instead of institutions or social aspects were the most influential factor in shaping different elite worldviews. Thus, this study will demonstrate that the focus on the second stage of this process, namely on the phase of Debates, could help our understanding of domestic reasoning for and proposed alternatives of desired foreign policy changes.

The study will have an introduction, five chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter will be composed of a review of the relevant literature, and theoretical and methodological framework for this study. The second chapter will introduce the principal 19th century Russian “schools of thought.” This chapter will also situate these schools within the main political and historical events of that period. The third chapter will present the 1990-96 foreign policy debate in Russia through the discourse among the main “schools of political thought.” The shift of political alliances will be presented on the basis of the changes in the discourse from the “Cooperation with the West” agenda

toward the “Russia first” agenda. The fourth chapter will present the 1996-98 foreign policy debate and the failure of “Russia first” to institutionalize its ideas. The fifth chapter will present the 1998-2000 foreign policy debate and the initial fragmentation of the “Russia first” agenda into the “reluctant realists” and the “advocates of brinkmanship and firmness.” The conclusion will represent a section in which findings will be elaborated from the perspective of a theoretical framework laid out in the first chapter. The theoretical goal is to show the utility of discourse analysis in the FPA. The research goal is to understand changes in Russian politics and to make sense of them in a manner that could open the possibility for classification and prediction of Russian foreign politics.

A pertinent issue of area studies is whether one’s object of study is specific or universal. For that matter the question can be made about the specific or universal character of this inquiry on Russia. This is a question of an ontological nature and it demands an answer that would explain what method of inquiry should be implemented: some Russia-specific method or more universal methods of the social sciences. As this question can be successfully debated from both viewpoints, I would rather present my view, and position that I am taking in this study, without any desire to make a final philosophy of science judgement.

I find the scholarship of the Russian language theorist Mikhail Bakhtin very relevant to this issue and some reflections on the aforementioned ontology-epistemology question could be made at this particular point. Let me start with an episode from the first conference on Bakhtin that was attended by both Western and Soviet scholars in Manchester in 1991. An account from this meeting reveals an initial clash of

perspectives: Soviet scholars and Western Slavists considered that the Western Bakhtinians were “doomed to misapprehend and misrepresent both Bakhtin and his thought.”⁸ On the other hand Soviet scholars and Western Slavists “were at loss to understand how connections could be made between their compatriot and the discreditable discourses of such outlandish, beyond-the-pale movements as Marxism or feminism.”⁹ Interestingly, this episode recalls of Bakhtin’s main concept of dialogism or “living mix of varied and opposing voices” (*raznorechivost*) and also of his own concept of “mutual outsideness” (*vnenakhodimost*). In this case, the opposition is to be expected since a language, as the primary bearer of culture and history, functions as a dialogue composed of opposing views and voices. The concept of dialogism indicates that various voices (some overlapping, some in opposition, etc.) can co-exist and this thesis will offer a more complex view of the foreign policy debate in Russia by keeping these differing voices side by side. As my goal is to present Russian foreign policy through Russian debate and primary sources who would be more appropriate in outlining the merger of universal and specific in an inquiry based on speech and text if not this Russian author. Bakhtin so successfully bridged his scholarship about a little known 16th century French writer Rabelais by evoking Russia-specific cultural parallels and expressing himself exclusively in Russian so that he achieved international relevance and worldwide application in a number of social sciences. That makes me believe that the division among disciplines could be avoided through the analysis of the truly universal medium of our existence - language. From this dialogical approach derives my answer to the question of whether Russia should be researched with Russia-specific methods or not

⁸ See David Shepherd, “(Mis)Representing Bakhtin,” *Bakhtin: Carnival and Other Subjects*, ed. David Shepherd (Amsterdam-Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1993) xvii.

⁹ David Shepherd, xvii.

through the attempt to implement the interdisciplinary approach of inquiry. More precisely, discourse analysis will allow me to incorporate the culturally specific foundations of Russian foreign and security policy into a systematic method for evaluation that opens up space for understanding of culture-politics dynamics. By doing so divisiveness between specific and universal could be bridged in the same manner as the discourse analysis of this Russian author was universally and interdisciplinary applied. Or as one Western author argued “dialogism appears more and more to be a humanistic contribution to the reformulation of the disciplinary allegiances ongoing in this latter half of the century: it confronts us with a cosmology in which nature and culture converge, share the same continuum without being diluted one into the other.”¹⁰

¹⁰ See Francesco Loriggio, “Mind as Dialogue: The Bakhtin Circle and Pragmatist Psychology,” *Mikhail Bakhtin and the Epistemology of Discourse*, ed. Clive Thomson, (Amsterdam-Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1990).

CHAPTER I

1. Theoretical Framework for Analyzing the Foreign Policy Debate in Russia of the 1990s

1.1 Introduction

Following the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, Russia emerged again as an independent state. One of the first questions that such a new state had to deal with was formulating and implementing its foreign policy. However, this time the characteristics of the Russian state and Russian society, as well as the international context, were different from those of 1917. Therefore, acting on the basis of historical analogy to pursue czarist policy could not benefit the new Moscow decision makers. At the same time continuation of the old Soviet foreign policy was rejected by virtually all political actors in Russia. It was observed that the formulation of Russian foreign policy could no longer function as an exclusive domain of the Kremlin leadership's institutional monopolies but was now open to debate and influences by other political actors.¹¹

During the years of the USSR, the CPSU Politburo was, institutionally, the body that had the final say in formulating and implementing foreign policy, although it should be noted that state ministries such as Foreign Affairs and Defense had significant leverage in the elaboration of Soviet foreign policy. In contemporary Russia foreign policy concerns have proliferated so that the scene of foreign policy actors looks

¹¹ Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, eds., *The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, (Armonk, New York, London, England: M.E. Sharpe, 1995) 53.

significantly different than during the era of the USSR. These actors can be grouped into state and non-state agents. The President of Russian federation with his administration, the Russian government, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are heading the executive side of the political spectrum in terms of the articulation and implementation of foreign policy. Ministries such as Defense, Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, and the National Bank and the Federal Secret Services are also important state agents from the executive branch. State agents on the legislative side are both the upper and lower houses of the Russian parliament (the Duma, and the Federation Council respectively) as well as their committees and the different political parties represented in Parliament. The Russian regions (all 89 federal units) and the cities may also be grouped as state agents since they also have the right to sign international agreements and conduct foreign relations. Non-state actors include major joint-stock companies, usually producers and exporters of raw material like LUKoil, Gazprom, Norilsk Nickel, as well as producers and exporters of finished products such Rosvooruzheniye for arms, and large financial groups such as Oneksimbank, Menatep, and Most. Additional non-state actors are the Church, media and intellectuals. All of these actors seek to realize their particular interests with foreign partners, and their interests are neither fully synchronized nor do they necessarily coincide with those of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹²

Therefore, in 1991 the question was what was to be the Russian foreign policy, both with respect to the process of making foreign policy and its actual substance. All the domestic actors from the Russian political spectrum demonstrated a desire and an interest in participating in the debate on Russia's new foreign policy. However, the domestic

¹² As was the case during the negotiations for the division of the oil sector in Caspian Sea where Russian oil companies sided with American companies against the proposals of the Russian government.

policy reality of being a country without an elaborated and consensus-based foreign policy platform made it more difficult for Russia to participate in an active way in the international community. The international reality was that Russia, as the biggest and most important Soviet successor state, had to answer to pressing foreign policy challenges from day one of its existence.¹³ Therefore, the Moscow leadership could not wait for the emergence of a consensus on a variety of foreign policy dilemmas, and it pursued certain policies on its own.

1.2 The concept of "schools of thought"

The initial policy that Moscow pursued was described in the slogan "Cooperation with the West." However, there was gradually a change in Russian foreign policy and by the end of 1995 it was most coherently expressed in the slogan "Russia first."¹⁴

The origins of the political bloc that promoted the slogan "Cooperation with the West" can be traced back to the struggles of Russian democrats against communism and Soviet federal structures in 1990 and 1991. This bloc of political forces can be termed the *Democratic forces*.¹⁵ However, the name *Democratic forces* originates more in how this group labeled themselves vis-à-vis hard-line communists, and how they were perceived in the West, than in any coherent democratic policy prescription advocated by the various members of this group. Originally, the *Democratic forces* contained such various groups as reform communists, liberals, Russian nationalists, religious groups, ecologists, human

¹³ Russia, by inheriting the USSR seat as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, had to deal with a variety of international issues from the very first day of independence.

¹⁴ Peter Truscott, *Russia First; Breaking with the West*, (London, New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1997).

¹⁵ See A.Lukin, "Predstavlenie "demokraticeskikh" grupp o vneshnem mire", ['Democratic' Groups' Perception about the World] *MEMO*, 8 (1995) 104-114.

rights groups, regional groups, oppressed ethnic groups, veterans, etc. The unity of the *Democratic forces* lasted no longer than the old Soviet system. In August 1991, once Russia was practically established as an independent state and the old communist system was dismantled, the *Democratic forces* started to fragment into a variety of political parties with different agendas. However, in the initial period of Russian independence Moscow's foreign policy was mainly a product of the *Democratic forces* way of thinking. Therefore, in 1991-92 the foreign policy of Russia was based on the arguments *Democratic forces* had made in the 1989-90 period. The agenda "Cooperation with the West" was based on the assumption that in the post cold war era the relations between Russia and the US will be radically different from the USSR-US relations. This assumption formed the basis for the expectations of how the West - primarily the US - should act vis-à-vis Russia. These expectations of Western roles were related to large humanitarian and technical assistance; the participation of big Western companies in large projects in Russia; help to the private sector; and facilitating Russian export. Therefore, on the basis of these perceptions the foreign policy agenda was expressed in the slogan "Cooperation with the West."

As these expectations failed to materialize the replacement of the "Cooperation with the West" foreign policy agenda became reality at the end of 1995. Foreign Minister Kozyrev and the political bloc of the *Atlanticists*, who were the dominant force behind the agenda "Partnership with the West," had lost public support to continue with their platform. The Russian communists, headed by Genadiy Zyuganov, nationalists headed by Vladimir Zhirinovskii, and the *Neo-Eurasians* headed by Duma's Foreign Committee chairman Lukin were united in accusing Kozyrev of being naive and idealistic in dealing

with the West. This was especially true after the international community imposed punitive measures on Russia in response to the war in Chechnya. Kozyrev's removal in December 1995 represented a final victory for the already dominant perception of Russian national interest as well as the institutionalization of the "Russia first" agenda. This time the emphasis, domestically, was placed on strengthening the eroded state powers, and, internationally, on the dominant role of the Russian state in the region and on the protection of Russians in the "near abroad". Kozyrev was replaced with Evgenii Primakov, formerly head of Federal Secret Services. Primakov was a long time proponent of gradual reform, state interventionism, revitalization of CIS bonds and assertive foreign policy vis-à-vis the West. His nomination was unanimously approved across the Russian political spectrum.

However, between 1992 and 1996 nothing changed significantly in the way Russian foreign policy operated institutionally, and this shift may not be explained by entirely institutionalist explanations. Although President Yeltsin was trying, on two occasions, to make the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a supreme foreign policy coordinating body, his attempts remained a dead letter. These attempts failed primarily because granting more power to this Ministry would legally require a change of the Constitution. Moreover, increasing the Ministry's power, for all intents and purposes, would have practically diminished the President's influence in foreign policy decision making. Therefore, since no legal steps were made in the direction of institutional changes, the question remains how to understand the 1996 agenda change in Russian foreign policy.

In seeking an understanding, an inquiry about ideas and debates that were taking place among Russian foreign policy agents could represent an useful avenue. Thus, there

is a need to inquire as to how ideas affected foreign policy. The phases of the foreign policy debate in Russia are delineated according to the process of the evolution of political alliances in the Russian political arena and according to the main political discourse that characterized that arena. The dynamic relationship between various opponent factions arguing for different foreign policies was something that characterized the Russian political arena.

In my work, foreign policy will be understood as a link between a set of ideas and set of institutions that consequently result in a foreign policy behavior. Ideas and institutions represent two connected and related sides of the same phenomenon. Importance of the Russian case is that a set of ideas and a set of institutions merge in the category of “schools of thought.” This particular link provides for cultural traits to determine public policy choices. Specific for Russia is that those cultural traits represent coherent and sophisticated political thought so that ideas act as a filter between societal demands and institutional responses. At the same time “schools of thought” represent social movements that penetrate any political institution and act as all encompassing social institutions. Intelligentsia, as culture builder in Russia, is rather divided according to its belonging to various “schools of thought” than to party, professional, religious or ethnic affiliation. Thus, specific to Russia is that “schools of thought” have twofold ontological nature – combining ideas and institutions. “Schools of thought” represent the most influential social movements that shape institutional public policies while at the same time they represent cultural traits and sets of ideas that shape the thinking of those movements. It will not be possible to understand foreign policy behavior if these two sides are left divided. Since there were no radical changes in the institutional framework

of Russian foreign policy, we should give weight to foreign policy debates in Russia in order to understand Russian foreign policy changes. The link between “schools of thought” and Russian foreign policy could be explained as the relationship between society’s cultural currents and public policy choices. The process of institutionalization of ideas will be addressed, as well as the content of ideas themselves. I will try to prove that in the last few years the debate among the various schools of thought in Russia has been very rich.

The primary goal of this thesis will be to understand shifts in Russian foreign policy by analyzing this debate. The debate will be traced in reference to Russian foreign policy discussions from 1990 to 2000. The foreign policy debate will be understood as a process of discussions of vital national interests of the country and of its security dilemmas in the new post-cold war environment. Debate will be defined as a dominant discourse on concepts (such as national interests, objectives and worldviews) and events within one state.

The secondary goal of this thesis is to seek the origins and foundations of the debate of ideas among the Russian foreign policy “schools of thought” that have recently emerged. These “schools” represent different theoretical traditions of Russian political and philosophical thought.

In my thesis I will follow the work of Andrei Tsygankov on Russian contemporary foreign policy “schools of thought.”¹⁶ He developed the concept of “schools of thought” on the basis of their definition of security. This way in Russian political space four “schools of thought” were articulated, namely, *International*

¹⁶ See Andrei P. Tsygankov, “From International Institutionalism to Revolutionary Expansionism: The Foreign Policy Discourse of Contemporary Russia”, *Mershon International Studies Review*, 41 (1997) 247-268.

Institutionalists, Defensive Realists, Aggressive Realists and Revolutionary

Expansionists. Even though the author considered these “schools of thought” as intellectual rather than as political movements, it was obvious that he put an emphasis on the geopolitical thinking of these schools. In my understanding the schools of thought will be considered more broadly and not only in geopolitical terms, namely, as coherent ways of thinking expressed by debate participants on issues concerning foreign policy. Consequently, the mapping of Russian schools of thought in this study is going to differ significantly. However, I will keep the descriptive and comparative method of Tsygankov in searching “for their [“schools of thought”] intellectual roots and reality-defining assumptions as well as for their policy prescriptions.”¹⁷ The implementation of such a method will be done through a content analysis of main Russian journals, similar to what Tsygankov had attempted in both of his articles.

These reality-defining assumptions and policy prescriptions will be considered as ideas that shaped behavior of Russian institutions. Since ideas and discourse portrayed by various schools of thought were often overlapping, they will be presented as related to each other rather than as separate entities with clear borders. The basic assumption is that general ideas and “schools of thought” do not arise in a vacuum, rather they represent an amalgam of history and new experiences in every society.¹⁸ In tracing this debate, the focus will rest on the perceptions of the debate participants about concepts, and on the relations between the new and the old “schools of thought.”

¹⁷ See Andrei P. Tsygankov, “Hard-line Eurasianism and Russia’s contending Geopolitical perspectives”, *East European Quarterly*, 32, 3 (Fall 1998) 316.

¹⁸ “...by general ideas we refer in effect to beliefs, attitudes, and mental and emotional habits, some of which are vague and undefined, others of which have become crystallized into religious, legal, or political systems, moral doctrines, social outlooks, psychological dispositions, and so forth.”, Marc Raeff, *Russian Intellectual History: an Anthology*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966) 4.

The old or traditional Russian “schools of thought” related to the ideas of Russia will be referred to as: *Slavophiles*, *Westerners*, *Pan-Slavists*, *Eurasians* and *Russian Nationalists* (the doctrine of official nationality of Nicholas I), all originating from the 19th century. An in-depth analysis of these traditional “schools of thought” will be offered in II chapter.

Slavophilism was an anti-rational approach in its epistemology, an anti-individualistic approach in its social thinking, and an anti-Western approach in its national thinking. Its “founding father” was Danilevsky,¹⁹ while Odoevsky, Khomyakov²⁰ and Soloviev²¹ represented later followers who developed new streams of this school of thought.²²

Among the founding fathers of the *Westerners* were Chaadaev,²³ Belinsky²⁴ and Herzen.²⁵ This school was based on rationalism and on the project of modernity. The Social Democrat and Socialist parties emerged from this school of thought.

Pan-Slavism was a romantic reaction to processes of national-awakening in Europe and was most often described as the Slavic movement for political union.²⁶ Pan-Slavism was perceived in different ways by Austria, Russia and the smaller Slav nations. Austria perceived it as a counterbalance to Russian expansion, due to the fact that the movement, for a long time, wanted to create an Austrian Federation, that is, to revitalize

¹⁹ See Nikolai Iakovlevich Danilevsky, *Rossia i Evropa* [Russia and Europe] (New York: Johnson Reprint Corp. 1966).

²⁰ See Nikola Berdiaev, *Aleksei Stepanovich Khomiakov* (1912; reprint, Westmead, Eng.: Gregg. 1971).

²¹ See Vladimir Sergeevich Soloviev, *Dukhovnye osnovy zhizni* [Spiritual foundation of life] (New York: Russian Center, Fordham U. 1958).

²² See Julius F. Hecker, *Russian Sociology; A Contribution to the History of Sociological Thought and Theory* (New York, 1915)

²³ See Petr Iakovlevich Chaadaev, *Stat'i i pis'ma* [Articles and Letters] (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1987).

²⁴ See Vissarion Grigoryevich Belinsky, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* [Collected Works] (Moscow: 1953).

²⁵ See Aleksandr Herzen, *From the other shore, ...and The Russian people and socialism an open letter to Jules Michelet* [S togo berega] (London: Weidenfeld, 1956).

²⁶ See John Erickson, *Panslavism* (London: Historical Association, 1964).

Austria rather than destroy it.²⁷ The Austrian throne, on occasions, counterbalanced Prussian Pan-Germanic threats and Hungarian secessionists aspirations by promising more political rights to Slavic population – Austro-Hungarian monarchy's most numerous citizenry.²⁸ Russia recognized in this movement a pretext for expansion. There were two streams in the Russian approach to this movement. The one supported by the late 19th century Russian czars encouraged the movement on the grounds of the expansion of the *Russian Nationalists* and the creation of an autocratic state,²⁹ while the other current sponsored by the Decembrist movement³⁰ had in mind a more genuine project of creating a federation of "united Slavs" with the liberal political system.³¹ The smaller Slav nations perceived in this movement an opportunity for national liberation, but their expectations were divided along the lines of three programs. These ranged from calls for full national sovereignty, to those which were more pro-Russian, and those who advocated the creation of an independent Slavic federation.³²

The *Russian Nationalists* school sprang from the doctrine of 'official nationality' instituted by czar Nicholas I in 1833. Due to the emergence of nation-states and nationalist revolutionary movements which were almost all anti-monarchic, the Russian

²⁷ See Barbara Jelavich, *The Habsburg Empire in European Affairs, 1814-1918* (Chicago: McNally, 1969).

²⁸ See C.A. Macartney, *The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918* rev. ed. (London: Weidenfeld, 1971); A.J.P. Taylor, *The Habsburg monarchy, 1809-1918; a history of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary* (Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin, 1964); Hans Kohn, *The Habsburg Empire 1804-1918* (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1961).

²⁹ See Mikhail Petrovich Pogodin, *Pol'skoi vopros; sobranie razsuzhdenii zapisok i zamechanii, 1831-1867* [Polish Question; Collection of Opinions, Notes and Comments] (Moscow: Tipografii gazety "Russkii", 1867). Microfiche. Zug, Switzerland, Inter Documentation Company AG.

³⁰ See V.A. Fedorov, ed., *Memuary dekabristov* [Decabrists' Memoirs] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1981).

³¹ See Frank Fodner, *Seventy years of Pan-Slavism in Russia; Karazin to Danilevskii 1800-1870* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1962).

³² See Jelena Milojkovic-Djuric, *Panslavism and National Identity in Russia and in the Balkans 1830-1880: Images of the Self and Others* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

throne was forced to respond with some counter measures to this 'revolutionary threat'.³³ The concept of 'official nationality' was based on the trinity of orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality/ethnicity. The category of orthodoxy was perceived as a church controlled by the state; the category of autocracy was perceived as the category in which legitimacy derives from the natural law (divine law) of a sovereign, while nationality was perceived as being in the service of autocracy.³⁴

The founders of the *Eurasianism* school were N.S. Trubetzkoy,³⁵ P.N. Savitskii, G.V. Florovskii,³⁶ G. Vernadskii³⁷ and P.P. Suvchinskii in 1920-30. Eurasians argued for the emergence of an Eurasian federation and the adoption of dual identities principle. In the case of Russia it would mean the Russian and Mongolian cultural identity or Russian and Asian civilization identity. Otherwise, they argued, Russia would face colonization by the West. The only way to avoid this perceived colonization by the West would be to join the destiny of the common struggle of the Asian states against colonialism and European civilization. Trubetzkoy perceived that the best agent for this change is the state itself. In the field of historical debates this "school of thought" took "anti-Peter the Great" position. *Eurasians* argued against mythologizing Russian opening toward the West by insisting that Russia has dual Slavic-Asian identity.

The contemporary participants of the 1990s debate will be referred to as *Democratic Forces*, *Atlanticists*, *Nationalists*, *Neo-Eurasians* and a vague alliance of the

³³ See Cynthia Whittaker, *The Origins of modern Russian education; an intellectual biography of Count Sergei Uvarov, 1786-1855* (DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois U. P., 1984).

³⁴ See Nicolas Bergyaev, *The Russian Idea* (London: The Centenary Press, 1947).

³⁵ See Nikolai Sergeevich Trubetskoi, kniaz, *The Legacy of Genghis Khan and other essays on Russia's identity* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Mich. Slavic Pub., 1991).

³⁶ See Georgi Vasil'evich Florovski, *Bible, church, tradition: an Eastern Orthodox view* (Belmont, Mass.: Nordland, 1972).

³⁷ See George Vernadsky, *Ancient Russia* (New Haven: Yale U. P., 1943); George Vernadsky, *The origins of Russia* (Oxford: Clarendon P., 1959).

Nationalists and *Neo-Eurasians* termed *National-Patriots*. An in-depth analysis of these contemporary “Schools of thought” will be offered in chapters III-V.

The *Democratic Forces* was a vague alliance of groups with various political orientations. The common denominator of their thinking was a belief in the supremacy of international law and international institutions. They argued for the opening-up of Soviet society towards integration and cooperation with the world. Society was their main focus and they argued that the common good and common interests should be main objectives of any policy.

Atlanticists were a more elaborate and homogeneous sub-group of the *Democratic Forces*. First Russian Prime Minister Egor Gaidar and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev most visibly represented *Atlanticists*. The foundation for the international position of this “school” was again in international law, while the main prescription for Russian behavior was cooperation with the world, especially with members of the Atlantic community. Their main focus was on citizens and their benefits.

Nationalists were more visibly represented by politically outspoken leaders such as the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, and the Duma Deputy speaker and leader of the People's Power Party, Sergei Baburin. This school perceived the world as based on a balance of power relationship and argued not for a cooperation, but rather rivalry with the external world. Their main focus was on categories of state and nationality which were perceived as being in symbiosis.

Neo-Eurasians sought to build upon *Eurasianist* scholarship from the '20s and '30s. However, they should be regarded as a new stream and not as a continuation of the teachings of prince Trubetzkoy. Historian Lev Gumilev (son of Anna Akhmatova) was the

founding father of *Neo-Eurasians* and the most important author who, throughout the '60s and '70s, kept alive among history scholars the "anti-Peter the Great" position and have introduced the specific ethnic analysis approach (*ethnogenez*) built upon history, geography and biology.³⁸ The most visible contemporary advocate of *Neo-Eurasians* was the Chairman of the Duma's foreign relations Committee, A.Lukin. *Neo-Eurasians*, believed that state power was a main element of international relations. They argued for Moscow's cautious cooperation with the West since an unrestricted opening-up could make Russia more dependent and less powerful. Their understanding of the state was less organic compared to that of the *Nationalists*, since the state was perceived as an institution and not an ethnic category.

The *National-Patriots* emerged as a mixture of *Nationalists* and *Neo-Eurasians*, with the most visible exponents represented by politicians such as Genadii Zyuganov and Governor of Krasnoyarsk and former General and Commander of the 14th Army in the Transdnistria, Aleksander Lebed. *National-Patriots* perceived international relations in terms of eternal competition among states. In their view, the best scenario for Russia was to enter into cautious cooperation with the external world with the aim of avoiding interdependence since it would make Russia more vulnerable. The main category they sought to protect was the state rather than the ethnic group or the individual.

The debate of the 1990s involved participants from various segments of Russian society. The most influential ones came from the legislative (Parliament) and the executive (Government) branches of Russian political arena, but participants from the

³⁸ See Lev Gumilev, *Etnogenez i biosfera zemli* 2nd ed. [Ethnogenesis and the Earth's Biosphere] (Leningrad: Izdatelstvo Leningradskogo Universiteta, 1989); Lev Gumilev, *Ot Rusi k Rossii: ocherki etnicheskoi istorii* [from Rus' to Russia: Remarks on Ethnic History] (Moscow: Ekoprogres, 1992); Lev Gumilev, *Drevnaia Rus' i velikaia step'* [Ancient Rus' and Grand Steppe] (Moscow: Mysl', 1989).

academic field, the ranks of the intelligentsia, the church and the new entrepreneurial elite also played quite an important role.³⁹ In following the participants of this debate, I will adopt P. Lawrence's approach on unity between participants and debate. Lawrence argues that "the political significance of intellectuals is not merely a matter of individuals influencing policy; it concerns the construction of modes of discourse which legitimize aspects of state policy... Thus the power of intellectuals must be seen as more than a question of institutional location. It resides partly in the creation of discourse which constitutes the symbolic reality of political argumentation."⁴⁰

The real uniting point of Russian 19th century "schools of thought" was in their desire to 'change' Russia. The frustration with Russian realities, which was most pronounced within the intelligentsia, who were farthest from these realities, represented the basis for the call for 'change'. But 'change' had different meanings. For some this was a call for a change in the political system (*Slavophiles, Westerners, Eurasians*), while for others it presented only a call for a change of the borders (*Russian Nationalists, Pan-Slavists*). The inappropriate orientation of Russia's development was identified as the primary issue underlying the need for change. For some, this wrong direction was manifested in Russia losing its real nature (*Slavophiles, Russian Nationalists, Pan-Slavists*). Others, such as the *Westerners* and *Eurasians*, argued that Russia's nature did

³⁹ On contemporary Russian intelligentsia see: A.I. Studenikin, ed., *Intelligentsiia v ulsoviiah obshchestvenoi nestabilnosti* [Intelligentsia during the period of Social Instability] (Moscow: Editorial URSS, 1996); A. I. Studenikin, *Intelligentsiia i vlast'* [Intelligentsia and Power] (Moscow: URSS, 1999); Evgenii Evgen'evich Degtiarev, V.K. Egorov, *Intelligentsiia i vlast': fenomen rossiiskoi intelligentsii i problemy vzaimootnoshenii intelligentsii i vlasti* [Intelligentsia and Power; The Phenomenon of Russian Intelligentsia and the Intelligentsia-Power Relationship] (Moscow: Novaia sloboda, 1993); V.S. Memetov, ed., *Intelligentsiia Rossii--traditsii i novatsii* [Russian Intelligentsia – Tradition and Change] (Ivanovo: Ivanovskii gosudarstvenii universitet, 1997); V.S. Memtov, ed., *Intelligentsiia Rossii: uroki istorii i sovremennost'* [Russian Intelligentsia: Historical Lessons and the Present] (Ivanovo: IvGU, 1994).

⁴⁰ Philip K. Lawrence, "Strategy, Hegemony and Ideology: the Role of Intellectuals," *Political Studies* 44, 1 (1996) 44.

not aid her development. Therefore, they all had a different definition of Russian nature, reflecting the different philosophical origins of each of these schools, and consequently a different prescription of what had to be done.

A very similar process appeared in post-communist Russia. In the 1990s, frustration with Russian reality emerged, and again the intelligentsia -- the group most frustrated by this reality -- was the most vocal and articulated. This time the intelligentsia was much larger and professionally-oriented, but remained dependent on the state and market forces for its social standards, and so it varied significantly from the intelligentsia of the 19th century. The new "schools of thought" also differed among themselves regarding how to 'change' Russia so that the post-communist period was characterized by the debates between various policy alternatives and reality assessments. These debates practically brought to the fore the issues of continuity and change in Russia and "adaptations of political actors to their internal and external environment."⁴¹ In my thesis the argument goes that this process of adaptations in Russia was built, more than in any other East European country, on cultural and historical heritage. Thus, the analysis of continuity with the 19th century "schools of thought" will contribute our understanding of proposed policy alternatives.

My primary interest in this project is in the contemporary debate regarding participants' perception of the world of today and the role of Russia in it. Under this perception the dominant view of the debate participants regarding the Russian past, Russian identity and Russian national interests in the new international environment will be investigated. The thesis' contribution will be in presenting the emergence of the

⁴¹ Andrew C. Janos, "Continuity and Change in Eastern Europe: Strategies of Post-Communist Politics," *East European Politics and Societies* 8, 1 (Winter 1994) 3.

competing concepts of Russian national interest and the reasons why the concept of "Russia first" won the consensus of the debate participants in late 1995 and how it consequently fragmented. "Russia first" represented a policy prescription built upon the new security perception of multi-polar world. The *Atlanticists* policy prescription of the "Cooperation with the West" agenda was built upon the security perception of one world. The perception of one world argued about the interdependence of global threats and interests and assumed the mutually beneficial global cooperation in dealing with those threats. Negative experiences of Russian post-communist domestic and international developments shaped new security perception. The functioning of one-world interdependence processes was perceived as advantageous for the West and detrimental for Russia due to the uni-polar nature of international system. It was assumed that Russian interests would be better protected in a multi-polar world system. In order to shape Russian sphere of interests a more assertive "Russia first" policy was advocated. Thus, as security perception has changed toward the multi-polar world vision so the policy prescription took the form of "Russia first."

In order to understand the link between those phenomena the study's emphasis will be on the participants' perception of the Russian national interest and its components of security, prosperity and identity.⁴² The national interest will be understood in terms of behaviorist concepts. The working definition of national interest is that the state should base its perception of the particular interests of that nation as defined by its decision makers. Realization of that defined, or perceived, national interest is a goal of a state's behavior. The importance of the categories of security, prosperity and identity in the

⁴² William O.Chittick, Keith R.Billingsley, Rick Travis, "A Three-Dimensional Model of American Foreign Policy Beliefs," *International Studies Quarterly*, 3, (1995): 313-331.

foreign policy debate is based on the work of William O.Chittick, Keith R.Billingsley, and Rick Travis. The authors argue that identity, security, and prosperity are the pillars of a workable model of foreign policy beliefs. The authors' starting assumption is that "the general public and elite groups use fairly simple organizing beliefs when viewing the conduct of foreign policy."⁴³ This happens primarily because the public and elites are asking the same questions of how to comprehend relationship between the society, the state and its international environment. The authors have used public surveys and data collection about elites in order to test foreign policy beliefs. Despite the fact that the authors later used factor analysis in operating and processing their data, the significance of these three belief pillars, I would argue, holds true for other approaches as well. Consequently, in my thesis the public surveys will be used as the contributing point for claims about the existence or lack of existence of certain beliefs. However, the dominant discourse will also be traced in order to follow the emergence and transformation of competing ideas about foreign policy. In addition to Tsygankov's definition of differences among the "schools of thought" based only on their perception of security issues, the perceptions of prosperity and identity will also be used as defining elements between various schools of thought. Therefore, the Chittick's, Billingsley's and Travis' clearly behaviorist approach, based on positivist methodology of data collection, is going to be used in my paper as a complement to Tsygankov's discourse analysis. It is from these three beliefs which are at the same time the three main goals of the foreign policy that differences in the foreign policy debate are going to be traced.

The debate, which will be followed through the dominant discourse in Russia, is perceived as an aggregate of already existing concepts and ideas, and also of new events

⁴³ William O.Chittick, Keith R.Billingsley, Rick Travis, 314.

taking place in the international and domestic contexts. The debate has both structural and agency qualities, since the ideas and events share a dialectical connection, influencing each other through the discourse.

During the '90s there were four groups of events that decisively influenced political discourse. These new key events were: the economic crisis in Russia; the assistance of the West; wars in the "near abroad", and the war in the former Yugoslavia. This selection of events is based on their presence in the debate and on their use as reference points in the texts examined. The economic crisis in Russia generated a debate on possible reform paths and on the models around which the economy should be organized. This debate also included different visions as to how and why the Soviet economic system collapsed and, consequently, what should be the best economic policy for government to pursue. The partisanship in this debate oscillated between those who supported radical privatization and envisioned the role of the state primarily through monetarist interventions, and those who argued for gradual reform and an active and protectionist role of the state in all spheres of economy. The role of the state was debated by those who advocated that the state has only economic functions, and by those who claimed that the state has economic and social functions.

The help of the West generated debate as to how much Russia should rely on, and trust in, Western financial institutions, international organizations and countries. The arguments raised in this debate oscillated between the position of genuine support for a large influx of Western aid, to the position of great suspicion based on the assumption that any help is conditional on political concessions by Russia. The main dividing point in this debate was the perception of the West, and the range of views among debate

participants which oscillated between perception of a benevolent partner to the one that portrayed the West as a shrewd rival.

Based upon content analysis of Russian media I argue that the wars in the “near abroad” and the former Yugoslavia represented the most influential events that shaped Russian security discourse and contributed, as reference points, to the creation of the reality-defining assumptions or worldviews among Russian intelligentsia. Both focus areas were more instrumental in shaping perceptions about the world and Russia’s relationship with the West than were Russia’s participation either in multilateral frameworks of UN and OSCE or bilateral relations with US or EU. Both focus areas were constantly present in Russian press and broadcast so that they overwhelmingly dominated mass media space. These areas were the only places where Russian troops were deployed and where Russian lives were in danger. Russian diplomatic activity related to the “near abroad” and the former Yugoslavia was far more frequent, intensive and high-profile than in any other area over the last ten years. Declarations and discussions in Russian parliament (including committees’ work and parliamentary visits) indicate that these two focus areas were the most debated international issue in Russian legislature.⁴⁴

The wars in the “near abroad” shaped a debate on how to deal with instability in post-Soviet countries as well as how to manage ethnic conflicts on Russian soil. The expectations of harmonious and democratic developments in the post-Soviet world was confronted with the bitter reality of civil wars and ethnic conflicts in Tajikistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova. Several millions of Russians living in the “near abroad” faced severe loss of ethnic and civil rights or became refugees. This development

⁴⁴ See for Duma <http://www.duma.ru/infgd/INFGD.HTM> and for Federation Council <http://www.akdi.ru/sf/op-inf.htm>

was accompanied by a rise in ethnic tensions in some Russian regions, and even secessionist claims, such as was case in Chechnya. The main dividing point in this debate concerned the proper policy toward these hot spots, and the range of views among debate participants ranged from reliance on international norms and multilateral institutions in dealing with the countries in question, to the position of those who advocated unilateral military and political interventionist measures.

The war in the former Yugoslavia shaped a debate on the 'new world order' and Russia's role in international crises. Civil war in the former Yugoslavia held a three-fold significance for Russia. First, it was the only international crisis where Russia took a significant and sometimes even determining role as mediator and arbitrator. Second, this war was perceived in Moscow as a test ground for how the West would manage future international conflicts, and in that sense, was a sort of a precedent for the 'new world order'. Third, it confronted Russia, in quite practical terms, with the issue of NATO expansion, since the Atlantic military alliance installed its troops for the first time outside the area of its member-states. The main point of departure in this debate involved responses to American-led policies in the Balkan region, and the range of views among debate participants ranged from proposals for alliance-like integration into US regional policies, to the position of those opposing just about any American foreign policy measure.

These key events generated debates that redefined national interest categories such as identity, prosperity, and security. Consequently, the discourse itself became an empirical reality since it began to influence a change in foreign policy behavior. Thus the link between ideas and institutions came to be operationalized. This operationalization

was due to the Russia-specific nature of “schools of thought.” In the case of Russia the category of “schools of thought” has twofold ontological nature – combining ideas and institutions. “Schools of thought” represent the most influential social movements that shape institutional public policies while at the same time they represent cultural traits and sets of ideas that shape the thinking of those movements.

1.3 Object of study

The object of study will be Russian foreign policy debate in the '90s. More precisely, the shifts in the Russian foreign policy behavior that occurred during this period will be traced through the changes in foreign policy debate on the examples of “near abroad” and the former Yugoslavia. The link between “schools of thought” and Russian foreign policy could be explained as the relationship between society’s cultural currents and public policy choices. This focus on cultural currents, expressed in Russia-specific political thought, represents contribution to the FPA scholarship.

1.4 What is the question

The question is how to understand and explain these changes in Russian foreign policy behavior. The changes represented a move from a position of unconditional compliance with the West’s standards, expressed in the slogan “Cooperation with the West”, toward the position of assertion and occasional coercion, with an emphasis on

Russian needs, expressed in the slogan "Russia first," and subsequent fragmentation of "Russia first" and the emergence of "reluctant realism" by the end of 1990s.

1.5 Tentative answer to the question

The understanding of the shift offered by the traditional foreign policy analysis (FPA) would be limited to the following: concessions of the Russian President to pressures made by the nationalist political parties made this shift possible. In that case the focus will be on a pure decision-making mechanism and belief system of the bureaucracy. Therefore, the traditional FPA explanation would truly account for the result but this would not help us to understand the reason and nature of this change and its dynamic since institutions and not ideas would be seen as the primary mechanism. Relevance of my thesis is in its attempt to reach beyond this explanation by offering the culture-sensitive understanding of how the change occurred.

I will argue that the change occurred as a result of the interaction of the domestic debate on foreign policy and domestic and international events reflected in this debate. I will argue that by the use of discourse analysis, and analysis of ideas represented in the debate, one can reach an understanding of the shift in Russian foreign policy. Graphically this process had the following trajectory:

Events=>Debates=>Redefinition of national interest=>Change in foreign policy behavior

It should be noted that this graph represents already established findings of behaviourist FPA about the causal mechanism of foreign policy changes. The contribution of my thesis is in the focus on the phase of Debates where the analytical

lenses will be placed on the culture sensitive theory of ideas that govern the competing elite worldviews. While for many other countries it would make more sense to analyze the phase of Debates through institutional analysis of foreign policy consensus making or bureaucratic elite surveys, in the case of Russia the focus on ideas would be more beneficial. In the case of Russia, as opposed to other countries, ideas instead of institutions or social aspects were the most influential factor in shaping different elite worldviews. Thus, this study will demonstrate that the focus on the second stage of this process, namely on the phase of Debates, could help our understanding of domestic reasoning for and proposed alternatives of desired foreign policy changes. The methodological relevance of this study is in its innovative approach. This approach represents the link between behaviorist scholarship (in attributing the role of agency to the elite – in Russian case to the intelligentsia) and post-modern scholarship (in using the discourse as medium of change and discourse analysis as research method).

1.6 Literature review

The scholarship on FPA acknowledges a link between agents/institutions and ideas and belief systems, but devotes much more attention to the institutional side of foreign policy. On the other hand, contemporary Russian scholarship on the period of the '90s was more interested in the foundations of social processes, understood as the agency/structure relationship, than in ideas.

Russian authors expressed varying accounts of Russian foreign policy between 1991 and 1995. The common denominator of these accounts is their non-modernist

nature. Thus, they focused on the role of agency as responsible for changes in society and, consequently, changes in foreign policy. For example, by glorifying nationalism and being anti-international, almost isolationist, Zhirinovsky advocated more confrontational relations vis-à-vis certain countries.⁴⁵ His prescription for foreign policy was to implement more antagonistic policies. He was placing the responsibility for contemporary Russian problems on political leaderships, on agency, therefore, and not on structure. On the opposite normative and political position, but the same theoretical one, stood, for example, Aleksandr Yanov in arguing against the emergence of a fascist state in Russia.⁴⁶ He also placed the ontological importance on political elites, therefore agency, in outlining how Russia could easily follow the path of pre-Hitler Germany and slide toward fascism. He understands foreign policy to be a mirror of domestic policy. His argument, consequently, predicts that eventually a Russian non-democratic domestic regime would trigger an expansionist war, and so the way to have a peace-oriented foreign policy is to have a democratic domestic regime.

The same agent approach is used as an explanatory mechanism even in texts with a political economy content. For example, Leonid Abalkin argued that the government's inexperience and lack of expertise, especially in insisting on monetarism, caused the harsh economic crisis in Russia between 1992 and 1994.⁴⁷ To him foreign policy will be a reflection of the domestic economic processes.

⁴⁵ See Zhirinovskii, V.V., *Poslednii vagon na Sever* [The Last Car to the North] (Moscow: Svetoton Ltd., 1995).

⁴⁶ See Yanov Aleksandr, *Posle Yeltsina: Weimarskaia Rossia* [After Yeltsin: Weimar Russia] (Moscow: KRUK, 1995).

⁴⁷ See Leonid Abalkin, *Zigzagi sudby: Razocharovaniia i nadezhdy* [Twists of Destiny; Disappointments and Hopes] (Moscow: Institut Ekonomiki RAN, 1996).

On the other hand, there existed a historical cycle explanatory scholarship that linked the Russian domestic crisis to the world cycle of crisis.⁴⁸ Authors of this scholarship portrayed this crisis as a global phenomenon of a crisis in Euro-American civilization. According to this argument, the end of the cold war was situated in the larger historical framework and was just another manifestation of the same global phenomenon. There exists a more politically charged and nation-specific approach that argues for the same cyclical crisis explanations of changes in contemporary Russia. One of its main proponents is Aleksandr Lebed with his focus on the performances of the Russian state in history, where people and history create an agent/structure symbiosis, almost as in Tolstoy's discussion, in "War and Peace," of the driving forces of history.⁴⁹

On the more precise matter of foreign policy analysis, contemporary Russian scholarship demonstrated several approaches. For example, some authors argued for the need to reject "agency-only explanations", and for a more balanced structure/agency relationship.⁵⁰ Others were in favor of more institutionalist agendas in terms of research, placing exclusive emphasis on the state and its bureaucratic mechanisms.⁵¹ In the Russian scholarship dealing with foreign policy issues, the emergence of a clear behaviorist approach could also be seen in the growth of survey research targeting the Russian

⁴⁸ See N.N. Moiseev, "Sumerki Rossii (Rassvet ili Zakat? Rossia na perepute)," [Twilight of Russia (Sunlight or Sunset? Russia at the Crossroad)], *POLIS* 1 (1993): 7-17; and "Rossia v mire XXI veka (Materialy obsuzhdenia)," [Russia in the World of 21st century (conference materials)], *POLIS* 2 (1993): 31-40.

⁴⁹ See Aleksandr Lebed, *Za derzhavu obidno...*, [For the State obediently...] (Moscow: Redakciia Gazety "Moskovskaia Pravda", 1995).

⁵⁰ V.I. Maksimenko, "Faktory vliiania na vneshnopoliticheskie orientacii Rossi," [Factors Influencing Russian Foreign Policy Orientations] *POLIS* 4 (1993): 204-206.

⁵¹ See E.M. Kozhokin, "Faktory vliiania na vneshnopoliticheskie orientacii Rossi," [Factors Influencing Russian Foreign Policy Orientations] *POLIS* 4 (1993): 206-208.

decision making and intellectual elite.⁵² On a more methodological level, serious attempts were made to re-think the methodological instrumentarium when it comes to Russian policy.⁵³

This brief overview suggests that positions taken and questions raised within the foreign policy debate in Russia were far from being in unison. These different theoretical foundations have produced different visions of what happened in Russia and, consequently, what Russia should do. While some Western authors expected the 'post-communist vacuum of ideas' this variety of approaches and prescriptions went against those predictions.

I will argue that the notion of a post-communist vacuum appeared to be more a logocentric thinking than a view based on the understanding of the history of ideas.⁵⁴ On the other hand, the variety of ideas that were involved in the foreign policy debate should have its origins somewhere. Since no society offers limitless choices, I will attempt in my study to link the new schools of thought on Russian foreign policy with those in the past, with the emphasis on the 19th century. The goal is to demonstrate that there was no vacuum in Russia's intellectual debate, and that the plenum is a better explanatory mechanism.⁵⁵

It seems more useful to trace the origins of the plurality of ideas in the admittedly eclectic debate, and to examine the transformation and development of Russian political discourse, than to insist on the static explanation of how the Russian post-communist

⁵² See "Vneshnaia politika Rossii - 1993 Analiz politikov i ekspertov," [Russian Foreign Policy in 1993; An Analysis of Politicians and Experts] *POLIS* 4 (1993): 214-223.

⁵³ See V.G. Fedotova, "Sud'ba Rossii v zerkale metodologii," [Destiny of Russia in the Mirror of Methodology] *Voprosy filosofii* 12 (1995): 21-35.

⁵⁴ On logocentrism, and related concepts of centre/decentre, and binary opposition see Irena R. Makaryk, ed., *Encyclopedia of Contemporary Literary Theory: Approaches, Scholars, Terms* (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1993).

⁵⁵ *Webster's Third New International Dictionary* (1971), 2527, defines plenum as to opposite of vacuum.

polity faced a vacuum of ideas. Even if Russian schools of thought may appear to be more poetic than scientific, more literary than academic, more eclectic than coherent, more all-encompassing than parsimonious, they still create a reality that should be taken and analyzed as such and not rejected as 'different' or 'wrong' (since it does not fit some Western patterns) or only to be deconstructed in a post-modernist fashion and left without a possibility to account for its dynamics and predict its future developments.

For such a task the FPA seems to be the most suitable academic tool. FPA scholarship, despite the fact that it is generally perceived as a sub-discipline of international relations (IR), offers an opportunity to bridge the fields of international relations and comparative politics. In order to account for the changes in the international sphere, the FPA looks to the domestic policy of each country. This way the FPA can be used to account for changes, their origins and meaning, something that IR was accused of not being able to fulfill due to its most disturbing example of not being able to predict the end of the cold war.

My literature review is more illustrative than comprehensive since the FPA scholarship is so large that it cannot be surveyed here in its entirety. In this literature review my main task is to outline the advantages that FPA offers as a disciplinary framework that can be used for better understanding the foreign policy debate in Russia as well as to point out how the link between ideas and institutions was made in the existing FPA literature.

The pre-theory period of the FPA started practically with James Rosenau and his work in the early '60s.⁵⁶ More traditional FPA primarily included two approaches, and both of them followed the main IR debates.⁵⁷

The first approach was based on the systemic level of analysis. In this approach, the national and sub-national specifics were ignored at the expense of the main unit of analysis -- the international system.⁵⁸ At this point the link between IR and FPA was still very strong. That way the predominance of realists and neo-realists practically forced those interested in foreign policy to focus on policy making as a process based on agents and their perceptions in a given time and place from more structural power based explanations offered by IR. At that time (the 1970s), the predominant IR perception of the international system was one that based the reality on the "black box" principle when it comes to the state and on the "billiard ball" concept when it comes to the international system functioning. Within the structure of the international system the main categories were hierarchy, power and national interest. These assumed categories were used as explicandum for the state's behavior in the determined/determinant anarchical international system.⁵⁹ A rational-choice nature was attributed to the state and such a state was always aiming for balance of power in its international affairs.

In the 1980s and 1990s realist and neo-realist scholarship departed toward questions of the reciprocal influence of the external environment and the foreign policy of

⁵⁶ See James Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," *Approaches in Comparative and International Politics*, ed. R. Barry Farrell (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

⁵⁷ The FPA is represented here through the Western literature since there is no adequate strictly Russian equivalent.

⁵⁸ The most representative scholars from this stream are Kaplan Morton, *Great Issues of International Politics; the International System and National Policy* (Chicago: Aldine, 1970); Richard Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics; International Systems in Perspective* (Boston: Little, 1963), and Kenneth Waltz, *A Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

⁵⁹ See Steve Smith, "Theorizing of Foreign Policy: An Historical Overview," *Review of International Studies*, 12 (1986): 13-30.

states. There were attempts to link the international system of states and states' behavior through the claims of transnationalism and the existence of interdependence between the system (international relations) and the system's units (states).⁶⁰ Less systemic and more modernist oriented was the approach that emphasized globalization as a world wide process and its repercussions on the foreign policies of individual states.⁶¹

During the 1970s, scholars interested in foreign policy, often labeled as a first generation, laid the groundwork for the three main areas of interest within the FPA, namely: comparative foreign policy; foreign policy decision making; and foreign policy context (with emphasis on either individual characteristics or national and societal characteristics).⁶² The stream that was more comparative-oriented in its attempt to provide a scientific and universal explanation attributed the existence of different foreign policy outcomes to the country's size, economic output, political system, etc.⁶³ This mapping of foreign policy of different countries was developed in order to list factors that caused different policy outcomes and to make them predictable, despite the fact that the whole approach was not testable. The main point was that methodologically, foreign policy is a dependent variable, and this characterized all subsequent streams of FPA analysis.

Within this stream, the link between ideas and institutions, in terms of foreign policy processes, was not elaborated in a way that is helpful for my work. At the same

⁶⁰ See Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane, *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd ed. (Glenview, Ill.: HarperCollins, 1989).

⁶¹ See James Roseanu, "New Dimensions of Security: The Interaction of Globalizing and Localizing Dynamics," *Security Dialogue* 25 (Sept. 1994): 255-282.

⁶² See Valerie M. Hudson, with Christopher S. Vore, "Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," *Mershon International Studies Review*, 39 (1995) 209-238.

⁶³ J. Rosenau was one of the academic pillars of the comparative foreign policy, see for example James Rosenau ed., *Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings, and Methods* (New York, London, Sydney, Toronto: SAGE Publications, 1974).

time, this stream also does not correspond to the contemporary Russian literature. As mentioned earlier, Russian literature was highly nation-oriented and with very few comparative cross-national references.

The second approach in traditional FPA was based on structural-functionalism and the focus was almost exclusively on decision makers and decision-making process.⁶⁴ This approach emerged in order to deal with the question of testability. This approach introduced behaviorism into the international relations theory.⁶⁵ For a long time, emphasis was placed on the state institutions that were perceived through the prism of communication theory and phases of foreign policy decision making such as the aggregation of interests, formulation of policy options, the decision making phase, and implementation and feedback. Although this stream could also be subdivided on the basis of the bureaucratic politics model⁶⁶ and political process model;⁶⁷ however, tension remained between the rational choice approach,⁶⁸ with its emphasis on institutions, and challenges coming from psychological research and its focus on humans as decision makers. This tension emerged as a result of the overlap between authors interested in the foreign policy decision making and those interested in foreign policy context. Authors interested in the institutional side of foreign policy contributed significantly to the knowledge of IR, but this did not satisfy authors coming from the third stream of FPA

⁶⁴ See Wolfram F. Hanrieder ed., *Comparative Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays* (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1971).

⁶⁵ As one of the first works see Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Organizational Behavior Section, Princeton University, Foreign Policy Project, Series No. 3, June 1954).

⁶⁶ See David Welch, "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms," *International Security* 17 (1992): 112-146.

⁶⁷ See Roger Hilsman, *The Politics of policy making in defense and foreign affairs; conceptual models and bureaucratic politics*, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993).

⁶⁸ See Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston, Mass.: Little, 1971).

(foreign policy context), who focused on individual or societal characteristics. Authors interested in context also offered a significant contribution to the IR by unveiling the possibility of decision making errors, something that was inconceivable in realist IR rational choice politics. Scholars more interested in psychology argued that humans when working under stress and pressure are more inclined toward making errors.⁶⁹ According to these authors, any creation of ideal types and models for foreign policy decision making is subject to revision and demands caution in their implementation. This is where fruitful foundations can be laid for the inquiry as to the link between ideas and institutions in Russian foreign policy debate. At the same time, Russian contemporary authors themselves focus either on the foreign policy decision making mechanism or the foreign policy context and, in that way, they present a scholarship that is compatible with these two streams of FPA. This compatibility is even more easily understood if we recall the points where different Russian schools of thought have placed their focus, namely, on definitions of national character and on the characteristics of agency. Outlining how these understandings have changed in over time will be possible through discourse analysis as a bridge between these two streams of the FPA.

On the other hand, FPA did not provide a straightforward solution for the overlap between these two streams, despite the existence of a few attempts to do so. One of the best attempts to combine them was in the works of Joe Hagan who focused on the role of opposition and its influence on changes of foreign policy.⁷⁰ However, his method was exclusively behaviorist and less responsive to examine ideas. More contemporary debate

⁶⁹ See Irving Janis, *Victims of Groupthink* (Boston: Houghton, 1972).

⁷⁰ See Joe D.Hagan, "Regimes, Political Oppositions, and the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy," *New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy*, eds., Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and James N. Rosenau, (Boston: Allen & Urwin, 1987), 339-366.

on this tension (between the foreign policy decision making mechanism and the foreign policy context) leans towards reconciliation of ideal types and psychological scholarship through the introduction of the evolutionary model.⁷¹ The evolutionary model is based on the assumption that the growing influence of decision makers, who offered good solutions in the past, will in some future crisis situations diminish the importance of decision makers whose policy proposals were not successful in the past.⁷²

There was also a quite recent attempt to revitalize small-group analysis in policy-making settings by developing a broader research agenda based on social psychology and management theory and arguing for a multi-level approach.⁷³ Although useful as a methodological tool, the evolutionary model does not seem to be a proper device for understanding the Russian foreign policy debate and the subsequent changes in Russian foreign policy. This tool would stand well either in accounting for the institutional side of the foreign policy process or in reflecting on the victorious side of the debate, but will not be able to account for the complexity of competing ideas and perceptions. Therefore, the problem of finding a supplementing methodological feature, able to account for the diversities of foreign policy discourse, remains.

On the IR side of the problem of this overlap between foreign policy decision making and the foreign policy context, and more as a continuity of neorealism, the concept of national role emerged. This concept was based on the assumption that countries, after the international order/system had changed, re-define their identities and,

⁷¹ See Andrew Farkas, "Evolutionary Models in Foreign Policy Analysis," *International Studies Quarterly*, 40, 3, (1996) 343-363.

⁷² Farkas, 358.

⁷³ See Paul 't Hart, Eric K. Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, eds., *Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997).

consequently the role they play in international relations.⁷⁴ However, it should be noted that FPA scholarship that seeks to account for changes in foreign policy emerged much earlier than in IR, as was the example in Kal Holsti's book on "foreign policy restructuring" written in the mid-80s.⁷⁵ Although Holsti argued that the origin for changes in a country's foreign policy is primarily the "growing interdependence" in international relations, he remained within the realist framework of power based relations. However, he described the link between foreign and domestic policy as a much more dynamic web than traditional realists used to do.

This is basically where the traditional FPA stops and where it would be useful to supplement this scholarship with some methodological features from the post-modern IR scholarship. The reason to supplement the traditional FPA method with a more heuristic discourse analysis is related to the outlined overlap of the two FPA streams which leaves ground for offering a combined methodological tool for the obviously existing combined object of study. This proposed tool should originate in post-modern IR, since traditional IR proved largely unable to account for, and make sense of, changes in foreign policy, especially when these changes were not a consequence of the international crisis or pre-conflict situation and were not happening in the bipolar international environment.⁷⁶ The traditional IR reliance on binary opposition in terms of dialectic logic (when the relationship is functionally divided into good and bad outcome or behavior) should be

⁷⁴ See Philippe G. Le Prestre, ed., *Role Quests in the Post-Cold War Era: Foreign Policies in Transition*, (Montreal & Kingston, London, Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997).

⁷⁵ See K.J. Holsti with Miguel Monterichard, Ibrahim Msabaha, Thomas W. Robinson, Timothy Shaw, and Jacques Zylberberg, *Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World* (London, Boston, Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1982). Although, Kal Holsti had an even earlier work with the similar content. See Kal Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 14 (1970): 233-309

⁷⁶ Though not entirely if we keep in mind works of Modelski. See George Modelski, *Exploring long cycles* (Boulder, Colo.: Rienner, 1987).

supplemented with discourse analysis.⁷⁷ Discourse represents a medium where change is possible to locate due to the coexisting competing voices/positions – expressed in speech or text. The role and applicability of discourse analysis will be outlined in the following section in which I will be dealing with my conceptual framework.

1.7 Theory/conceptual framework

My study contributes the FPA scholarship on several accounts. First, by looking simultaneously at the relationship between ideas and institutions where discourse acts as the interface between ideas and institutions. The link between ideas and institutions could be achieved due to the dual ontological nature of Russian “schools of thought.” “Schools of thought” act at the same time as cultural currents and as social movements, and the intellectual allegiance of the Russian intelligentsia is stronger to the “schools of thought” than to any other political, social, ethnic or religious affiliation. Second, this search for understanding of public policy choices by the analysis of cultural traits is in harmony with the relationship between culture and politics. Culture is larger phenomenon than politics so there is also a justification to inquire not only the level of change in Russian security debate but also the level of continuity by revoking the 19th century “schools of thought” (and searching for their influence on the contemporary “schools of thought”). Third, the epistemological contribution of my thesis is in using discourse analysis as a tool of inquiry (while the discourse is also considered as the ontological medium of

⁷⁷ “The oppositions posited as functional in a given analysis ignore qualitative distinctions which are not functional – but nevertheless real – and for this reason binary analysis often operates on a level of misleading abstractions from the way in which phenomena present themselves to us.”, Mario J. Valdes, “Binary opposition,” *Encyclopedia of Contemporary Literary Theory: Approaches, Scholars, Terms* ed., Irena R. Makaryk (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 511.

change) and by that trying to build the bridge between behaviorist and post-positivist scholarships. Focus on elite represents reliance on behaviorist scholarship but it will be complemented with post-positivists tool of discourse analysis. My thesis will attempt to combine behaviorist scholarship and post-modern approach to foreign policy analysis (FPA). The reason for this attempt lies in the previously-mentioned characteristic that traditional FPA has not fully accomplished the need to make sense and provide an understanding of changes in foreign policy as the result of the web of ideas and institutions. Therefore, if an understanding of changes in Russian foreign policy is the goal, an alternative method should be used.

These omissions of traditional FPA approaches, called "the first generation", were very well outlined in the book edited by Neack, Hey and Haney.⁷⁸ The authors were especially keen to point out limitations imposed by positivist scientific method so dominant in the "first generation"; however, they did not try to discredit and reject this method. "This disposition toward positivist theory-building required that scholars assemble "data" on the foreign policy behavior of states, often in the form of event counts, and explore sources of foreign policy behaviors through discrete, separate levels of analysis. The explanations produced in this pursuit were intended to be general (even generic) in nature, stressing ideal nation-types, societal characteristics, and behavioral modes, including those linked to systematic decision-making models."⁷⁹ Therefore, the goal of these critics was not to reject the positivist scholarship of this "first generation" but to create space for the more innovative research agendas of the "second generation". These innovative research agendas proposed a mixture of quantitative and qualitative

⁷⁸ See Laura Neack, Jeanne A.K. Hey and Patrick J. Haney, eds., *Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation*, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995).

⁷⁹ Laura Neack, Jeanne A.K. Hey and Patrick J. Haney, 3.

methods, as they opposed a central monolithic methodology and any grand theory paradigms. These agendas were open to comparative politics accounts of domestic political processes and linkages between domestic and international context.⁸⁰

Consequently, the approach in my thesis will be to follow the demand of the "second generation" that space be opened up for new approaches while retaining foundations of more traditional FPA as an integral part of our academic heritage. The link between ideas and institutions in foreign policy will be addressed as a combination of two main FPA streams: decision making and foreign policy context. By doing that the Russian case can be understood, not only institutionally in terms of competition among various government and non-government actors in the arena of foreign policy decision making, but also, on a discursive level in the debate between various schools of thought on the dilemmas of Russian foreign policy. This approach, then, affords an understanding of how governmental and non-governmental actors have changed their views, and, consequently, Russian foreign policy.

From the epistemological perspective both traditional IR approaches mentioned in the Literature Review section relied on the inductive and the deductive method. However, the realist approaches were primarily descriptive in nature while behaviorist approaches were empirical and testable despite the fact that behaviorist approaches belonged to the realist paradigm. The traditional FPA has been developed on the basis of a strong behaviorist legacy and from within the realist paradigm. Precisely because of the empiricist nature of the traditional FPA, I am not arguing for its replacement and rejection. I retain this scholarship in my methodology, recognizing that while empiricism provides explanations, heuristic approaches from post-modernist scholarship provide

⁸⁰ Laura Neack, Jeanne A.K. Hey and Patrick J. Haney, 11-12.

understanding. Fusion of the two approaches is suggested because totally rejecting the traditional FPA and replacing it with deconstructivist approaches would ultimately lead to relativist conclusions and explanations.⁸¹ Therefore, the merger with post-modernist scholarship is advocated precisely to account for and make sense of changes in foreign policy since these two scientific approaches put together could do that.

From the ontological standpoint the two traditional IR approaches do not use the same unit of analysis. For realist approaches the unit of analysis is the state, while in neo-realism the unit of analysis is the international system (but, represented as an anarchical society of states). In behaviorist scholarship, which is the most common FPA approach, the unit of analysis is the political system (although it could be a group or individual). The non-traditionalist IR approaches challenged the foundationalist nature of the units of analysis used in these traditionalist IR approaches. The challenge was made on several levels. Mainly it questioned the notion of the state and the state's assumed or imagined border with society. These critics came from what is often called "reflectionist" IR scholarship, namely, the international system approach, development theory, critical theory, international political economy, feminist and post-colonialist theory.

For example, in the international system approach the borders between the domestic and international were challenged as well as the failure of realist IR to account

⁸¹ "Put differently, instead of an attempt to find the final frontier of some true reality, postmodernism focuses on "social and linguistic construction of a perspectival reality" and the ways in which global electronic media increase our exposure to "a multiplicity of perspectives, undermining any belief in one objective reality." Steinvar Kvale, "Postmodern Psychology: A Contradiction in Terms?" *The Humanist Psychologist* 18, 1 (1990) quoted in Malinda S. Smith, "Globalization and International relations Theory," *Critical Concepts: An Introduction to Politics*, ed., Janine Brodie, (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice Hall Allyn and Bacon Canada, 1999), 381.

for the existence of non-state actors.⁸² In this criticism, factors such as power and national interest were tentatively deconstructed in a post-structuralist fashion. In terms of behaviorist scholarship, and consequently FPA, its attempt to copy natural sciences by introducing the all-encompassing research category such as the political system was the prime complaint of post-modern critics. Critics argued that despite the existence of such a large unit of analysis, such as the political system, it was only its functional part, a decision making process, that was used as focus in the FPA, and the challenge from the post-modernist critics was that by following such a limited focus the historical and cultural context is neglected as well as the influence of other actors. Therefore, the institutional and psychological dimension of decision making was largely overemphasized by FPA scholars. The critics, especially from the field of international political economy and critical theory, argued that this represented an imposition of politics over economy when it comes to the analysis of social phenomena. Consequently, they argued, it represents only a partial reality and not its totality.⁸³

My goal will be to introduce some of the epistemological elements of these "reflectionist" scholarships into the FPA. The blurring of the border between the state and society as the main unit of analysis would allow me to use discourse analysis not only among Russian state bureaucrats but also among other relevant actors coming from society and, in that way, I will be more able to account for the relationships between institutions and ideas. In my thesis the link between ideas and institutions is established through the use of "schools of thought." In Russia "schools of thought" ontologically

⁸² See Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern world system* (New York: Academic P., 1974) and Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Politics of the world-economy: the states, the movements, and the civilizations* (Cambridge, Cambridgeshire, U. P., 1984).

⁸³ See R. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," *Neorealism and its critics* ed., Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 204-254.

represent both, society, by acting as cultural currents and nation-specific sets of ideas, and the state, by acting as social movements so that institutions intellectually operate as the social constructs of “schools of thought.” The medium of expression of and interrelation between “schools of thought” is discourse itself. Discourse analysis will be used to account for the change of dominant foreign policy perceptions and the emergence of new policy proposals. This inductive tool is culture sensitive but falsifiable at the same time so that it can help us to understand how ideas (culture) influenced institutions (politics). Falsifiable nature of inquiry is possible to maintain if discourse is contextualized and contrasted with corresponding policy actions of the Russian state.

Therefore, there are two main arguments raised against traditional FPA that should be reconciled if the aim is the symbiosis between behaviorist and post-modern scholarship in the FPA. The *first* argument is the concept of the state and its primarily ontological nature, while the *second* one is in the applicability of the discourse analysis and its primarily epistemological nature. Since in my thesis the state is going to figure as a main promoter of foreign policy activity, the working concept of the state should be outlined here.

I would argue for a more innovative concept of the state that could be operationalized through equal use of empirical evidences and theoretical examination, and not either/or as it was so far the case. This approach would link domestic and foreign policy and, it would link the state and society. It would represent a certain “re-analysis” of a concept since pre-existing approaches insisted on divisions.⁸⁴ The link between the domestic and foreign would account for the influence of domestic debates based on the

⁸⁴ See Timothy Mitchell, “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics,” *American Political Science Review* 85, 1 (1991): 77-96.

intellectual, historical and cultural heritage of Russia and foreign events that influenced Russia as well as actions undertaken by the Russian state or other international agents. By the same token, the state and society link would provide for an understanding of the origin of these various concepts and ideas for state actions and how state actions, consequently, influence society and represent a focal point of discussions about new ideas and concepts. In that sense my paper will try to go one step farther from the most recent accounts of Russian foreign policy changes made by Alexander Kozhemiakin and Andrei Tsygankov.⁸⁵ Kozhemiakin implemented a development theory on the Russian example but placed the focus on institutions. He has raised valuable points on how democracies in transition face difficulties and could more easily resort to a confrontational foreign policy, but he did not touch upon ideas that underlie foreign policy actions. Tsygankov's work is much closer to my approach. He examined Russian foreign policy discourse in the post-1991 years. Despite the fact that he discerned the existence of four different schools of thought in Russia (*International Institutionalists, Aggressive Realists, Defensive Realists, Revolutionary Expansionists*), he did not attempt to make a link with the previously existing Russian schools of thought. This occurred because Tsygankov used Martin Wight's typology of international relations traditions rather than a typology of Russian origin. I would argue that what is necessary is a more Russian-specific examination of schools of thought, and an investigation of their discursive link with the most significant post-1991 events.

⁸⁵ See Alexander V. Kozhemiakin, "Democratization and foreign policy change: the case of the Russian federation," *Review of International Studies* 23 (1997): 49-74, and Andrei P. Tsygankov, "From International Institutionalism to Revolutionary Expansionism: The Foreign Policy Discourse of Contemporary Russia," *Mershon International Studies Review* 41 (1997): 247-268.

It is important to mention that I intend to bridge the imposed disciplinary differences between comparative politics and international relations. I will do that by looking at Russian society, primarily, but I will also examine the international environment and actions taken by the Russian state. That way there will be no division of the foreign and domestic but rather an interactive web of the two.

The *second problem* is the applicability of discourse analysis and therefore, the issue of epistemology. In order to operationalize discourse analysis, the works of Henrik Larsen, David Campbell and Jutta Weldes will be used as scholarship to follow.⁸⁶ I will argue that a working model of discourse analysis can be made on the basis of the works of these three authors.

Regarding the working definitions of the main categories, I should outline that the discourse analysis will be understood more as a category of post-positivism than as a part of the cognitive psychology approach developed in behaviorist models.⁸⁷ There might be a space to argue that there is a tension between behaviorism and post-positivism, with behaviorism predominantly interested in the creation of ideal types and post-positivism often driven toward relativism. I am not interested in using or creating any ideal types to resolve that tension. For that purpose I would use, predominantly, content analysis of texts and public surveys as features of behaviorist scholarship and supplement it with discourse analysis. On a more ontological level, discourse analysis will figure as a phenomenon with a structural position (such as the economic structure and social

⁸⁶ Henrik Larsen, *Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997); Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," *European Journal of International Relations* 2, 3 (1996): 275-319; David Campbell, "Global Inscription: How Foreign Policy Constitutes the United States," *Alternatives* 15, 3, (Summer 1990) 263-286.

⁸⁷ See Valerie M. Hudson, ed., *Artificial Intelligence and International Politics* (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1991).

structure) but with the capacity to change the reality as well. Therefore, it will have also agency qualities.⁸⁸ In that sense discourse analysis will represent both structure and agency. Henrik Larsen offers the most appropriate understanding of the discourse practice, that I will use in my paper. "Discursive practice is here understood as the way in which the discourse is projected onto society, its social reification. That is, its effects in the social world such as the arguments of social actors (for example, political parties) or the actions or beliefs emanating from societal institutions."⁸⁹ Nonetheless, the impulses, or events, arising from the international environment are basically "translated internally via the discourse" and this is the link where domestic and foreign are bounded.⁹⁰ In my case, this is where two most influential events (situation in the "near abroad", and the war in the former Yugoslavia) would be used as reference points around which the discourse is created.

The practical question arises as to whose discourse to follow. I would argue against a discourse analysis strictly related to the bureaucratic elite. In the Russian case it would mean that I will not follow only government representatives but also other non-governmental participants of the debate. It is wrong to link political discourse exclusively to the political elite since the discourse is characterized in terms of structure and relationship, not in terms of location, that is, the language of discourse cannot be situated strictly with one social group. Those who express themselves through the political discourse are using written and oral form. The Russian case offers in its intelligentsia the

⁸⁸ "Because the political discourse is not fundamentally an institutional concept, but a structure of meaning, it bridges several levels. It encompasses in a sense both structure and agency. It breaks down the structure-agency distinction."-Henrik Larsen, 26.

⁸⁹ Henrik Larsen, 16.

⁹⁰ Henrik Larsen, 22.

most specific but representative group to follow due to its historical and cultural fact that Russian intelligentsia generates culture and discourse.

Therefore, sources of discourse analysis are not "radically different from source material used in more traditional analysis. The main difference is that whereas traditional analysis would tend to focus on relatively narrow political contexts (e.g. debates in parliament, speeches by ministers, party programs and reports from selected committees), the discourse approach does not restrict itself to these contexts. The discourse approach could, for example, draw on reports from think-tanks related to a political party, the editorials of newspapers, academic writings or fiction because these could be considered part of the debate in the political sphere and in a wider sense part of a discourse or a rival discourse. The assumption behind using this broader kind of source material is not that it is representative in any narrow sense but that the political language is not restricted to a narrowly political context."⁹¹ Therefore, the texts and language are the main sources of analysis.⁹² For that matter "texts, however, can only be understood in their immediate and wider contexts of occurrence. Texts are communicative units embedded in social and cultural practices, shaping and being shaped by them."⁹³ On the this basis, the discourse analysis in my thesis is not going to be used as a critical tool for deconstruction of existing scholarship but as an understanding-building tool.

Weldes adopted a similar approach in an attempt to situate the category of national interest fusing post-modernism and post-positivism.⁹⁴ In this approach, the

⁹¹ Henrik Larsen, 28.

⁹² Language is here understood in a Foucault-ian way as a social relationship, as opposed to a positivist understanding of a language as neutral instrument of communication.

⁹³ Alexandra Georgakopoulou and Dionysis Goutsos, *Discourse Analysis: An Introduction* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University press, 1997), ix.

⁹⁴ See Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," *European Journal of International Relations* 2, 3 (September 1996) 275-319.

author argues that the category of national interest is a social construction. However, the author's deconstructivist approach was not aimed at predatory deconstructivism and relativism but at re-conceptualization and continuity of use of this category. Weldes held that national interests was a concept of significance and cannot be ignored, since while being socially constructed, it reflects reality. My intention in using the discourse analysis would be the same.

However, discourse analysis itself may be empirical as Campbell's study shows.⁹⁵ Therefore, by discourse analysis it is possible to achieve a reconceptualization of foreign policy and to be empirical and not only theoretical. Especially as foreign policy is not only a product of external impulses but also of "domestic social order". The questions of identity and narrative then come to the forefront, and this is precisely where the imposed dichotomy between ideas/theory and practice can be reconciled since ideas/theory are practice.⁹⁶ In the case of Russia, it would represent a link between ideas and institutions, or how ideas became institutionalized.

Finally, on a more theoretical note, I am opposed to the dichotomy imposed on data-based research and research based on theory and logic when it comes to philosophy of science.⁹⁷ By trying to combine behaviorist and post-positivist approaches I am trying to avoid such a dichotomy and to search for their eventual complementarity.

I will argue that an exploration of the foreign policy discourse could be used as an explanatory method for better understanding the foreign policy. Therefore, by keeping the

⁹⁵ See David Campbell, "Global Inscription: How Foreign Policy Constitutes the United States," *Alternatives* 15, 3 (Summer 1990) 263-286.

⁹⁶ Campbell, 269.

⁹⁷ On this constructed dichotomy see John A. Vasquez, "The Post-Positivist Debate: Reconstructing Scientific Inquiry and International Relations Theory After Enlightenment's Fall," *International Relations Theory Today* eds., Ken Booth and Steve Smith (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 217-241.

primarily behaviorist approaches of the FPA as a useful starting point, and supplementing them with a more heuristic approach in discourse analysis, a better understanding of political phenomena could be achieved. My understanding of political phenomena converges with the notion and nature of reality put forward by Jim George. "...reality is never a complete, entirely coherent "thing", accessible to universalized, essentialist, or totalized understandings of it. Nor can the question of reality be exhausted by reference to the facts of the world or any simple aggregation of them, because reality is always characterized by ambiguity, disunity, discrepancy, contradiction, and difference."⁹⁸ On that basis, the attempt to depict reality as something given and static in time and space and, consequently, measurable, will be rejected. Instead, reality will be analyzed as constantly changing and subject to change. Therefore, I will attempt to measure political phenomena while acknowledging the existing dialectical link between actors and structures in a specific time and space.

In the Russian case this will mean that the key events that generated foreign policy debate will be observed as debate reference points. The discourse that evolved touched upon the most vital elements of Russian national interest such as identity, prosperity, and security. Consequently, the discourse itself became empirical reality since it started influencing changes in foreign policy behavior. This is how the link between ideas and institutions was operationalized and the foreign policy behavior changed.

⁹⁸ See Jim George, *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical (Re)Introduction to International Relations* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 11.

1.8 Methodological concept

The thesis will be a case study of Russian foreign policy debate in the 1990s. This thesis will also have a comparative element as it will place the principal 19th century Russian “schools of thought” into perspective with contemporary “schools of thought” in Russia.

Drawing on more traditional FPA, the method of content analysis will be used. The sources will be official documents, speeches, academic texts and studies, as well as public surveys and opinion poles. These sources will be systematically monitored. On-line publications in Russian and their English translations such as OMRI (Institute for Journalism in Transition), Radio Free Europe, Foreign Broadcast Information Service and the Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press will be the main sources for this part of the research. These sources basically cover the main Russian dailies and weeklies such as *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, *Izvestia*, *Pravda*, *Sevodnia*, *Zavtra*, *Kommersant*, etc. Many other Russian sources are also available on-line, including government statements and parliamentary debates. Public surveys monitored were regularly reported either in Russian mainstream dailies or by the three principal sociological journals *Politicheskie issledovania (Polis)*, *Sociologicheskie issledovania*, and *Monitoring obshchestvennogo mnenia*.

Unilateral, bilateral and multilateral actions of the Russian state will serve as indicators for Russian foreign policy change.

A methodological tool of non-traditional FPA that will be used is discourse analysis. Discourse analysis will be understood as empirical since it would be based on reading/interpreting texts and interpreting actions.

The literature in Russian, especially editorials, interviews and comments from the daily press, will have a precedence as a source for the discourse analysis. The search for most prominent opinion leader's viewpoints, discursive categories, and debate themes will be performed systematically and chronologically. Texts of more academic nature will be used especially in the part dealing with contemporary Russian schools of thought. For the purpose of outlining discursive trends and worldviews a bi-annual survey of the most influential academic journals will be offered in chapters III-V. For this purpose will be used Russian academic periodicals such as *International Affairs* (Moscow), *Mirovaia ekonomika I mezhdunarodnie otnoshenia (MEMO)*, *Svobodnaia Mysl'*, *Nash Sovremennik*, *Voprosy Filosofii*, etc. Academic and more literary and philosophical books in English and Russian will be used to present the principal 19th century Russian schools of thought in the chapter II.

CHAPTER II

2. The 19th century Russian “schools of thought”

2.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to chronologically and thematically introduce the main research category: “schools of thought”. The goal of this chapter is to delineate and analyze the theoretical and discursive basics of 19th century Russian “schools of thought” in order to present them as historical and theoretical foundations of the contemporary “schools of thought.” This chapter will also introduce the link between culture and politics by advocating that in the contemporary Russia this link was much more direct than in 19th century due to the public nature of the post-communist Russian politics. The issues of continuity and change will be addressed in the conclusion with an ultimate goal of this chapter to present important concepts and categories from the 19th century “schools of thought” that resonated into the security discourse of the 1990s as well as to problematize some of the accounts that could be perceived as stereotypes.

2.2 “Schools of thought” and intelligentsia

In order to trace the foundations and origins of the debate over contemporary foreign policy in Russia, an inquiry into the history of Russian social and political

thought is necessary.⁹⁹ There are four main reasons for focusing such an inquiry on the 19th century Russian thinkers and public debates.

First, the 19th century saw the emergence of social thought that was more elaborate and coherent than anything Russia had yet seen. In the history of Russian social thought, the 19th century represented a period in which, for the first time, emerged concepts and organized systems of ideas advanced not by individual thinkers, but by informal groups. These groups were interrelated and embedded within their historical context. Their thinking therefore emerged in the form of debate and discourse, and not through the 'ivory tower' world contemplation of individual scholars. From this point on the intellectual and political socialization of Russian intelligentsia occurred primarily through participation in or allegiance to various "schools of thought."

Second, this period in Russian social thought saw the establishment of original and complex philosophical and social worldviews, matching in their sophistication German idealism or English rationalism. Despite the fact that Russian thinkers relied upon German, French and English philosophical writings, they were able to generate an originally Russian social thought. The link of continuity between 19th and 20th centuries "schools of thought" could be detected in the debated core security issues. The core issues of Russian security discourse debated in the '90s were as those in the 19th century: the aim to situate its identity on the East-West scale; the aim to situate a security paradigm on the isolation-integration scale vis-à-vis the West; the aim to situate prosperity on an individual-collective scale. What also seemed to link the old "schools of

⁹⁹ For synthesized general overview of Russian political thought see S.V. Utechin, *Russian Political Thought; A Concise History* (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1963), and *A Documentary History of Russian Thought; From the Enlightenment to Marxism*, trans. and ed. W. J. Leatherbarrow and D. C. Offord (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Ardis Publishers, 1987).

thought” with those of the 20th century was the search for the policy solution of how the great impact of modernity/globalization is enough to maintain the identity and strength of the nation (state).

Third, during the 19th century we can trace the emergence of "schools of thinking" as a political and not only cultural phenomenon. During this period political action was strictly prohibited by the Russian authoritarian political regime but thinking and debating, at least in informal circles or in press (primarily in cultural journals), was possible. Therefore, from the point of view of public discourse, the absence of political parties was replaced by the existence of "schools of thinking".

Finally, “schools of thought” as specifically Russian social phenomenon possess dual ontological nature – as cultural currents and political institutions. “Schools of thought” represent the most influential social movements that shape institutional public policies while at the same time they represent cultural traits and sets of ideas that shape the thinking of those movements. Due to such ontological nature they are capable of influencing public policy through discourse carried by intelligentsia. The link between “schools of thought” and Russian foreign policy could be explained as the relationship between society’s cultural currents and public policy choices. The thesis will focus precisely at this link since “schools of thought” represented reference points for Russian policy makers.

Traditionally, Russia’s intelligentsia was the foremost promoter of coherent thinking.¹⁰⁰ The ideas about Russian identity, prosperity and security were coherently

¹⁰⁰ See N.A. Tomilov (glavnyi redaktor) *Kul'tura i intelligentsiia Rossii v epokhu modernizatsii (XVIII-XX vv.): materialy Vtoroi vserossiiskoi nauchnoi konferentsii* [Culture and Intelligentsia during the Modernity Period (18th –20th centuries)] (Omsk: Omskii gosudarstvennyi universitet, Sibirskii filial Rossiiskogo

elaborated and debated by this new class which emerged in Russian society during the 19th century.¹⁰¹ Socially, Russia's intelligentsia was a product of Westernization and education of the aristocracy.¹⁰² Therefore, contrasting with the Peter the Great period when the social structure was quite organic and homogeneous, 19th century Russian society generated social division on at least three detached groups, namely, the people (serfs), the authorities (the state), and the intelligentsia.¹⁰³ "These features in turn created a specific psychological atmosphere for Russian thought: the intelligentsia's oppositionist spirit and negative attitude to the authorities were synthesized with the sense of being persecuted and not wanted, which was often transformed into its opposite, viz., into a feeling of the intelligentsia's mission of suffering, belief in its special calling, and messianism. That, too, colored Russian philosophy with clear tones of moralism and prophetism, evolving its social radicalism or, at the opposite pole, its mysticism and apocalypticism."¹⁰⁴ The philosophical origins of Russian intelligentsia were located in rationalism and the Enlightenment project.¹⁰⁵ The second source of Russian intelligentsia's thinking was theological, namely the Russian Orthodox Christianity.¹⁰⁶

instituta kul'turologii, 1995); Iosif Ivanovich Kablits, *Intelligentsiia i narod v obshchestvennoi zhizni Rossii* [Intelligentsia and People in Russian society] 1886.

¹⁰¹ See Vera Leikina-Svirskaja, *Intelligentsia v Rossi vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka* [Russian Intelligentsia in the second half of 19th century] (Moscow: Mysl', 1971).

¹⁰² See V.B. Ust'iantsev (otv. redaktor) *Intelligentsiia i liberalizm v Rossii* [Intelligentsia and Russian liberalism] (Saratov: Saratovskii gosudarstvennii tekhnicheskii universitet, 1995).

¹⁰³ See Valery A. Kuvakin, ed., *A History of Russian Philosophy: From the Tenth through the Twentieth Centuries* Vol. 1 (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1994), 14.

¹⁰⁴ Valery Kuvakin, 14.

¹⁰⁵ See Richard Pipes, "The Historical Evolution of the Russian Intelligentsia," *The Russian Intelligentsia*, ed. Richard Pipes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961).

¹⁰⁶ See Antonina Nikolaevna Lazareva, *Intelligentsiia i religiia: k istoricheskomu osmysleniiu problematiki "Vekh"* [Intelligentsia and Religion: Toward the historical conceptualization of the "Vekh" issues] (Moscow: IFRAN, 1996).

2.3 Foundations for the emergence of different “schools of thought”

The 18th century represents the beginning of Russian scientific and academic life.¹⁰⁷ At this time, the Enlightenment project’s precursors was Mikhail Lomonosov along with many other scientists and professors predominantly associated with Moscow or St. Petersburg Universities.¹⁰⁸ In the social sciences, Semen Desnitskii and Dmitrii Anichkov from Moscow University were among the best known. Desnitskii was a theoretician of law whose writings bore a close relationship to John Locke.¹⁰⁹ Anichkov wrote on philosophical and theological subjects but from a clearly anticlerical position.¹¹⁰ Historian Pafnuty Baturin and philosopher Yakov Kozelsky were not closely related to the universities but were quite influential in their writings. The most sophisticated thinker of the era was Aleksandr Radishchev.¹¹¹ Influenced by Spinoza and by materialism of Lomonosov, he developed an interesting ontological position when talking about the substance and essence by perceiving them as a synthesis of sensualism and rationalism.¹¹² This is maybe one of the first coherent attempts for what will later on be the frequent

¹⁰⁷ Although, the relevance of the 17th century Croat priest Iurii Krizhanich’s book *Politika* written during his stay in Russia was acknowledged. See John M. Letiche and Basil Dmytryshyn, *Russian Statecraft: The Politika of Iurii Krizhanich* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985).

¹⁰⁸ See *Pervyi russkii akademik: k 285-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia Mikhaila Vasil'evicha Lomonosova* (Barnaul: Izdatel'stvo Barnaul'skogo gospeduniversiteta, 1996); G.E. Pavlova, A.S. Orlov, eds., *Mikhailo Lomonosov: zhizneopisanie, izbrannye trudy, vospominaniia sovremennikov, suzhdeniia potomkov, stikhi i proza o nem* [Mikhailo Lomonosov: Biography, Selected Works, Memories of his Contemporaries, Judgments of his Descendants, Prose and Poetry on him] (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1989).

¹⁰⁹ See Semen Efimovich Desnitskii, *Slovo o priamom i blizhaishem sposobie k naucheniiu iurisprudentsii* [Tracts on Direct and Nearest Ingenuity of Understanding Jurisprudence] (Moscow: Moskovskii univerzitet, 1768); Semen Efimovich Desnitskii, *Iuridicheskoe razsuzhdenie o nachalie i proiskhozhdenii supruzhestva* [Juridical Tracts on Beginning and Origin of Marriage] 1775.

¹¹⁰ See Dmitrii Sergeevich Anichkov, *Slovo o svoistvakh poznan'ia cheloviecheskago* [Tracts on Characteristics of Human Cognition] 1770.

¹¹¹ Aleksandr Nikolaevich Radishchev, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* [Collected Works] 1907; Radishchev’s relevance for the development of Russian political thought was emphasized in Soviet scholarship, see Gratsianskii, P.S., *Politicheskaiia I pravovaia mysl' Rossii vtoroy poloviny XVIII veka* [Political and Juridical Thought in Russia during the second half of 18th century] (Moscow: Nauka, 1984).

¹¹² Valery Kuvakin, 96.

quest of Russian scholars and thinkers: establishment of a synthetic worldview. A synthetic worldview meant the acknowledgment of contradictory nature of being and philosophy of history, thus an attempt was made of complementing seemingly different categories and creating a synthesis as an explanation. On the more social side of his thinking, Radishchev, as a materialist and modernist, argued for the emancipation of man thus, for the end of serfdom in Russia.¹¹³

As Russian political system was based on the czar's absolutism, the public involvement of the intelligentsia presented activity of its leisure time because politics was not public or professional affair. Russia's industrialization created pressure on the intelligentsia to become professional and to enter the state services. But even that did not change the "tendency of self-preoccupation" as writers were always trying to answer on questions about Russia and Russians.¹¹⁴ By the beginning of the 19th century, the intelligentsia's thinking was founded upon dissatisfaction with the nature of Russian system, namely with its autocratic nature, and upon admiration for Western liberalism. Western liberalism arrived in Russia as a wave of European romanticism. It gave rise to the perception of a possible "way out" from Russian absolutist reality through the notion of a "third way".¹¹⁵ As the czarist way of Russian politics was not perceived as beneficial, and as it was impossible to expect anything similar to European parliamentary democracy processes emerging in Russia, the notion of the need for something else, "the third way", came to dominate the intelligentsia's debate.

¹¹³ Aleksandr Nikolaevich Radishchev, *Puteshestvie iz Peterburga v Moskvu* [Travel from Peterburgh to Moscow] (Leningrad: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1969).

¹¹⁴ Marc Raeff, 8.

¹¹⁵ On the notion of "the third way" see Adam B. Ulam, *Ideologies and Illusions: Revolutionary Thought from Herzen to Solzhenitsyn* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976).

Indeed, at the beginning of 19th century two political movements emerged in relation to the "third way" debate. These movements, namely the Decembrists and Masonry, represented the debate's revolutionary and conservative sides respectively.¹¹⁶

The Decembrists were primarily composed of military officers that failed to carry a military coup in 1825. The plotters, inspired by the French Revolution, were demanding significant social and political changes, including abolition of serfdom and establishment of republic.¹¹⁷ The Decembrists were not a homogeneous movement and they had at least two streams, the more moderate one represented by Nikita Muroviev, and the radical one represented by Pavel Pestev. After their coup attempt failed the leaders were executed and majority of plotters incarcerated.¹¹⁸

The Masonry movement emerged as a conservative response to the "third way" dilemma and as reaction to the widespread influence of the French Revolution and Western liberalism, peaking at the beginning of the 19th century.¹¹⁹ "In Russia Freemasonry was called upon to become an effective counterweight to the scientific, philosophical, and sociopolitical views of the Enlightenment. Subjectively, for the majority of educated people, it was a long-awaited moral and philosophical doctrine that not only fixed the universal, spiritual foundations of human existence in theoretical form, but also introduced them, through joint "fraternal works" in the lodges, into the practice

¹¹⁶ See Peter K. Christoff, *The Third Heart; Some intellectual-ideological currents and cross currents in Russia 1800-1830* (The Hague: Mouton, 1970).

¹¹⁷ See V.A. Fedorov, ed., *Dekabristy v vospominaniakh sovremennikov* [Decabrist in Memories of their Contemporaries] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1988); B.S. Meylah, ed., *Dekabristy i Russkaia kul'tura*, [Decabrist and Russian Culture] (Leningrad: Nauka, 1975).

¹¹⁸ See V.A. Fedorov, *Svoei sud'boi gordimsia my: sledstvie i sud nad dekabristami* [Proud of our Destiny: Research and Opinions about Dekabrist] (Moscow: Mysl', 1988).

¹¹⁹ See Tatiana Bakunina, *Znamenitnye russkie masony; Vol'nye kamenshchiki* [Famous Russian Masons; Free Masons] (Moscow: Interbuk, 1991); Boris Bashilov, *Istoriia russkogo masonstva* [History of Russian Masonry] (Moscow: Ruslo, 1992); Vasilii Fedorovich Ivanov, *Russkaia intelligentsiia i masonstvo: ot Petra I do nashikh dnei* [Russian Intelligentsia and Masonry: from Peter I until Today] (Moscow: Moskva, 1997); V.I. Novikov, *Masonstvo i russkaia kul'tura* [Masonry and Russian Culture] (Moscow: Megakontakt, 1993).

of everyday life. Freemasonry cultivated spiritual "wholeness", and was attractive by its attempt to reconcile faith and knowledge, religion and science, and thought, feeling, and will to act."¹²⁰

2.4 Slavophilism

Slavophilism represented the Russian theoretical response to Western liberalism.¹²¹ Philosophical foundation of *Slavophilism* was built as reaction to the close familiarity with Western (Western being synonym for European in 19th century Russia) experiences.¹²² It is important to mention that *Slavophiles* had a very good knowledge of the West and admired many things related to Europe. *Slavophiles* consequently wanted to avoid mistakes that the West made in its development, and not necessarily to reject everything Western.¹²³ From that perspective they argued that Russia should pursue a different developmental path.

Domestically, *Slavophilism* represented a response to the failed Decembrist uprising and an acknowledgment of the impossibility of executing western-style revolutionary changes in Russia. However, as *Slavophiles*' quest for the change was not

¹²⁰ Valery Kuvakin, 74.

¹²¹ See Petr Ivanovich Linskii, *Slavianofil'stvo i liberalism* [Slavophilism and Liberalism] (1882). As a most insightful and comprehensive study of Slavophilism and its "collective consciousness" see Andrzej Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy; History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).

¹²² Konstantin Leont'ev, *Vostok, Rossiia i Slavianstvo: filosofskaia i politicheskaia publitsistika: dukhovnaia proza, 1872-1891* [East, Russia and Slavophilism: Philosophical and Political Writings; Spiritual Prose, 1872-1891] (Moscow: Respublika, 1996); *Slavianofil'stvo i zapadnichestvo: konservativnaia i liberal'naia utopiia v rabotakh Andzheia Valitskogo* [Slavophilism and Westernism: Conservative and Liberal Utopia in the Works of Andrzej Walicki] (Moscow: Akademiia nauk SSSR, Institut nauchnoi informatsii po obshchestvennym naukam, 1991); Ivan Aleksandrovich Poroshin, *A. I. Gertsen, slavianofily i zapadniki* [A.I. Herzen, Slavophiles nad Westerners] (1905).

¹²³ See V.V. Zenkovskii, *Russian Thinkers and Europe* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: J.W. Edwards Publishers, 1953), 48.

revolutionary there is no ground to call them conservatives since they were arguing for the social change only by other means. On a more cultural note *Slavophilism* also represented a critical response to the idolatry of the local intelligentsia toward the West.

The most influential heritage that *Slavophilism* left to Russian social thought was the system of categories used in 19th century discourse. These categories were "land" (*zemlia*), "state" (*derzhava*), "people" (*narod*), "organic togetherness" (*sobornost*), "populism" (*narodnichestvo*), "soil" (*pochva*), "uniqueness" (*samobytnost*). Common thing to all these categories was that they represented synthetic combination of at least two sub-categories. "Land"(*zemlia*) signified a unity of the concepts of territoriality and people living on it. "State" (*derzhava*) was the combination of the state understood as an institution with its domestic social relations and people who live in such a state. "People" (*narod*) was different from nationality and meant unity of all citizens and not an ethnic group. This category was above any social and power divisions in the society. Therefore, this term instead of nationality represented the main identity category. "Organic togetherness" (*sobornost*) was occasionally also translated as "conciliarism". "Organic togetherness" meant political unity of "people" on the basis of ancient Slavic pre-state annual decision making conventions (*sobor*) that had quite democratic content and mechanisms and became a traditional landmark. "Organic togetherness" also meant spiritual unity on the basis of Christian Orthodoxy since word "*sobor*" also means church. "Populism" (*narodnichestvo*) indicated the policy advocated and those who should benefit from political projects. This category signified not only that the intelligentsia works to bring better living conditions to people - serfs in particular - but that the way such work would be performed would be traditional, thus deriving from

people's heritage, and based on people's values. "Soil" (*pochva*) was sometimes also translated as the "cult of primitive immediacy". The category of "soil" was the most used in literature and it represented the unity between people and land.¹²⁴ This was a metaphysical category that signified the cycle of birth and death on one territory and the right of people to this territory. "Uniqueness" (*samobytnost*) was the category that signified the relationship between culture and historical development. This category was used to outline Russian specifics when compared to Europe and the consequent necessity that Russia follows its own independent developmental path.

Slavophilism can be traced in the writings of several 18th century thinkers but it took a coherent form as a "school of thought" after the Russian army's defeat of Napoleon, blossoming after the 1830s. While *Slavophilism* emerged in the third decade of the 19th century, the *Westerners* "school of thought" also emerged after unsuccessful Decembrist coup attempt.¹²⁵ The 1840s saw the first public debates among these two schools of thought.¹²⁶ The debate centered on the directions of the Russian "third way". The search for "the third way" also entailed the theoretical quest for a balance between the extremes of *Slavophilism* and *Westernism*. This is why there was the space for other "schools of thought," most notably the one of *Official Nationalism of Nicholas I*.

In its core and mainstream interpretation, *Slavophilism* was anti-rational (particularly in Ivan Kireevskii's epistemology of 'integral knowledge');¹²⁷ anti-

¹²⁴ As an example of vitality of this category stands its use by 20th century Russian cultural icons such as filmmakers Eisenstein and Tarkovskii and writer Solzhenitsin.

¹²⁵ The *Westerners* "school of thought" relevance was not only in representing the "other" for *Slavophiles* but also in influencing Russian political thought and public policy, especially toward the end of 19th century.

¹²⁶ See Tatiana Fedorovna Pirozhkova, *Slavianofil'skaia zhurnalistika* [Slavophiles Press] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1997).

¹²⁷ See Abbott Gleason, *European and Muscovite: Ivan Kireevsky and the origins of Slavophilism* (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972); I.V. Kireevskii, *Izbrannye statyi* [Selected

individualistic in its social thinking, and anti-Western in its national thinking. However, the pace of *Slavophilist* arguments was not linear and it could be traced through two main chronological periods. The first phase [1830-60] was characterized by thinkers such as Odoevsky, Alexei Khomyakov,¹²⁸ Ivan Aksakov¹²⁹ and Yuri Samarin¹³⁰ who represented more theological/metaphysical scholarship (negating the division between the man and nature). In the second phase [1860-80s] there were two streams: nationalistic (Apollon Grigor'ev,¹³¹ N.N. Strakhov¹³² and Fyodor Dostoyevsky¹³³) and more theological (Konstantin Leontyev¹³⁴ and Vasili Rozanov¹³⁵). There were thinkers such as Vladimir Soloviev¹³⁶ who often oscillated between schools of thought, or those *Slavophiles* who have joined the stream later on articulated in the *Official Nationalism of Nicholas I*, based on orthodoxy, autocracy and nationalism.¹³⁷

Works] (Moscow: Sovremennik, 1984); Ivan Kireevskii, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* [Collected Works] (reprint, Westmead, England: Gregg International Publishers, 1970).

¹²⁸ See Peter K. Christoff, *An Introduction to Nineteenth-Century Russian Slavophilism; A Study in Ideas – A.S. Khomyakov* (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1961).

¹²⁹ See I.S. Aksakov, *Pisma k rodnym* [Letters to Compatriots] (Moscow: Nauka, 1988); Stephen Lukashovich, *Ivan Aksakov 1823-1886: A Study in Russian Thought and Politics* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965).

¹³⁰ See Aleksei Khomiakov, Ivan Kireevsky, with essays by Yuri Samarin, Nikolai Berdiaev, and Pavel Florensky, *On spiritual unity: a Slavophile reader* trans. and ed. Boris Jakim and Robert Bird, (Hudson, NY: Lindisfarne Books, 1998).

¹³¹ See E.W. Dowler, "Two conservative views of nationality and personality. A.A. Grigor'ev and K.N. Leont'ev," *Studies in Soviet Thought* 41 (1991): 19-32.

¹³² See N. Strahov, *Bor'ba s Zapadom v nashei literatury* [Struggle with the West in our Literature] (The Hague: Mouton, 1969).

¹³³ See Bruce K. Ward, *Dostoyevsky's critique of the West: the quest for the earthly paradise* (Waterloo, Ont., Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1986).

¹³⁴ See Konstantin Leontyev, *Vostok, Rossiia i Slaviansstvo; sbornik statey* [East, Russia and Slavdom; Collected Articles] vol. 1 (Osnabruck: Otto Zeller, 1966); Konstantin Leontyev, *Pis'ma k Vasiliu Rozanovu; vstuplenie, kommentarii i posleslovie V.V. Rozanova* [Letters to Vasilii Rozanov; Introduction, Comments and Epilogue by V.V. Rozanov] (London: Nina Karsov, 1981).

¹³⁵ See Vasilii Vasilevich Rozanov, *Okolo tserkovnykh sten* [Around Church Walls] (Moscow: Respublika, 1995).

¹³⁶ See Vladimir Soloviev, *Natsional'ny vopros v Rossii* [National Question in Russia] (S.-Peterburg: Tipografia M.M. Stasiulevicha, 1891).

¹³⁷ See Julius F. Hecker, *Russian Sociology; A Contribution to the History of Sociological Thought and Theory* (New York, 1915), 30-62.

Slavophiles perceived the "third way" as revolutionary change that should not necessarily come in a revolutionary manner. This non-revolutionary stand is probably the reason why *Slavophiles* were always negatively portrayed by the Soviet philosophy books.¹³⁸ Another reason for their negative image throughout Soviet times was that *Slavophiles* were idealists, an apparent deadly sin for the reigning dialectical materialism of Soviet era.

Education and gradual reform were perceived by *Slavophiles* as mechanisms of social change. Their ontology was idealistic and synthetic, negating the rationalist claim about the superiority of a man over nature. Up until 1860 *Slavophiles* focused on the unity of man and nature as well as on the harmony between the individual and collective. They aimed to preserve traditional social forms of peasant community and to model the state on these traditional forms. In their debate with *Westerners* about the issue of state organization, *Slavophiles* rejected the idea of constitution. This dispute was often used to undeservedly portray *Slavophiles* as conservative anti-constitutionalists. "The anticonstitutionalism of the *Slavophiles* was primarily associated with their dream of a state system in the "Slavonic spirit" and was not at all equivalent to antidemocracy: the Russian "Tories" constantly defended freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of conscience; opposed censorship; and recognized the inevitability of a

¹³⁸ See *Iz istorii russkoi filosofii XVIII-XIX vekov* [From the History of Russian Philosophy (18th-20th centuries)] (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Moskovskogo Univerziteta, 1952); A.A. Galaktionov and P.F. Nikandrov, *Russkaia filosofia XI-XIX vekov* [Russian Philosophy (11th-19th centuries)] (Leningrad: Nauka, 1970); T. F. Pirozhkova, *Revoliutsionery-demokraty o slavianofil'stve i slavianofil'skoi zhurnalistike* [Revolutionary-democrats on Slavophilism and Slavophil Press] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo Univerziteta, 1984). Although some exceptions emerged during the "perestroika" period. See N.I. Tsimbaliev, *Slavianofil'stvo; Iz istorii russkoi obshchestvenno-politicheskoi mysli XIX veka* [Slavophilism; From the History of Russian 19th century Social and Political Thought] (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Moskovskogo Univerziteta, 1986). For an innovative perspective, having as a focus *Slavophiles'* literature see *Literaturnie vzglady i tvorchestvo slavianofilov 1830-1850 gody* [Literary Views and Writings of Slavophiles (1830-1850)] (Moscow: Nauka, 1978), and V.I. Kuleshov, *Slavianofily i Russkaia literatura* [Slavophiles and Russian Literature] (Moscow: Hudozhestvennaia literatura, 1976).

development of elected representative institutions in Russia."¹³⁹ Therefore, the traditional Western classification of political and theoretical movements into conservative and liberal ones did not present a workable model for the 19th century Russia.

It was noteworthy that on the issue of continuity and change relationship *Slavophiles* maintained a constant divide between tradition ("old things") and modernity ("new things") in their social analysis. They were not negating modernity but rather pointing out its negative consequences. This approach would place *Slavophiles* in a post-colonial rather than staunch fundamentalist position at the 20th century's close. *Slavophiles* thus foreshadow a resistance to globalization discourse performed by the 1990s post-positivists.

Rejection of Kant's notion of the Age of Reason and advocacy for the unity of man and nature were the main ethical claims of *Slavophiles*. They advocated existence of absolute values, autonomous ideas, and claimed, therefore, that exists a natural limit to human knowledge.¹⁴⁰ On this basis emerged *Slavophilism*. As they believed in a natural limit to human knowledge they did not believe in a power of reason.

Slavophiles argued that the West does not share the historical path that Russia is following. It was argued that Russian people "...preferred the "road of inner truth" (Christian moral organization of life within the framework of the peasant community) to the "external truth" (a political and legal organization of society of a Western type)."¹⁴¹ Precisely due to these differences *Slavophiles* did not see the world as one but as divided. Therefore, Russia was not part of Europe (at that time it was a synonym for the West), but contraposed to it. This positioning of Russia was based on older theological concept

¹³⁹ Valery Kuvakin, 140.

¹⁴⁰ Richard Pipes, 55.

¹⁴¹ Valery Kuvakin, 152.

of Russia as a "third Rome".¹⁴² In this concept Russia was perceived as the only truly Christian state, the heir of Jerusalem, Rome and Konstantinopol.¹⁴³ *Slavophiles* thought that this gap between Russia and the West existed due to different spiritual principles. According to them these principles were patterns of having a society and history different from the West's.¹⁴⁴ Russian principles were perceived as better and Russia would eventually reconstruct the West for the benefit of all mankind. Therefore, Russia as a society was perceived to have the messianic role of saving the mankind.

Russia's defeat in the 1856 Crimean war changed the societal mood such that more radical and secular orientation in social thought came to dominate the political scene. Defeat had a sobering effect on social thought, resulting in a demand for realism and exactness in science.¹⁴⁵ But this resurgence of *Westernism* epitomized by figures such as Nicholay Chernyshevski¹⁴⁶ and Peter Lavrov¹⁴⁷ was followed up by the *Slavophiles* response at the beginning of the 1860s.¹⁴⁸

This second phase of *Slavophilism* represented a clear anti-secular response. Initially Nicholas Pirogov and Leo Tolstoy introduced the inner religious concept of "God-man". Two streams of *Slavophilism* derived from their thought. The first was more

¹⁴² "It was with the marriage of Ivan III with Zoe Paleologus, the niece of the last emperor of Constantinople, on June 1, 1472, that Muscovy began to think of itself as the only true heir of Byzantium." Michael Boro Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian Pan Slavism 1856-1870* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), 5.

¹⁴³ This image was strong since the Ottoman conquest of Byzantine state and decline of Papal state.

¹⁴⁴ Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *Russia and the West in the teaching of the Slavophiles; a study of romantic ideology* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952).

¹⁴⁵ V.V. Zenkovsky, 322.

¹⁴⁶ See Nikolay Gavrilovich Chernyshevsky, *Selected philosophical essays* (Westport, Ct.: Hyperion Press, 1981).

¹⁴⁷ See Peter Lavrov, *Ocherki voprosov prakticheskoi filosofii* [Essays on Questions of Practical Philosophy] (1860).

¹⁴⁸ In the 1860s as an off-shoot of Westernism emerged Nihilism whose "founding father" was Irenarch Vvedenski, although the term was introduced by Ivan Turgneyev's *Fathers and Sons*. To Nihilist aesthetic criticism often adhered Chernyshevsky, Nicholas Dobrolyubov and Dmitry Pisarev.

nationalistic, represented by Grigor'ev, Strakhov and Dostoyevsky. The second stream was more theological, represented by Leontyev and Rozanov.

The nationalistic stream also had to answer to the nation-state processes in Europe and it was done by slightly refocusing the *Slavophiles'* ontology from the people-church category to the category of people-land "*pochva*" (soil). Therefore, this stream was often called "*pochveniki*". "The concept of the "soil" embraces the people in their past and present, and in their daily life and metaphysical depths. Thus, the concept of "closeness to the soil" merged here with the idea of nationality. It was a peculiar sort of religious nationalism."¹⁴⁹ Grigor'ev was among the first thinkers to address the issue of the "soil" as a historiosophical concept, something that bonded categories of Russian nationality, Russian state and territoriality with the discipline of philosophy of history.¹⁵⁰ The argument for Russian independence and originality was further strengthened by Nicholas Strakhov.¹⁵¹ One of the most influential authors from this *Slavophiles'* stream was Fyodor Dostoyevsky. Initially he was attempted to reconcile *Slavophilism* with *Westernism* by insisting on anthropocentrism and by claiming that the centre of history is man and not God. However, in his later works Dostoyevsky increasingly came to dwell on the complexities of human nature, specifically upon the dilemma of good and evil therein. In so doing he became anti-secular and negative about everything that was associated with the West. "The dark vision of Petersburg in Dostoevskii's later work derives from Dostoevskii's *Slavophile-Pochvenik* agenda, with its rejection of much of Peter's legacy and its revulsion at the ills of the modern metropolis. For Dostoevskii,

¹⁴⁹ V.V. Zenkovskii, *Russian Thinkers and Europe*, 141.

¹⁵⁰ See Apollon Aleksandrovich Grigor'ev, *Sochineniia* [Works] (S.-Peterburg: Izdates'tvo N. N. Strakhova, 1876)

¹⁵¹ V.V. Zenkovsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy*, 409.

Petersburg is a city of dismal, dirty, cramped slums, ravaged by unemployment, alcoholism, and crime - a new Babylon, a window through which western evil continues to enter and poison the Russian land."¹⁵² Dostoyevski identified individualism as the greatest evil, and opposed it with the idea of universal service for humankind.

It is worth noting that Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy had bigger influence on 20th century Russian social thought than did many 19th century philosophers and social thinkers. This is due to the selective publishing of history and philosophical texts during the Soviet era. Soviet era censorship was quite harsh toward *Slavophiles* but through the literature of Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy which was published in its entirety, the ideas of "*pochvenishtvo*" and negative and complex human nature became widespread.

The theological stream of *Slavophilism* was presented by Leontyev and Rozanov. This stream attempted to effect a synthesis between Orthodox Christianity and a belief in nature as an all-encompassing ontological category. Leontyev was very original author who was first to emphasize Eurasian ideas. He argued that Russia was not only Slavic but Slav-Oriental civilization. On the basis of such an unique cultural and psychological pattern, he argued, Russia should be regarded as more universal than Europe and could offer more than the decaying West.

2.5 Official Nationalism of Nicholas I

In between *Slavophilism* and *Westernism* as extreme poles of Russian debate, space remained for the establishment of other schools of thought. Due to the emergence

¹⁵² See Gary Rosenshield, "The Bronze Horseman and The Double: The Depoetization of the Myth of Petersburg in the Young Dostoevskii," *Slavic Review* 55, 2 (Summer 1996): 403.

of nation-states and nationalist movements in Europe which pursued anti-monarchist and republican agendas the Russian throne was forced to respond with some counter measures to this 'revolutionary threat'. In 1833 Nicholas I promoted the doctrine of 'official nationality' based on orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality.¹⁵³ This was a basis for the school of "*Russian Nationalists*". Philosophically, this school was based on the works of theists. Theism "...tried to unite religion and philosophical idealism in order to renew traditional Orthodox conceptions, and to subordinate philosophy and science to theology. Theistic philosophy was contraposed to rationalism and especially to materialism, tried to substantiate the unity of reason and faith, and spoke of the powerlessness of the human mind to cognize truth without the "illuminating light" of revelation."¹⁵⁴ Principal theist authors were Fyodor Golubinsky, Fyodor Sidonsky, Vassily Karpov and Archimandrite Gavril.

Sergei Uvarov was the main exponent of the *Russian Nationalists* school. Uvarov was a Minister of Education in charge of the public education curriculum but also (and perhaps more importantly) very influential in directing censorship policy.¹⁵⁵ He was trying to integrate the loyalty to monarch with feelings of religiosity as the Russian peoples' dominant identity matrix. The leading theorists of this school of thought were Mikhail Pogodin and Stepan Shevyrev.¹⁵⁶ Pogodin relied on Shelling's idealist philosophy and was a staunch opponent of materialism, Darwinism and positivism. When it came to the philosophy of history, he argued for the circularity of history and for the

¹⁵³ Ibid., V.V. Zenkovsky

¹⁵⁴ Valery Kuvakin, 170.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., Cynthia Whittaker

¹⁵⁶ See Mikhail Petrovich Pogodin, *Drevniaia russkaia istoriia, do mongol'skago iga* [Ancient Russian History until Mongol Conquest] (Moscow: Vypusheno Synodal'noi tipografii, 1871); Mikhail Petrovich Pogodin, *Vospominanie o Stepane Petroviche Shevyreve* [Memories on Stepan Petrovich Shevyrev] (S.-Peterburg: Pechatnia V. Golovina, 1869).

presence of God's design in everything.¹⁵⁷ The goal, therefore, was to justify the monarch's policies.

In *Russian Nationalists'* school of thought the category of orthodoxy was perceived as a church controlled by the state. Autocracy was perceived as the category above all other which derived its legitimacy from the natural law of a sovereign, while nationality was perceived as a uniting identity in the service of autocracy. The path towards Europe's salvation was perceived not as a way of 'third Rome' but as a way toward the New Jerusalem, and was actually a state expansion agenda. Therefore, the way toward Europe was not going to be one of ideas but of territoriality - soil.¹⁵⁸ The word "soil" is a translation of word "*pochva*" which has a metaphorical meaning, and it presented an organic synthesis of people and land. But due to the patrimonial nature of Russian state, where everything belonged to the czar, the czar's sudden devotion to *Slavophiles'* "soil" category could be interpreted as his desire to publicly justify state expansionism.¹⁵⁹ The 1853 Crimean war and subsequent Russia's defeat proved that territorial expansion was not easy to achieve and that it was very costly.

Slavophiles were not apologetic towards the government while arguing against the concept of "Russian Nationalism," as they perceived it as an attempt to enlarge authoritarianism. Needless to say that *Westerners*, who were harshly persecuted by the authoritarian regime, also argued against the *Russian Nationalists'* school of thought.

¹⁵⁷ Valery Kuvakin, 164.

¹⁵⁸ Nicolas Bergyaev, *The Russian Idea* (London: Geoffrey Bles, The Centenary Press, 1947).

¹⁵⁹ On the concept of patrimonial state see Richard Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime* (New York: Scribner's, 1974).

2.6 *Pan-Slavism*

The “school of thought” that was closely connected to Russian foreign policy was *Pan-Slavism*. History of this school demonstrated that ideas and culture could influence public policy to the extent that state institutions adopt discourse, worldviews and policy proposals inaugurated by “schools of thought.” Russian foreign policy, especially during the 1856-78 period, advocated *Pan-Slavism*’s policy proposals toward the Balkans and Austro-Hungarian Slav-populated provinces. On some accounts the aggregation and implementation of those policy proposals differed from the political practices in contemporary Russia due to the authoritarian nature of 19th century Russian politics. This difference was centered on the capability of Russian czarism to conduct foreign policy without much accountability to its domestic constituency so that in final analysis *Pan-Slavism* resulted in Pan-Russism. Nevertheless, the heritage of idea and culture based policy proposals remained as vital legacy for contemporary Russia due to the two facts: the throne responded to social movements pressures indicating the relevance of “schools of thought”; socialization of intelligentsia and civil servants was achieved through the appeal and argumentation of “schools of thought” and not state apparatus. Another link with contemporary Russian “schools of thought” could be also established by analyzing the importance of influential events such as Crimean War and 1875-1878 wars in the Balkans. These wars represented perception-shaping events for Russian intelligentsia to the same extent that unfolding crisis in “near abroad” and the former Yugoslavia influenced thinking of contemporary Russian “schools of thought.”

Pan-Slavism emerged at the beginning of 19th century as a romantic reaction to the national-awakening process in Europe. Generally, *Pan-Slavism* was described as the Slavic movement for political union.¹⁶⁰ This movement was based on the findings from the field of literature and linguistic about Slavic common language. It was an attempt to found for the Slavs of Prussia, Austro-Hungary, Ottoman Empire and Russian Empire some new form of political existence. Philosophically it was based on romanticism and on Herder's conception of the Slav life style and character as better than those of the West.¹⁶¹ The movement had its missionary attributes in calling for universal monarchy. These attributes were based on religious, rational, and romantic grounds. The religious attribute was rooted in their belief in the moral unity of a Slav community and in the necessity of its regeneration. The rational attribute was rooted in Hegel's philosophy, especially in the notion of universalism, and the romantic one in belief in glorious past of Slavs and in shining future to come. However, it is important to know that "*Pan-Slavism* did not originate as an imperialist movement with the Russians sponsoring it. Russian expansion in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century was motivated by the czar's interpretation of Great Russian demands and drives and by the ideology of the Orthodox religion, not by any feeling of Slav community. It was the non-Russian Slav world in its national awakening which felt the need or closer cooperation."¹⁶² The non-Russian Slavs were driven by ideas such as liberty, equality and fraternity. Therefore, the movement reflected the 1789 French Revolution and the national awakening process that erupted all

¹⁶⁰ John Erickson, *Panslavism* (London: Historical Association, 1964), 3.

¹⁶¹ Hans Kohn, *Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953).

¹⁶² Hans Kohn, 5.

over Western and Central Europe in 1848.¹⁶³ Consequently, the Russian court was at odds with any idea of emancipation and republicanism and viewed the *Pan-Slavism* with suspicion and animosity until defeat in the Crimean war in 1856.¹⁶⁴

Pan-Slavism can be divided in five periods: before 1848; between 1848 and 1856; between 1856 and 1878; between 1878 and 1905; between 1905 and 1914.¹⁶⁵ This periodization is made according to the development of Slav-unity ideas among non-Russian and Russian *Pan-Slavists*, and according to the Russian state's implementation of various foreign policy concepts.

The first two periods were characterized by the general absence of Russian contributions to *Pan-Slavism*.¹⁶⁶ During that time in Russia was developing the debate between *Westernizers* and *Slavophiles*. The Russian state was pursuing the Nicholas' I concept of *Official Nationalism* and in its foreign policy was interested in maintaining a status quo in Europe. Practically, *Pan-Slavism* did not exist in Russia as an articulated public discourse and movement until the end of the Crimean war and the beginning of Alexander's II reign.¹⁶⁷ Therefore, it was non-Russian Slavs who initiated the *Pan-Slavic* debate and rallied around this idea either in the form of public movements and initiatives or in the form of articulated philosophical and political worldviews.

¹⁶³ V.A. D'iakov, ed., *Slavianskaia ideia: istoriia i sovremennost'*, [Slavic Idea: History and Present] (Moscow: Rossiiskaia akademiia nauk, Institut slavianovedeniia, 1998); G.V. Rokina, *IAN Kollar i Rossiia: istoriia idei slavianskoi vzaimnosti v rossiiskom obshchestve pervoi poloviny XIX v* [Ian Kollar and Russia: History of the Idea of Slavic Interconnection in the Russian society at the first half of 19th century] (1998).

¹⁶⁴ The throne banned Russian participants of attending Prague Congress.

¹⁶⁵ G.A. Bogatova, A.N. Goriainov, eds., *Slavianskoe dvizhenie XIX-XX vekov: s'ezdy, kongressy, soveshchaniia, manifesty, obrashcheniia* [Slavic Movement in 19th-20th centuries: Meetings, Congresses, Consultations, Manifests, Addresses] (Moscow: Mezhdunar. assotsiatsiia pisatelei batalistov i marinistov, 1998).

¹⁶⁶ Although, Fadner argued that coherent Pan-Slavic thinking and political activism existed in Russia even before 1848. See Frank Fadner, *Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism in Russia; Karazin to Danilevskii 1800-1870* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1962), 73-147.

¹⁶⁷ Michael Boro Petrovich, 3.

Slovak philologist Jan Herkel invented the term *Pan-Slavism* in 1826. He used this term in his work on common Slavic linguistic roots.¹⁶⁸ Other prominent *Pan-Slavic* advocates from the non-Russian countries were, as was Herkel, primarily poets, writers, and professors. This indicated that the culture and language were rallying points for the articulation of Western Slav national awakening projects.¹⁶⁹ Most prominent *Pan-Slavic* figures among the Western Slavs were Jan Kollar and Pavel Safarik among Slovaks, Frantisek Palacky and Karel Havlicek among Czechs, Stanislaw Staszic, Josef Marie Hoene-Wronski, Bronislaw Trentowski and Joachim Lelewel among Poles. Southern Slav intellectuals, such as Serbs Vuk Karadzic, Djura Danicic, Janko Safarik, Croat Ljudevit Gaj, and Slovenes, Stanko Vraz, Anton Zalek and Jernej Kopitar were also enthusiastic about Pan-Slavism while nurturing alternative Illirian and Yugoslav concepts of South Slavic cultural and political cohesion.¹⁷⁰

The public perception and appeal of *Pan-Slavism* in Serbia and Montenegro - besides Russia the only two independent Slavic countries - was mixed. Here the idea of Slavic unity was highly praised and Russia was perceived as a protector of Balkan Slavs and as an eventual liberator of the remaining Ottoman territories inhabited by Serbs and Bulgarians. On the other hand as much as Serbian and Montenegrin rulers, respectively Michael Obrenovic III of Serbia and Prince Nicholas I of Montenegro, were in favor of *Pan-Slavic* ideas and even financially sponsored the 1867 Slavonic Ethnographic Exhibition and Moscow Slavic Congress, they also pursued national liberation concepts

¹⁶⁸ It is interesting to note that his work was written in a non-Slavic language (Latin) and published in a non-Slavic place (Budapest). See Michael Boro Petrovich, 3.

¹⁶⁹ "Pan-Slavism in the first half of the nineteenth century was a movement of the Western Slavs born out of their cultural awakening and their political weakness." See Hans Kohn, *Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953), 99.

¹⁷⁰ See Ivan Bozic, Sima Cirkovic, Milorad Ekemcic, Vladimir Dedijer, *Istorija Jugoslavije, drugo izdanje* [2nd ed. History of Yugoslavia] (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1973); Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983)

with the aims of national sovereignty and independence.¹⁷¹ On several occasions, this pursuit conflicted with the interests of Russian Empire and resulted in Russian throne making secret agreements with Austro-Hungarian Empire at the expense of Serbs, Croats and Montenegrins.¹⁷²

Pan-Slavic ideas among non-Russian Slavs were based on the national awakening process characteristic of post-Napoleonic Europe. The content of these ideas was that Slavs share the same language and have a distinct culture. Consequently, on the basis of specific Slavic identity, the argument went toward claims for the political union of Slavs. Therefore, until 1848, in the first phase of *Pan-Slavism*, the general perception was that acknowledging cultural similarities should bring Slavic people closer and that after such a rapprochement, political union would be possible.¹⁷³ Such a policy prescription demonstrated the strong link between culture and politics in the activity of *Pan-Slavism*.

At the same time, the philosophical foundations of *Pan-Slavism* were established. Philosophically *Pan-Slavism* was based on the works of German idealist thinkers such as Hegel, Herder and Schelling. The understanding of concepts such as history and change was borrowed from Hegel and his history of the Idea. Therefore, *Pan-Slavists* did not adhere to social-Darwinism or claims about the superiority of one race over an other.¹⁷⁴ On contrary, when talking about nations, *Pan-Slavists* claimed that different historic-

¹⁷¹ Frank Fadner, 259.

¹⁷² See B.H. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880* (London: Archon Kooks, 1962); Andrew Rossos, *Russia and the Balkans: Inter-Balkan rivalries and Russian foreign policy 1908-1914* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981), and Charles Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism; Russian influence in the internal affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879-1886* (Los Angeles: University of California press, 1962).

¹⁷³ Michael Boro Petrovich, 241.

¹⁷⁴ There were authors who did not emphasize on this philosophical foundation and instead attributed a racist and "anti-European" nature to Pan-Slavism. Although, the argument can be made that this type of judgment could be attributed to cold war hype. See Wacław Lednicki, "Panslavism," *European Ideologies: A Survey of 20th Century Political Ideas*, ed. Feliks Gross (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), 805-913.

cultural types exist and that there should not be any political subordination among them.¹⁷⁵ Consequently, *Pan-Slavists* argued for the cultural and political independence of the Slavic nation. The concept of 'nation' was relying on Herder's metaphysics of nationality. "What may be called Herder's metaphysics of nationality postulates nationalities or *Volker* as integral realities objectively existing as cultural organisms with souls, supra-personal beings, independent of the free will of the human beings who go to make them up. Every such organism has within itself the norm of its own perfection, independent of comparison with any other such racial collectives. Accordingly the development of the nationality with its individuality is an end in itself."¹⁷⁶

Aside from the liberal principles of the French revolution the political foundations of Pan-Slavism were located in political culture of Habsburg Monarchy where Slavs enjoyed some collective rights of political representation. The traditions of Habsburg political culture and Slavic rights in the Monarchy represented the starting point for the elaboration of new claims in 1848. On the basis of these foundations, Slavic claims were expressed in a form of a non-violent political struggle.

"The slowly maturing harvest of the seeds sown by the French revolution and by German philosophy and scholarship among the Slavs ripened quickly in the stormy spring of 1848".¹⁷⁷ These ideas culminated in the 1848 Prague Congress. The Congress represented the first large scale public demonstration of Pan-Slavic ideas and their political elaboration. The Prague Congress was organized in response to the 1848 German Parliament's meeting in Frankfurt at which was proposed the creation of a Greater Germany which would include some Slavic lands - Bohemia, Moravia, Slovenia

¹⁷⁵ Michael Boro Petrovich, 82.

¹⁷⁶ Frank Fadner, 2.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, Hans Kohn, 61.

and Croatia. Therefore, the banner under which the Prague Congress was convened was not only to express the Slavic national revival but also to quest for cultural distinctiveness and political solidarity against possible germanization. "The Slavs did not want to change the established political and administrative borders; their aspirations were mostly directed to the enhancement of their constitutional rights and to the freedom of intellectual pursuit."¹⁷⁸ The Congress itself stirred-up Slavic national enthusiasm and demonstrated how strong, if united, the group could be. The Congress delegates did not, however, demand national independence but rather the Austrian Monarchy's reorganization into a federation. Pursuit of this goal had to be achieved peacefully within the Hapsburg Empire's democratic institutions - through the parliament and universal suffrage – which is why the project came to be called Austro-Slavism. Internal fragmentation among Austrian Slavs emerged as soon as Congress working groups started designing these federal units' eventual borders. At this point enthusiasm for Slavic unity waned and national territorial aspirations emerged causing movement's internal fragmentation. External fragmentation, among non-Russian *Pan-Slavists* and Russia, emerged over whether the absolutist monarchy should be rejected and over demands for the acknowledgment of the national rights of non-Russian Slavs, such as Poles, Ukrainians, Ruthenians, within the Russian empire. Therefore, it is of little surprise that czar Nicholas I banned Russian delegates' participation at the Prague Congress and in the same year, militarily helped the Habsburg crown to crush the Hungarian revolution. It was obvious that maintaining the European geostrategic status quo and suppressing revolutionary movements, which demanded the establishment of elected republics, were Russia's

¹⁷⁸ See Jelena Milojkovic-Djuric, *Panslavism and National Identity in Russia and in the Balkans 1830-1880: Images of the Self and Others* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 32.

primary concerns, stronger than any Slavic unity appeals. At that time *Pan-Slavism* did not have any visible discursive presence in Russia. The impact of *Pan-Slavism* on Austrian foreign policy was quite visible on three issues. First, Vienna extended its financial assistance and trade preferentials to Serbia thus driving Belgrade away from possible dependency on Russia. This policy also aimed at making Belgrade less interested in politically supporting Slavic, especially Serb, cause in the monarchy. Such a policy appeased Serbia until 1903 when a military coup in Belgrade brought back to power Karadjordjevic dynasty, a traditional pro-Russian ally. Second, Habsburg throne attempted to play a leading role in German world in order to expand its borders to non-Slavic lands and citizenry and counterweight its dominant Slavic population. This policy collapsed with Hapsburg's defeat in the Austro-Prussian war in 1866. Third, Vienna nurtured friendly relationship with Russia, which included Russia's help in crushing 1848 Hungarian revolution and Austrian neutrality in Crimean war. Russia's throne support to Pan-Slavism was practically directed only at Ottoman Empire Slavs and not to Austrian Slavs. The discursive reasoning for such a discrepancy indicated shift in focus from ethnic and linguistic closeness to common Orthodox Christian faith that Russians share with Balkan peoples.¹⁷⁹

European reaction to the emergence of *Pan-Slavism* was quite negative – most perceived it as a Russian expansionist project. Russia, meanwhile, perceived *Pan-Slavism* as a dangerous revolutionary fashion and imprisoned Mikhail Bakunin, one of the most vocal advocates of revolutionary change, and the only Russian participant at the Prague Congress.

¹⁷⁹ See Vladimir Petrovich Potemkin, *Istoriia diplomatii*, 3 vols. [Diplomatic History] (Moscow: Gossudarstvennoe sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe izdatel'stvo, 1945).

The 1848-56 period saw a continuity of *Pan-Slavic* cultural awakening projects among non-Russian Slavs, mostly in literature, ethnography and music. Meanwhile in Russia, *Pan-Slavism* had few proponents. However, Russia's defeat in the Crimean War gave rise to an almost complete reversal. After the defeat, the Russian throne realized that it had no allies in Europe. Henceforth, *Pan-Slavism* came to be officially encouraged, as non-Russian Slavs were perceived as potential allies against the Ottoman and Hapsburg Empires.¹⁸⁰ The Russian intelligentsia became disillusioned with *Westernism* and European models after the failed 1848 revolutions.¹⁸¹ Many former *Westerners* became reticent toward the ideas of citizen social contract and adopted nation-state based concepts of democracy instead.

The 1856-78 period thus encompassed a flourishing years of Russian *Pan-Slavists* thinkers whose activity, moreover, was largely supported by the Russian state. This support is the main reason that *Pan-Slavism* emerged into the movement as opposite to earlier Russian schools of thought. Russian *Pan-Slavists* emerged from the debates between *Westerners* and *Slavophiles* but with the focus of their discourse primarily centered to foreign world and not Russia itself. The shift away from religion (Orthodoxy) to ethnicity (Slavic) as the identity principle constituted another significant change. Russian *Pan-Slavists* were enthusiastic about Alexander's II reign, which offered the hope for social and political change in Russia. Ivan Aksakov, one of the most prominent Russian *Pan-Slavists*,¹⁸² who represented a bridge "between the *Slavophile* philosophy of

¹⁸⁰ Michael Boro Petrovich, 29.

¹⁸¹ See Alexander Tchoubarin, *The European Idea in History in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: A View from Moscow* (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 1994), 72.

¹⁸² On early Russian Pan-Slavists see N.L. Brodskii, *Ranyie Slavianofily; A.S. Homiakov, I.V. Kirevskii, K.S. Aksakov i I.S. Aksakov* [Early Slavophiles: A.S. Homiakov, I.V. Kirevskii, K.S. Aksakov and I.S. Aksakov] (Moscow: istoriko-Literaturnaia biblioteka, 1910).

the forties and the *Pan-Slavic* program of the sixties and seventies," was also an advocate of domestic reforms, such as the "emancipation of the serfs, land reform, abolition of censorship, judicial reforms, and other enlightened domestic improvements".¹⁸³ Other prominent Russian *Pan-Slavists* were Michael Pogodin, Iurii Samarin, Vladimir Lamanskii,¹⁸⁴ Aleksandr Gil'ferding,¹⁸⁵ and Nikolai Danilevskii.¹⁸⁶

No one more than Nikolai Danilevskii influenced Russian *Pan-Slavist's* philosophy.¹⁸⁷ He expanded Herder's notion of nations as cultural-historical types or 'local civilizations'.¹⁸⁸ Danilevskii argued, influenced by positivism, that these 'local civilizations' go, as do live organisms, through evolutionary phases in their development. The further argument was that the Slavic civilization had still to reach its high phase, unlike some other civilizations, such as the European, which were already in decline. In Danilevskii's final argument the division of the world along civilization lines would be on Europe, America and Slavdom. This main advocate of *Pan-Slavism* did not therefore, seek world dominance and its theocratic justifications (as was the case with many *Slavophiles*) but intended the division of spheres of interest and balance of power politics.¹⁸⁹ Thus, in terms of 20th century international relations theory, Russian *Pan-Slavism* resembled a realist rather than an idealist approach.

¹⁸³ Michael Boro Petrovich, 62-63.

¹⁸⁴ See Vladimir Lamanskii, *Stat'i po slavianoviedienitiu* [Essays on Slavic Affairs] (1904); Vladimir Lamanskii, *Serbia i iuzhno-slavianskiie provintsii Avstrii* [Serbia and South-Slav Austrian Provinces] (1864).

¹⁸⁵ See Aleksandar F. Giljferding, *Putovanje po Hercegovini, Bosni i Staroj Srbiji*, trans. Branko Culic [Voyage in Hercegovina, Bosnia and Old Serbia] (Belgrade: Sluzbeni list SRJ, 1996); Aleksandr Gil'ferding, *Pis'ma ob istorii serbov i bolgar* [Letters on History of Serbs and Bulgarians] (1855).

¹⁸⁶ Michael Boro Petrovich, 61.

¹⁸⁷ See Nikolai Danilevskii, *Darvinizm* (1885-89); Nikolai Danilevskii, *Rossii i Evropa* [Russia and Europe] (1966).

¹⁸⁸ Alexander Tchoubarin, 69.

¹⁸⁹ Michael Boro Petrovich, 282.

Pan-Slavism ceased to be confined to Russia's debating circles and began to be expressed publicly, through the organization of societies, committees and journals. This would not have been possible without state approval. In 1858 the Slavonic Benevolent Committee was founded in Moscow. Its goal was to help Slavic churches and schools abroad by sending liturgical materials, teachers and books. Until 1870 there were similar committees working in St. Petersburg, Kiev and Odessa.¹⁹⁰ However, the churches and schools that received this help were primarily in the Balkans. This Russian-backed Slavic national revival was deployed as a counterweight to Greek Phanariots influence on the Balkans, especially on Bulgarians.¹⁹¹

During the 1860s and 1870s a vast array of articles propagating the Slavic cause in the Balkans appeared in Russia's press.¹⁹² Travel reports, patriotic poetry and often glorifying reports about Serbian and Bulgarian uprisings against Turks were featured on a regular basis in a variety of Russian journals.¹⁹³ But the most catalytic event for the *Pan-Slavic* cause at this time was the 1867 Austro-Hungarian agreement. Even though Slavs in the Habsburg Monarchy represented a majority of the population they were entirely excluded from the dual monarchy arrangement between Vienna and Budapest. It appeared that parliamentary political struggle would not result in an improvement of Austrian Slavs' lot. Almost at the same time, Germany and some parts of Italy achieved national unification after victorious military campaigns. These events created the

¹⁹⁰ See S.A. Nikitin, *Slavianskie komitety v Rossii v 1858-1876 goda* [Slavic Committees in Russia (1858-1876)] (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Moskovskogo Univerziteta, 1960).

¹⁹¹ Frank Fadner, 243.

¹⁹² See Rovniakova, L.I., *Borba luzhnih Slavian za svobodu i russkaia periodicheskaia pechat' (50-70-e gody XIX veka)* [South-Slavs' Liberation Struggle and Russian Periodical Press (1850s-1870s)] (Leningrad: Nauka, 1986).

¹⁹³ For the documented account of the impact Russian press had on the throne see Karel Durman, *The Time of the Thunderer Mikhail Katkov, Russian Nationalist Extremism and the Failure of the Bismarckian System, 1871-1887* (Boulder, Colorado: East European Monographs, 1988).

perception among *Pan-Slavists* that a more active policy would be required. Therefore, embittered Austrian Slavs and more militant Russian *Pan-Slavists* organized a Moscow Slav Congress in 1867.

Despite existing differences among delegates, the Congress represented the emergence of a new view on the *Pan-Slavic* issue. In contrast with the 1848 view, this time it was argued "...that only through political unification could the Slavs effectively "restore" the unity of their culture."¹⁹⁴ However, there was no agreement among delegates on the scope of such a political unification. For Austrian Slavs, the term unification had several meanings. The small Slav nations saw in this movement a chance for national liberation, but their expectations were divided along the three projects. Each nation's intelligentsia was divided as to which of the projects would best suit their specific circumstances. The projects ranged from calls for full national sovereignty, to more pro-Russian oriented compromises, to those who advocated the creation of an independent Slavic federation.¹⁹⁵

Pan-Slavism had distinct meanings for Austria, Russia and small Slav nations. Austria saw it as a counterbalance to Russian expansion, due to the fact that the movement, for a long time, aimed to create an Austrian Federation, therefore to revitalize Austria and not to destroy it.

During Nicholas' I rule, Russia located a pretext for expansion within the movement, but was hesitant to support it publicly, fearing a diplomatic backlash. There were two streams in the Russian approach to *Pan-Slavism*. The first variation (supported by the czar) encouraged the movement in accordance with the *Russian Nationalists'*

¹⁹⁴ Michael Boro Petrovich, 241.

¹⁹⁵ For one case study see Jelena Milojkovic-Djuric.

expansion, and advocated creating an autocratic state. The second variation (sponsored by the Decembrist movement) envisioned the more genuine project of a federation of "United Slavs" based on a liberal political system.¹⁹⁶ Left-wing support for *Pan-Slavism* - especially from Bakunin and Herzen - existed simultaneously.¹⁹⁷ "Thus up to 1870 there was a definite *Pan-Slav* thread in the revolutionary Bakunin's thought and activity. The political realization of the *Pan-Slav* ideal was always treated by him as a means, first to the establishment of 'democracy' in a united Slavdom, and finally as a possible means to the establishment of world-wide socialism."¹⁹⁸

However, the 1830-31 Polish uprising, which was severely suppressed by autocratic Russia, demonstrated the real nature of Russian state interests. "Polish-Russian relations were a source of constant embarrassment for sincere *Pan-Slavists* in Russia."¹⁹⁹ Southern Slavs, Serbs especially, were prone to call to open warfare to liberate their fellows from the Austrian and Ottoman Empires. All of the above projects were predicated on an assumption that the Russian Empire would offer its assistance to but that it would not expand over liberated Slavic lands.

Increasingly, Russian *Pan-Slavists* demanded their country's military involvement to achieve their goals. "Just as Fadeev and Danilevskii reversed the *Pan-Slavic* philosophy by claiming that a physical Slavic union was not the ultimate aim of a cultural unification but a prerequisite for the latter, so they reversed *Pan-Slavic* political policy by maintaining not that Slavic solidarity was the best way of avoiding war but that war was

¹⁹⁶ See Frank Fadner, *Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism in Russia; Karazin to Danilevskii 1800-1870* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1962).

¹⁹⁷ See Mikhail Bakunin, *Pis'ma M. A. Bakunina k A. I. Gartsevu i N. I. Ogarevu* [Bakunin's Letters to A.I. Gertsen and N.I. Ogarev] (1906).

¹⁹⁸ Frank Fadner, 170.

¹⁹⁹ Frank Fadner, 356.

the only way of obtaining Slavic solidarity."²⁰⁰ Many European authors and observers considered this change in *Pan-Slavists'* unification agenda to be a war mocking and "conflicting conception".²⁰¹ It was labeled as such, consequently, in European discourse – without regard for the fact that *Pan-Slavists* were reacting to 1860s events in Austria, Germany and Italy and demanding the same national rights for themselves. European reactions to the 1867 Moscow Congress were negative. "Those who warned most persistently against the Russian *Pan-Slav* danger were socialists and liberals."²⁰² They mostly focused on Russia's political conservatism and on its expansionist foreign policy. In this, not only was the non-Russian *Pan-Slavists* component neglected but the Russian *Pan-Slavists* side was wrongly perceived as unanimous. The Russian *Pan-Slavists* side was neither only conservative nor liberal nor fixed solely on state expansion. Rather, these three streams coexisted and mutually influenced each other.

Russian advocates of military interventionist policy, most notably the retired generals Rostislav Andreevich Fadiev and Mikhail Grigorievich Cherniaev, were strongly influenced by Russian army victories in Caucasus and Central Asian campaigns.²⁰³ The two generals, believed that the Ottoman Empire was losing its strength and that decisive Russian military action was needed – a view shared by many other military officers. Many Russian *Pan-Slavists* supported their belief since it coincided with patriotic reporting in the Russian press on the Turkish oppression of Ottoman Slavs; a climate reinforced by Serbian and Bulgarian appeals for Russian help. The general perception was that the Ottoman Empire's collapse was near. However,

²⁰⁰ Michael Boro Petrovich, 268.

²⁰¹ Wacław Lednicki, 900.

²⁰² Hans Kohn, 87.

²⁰³ See Rostislav Fadiev, *Opinion on the Eastern question* (London: E. Stanford, 1871). Mikhail Cherniaev, *Vzaimnoe sochuvstvie slavian* [Slavic Mutual Feelings] (1897).

consequent discourse offered by this Russian *Pan-Slavists* group did not elaborate on what would happen when Russia would liberate these regions. This ambiguity left space for the emergence of various alliances among Russian *Pan-Slavists*. Therefore, Russian *Pan-Slavists* agreed only on the issue of Slavic lands' liberation but not on how it should be done or on what the status of the newly liberated Slavic lands should be. This mainstream agreement on the necessity of liberating of Slavic lands resonated widely among Russian intelligentsia and became the banner of its socialization and part of its normative credo. This element of *Pan-Slavic* political discourse created strong social base that could support future Russian foreign policy activities on the East European and Balkan directions, as far as those policies declared liberation of Slavs. Mainstream agreement on the necessity of liberating of Slavic lands within public discourse was reinforced by the Russian state as well. Russian politics was still more determined by the throne's interventions and less by public demands so that "schools of thought" could less influence state institutions. Practically, it was a period of domination of politics over culture, with the state and not society dictating what are the political rules.

As of 1856, the Russian state adamantly supported the *Pan-Slavic* cause. The Russian Empire's post-1856 activity indicated its strategic interest in the Eastern Question and Balkan Slavs. One of the most vocal advocates, on the governmental side, of the *Pan-Slavic* cause was Russian Ambassador to Constantinople Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev.²⁰⁴ "Ignatiev maintained that Russian foreign policy must be directed toward the destruction of the Ottoman Empire as a solely Slavonic project."²⁰⁵ However, Ignatiev did not promote granting independence to liberated South Slavs but argued Russia should

²⁰⁴ See Nikolai Pavlovich Ignatiev, *San Stefano* (1916).

²⁰⁵ Frank Fadner, 294.

expand over these territories. This project of *Pan-Slavism* could be called Pan-Russism. The Russian government was trying to capitalize on Pan-Slavic feelings at home by gradually penetrating Slavic organizations.

The 1875 Hercegovina rebellion against Turks, the subsequent 1876 Serbo-Turkish war and the uprising in Bulgaria fermented patriotic Slavic feelings among Russians. Hundreds of Russians went to fight as volunteers alongside Serbs and immense charity donations were collected to support the South Slavic rebellions. The Commander in Chief of the Serb army was retired General Cherniayev, while the Bulgarian army's first eight Commanders in Chief were Russians. It comes as no surprise that the Russian government sought to coordinate these activities. In 1877, the Moscow Slavonic Benevolent Committee ended up virtually controlled by the Asiatic Department (in charge of the Balkans) in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by the Ministry of Public Education.²⁰⁶

The 1876-78 Russo-Turkish war represented the peak of Pan-Russism.²⁰⁷ The Russian army waged a victorious Balkan war against Turkey and almost reached Bosfor. The 1878 San Stefano peace agreement reflected Russian aspirations for the regional domination. However, the concert of European powers annulled this Russian dictate to defeated Turkey and organized the Berlin Congress for later that same year. The Berlin Congress effectively halted Russian state expansion into the Balkans, granted independence to small Balkan states and returned some territories to Ottoman Empire. This event significantly influenced the *Pan-Slavists* movement. Among Austro Slavs it

²⁰⁶ Frank Fadner, 256.

²⁰⁷ It is noteworthy that prominent Russian Pan-Slavists perceived Russian military actions as directed toward "Slavonic cause" and not Russian state interests. See O.K., *Skobelev and the Slavonic Cause* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1883).

confirmed suspicions that the Russian state was less interested in liberating non-Russian Slavs than in controlling them. South Slavs, Serbs especially, were disappointed by Russia's disinterest in the Slavic national agenda and by the throne's exclusive focus on strategic military expansion.²⁰⁸ For that matter, Russian preferences were for Bulgarians, which triggered rivalry between small Slavic nations in Balkans, and resulted in the Serbian Kingdom abandoning *Pan-Slavism* and gearing itself toward a rapprochement with Austro-Hungary. Russia refocused its military sights on the Far East, partially due to the emergence of a formidable challenger in Japan, and increased its military and diplomatic activity toward China and the Pacific, practically abandoning the Slavic cause in Europe. This foreign policy refocusing indicated that the state still had the dominant position over society and that it could neglect some discourses. However, the heritage of "schools of thought," such as *Pan-Slavism*, in creating an intellectual and normative base for intelligentsia's upbringing resulted in future fertile revivals of Slavic oriented foreign policies. These future revivals indicated that Russian society generated strong social base for future foreign policy options as far as those options could accommodate basic discourse of "schools of thought." "Schools of thought" acted as social movements able to influence state institutions. As it will be argued in chapters III-V this influence was more powerful as political life adopted more democratic features. In contemporary Russia politics is public affair, as different from the czarist Russia, and society determines political rules. This way in contemporary Russia culture performs social role that is larger than politics so that state institutions respond to culture and "schools of thought" through intelligentsia's discourse as a medium.

²⁰⁸ See David MacKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism 1875-1878* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967).

From 1878 until 1905 Russia was effectively absent from *Pan-Slavic* activity in Europe. *Pan-Slavism* was increasingly oriented toward national projects and, as a movement and a discourse, lost its political appeal. Nevertheless, it retained its cultural importance and offered cooperation in this field by organizing gymnastic organizations for youth: "Sokol". From 1882 until 1912 six congresses of "Sokol" were organized in different European cities. Sporting events were accompanied by exhibitions and cultural manifestations. Slav Congress was convened in Prague in 1908 to mark the 60th anniversary of the first Slavic Congress. In order to dissociate themselves from the old Pan-Slavism and eventual Russian influences, delegates used a new term: Neo-Slavism.²⁰⁹

Russia's defeat by Japan in 1905 saw the end of Russian expansion in Asia. The Russian throne once again re-oriented its foreign policy toward the Balkans and the straits. Domestically, after the 1903 Revolution and Stolypin's reforms, Russia offered much more European features such as parliament, freedom of expression and political organization.²¹⁰ Therefore, there was a potential that Russia's image among non-Russian Slavs could be improved and some *Pan-Slavic* rhetoric rejuvenated. However, rapprochement did not happen with Austrian Slavs partially because on the Russian side there were no significant *Pan-Slavic* figures and movements. On the other side, among the Balkan Slavs, Russia had a much more favorable historical record of cooperation and new circumstances in her favor. The 1903 coup d'etat in Serbia restored the Karadjordjevic dynasty which somewhat bolstered Russian influence in South Slav

²⁰⁹ See Paul Vysny, *Neo-Slavism and the Czechs 1898-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), and Edvard Benes, *Uvahy o slovanstvi: Hlavni problemy slovanske politiky* [Tracts on Slavism: Main Problems of Slavic Politics] (Prague: Cin, 1947), 134-199.

²¹⁰ See Zenkovskii Aleksandar, *Stolypin: Russia's last great reformer* (Princeton, N.J.: Kingston Press, 1986).

affairs. However, as the following events, such as the 1912-13 Balkan wars and WW I have proven, it was no longer presented as *Pan-Slavism*, but as a policy of Yugoslavism on the Serbian side – with which Russia frequently disagreed. *Pan-Slavism's* last incarnation occurred under Stalin during WW II, when the creation of Slavic Committees was encouraged as another mobilization effort in the anti-fascist struggle.²¹¹

2.7 Eurasianism

Another school of thought on Russia and Russian destiny emerged in the 1920s namely *Eurasianism*. The reason why this 20th century school of thought is included in a review of 19th century schools is twofold. First, *Eurasians* philosophically originate in the late 19th century and represent a continuation of the *Slavophilism* and *Westernism* debate - if not their symbiosis. Second, the importance of tracing the origins of this school became evident once their discourse re-emerged in Russian political debates of the 1990s.

Eurasianism was an intellectual movement of Russian émigrés in Western Europe. The founders of the *Eurasianism* were prince N.S. Trubetzkoy, P.N. Savitskii, G.V. Florovskii and P.P. Suvchinskii in 1920-21. Although it can be argued that the founding father of this worldview was one of 19th century *Slavophiles*, Konstantin Leontyev.²¹²

²¹¹ For an assessment of Pan-Slavism by Soviet historiography see Vasyl Hryshko, *Panslavism u sovietskoj istoriografii i politiki* [Pan-Slavism in Soviet Historiography and Politics] (Munich: Institute for the Study of the USSR, 1956).

²¹² Although, some authors placed *Eurasianists* foundations into N. Danilevsky's book *Russia and Europe*. See Boris Ishboldin, "The Eurasian Movement," *The Russian Review*, (Spring 1946), 64-74.

Eurasians argued for the emergence of a *Eurasian* federation and for the adoption of dual identities.²¹³ This school of thought has its philosophical origins in the German idealism, although not in Kantian one, since they were against cosmopolitanism, but specifically on a Hegelian idealism which advocates the concept of idea governing state. In this view, as emphasized by economist Savitskii, the state should be an economically autarkic region. Since it is autarkic it does no harm to others, and, in presenting no threat, is defined not by its borders but by its body. This argument about the state's body originates from the findings of linguistic and cultural inter-connectedness all over the *Eurasian* continent. The postulated state, therefore, will be that bigger identity because it encompasses several sets of ties among *Eurasian* nations, as different to the projects of *Pan-Slavism* and Pan-Turkism which link people along only one (linguistic) or two (language and religion) ties. The smaller identity within the *Eurasian* state will be the one of each individual nation. The *Eurasians*' negation of the validity of Western modes of development was not based on a perception as Europe's decay (as was the case with the *Slavophiles*), but rather on Europe's hostile and aggressive behavior toward non-Europeans.²¹⁴

The *Eurasians* did not believe in possibility of having one dominant culture because their concept of belongings originates from a belief in common origin or departing point. For this reason they disagreed with the *Westerners* who wanted to organize Russia as modern European state, or nation-state. Prince Trubetzkoy, in

²¹³ As one of the rare texts of the *Eurasians* translated in English see Nikolai Sergeevich Trubetzkoy, *The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia's Identity* (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1991).

²¹⁴ The point of disagreement with the *Slavophiles* was also in the understanding of the state. The *Slavophiles* were more anti-state oriented while the *Eurasians* were not. Also, the *Slavophiles* doctrine was more based on the history and past, while the *Eurasians* dealt with the culture which was perceived as an organic and changing entity. See Alain O.J.Londres, "Geopolitics and the nationalistic Opposition and Intelligentsia 1992-95," M.A. Essay, Carleton University, Ottawa, 1995, 65.

particular, claimed it would be impossible because there is no single conscience of belonging to such a state. As single conscience did not exist except along the lines of belonging to *Eurasianism*, he concluded, "the unity and uniqueness of the multiethnic *Eurasian* nation is only solution".²¹⁵ Therefore, *Russian Nationalism's* agenda could be conceived as separatism because it would cause the fragmentation of Eurasia in order to make from Russians the "rear Europeans".²¹⁶

The strong component of thinking of this school presented its critique of the West. The *Eurasians* were against communist government in the USSR but they were also against the policy that the West was pursuing. Their critique of the West was not based on a disappointment with the invasion of young Soviet state by the world powers, having this 'intervention' look more as an imperial race for conquest than as a fight against communism, but on the pattern of such behavior. In his essay "The Russian Problem", Trubetzkoy elaborated this position, saying that the West was only interested in subordinating and exploiting Russia. Consequently, he claimed, the West would not confront communism but would help Russia become more like the West.²¹⁷ The West would try to colonize Russia by offering her aid and by supporting her government until this government reforms Russia according to Western patterns. The same critique says that the intelligentsia will help the West due to intelligentsia's perception that Russia has "much to learn from Europe".²¹⁸ By doing this Russia would lose its true nature and independence. The only way to avoid this perceived colonization by the West would be to follow the destiny of common struggle of Asian states against colonialism and European

²¹⁵ N.S.Trubetzkoy, 244.

²¹⁶ N.S.Trubetzkoy, 77.

²¹⁷ N.S.Trubetzkoy, 104.

²¹⁸ N.S.Trubetzkoy, 106.

civilization.²¹⁹ But, according to Trubetskoy, this would be possible only when a radical shift in Russian consciousness, as a whole society, occurs.²²⁰ The perception was that the best agent for this change is the state itself. During the cold war rivalry some Western scholars perceived *Eurasianist* theory of state in equal totalitarian terms as they perceived the Stalinist model.²²¹ But it could be also argued that Trubetskoy's criticism approaches 20th century post-colonial scholarship – except that he offers a solution/prescription rather than deconstructivist methodology. Revisited from the 1990s point of view, *Eurasianism* appeared quite ahead of its time. However, *Eurasianism* remained confined to Russian émigré circles and, by the end of the 1930s, had lost its visibility.

2.8 Westerners

The state agent school of thinking with much longer tradition in Russian history of thought was the *Westerners*. They emerged at the beginning of the 19th century as a reflection of French Revolution and Napoleonic wars. It should not be a surprise that many Russian army officers who were by the nature of their service exposed to the West during the Napoleonic wars admired liberalism and were followers of Enlightenment and romanticism. Most visible political manifestation of *Westernism* was Decembrists coup attempt in 1825.

The philosophical origins of *Westerners* were in rationalism, the notion of modernization and a faith in progress. Their goal was to modernize Russia along the lines

²¹⁹ His understanding of civilization could be synthetized as a relationship of power and dependency among different nations with the goal to impose patterns of social fabric on the "others".

²²⁰ N.S.Trubetskoy, 111.

²²¹ Boris Ishboldin, 70.

of other European states. However, when it comes to the understanding of the state *Westerners* adopted a Hegelian approach. The state was perceived, in keeping with Hegel's formulation, as a rational form as opposite to a liberal Lockean approach. On the other hand *Westerners*, were well acquainted with findings of natural sciences and consequently positivistic in their social sciences thinking. Therefore, *Westerners'* philosophical foundation demonstrated the existence of combination of Hegel's idealism and positivism. This is why very often *Westerners* used in their discourse some *Slavophile* categories - such as organic togetherness (*sobornost*) and populism (*narodnichestvo*).

One of the *Westerners'* founding fathers was Petr Chaadaev.²²² His main interest was in the philosophical interpretation of history and consequently in Russia's nature. Even though he was critically oriented toward Russian political system he did not argue for a total adoption of Western standards. In the later phase of his life, Chaadaev perceived Russia as being in a more advantageous position than the West. This advantage is in possibility of not repeating some Western mistakes. Therefore, from their very beginning *Westerners* did not reject everything Russian just as they did not glorify everything European. Other *Westerners* were Vissarion Belinskii,²²³ Michael Bakunin, Alexandre Herzen,²²⁴ Nicholas Chernyshevski, Nikolai Mikhailovski and Nicholas Stankevich.²²⁵ *Westerners* shared a belief in need for radical social change and argued for political activism.

²²² See Petr Iakovlevich Chaadaev, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii i izbrannye pis'ma* [Collected Works and Selected Letters] (Moscow: Nauka, 1991).

²²³ See Vissarion Grigor'evich Belinskii, *Selected works* (Tatar, Sailanmalar, 1946).

²²⁴ See *Herzen i Zapad* [Herzen and the West] (Moscow: Nauka, 1985).

²²⁵ See N. Pirumova, B. Itenberg, and V. Antonov, *Russia and the West: 19th Century* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1990).

Westerners' political involvement was based on requests for liberalism and secularism. However, the kind of secularism they were arguing for was quite specific. *Westerners* were arguing for separation of Christianity and the Church since they believed in "inner Christianity". A majority of *Westerners* were believers due to their religious upbringing. Some thinkers such as Bakunin and Belinskii were declared atheists but they represented a minority.

In terms of its thinking about political systems Russia was perceived as a backward Eastern despotic state which should reject the czar's despotism and develop a parliamentary political system with civil rights. While *Slavophiles* glorified the past, *Westerners* neglected it - not as a philosophical category but as an empirical one. This position was based on an understanding that the Byzantium state was corrupt and that the Russian czar and *Slavophiles* were trying to copy it as a model for the future. The founding fathers of this stream include Chadaev, Belinskii and Herzen. Belinskii and Herzen were forerunners of the quest for social justice as a prerequisite for the emancipation of the individual.²²⁶ After the 1848 revolutions in Europe, Herzen made another rapprochement with *Slavophilism*. After being disappointed with the failure of liberal ideals in 1848 revolutions in Europe Herzen became an advocate, such as *Slavophiles* of village commune (*obshchina*) concept. This appreciation of village commune concept created a prerequisite for later *Westerners* to embrace the concept of populism. Russia's defeat in the Crimean war changed the mood in society: a more radical orientation in social thought started dominating the political scene.

During the 1860s there was a significant orientation with Bakunin and Chernishevsky toward populism. This time populism was understood as a

²²⁶ V.V. Zenkovsky, *A History of Russian Philosophy*, 269.

democratization process based on radical action taken by citizens. "In the hands of the full-fledged "*narodniki*", or Populists, of the seventies and after, it became a fully explicit and coherent social philosophy stressing the virtues of the peasantry, the evils of capitalism, and the possibility of avoiding capitalism in Russia by the direct revolutionary establishment of a more or less anarchistic socialist order based on the "*obshchina*".²²⁷

However, as none of the previous schools of thought represented a homogeneous and unanimous group of thinkers, the same is valid for *Westerners*. Especially after the 1860s within the *Westerners* school emerged at least three streams: the mainstream populism and its two extremes of anarchism and nihilism. The anarchist stream originated from Bakunin and later on involved Nechaev and Peter Kropotkin, ending in socialist anarchism.²²⁸ The Nihilist stream, primarily characteristic of the 1860s, started with Chernishevsky²²⁹ and had its most notable representatives in Nicholai Dobroliubov²³⁰ and Dmitrii Pisarev.²³¹ More mainstream populism was represented by Peter Lavrov and Mikhailovsky and had its heyday during the 1870s. During the 1890s this mainstream group later became known through Michailovsky and Plekhanov as Social Democratic and with the creation of the party under the same name represented political institutionalization of *Westerner's* ideas. "The development of capitalism in Russia, which was gaining momentum after the abolition of serfdom in 1861, inevitably put an end to the discussion in which the radical democrats and the *Slavophiles* had been

²²⁷ See James M. Edie, James P. Scanlan, Mary-Barbara Zeldin eds., with the collaboration of George L. Kline *Russian Philosophy*, vol. 2 (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 1976), 112.

²²⁸ See Peter Kropotkin, *Anarchism* (Corinth, Vt: Black Mountain Press, 1971).

²²⁹ See N.G. Chernishevskii, *Chto delat'; iz raskazov o novykh liudiakh* [What to do; From Essays on New Man] (Moscow: Hudozhestvennaia literatura, 1963).

²³⁰ See Nikolai Aleksandrovich Dobroliubov, *Sobranie sochinenii v trekh tomakh* [Collected Works in three Volumes] (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1986-1987).

²³¹ See Dmitrii Ivanovich Pisarev, *Istoricheskie eskizy: izbrannye stat'i* [Historical Excuses; Selected Works] (Moscow: Pravda, 1989).

engaged for several decades. Other trends of social thought took the place of *Slavophilism* and *Westernism*, among them populism, Marxism, and liberalism of the constitutional democrats."²³²

The Socialist-Leninist school had the most significant political impact on Russia. This school was close to the *Westerners*, thanks to the fact that communist ideas originate from the West and are not a genuinely Russian product of thinking on Russian nature. As the difference from the *Westerners* the Socialists pursued structuralist approach which was based on historical materialism. Regardless of this theoretical difference Socialists were using the state as the promoter of structural changes which was within the modernization paradigm. It made them similar to many other schools of thought. However, this school changed Russian reality more than any other school by guiding the communist political movement with its modernist social and economic agenda through the seven decades of the USSR. The fact that this school had elaborated and implemented its economic agenda makes it different from other Russian schools of thought. Another thing that makes Socialist school clearly different from other schools of thought is that during the communist period it had a cultural socialization monopoly over several generations of Russian citizens, including the recent political elite. During the 19th century in Russia very similar cultural socialization monopoly existed in the religious upbringing of Russian intelligentsia. Despite the fact that Socialists under the guidance of revolutionaries such as Lenin and Trotsky have managed to change Russian political system and establish socialist government for more than seven decades it could be argued that they represented continuity with *Westerners* rather than shift toward some radically new visions of world nature and Russia's role in it. Significant portion of Western

²³² Valery Kuvakin, 161.

scholarship had rather treated the Soviet Union foreign policy as change from the traditional Russian patterns than as continuity with one of the pre-existing schools of thought. In this scholarship it was attributed that the Soviet Union decision makers were under the perception of constant presence of foreign threats.²³³ At the same time it was attributed that Marxist ideology by advocating the world proletarian revolution is directing Soviet Union toward expansionist foreign policy.²³⁴ As the main evidence for those claims were used Lenin's writings on the nature of imperialism, Komintern's propaganda and advocacy, and practical foreign policy measures, which were often selectively chosen out of Soviet military engagements.

I would rather argue that even if socialists/communists during and after Lenin's years perceived world as an arena of conflicting states, the West as an imposing entity and Russia as isolated and vulnerable this did not represent radically new visions in terms of the 19th century "schools of thought" thinking, especially the one offered by *Westerners*. The practical applications of Socialists' foreign policy measures, as heirs of *Westerners*, corresponded to a larger extent to international circumstances, available power resources and international rules of the game of the time, than to Marxist/Leninist ideological prescriptions or dogmas.²³⁵ Respectively, I would argue that, if Soviet foreign policy was not ideologically Marxist/Leninist motivated it nevertheless maintained the link with other patterns of "schools of thought," primarily the *Westerners* one.²³⁶ An analysis of Soviet foreign policy actions could indicate that despite changes the

²³³ Jonathan Alford, *The Soviet Union: Security Policies and Constraints* (New York, 1985).

²³⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1971).

²³⁵ Margot Light, *The Soviet Theory of International Relations*, (New York, st. Martin's Press: 1988).

²³⁶ Some authors indicated the presence of the same trend but focused more on security dilemma explanations, see *Soviet Foreign Policy: New Dynamics, New Themes*, Carl G. Jacobsen, ed. (London, Macmillan: 1989).

continuity that existed was linked predominantly to *Westerners* end-goals: to make from Russia a modern society which would become the part of an interdependent world by which would be finally solved Moscow's identity, developmental and security dilemmas.

An inside into the Soviet security policy offered by Craig Nation points at the existence of several, more or less, distinct periods of Soviet foreign policy.²³⁷ First phase, "the age of world revolution" (1917-1921) was often portrayed as being the most ideological and Marxism/Leninism driven than it was the case in other periods of Soviet foreign policy. However, Craig Nation offers more balanced analysis by pointing at substantial basis of non-Marxist patterns in Soviet foreign policy conduct. Second phase, the one of "accommodation and retreat" (1921-1928) was transitory period for the third phase of "from collective security to separate peace" (1928-1939). The phases of "the Great Fatherland War" (1941-1945) and "la guerre manquee" (1945-1953) were the introduction for the "coexistence" phase (1953-1964). What is interesting was that during this period the use of tactic was similar to the one prescribed by the *Westerners* with the same endgoal in sight – to maximize Russian chances of modernization. The phases of "détente" (1964-1982) and "new thinking" (1982-1991) represented an even bigger reliance on non-Marxist thought. The phase of "new thinking" for that matter embodied various assumptions, predominantly *Westerners*, so that it became the main source of *Atlanticists* worldviews. This link of *Atlanticists* and Gorbachev's "new thinking" will be outlined in chapter III.

I do believe that it would be beneficial to make a study having a specific focus on the Soviet foreign policy debates. Such a study would most likely reveal the existence of

²³⁷ R. Craig Nation, *Black Earth, Red Star; A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917-1991* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992).

competing worldviews even among seemingly unanimous Socialists but the question is how fundamentally different these worldviews would be from the *Westerners* “school of thought.”

The real uniting point of the 19th century schools of thought, Socialists included, is in their desire to 'change' Russia. The frustration with Russian realities, which was the most present within the intelligentsia, who differed so much from these realities, presented the basis for the call for 'change'. But the 'change' had different meanings. For some this was a call for the change of the political system (*Slavophiles, Westerners, Eurasians*), while for others it presented only a call for the change of borders (*Russian Nationalists, Pan-Slavists*). The reason for 'change' was mainly perceived as a consequence of the wrong direction of Russian development. While some were finding a reason of this wrong direction in the claim that Russia was losing its real nature (*Slavophiles, Russian Nationalists, Pan-Slavists*), others were arguing that it was because Russia was keeping the wrong nature (*Westerners, Eurasians*). But they all had different definitions of Russian nature, and it depended on different philosophical origins of each of these schools.

2.9 Conclusion: 19th and 20th century's linkages

Findings from this chapter indicate that 19th century “schools of thought,” except *Pan-Slavism*, did not significantly influence Russian foreign policy. This limited impact was due to the authoritarian nature of Russian political system and modest role that society could exercise over public policy choices. On the other hand political system of

such a repressive nature made culture, as the society's only liberal domain, crucial in socialization of Russian intelligentsia. The fundamental importance of "schools of thought" was outlined in their metamorphosis into social movements that created intellectual and social base for future public policy prescriptions. "Schools of thought" were able to transmit social demands into public policy prescriptions when the domination of politics over society ended. This happened in the post-communist period when the Russian society progressively more modeled Russian politics. In the post-communist Russia "schools of thought" politically re-emerged on the basis of created social base and through this intellectual allegiance and discourse were able to influence state institutions.

In order to argue that significant connections between 19th and 20th century "schools of thought" existed scrutiny between complexity and stereotyping should be established. This should be done in order to avoid possible misperceptions.²³⁸ For example the perception of Russian schools' unanimity would end up as exaggerated since no unanimity within any of the 19th century "schools of thought" ever existed. A similar claim can be made for the contemporary "schools of thought" on Russian security discourse during the 1990s. However, due to the character of politics as a public affair, in the Russia of the 1990s, it was able to achieve discursive consensus among different "schools of thought." To go back on the issue of whether or not there was unanimity between the "schools of thought" and the state, it should be stressed that, occasionally, significant links between some "schools of thought" and the Russian state existed during

²³⁸ On predominant Western perceptions of the XIX century Russia see Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe; the map of civilization on the mind of the enlightenment* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1994). For the similar account of Western stereotypes of the Balkans see Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

the 19th century. This could be explained less as an influence of public discourse on the state and much more as czars' deliberate 'ideological borrowing' due to demands of strategic calculations. The argument will be made, in following chapters, that security discourse had much more influence over Russian foreign policy, thus over institutions, in the 1990s due to the change of Russian state and society.

An additional potential omission would be to neglect the shift in identity focus and the character of "other" between the 19th and 20th century Russian "schools of thought." The issue of identity or perceptions of the "other" varied in Russian history. Russian 19th century "schools of thought" perceived their "other" in Europe, as a synonym for the West, in terms of ideas and philosophical concepts. Russian 20th century "schools of thought" perceived the West in terms of politics. Therefore, the state and public affairs replaced philosophy. However, significant philosophical foundations and categories from 19th century resonated as the foundations of the 20th century "schools' of thought" worldviews and discourse.

Similar theoretical omission that could be made at the expense of Russian 19th century "schools of thought" would be the inability to situate them more clearly within the framework of modernity/tradition debate. Furthermore, the representation of polarizations among the Russian "schools of thought" along this issue could make an impression as they were clearly against each other. For example, it could be misperceived that *Westerners* were unconditional supporters of modernization and that they rejected everything Russian and glorified everything European. Similarly it could be misperceived that *Slavophiles* were unconditional opponents of modernization and that they rejected everything European and glorified everything Russian. The sophistication of debates

within each of Russian 19th century “schools of thought” and among them indicates to contrary conclusion: Russian 19th century “schools of thought” were much more interlinked and in final analysis almost always argued for the specific “third way” of Russian development. Correspondingly, one more 19th century concept that resonated in contemporary Russia was the pointing at negative consequences of globalization (in the 19th century discourse the contesting issue was modernization) but not the negation of the globalization (modernization) as such. The dilemma of 20th century “schools of thought” was: what policy solution to implement vis-à-vis globalization in order to maintain the identity and strength of the nation (state). The continuity with the 19th century “schools of thought” on this issue was the search for “the third way” – the solution that will change Russia within the framework of its distinctiveness. Thus, the *Slavophiles* notion that Russia cannot be changed along the Western blueprints resonated in the 20th century “schools of thought.” Furthermore, it could be argued that contemporary Russian security discourse resembled to Western post-positivist critical assessment of globalization consequences especially making them close to the critical political economy scholarship. On the other hand Western security discourse mainstream primarily represented advocates of benefits of globalization. It will be argued in following chapters that this clash of visions over globalization consequences was translated into the proposed Russian security proposals of multi-polar world and isolation being negatively perceived by Western policy makers.

Another argument will be raised in following chapters: that these potential paradoxes were translated into how the “schools of thought” of the 1990s were perceived – focusing only on their divisions and not on complementarities. Consequently, by

focusing on divisions the observers were unable to provide an explanation for the emerging alliances and consensus situations among security discourse participants during the 1990s. For example, among 20th century “schools of thought” consensus was reached on globalization issue and shared worldviews and discursive categories were quite instrumental in reaching such a consensus.

There were several important concepts and categories from the 19th century “schools of thought” that resonated into the security discourse of the contemporary “schools of thought”. In contemporary Russia significantly resonated the concept about the character of intelligentsia. Intelligentsia kept its self-perception of being the main debating body in charge of outlining strategies of Russian development. Despite the proliferation of other political actors in contemporary Russian state the intelligentsia was still perceived by the public as the main promoter of political discourse. Thus even as Russian public was less supportive of certain security initiatives during the ‘90s, such as the war in Chechnya, the support of Bosnian Serbs, the anti-NATO and anti-US feelings, the intelligentsia was able to promote those issues through the security discourse.²³⁹

Another concept that resonated in contemporary Russia was the notion of synthetic worldview inaugurated by Alexander Radishchev. This was an attempt of reconciling contradicting natures of human being and history, as well as between materialism and idealism, substance and essence and rationalism and sensualism. Consequently, this

²³⁹ On the split between the popular rejection of the war and the elite bellicose advocacy see Iurii Levada, *Narod i voina: bol'shinstvo protiv*, *Izvestia*, 23 December 1994. Similarly, on the intelligentsia's portrayal of NATO enlargement see Laurence Black, *Russia faces NATO expansion: bearing gifts or bearing arms?* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999). On the split between overwhelming public condemnation of NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and minimal (12%) support for sending Russian volunteers to Serbia see Oksana Bocharova and Natal'ia Kim, “Rossiia i Zapad: obshnost' ili otchuzhdenie?” [Russia and the West: togetherness or alienation] *Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia* 1(2000) 41-45. On the decrease of popular support for backing of the Serbs in the Bosnian conflict to only 19% see Vera Nikitina, “God za godom: 1994” [Year by Year: 1994] *Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia* 3 (1998) 55.

Russian specific philosophical tradition was very often perceived in the West as intentional eclecticism, due to the difficulty of logical positivism to penetrate this quite sophisticated viewpoint. It will be argued in following chapters that this synthetic worldview represented significant feature of contemporary Russian security discourse.

Another 19th century concept that resonated in contemporary Russia was the system of synthetic categories initiated by *Slavophiles* and adopted by the *Westerners*. The continued use of those categories, composed from at least two sub-categories, made for foreign observers quite incomprehensible referent point. The situation with the 20th century “schools of thought” reveals that they keep referring to some of the same categories, especially “people” and “state”. Difficulty for an analysis emerged when those categories were tentatively merged in order to justify materialistic policy objectives of political realism. Their domestication with Western norms and political practices will remain to be a contested analytical issue. This issue of analysis can be related to another concept that resonated in contemporary Russia – the influence of German idealistic philosophy. The foundation of German idealistic philosophy, as an ontological basis, and still vibrant communist heritage of dialectics, as an epistemological basis, made contemporary Russian social and political thinking different from positivist and quite closer to post-positivist Western scholarship. This does not preclude that behaviorist social science scholarship was not present in quite a visible way in contemporary Russia, but that there is a quite substantial and influential ‘non-typical’ scholarship.

The overlap between conservative and liberal was another important concept that resonated in contemporary Russia. Russia’s specific was that Western classification on liberals and conservatives was not always workable model of analysis since Russian

conservatives were also proponents of change and respect of freedoms and parliamentary principles, and, on occasions, advocates of socially-oriented economic principles. Thus, the division on liberals and conservatives in the 1990s should not be situated in the perestroika context of political rivalry between reform-minded and hard-line communists but should be perceived as substantially new debate.

Another 19th century concept that resonated in contemporary Russia was the perception that Russia was more universal than the West. Russia was perceived as multiethnic and multicultural state while the Europe was perceived as composed of nation-states; Russia was perceived as the follower of original Christianity while the Europe abandoned and modified the original Christianity; Russia was perceived at the beginning of its developmental path while the Europe was perceived at decaying developmental phase. This perception was linked to the methodological issue of what is the agency for Russian social thinkers and to the issue of how change happens in philosophy of history. On the issue of agency the prevalence among contemporary Russian thinkers got the notion of nations as cultural-historical types – the concept being mostly developed by the 19th century *Pan-Slavist* thinker Nicholas Danilevsky. This understanding was translated into the contemporary Russian security discourse's notion on Russian distinctiveness. On the issue of philosophy of history the prevalence achieved the concept of evolutionary phases of development. This made perfect sense for all those in Russia who criticized negative effects of globalization, while it also fitted well the dialectic's heritage. It will be argued in the following chapters that the emergence of similar scholarship in the West, particularly the one by Huntington on clashes of civilizations and by Fukuyama on cyclical development and the end of history resulted in

reinforcing these elements of Russian security discourse. During the 1990s the echo of this Russian security discourse, which argued about Russia's specific place in the world resonated as conflictual to Western policy makers. Thus the 19th century *Pan-Slavists* claim that different historic-cultural types exist and that there should not be any political subordination among them but the division of spheres of interest and establishment of balance of power resonated to Western policy makers in the same way as Soviet-style opposition to capitalist countries.

Consequently, this revokes *Slavophiles* notion of a "divided world" resulting in an opposite claim to the globalization paradigm of "one world." This positioning of Russia outside of Europe made link with the 20th century policy options that argued for isolation and orientation toward Asia. Furthermore, the 19th century *Eurasianist* argument by Leontyev about Russia's dual identity as a Slav-Oriental civilization is in harmony with the notion of "divided world" and the 20th century agenda of multi-polar world, "alternative alliances" and partnership-search in Asia. The 19th century *Eurasian* argument for the state autarky in economy as the best prescription for the maintenance of its identity and security resonated in the 20th century security discourse as the temporary isolationist prescription for Russia's developmental challenges.

Finally, what links the 19th century Russian "schools of thought" to the contemporary ones was the context of political crisis and the quest of reform. In the 1990s emerged a frustration with Russian reality, and again most vocal and articulated was the group most frustrated by this reality, the intelligentsia. This time the intelligentsia was much larger and professional oriented, but state dependent in terms of its social standard, therefore it significantly varied from the 19th century one. As an analogy, it

could be argued that as the failed 1848 revolutions provoked disillusionment among *Westerners* and their orientation from citizen-oriented social contract based society toward nation-state concept in the similar way the bitter experiences of the 1991 economic reform in Russia, and multiplication of crisis in “near abroad” and NATO interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo through the 1991-1999 period oriented Russian intelligentsia’s discourse toward foreign policy and security issues. In the following chapter (chapter III) I will try to follow the argumentation of these new “schools of thought” on the example of the foreign policy debate especially around the issue of Russian national interest in the 1991-95 period.

CHAPTER III

3. The new “schools of thought” on Russian dilemmas (1990-1996)

3.1 Introduction

The goal of this chapter is to present the process of emergence of contemporary Russian “schools of thought” by focusing on the 1990-1996 period. This emergence appeared as a heritage of 19th century “schools of thought.” The objective of this chapter is to provide an understanding of how ideas influenced institutions, or more specifically of how specific national culture influenced public policy choices. The focus of such an inquiry will be on foreign policy debate in Russia. This debate was manifested in growing intelligentsia’s opposition to foreign policy implemented by Andrei Kozyrev, Minister of Foreign Affairs. The method used in this and in following two chapters is combination of historical and thematic analysis. The advantage of such a method is twofold. This method will allow an inside into the chronological evolution of the post-communist alliance politics in Russian society as well as into the discourse and ideas presented by “schools of thought.” The discourse (text and speech) will be analyzed along the lines of policy proposals and worldviews expressed by the contemporary “schools of thought” on the core foreign policy beliefs of: identity, security and prosperity.

3.2 Perestroika legacy

During the late 1980s, the approaching end of communist party monopoly and the emergence of freedom of speech set the conditions for the re-emergence of plurality in political expression in Russia. The initial impetus for political opening-up provided by Gorbachev in the USSR was followed by Yeltsin's even more radical changes in Russia. By the end of 1980s political organizations, NGOs, mass media, academic conferences and, most visibly, the sessions of the Congress of People's Deputies were actors and avenues for the expression and articulation of different views and assessments of the Russian past, present and future.²⁴⁰ At that point (1988-1991) the relationship between continuity and change indicated that continuity of perestroika legacy was dominant feature of Russian politics, especially political thought. Perestroika discourse imposed certain framework on debate participants. This framework implied, despite the allowed freedom of speech and political expression, that Soviet crisis could be halted by more creative implementation of Lenin's and Marx's thinking, preserving the federal state and federal communist party. During the 1990-91 period the content of Russian political thought and discourse gradually departed from the perestroika framework.²⁴¹ This change is evident in any overview of influential Russian academic journals (serving as indicators of intelligentsia's discourse). For example, although the periodical *Voprosy Filosofii* debated social and theoretical issues related to perestroika throughout the 1990-

²⁴⁰ On political debates in Soviet Russia see Yitzhak M. Brudny, *Reinventing Russia; Russian Nationalism and the Soviet State, 1953-1991* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1998).

²⁴¹ On developments in Soviet philosophy during the 1980s see Evert Van Der Zweerde, "Recent Developments in Soviet Historiography of Philosophy," *Studies in Soviet Thought* 39, 1(1989), 1-55.

91 period, it also introduced a variety of articles on Russian culture and traditional Russian philosophers focused on re-evaluating their heritage. During the same period, almost exclusively, *Nash Sovremennik*, the influential periodical of the writers' association, offered articles that were critical of Soviet practices, and presented an open forum for former dissidents' views. The same periodical was the first to introduce to Russian post-communist discourse the ideas of Russian rebirth and the debate between *Westerners* and *Slavophiles*.²⁴² On the other hand, *Svobodnaya Mysl'*, an academic journal of reform minded scholars, focused primarily on comparative analysis of the international experience in transition with only a few traditional Russian themes. This variety of theoretical viewpoints on the Russian past and present and, above all, on the future Russian developmental path created a qualitatively different situation from that of perestroika discourse. As the perestroika discourse represented a plurality within the socialist framework, the further fragmentation in the field of ideas created a substantially new situation by the end of the 1990-91 period. However, this fragmentation of Russian discursive space and the flourishing of new ideas and worldviews did not create an anarchical, open-ended number of approaches. It could be argued that rather few, more or less, coherent "schools of thought" emerged to replace perestroika discourse. These new "schools of thought" had their foundations in the Russian traditional 19th century "schools of thought". However, despite the richness of the new "schools' of thought" of political thinking, the focus of this analysis will only be on the foreign policy debate and security discourse emerging from this debate. During the 1990-1996 period several contending

²⁴² See Mikhail Nazarov, "Zapadniki i pochveniki, ili rasseyeniye dvuglavogo orla," [Westerners and Pochvennikhs, or dividing the two-head Eagle] *Nash Sovremennik*, 9 (1990): 133-143.

“schools of thought” participated in the security discourse: *Democratic forces, Atlanticists, Nationalists, Neo-Eurasians, National-Patriots*.

All the new “schools of thought” across the Russian political spectrum demonstrated a desire and interest in participating in the debate on the new Russian foreign policy. Therefore, the foreign policy debate was a process of discussions regarding the vital national interests of the country and its security dilemmas in the new post-cold war environment. In the following chapter the focus of analysis will be centered on the period during which Andrey Kozyrev headed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that is, from 1990 to 1996. The three phases of emerging discourses of the various “schools of thought” in Russian foreign policy that were current during this period will be outlined and analyzed.

3.3 Phase one: Unconditional cooperation with the West (1990-1992)

Russian foreign policy in this first period following perestroika largely had its origins in the perceptions and values of the winners who emerged from the USSR's political struggles in 1990 and 1991.²⁴³ These conflicts were essentially the struggle of Russian “democrats” against communism and Soviet federal structures. As will be explained later, many Russian groups with different political orientation, or without any articulated political orientations, stayed together throughout these conflicts. The culmination of these struggles against communist and federal structures occurred during

²⁴³ On the more profound foreign policy perceptions of the Soviet era, see Y.S. Borisov, A.V. Golubev, M.M. Kudukina, V.A. Nevezhin, eds. *Russia and the West: The development of foreign policy stereotypes in the consciousness of the Russian society of the first half of 20th century* (Queenston, Ontario: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1999).

the Moscow coup in August 1991.²⁴⁴ The military coup, with its intentions of preserving socialist political system and revitalizing the federation, presented a catalyst which helped to unite all the anti-Communist and anti-federal forces together in one bloc.²⁴⁵ This bloc of political forces can be called *Democratic forces*.²⁴⁶ However, it should be mentioned that the name *Democratic forces* originates more from how they labeled themselves vis-à-vis hard-line communists, and how they were perceived on the West, than by any coherence in the democratic content of this group. Originally, these forces contained such various groups as reform communists, liberals, Russian nationalists, religious groups, ecologists, human rights groups, regional groups, oppressed ethnic groups, veterans, etc, to the extent that many of them would hardly agree on how to define or implement, for example, a liberalist (pluralist) notion of democracy.²⁴⁷ However, there were some common features in the world-view of this bloc.

The *Democratic forces* saw the world as divided between two poles: the democratic world and the totalitarian world. This reductionist polarization is evident in the perception of the *Democratic forces* that Russia was developing in the wrong direction because it adhered to a flawed domestic political system. In the view of the *Democratic forces*, the nature of the domestic political system determined whether Russia was included in the democratic world, or the totalitarian world. This school was based on

²⁴⁴ See Martin Sixsmith, *Moscow Coup; The Death of the Soviet System* (London: Simon & Schuster, 1991).

²⁴⁵ For pro-coup arguments see the book by the USSR's former Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, *Gorbachev-putch; Avgust iznutri* [Gorbachev-coup; August from within] (Moscow: Business World, 1993). For against-coup arguments see *Putch; hronika trevoznykh dnei* [Coup; Chronicle of Troubling Days] (Moscow: Progress, 1991).

²⁴⁶ See in A.Lukin, "Predstavlenie "demokraticeskikh" grupp o vneshnem mire (1985-1991)," ['Democratic' Groups' Perceptions about the World] *MEMO* 8 (1995): 104-114.

²⁴⁷ Reform communists would object to Dahl's model of pluralism for one reason, while, for other reasons, it would be objected to by religious groups, or by groups that were coming from civil society, or by Russian nationalists. See, Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy; participation and opposition* (New Haven: Yale U. P. 1971) and Robert Dahl, *Democracy and its critics* (New Haven: Yale U. P. 1989).

the notion of change in society arising from its modernization, and as a part of the same modernization paradigm it advocated that Russia has to become democratic.²⁴⁸ Therefore, according to the *Democratic forces*, the USSR, due to its totalitarian domestic system, belonged to the group of countries with a totalitarian foreign policy. Consequently, according to the same argument, the new Russia, as a democratic state, should by definition adopt a democratic foreign policy. The discursive practice of the *Democratic forces* represented some degree of continuity with perestroika. The categories of the common good and common interest found in the vocabulary of this “school of thought” were more or less borrowed from Gorbachev’s “new thinking” policy.²⁴⁹ The category of common interest was based on legalist and ecologist approaches to international relations. The *Democratic forces’* understanding of legalist arguments was in terms of advocacy for the rule of law, but not necessarily for the creation of world government. The understanding of ecologist arguments of this “school of thought” was based on the concept that only multilateral action could prevent the degradation of environment. Therefore, it was more reductionist than Gorbachev’s original “new thinking” proposal that sought to challenge all realist state-oriented approaches to world politics. The category of common good employed in the foreign policy thinking of the *Democratic forces* was based on the plus-sum game theory (a.k.a. win-win scenario) of international relations. This theory advocates the possibility of having benefits of interaction for both participants, as opposed to the zero-sum games scenario where one participant’s gain

²⁴⁸ But having in mind all heterogeneity of the “democratic forces” it is maybe better to say that it was clear what should be point of rejection and departure from, but much less was clear what for all its members presented point of desire or arrival.

²⁴⁹ See Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev *Perestroika: global challenge; our common future* (Nottingham, England: Spokesman, 1988); Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev *Perestroika I novoe myshlenie dlia nashei strany I dlia vsego mira* [Perestroika and new thinking for our country and for the whole world] (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1987).

represents a loss for the other participant. The dominant assumption was that, after a long period of alienation, two super powers are entering a new era. "Relations should be without ideological dogmas, military-strategic and geopolitical rivalry, as opposite to Soviet-American relations."²⁵⁰ This assumption was a basis for the expectation of what the West (primarily the USA) should do with Russia.²⁵¹ For example, Kozyrev boldly called the West to offer "unorthodox" help.²⁵² These expectations of the West's role were related to: large humanitarian and technical assistance; the participation of major Western companies in large projects in Russia; aid to the private sector; the facilitation of Russian exports.²⁵³ Therefore, on the basis of such perceptions, the foreign policy agenda was expressed in the slogan "Partnership with the West".

However, the unity of the *Democratic forces* lasted no longer than the old Soviet system. In August 1991, once Russia was established as an independent state and the old "communist" system was dismantled, the *Democratic forces* started to fragment into a variety of political parties with different agendas.²⁵⁴ The group that institutionally inherited the ruling position were the *Atlanticists*. The most prominent figures of this "school of thought" were Andrei Kozyrev, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Egor Gaidar, Russian Prime Minister, and economist Evgenii Yavlinskii, the leader of YABLOKO political party. The most vocal opponents of the *Atlanticists* were the *Nationalists*. The *Nationalists* represented a broad, often internally irreconcilable, spectrum of political

²⁵⁰ Spandarian V.B., "Rossiisko-amerikanskii ekonomicheskie svyazi: neotlozhnye zadachi," [Russian-American Economic Relations: Urgent Tasks] *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologia* 6 (1992): 3.

²⁵¹ Russian diplomat Sergei Kortunov expressed these expectations by predicting that "growing economic interdependence and an objective need to solve global problems of world development by joint efforts are becoming powerful political integration factors for both countries." See Sergei Kortunov, "Toward a new pattern of strategic relationship," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 10 (1991): 21.

²⁵² See Andrei Kozyrev, "Russia: A chance for survival," *Foreign Affairs* 2 (Spring 1992): 1-17.

²⁵³ V.B. Spandarin, 3-9.

²⁵⁴ Though, the old communist system was in constant change since 1985.

forces with a communist and labor orientation and a significant number of populist and patriotic movements and parties as well. The most prominent figures with this discursive orientation were Genadiy Zyuganov, chairman of the Communist Party successor KPRF; Sergei Baburin, leader of the "Russia's Path" movement; Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of the LDPR; Alexander Prokhanov, editor of the daily *Zavtra*; Alexander Dugin, leader of the "Pamiat" movement; and Eduard Limonov, leader of the "National Bolshevik Front".²⁵⁵

However, in the initial period of Russian independence, Moscow's foreign policy was mainly a product of the *Democratic forces* way of thinking. Therefore, the foreign policy of Russia in 1991-92 institutionally implemented by the *Atlanticists* was based on the arguments *Democratic forces* made in the 1989-90 period. These arguments had the goal of discrediting the old bureaucratic-communist structures of the USSR. It is interesting that during the 1991-1992 period the *Democratic forces* did not make a case against the policy of "new thinking" introduced by Gorbachev and Shevernadze.

Other categories of interest for foreign policy conduct that the *Democratic forces* employed originated with the theory of convergence. These categories negated balance of power and conflict as determinants of international life. Therefore, the *Democratic forces* favored the harmonious development of inter-state relations on the basis of the mutual benefits of such cooperation. Consequently, they sought to put the individual in the place of the state as supreme actor in international relations. This was directly linked to the orientation of the *Democratic forces* vis-à-vis domestic policy. The goal in domestic policy was to place the state under the control of the individual and in the service of the individual. This goal was a response to long-term frustration with the totalitarian system

²⁵⁵ Alain O.J. Londes, 18-40.

of the USSR. However, by demanding discontinuity in domestic policy with the old regime, the *Democratic forces* sought a change in the old regime's foreign policy as well. Finally, at the end of 1991, once they were in power, rejection of Soviet foreign policy was one of the first measures they implemented.

When the *Democratic forces* came to power in August 1991, they began to fragment into more articulated and contraposed political groups. Regarding the issue of foreign policy, these groups were defined by some authors as: *Westerners*, *Russian Nationalists* and *Eurasians*.²⁵⁶ I would argue that confusion is created by the use of these names, as these 20th century "schools of thought" were not the same as their 19th century predecessors. In order to avoid this confusion, I will continue to use a typology that differentiates those groups into *Atlanticists*, *Nationalists*, *Neo-Eurasians*, and, in the case of a broad coalition of the last two groups, the *National-Patriots*. *Atlanticists* is a better term than *Westerners*, since the reference point were Atlantic security and economic partners and integration frameworks, as well as Anglo-Saxon liberal democracy traditions and economic free market prescriptions. *Nationalists* is a better term than *Russian nationalists*, since there was more of an orientation on inclusiveness based on culture, language and common citizenship instead of exclusiveness based on ethnicity that the name *Russian nationalists* would imply. *Neo-Eurasians* is a better term than *Eurasians* since there was a positive view on Europe as opposed to the original 19th century *Eurasianism*'s rejection of everything Western.

In Russia in 1991-92, the understanding of security was almost exclusively related to strategic security and to the global issues. It was notable that much more attention was

²⁵⁶ A. Lukin, p 105 and Francoise Thom, "Eurasianism: a new Russian foreign policy?" *Uncaptive Minds* (Summer 1994): 65-79.

related to the START-2 issues than to the imminent threats emerging from the wars in the 'near abroad'.²⁵⁷ This fact could be attributed to the inertia of the old Soviet way of thinking which dealt with security only in global strategic terms. On the other hand it could be also attributed to the outward attention of foreign policy debate participants. They believed, optimistically, that the change of the domestic political system had resolved once and for all the links and tensions between domestic and foreign policy. It was only in the later part of 1992 that the understanding of security shifted gradually from a global to a national security.

This change originated from a re-evaluation of the nature of the 'new world order'.²⁵⁸ The emphasis on re-evaluation was on the nature of the new international system and on the nature of Russia. Therefore, the initial perception of the *Democratic forces* regarding the division of the world along democratic and totalitarian lines and the primacy of the common good in international relations was given serious reconsideration. An examination of Russian emerging security discourse could shed light on the nature of this change in approach.

²⁵⁷ In 1991-1992 editorials in the review *International Affairs* (Moscow) dealing with global issues, and in particular with START-2, impressively outnumbered articles dealing with Russian national security and wars in the 'near abroad'. This was probably due to the predominant view of the authors favouring the independence of the former Soviet republics as events in the 'near abroad' led in that direction. The *Democratic forces* did not anticipate collision of interests of Russian minority living in the 'near abroad' with the emergence of independent post-Soviet republics.

²⁵⁸ Initially, the term "new world order", coined by the US President George Bush, was used as synonym for the "post-cold war order". However, this Bush's term, despite the fact that American administration did not proceed to use it further since its resemblance of Hitler's rhetoric, kept an unfriendly and pejorative echo in Russia, being primarily understood as synonym for American dictate.

3.3.1 Rival discourses emerge: Stankevich - Kozyrev Debate

The first sign of differences and coming disputes over Russian foreign policy came in summer 1992 in the polemic between Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev (representing the *Atlanticists* viewpoint) and Presidential adviser Sergei Stankevich²⁵⁹ (representing an emerging *National-Patriotic* viewpoint)²⁶⁰ that was described in a *Izvestia* newspaper article on the Moldovan crisis.²⁶¹ The Moldovan crisis erupted in 1991-92 as a conflict between the nationalist Moldovan militia and the Russian-speaking population on the left bank of Dniestr river.²⁶² The 14th Soviet Army stationed in this region intervened to support the Russian-speaking minority.

In this polemic, Kozyrev argued for a peaceful means of crisis resolution in Moldova. He supported a dialogue between the conflicting sides instead of sanctions and punishment of the presumed culprit. The argument he raised posited that, in ethnic warfare, civilians are victims and the armed are the culprits, while Stankevich argued that one side in the conflict is the victim and the other side is the aggressor. Kozyrev, in his speeches, for the first time, used the category 'war party' which he later used often in the Yugoslav crisis to depict discursive groups in Russia that were proponents of a military solution in solving ethnic conflicts.²⁶³ Kozyrev stressed that the legacy of the Soviet

²⁵⁹ Stankevich's article "Derzhava v poiskah sebia," *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 28 March 1992, was the first to openly problematize *Atlanticist* foreign policy assumptions.

²⁶⁰ Since Stankevich did not belong either to the *Nationalists* or *Neo-Eurasians* discourses, I would argue that he represented a predecessor of emerging *National-Patriots* worldviews.

²⁶¹ See A. Kozyrev "Partiia voyny nastupaet," *Izvestiia* 30 June 1992, and S. Stankevich, "Poka nikomu ne udavalos' polnostiu iskluchit' silu iz arsenala politiki," *Izvestiia* 7 July 1992.

²⁶² See *Moldova: Chronology of Events June 1940 - February 1993* (Ottawa: Immigration and Refugee Board, April 1993); Vlada Tkach, "Moldova and Transdnistria: Painful Past, Deadlocked Present, Uncertain Future," *European Security* 8, 2 (Summer 1999) 130-160.

²⁶³ This way he managed to establish the discursive practice that was depicting dualistic nature of debate participants - those who were for war ('war party') and those who were for peace ('peace party').

Union left many hot spots in Russia's neighborhood and, if they were going to be resolved by the use of force, then continuous warfare would be the Russia's future.

The counterproductive nature of this approach, argued Kozyrev, was evident in the Moldovan case. For the sake of intervention in the Trans-Dniestr region where 150,000 Russians lived, Moscow abandoned 450,000 Russians who live in the rest of Moldova.²⁶⁴ Kozyrev said that his main concerns were the lives of people and long-term relations between Russia and Moldova. The prevalence of these two concerns was going to be quite visible in the case of the former Yugoslavia where Russian foreign policy, formulated mainly by Kozyrev, stemmed from the same base. Therefore, concern for citizens and emphasis on the long-term benefits of friendly relations for the Russian state became strong elements in Russian foreign policy. Consequently it could be argued that Kozyrev's discourse became operationalized and implemented as the state policy.

The opposing discourse in this polemic over Moldova, articulated by Stankevich, argued for the use of both force and negotiations at the same time. He believed that 150,000 Russian on the left bank of Dniestr river should not be sacrificed for the well-being of 450,000 Russians who lived in the rest of Moldova. This proposal could be labeled the "two-track policy", similar to the approach used by NATO in dealing with Yugoslavia during the Kosovo crisis in 1999.²⁶⁵ It is noteworthy that Stankevich did not see countries as equal partners but argued that some could have 'special interests' and 'historical rights' to interfere in the affairs of others. He replaced the category of sovereignty in legal terms with a category of sovereignty in terms of power.

²⁶⁴ On the pre- and post-war ethnic situation in Moldova see *Moldova: Internal Flight Alternatives* (Ottawa: Immigration and Refugee Board, July 1993).

²⁶⁵ The "two track policy" represented the continuation of diplomatic efforts while the military efforts, including the use of force, were performed against the non-compliant state.

Consequently, if a state is unable to demonstrate power, there is no international law to protect its rights.²⁶⁶ Stankevich also argued that ideological categories such "pride", "dignity" and "respect" are more important than legal categories such as "sovereignty", and "non-interference in domestic affairs". Therefore, he argued, categories of "pride", "dignity" and "respect" are linked to the state's ability to exercise power whenever it was necessary. Therefore, according to Stankevich, Russia had to start with military interventions in the "near abroad". However, the relevance of these categories for Russian citizens is a question Stankevich did not answer, though it could be presumed that, his stance being based on neo-realism, perhaps he believed that benefits for Russian citizens would eventually be obtained as a result of increased state power.

In nationalistic warfare, Kozyrev argued, the process develops according to a spiraling formula of action-reaction, reaction to reaction etc., while Stankevich perceived the same event as an emergence of a challenger to the regional stability. Consequently, Kozyrev argued for peaceful resolution through negotiations while Stankevich argued for the restoration of security and order through the use of military arbitrage and victory by the use of force. While for Kozyrev it was important not to start with hostilities, for Stankevich what was important was who initiated the hostilities. While Kozyrev argued that it is important not to allow emotions to lead political processes, Stankevich practically argued for the use of emotions under the formula of "intervention to save face" thinking, primarily arguing of a possible "domino effect" caused by failure to oppose a rival.²⁶⁷ By using emotions in political judgment, Stankevich, practically speaking, was forced to place responsibility for hostilities on the 'other' side. This use of

²⁶⁶ "Power, of course, will never replace diplomacy and law, but unfortunately, nobody has yet been able to eliminate power from the instruments of state-to-state relations." – S. Stankevich, *Izvestia* 7 July 1992.

²⁶⁷ S. Stankevich, *Izvestia* 7 July 1992.

emotions opened up the space for the introduction of culturally specific categories into the foreign policy discourse and strongly underlined the importance of prompt, visible and skillful communication with the public.²⁶⁸ It appeared that the *Atlanticists* messages did not resonate as well with Russian public as did those of the *National-Patriots*. Several Western scholars noted this debate, describing it as a clash between “*Atlanticists* and *Eurasians*”.²⁶⁹ The points that were noted, such as the inclusion of culture and tradition into the security discourse, the clearly democratic nature of the *National-Patriots*, and linkages to 19th century Russian scholarship, attributed major significance to this dialogue.²⁷⁰ It was noteworthy that the *National-Patriots* were present in state institutions and the academic community to the same extent as the *Atlanticists* but their discourse was not dominant. Besides Stankevich, who was, at the time, Yeltsin’s top policy adviser, other prominent opponents of the *Atlanticists* viewpoint were Russian State Secretary, Gennadii Barbulis, and scholars such as Aleksei Malashenko, Sergei Goncharov, Aleksei Vasil’ev, Aleksei Bogaturov and Mikhail Kozhokin.

In the upcoming political discourse of 1992-1993, cultural heritage as well as political interests started resonating as motivations for foreign policy action. It could be argued that this effort ‘to save face’ resulted in a qualitative change in foreign policy debate in years to come. This debate between Kozyrev and Stankevich represented the main differences between the *Atlanticists* and *National-Patriots* on the issue of foreign

²⁶⁸ In an interview with the U.S. TV network PBS (2400, 31 January 2000), Yegor Gaidar, the first Russian post-communist PM, admitted that one of the main mistakes of his team, Kozyrev included, was that they were not politicians but technocrats. In his view this fact attributed to their inability to communicate in an acceptable and efficient way their policies to public and other domestic political partners.

²⁶⁹ See Alexander Rahr, “‘Atlanticists’ versus ‘Eurasians’ in Russian Foreign Policy,” *RFE/RL Research Report* 1, 22 (29 May 1992) 17-23.

²⁷⁰ Alexander Rahr, 20-21.

policy. These differences were going to be more and more clearly articulated as political space became better organized following the parliamentary elections in 1993.

3.3.2 Emerging political alliances

In the second part of 1992, the nature of the international system was perceived, by Russian security discourse participants, more and more as a multi-polar system rather than a system divided between democratic and totalitarian states. The benefiting role of the 'new centers of power in the multi-polar world' was defined on the realist theory premises. The perception that the key to Russia's becoming one of the new centers of power lay in meeting Russia's main security interests, which were within the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) was gaining ground.²⁷¹ Outspoken proponents of this viewpoint were Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoi,²⁷² Parliamentary Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov,²⁷³ and Yevgeny Ambartsumov, the Chairman of the Parliament's Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations.

It could be argued that the *Atlanticists* were initially quite disinterested in CIS region to the extent that in early 1992 Yeltsin even asked for CIS troops withdrawal from Nagorno Karabakh and the subsequent deployment of NATO troops in this war-ridden area.²⁷⁴ The *Atlanticists* were under constant domestic pressure over the CIS issues to the extent that, only one year later, Kozyrev proposed that the UN sanction Russian troops

²⁷¹ See Rogov S.M., "Rossia i SShA v mnogopoliarnom mire," [Russia and the US in the Multi-polar World] *SShA; Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologia* 10 (1992): 3-15.

²⁷² See Aleksandr Rutskoi, *Obretenie very* [Converting Faith] (Moscow: 1995).

²⁷³ See Ruslan Khasbulatov, *Vybor sud'by; stat'i, vystupleniia, interv'iu* [Choice of Destiny; Articles, Addresses, Interviews] (Moscow: Respublika, 1993); *Vlast'; razmyshleniia spikera* [Power; Speaker's Reflections] (Moscow: Tsentr delovoi informatsii, 1992); *Velikaia rossiiskaia tragediia* [Great Russian Tragedy] (Moscow: TOO SIMS, 1994).

²⁷⁴ Alexander Rahr, 19.

peacekeeping in this region as a “blue helmets” mission.²⁷⁵ This change in foreign policy could be attributed to the evolution of ideas from security discourse into the state institutions.

At the same time, a parallel, and complementary rather than contradictory, perception emerged in Russia regarding the nature of the 'new world order'. This order was perceived as a division of the world between the center and the periphery.²⁷⁶ Russia, as a producer of raw materials, was perceived as belonging to periphery.²⁷⁷ But, if Russia wanted to be in the center, it could only achieve this by relying on her own forces since the transition from the periphery to the center would not be supported by the center. This line of the argumentation was based on the Western and Latin American dependency theory but the specific Russian contribution was the geo-strategic angle of analysis: strategic power replaced capitalist economy as ontological unit of analysis. The argument here was in connected protection of common economic and strategic “space” (*prostranstvo*), that Russia should perform with other Soviet republics.²⁷⁸ Therefore, relations between the center and periphery are conflictual and based on the domination of the more powerful. These two perceptions (the *multi-polar world* and the *center-*

²⁷⁵ See Suzanne Crow, “Russia Seeks Leadership in Regional Peacekeeping,” *RFE/RL Research Report* 2, 15 (9 April 1993): 28-33.

²⁷⁶ As a great review of debate on this issue see, Tarasov A.A., Tsymburskii V.L., “Rossia: na puti k doktrine natsionalnoi bezopasnosti,” [Russia: Toward National Security Doctrine] *SShA; Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologia* 12 (1992): 23-33. It is interesting to mention that the authors predicted a revival of egocentrism and isolationism rather than ‘messianic expansion’ (imperialism) as the paradigm of Russian foreign policy in future.

²⁷⁷ The argument about dangers of Russian “Kuwaitisation” was raised by several economists, most notably by Aleksandr Vladislavlev. This argument advocated for stop in industrial production decline otherwise Russia would end as mono sector country – exporter of oil. This would replicate social structure of Kuwait: huge social division among small group related to oil production and the pauperized rest of society. In political terms it would profile Russia’s future along Mexico, Venezuela and Peru experiences. See Aleksandr Vladislavlev, *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 11 July 1992: 4.

²⁷⁸ See Alekssei Bogaturov & Mihail Kozhokin, *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 26 March 1992: 4. This argument was later fully developed by *Neo-Eurasians*. See N.P. Gusakov & N.A. Zotova, *Natsional’nye interesy i vneshneekonomicheskaya bezopasnost’ Rossii* [National Interests and Foreign Economic Security] (Moscow: Evraziiskii region, 1998).

periphery world) definitely replaced the old perception that saw the world as inevitably oriented toward multilateral cooperation based on the predominance of common interests. However, it is noteworthy that two emerging perceptions were not contraposed to each other but clearly opposed the “Atlanticists”’ image of the *world divided between democratic and totalitarian states*. The political alliance of the proponents of two former worldviews was more or less announced in the pages of *Sovetskaia Rossiia* in September 1992 when “A Political Declaration of the Left and Right Opposition” was published.²⁷⁹

At the same time, another discursive category, the question of the nature of Russia, was being re-examined by foreign policy debate participants, rendering obsolete and unsophisticated the dominant 1990-91 understanding that Russia was essentially democratic. During 1992-93 the category of nature of Russia was addressed from two different standpoints.²⁸⁰ First, the **meta-historical** view represented the national character of Russia as something static in time and space and irreconcilable with the West.²⁸¹ Therefore, the conclusion was that Russia is a world onto its own and that she should have a special status in international relations. Proponents of this viewpoint were primarily Solzhenytsin-style dissidents, representatives of the academic, artistic, and clerical communities.

The second position problematized the evolution of Russian identity in its post-Soviet phase.²⁸² Two main concepts were offered regarding to the dilemma of how

²⁷⁹ A. Londes, 32. The use of terms “Left and Right Opposition” should practically mean “the entire opposition.”

²⁸⁰ This identity category was often referred to as the ‘Russian idea’, and it encompassed the search for the best blueprint to ‘change’ Russia towards desired development. Due to its strategic policy prescriptive content, this category had a clear security implication.

²⁸¹ Lapitskii M.I., “Dva folklor - dva kharaktera,” [Two Folk Cultures – Two Characters] *SShA; Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologia* 10 (1992): 15-27, offered a very interesting comparison of the “Russian soul” and “American pragmatism.”

²⁸² Therefore, the accent was on its dynamic nature in time and space.

Russian identity is expressed: **nationhood and statehood**.²⁸³ The concept of nationhood or integrative Russian nationalism (*'ruskost'*) was supported by: the liberal-populists (Zhirinovskiy); the communist party nomenclature and new entrepreneurs related to local communist party branches; senior army officials and young officers; and patriotic organizations, such as "Pamiat". The concept of statehood (*'derzhavnost'*) was based on the adoption of the US state-centered model of national identity, and the *Atlanticists* of the *Democratic forces* supported it.²⁸⁴ This concept argued for a citizenship-based identity. However, it could be argued that these two concepts were not that irreconcilable since they both argued for the respect of human rights and minorities' rights. The main difference was that the nationhood one was more based on language, historical memory, culture and the state while the statehood one was based on the rule of law protected by the state. The prominent role attributed to the state agency in both concepts would be an important element for the eventual merger of the two concepts in consensual discourse a few years later.

Despite this division in the identity creation of political space, a new foreign policy concept did not appear to be that vital for Russian politicians during 1992. There were several reasons for the lack of coherent initiatives for a new foreign policy concept. During 1992 Russia had distinctive relations with the "near abroad". These relations were based more on traditional Soviet domestic policy – the inertia principle - than on some new foreign policy principles. A new foreign policy program was not deemed necessary. Another reason for the lack of coherent initiatives for a new foreign policy concept was

²⁸³ For the close association between belief, nationality, and the state in Russian history see Stephen White, *Political Culture and Soviet Politics* (London: The Macmillan Press, 1979), 39.

²⁸⁴ As an excellent review of this debate see, Bogaturov A.D., Kozhokin M.M., Pleshakov K.V., "Vneshnaia politika Rossii," [Foreign Policy of Russia] *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologia* 10 (1992): 27-42.

that, during 1992, Russia did not have significant problems or intensive relations with the world beyond the CIS. Therefore, professional diplomatic activity was conducted without requiring previous elaboration in the form of a precise concept.²⁸⁵ Thus Russian foreign policy remained the exclusive domain of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the focus on the "near abroad".²⁸⁶ In Kozyrev's own assessment, this phase was based on three initiatives: to define Russia's international role; to avoid further disintegration and a "Yugoslav-type" scenario; to create partnership-style relationships with Western democracies.²⁸⁷ Consequently, in this phase, the security discourse ideas did not decisively influence the main foreign policy institution – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

However, there were institutional and political changes that terminated the foreign policy monopoly of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Institutionally, this monopoly over foreign policy was counterbalanced by the Security Council, later created under the secretary Yuri Skokov,²⁸⁸ and by the more prominent role of the Ministry of Defense (led by General Pavel Grachev) and Foreign Intelligence Services (headed by Evgeny Primakov). Creation of the Security Council represented President's attempt to have a more visible role in foreign policy decision making as well as to have more transparent policy aggregation process by incorporating into Security Council representatives from several federal ministries and agencies. "The Security Council was designed to be a consultative body that would make recommendations and proposals, and prepare decisions for the President of the Russian Federation on security matters... The Council

²⁸⁵ This explanation was offered by V. Sogrin, "Novaya ideologiya dlia Rossii: drama iz sovremenoy istorii," [New Ideology for Russia; A Drama from Contemporary History] *MEMO* 10 (1993): 5-17.

²⁸⁶ A. Abramov, "Rossia: nacionalniaya bezopasnost v 90-e gody," *MEMO* 7 (1994): 10.

²⁸⁷ See Andrey Kozyrev, *Preobrazhenie* [Transformation] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnie otnosheniya, 1995), 53-54.

²⁸⁸ The Security Council was created by the Presidential decree No. 547 on June 3, 1992. For the chronology of the Security Council see <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/>.

contains both a Foreign Policy Commission and a Defense Security Commission. The role of these commissions is to oversee foreign policy and security decisions, including the right to recommend policy 'improvements.'²⁸⁹ Politically, this situation changed after the December 1993 parliamentary elections, when newly elected political forces began to focus on Russian foreign policy much more. At that time the *Democratic forces* completely disintegrated into political parties and electoral blocs. But, the ground for a clear division of perceptions on national interest was, as shown earlier, prepared in the second part of 1992.

Throughout 1993 the *Atlanticists* maintained institutional power by holding crucial governmental offices but constituted an electoral minority, and had no possibility of creating a workable parliamentary alliance with other political forces. The *Nationalists* and *Neo-Eurasians* formed a vocal and powerful opposition. These two groups could be called a *National-Patriotic* bloc due to their common effort to challenge the government's position in the field of foreign policy. In general, the main argument the opposition used against the government was the critical stage of the national economy and the negative consequences on all of society of Yelstin's reforms.²⁹⁰ From that fact emerged the debate on the nature of prosperity, and on the way to achieve it. The *National-Patriotic* bloc put the state, and not the individual, at center stage. The state was perceived as a provider of the common good, and, at the same time, as protector of the common interest. This approach understood the state as an agent of change. It was different from the *Atlanticists'* understanding of common interest that was not agent-centered but oriented toward the definition of 'the rules of the game'. In this respect, the *Atlanticists* differ from

²⁸⁹ See Rosemary Yeremian, "Russia's relations with CIS states in the context of NATO expansion 1991-1998: A complex relations approach," M.A. thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa, 1999, 96-97.

²⁹⁰ A.Londes, 41.

all the 19th century Russian “schools of thought”. However, this agent-centered view of the state had an impact on the understanding of other categories such as security.

Therefore, the argument based on such an understanding was that the threat to the security of individuals arises when the state is in danger. The *National-Patriotic* bloc argued that the individual's interests are best safeguarded when the interest of the state is protected.²⁹¹ Implicitly, the state could only effectively provide for the welfare of its citizens if the state is strong.²⁹² Thus the concept of statehood (*derzhavnost*) of *Atlanticists* identity discourse was appropriated and integrated into the prosperity discourse of the *National-Patriots*. Consequently, the statehood category content developed by the *Atlanticists* was replaced with the nationhood content of the *National-Patriots* identity discourse. In the *National-Patriots'* discourse, the state was presented as a nation, and the nation was presented as the dominant ethnic group. Unlike the USSR, in modern Russia a predominance of one ethnic group existed. More than 85% of Russian citizens are ethnic Russians, and presumably more than 90% of Russian citizens are of the Orthodox Christian faith²⁹³. However, these figures and the perceptions surrounding

²⁹¹ Almost along the lines of Barry Buzan, *People, states and fear; an agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era* 2nd ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Rienner 1991).

²⁹² With such a deterministic reading of the state's role, the call for sacrifices by individuals for the benefit of the state could emerge. This collectivist notion was typical for national-socialism and communism. In these regimes the violence of the state over individuals was justified on the premise that the citizen is subordinate to the state.

²⁹³ The assumption of these figures is that there are no atheists in Russia. It was primarily the “National-patriotic” bloc that used these figures in order to contrapose Orthodoxy to other religious faiths. Some sociological surveys indicated that only 44% of respondents were believers, while 27% were non-believers. See Aleksandr Golov, “Obrashenie k religii i ego znachenie v segodniashnei zhizni rossiian,” [Responsiveness to Religion and its meaning in the Life of Contemporary Russians] *Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia* 1 (1998): 38-39. There was also some established correlation between believers and voting patterns, as Orthodox believers tend to vote more for the communist candidates. See Boris Dubin, “Religioznaia vera v Rossii 90-tih godov,” [Religious faith in the Russia of the 1990s] *Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia* 1 (1999): 31-39.

them did not push *National-Patriots* towards systematic and organized nationalist and chauvinist rhetoric or behavior against other ethnic groups living in Russia.²⁹⁴

Another discursive difference between the *National-Patriotic* bloc and the *Atlanticists* that influenced their security thinking emerged over the contraposed perceptions of the end of the Soviet Union.²⁹⁵ While the *Atlanticists* perceived the break-up of the Soviet Union as a Russian political victory against the communist and non-democratic nature of the USSR, the *National-Patriotic* bloc saw it as a geo-strategic defeat and a retreat by Russia from its 'natural borders'.²⁹⁶ On this issue, the *National-Patriotic* bloc began defining itself as 'realists', and at the same time they called the *Atlanticists* 'idealists'. But this is a distinction that only makes sense within Russia. In the West it could be wrongly perceived as a philosophical distinction between followers of Woodrow Wilson and Hans Morgenthau, or something similar. In the Russian context this distinction is along expectations of the future and means more a distinction between realist and optimists. Discursively this was an attempt to pejoratively define *Atlanticists* thinking and policy prescriptions and to portray them as naïve and incompetent public policy planners. This creation of negative "other" signified that, on the other hand, *National-Patriotic* bloc perceived itself as sober, rational and competent "school of thought" that merits to hold public office with the only goal of maximizing Russia's interests. The selection of the word 'realist' as epitome of such a positive self-perception

²⁹⁴ For example, throughout the 1990s the Russian public demonstrated constant tolerance and affirmative perception toward Jewish Russians, see Lev Gudkov, "Parametry antisemitizma. Otnoshenie k evreiam v Rossii, 1990-1997," [Parameters of Anti-Semitism. Attitudes toward Jews in Russia, 1990-1997] *Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia* 2 (1998): 34-44. However, some authors indicated at the dangers of chauvinistic elite inciting anti-Semitic feelings, see Robert Brim, *Russkii antisemitizm*, [Russian Anti-Semitism] *Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia* 3 (1999): 43-47.

²⁹⁵ This definition of the past was also an important element for distinction among the 'old schools'.

²⁹⁶ The *National-patriots* perceived the break-up of the USSR as a loss of Russian historic territory. They disputed the legal basis for the emergence of independent Slavic (Belarus and Ukraine) and Central Asian states on the historical basis that these states did not exist before.

was in the nature of Russian linguistic and cultural matrix. The *National-Patriotic* bloc claimed that it followed the geopolitical realism school of thought. "The 'realists' formulate Russia's foreign policy priorities in terms of power and the exertion of influence."²⁹⁷ According to 'realists' "Russia would become all the more important in world politics the greater the extent to which she adopts the power capacities of the former Soviet Union."²⁹⁸ On the other side the *Atlanticists* were proponents of the rules of international law and supremacy of the collective security system. They advocated a bigger role for international organizations and for the respect of individual rights in the international community. Therefore, the discrepancy between these two concepts of foreign policy was very profound, not because they were starting from the same denominator and finishing with different policy prescriptions, but because they did not have a common denominator.

This discrepancy was partly caused by changing perceptions on the economic crisis in Russia. The *Atlanticists* expected that the introduction of Gaidar's shock therapy would solve domestic economic problems.²⁹⁹ The bitter experiences of drop in social standard and production, high unemployment and job insecurity, high inflation, and vanishing of savings created the perception that moderate economic reform would be more opportune and suitable to Russian reality. On the economic issue the *National-Patriotic* bloc had the same common denominator with *Atlanticists* since both groups were interested in establishment of market economy in Russia. They differed from one

²⁹⁷ Olga Alexandrova, "Divergent Russian Foreign Policy Concepts," *Aussen Politik* 4 (1993): 368.

²⁹⁸ Olga Alexandrova, 368.

²⁹⁹ Gaydar's viewpoint on the issue of reform was offered in his book *Dni porazheniy I pobed* [Days of Defeat and Victory] (Moscow: Vagrius, 1996).

another on the proposed speed and depth of reform, since the *National-Patriotic* bloc advocated more gradualist and moderate reform.

At the same time, the perception of the role the West played and the help it offered to Russia changed more and more. Russia did not receive all the promised financial help, and became more and more indebted. At the same time, there were no significant investments and transfers of technology to Russia and Russian exports faced many barriers to Western markets. Frustration and dissatisfaction with the West's policy in general emerged, and the West ceased to be trusted and perceived as a genuine friend.³⁰⁰

In addition, the experiences and images of the wars in the 'near abroad' and the former Yugoslavia decisively changed perceptions of Russia's international role and the nature of the 'new world order'. The start of 1993 began with traditional 'year in review' public surveys of the most important events of the previous year.³⁰¹ These surveys could be used as an indicator of how much foreign policy and security issues were resonating in the memory of average Russian citizens. In the list of the ten most important events of 1992, the ranking of events was as follows:

- 1) Liberalization of prices (considered important by 46% of people);
- 2) PM Egor Gaidar's dismissal (30%);
- 3) Introduction of privatization voucher's (20%);
- 4) Yeltsin's decree on wage indexing (19%);

³⁰⁰ Here is important to know that there were exaggerated expectations on the Russian side about the economic help that the West is going to offer. Whatever was the reason of frustration for the unfulfilled expectations, the fact of the existence of the widespread and deep frustration and dissatisfaction in Russia with the West's economic help remains unchanged.

³⁰¹ See Vera Nikitina, "God za godom: 1992," [Year by Year: 1992] *Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia* 1 (1998): 55-58.

- 5) Armed conflicts in the Northern Caucasus (14%);
- 6) TV serial "The rich cry too" (13%);
- 7) Permission of street markets (13%);
- 8) Armenia-Azerbaijan war (12%);
- 9) War in Moldova (9%);
- 10) Signing of the CIS agreements in Alma Ata and Bishkek (9%).

It was obvious that domestic economic and social events such as introduction of market economy drew the most attention from citizens. However, several foreign policy issues starting with the wars in the 'near abroad' demonstrated the public's high sensibility to security concerns. Images of Russian refugees from the 'near abroad', the maltreatment of the Russian-speaking minority in the Baltic, civil wars and separatist warfare in Moldova, Georgia, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan changed the previous content as to the nature of Russia. The perception of the nature of Russia was no longer related to the existence of the democratic political system and set "rules of the game," but to the acquisition and exercise of state power. The perception emerged that only by using state power could Russia protect her vital interests in the 'near abroad'.³⁰² Therefore, the need for action was perceived as beneficial since it was perceived that Russian foreign policy inaction jeopardized Russian interests and regional stability. Furthermore, the civil war in the former Yugoslavia decisively influenced critical perception of the US-proposed 'new world order'.³⁰³ Mistrust in multilateral institutions and legal norms were triggered by,

³⁰² In the same public survey the respondents indicated that among the things that made them bitter during 1992 were: price hikes and social standard's fall (considered bitter by 62% respondents); Russia's loss of previous interantinal standing (31%); break-up of USSR (23%); increase of tensions among the Soviet successor states (23%), etc. Vera Nikitina, 58.

³⁰³ For the critical assessment of the post-cold war western practices see Carl Jacobsen, *The new world order's defining crises: the clash of promise and essence* (Aldershot, England: Dartmouth Publishing, 1996).

from the Russian perspective, Western dominance over UN and European institutions.³⁰⁴ All these rivaling discourses and growing dissatisfactions indicated that the time for full-scale institutional foreign policy changes was fast approaching.

3.4 Phase two: Growing discontent with Russia's foreign policy (1992-1994)

An overview of Russian influential academic journals published in the 1992-94 period indicated a shift in targeted themes, which, consequently can attribute to understanding changes in security discourse. The prestigious academic journal *Voprosy Filosofii* focused primarily on Russian themes and Russian authors in the majority of its published articles. Issues such as "Russia as a major society", "Eurasianism", "Russia and the West", "Russian modernization," Bakhtin, theological and Christian tradition outnumbered other issues significantly. The semi-official but leading international relations review, *International Affairs*, also changed the profile of articles and started very intensively examining Russian foreign policy capabilities and regional issues. During this period, the most often observed issues were: foreign policy concept; foreign policy goals; regional issues and regional conflicts; Russian regions; link between Russian foreign policy and domestic issues; and security and military issues. Another international relations review, *Mirovaia ekonomika I mezhdunarodnie otnosheniia (MEMO)*, with a primarily economic focus, began devoting more attention to Russian foreign policy issues and regional and CIS issues. The experience of Russian economic reform was often analyzed and compared with the lessons of economic transition in

³⁰⁴ This is how the Yugoslav civil war was portrayed by the main leftist daily *Pravda*, and by the main nationalist newspaper *Zavtra*.

Eastern Europe. It was noteworthy that Russia's geo-strategic position emerged as a relevant topic, more or less to the same extent as issues of Russian economic cooperation and economic reform. The journal of the Russian writers' association, *Nash Sovremennik*, maintained a critical tone on the outcome of Russian reform, depicting Russia as a destroyed country. This was the journal that first introduced and constantly maintained a debate on geopolitics. Equally visible were debates on Russian nationalism, *Eurasianism* and very favorable comments on Russian WW II engagement, Orthodoxy, and the Bosnian Serbs. The independent, and most *Atlanticist*, of the journals monitored, *Svobodnaia Mysl'*, kept its focus on issues of public policy and transition with an emerging focus on the characteristics of the Russian political system, but it also offered a constant debate on *Eurasianism*. What was noteworthy in all the above journals was their quick responsiveness to Samuel Huntington's article "Clash of Civilizations", which provoked quite negative reactions and criticism, and their protracted criticism of Francis Fukuyama's article "The End of History". These two articles were comprehended in a two-fold manner. First, the shared perception about these two articles was that they approve the existence of cyclical historical development and the identities that were not citizen or individually based. Russian authors from the *National-Patriots* "school of thought" agreed with Huntington and Fukuyama on these accounts. It is noteworthy that similar partial acceptance of this side of Huntington's argument could also be detected among Islamic fundamentalists and post-communist extreme nationalist authors from the former Yugoslavia.³⁰⁵ But what created the strong negative reaction to Huntington and Fukuyama's articles was the second element: these two articles were perceived as

³⁰⁵ See Dejan Guzina, "Yugoslavia's disintegration; an interpretation," M.A. thesis, Carleton University, Ottawa, 1995.

prescriptive ethical claims for the policy of US world leadership. Thus, by being perceived as an academic approval of US hegemonic role in the world, and by being perceived as crucial ideologues of such a US policy, both articles created the mini-discourse where Russian authors argued for decisive state counter measures. For the Russian security discourse this implied that the US were perceived not as a genuine partner but as an expansionist rival.

In the second part of 1992, after the introduction of shock therapy, the *Atlanticists* lost their political support. The Russian public, after the period of high expectations of social changes, became more skeptical and willing to follow more moderate and conservative political and economic agendas.³⁰⁶ Economic reform in Russia had enormous social costs, and as an outcome of such a traumatic experience, a new perception emerged - that there is more than one road to the market economy.³⁰⁷ Therefore, the concept of gradual economic reform won the significant support of about 66% of Russians who indicated that they were in favor of economic reform, but without shock therapy and with better social safety net measures.³⁰⁸ This represented a pattern for political conflicts in the Russian parliament between opposition and government all through 1993.³⁰⁹ The December 1993 elections demonstrated that this was not only a temporary issue. The new perception about economic reform was confirmed as the dominant perception by the electoral victory of the *National-Patriots*. Thus, by losing

³⁰⁶ For mindset and socio-psychological climate in Russia see Roy Laird, "The Soviet Legacy 1994: *Homo Sovieticus* is Alive if Not Well," *European Security* 4, 2 (Summer 1995) 225-241.

³⁰⁷ A year later that admitted even a reform oriented *Litaraturnaya gazeta* 6 April 1994: 10.

³⁰⁸ Ibid., *Litaraturnaya gazeta* 10.

³⁰⁹ Knowing the nature of the Russian mass media, it could be argued that during the parliamentary debates the media were used to test a certain perception hypothesis of the political elite and intelligentsia in public – the testing balloon principle.

their reputation and monopoly over the economic policies that had been implemented, the *Atlanticists* also lost their policy monopoly over foreign policy issues.

As the economic reform of 1992 proceeded with many hardships, the previously dominant over-optimistic expectation that the West would help Russia significantly diminished. In 1993 a new dominant perception in Russian public discourse emerged - skepticism and disappointment vis-à-vis the West. This perception signified that the Russian political elite had become more skeptical of promises of economic aid and, in particular, sensitive to any conditionality attached to such aid.³¹⁰ The sensitivity to conditionality was in particular related to the issue of the conversion of military-industrial sector. The argument of the *National-Patriots* that, while Russia had lost her foreign military markets the US was expanding its arm sales, became the view of the majority. Therefore, the argument followed, Russia should ignore the West's displeasure and continue to export military equipment, her only competitive industrial goods.³¹¹ As this perception of the West became common to various fractions of the *National-Patriots*, agreement on solutions started to be found on other issues as well.³¹² However, it should be noted that their "view of the West is not hostile, but it is non-euphoric and "non-fraternal" ."³¹³

³¹⁰ Andrei Orlov, "Delo o 24 milliardah," [It is about \$24 billion] *Dialog* 2 (1993): 60-65. However, the Russian public did not demonstrate the same rate of anti-American feelings as shown in the 1994 survey where 60% of respondents believed that the US-Russia relations should be friendly while 37% sustained that these relations "will always be built upon distrust" – Vadim Sazonov, "Zapad: Friend or Foe?" [West: Friend or Fore] *Sevodnia* 6 December 1994.

³¹¹ "Recent sales of a wide range of weaponry to China, the offer to sell \$800m worth of fighter aircraft to Malaysia and, more obviously, the delivery of submarines and other military equipment to Iran, suggest that economic realities are sufficiently stark for Russia to ignore Western expressions of displeasure." S.Neil MacFarlane, "Russia, the West and European Security," *Survival* (Autumn 1993): 15.

³¹² Ibid. S.Neil MacFarlane

³¹³ Mohiaddin Mesbahi, "Russia and the Geopolitics of the Muslim South," *Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union: Domestic and International Dynamics* ed., Mohiaddin Mesbahi, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994), 278.

The results of an opinion poll conducted among the Russian foreign policy elite indicated the existence of a division between two camps, but also suggested the possibility of a rapprochement due to some shared visions.³¹⁴ This survey was conducted in the summer of 1993 and it focused on answers from the top “113 representatives of various organizations and groups taking part in formulation and implementation of Russian foreign policy”.³¹⁵ The survey respondents were almost equally divided about the developmental path Russia should follow: 52% advocated that Russia should follow other developed countries, while 45% argued that Russia should follow a specific developmental path. However, despite this division, 61% of respondents advocated the observance of international standards in dealing with domestic issues, while only 30% advocated the implementation of “Russian-specific rules and traditions”.³¹⁶ Another issue that represented a rapprochement between seemingly polarized visions was the issue of Russian international status. On this issue 57% of respondents argued for Russian great power status while 36% preferred for Russia to be “equal among equals”.³¹⁷

After the violent clash between the Presidency and the Parliament in October 1993, the debate on the 'Russian character' entered a new phase - **the phase of rapprochement**. Since there were two competing understandings of the 'Russian character', namely, the concept of nationhood (*'russkost'*) and the concept of statehood (*'derzhavnost'*), the logical attempt to mediate these two concepts was launched within the *National-Patriotic* political bloc. The mediation attempt originated with the political

³¹⁴ See N. Popov, “Vneshnaia politika Rossii; analiz politikov i ekspertov,” [Russian Foreign Policy; Analysis of Politicians and experts] *MEMO* 3 (1994): 52-60.

³¹⁵ N. Popov, 53.

³¹⁶ N. Popov, 58.

³¹⁷ It is noteworthy that this question caused an even split among the *Atlanticists*. N. Popov, 59.

left of the bloc and represented an effort to unite different political platforms around the idea of the 'Russian character'.

At the same time, two already existing concepts of how to 'fill the Russian ideological-political vacuum' were subjected to a change in name that could have further confused foreign observers. The first concept represents the *Atlanticist* approach of Russia becoming a part of the West ("*upodoblenie*"), and the second concept was committed to the 'rebirth of Russia' ("*vozrozhdenie*"), and was proposed by the nationalistic wing of the *National-Patriots*.³¹⁸ Bearing in mind the fact that the *Atlanticists* were still in power, their demand for "change" of Russia was more a matter of rhetoric, since Russia had already changed its political system. Therefore, they were more interested in consolidation of this "change," in terms of implementing 'the new rules of the game' for future developments, into the Russian pattern. Regardless of their claims, at the level of implementation, they were using the state as an agent of change. On the other side, the *National-Patriots* had an eclectic mixture of visions for "change", willing to change both the political establishment, here presented as Yeltsin's elite, and borders. Paradoxically, it could be argued that no one wanted to change the political system, and that both concepts were state agent concepts. However, by proposing the ideology of renewal ("*obnovlenie*") was built a platform suitable for both nationalists and ex-communists.³¹⁹ At that point, cohesion inside the *National-Patriots* was achieved with regard to the perception of state nationalism.³²⁰ Consequently, the attempt at

³¹⁸ Vladimir Kutyrev, "Mif dlia Rossii," [Myth for Russia] *Dialog* 3 (1993): 57-61.

³¹⁹ "Renewal does not mean rejection of socialist solutions in society but their modification. Renewal does not mean destruction of ideas and myths from our culture but their reform." V. Kutyrev, 58.

³²⁰ "Russian nationalism is justified if it does not have an ethnic but rather a cultural-state character and when it supports and protects those who suffer from xenophobic and aggressive nationalism in other regions." V. Kutyrev, 60.

rapprochement for cohesion in foreign policy perceptions arose from the mainstream of the *National-Patriotic* bloc and, not incidentally, it made use of the Yugoslav civil war. The *National-Patriots* highlighted the Yugoslav crisis as an example of the government's ill-managed foreign policy. They demanded changes in Moscow's policy on this issue.³²¹

3.4.1 Growing cohesion among *National-Patriots*: Baburin bridging the gap on the 'Russian character' issue

The moment for loud criticism of Moscow's foreign policy coincided with the discrepancy of the presentation of the Yugoslav civil war by the Western and Russian, especially nationalist, mass media. In the summer of 1992, the visit of the Duma representatives to Serbia provoked subsequent wide-scale dissatisfaction with Kozyrev's foreign policy vis-à-vis the former Yugoslavia.³²² From that time on, the position of the *National-Patriots* shifted from dissent from Kozyrev's policy toward a demand to help the Serbs. The argumentation of the most extreme *National-Patriots* did not present a serious challenge to the *Atlanticists'* policy.³²³ However, quite the opposite could be said for the argumentation originating with the mainstream of the *National-Patriotic* bloc.

³²¹ On this point the Russian public was also eager to see some change in Russian policy toward Yugoslavia. According to the 1993 public survey only 15% respondents supported further implementation of the embargo against Yugoslavia while 32% demanded return to the pre-embargo level of cooperation (53% respondents were undecided on this issue) – Vera Nikitina, "God za godom: 1993," [Year by Year: 1993] *Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia* 2 (1998): 54-58. According to the same survey, the public support for the UN sanctions against Iraq was higher (19%) and the quest for Russia's unilateral withdrawal from sanctions was lower (21%).

³²² After this visit to Serbia, the Duma's delegation claimed that there were no concentration camps run by the Serbs. This was contrary to the claims made by Kozyrev.

³²³ For example, the article "The Fate of the Urals is Being Decided in the Balkans" in *Zavtra (The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 34 (1995): 28.) says "At this time of peril for the Serbs, when the German 'Luftwaffe' is shelling radar installations in Bosnia, when fat and stupid America is putting together an invasion armada, when Milosevic, who considers himself a Serb, is doing nothing, when 'Bill's and Helmut's friend' Yeltsin is behaving treacherously as usual, and when the perfidious Catholics, the crafty

Sergei Baburin, a Duma member, and politician widely known for his short political platform summarized in the slogan "Russia is the Soviet Union", was a leader of the "Power to the People" bloc, which was a part of "National-patriotic" forces within the Russian political spectrum. His article, "The Contemporary Serbian Question and Russia," was published in the monthly *Nash Sovremennik*, the official voice of the Russian Writers' Society, in the issue dedicated to the 50th anniversary of VE-day.³²⁴ This article represented part of the ongoing debate on Russian national interests and foreign policy. This article was tremendously relevant, not only in terms of the author's criticism of recent government policy, but also in terms of his proposal's impact on foreign policy discourse and the theoretical and empirical premises he offered for the new foreign policy. In this article Baburin used the inductive approach to analyze the Yugoslav civil war, but his main goal was not to answer any questions about the origins of the war. He tried rather to use the findings of his analytical method to draw general conclusion from this case study to explain the international relations of our time – in short, to create a general theory.

He started with the assumption that actually, within the Yugoslav crisis, Serbia is the testing-ground for the "new world order". Instead of explaining why and how this is so, he introduced another assumption, claiming that the destinies of Russia and Serbia are intertwined. Thus, his causal mechanism started with another assumption that everything that happened in Serbia, would, within a short time, happen in Russia, too. At this point

Jews and the frenzied Muslims are throwing down the Orthodox Cross in the Balkans, one incorruptible and splendid face shines its light on Russia and Serbia. Your face, brother Radovan; your face, friend Karadzic!"

³²⁴ Baburin and other pundits from the *National-Patriots* bloc presented these views since 1992 but this particular article, even though it was published in 1995, represented a very comprehensive and condensed essence of their views on the former Yugoslavia.

he drew the conclusion that Serbia has always been a testing ground for anti-Russian Western powers. He actually went even further in expanding this conclusion, claiming that the West will implement these tested mechanisms of the 'new world order' in its future relations with Russia.

Baburin did not offer any definition of the categories that he used, and for the reader it was rather unclear what he meant by the 'new world order'. His logical credibility was compromised by the fact that he arrived at his conclusions from dubious assumptions, without providing any empirical or historical evidence for them. Also, it was not made clear to the reader why the West seeks to hurt Russia. However, all these questions arise from standard Western social science analysis, while, from the viewpoint of the majority of Russian security discourse participants, the flow of thought and credibility of conclusions were quite logical and commonsensical.

Furthermore, some of the generalizations offered by the author about the similarities between the position of Russia inside the USSR and that of Serbia inside Yugoslavia do not correspond to historical evidence, but this did not undermine the validity of the points Baburin raised, at least in the view of Russian recipients.³²⁵

On the issue of agency, Baburin dealt with two interconnected categories, namely, the nation (in the sense of ethnic group) and the state. He actually regarded these two categories as identical. He used them in an axiomatic way without offering any explanation as to why these agencies were seen as fundamental categories *per se*, and

³²⁵ For example, it was perceived that in the creation of USSR and Yugoslavia Russia and correspondingly Serbia suffered high human and material costs. This perception negates the fact that the political forces that created the USSR were organized on a social and not on a national basis. In 1918 Yugoslavia was created through the agreement of various national elites and not by unilateral Serbian action, and this is even truer of post-1945 Yugoslavia. Therefore, it is not clear how Russia and Serbia fit into his categorization as being identical.

why they were only applicable in this specific case. Since he used the terms Russia and Serbia to describe both ethos and statehood, Baburin's "agency" could be questioned on the ground that Russia and Serbia are multiethnic societies and not nation-states in the European sense. However, due to the Russian XIX century "schools of thought" argumentation where an organic linkage was seen between the people and the state, this was not perceived as a discrepancy.

In the second chapter, the author gave an account of the pre-history of the contemporary conflict in the former Yugoslavia. He focused more on the state as the main actor, and argued for the unification of the ethnic and state identities. Thus, for Baburin, the political representation of a variety of different ethnic identities was the cause of the Yugoslav civil war. Again, from the perspective of Western scholarship, it could be argued that he entered into a contradiction with his previous statement regarding the necessity of people's identification with the state, since he regarded people's supra-national identification as "Yugoslavs" or "Soviets" rather negatively. But in the context of 19th century Russian "schools of thought", this identification is negative since it was not "organic" but was imposed by the communists', and was, therefore, not a natural ideology.

In the third chapter, Baburin described Serbia as a Slavic and Orthodox-Christian state. He attributed importance to the Serbian question³²⁶ for European affairs as a result of this Serbian distinctness. Furthermore, this distinctness had clearly geostrategic consequences, which was, again, a favorite academic theme of the *National-Patriots'* security discourse. According to Baburin, preventing an increase in Muslim influence in

³²⁶ The 'Serbian question' was defined as the impossibility of uniting all Serbs in one state, due to the fact that one-fourth of Serbs live outside of Serbia, namely in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

the Balkans was of the utmost importance in this respect. However, he did not specify why Muslim influence was something bad or dangerous. This appeared to be another axiom, a category that was to be accepted per se. Generally, this chapter depicted the Yugoslav conflict in ethnic categories, without using political, legal, or sociological methods of interpretation. Thus, ethnic distinctness, together with revisionist historicism (based on selective chronology of events), were the main criteria used by Baburin in his analysis of this international problem. It is not surprising then, that his reading of international politics and his future paradigm of international relations followed the same ethno-historical "methodology". However, it should be mentioned again that, for the Russian reader, the issue of "cultural types" and distinctness, together with the geostrategic challenges, seemed like a quite logical perception of an international crisis. This was probably why Russian security discourse participants agreed with Baburin that, in the face of the complexities of the Bosnian "cauldron", the restoration of the multiethnic state was not a feasible option, and deemed the Western proposals to the contrary as idealistic and naïve but also intentionally anti-Serb. Therefore, Baburin's advocacy that peace in the Balkans could only be achieved through territorial divisions and the removal of international sanctions from Serbia was accepted by the majority in Russia as just and logical solutions.

Finally, Baburin presented the Russian-Serbian strategic alliance as a "necessity". Presumably, the alliance would be in the best interest of these two countries, due to the assumption that these two countries were both victims of the "new world order". Such an alliance could best protect Russian and Serbian security interests. For Baburin the category of security was based on "cold war" categories such as state, power, and balance

of power. This is probably the reason why Baburin did not criticize the "cold war order" in his revisionist historicism but only domestic Soviet policy. Thus, when contrasting Russia and the USSR, it is domestic policy that should be changed, not foreign policy. This appeared to be one of very important differences between his position and that of the *Atlanticists*.

Baburin did not strictly define the meaning of security, but implicitly it could be perceived as the protection of the nation from military threats from abroad. The author had the aspiration to create a "grand theory" (to explain the causalities of world politics), but he did not offer an elaborate answer as to what the causal mechanism is in security studies. The assumption offered as in response was that differences of civilization and culture present a security threat. Thus, the imposition of one's cultural values over those of one's neighbors (or simply others) presented the essential security threat. Therefore, the nation state was the best protector of cultural and civilization values and distinctions. In this case, Serbia, as a Slavic and Orthodox-Christian state, should be in the same camp of protectors of core Slavic values as Russia. Turkey and the Muslim world with its expansionist policies, according to the author, were the enemies to engage. The elements of this "grand theory" became a common foundation in the foreign policy discourse of the *National-Patriots*. On the other hand, parts of his explanation based on conspiracy theory were only accepted by hard-liners.

Baburin, on occasion, presented conspiracy theory as a driving force of international relations.³²⁷ The crucial element of his interpretation of conspiracy theory

³²⁷ "Disintegration of Slavic world is pre-condition for Turkish penetration and for rebirth of Pan-Turkism. In the CIS area the main obstacle for such a penetration is Russia while in the Balkans it is Yugoslavia. Therefore, the balance of power could be changed only through disintegration of those two states." Sergei Baburin, 101.

was that Turkey's expansionist policy in Central Asia (after the break-up of the USSR) was designed by the *Atlanticists*³²⁸ ideas and that it was part of the "new world order". According to him, Turkey was fighting to enlarge its spheres of influence, and for Baburin it would change the regional balance of power toward instability and conflicts. His prescription was that Russia needed new alliances of a political, military, and economic nature in order to counterbalance this security threat. Therefore, it could be said that Baburin's elaboration proceeded along the lines of Cold War logic, and reflected the author's desire for the *status quo* in international relations. The nostalgia for the "cold war order" was based on a static vision of international relations. That is probably why Baburin preferred borders and strict delineation among international entities. He argued that Russia was isolated due to the foreign policy the Moscow government pursued throughout the 1991-1994 period. According to his concept of protecting core values against the "expansionist Muslim world", isolation would signify the achievement of security for the state.³²⁹ Thus, being isolated would mean being secure. Or to follow his line of reasoning, it would mean not to fear remaining in the minority or outside of integration processes. This element of his reading of security was particularly well received and resonated for a long time among *National-Patriots*, especially on the issue of NATO Eastward expansion and eventual Russian estrangement from this alliance.

³²⁸ Probably referring to NATO.

³²⁹ Bearing in mind the "civilization" component of the Russian "schools of thought", our emphasis on 'cold war order' may reflect Western analytical practices, rather than the true nature of the ideas held by Russian security discourse participants, especially those of the *National-Patriotic* bloc.

3.4.2 Further evolution of the *National-Patriots'* security discourse: the agenda of inclusivism

In 1993, Russia stabilized its domestic politics at the federal level and achieved a workable agreement with her regions.³³⁰ These achievements led *National-Patriots* to abandon their fears of the possible disintegration of Russia. However, the security of Russia remained one of the main concerns of the *National-Patriots*. As they realized that the nuclear arsenal provided Russia with strategic security, the emphasis was put on regional threats.³³¹ Based on this primary concern, the assumption was drawn that Russian borders were difficult to defend. Russia was almost completely surrounded by areas of conflict and hostilities. These conflicts appeared just as the Russian army was undergoing complex structural changes and was facing a deep financial, technological and moral crisis.³³² Therefore, the *National-Patriots* argued, the security of Russia was challenged more than ever, because the resources to provide security were more limited than ever. In this argument, the emphasis was put on the capacity of the state, therefore the state was the focus, rather than the individual. However, in the *National-Patriots* understanding, it was difficult to distinguish between the state and the community. This distinction was perhaps not as clear as it is in western scholarship, and the tendency to

³³⁰ The Russian public also perceived that the domestic affairs were the only relevant political issues in 1993. This was the explanation of the fact that in the end-of-the-year public survey they did not include any foreign policy issue - Vera Nikitina, 58.

³³¹ Some of the most respected Russian military minds believed that regional wars were likely to strike the Russian periphery and that direct action toward settlement of military conflicts should be taken. However, this argument never implied that Russia should or would alienate the West by pursuing these security policies. See Gen. Makhmut Akhmetovich Gareev, *If war comes tomorrow? The contours of future armed conflict*, trans. (1995; London: Frank Cass, 1998).

³³² About the crisis in the Russian military and reasons it could not be an agent of change, see David Mendeloff, "Explaining Russian Military Quiescence: The "Paradox of Disintegration" and the Myth of a Military Coup," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 27, 3 (1994): 225-247.

equate concepts such as the state, the people, society and community primarily had its origins in the political opportunism of the *National-Patriots* agenda, as well as in the Russian 19th century philosophical and social science tradition. Therefore, the argument could be made that this overlap of concepts arose from reliance on the 19th century Russian scholarship that have treated these concepts in a different way from any Western scholarship. The political opportunism rationale behind the mixed presentation and use of these concepts stemmed from a desire to build a consensus with the electorate vis-à-vis Yeltsin's government. The final interplay of these concepts reinforced the image with the public of having **an agenda of inclusivism**, that allowed all citizens of Russia to belong, and not only ethnic Russians.

In the *National-Patriots* view, security had a primarily military meaning, and their approach was very close to neo-realism. However, they were not correspondingly neo-realist – that is politically liberal or neo-conservative - on the issues of prosperity and identity. Therefore, in their political approach as to how to achieve prosperity, they were social-democrats since they proposed state-regulated economy.³³³ In the *Atlanticists* world view, security had a primarily economic meaning. It was argued that the state needs more economic and technological power than military power, but the economy should be based on liberal values while the economy should be regulated by monetarist policies. Therefore, this school of thought was legalist in its approach to the security issue, but liberal in its approach to the prosperity issue. Again, from the point of view of

³³³ This policy of state regulation gradually gained significant popular support. During the 1989-90 period various public surveys indicated that only 8% of respondents supported the introduction of “strong hand” rule in Russia. However, during the 1993-94 period, this support stabilized at 25%. It was noteworthy that such a trend could have been interpreted as increased support for a totalitarian-type political system, while at the same time it could be perceived as the hope that this was the best way to ensure the end of corruption and the introduction of the rule of law. See G.I. Vainshtein, “Rost avtoritarnykh nastroyenii i fashistskaia opasnot’ v sovremenoi Rossii,” [Increase of Authoritarian Orientations and Danger of Fascism in Contemporary Russia] *Polis* 2 (1995): 39-41.

Western scholarship, it would present an inconsistency, but from the point of view of Russian schools of thinking it presented the continuation of the discourse on how to 'change' Russia.

As for the *National-Patriots*, the security threat was linked to the threat to territorial or political sovereignty of the state; for the *Atlanticists* the main security threat lay in economic decline and environmental degradation.³³⁴ According to the *National-Patriots*, without the ability to militarily counterpoise emerging security threats, Russia could be marginalized and isolated from the international community.³³⁵ Therefore, the *National-Patriots* were not isolationists in their policy prescription even though they attributed some benefits to the situation of Russia being temporarily isolated.³³⁶ They argued that by efficient military responses to her security threats, Russia could find a more privileged place in the world community and avoid isolation. Consequently, it meant the adoption of a policy of assertiveness and intervention with the purpose of greater accommodation of Russian interests vis-à-vis the West.³³⁷ The policy of assertiveness should be exercised against all actors and trends that tried to marginalize Russia. The *National-Patriots* argued that Moscow should start this process of assertiveness anywhere where Russia 'still has some influence' as in the former Yugoslavia.³³⁸ This attributed strategic relevance to Yugoslavia was why the debate over

³³⁴ See Kolikov N., "Rossia v kontekste global'nyh peremen," [Russia in the context of Global Changes] *Svobodnaia Mysl'* 2-3 (1994): 7.

³³⁵ Particularly in terms of her claim to great power status.

³³⁶ Konstantin Sorokin argued against entering into the Western 'geopolitical entities'. Instead, according to Sorokin, Russia should follow the policy of "balancing equidistance" with the West with occasional "tilting-the-balance" interventionism along the national interest lines. See Konstantin Sorokin, "Russia and Multipolarity: a 'Time to Embrace, and a Time to Refrain from Embracing'," *Polis* 1 (1994): 7-33.

³³⁷ It could be argued that here resonated the vocabulary of Stankevich on "pride" and "dignity" as important avenues for achieving international power.

³³⁸ Interview of V. Lukin (himself one of *Neo-Eurasians*), Chairman of the State Duma's Committee on International Affairs in *Nezavisimaya gazeta, The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 11 (1995): 25.

the former Yugoslavia could be used as an indicator of Russian security discourse. The *Atlanticists* believed that, in an emerging multi-polar world Russia cannot be an independent center of power.³³⁹ They also believed that Russia could not be easily incorporated in any of emerging regional coalitions. Therefore, Russia should best protect her interests in the global collective security framework of the UN.³⁴⁰ On the other side, the *National-Patriots* thought that Russia could benefit from being an independent center of power in an emerging multi-polar world. Their perception came to prevail among the ranks of the opposition in particular as a result of the opposition's fear of the eastward expansion of NATO, which symbolized to them that the West does not want Russia as an ally. The predominance of the *National-Patriots* view that Russia could benefit from being a more independent center of power also arose from the opposition's confidence at the consolidation of Russian regional power, for example, within the CIS.³⁴¹ Therefore, the Russian nationalism, presented by this "school of thought," appeared to be more grounded to the state's capacities than to spiritual or value concepts.³⁴² Also, the Russian nationalism, presented by this "school of thought," demonstrated an ability to evolve toward an agenda of inclusivism from its previous positions. The security accent was on the role of the Russian state in the region and on the protection of Russians in the "near

However, the Russian public was still against Russian one-sided support of the Bosnian Serbs. In the 1994 end-of-the-year public survey only 19% of respondents demanded Russia's support of the Bosnian Serbs while 40% of respondents argued against such a support – Vera Nikitina, "God za godom: 1994," [Year by Year: 1994] *Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia* 3 (1998): 55.

³³⁹ The understanding of the 'independent center of power' was different between these two schools of thought. For the *Atlanticists* it meant a division of already united world and return into the scenario of the 'cold war'. For the *National-Patriots* it meant an alliance with possible partners in an already divided (multipolar) world, in the world where being alone means being exploited by other alliances.

³⁴⁰ N. Kolikov 18.

³⁴¹ V.P.Lukin, "Natsionalnaya politika dolzhna byt napravlena na otstaivanie sobstvennyh interesov, no s uchetom interesov partnerov," [National Policy should lean on Defense of National Interests, but with Respect of Partners' Interests] *SShA, Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya* 8-9 (1994): 145-149.

³⁴² Consequently, a specific understanding of national consciousness emerged: the symbiosis of the ethnic and the national. See Vladimir Iordanskii, "Dve grani obshchestvennogo soznania: etnicheskaya i natsionalnaya," [Two Branches of Social Cognition: Ethnic and National] *MEMO* 6 (1993): 87-101.

abroad".³⁴³ By the end of 1994 the Russian public clearly indicated its concerns over the regional security issues in the end-of-the-year public survey of the most important political events in 1994.³⁴⁴ Conflict in Chechnya, hot spots in Abkhazia, Tajikistan and Russian troops pull out from Germany and the Baltic region clearly indicated popular concerns over security issues but with clearly regional scope. This is how the "Russia first" agenda was articulated and initiated.

This could also be analyzed in the context of language. The word '*ruskii*' and '*rossiskii*' were both translated into English as 'Russian', but they do not have the same meaning because the latter refers to the state '*Rossia*' and the former to the ethnicity '*Rus*'. The *National-Patriots* were using the term '*rossiskii*' with statehood in mind, and it encompasses not only members of the Russian ethnic group but all citizens of Russia and those who look upon Russia for personal security, such as, for example, the Russian-speaking minority from the 'near abroad' and some mistreated ethnic groups that would rather be a part of Federal Russia than of some CIS nation-states. However, it was noteworthy that Russian public opinion was rather divided on this issue and did not demand Russian actions toward unification with Russian-inhabited territories in the CIS.³⁴⁵ But inclusivism was provided on the basis of culture rather than on the basis of language, ethnicity or religion. All-Russian survey results indicated that the Russian public believed that the Russian federation should be built upon traditional Russian values (46% of respondents) or Soviet values (16% of respondents) while only 4% of

³⁴³ See James W. Morrison, *Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: An assessment of a Russian Ultra-Nationalist* (McNair Paper 30, INSS, 1994), 38.

³⁴⁴ Vera Nikitina, 3 (1998), 56.

³⁴⁵ In early 1995, 33% respondents preferred this policy while 46% rejected it. See I.M. Kliamkin and V.V. Lapkin, "Russkii vopros v Rossii," [Russian Question in Russia] *Polis* 5 (1995): 78-97.

respondents preferred Western values.³⁴⁶ This way the security, prosperity and identity could have been built on the shared patterns that many in the CIS could identify with. Therefore, the “Russia first” agenda was more inclusive but, again, in terms of the state and culture. Consequently, there was no desire for a messianic role abroad on religious or ethnic grounds.

3.4.3 *Neo-Eurasianism*

These intentions of the *National-Patriots* for interventionism but not expansionism, which entailed not a desire to conquer and rule, but rather to discipline and eventually subordinate, were accompanied by the more balanced viewpoints of the *Neo-Eurasians*. V. Lukin, Chairman of the State Duma’s Committee on International Affairs emerged as the leading figure of this school. This school attracted many academics and public servants who did not want to be in the same environment with Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov (*Nationalists*) and who left the ranks of the *Atlanticists* due to disillusionment with Yeltsin’s policy.

The *Neo-Eurasians* were not as vocal on the issue of the Yugoslav civil war as they were on the issue of foreign policy principles and priorities. They wanted these priorities to serve the newly-defined domestic goals. The definition of these goals differed from that of the *Atlanticists*. Discursively, the *Neo-Eurasians* did not argue for “further economic reform” but rather for “the end of economic crisis.” They considered the economic reform implemented by the *Atlanticists* as a contributor to economic crisis. Also, as opposed to the *Atlanticists*, they did not argue for the “strengthening of

³⁴⁶ I.M. Kliamkin and V.V. Lapkin, 82.

democratic institutions in Russia” but for “domestic political stability.”³⁴⁷ Therefore, as the main foreign policy priorities, the *Neo-Eurasians* listed the CIS countries; second, Far East, the Middle East and Eastern Europe; and third, the West.³⁴⁸ This was a platform upon which the rapprochement within the *National-Patriots* was achieved on the question of foreign policy priorities. The dominant perception within the *National-Patriotic* bloc was that the main focus of Russian interests should be in the ‘near abroad’ and in relations with its Asian neighbors. The *Neo-Eurasians* argued that once Russia regains its economic power, Moscow would return to European affairs to participate in the creation of the partnership agenda with the West.³⁴⁹ This viewpoint was quite similar to the *Nationalists’* debate on the benefits of cultural isolationism and it ended up as a shared vision of the *National-Patriots* security prescription. At the end of 1993, the military doctrine and report by the Russian Foreign Security Agency (FSA) on NATO enlargement outlined two crucial state security documents.³⁵⁰ It was noteworthy that both documents originated from ‘non-*Atlanticists*’ state institutions, namely the FSA and the Ministry of Defense, and both argued from the self-reliance standpoint for a more coercive and cautious approach to security issues. The most important point was the introduction of policy of self-reliance and the constant emphasis on Russian national interests and their eventual collision with the policies of Western countries. The resounding argument of these documents was that, since Russia was not incorporated into Western structures, the West would definitely challenge the realization of Moscow’s

³⁴⁷ See *Izvestia, The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 1 (1995): 24.

³⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, *Izvestia*

³⁴⁹ See N. Arbatova, “Uroki Yugoslavii dlia Rossii i Zapada,” [Yugoslav Lessons for Russia and the West] *MEMO* 2 (1995): 45-58.

³⁵⁰ See “Osnovnie polozhenia voennoi doktriny Rossiiskoi Federatsii,” [Basic Principles of Military Doctrine of Russian Federation] *Izvestia* 18 November 1993: 1, 4; and “Opravdano li rashirenii NATO?,” [Is NATO Enlargement Justified?] *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 26 November 1993: 1, 3.

national interests. Therefore, it offered almost the same worldview as that of the *National-Patriots*. On this example it was visible how some of the crucial foreign policy making institutions adopted dominant ideas from the Russian security discourse.

However, it was noteworthy that the *Neo-Eurasianism* was a two sided phenomenon. While this “school of thought” called for the protection of cultural specifics and the delineation of political and strategic spaces vis-à-vis the West, with regard to the CIS it argued for integrative policies and the respect of democratic and human rights norms as well as market economy principles. Some authors argued that Russia, by conducting an *Atlanticists* policy of “open political space and de-ideologization” in “near abroad” while confronting geopolitics with a globalization project in its relations with the West – was echoing the 19th century modernity/tradition debate.³⁵¹ The existence of this double-sided feature of *Neo-Eurasians* might explain the coming eventual changes in security discourse when one of these tendencies become dominant over the other. At the same time, this duality within the same “school of thought” follows the 19th century tradition of a system of synthetic categories.

3.4.4 *Neo-Eurasianism* by Arbatova

The comprehensive and condensed viewpoint of the *Neo-Eurasians* and their argumentation can be traced to an article by Professor N.Arbatova.³⁵² The relevance of this article was in its focus on one of Moscow’s most important strategic issues: the

³⁵¹ See L.G. Ionin, *Rossieskie metamorfozy: kul’turnaia transformatsiia i sotsial’nyie izmeneniia* [Russian Metamorphosis: Cultural Transformaiton and Social Changes] (Lewiston, Queenston, Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1999) 248, 262.

³⁵² Ibid, N.Arbatova, “Uroki Yugoslavii dlia Rossii i Zapada,” [Yugoslav Lessons for Rusia and the West] *MEMO* 2 (1995): 45-58.

Yugoslav crisis. Arbatova argued that the relevance of the Yugoslav crisis for Russian politics was based on the Moscow government's perception of the Yugoslav civil war. This perception, she argued, was based on the logic of the precedent. Therefore, events in the former Yugoslavia were, in advance, qualified as something that could take place in Russia itself. Arbatova questions the possibility of such a scenario on the grounds that no causal link had been hitherto identified. The author presents the initial understanding of the Yugoslav crisis in a different light from that of the mainstream *Nationalists*. Her perception was that the unitary policy of the former Yugoslav and Soviet federations did not pay respect to the nationalistic pretensions of their respective federal units. Due to this "totalitarian" element, these two countries faced the prospect of disintegration. Therefore, disintegration was equal to liberation. In the case of the USSR, Russia led this disintegration. But, Russia was the catalytic factor for the peaceful outcome of this disintegration as well. In the Yugoslav case, domestic actors did not have an agreement on disintegration and they did not have any catalytic force to provide a form of 'velvet divorce' scenario. Therefore, for Arbatova, the role of Russia inside the USSR had more in common with the role Croatia played in the former Yugoslavia. Arbatova characterized Serbia as a keeper of the old communist federal unitarism and that was the reason, according to her, that Russia followed the policy of Western countries during the crisis management in 1992 and 1993. Thus, it was a different assessment from that of Baburin or the other *Nationalists*. There were no references to Slavic historical relevance or cultural significance, nor did Arbatova imply any links to the West's intentional tailoring of the 'new world order' in the case of the former Yugoslavia.

However, the author was critical of the role the West played in the former Yugoslavia. According to Arbatova, the West perceived this conflict as something of secondary relevance. In the view of Arbatova, and the majority of the *Neo-Eurasians*, the security interests of the West were not challenged by this war. Therefore, she concluded, the West did not intervene in 1989-90 when it would have been easy to control the crisis. But, Arbatova argued, the role of the West remained the only possible pacifying factor in the former Yugoslavia. Later on, as this crisis escalated, the West demonstrated an absolute lack of crisis management will and capacity. Therefore, by behaving without a plan, according to Arbatova, the West launched counterproductive measures and helped to escalate the crisis even further. By imposing and insisting on vague principles of “democracy,” the West failed to understand the essence of the crisis from the very beginning. Arbatova said that the common characteristic of the Yugoslav and Soviet republics was their multiethnic composition. After the disintegration of these states, this characteristic caused the national minority issue to emerge. The national minority issue was not only related to questions of “democracy” and “human rights,” but also to the question of territorial secession and statehood, because national minorities questioned not only the framework of the domestic political system, but also the borders of the state and its territorial integrity. This movement for secession was very often supported by a ‘mother country’ of the national minority in question. Therefore, the author considered the Serbs mainly responsible for the Yugoslav civil war. But, Arbatova did not argue that the Serbs should be punished since they were not solely responsible, and she concluded that nothing would be achieved by punishing them except to stimulate other nationalists groups to take advantage of the situation. On the contrary, Russia should have

disassociated itself from the West whenever the latter wanted to take punitive, anti-Serb measures. Failing to do so at the proper moment, Arbatova argued, was the main error of Russian foreign policy. This point represented another bridge between the *Nationalists* and the *Neo-Eurasians*. Therefore, as with the issue of isolation, the policy prescription, and not the rationale for the policy prescription, was the main unifying point between the *Nationalists* and the *Neo-Eurasians*.

Arbatova said that, in the later phase of this crisis, Russia changed its foreign policy, to some extent, toward a more independent policy. These changes in Russian foreign policy regarding the Yugoslav issue were motivated by several factors. Primarily, according to Arbatova, it was a reaction to the anti-Serbian behavior of the Western powers. By not following the policy of the West on this issue, Russia signaled that she did not want to be responsible for the negative consequences of such a policy. This caution against following the West's policy was also based on a desire to have a more independent foreign policy, one that was not tied to, and conditioned by, the promise of Western financial and technical aid. The author also emphasized, as a very important psychological factor in Russian decision-making, the strong sentiment, throughout all levels of Russian society, of national humiliation.³⁵³

Arbatova's perception, based on the experience of this crisis, was that the West did not want to accept Russia as an equal partner. However, for Russia, the question remained as to what to do in the former Yugoslavia. A policy of confrontation with the West over the former Yugoslavia was not perceived as beneficial for Russia. At the same time, Moscow's policy of continuity with the "Partnership with the West" agenda, pursued by Kozyrev, was also seen as wrong. To Arbatova, continuity would mean

³⁵³ N. Arbatova, 55.

conducting policy in accordance with an uneven partnership with the West rather than on the basis of Russian national interests. In order to change Russian policy, she argued, Moscow should pay attention to two things. First, was that any American-led 'peace-enforcement' in the former Yugoslavia could present a precedent for hard liners in Russia to do the same thing in the 'near abroad'. Therefore, if some local government started to treat a Russian-speaking minority badly, Moscow could use air strikes against that government. That would lead to a 'clash of civilizations' scenario, the one preferred by the hard liners in Russia and the US. The second dilemma facing Russia was in the long-delayed answer from the West about the character of relations with Moscow. The West should decide whether it was going to deal with Moscow as a partner or as an adversary. The prescription from Arbatova was that in the meantime Moscow should pursue a **parallel policy**. This meant that Moscow should pursue an independent foreign policy that will not be against but parallel with the West. According to this prescription the main focus of Russian interests should be in the 'near abroad' and in relations with its Asian neighbors. Once Russia regains its economic power, Moscow could return to European affairs to participate in the creation of the partnership agenda with the West. Therefore, bearing in mind the discursive elements of Russian foreign policy debate, Arbatova's critique of Kozyrev's foreign policy could be placed, in what emerged after the rapprochement of *Nationalist* and *Neo-Eurasians*, in the centrist space of the *National-Patriots* bloc. What this rapprochement actually meant was that all the opponents of Kozyrev's foreign policy were united on the question as to what direction, in policy-prescription terms, Russia should take. This direction has switched from the West toward the East. This switch also represented a desire to follow more gradualist and state-

sponsored ways of implementation of market reforms with the coexistence of private and social sectors, as was the case in China. At the same time, this direction did not argue for the confrontation with the West.

The accent of the *National-Patriots* was based on the security dilemmas of these proposed directions. If the direction of integration with Europe implied, as a consequence, that Russia had to sacrifice something, or to change its nature, then, according to the *National-Patriots*, it was much more appealing to adopt an orientation towards Asia. The *National-Patriots* frequently credited Asia for the fact that countries with various political and economic systems coexist and cooperate side by side.³⁵⁴ It was assumed that in this region there were no imposed rules for cooperation, or standards to follow. This was probably the most important reason that the *National-Patriots* perceived this direction as the one allowing Russia more freedom of action ("parallel policy") and one that would not threaten Russia's national identity ("cultural isolation"). If economic cooperation with the West was conditioned by some political 'readjustments and commitments', this was not the case in cooperation with Asia.³⁵⁵ In Asia, economic cooperation was not linked with political issues. Therefore, the opposition managed to change the discourse in Russia. The discourse was no longer about democratic and totalitarian world politics, but rather about distinctiveness and how to preserve it. The call to retain Russia's distinctiveness by increasing state power grew louder and louder. This change gradually resonated in public as well, and deprived Kozyrev and the *Atlanticists* of electoral support in both the 1993 and 1995 elections. This change more or less brought a coherent worldview into existence that was expressed in the slogan "Russia

³⁵⁴ The *Neo-Eurasians* were the most vocal among them.

³⁵⁵ See David Kerr, "The New Eurasianism: The Rise of Geopolitics in Russia's Foreign Policy," *Europe-Asia Studies* 47, (1995): 977-989.

first". It could be argued that throughout 1995 this slogan first existed as a discursive category with blurred content, but by the end of 1995 had evolved from discursive category into a perception composed of four worldviews: maintenance of Russian cultural specifics were more important than adoption of universalism principles; an increase in state power was the best guarantor of security, prosperity and identity for everyone in Russia; the Russian state should have a more active and prominent role in the CIS region; protection of the Russian-speaking minority in "near abroad" should be one of the imperatives of the Russian state. As these perceptions became predominant worldviews held by the majority of Russian foreign policy debate participants, it could be also argued that "Russia first" almost emerged as a separate "school of thought" by the beginning of 1996.

3.5 Phase three: Assertion toward the West articulated through "Russia first" (1995-1996)

An overview of Russian influential academic journals published in the 1995-96 period indicated an erosion of *Atlanticists* themes and worldviews and an increase in "Russia first" rhetoric and views. *Nash Sovremennik* led the trend with the glorification of Russian military achievements in WW II on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of VE Day. This journal maintained a constant focus on topics of Russian national interest, bringing them close to the emerging issue of "the idea of national crossroad and renewal". Support for the notion of the specific over the universal was so overwhelming that it created wide interest in the emergence of the specific Russian school – meaning a

‘non-globalization’ path of thinking and teaching. The prestigious philosophical journal *Voprosy filosofii* continued to devote substantial space to traditional Russian philosophers. The issues of civilization paradigms and *Eurasianism* were debated in-depth while the main question of ‘what is Russia’ dominated the scene. Violence in post-totalitarian societies and the conditions of Russia’s strategic instability often moved the authors to argue for “Russia first” policy prescriptions.³⁵⁶ Even the semi-official *International Affairs* departed from *Atlanticist* notions by debating the issues of civilization paradigms and Russia’s security. Significant re-thinking occurred on issues such as US-Russia relations, NATO enlargement, Russia-Iran relations and relations with the West in general. The trend of presenting Russian regions continued and other articles accentuated the role of the Duma and Russian political parties in creating Russian foreign policy. This indicated the institutional shift toward the “Russia first” agenda. A key aspect of this agenda was that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should not be sole architect of Russian foreign policy and interpreter of Russia’s security interests. *MEMO* continued to focus on the lessons of privatization and economic reform. However, the bitterness of these lessons created arguments that more and more advocated economic, rather than democratic, development. On issues of economic security, comparisons were made with the Scandinavian countries and the achievements of their state-dominated economies. Thus the desired model became the state controlled market economy rather than the liberalist market economy. The problems of federalism were prominently debated and, within the perspective of CIS conflicts, often argued that a viable mechanism of conflict prevention was needed. Therefore, a stronger role for the state was perceived to be the

³⁵⁶ However, there was an impressive attempt to reach the synthesis of universal and culture-specific in the article by V.G. Fedotov, “Sud’ba Rossii v zerkale metodologii,” [Destiny of Russia in the mirror of Methodology] *Voprosy filosofii* 12 (1995): 21-35.

guarantor for peace which corresponded exactly with the “Russia first” line. *Svobodnaia Mysl’*, in the meantime, became a journal of the Gorbachev Foundation and as such expressed more social-democratic views. Despite its focus on Russian economic and political transition and the ideological issues related to it, this journal also featured a significant increase in articles related to Russian history and Russian specifics. Therefore, it aborted its once unconditional support of *Atlanticist* worldviews and themes such as the belief in the linear advantages of globalization and the necessity of rejecting tradition. Russian public opinion indicated strong concerns over the domestic security issues giving a support for the arguments demanding the increase in state intervention and control. The war in Chechnya and terrorist attacks in Budennovsk, Moscow and Vladikavkaz were among the top political events indicated in the end-of-the-year public survey for 1995.³⁵⁷

Institutionally, by the end of 1995 the Russian foreign policy became an activity pursued not only by Moscow but also by the Russian regions. Various international activity performed by Russian federal units culminated in signing of more than 300 international agreements, though majority of them being concluded with the assistance of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³⁵⁸ There were three groups of regions that championed frequent and broad international cooperation: regions that were promoters of increased sovereignty on the basis of previously achieved ethnic-territorial autonomy such as Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Kalmykia, Chechnya; regions bordering foreign countries, such as Karelia, Primorskii Krai; economically and financially developed regions (so called

³⁵⁷ See Vera Nikitina, “God za godom: 1995,” [Year by Year: 1995] *Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia* 4 (1998): 54.

³⁵⁸ See Aleksandr Sergunin, “Regiony i finansovo-politicheskii crisis v Rossii: mezhdunarodnie aspekty,” [Regions and Financial and Political Crisis in Russia: International Aspects] *Chto hotiat regiony Rossii* [What do Russian Regions Want] (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Centre, 1999).

“surplus regions”) such as Nizhgorodskaya oblast, Samara, St. Petersburg.³⁵⁹ The local elite perceived international cooperation as an additional source of political legitimacy often promoting a discourse that the federal center’s ill-managed budgetary and tax policies were to blame for the regions’ economic problems. Thus, the argument was made that an active international cooperation may alleviate those problems and in the same time sustain regional-based identity and promote electoral support for local leaderships. However, in order to achieve a comprehensive international cooperation the Russian regions face severe limitations when it comes to personnel available, regions’ institution-building and legal framework. On the other hand the perseverance of regional leaderships’ criticism of federal center’s policies may lead to the regionalization of the institutions of coercive power thus making the police and army locally funded which would further open the issue of army’s and police’s loyalty.³⁶⁰ However, this regional foreign policy discourse did not demonstrate a capacity to decisively influence either the Russian security discourse or the state institutions.

The continuing economic hardship in Russia and 'anarchization' of the economy subsequently strengthened the perception that there was a need for state intervention and regulation. The *National-Patriots* promised that they could end the "criminalization of the economy; the widespread despair of citizenry; the decline in spirituality; the deterioration of the army; the gulf between the people and their rulers; the disunity of society."³⁶¹ It was the same perception of state nationalism (renewal) that had previously united the

³⁵⁹ See Sergei Borisov, “Vneshnepoliticheskaya deiatel’nost’ rossiiskikh regionov kak atribut ih politicheskoi samoidentifikatsii,” [Foreign Political Activity of Russian Regions as an Indicator of their Political Selfidentification] *Chto hotiat regiony Rossii* [What do Russian regions Want] (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Centre, 1999).

³⁶⁰ Ibid. Aleksandr Sergunin

³⁶¹ A. Lebed in *Nezavisimaya gazeta, The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 41 (1995): 1.

National-Patriots that later became almost a dominant public perception determining the outcome of the December 1995 parliamentary elections. In these elections, the communist leader Zyuganov best expressed this dominant perception on Russia's nature by saying that "statehood and spirituality are twin pillars of the Russian idea."³⁶² Spirituality in this case meant more the value system, or in the conception of the 19th century thinker Danilevsky "cultural-historical types," rather than a religious faith.³⁶³ The dilemma of which value system to put in the place of the old communist value system was solved by providing an eclectic agenda which encompassed the legacy of Russian experiences from communist and pre-communist times such as social justice, a sense of belonging, and security, and which forges a relationship with old mythologies, the collective historical memory and new hopes for progress. The achievement of a consensual perception of Russia's nature facilitated the efforts of the *National-Patriots* to take Russia on her own way toward modernization instead of following the Western pattern of universalism proposed by the *Atlanticists*.³⁶⁴ Therefore, by using the notion of progress and modernization, the new "schools of thought" were much more grounded in rationalism than the 19th century "schools of thought". At the same time, the strategic thought of the new "schools of thought" cannot be viewed as isolationist or messianic as the 19th century "schools of thought" were (especially in their *Slavophile* and *Eurasianism* streams).

However, the West perceived the *National-Patriots* as primarily anti-democratic and isolationist, especially from 1994 onward. This coincided with the decline of political

³⁶² Ibid, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 4.

³⁶³ See Genadiy Zyuganov, *Veriu v Rossii* [I believe in Russia] (Voronezh: Voronezh, 1995): 15-17.

³⁶⁴ S.M.Samuylov, "Neizbezhno li stolknovenie tsivilizatsii? - chast II," [Is Clash of Civilizations Unavoidable? – part two] *SShA, Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya* 2 (1995): 61.

support in Russia for Kozyrev's foreign policy of "Partnership with the West". This dissatisfaction in Russia originated from different perceptions of what Russia's power base was, and was unrelated to the issue of democracy versus anti-democracy. On one side, the *Atlanticists* vision of national strength and power was not based on the military power of the country but on its economic well-being. In their understanding, the well-being of citizens is the main indicator of a successful foreign policy. Therefore, the main goal of their foreign policy was to make Russia more powerful by providing the best possible environment for her citizens to increase their individual well-being. The *Atlanticists* observed that Russia required time for this scenario, as well as some degree of amicable understanding from other great powers. On the other side, the *Atlanticists* vision of increasing national strength and power was linked to preventing 'non-democratic developments' inside Russia.³⁶⁵

But one could argue that both pillars of the *Atlanticists* expectations, related to the increase of national strength and power, were not controlled by *Atlanticists* themselves. As well, preventing 'non-democratic developments' in Russia was not within the control of the *Atlanticists*. At the same time, the willingness of other great powers to pursue the most preferable (to the *Atlanticists*) kind of relations with Russia, depended primarily on the Western powers and their interests and calculations. Therefore, one could conclude that the *Atlanticists* were actually incapable of decisively influencing the best scenario for their foreign policy objectives.

³⁶⁵ In this context, the expression 'non-democratic developments' was used more rhetorically and with the purpose to politically label opponents of the *Atlanticists* policy agenda, then as a scholarly demarcation. This was mainly due to the fact that the understanding of democracy was different among different Russian political groups.

At the same time, the external event of the expansion of NATO became increasingly important in Russia. This event brought about a coalescence of the *National-Patriots* around one perception:³⁶⁶ that Russia was in danger, and that world politics is a stage of competition where only power counts.³⁶⁷ The September 1995 NATO document on NATO expansion in Eastern Europe, together with the West's air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, furthermore, strengthened unity around this perception not only among *National-Patriots* but among almost all segments of the Russian political elite.³⁶⁸ The *National-Patriots* perceived the concept of security in state terms, and it meant, consequently, that Russia should not allow itself to be dragged into a meaningless and inferior relationship with the West. "We need to combine a policy of deepening our relations with the West with a policy of independence, to gain time to build up our economic and political strength, and to prevent situations that could perpetuate our weakness."³⁶⁹ Therefore, the advantage of the concept of "Russia first" was that it incorporated the Kozyrev's "Partnership with the West". It was possible because the *National-Patriots* bloc also wanted cooperation with the West, but on new terms.

It appeared evident during the 1994-1996 Chechnya crisis that the *Atlanticists* lost public support to continue with their foreign policy concept. The *Nationalists* and *Neo-Eurasians* were united in accusing the government of bad performance in this crisis and

³⁶⁶ "The forthcoming expansion of NATO has united Russia's ruling elite. Everyone now realizes that this action must be opposed vigorously and that a limit must be drawn somewhere to the expansion of the Western alliance." *Sevodnya, The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 21 (1995): 1.

³⁶⁷ That was exactly what some cautious observers, such as US Senator Bill Bradley, were afraid of. "By advancing NATO to the borders of the former Soviet Union while simultaneously insisting on continued disarmament, we would revive the impression of a military threat from the West in the minds of many Russians." - Bill Bradley, "Eurasia Letter: A Misguided Russia Policy," *Foreign Policy* 101 (1995/96): 92.

³⁶⁸ "An unofficial four-hour exchange of opinions among representatives of Russia's academic elite and political establishment and members of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy that was held at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Europe last Friday offered an example of unanimity rare in the post-Soviet era." *Nezavisimaya gazeta, The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 40 (1995): 25.

³⁶⁹ Sergei Karaganov, deputy director of the Russian Academy of Science's Institute of Europe, in *Moskovskiy novosti, The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 27 (1995): 23.

in accusing the West for its interference in Russian internal affairs. When at the beginning of 1995 the EU suspended its Agreement on Cooperation with Russia due to Moscow's military intervention in Chechnya, the interest of the *National-Patriots* bloc in following Kozyrev's policy of "Cooperation with the West" absolutely disappeared. Therefore, they accused Kozyrev of being naive and an idealist in dealing with the West. They accused him of making too many concessions for too little benefit. The opposition perceived Kozyrev as a traitor to Russian interests and priorities. His removal in December 1995 represented a final political victory for the already dominant perception of the Russian national interest and an apparent institutionalization of the agenda "Russia first".

3.6 Conclusion

Discourse analysis findings from this chapter indicated that: schools of thought acted as social movements that influenced state institutions through public discourse; intelligentsia, including officials from state institutions, intellectually belonged to schools of thought and generated their discourse; absence of majority party in parliament and President's non-party affiliation indicated that political parties were less instrumental in the 1995 Russian foreign policy change than schools of thought; party alliance changes were better understood by tracing their discourse and theoretical thinking than ideology or programmatic orientations because political parties with often seemingly incompatible worldviews were at the idea level belonging to the same "school of thought" so that "schools of thought" practically acted as more relevant social movements than any party

alliance. Therefore, if the understanding of changes in Russian foreign policy during the 1990-96 period was the objective of this chapter then it could be concluded that Russian culture, expressed through sets of ideas of “schools of thought” on core foreign policy beliefs of identity, prosperity and security, significantly influenced public policy prescriptions. For that purpose the evolution of Russian security discourse in the 1990-96 period was traced and better understood by analyzing the emergence of “schools of thought.” At the same time security discourse, promoted by those “schools of thought,” was used as the vital component in understanding changes in Russian foreign policy during this period. Vital link between 19th and 20th century “schools of thought” could be seen in re-actualization of security dilemmas and quests about identity, security and prosperity. The core issues of Russian security discourse debated in the 1990s were as those in the 19th century: the aim to situate its identity on the East-West scale (with *Atlanticists* opting for the West, *Nationalists* for the East and *Neo-Eurasians* creating the symbiosis of two); the aim to situate a security paradigm on the isolation-integration scale vis-à-vis the West (*Atlanticists* opting for unconditional integration, *Nationalists* for assertive coexistence, and *Neo-Eurasians* for temporary isolation); the aim to situate prosperity on an individual-collective scale (*Atlanticists* opting for individual prosperity, *Nationalists* for state prosperity, and *Neo-Eurasians* for societal and state prosperity) .

The main developmental model dilemma of the 1990s was practically the same as in the 19th century: how to find adequate policy solution to accommodate globalization impact with preservation of national strength and identity. Russian traditional national thought on all those issues re-emerged throughout the 1990s avalanche of re-printed books and articles from 19th century authors. Variety of discourse categories and conceptual

frameworks from 19th century, especially those of *Westerners*, *Slavophiles* and *Eurasians*, strongly resonated among the contemporary “schools of thought.” This indicated strong cultural influence over politics as it also demonstrated that the primary intellectual allegiance of Russian intelligentsia was toward “schools of thought.”

This chapter indicated that, if the perestroika period represented the rejection of Soviet-type foreign policy, then the self-labeled *Democratic forces* represented, in all the heterogeneity of their views, the continuation of Gorbachev’s and Shevernadze’s policies. However, when the predominance of a discourse conducted by the *Democratic forces* ended, this represented the end of these policies of universalism during the 1990-92 period. This discourse was superseded by debates conducted by the emerging “schools of thought” on formative issues of Russian state building, such as national character and perceptions of the world. Thus, the world was no longer perceived through the lens of the *Democratic forces*’ as divided between democratic and totalitarian states, but as either a multi-polar world or one divided between the center and periphery. While the *Atlanticists* proceeded on the basis of the democratic/totalitarian world perception, the *Nationalists* and *Neo-Eurasians* offered the alternative perceptions of multipolarity and center-periphery relations. During the 1992-94 period, the discursive convergence materialized in the agenda of inclusivism and similarity of policy prescriptions gradually merged the *Nationalists* and *Neo-Eurasians* into the broader “school of thought” of the *National-Patriots*. This “school of thought” argued for the “Russia first” policy prescription, instead of the “Cooperation with the West” principle implemented by the *Atlanticists*, as state policy during the 1990-95 period. The “Russia first” principle referred to: the necessity that state power be increased to guarantee security, prosperity and identity for

Russian society; an increased and active role for the Russian state in the 'near abroad' region; protection of the Russian-speaking minority in the 'near abroad'; and an active engagement in crisis management in hot-spots of Russia's special interest such as the former Yugoslavia. It could be argued that, during the 1994-95 period, "Russia first" evolved from the minority advocated policy prescription to a dominant discursive category. At the end of this evolution, it could be concluded that by the end of 1995 "Russia first" had emerged as a "school of thought" and it consequently decisively influenced Russian foreign policy institutions. The foreign policy debate in Russia of the 1990s was primarily generated as an echo of the evolving events in the 'near abroad' and the former Yugoslavia. These two areas were present in the security discourse much more than any other international relations issue.

Equally significant was the phenomenon that security discourse had, by the end of 1995, reached a consensus in terms of policy prescription. It was noteworthy that this consensual policy prescription was reached despite the existence of different worldviews. For example, security debate participants such as Baburin and Arbatova held different perceptions on international issues, but proposed quite similar or identical policies as remedies for Russian security challenges. It will be argued in chapters IV and V that the "Russia first" discourse further evolved during the 1995-99 period and fragmented into the two competing "schools of thought" of the "reluctant realists" and the "advocates of firmness and brinkmanship." This fragmentation occurred along the lines of different policy prescriptions despite the fact that the security discourse participants had common worldviews and perceptions, especially on the issues of the CIS, NATO expansion and the NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia.

CHAPTER IV

4. From “Russia first” to the emergence of “reluctant realism” (1996-1998)

4.1 Introduction

The goal of this chapter is twofold: to present and assess the development of Russian security discourse; and to demonstrate its influence on state institutions during the 1996-98 period. For that purpose the “schools of thought” will be traced along the discourse generated around the issues of the ‘near abroad’ and the Yugoslav crisis. This discourse will be presented, as in chapter III, by using chronological and thematic method. The *National-Patriots* discourse of “Russia first” became dominant in speech and text and totally marginalized *Atlanticists*’ “Cooperation with the West” by the end of 1995. This brought about the institutionalization of “Russia first” agenda, visible in the replacement of Andrei Kozyrev by Evgenii Primakov. This development also resulted in metamorphosis of “Russia first” from a discursive category into a “school of thought” (helped by *National-Patriots* inclusivism project as shown in chapter III). Due to the fact that “Russia first” was based more on public policy consensus than on shared worldviews it is vital to remember that its core theoretical thinking was based on tenets of *Atlanticism*, *Nationalism*, and *Neo-Eurasianism* which brings to the fore relevance of 19th century cultural heritage.

It will be argued in this chapter that security discourse continued to evolve further from “Russia first” resulting in the emergence of new “schools of thought”. The evolving

events in the 'near abroad' and the former Yugoslavia produced new policy dilemmas that were addressed by the Russian security discourse participants. Novelty with this new discourse, polarized among "reluctant realists" and the "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness," was that it produced phenomenon of discursive and institutional division upon proposed public policy measures while discourse participants kept sharing the same worldviews. This phenomenon further validates the thesis of vital relevance of cultural heritage and importance of "schools of thought" as indicators of intelligentsia's intellectual affiliation and as a key for understanding differences among debate participants. At the same time this phenomenon indicates that "schools of thought" play the role of social movements in Russian society as it also indicates their ability not only to change society but also to evolve themselves.

4.2 The end of *Atlanticists*' institutional dominance

The December 1995 parliamentary elections in Russia resulted in the victory of anti-government political parties. One of the institutional consequences of this victory was the removal of *Atlanticists* proponents such as Andrei Kozyrev, Minister of Foreign Affairs, from the government ranks.³⁷⁰ This removal was linked to the growing perception that Russia was not benefiting from relationships with the West.³⁷¹ The question of what Russia should do in order to foster its national interest had been

³⁷⁰ From 1992 to 1995 "liberals were increasingly perceived as an arrogant elite with little regard for the price that fascination with the West and Western advice was exacting from the Russian masses." Ilya Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy; Nationalism and leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 226.

³⁷¹ Survey data reveal that in 1991 public support for a foreign business presence in Russia was 54% while in 1995 that support was only 33%, with 59% opposed. Trust in the US dropped steadily, so the survey from 1993 indicated that 51% of those questioned believed that the US would take advantage of Russia, while in 1996 71% believed that the US would take advantage of Russia. Ilya Prizel, 247.

constantly debated since 1990, but by the end of 1995, a tentative consensus on the response to this question was reached: "Russia first."³⁷² It seems that a consensus emerged from common beliefs and values held by security discourse participants, resulting in the creation of the broad action platform of "Russia first". A common perception of international events further strengthened this consensus. These perceptions primarily addressed the West's behavior, or as Russian scholar Dmitriy Trenin described it, "although it is premature to talk about a wave of anti-Americanism in Russia, U.S. imperialism and NATO militarism are gradually returning to their former places in the perception not only of people and structures traditionally responsible for conducting foreign and defense policy, but also society as a whole."³⁷³

During 1996 "Russia first" represented the dominant discursive practice as well as a very broad political alliance between different "schools of thought." This alliance primarily involved the *Nationalists* and *Neo-Eurasians* "schools of thought." Furthermore, it could be said that "Russia first" existed for a year or two as a "school of thought" on its own. Therefore, it could be argued that it emerged as a specific "school of thought" where security discourse is concerned, but since it was also a discursive category, it began fragmenting once the discourse became polarized. The evolution of Russian security discourse into the "Russia first" consensus was primarily made possible by the shared anti-*Atlanticist* perceptions of the *Nationalists* and *Neo-Eurasians*. It was noteworthy that the *Neo-Eurasians* were anti-*Atlanticist* in the sense of being anti-USA and that they were not anti-Europe at all; unlike the founder of *Eurasianism*, Prince

³⁷² See Peter Truscott, *Russia First: Breaking with the West* (London, New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1997).

³⁷³ See Dmitriy Trenin, "Russia and the West: Avoiding Complications," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 42 (January-February 1996): 32.

Trubetskoi.³⁷⁴ However, it would be argued that the "Russia first" consensus discourse started fragmenting toward the end of 1996 and throughout 1997 due to disagreement on policy proposals. What emerged, on the basis of different policy proposals, were two discursive groups that can be tentatively named "reluctant realists" and the "advocates of firmness and brinkmanship." Looking at party affiliations we can tentatively situate the majority of "Russia first" proponents within the "no-mutual-attacks-alliance" formed in September 1997 among 32 political parties and movements. Those left aside more or less made up the "reluctant realists" wing. Among the alliance members, the most prominent were: Zyuganov's Russian Federation Communist Party, Tyulkin's Russian Communist Worker's Party, Anpilov's Working Russia, Achalov's Officer's Assembly, Shenin's Union of Communist Parties/Communist Party of Soviet Union, Baburin's Russian Union of All the People, Rogozin's Congress of Russian Communities, Skurlatov's Revival Party, and Rutskoï's The Great Power movement.³⁷⁵ In this chapter, the evolution of Russian security discourse during the 1996-97 period and its relationship with the state institutions will be traced by focusing on debate between main foreign policy advocate groups and individuals. The responsiveness of Russian foreign policy actions to the security discourse evolution during the same period will be evaluated.

³⁷⁴ See V.L. Tsymburskii, "Ostrov Rossia; Perspektivy rossiskoi geopolitiki," [Island Russia; Prospects of Russian Geopolitics] *Polis* 5 (1993): 6-24.

³⁷⁵ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 37 (1997), translated from *Sevodnya* 30 September 1997, 3.

4.3 "Russia first" worldviews became predominant

1996 began with Kozyrev's resignation, a long awaited event by the Russian opposition parties. Critics were so predominant that Yeltsin did not have much choice but to sacrifice his longest acting Minister (Kozyrev had been Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1990). The unanimous chorus of the opponents of *Atlanticism* argued that Kozyrev was personally to blame for several defeats of Russian foreign policy. The list of criticisms leveled against Kozyrev could be quite long but, essentially, it entailed perceptions that he was "catering" to the Americans; gave too much concessions to some chauvinist CIS countries; was to blame for Russia's absence from the table when the outcome of Yugoslav crisis was decided in Dayton; and did not efficiently oppose NATO expansion.³⁷⁶ It could be argued that the created consensus in security discourse finally influenced institutions and new foreign policy ideas became predominant in the Russian executive branch.

Evgeniy Primakov, head of Foreign Intelligence Service was nominated to replace Kozyrev.³⁷⁷ Primakov imbued the public discourse of the executive branch with his brand of socio-economic determinism characterized by his skeptical view of globalization. This was a clear departure from Kozyrev who attempted to portray globalization only in positive terms. Consequently, the foreign policy objectives initially proposed by Primakov were much less global in their scope than those advocated by Kozyrev. The sobering effect of the war in Chechnya, that suggested the limitations of Russian power,

³⁷⁶ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 1 (1996), translated from *Literaturnaya gazeta* 1-2, 10 January 1996.

³⁷⁷ On Primakov's personality and biography see *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 20 (1996), translated from *Izvestia* 15 May 1996, 6.

probably contributed to this direction. On the other hand, this foreign policy proposal also reflected the institutional acceptance of "Russia first" viewpoints traceable in Primakov's remarks that "despite the current difficulties, Russia has been and remains a great power, and its policy toward the outside world should correspond to that status."³⁷⁸ In one of his first public appearances, Primakov outlined the "top-priority tasks for Russia's foreign policy": activities aimed at creating favorable conditions for securing Russia's territorial integrity; strengthening integration processes in the CIS, especially in the economic sphere; and the stabilization of existing regional hot spots in CIS and the former Yugoslavia and the prevention of new hot spots.³⁷⁹ However, this action plan was soon accompanied by more conceptual and doctrinal presentations by the new Foreign Minister.³⁸⁰ These more detailed and elaborate presentations offered an insight into the government's worldviews and perceptions. At this point, these views and perceptions did not significantly differ from those held by the "Russia first" proponents. The main assessment of world politics, articulated by Primakov and shared by "Russia first" advocates, was that it was based on competition and not on democratic cooperation among states.³⁸¹ Therefore, Russia will best maintain its interests if it keeps a position as one of the centers of power in the multi-polar world. This way, it was assumed, Russia would have enough leverage to compete with other centers of power for concessions on some issues. The emergence of a multi-polar world was something that Russia's security discourse participants considered as a new world order, and one that would suit Russia.

³⁷⁸ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 2 (1996), translated from *Moskovskiye novosti* 2, 14-21 January 1996, 13.

³⁷⁹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 2 (1996), translated from *Moskovskiye novosti* 2, 14-21 January 1996.

³⁸⁰ See Yevgeniy Primakov, "The World on the Eve of the 21st Century," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 42, 5/6 (1996): 2-15.

³⁸¹ *Ibid.*, Primakov 1996.

Since, American President Bush had coined the term "new world order" after the end of the cold war,³⁸² 1989-91 "velvet revolutions," and the Gulf War this expression was used in Russian political discourse in a primarily pejorative way.³⁸³ The content of this term in Russia implied American disrespect of norms of international law and the use of dictate over sovereignty of other states. Since every post-1990 "school of thought" perceived Russia as a great power, the emerging perception of a new multi-polar international system as an opposition to American dictate became the common denominator in Russian security discourse by the mid-'90s.

Therefore, the international system was, according to Russian security discourse, based on the parallel existence of several centers of power, and it was called a multi-polar world. The perception of Russia as a great power was built on the empirical fact of Russian nuclear and military might and her assumed influence in the CIS region. Similar significance was given to the military, economic and political might of EU, Japan and China in their respective regional domains. Consequently, it was claimed that the US cannot dictate its own terms to these "centers of power" and that this 'polycentric structure' by itself creates a multi-polar world as a truly new world order and not the new world order announced by Bush. However, what Russians desired in this new order may appear quite eclectic. For example, Primakov stressed that the creation of new lines of division should be avoided, thinking primarily of lines of division and frictions between the centers of power. At the same time, according to Primakov, the roles of 'leaders' and 'followers' should be avoided, for example between the USA and Russia, and not within a

³⁸² For the end of the cold war could be used Bush-Gorbachev Malta meeting in 1989, and subsequent 1990 Paris declaration.

³⁸³ Toasts at a Dinner Hosted by President Bush in Moscow July 31, 1991, see <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1991/91073102.html>

regional power system, for example between Russia and CIS member.³⁸⁴ These perceptions might appear to resemble neo-realist cold-war prescriptions. But, the following two Russian policy prescriptions were diverging from this neo-realist nature. First, it was argued that the democratization of international economic relations was needed, while, second, it was also suggested that cooperation in solving fundamental world issues was necessary. It could be argued that this economic prescription resembled more the demand of the non-aligned movement's "Group 77," while the suggestion concerning cooperation resembled Gorbachov's "new thinking" policy. Therefore, none of the perceptions were in fact new but it was quite innovative that they were grouped together in one common concept -- a multi-polar world of "Russia first".

Concerning policy, or the practical governmental side of implementation of this "Russia first" worldview, Primakov suggested the strengthening of the OSCE and the reform of UN.³⁸⁵ A formula for eventual cooperation with NATO was sought within the framework of "special relations" between Moscow and Brussels. These "special relations" were to have been modeled on NATO-France relations and it was argued that only if NATO rejects this or some similar proposal should other measures be taken.³⁸⁶ Therefore, NATO was not necessarily perceived as a threat but as an alliance with which Russia should conclude "a strategic partnership agreement", thus developing cooperation along the lines of protection of common interests.³⁸⁷ It is indicative that Kozyrev's "Partnership with the West" in political, economic, and military spheres was reduced

³⁸⁴ Ibid., Primakov 1996.

³⁸⁵ Ibid., Primakov 1996.

³⁸⁶ See the article by two prominent strategic experts Dmitry Chernogorsky and Sergei Kortunov in *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 16 (1996), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 10 April 1996, 1,4.

³⁸⁷ See Yury Davydov, the Institute of the US and Canada, in *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 8 (1996), translated from *Sevodnya* 23 February 1996.

only to the military-strategic sphere of partnership under Primakov. The case of NATO-Russia cooperation in Bosnia was offered as a blueprint for the future. Thus, the "Russia first" agenda was not anti-Western or neo-imperialist in its content, as some Western commentators have argued, but more of a realistic understanding as to what could be achieved with existing resources.³⁸⁸ Furthermore, Primakov stated that Russia's goal was not to stop East European countries from joining NATO but to obtain the West's respect for Moscow's own security dilemmas and interests.³⁸⁹ This only confirmed that Russia was more interested in strengthening CIS integration than in playing some global role, despite Primakov courteous statement about developing a "civilized partnership with former cold-war foes".

General Lebed offered a similarly sobering viewpoint on relations with NATO.³⁹⁰ He reiterated that neither the "admiration of Westernizers" nor "alarmism of patriots" represented good policy vis-à-vis NATO enlargement. Instead, he argued that Russia should join Partnership for Peace while, at the same time, he advised that Moscow should reject any attempts at creating a counter-alliance, labeling these proposals "ridiculous".³⁹¹ Therefore, throughout 1996 the security argumentation of the "Russia first" discourse was increasingly inclined towards the understanding that Russia's nuclear capability was the best and cheapest deterrence and security guarantee for the time being. It was assumed that Russian societal energy and resources should be directed toward domestic reforms

³⁸⁸ See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand chessboard; American primacy and its geostrategic imperatives* (New York: BasicBooks, 1997).

³⁸⁹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 9 (1996), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 1 March 1996.

³⁹⁰ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 20 (1996), translated from *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye* 16 May 1996, 4.

³⁹¹ *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye* 16 May 1996, 4.

(political, economic, and military) and not foreign policy engagements and rivalries that could not bring any positive results in the short term.³⁹²

Primakov's replacement of Kozyrev, aside from representing a personal and discursive shift, also brought upon additional institutional change in Russian foreign policy. Additional institutional change occurred by the creation of the Foreign Policy Council. The Foreign Policy Council was created at the beginning of 1996. This body was part of the Presidency and it represented an avenue for the President to streamline and control the initiative and preparation phases of foreign policy. The Foreign Policy Council was created as a coordinating body "which carries out the preliminary examination and interdepartmental study of RF foreign policy questions and the preparation of the appropriate proposals for the Russian Federation President."³⁹³ The Council was composed of representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, the Security Services and the Presidential office advisers that clearly undermined Kozyrev-era Ministry of Foreign Affairs exclusive authority for dealing with international affairs. This council complemented the work of Security Council by dealing only with foreign policy issues and leaving security and military issues to the jurisdiction of Security Council.

As the 1996 Presidential elections approached, the Russian political space became more polarized and emotionally charged speeches filled the political discourse.

Zyuganov³⁹⁴ lead this trend in an attempt to electrify a quite disillusioned electorate with

³⁹² *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye* 16 May 1996, 4.

³⁹³ See *The Foreign Broadcast Information Service* SOV-96-011, translated from *Rossiiskaya gazeta* 13 January 1996, 6.

³⁹⁴ See Gennadii Ziuganov, *Za gorizontom* [Behind Horizon] (Moscow, 1995), and Gennadii Ziuganov, *Drama vlasti* [Drama of Power] (Moscow, 1993).

his quest for patriotism and protection of the nation and the state as a whole.³⁹⁵ In terms of strategic discourse, Yeltsin recalled Russian history in terms of advocating advantages of having presidential system by making it equal to czarism. Meanwhile, Zyuganov recalled history in terms of czarist-era borders.³⁹⁶ As a reaction to these election messages and the rhetorical hostility expressed toward members of the opposing electoral bloc, many political analysts cautioned the public about the dangers of political extremism and strongly advocated consensual policy making.³⁹⁷ Tsipko, a renowned scholar, even argued against presidential elections because "the people will be choosing between artificially invented, not real, alternatives for the development of Russian society."³⁹⁸ Even among media more inclined to the *National-Patriots*, the perception of "elections without real choice" became dominant with a strong message that, in order to avoid catastrophic scenarios, mutual concessions among Russia's major players were very much necessary as short-term sacrifices.³⁹⁹ Similar concerns were raised by the most prominent Russian businessmen in a public statement issued on the front page of the April 27, 1996, issue of *Kommersant-Daily* with reprints on almost all other national front pages.⁴⁰⁰ The appeal of these wealthy Russians was that society was divided and that compromise and concessions were needed. In the same message the 'patriotic bloc' was advised not to become nationalistic while the argument was made that democratic

³⁹⁵ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 4 (1996), translated from *Pravda Rossii* 18 January 1996. In terms of quantitative analysis it should be mentioned that Zyuganov's election platform mentioned word "communism" only once while the word "fatherland" was mentioned 18 times. Peter Truscott, 233.

³⁹⁶ Peter Truscott, 242.

³⁹⁷ See Lidia Shevtsova of the Moscow Carnegie Center in *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 8 (1996), translated from *Moskovskije Novosti* 18-25 February 1996.

³⁹⁸ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 7 (1996), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 20 February 1996, 1,5.

³⁹⁹ See Igor Shafarevich, "Kak umiraiut narody," [How Nations Die] *Nash Sovremennik* 7 (1996): 99-112.

⁴⁰⁰ Some of the signatories were B.Berezovsky, president of the LogoVAZ group; V.Gusinsky, chairman of the board of directors of the Most group; V.Potinin, president of the ONEKSIM bank; M.Fridman, chairman of the board of directors of the Alpha Group consortium; M.Khadorkovsky, chairman of the board of directors of the Menatep bank.

mechanisms should not be rejected just because the word democracy had become corrupted. Therefore, the call made here for an alliance of 'anti-crisis' political forces was based on the emergence of a unifying perception. This unifying perception was that growing domestic political differences would hamper the country's developmental chances and increase security risks. Consequently, at that time, the growing perception was that Russian political space was divided between the "populists" and "realists". However, the notion of realism was quite different from what is generally understood by realism in the theory of international relations. According to Yegor Stroev, the Federation Council speaker, the realists were "realistically thinking people."⁴⁰¹ This primarily meant that advocates of ideologically-based projects were identified as destabilizers, while those who argued for practical agreements on the basis of lowest common denominator were deemed to be practical problem solvers. Various Russian political and interest groups welcomed the discourse of "Russia first", with its "realistic assessments of reality" and problem-solving capacity, as a sign of national stability. Thus this discourse came to prevail in foreign and domestic policy thinking. Another perceived benefit of having "realists" taking charge of Russian foreign policy was in their presumed capacity to provide a counterweight to American geostrategic thinking.⁴⁰² It was assumed that American security thinking was dominated not by democratic or conservative ideologies but by "pragmatism" of a more purely *realpolitik* nature. It was argued that Russia's security discourse should adopt a similar profile.⁴⁰³

⁴⁰¹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 5 (1996), translated from *Moskovskije novosti* 4 (28 January – 4 February 1996), 9.

⁴⁰² Andrei Krutskikh, "Pragmatists in American Political Science," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 3 (1997): 84-96.

⁴⁰³ Andrei Krutskikh, 95.

The fact that foreign policy was absent from the June 1996 Presidential election campaign could signal that a political consensus was established around this issue, especially after Primakov's appointment. The dismissal of Defense Minister Pavel Grachev constituted a significant contribution to this foreign policy consensus. Dislike for Grachev had been growing steadily among the Russian political elite due to emerging allegations of corruption and his evident poor management of Chechen war, not to mention the personal grievances of many communist and nationalist politicians against Grachev due to his support for Yeltsin in the 1993 attack on the Parliament building. Therefore, in order to improve his re-election chances as well as to demonstrate that he, too, was among proponents of "Russia First", Yeltsin quickly appointed General Aleksandar Lebed to the post of Secretary of the newly-created Security Council and General Igor Rodionov to the post of Minister of Defense. Lebed chaired the Security Council, a coordinating body on defense, economic and intelligence security, responsible only to the President.

However, it could be argued that at the moment when "Russia first" became endorsed as a unanimous discursive and foreign policy view it began to fragment. One possible reason for such a fragmentation could be found in an emerging political division, as a consequence of the Presidential election campaign, between "the communists" and "the rest". This is probably why Primakov, with his socialist-looking worldview that suggested economic determinism, was almost never criticized in the communist-dominated Parliament, even though he vocally opposed some of the foreign policy prescriptions coming from the *National-Patriots*.⁴⁰⁴ It is noteworthy that his position was

⁴⁰⁴ For example, see the article "A minister the opposition doesn't curse" in *Obshchaya gazeta* 37 (19-25 September 1996), 4, translated in *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 39 (1996). This respect

not repetition of old-fashioned communist mechanicism but rather an adjusted socialist worldview. Primakov therefore pursued "Russia first" despite the fact that many *National-Patriots* had in mind alternative tactics in achieving the same goals. For example, Primakov clearly stressed that he would pursue an active policy, despite the fact that many advocates of "Russia first", predominantly communists but also Lebed, argued for Moscow's withdrawal from the international scene until Russia solves its domestic problems.⁴⁰⁵ On the issue of the CIS Primakov was also going against what many *National-Patriots* desired - restoration of the USSR. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs called for strengthened CIS cooperation without any desire to jeopardize the independence of Soviet successor states.⁴⁰⁶ However, his overall vision that Russia was not functioning well, that the current political and economic situation was not functioning well, coincided with the views of "Russia first" proponents. Primakov opposed Russia's status as a mere raw material supplier to the world, and he clearly indicated his belief in the convergence theory, and therefore he did not necessarily believe in the absolute supremacy of the capitalist system.⁴⁰⁷ This was probably what was ringing the West's alarm bells more than anything else, since it created an image of the re-emergence of the cold war ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism. General Rodionov, Minister of Defense, was another Yeltsin's appointee who pleased "Russia first" proponents. With his cold war rhetoric Rodionov was definitely more suitable for "Russia

toward Primakov was partly due to his consensus-driven personality as well as the fact that he opposed the more polemic-driven Kozyrev.

⁴⁰⁵ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 26 (1996), translated from *Moskovskiye novosti* 25 (23-30 June 1996): 10.

⁴⁰⁶ *Moskovskiye novosti* 25 (23-30 June 1996): 10.

⁴⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, *Obschaya gazeta* 37 (1996) and *Moskovskiye novosti* 25 (1996).

first" despite the fact that some of his alarmist views on "penetration by some foreign powers into the CIS area" were old-fashioned zero-sum perceptions.⁴⁰⁸

On the academic front of the security discourse, much more credible thinkers than Gen. Rodionov began presenting views on the advantages of a security arrangement that would include "...a synthetic concept that contains the features of a moderate national idea and isolationism."⁴⁰⁹ Sergei Kortunov, one of the most prominent Russian international relations experts, suggested that such isolationism should actually result in the creation of alternative alliances. His multi-polar vision was based on the assumption that the U.S., China, Germany and Japan cannot objectively be Russian allies since they had clearly rivaling interests towards each other.⁴¹⁰ While concluding that Russia's attempt to achieve a workable strategic partnership with the USA had failed, he suggested the strengthening of some sort of alliance with the Ukraine, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Georgia and Armenia.⁴¹¹ These demands for disengagement from the Kozyrev-era embrace with the USA were not solely based on security calculations but also on deeper philosophical disappointments with American culture and behavior.⁴¹²

It could be also argued that the rise of General Lebed to one of the highest places in the state hierarchy, namely to the post of secretary of the Security Council, represented the institutionalization of "Russia first" ideas while, at the same time, it can be argued

⁴⁰⁸ See Rodionov's outline of the Russian new military doctrine in *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 50 (1996), translated from *Nezavisimoye voennoye obozreniye* 22 (28 November 1996): 1,4.

⁴⁰⁹ See Dmitrii Baluev, "Moderation in the national Idea," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 42, 5/6 (1996): 113.

⁴¹⁰ See Sergei Kortunov, "Russia in Search of Allies," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 42, 2 (1996): 148-164.

⁴¹¹ Sergei Kortunov, 150.

⁴¹² Aleksandr Tsipko was more than explicit in his criticism of American Democrats arguing, "...in the democrats you have an unnatural kind of intellectual racism. They, supposedly, are the brightest, they know everything, they know how to re-do the world. But this is all banal; all of this is already on the record. To what does this lead? In realistic terms, this leads to a strengthening of double moral standards in US foreign policy." "Growing Support for New Foreign Policy in Russia," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 42, 5/6 (1996): 23.

that his removal less than four months later confirmed the emergence of divisions within "Russia first" viewpoints.⁴¹³ Lebed outlined as his reason for joining Yeltsin in the second round of the 1996 Presidential elections the danger of communists coming to power, or, in his words, "an old idea that left behind much bloodshed and grief".⁴¹⁴ Lebed, an outspoken critic of Russian involvement in Chechnya, was put in charge of negotiations with the rebel republic's leadership. On the other hand, Lebed's over-publicized work at the Security Council, including the reform of the Russian Army, gave an impression of him taking state power in his hands. Adding to this perception was Yeltsin's sudden creation of Defense Council and appointment of Yury Baturin to the post of Secretary of this newly-created body. The Defense Council was a "permanent advisory body to the President in the area of military development and is responsible for a broad range of problems having to do with preparations to defend Russia's population and territory against the threat of war, and for coordinating the actions of the pertinent ministries and departments."⁴¹⁵ Creation of the Defense Council left Lebed's Security Council without jurisdiction over the most important security area - defense.

At the end of August 1996 Lebed brokered and signed the peace treaty in Chechnya.⁴¹⁶ Even though he emerged as the rational and pragmatic savior of peace and Russian soldiers' lives, the general was accused of treason by the significant portion of political forces, especially in the pages of *Zavtra* daily. Therefore, a split appeared between the staunch proponents of war measures, both within and outside the

⁴¹³ Ivan Rybkin replaced General Lebed. See Ivan Rybkin, "Domestic Challenges to Russia's Security," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 4 (1997): 132-144.

⁴¹⁴ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 25 (1996), translated from *Sevodnya* 19 June 1996, 1.

⁴¹⁵ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 30 (1996), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 26 July 1996, 1.

⁴¹⁶ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 35 (1996), translated from *Sevodnya* 28 August 1996, 1.

government, and those who favored a halt to any military action and who advocated the search for a peaceful solution through political negotiation and accommodation. This split also brought about a split in the "Russia first" consensus. It is important to mention that the conflict in Chechnya did not emerge because Yeltsin's opposition wanted radical measures, but because Yeltsin himself and his office implemented and pursued a radical policy.⁴¹⁷ Consequently, the split within "Russia first" did not emerge along the lines of government vs. opposition, but within both governmental and opposition ranks. Fortunately for Primakov, the Chechnya issue figured as an internal policy matter and was out of his jurisdiction.

However, during 1996 Minister Primakov pursued policies in the sphere of foreign policy implementation that were more or less along the path approved by the majority of participants of Russian foreign policy discourse. This path should in no way be considered as anti-Western. For example, Russia made concessions to the West on some Bosnia-related issues. Igor Ivanov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, made clear that those accused of war crimes, including Karadzic, should not participate in the upcoming Bosnian elections.⁴¹⁸ Only two months earlier, Ivanov had expressed the view that even indicted persons could participate in elections as long as they had not been convicted in a trial.⁴¹⁹ On the other hand, Russia was not able to get similar concessions from its Western allies on the Yugoslav issue. After visiting Belgrade in June 1996, Primakov attended a meeting with NATO countries in Berlin. At this meeting he proposed lifting sanctions against Yugoslavia, but the US opposed this as they wanted to

⁴¹⁷ See John B. Dunlop, *Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of Separatist Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

⁴¹⁸ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 20 (1996), translated from *Izvestia* 17 May 1996, 3.

⁴¹⁹ *Izvestia* 17 May 1996, 3.

use the embargo to pressure Milosevic to get rid of Karadzic.⁴²⁰ The Russian side was quite disillusioned by this outcome, as the prevailing view, especially among "Russia first" proponents, was that the May 1992 UN sanctions, introduced due to the alleged involvement of Serbia in the Bosnian civil war, were no longer necessary. The continued existence of sanctions brought to mind the Iraqi and Libyan examples, but what raised even more concern among the Russians was that the UN, the institution that imposed sanctions, was being ignored as the body that should remove sanctions. This ineffectiveness of the UN to play an important role signaled to "Russia first" that the world was developing more toward the mono-polar, rather than multi-polar, system.

More anti-Western rhetoric was, on occasion, launched in discourse oriented toward domestic consumption, especially by members of Russia's legislative branch. For example, communist MP Ilyukhin, Duma Security Committee Chairman, came out with allegations about a CIA plot in Belarus.⁴²¹ What was more interesting in terms of Russian security discourse analysis was the fact that his allegations were based on a paper produced by Federal Intelligence Service, the same institution that Primakov had chaired just months before this allegation was made. The report on CIA activities was most probably prepared under Primakov's chairmanship and only made public while he was already the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This fact further contributed to Primakov's credibility within the "Russia first" and, especially, communist ranks.

Another security discourse that was emerging within Russia was one regarding military security, and it was primarily launched by army officials. This discourse could be delineated on two issues, namely, the position of the Russian military within the Russian

⁴²⁰ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 23 (1996), translated from *Izvestia* 8 June 1996, 3.

⁴²¹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 30 (1996), translated from *Pravda* 5 28 (26 July – 2 August 1996): 2.

institutional framework, and the formulation and implementation of Russian military doctrine. Some authors argued that the military department, during the Minister Grachev's tenure, achieved substantial autonomy from civilian oversight and control.⁴²² Consequently, the military seemed to be primarily interested in terms of payment issue, since this was, although arguably, the only item of military policy not controlled by the military itself. However, the issue of the formulation and implementation of military doctrine could not be seen as an separate issue, if only because of the fact that the Russian military was involved in peacemaking and peacekeeping missions along the CIS perimeter and in the Balkans, and in actual war in the breakaway republic of Chechnya. This use of numerous Russian military units in a variety of hot spots raised the question of the terms, conditions and mandate of deployment. Every deployment was done upon the political orders of civilian executive branch and so there was little reason to be alarmed that the army was not under civilian control.⁴²³ Although, it could be argued, at least on the basis of the Moldovan and Abkhazian examples, that once deployed in the theater of operations, the army had a more independent role due to the incapacity of civilian decision making in the combat-demanding real time.

However, the issue of military doctrine became the main arena of conflicting interests from the executive, legislative and military side. Since the control button was clearly in the hands of the executive branch, especially after the formation of the Defense Council, the most powerful weapon at the disposal of the legislative branch and the military department to press for their interests was the generation of specific discourses

⁴²² See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 45 (1996), translated from *Sevodnya* 12 November 1996, 1.

⁴²³ See Jacobsen C.G., "Russia's Revolutionary Arbiter? Arms and Society, 1988-1994," *War & Society* 13, 1 (1995) 101-146.

and perceptions. The army's main interest was in the economic and technical provisions of military doctrine, and in this it had the support of the legislative branch. The executive branch in all this civil-military "tit for tat" only pressed for changes in military doctrine, since it was not ready to commit any more funding for meaningful military reform. Therefore, the executive pushed for cosmetic changes in military affairs and targeted changing military doctrine. As the Defense Council Secretary, Yury Baturin said, "in accordance with the Constitution and in connection with the changed geopolitical situation a new doctrine is needed."⁴²⁴ General Rodionov, Minister of Defense, after unsuccessfully trying to block changes in military doctrine, acted quickly and launched his own proposal for a new military doctrine.⁴²⁵ This opened up space for the emergence of two competing discourses on military issues. Basically, Rodionov argued that the world, especially in Russia's neighborhood, is very much conflict driven and that Russian interests were everywhere in danger, presuming that the appropriate protection of Russian interests could be achieved by more military funding.⁴²⁶ He said that "first and foremost, the sphere of Russia's strategic interests extends to the independent states of the CIS, which quite recently were republics of the former USSR. Relations with them are of paramount importance for us in both the political-economic and military spheres."⁴²⁷ Rodionov did not hesitate to mention that "certain Western countries" were involved in

⁴²⁴ Ibid., *Sevodnya* 12 November 1996, 1.

⁴²⁵ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 45 (1996), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 6 November 1996, 1, and *Sevodnya* 12 November 1996, 1.

⁴²⁶ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 50 (1996), translated from *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye* 22 (28 November 1996): 1,4.

⁴²⁷ Ibid., *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye* 22 (28 November 1996): 1,4.

preventing further integration processes in the CIS region.⁴²⁸ The NATO enlargement was presented in the very same alarming tone.⁴²⁹

This assessment of the international situation was shared by almost all "Russia first" proponents. The extent of internal "Russia first" differences was along the lines of to which extent this situation was acute and what the possibilities were of real, military confrontation between Russia and some other country. The executive branch claimed that this worldview was quite alarmist and the Presidency tried to downplay images of Russia confronting other countries, especially with Western countries. However, the executive paid much more attention to sections of Rodionov's military doctrine proposal that pointed at the need for domestic changes. These changes, proposed by Rodionov, were accompanied by the perception that the real security threat rest in inadequate domestic assessment and management of countermeasures of potential foreign threats. Therefore, the credibility of the entire executive branch was called into question. Rodionov suggested the centralization of all armed forces, and reorientation from combat preparations on the basis of small-scale wars to preparations for a large-scale war as well. These two proposals definitely put the executive branch at odds with the military department. There were several reasons for this. The issue of putting the entire armed forces under a single military command would simply deprive President Yeltsin of having the final say on security issues. The proliferation of armed forces in Russia, with several ministries holding substantial armed personnel and military hardware under their command, was an issue of Kremlin-style checks and balances. After the August 1991

⁴²⁸ Ibid. *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye*.

⁴²⁹ It is noteworthy that Russian security discourse always used the quite hostile term "NATO expansion" while the same process in the West was more moderately dubbed "NATO enlargement or NATO accession".

military coup, and October 1993 storming of the Parliament building, the executive branch was trying to develop less dependence on military when it comes to using coercive power. Thus several ministries and government agencies developed rapid reaction units, anti-riot police, or anti-terrorist troops, while the border troops lost their formerly close Soviet-era links with the Ministry of Defense. The proliferation of these armed formations could also indicate a shift in the focus of the executive branch from foreign to domestic threats. It was obvious that the conscript-based Russian army could not be trusted in possible actions, in times of political turmoil, against its own people. The existence of these rival armed formations definitely made the army leadership feel abandoned and mistrusted and so the grievances against the executive branch steadily grew.

On the issue of refocused combat training, the perception of the executive branch was probably that the West and other of Russia's neighbors would negatively assess large-scale war training. The executive branch wanted to make sure that no one would feel threatened by some demonstrations of emerging 'Russian imperialism' and it refocused combat training toward preparations to fight small-scale wars. It could be argued that the emerging civil wars in the CIS countries were exactly the small-scale wars envisioned and so this focus made sense. However, General Rodionov argued that by depriving the army of the ability to fight a large-scale war, the security of Russia would be seriously undermined if a formidable adversary challenged security.

Some authors retained that the army had valuable points in this debate over new military doctrine but that the Ministry of Defense was unable and incapable of presenting its message clearly and efficiently. For example, Pavel Felgengauer, a respected political

analyst, argued that Russian generals only issued empty threats by relaying on old-fashioned Soviet-era public relations, thus undermining the chances for substantial policy changes.⁴³⁰ He also said that "the military department has no qualified market economists or "golden pens" who could write a speech or an article civilians would understand, and the ministry is not headed by an influential politician who could command the attention of the press and of society."⁴³¹ However, the message Rodionov was sending to the public about the dangers of NATO enlargement resonated broadly. The government wanted to sign a partnership-like agreement with NATO, while the most vocal skeptics proposed the creation of a counter-posing Russia-led military alliance.⁴³²

This proposal for a Russia-led alliance was something that "Russia first" proponents constantly argued in favor of when discussing the CIS countries. Therefore, the Ministry of Defense's security discourse merged with the existing "Russia first" economic-political discourse about the future of CIS. Coincidentally, at that time, the CIS was having its fifth anniversary and many voices even within the government were calling an increased concentration of powers in the CIS Affairs Ministry.⁴³³ Even though these appeals for a more unified legal and economic mechanism within the CIS made sense in terms of globalization processes going on in other parts of globe, especially in Europe, this issue of development was not welcomed by political brokers in the Russian executive branch. Simply put, by giving more power to the multilateral institutions, the

⁴³⁰ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 50 (1996), translated from *Sevodnya* 15 December 1996, 3.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*, *Sevodnya* 15 December 1996, 3.

⁴³² See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 51 (1996), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 10 December 1996, 2; *Sevodnya* 15 December 1996, 2; *Moskovskiye novosti* 50 (15-22 December 1996): 5; *Sovetskaya Rossiya* 15 December 1996, 7; *Rossiiskaya gazeta* 17 December 1996, 1,7; *Krasnaya zvezda* 20 December 1996, 1.

⁴³³ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 51 (1996), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 19 December 1996, 3.

President of Russia would no longer be able to exercise the same amount of unrestrained power within and outside Russia. This was definitely not something to which Yeltsin would agree. On that issue, Yeltsin had the support of some other CIS presidents who feared that their powers would be constrained by the emergence of some CIS confederation institutions.⁴³⁴

However, General Rodionov went further in his anti-NATO security discourse by arguing for the creation of a CIS defense alliance.⁴³⁵ His views were quickly rejected by the Presidential Press Secretary, Sergei Yastrzhembsky, who said that Rodionov's report "should be construed only as his personal reflection on hypothetical threats to Russia's security that may or may not emerge along the perimeter of the state border."⁴³⁶ This proved to be a growing confrontation on security-related issues between the executive branch and the Ministry of Defense. However, the only way to discredit "Russia first" security concerns and proposals was for the executive to argue for a Russia-NATO partnership agreement, support for which the Kremlin enjoyed from some portions of the Russian legislative branch, primarily from the Yabloko faction.⁴³⁷ It could be argued that the weakest side in their argument was that this was an agreement the realization of which was absolutely beyond Moscow's control and entirely according to NATO's wishes. It was noteworthy that Russian disarmament experts basically echoed Rodionov's fears about NATO enlargement. Strong arguments were made that, in the case of NATO

⁴³⁴ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 52 (1996), translated from *Sevodnya* 27 December 1996, 3.

⁴³⁵ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 52 (1996), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 26 December 1996, 1.

⁴³⁶ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 52 (1996), translated from *Sevodnya* 28 December 1996, 1.

⁴³⁷ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 52 (1996), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 26 December 1996, 2.

enlargement, a variety of disarmament treaties, primarily the CFE, should be renegotiated, otherwise Russian security would be undermined.⁴³⁸

During 1996, Primakov tried to promote "Russia first" worldview abroad, especially in his visits to US. The main goal was to present to Americans the benefits of the "multi-polar world" concept. But he was not successful in getting this message across probably due to two reasons. First, the Americans did not want to limit their power and to constrain themselves to be ruled by multilateral organizations such as the UN or the OSCE. Second, the concept of a "multi-polar world" probably sounded to the White House security advisers as another bipolar scenario, or even looked to hyper-cautious American 'cold war nostalgics,' as another 'Russian trick.' Primakov's speech at the 1996 session of the UN General Assembly in which he sought to identify the multi-polar system as a democratic system was not sufficient to convince his American counterparts that they should refuse to take advantage of NATO enlargement and US mono-polar supremacy.⁴³⁹ Primakov argued for "the development of an equal partnership, something that does not, of course, preclude the existence of differing approaches to individual problems" as a much less intimate and cooperative formula from that used during the Kozyrev years.⁴⁴⁰

While Russian foreign policy views differed from the US on issues of NATO enlargement and Iraq, the Yugoslav crisis demonstrated again that Russia could be a very

⁴³⁸ See *Razoruzhenie i bezopasnost' 1997-1998; Rossiia i mezhdunarodnaia sistema kontroli nad vooruzheniiami: razvitiie ili raspad* [Disarmament and Security 1997-1998; Russia and International System of Arms Control: Development or Collaps] (Moscow: Nauka, 1997); V.I. Dashichev, *Natsional'naia bezopasnost' Rossii i ekspansii NATO* [national Security of Russia and NATO Expansion] (Moscow: IMEPI RAN, 1996); Sergei Kortunov, "Disarmament and National Goals," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 42, 4 (1996): 71-84; Makhmut Gareev, "The expansion of NATO Does Not Solve, but Aggravates Security Issues," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 42, 2 (1996): 141-148.

⁴³⁹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 39 (1996), translated from *Rossiiskaya gazeta* 26 September 1996, 7.

⁴⁴⁰ *Rossiiskaya gazeta* 26 September 1996, 7.

useful Western ally. From the beginning of the 1996/1997 standoff between the Serbian regime and opposition parties over the disputed results of municipal elections, Moscow argued for dialogue between the two sides and for the recognition of opposition victories.⁴⁴¹ Unlike the US, Moscow did not blame the Belgrade authorities for violence and threaten them with sanctions, but rather Russia condemned violence in general, realizing that the standoff could only be solved by consensus and mutual concessions rather than the victory of one side over the other. Moscow probably relied on the fact that they could work with Milosevic, but not necessarily with the disunited Serbian opposition, on possible diplomatic formulas to solve either Serbian domestic or regional issues. Thus Moscow ended up portrayed as anti-democratic and pro-socialist for the policy that was, essentially identical to that implemented by the West. The only difference was that the West gave vocal support to the Serbian opposition and threatened Milosevic with sanctions, but, at the end of the day, the arrangements were always solely concluded with Milosevic. However, further events proved that this Russian position was quite adequate when the spring 1997 agreement between Milosevic and the Serbian opposition was reached and violence and sanctions were avoided. Thus, it comes as no surprise why Russia, unlike other Western countries, was able to sign a trade agreement with Serbia, thus resolving the issue of outstanding oil payments. At the same time, an accompanying military agreement was signed with provision for future arms deliveries once the international sanctions are removed from Yugoslavia.⁴⁴²

⁴⁴¹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 52 (1996), translated from *Sevodnya* 26 December 1996, 1.

⁴⁴² See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 49 (1997), translated from *Kommersant-Daily* 2 December 1997, 5.

In the domestic discourse on foreign policy Primakov, as a Middle East expert, started differentiating between Islamic extremism and Islamic fundamentalism, deeming only the former one as dangerous.⁴⁴³ Such a differentiation of terms had both domestic and foreign purposes. Domestically, this could indicate that the Russian security discourse of "Russia first" sought to dissociate itself from some extremist anti-Islamic views usually attributed to extreme segments of the Russian political spectrum during the wars in Chechnya and Tajikistan. Primakov wanted to make sure that the multiethnic Russian federation would treat its citizens equally.⁴⁴⁴ The foreign purpose of this discourse was to detach Russia from the anti-Islamic views and policies of the American administration and to leave open space for Russia to engage and cooperate with regimes even as fundamentalist as those of Iran or the Taliban in Afghanistan.

4.4 Discursive and policy shift from Kozyrev's "equal partnership" to Primakov's "diversified relations"

The start of 1997 began with traditional end-of-the-year public surveys of the most important events of the previous year. These surveys could be used as an indicator of how much foreign policy issues were resonating in the memory of average Russian citizens. However, in the list of the ten most important events of 1996, the journal

⁴⁴³ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 40 (1996), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 18 September 1996, 2.

⁴⁴⁴ *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 18 September 1996, 2. Primakov said that "As long as the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Russia does not lead to ethnic discord and civil strife, we must learn to respect and reckon with this phenomenon, which is having a certain impact on the development of our society. But there can be no tolerance of Islamic extremism."

Moskovskiye novosti, did not list any foreign policy events, but did list quite a number of security-related events.⁴⁴⁵ The ranking of events was as follows:

- 1) The wages and pension payment crisis (considered important by 42% of people);
- 2) The peace agreements and troop withdrawal from Chechnya (39%);
- 3) The Russian presidential election (26%);
- 4) Lebed's activity as Security Council Secretary (18%);
- 5) Terrorist acts in Moscow and other Russian cities (13%);
- 6) Yeltsin's heart surgery (12%);
- 7) The seizure of Pervomaiskoye and Kizlyar by militants (12%);
- 8) The Russia-wide miner's strike (11%);
- 9) The regional elections in Russia (9%);
- 10) The Russian airmen's escape from captivity in Kandahar (8%).

It was obvious that domestic social and political events such as labor unrest, financial problems and elections drew the most attention from citizens. Several security issues starting with the war in Chechnya, Islamic terrorism on Russian territory and ending with the successful escape of a Russian cargo plane crew from Taliban captivity in Afghanistan, demonstrated the public's high sensibility to security concerns. Such a split between domestic and security issues can also signify that the specifics of foreign policy debate had relevance primarily among the elite members and much less among the general public. A similar trend could be detected in 1997. The end-of-the-year public survey placed two security related issues, namely the Russian troops pull out from Chechnya and the kidnapping of people in Chechnya and Tajikistan, among the ten most

⁴⁴⁵ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 1 (1997), translated from *Moskovskiye novosti* 1 (29 December 1996 – 5 January 1997): 6.

important events of 1997.⁴⁴⁶ However, the foreign policy debate remained vibrant among the Russian political elite with the "Russia first" discourse advocating, more and more, an assertive policy.

On the other hand, implementation of assertive measures created further dissonant voices and opinions among the "Russia first" ranks. Thus discourse again became very rich with rival emerging perceptions. The catalysts for such a discourse were Primakov's assessments on the future directions of Russian foreign policy, and practical policy measures, among them the threat of economic sanctions against Estonia.⁴⁴⁷ Primakov, in his first 1997 interview, outlined Russia's main short-term goals: these included a steady path along the perception of a multi-polar world, but now accompanied by the proposal for **diversification in relations**. Thus, Moscow would not build its links only with the West, but also with China. The upcoming visit of Jiang Zemin to Moscow and the signing of several treaties (including treaties on economic and military relations, border cooperation and regional security measures) clearly signified that a shift was underway.⁴⁴⁸ Opposition to NATO enlargement was stated as one of the priorities, and terms used in expressing this position were quite confrontational, while a new linkage of the amending CFE Treaty to NATO enlargement was quite explicitly stated.⁴⁴⁹ In terms of relations with the CIS countries, further integration, primarily along the lines of a Russia-Belarus treaty on forming a community between these two countries and the "Treaty of Four" on deepening economic and cultural cooperation among Russia,

⁴⁴⁶ Vera Nikitina, "God za godom: 1997," [Year by Year: 1997] *Monitoring obshchestvennogo mneniia* 6 (1998): 41.

⁴⁴⁷ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 2 (1997), translated from *Rossiiskaya gazeta* 10 January 1997, 2, and *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 11 January 1997, 1.

⁴⁴⁸ Though, it could be argued that this was rather continuity of Gorbachev's Asia policies.

⁴⁴⁹ *Rossiiskaya gazeta* 10 January 1997, 2.

Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, were outlined as priorities.⁴⁵⁰ Primakov also warned that a variety of pressures, including economic sanctions, would be implemented against Estonia until this country changed its repressive policy toward the Russian-speaking minority.⁴⁵¹

Dissonant voices among "Russia first" began openly to question the validity of such a "confrontational policy".⁴⁵² These alternative perceptions argued that relations with NATO should create more options for Russia than simply to lead to a stalemate in talks and a confrontation-like future. It is noteworthy that all the opponents of NATO enlargement used, as a bitter remainder, the West's promise from 1990 given to Gorbachev that NATO would never go further than East Germany. However, dissonant voices from "Russia first," for all practical purposes, did not blame the West for not respecting its words by simply stating that the geopolitical situation had changed. Therefore, these voices, which might be referred to as "**reluctant realists**", cautiously assessed the situation and advised proceeding along less costly directions. At the same time they began more and more to dissociate from the "Russia first" discourse and viewpoints by describing these perceptions as "confrontational" and "empty rhetoric".⁴⁵³ The "reluctant realists" also argued that several open questions in relations with the US had emerged, such as, the Russian Duma's delay in ratifying the START II treaty and the threat that American Congress would violate the ABM treaty. At the same time, Washington complained about Moscow's nuclear technology transfers to Iran and anti-

⁴⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁴⁵¹ *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 11 January 1997, 1. On data about Russian minority residing in 'near abroad' see *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 1 (1997), translated from *Izvestia* 26 December 1996, 5.

⁴⁵² See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 2 (1997), translated from *Sevodnya* 14 January 1997, 2.

⁴⁵³ *Sevodnya* 14 January 1997, 2.

missile systems sales to Cyprus.⁴⁵⁴ “Russia first” proponents and the “reluctant realists” both shared the belief that 1997 would be a turning point in Russian foreign policy, with the “reluctant realists” emphasizing, primarily, the approaching crisis in U.S.-Russia relations.⁴⁵⁵

In line with expected radical foreign policy changes, the executive offered a highly divisive policy as a counterbalance to NATO enlargement, namely, union with Belarus.⁴⁵⁶ The divisive effect of this proposal on Russian security discourse was that the positions taken by those in favor and opposed were quite polarized without much space left for consensus. The “reluctant realists” considered integration between Russia and Belarus an unstable and unnecessary arrangement. This initiative of Yeltsin came to be viewed as a timely political maneuver directed at buying some support from domestic *National-patriots* critics. The proponents of “Russia first” advocated that this agreement was the right step towards the creation of broader security and economic cooperation within the CIS framework, thus pressing for extension of this agreement to other countries as well.⁴⁵⁷ On the other hand, such divided and polarized security discourse, and policy perceptions were something that gave a free hand to the executive, Yeltsin in particular, to exercise his favorite role of unchallenged arbiter.

At that time a public survey on the nature of Russia was published.⁴⁵⁸ The survey showed that Russian society was split between two poles, practically following the

⁴⁵⁴ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 2 (1997), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 15 January 1997, 1,4.

⁴⁵⁵ *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 15 January 1997, 1,4.

⁴⁵⁶ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 2 (1997), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 14 January 1997, 1,3.

⁴⁵⁷ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 2 (1997), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 15 January 1997, 1,3.

⁴⁵⁸ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 3 (1997), translated from *NG-Stsenarii* 1 (16 January 1997): 2-3.

divisions in Russian elite's security discourse. According to the poll, the public mood was split along the lines of "Western-oriented democrats" and "restorers of socialism".

However, when one looks more closely into the characteristics of perceptions expressed by "the Western-oriented democrats," the conclusion can be made that this group was, on many points, not as "Western" as some would think. The majority of this group believed that Russia is distinct from the West and that Russia's developmental path should be different "from the Western one."⁴⁵⁹ Also, it turns out that this group felt humiliated, more than other groups in society, by the outcomes of Russia's post-communist transition that turned Russia into a supplier of raw materials. The perception of Russia's past among this group was sometimes more glorious and pride-driven than in other groups. These perceptions left enough space for shared beliefs with other groups in society and this was most probably the explanation for the emergence of "Russia first" and for its acceptance among the population. On the other hand, differences in the interpretation of various concepts among groups were wide enough to explain the fragmentation in "Russia first" discourse. For example, "the restorers of socialism" had a different understanding of Russian distinctiveness from that of "the Western-oriented democrats". "What they had in mind was not the special features of Russia and its people that must be taken into account as real difficulties in moving toward the West, but special features that make Russia superior to the West and, therefore, enable the country to reject any movement in that direction."⁴⁶⁰ Therefore, it could be claimed that due to the emergence of a certain discourse focus, alliances can be created due to the existence of shared perceptions.

⁴⁵⁹ *NG-Stsenarii* 1 (16 January 1997): 2-3.

⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

However, it could also be claimed that these alliances were not stable and had a tendency to oscillate whenever change in discourse focus appears. These oscillations were possibly due to the different value systems among the interacting groups. Discourse focus would mean the shift from more general evaluations to more specific policy prescriptions. The level of agreement among various groups participating in the discourse would decrease as the discourse became more specific and policy prescription oriented. However, during 1997 the bonds of "Russia first" appeared to erode rather gradually. The most probable reason for this gradualism was that some fundamental perceptions were shared across the board so that the argument could be made that this was a common set of values or, rather, a compatibility of values that united the two polarized groups. These values were:

- "1) The life of an individual person is the highest value;
- 2) The law is mandatory for everyone - from the President to the ordinary citizen;
- 3) A person's property is sacred and inviolable;
- 4) The stronger the state, the greater the well-being of its citizens;
- 5) The stronger the state, the more strictly human rights and freedoms are observed therein;
- 6) The most important human rights are the right to life and the right to defend one's personal honor and dignity;
- 7) Russian citizens need freedom just as much as people in the West."⁴⁶¹

Special attention should be paid to values 4 and 5 where the emphasis was on the state and its power as a guarantor for social well-being and human rights. It could be argued that precisely these shared beliefs facilitated the emergence of "Russia first" and helped

⁴⁶¹ Ibid.

its existence. The gradual rather than instant fragmentation of "Russia first" was a function of the strength of these two shared beliefs. The strength of these two beliefs was probably due to the widespread perception that the state is the most viable agent of change and that Russian society did not have a better medium for further successful development than to rely on the state's strength. At the same time, the strength of these public beliefs was accompanied by the absence of their operationalization into clearly defined strategies for implementation. This opened up space for the elite's interpretation of these strategies. Furthermore, if the elite did not seem to be united on the issue of the best strategies or policy prescriptions, the executive played the role of uncontested decision maker.

NATO enlargement and Russia's policy response were an example of that trend. Russian Foreign Minister Primakov indicated several times that Russia expected more than a consultative formula offered by NATO. What Moscow wanted was a "legally binding" document.⁴⁶² Such a document would enhance Russia's status as a great power and would help materialize its security interests. These interests concerned opposition over NATO Eastward enlargement and the eventual deployment of NATO troops and weapons, especially nuclear ones, on the territories of new member states. Russian demands also included the creation of comprehensive accords that would "deal with joint reaction to crisis situations and joint peacekeeping."⁴⁶³ Russia was not entirely happy with how cooperation in peacekeeping mission was proceeding, having in mind the experience of Bosnia (ironically, this experience was often used by NATO as an example

⁴⁶² See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 3 (1997), translated from *Sevodnya* 21 January 1997, 1.

⁴⁶³ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet press* 5 (1997), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 17 January 1997, 4.

of successful cooperation with Russia). What Moscow demanded was more participation in political decision-making and policy planning.

For its part, NATO offered Russia "special consultative status within NATO and formulation of a new economic aid program."⁴⁶⁴ Primakov's proposal was better known as "16+1 formula" and was more along the model of France's status within NATO. At the same time, NATO's proposal was something more than Partnership for Peace status in a sense that there would be a consultative NATO-Russia entity that would meet periodically. These NATO offers clearly fell short of any of the expectations of the Russian political elite. On the other hand, Russian public opinion was more and more unanimous in its negative view toward NATO enlargement while being quite divided over adequate security strategies that Russia should adopt in response. Thus 50% of respondents were against the former Soviet republics joining NATO while 41% opposed former Warsaw Treaty countries joining NATO. However, on the issue of what Russia should do, respondents varied in their prescription from 26% suggesting to stay out of any military blocks, 22% suggesting that Russia should pursue cooperation with NATO, 17% advocating creation of a counterpoising military alliance, 8% demanding that Russia join NATO.⁴⁶⁵

The Russian political elite was apparently similarly united in its negative perception of NATO enlargement and, accordingly was divided in its views on what strategy Russia should adopt vis-à-vis this issue.⁴⁶⁶ For example, at the 1997 World

⁴⁶⁴ *Sevodnya* 21 January 1997, 1.

⁴⁶⁵ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 3 (1997), translated from *Trud* 21 January 1997, 1.

⁴⁶⁶ Some of the proposed policies were quite radical. Ivan Rybkin, Russian Security Council Secretary, argued that Russia should reconsider the USSR's "no-first-strike" policy in order to better deter security threats. Although, it can also be argued that such a statement was a response to the visit in February 1997 by NATO Secretary General Javier Solana to the Caucasus and the Central Asian states of the CIS, a zone

Economic Forum in Davos Russian PM Chernomyrdin was unequivocally opposed to NATO enlargement but in favor of NATO-Russia cooperation.⁴⁶⁷ At the same meeting, Anatoly Chubais, Deputy PM and the President's Chief of Staff, and the strongest pro-Westerner in the executive branch, argued that the implications of NATO enlargement would be damaging for Russia-West relations and would negatively affect Russian cooperation with the IMF, the Council of Europe, the WTO, the Paris Club and other organizations.⁴⁶⁸ Chubais also said that all of Russia's political forces opposed NATO enlargement, adding that "For me personally, for example, this is the first time in five years that I have held the same position as Mr. Zhirinovsky and Mr. Zyuganov" – and Chubais noted that this position is shared by 99 of every 100 Russians.⁴⁶⁹

Therefore, domestic opposition to NATO enlargement was stable but policy prescriptions for the response were the object of various disagreements. On the other hand, it would be untenable for Russia to continue without a policy response vis-à-vis NATO, especially since the date for the admission of new members was rapidly approaching. Therefore, the executive pushed for the signing of a Russia-NATO founding act thus capitalizing on divisions among the political elite while, at the same time, keeping open the possibilities for other kinds of Russia-NATO arrangements. However, one episode prior to the signing of the founding act showed that the executive was perhaps afraid of negative reactions from some segments of the establishment, especially the military. Thus, the President fired Defense Minister General Rodionov, shortly before

of Russian special interests. See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 6 (1997), translated from *Rossiiskaya gazeta* 11 February 1997, 1-2.

⁴⁶⁷ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 5 (1997), translated from *Sevodnya* 1 February 1997, 3.

⁴⁶⁸ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 5 (1997), translated from *Rossiiskiy vesti* 5 February 1997, 1.

⁴⁶⁹ *Rossiiskiy vesti* 5 February 1997, 1.

the Russia-NATO document was to be signed. This removal of the top military officer was explained as a step toward proper military reform with General Rodionov being accused of failing to implement this reform. Many critics of this step noted Yeltsin's attempt to change the discourse focus from the Russia-NATO relations to the issue of military reform in Russia.⁴⁷⁰ This maneuver by Yeltsin fragmented the expected opposition to the signing of Russia-NATO founding act, a document that definitely fell short of being legally binding and in accordance with the expectations of "Russia first" proponents. General Igor Sergeyev was nominated in Rodionov's place; he was expected, according to the executive, to move between the "Russia first" and "reluctant realists" rather than hold a firm position in either group.⁴⁷¹

A few days later in Paris, the Russia-NATO Founding Act ("The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization") was signed.⁴⁷² The treaty envisioned creation of the Permanent Joint Council as a biannual meeting of Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs. However, this body was of a consultative nature, which allowed Yeltsin's critics to argue that the agreement did not give any substantial reassurance that Russian security concerns would be protected. On the other hand, Yeltsin argued that this framework gave Russia an opportunity to be engaged in discussing and solving vital security issues together with NATO instead of becoming isolated.⁴⁷³ It was quite arguable as to whether isolation was the proper description for Russia's foreign policy activity at that moment, and a summary list of some events points rather to the opposite. For example, in March

⁴⁷⁰ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 21 (1997), translated from *Sevodnya* 23 May 1997, 1.

⁴⁷¹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 21 (1997), translated from *Sevodnya* 24 May 1997, 1, 3.

⁴⁷² See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 21 (1997), translated from *Izvestia* 28 May 1997, 1, 3.

⁴⁷³ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 21 (1997), translated from *Rossiiskie vesti* 28 May 1997, 1.

1997 there was a summit between Yeltsin and Clinton in Helsinki. In April 1997 Russia and Belarus signed a Union Charter. In April 1997, an agreement between Moldova and Transdniester republic was signed under the mediation of Russia.⁴⁷⁴ In late April 1997, the Chinese President visited Russia in his first foreign trip since Deng's death. On this occasion, Russia and China signed a declaration envisioning the creation of a multi-polar world and the strengthening of the role of UN and Security Council.⁴⁷⁵ In May 1997, Armenia ratified the Russia-Armenia treaty on Russian military assistance and military bases on Armenian soil.⁴⁷⁶ In the same month a more comprehensive peace treaty between Russia and Chechnya was signed. In late May 1997, the Ukraine-Russia Black Sea Fleet Treaty was signed, thus reducing possible dispute areas between Moscow and Kiev.⁴⁷⁷ Therefore, there was little basis for the perception that Russia was descending into isolation not was there any need to blame Minister Primakov for going too slowly in negotiations with NATO.⁴⁷⁸ However, the first cracks between Foreign Minister and the President were already visible since Yeltsin wanted the Russia-NATO treaty signed before the July 1997 NATO Madrid summit, thus speeding-up negotiations and probably negatively affecting the content of the agreement.⁴⁷⁹ Yeltsin apparently wanted to please domestic critics with some security arrangement achievement before NATO officially invited three new members at the Madrid meeting.

⁴⁷⁴ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 15 (1997), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 12 April 1997, 1.

⁴⁷⁵ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 17 (1997), translated from *Rossiiskiy vesti* 25 April 1997, 2.

⁴⁷⁶ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 18 (1997), translated from *Sevodnya* 6 May 1997, 3.

⁴⁷⁷ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 22 (1997), translated from *Rossiiskiy vesti* 30 May 1997, 1-3.

⁴⁷⁸ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 19 (1997), translated from *Izvestia* 12 May 1997, 1-2.

⁴⁷⁹ *Izvestia* 12 May 1997, 1-2.

During the same period (the first half of 1997), Russian relations with Serbia did not depart from the earlier patterns of Moscow's policy. Even during the several months long dispute in 1996-1997 between the Milosevic government and Serbian opposition over the results of municipal elections the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs pursued a role of constructive engagement rather than a role of applying pressures. Therefore, this policy remained different from the policy pursued by Western countries, especially the US. The policy of diversification from the West was quite visible on this issue. With regard to Russian foreign policy discourse, the issue of Serbia's disputed municipal elections moved the policy prescriptions of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs much closer to that proposed by the Russian Duma. This "agreement on fundamental positions," on the issue of Yugoslavia, between the legislative and executive branches could signify the predominance of "Russia first" viewpoints and another indication of how discursive ideas influenced state institutions.⁴⁸⁰ The reason to claim the synphony of their views can be found in comparing two declarations that both the Duma's delegation, headed by deputy speaker Sergei Baburin, and deputy Minister Igor Ivanov, issued separately after their respective visits to Belgrade in February 1997. These declarations coincide on all four elements: the disputed Serbian municipal elections are an internal problem; the problem should be solved through direct negotiations between the government and the opposition; any aggravations of the dispute could lead to a wider destabilization of the Balkans; Yugoslav-Russian state relations should not be affected by internal events in both countries.⁴⁸¹ Political commentators in Russia who sought to question the validity of any Yugoslav-Russian long-term prospects for cooperation often

⁴⁸⁰ See an interview with Igor Ivanov, Deputy Foreign Minister, in the *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 5 (1997), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 5 February 1997, 4.

⁴⁸¹ *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 5 February 1997, 4.

used the last point. On the one hand, it was argued that Russian economic problems at home made it an incapable donor abroad. Thus, once Serbia achieves a security agreement with the West, her need for friendship with Russia will disappear. On the other side, Russian communists argued that the Serbian opposition was truly pro-Western and that it was even snubbing Russia as an eventual strategic ally.⁴⁸² The response of "Russia first" to these critics was articulated by Igor Ivanov, who said that the USSR focused on individuals and regimes in its foreign relations while contemporary Russia follows its national interests and "common bonds" which were, in the case of Yugoslavia, "historical, cultural, economic, political, geopolitical, strategic."⁴⁸³ It should be also noted that while one part of the Russian political space, the more leftist oriented groups, had some reservations toward the Serbian opposition due to their pro-Western standing, with level of analysis being political affiliation, the more nationalist segments of the Russian political space, viewed Serbs affirmatively and with no reservations, primarily using a religious or ethnic level of analysis. Thus, even some prominent Russian politicians, including Moscow's mayor Yury Luzhkov, often referred in their discourse to "the Orthodox Serbs" while advocating protection of "Serbian interests".⁴⁸⁴

4.5 Identity and religion

The issue of religion ended up being very important for post-communist identity building in Russia. The development of such an identity significantly influenced security

⁴⁸² See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 32 (1997), translated from *Pravda*-5 13 August 1997, 3.

⁴⁸³ *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 5 February 1997, 4.

⁴⁸⁴ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 52 (1996), translated from *Sevodnya* 26 December 1996, 1.

discourse. When it comes to the role of Orthodoxy, two phases of this identity building can be detected. The first phase began with the rejection of "perestroika" and with the acceptance of the capitalist market economy. The radical economic reform that followed heavily influenced value system. In these circumstances the Christian Orthodox Church emerged as an anchor for the nation's belief system. The state quickly acknowledged the importance of the Church in replacing former communist ideology and practically incorporated it as another state institution – chaplains being quickly introduced in the Russian army. Thus, the state-church relationship, and appropriation of the church as another public institution and a custodian of national identity characterized this phase. In qualitative terms, this phase could also be characterized as "the honeymoon between the Church and politics" due to Orthodox Christianity's widespread acceptance. Regional leaders, in order of busting their image and legitimacy, were especially keen to develop good relations with the Orthodox Church and often urged the state to follow the suit. Yuriy Luzhkov, mayor of Moscow, said that "Russian authorities and society must repent before the Church and try to compensate it for property lost in Soviet times."⁴⁸⁵

The second phase, starting in the second half of the '90s, was characterized by a society-church relationship. Different assessments of the role that the Church should have in society and politics took place both within and outside the Church. At the same time, various political parties attributed different relevance and meaning to Orthodox Christianity while, at the same time, not insisting on the institutional evolution of the Church or rethinking its role. Therefore, almost every political party and politician was still very much supportive of the Church's presence in public life, but they differed in their assessments of the role that Orthodox Christianity should play in society. "Russia

⁴⁸⁵ See *FBIS-SOV* translated from *Interfax* 1345 GMT, 5 October 1997.

first" proponents believed that there was a need for a symbiosis between ethnicity, Orthodoxy and the state.⁴⁸⁶ Consequently, a geostrategic argument for an alliance or partnership relations with other Christian Orthodox states became sustained. In order to dismiss Western stereotypes attributed to Orthodoxy as a synonym for Empire, they argued that "it is not hard to prove that there is not and never has been any organic link between Orthodoxy and the imperial practice of subjugating other peoples. Anglican Britain was once far more imperialistic than Orthodox Russia."⁴⁸⁷ The argument of the "reluctant realists" was quite the opposite: they advocated a secular, and truly multicultural, identity policy at home and demanded a more universalistic moral credo when it came to foreign policy abroad. Otherwise, they argued, inhumane acts would end up again being approved by the Church, as was the case with the Chechen war or sanctions against Abkhazia.⁴⁸⁸ Orthodox Church, in words of Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Russia, argued, "we have common task with the state – to restore moral health of society."⁴⁸⁹

There were also reconciliatory voices that tried to bridge the positions on identity and ethics between "Russia first" and the "reluctant realists". Some scholars argued that there was a need for a new ethic for successful Russian modernization.⁴⁹⁰ The conclusion was that the Church could not offer such a role since "... Orthodoxy... is once again picking not society but the state as its partner, and, generally speaking, is legitimizing the gangsters, the ruling oligarchy and the nouveaux riches." A new ethic that would balance

⁴⁸⁶ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 35 (1997), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 20 August 1997, 2.

⁴⁸⁷ *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 20 August 1997, 2.

⁴⁸⁸ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 35 (1997), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 6 September 1997, 6.

⁴⁸⁹ See *FBIS-SOV* translated from *ITAR-TASS* 1853 GMT, 27 June 1997.

⁴⁹⁰ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 2 (1998), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 25 September 1997, 7.

between "...a heightened individualistic awareness of freedom, ... and a solidarity based on voluntary self-denial" was needed.⁴⁹¹

However, it was noteworthy that "Russia first" addressed Orthodoxy as a belief and cultural identity category, while the "reluctant realists" perceived it as an institution. "Russia first" proponents perceived the Orthodoxy credo as being above the state (it had an attributed metaphysical origin) but nonetheless in the service of the nation, with the state as the benefiting organizational form of the Russian nation. Church top leadership supported this position by stating that "Russia came to exist as a state on the basis of the Orthodox religion. So it is only on the basis of the Orthodox religion that the Fatherland can regain its magnificence."⁴⁹² The "reluctant realists" perceived the Church as subordinated to the state and serving only interests of the elite, thus being of no relevance to what citizens want. Therefore, the issue of the custodian of national identity was still open, and consequently, the debate over security and foreign policy remained a forum of expression of various identity views. It was noteworthy that Russian ethnic minorities also participated in the identity debate, being primarily interested in the legal framework of minority rights. It might come as a surprise to a Western observer that Russian minorities insisted that Russian personal identification cards should have some indication of bearers' nationality while Russians wanted to have personal documents without indication of their nationality.⁴⁹³

⁴⁹¹ *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 25 September 1997, 7.

⁴⁹² See an interview of Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow and All Russia in *FBIS-SOV* translated from *Interfax* 0815 GMT, 6 August 1997.

⁴⁹³ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 46 (1997), translated from *Kommersant Daily* 15 November 1997, 3.

4.6 Accommodating the "multi-polar world" vision: the "national idea" in foreign policy

Another attempt was made by Primakov in the sphere of foreign policy actions to move forward in discourse while still implementing the "multi-polar world" concept. In the second half of 1997, the Russian Foreign Minister visited several Latin American countries, and successfully brokered a UN-Iraq agreement that halted the announced US bombing of Baghdad. In the discourse that accompanied these foreign policy activities he introduced the category of "national idea" in Russian foreign policy implementation.⁴⁹⁴ Therefore, the foreign policy activities that were underway were not only perceived by Primakov as a result of the previous discursive consensus reached by "Russia first" on what is the beneficial foreign policy behavior but were also a springboard for the attempted consensus on nation-building. This endeavor could indicate that, within the executive branch, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Minister Primakov, in particular, had emerged as the force that sought to engineer national consensus. On the other hand, since 1992, the role of the Russian Presidency, as the main body of the executive branch, had been to capitalize on discords in society and to play the role of final arbiter, free from any responsibility. Thus, Primakov's attempt at this political engineering could have been perceived as a challenge to Yeltsin's conduct of politics, as it would erode the very base of President's power. During his ministerial term, Primakov

⁴⁹⁴ The category of "national idea" was launched by Yeltsin in early Fall 1997 as "the task of putting together a system, a set of ideals and ideas - an ideology, in the final analysis - in order to unite and consolidate our society and direct its energy into a constructive and creative channel." See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 45 (1997), translated from *Sevodnya* 12 November 1997, 3.

was perceived in positive terms by almost all segments of the Russian political elite⁴⁹⁵ and especially by the academic community.⁴⁹⁶ This fact created an opportunity for him to try to appease the existing gap between "Russia first" and the "reluctant realists".

Such an attempt can be seen in Primakov's year-end account of Russian foreign policy activities and achievements in 1997.⁴⁹⁷ Primakov clearly offered the "Russia first" discursive line of "diversification of links" in his account of Russia's relationship with the West, indicating three directions of activities: the G-8; Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation; and cooperation with the EU on the basis of the signed Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between Russia and the EU. However, as a compromise with the "reluctant realists," the level of the relationship was described as a "strategic partnership," thus focusing on meaningful, pragmatic and constructive relationships instead of declarative prophesies of Russia's own power and significance. Even more appealing to the "reluctant realists" must have been Primakov's approach to NATO enlargement. He said that "practical cooperation with NATO" instead of "counterproductive confrontation" guided Russian foreign policy. Such a view was along the lines of the foreign policy prescriptions offered by the "reluctant realists".

In 1997, influential Russian academic journals strongly voiced their editorial positions toward the multi-polar world concept, the creation of a "national idea" in foreign policy and "pragmatism" in security measures. NATO enlargement emerged as the single most debated issue. The journal *International Affairs* primarily focused on

⁴⁹⁵ *Sevodnya* 12 November 1997, 3. Also see *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 48 (1997), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 28 November 1997, 1,4.

⁴⁹⁶ See Aleksei Pushkov, "'The Primakov Doctrine' and a New European Order," *International Affairs* (Moscow) 44, 2 (1998): 1-14.

⁴⁹⁷ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 1 (1998), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 24 December 1997, 1.

regional security and integration issues. The region that was most analyzed was CIS and several proposals for further integration were made, thereby proposing alternative alliances. This was along the lines of the multi-polar world vision. NATO enlargement was considered a future security risk but the policy proposals advocated constructive engagement instead of confrontation, thus pursuing the “reluctant realists” discourse. Significant attention was given to UN themes while it was noteworthy that several representatives from the legislative branch presented their views on *International Affairs* pages, demonstrating an all-inclusiveness. The prominent philosophical journal *Voprosy Filosofii*, aside from traditional articles dealing with ontological and epistemological issues, presented a forum for frequent in-depth debates on Russian national idea. Constant efforts were made to problematize and understand the specifics of Russian culture and history. The accent was on the benefits of accommodating the Russian national idea into public policy and foreign policy security activities. Another dominant theme was the process of transition from traditional to civil society. Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” often emerged as a point of reference and Russian authors predominantly advocated a “pragmatic” response to what they perceived as the American interventionist security threat. The “pragmatic” response included maintenance of Russian specifics but also geopolitical containment through the creation of “alternative alliances”. *Nash Sovremennik* focused on the Russian national idea but, in its general tones, abandoned its maverick image from previous years and practically became mainstream. It was strongly emphasized that Russia was a great power in a multi-polar world, practically the same line employed by Primakov or any member of executive and legislative branch. The themes of *Slavophilism* and re-assessment of Stalinism and

Leninism were prominently covered. What was probably most important in terms of the Russian security discourse was the accent on *Neo-Eurasian* all-inclusiveness instead of the quests for division in society. This practically represented the “reluctant realists”’ quest for domestic consensus and the “pragmatic” agenda of avoiding conflicts by creating domestic consensus and foreign “alternative alliances”. During the 1997 period *MEMO* was definitely more oriented toward Russian rather than international issues. The dominant theme was Russia and the world market and this theme frequently argued for a “pragmatic” orientation when protecting Russian economic interests. This was followed by debates on the specifics of Russian capitalism and how best to continue with economic development, noting some negative consequences of globalization and free trade. Again the accent was not on Russia abandoning the capitalist economy but on how to best protect Russian interests. Issues of NATO enlargement and the role of Russian military in the economy and politics were the second most frequent theme. The “reluctant realists”’ approach was advocated on the issue of creating “alternative alliances” while at the same time, maintaining constructive relations with NATO. *Svobodnaia mysl’* showed little interest in security issues and carried less contradictory articles with the exception of a sociological analysis of the war in Chechnya.⁴⁹⁸ The themes of Russian history, social-democracy and Marxism dominated the pages of *Svobodnaia mysl’* during the 1997. However, the articles that addressed the issues of the Russian political system argued for the acknowledgment and respect of Russian specifics and advocated “pragmatism” as a prerequisite of successful political and economic development.

⁴⁹⁸ See B. Kagarlitskii, “Chechenskaia voina I obshestvennoe mnenie,” *Svobodnaia mysl’* 1 (1997): 33-44.

4.7 Conclusion

Discourse analysis findings from this chapter were charted in chronological and thematic manner. This method facilitated understanding of discursive evolution and institutionalization of ideas generated by “schools of thought” during the 1996-98 period. Several findings from this chapter stand out as a link with the thesis core: state institutions’ worldviews were generated by “schools of thought” such was the case with *Atlanticism* and “Russia first”; the implementation of “Russia first” discourse and policy prescriptions as the state policy was an evidence of the impact ideas have on public policy choices; foreign policy discourse primarily evolved around the issues of ‘near abroad’ and the former Yugoslavia as those two themes dominated text and speech of debate participants; further evolution of “Russia first” indicated that “schools of thought” acted as social movements which were able of creating consensual solutions about the public policy choices even when holding different worldviews.

Thus, the first two years (1996 and 1997) of Primakov's ministerial term began with the prevailing consensus of "Russia first" worldviews among the Russian foreign policy institutions and proceeded towards a growing split in the Russian security discourse between the proponents of "Russia first" and the "reluctant realists". Primakov institutionally implemented the concept of a multi-polar world which was the dominant perception of security discourse participants in the last years of Kozyrev's tenure. This concept incorporated the new dimension of relationship with the West, notably the shift from Kozyrev's “equal partnership” towards the policy of security related “strategic partnership” and “diversified relations.” “Diversified relations” meant that alternative

international alliances could be established if Russian political and security needs required it. Despite practical steps by Primakov to pursue a “diversified relations” policy, the actual results were not beneficial, especially in terms of participation in the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis and controlling NATO enlargement, while some success was achieved in CIS affairs. The perception that results were not beneficial produced fragmentation within “Russia first” and the maverick discourse of the “reluctant realists” emerged. The “reluctant realists” argued for pragmatic and constructive foreign policy involvement, aware that Russian power resources were limited. This view facilitated the emergence of a perception that temporary isolation could be as beneficial since present relations with the West were not benefiting Russia, while confrontation with the West was simply beyond Russia’s capacities.

In terms of links with the 19th century “schools of thought” several comparisons could be made. First, Russian security concepts remained synthetic thus possibly being labeled eclectic. For example, “Russia first” concept was based on: international relations theory approach of neo-realism; Group 77 economic analysis; some prescriptions of Gorbachev’s “new thinking” policy. Second, the identity issue provoked contending security policy prescriptions, such as shift from “equal partnership” toward “diversified relations.” A similar impact of identity issue on foreign policy prescriptions was visible throughout the 19th century debate between *Westerners*, *Slavophiles* and *Pan-Slavists* especially after the Crimean war in 1856. Consequently, foreign policy prescriptions aimed toward isolationisms not only during the periods when the state was facing international challenges and power erosion but also when the debate on identity perceived the consequences of modernity and globalization as dangerous for Russia. Third, the 19th

century intelligentsia and the 20th century political elite had a dominant role over the Russian security discourse, though greater significance should be attributed to the public opinion of the contemporary Russia due to the different nature of political system. However, despite the fact that the public surveys revealed that the Russian public was much less enthusiastic about Russia's interventions in Chechnya in 1994 and Bosnia, or anti-NATO policy than its elite, it was also revealed, that as alternative discourse would emerge reflecting the dominant discontent these ideas were not able to influence the state institutions, with exception of Chechnya in 1996. It was rather the case that institutional policy changes were obtained due to the new security discourse resulting in security policy changes such as the creation of alternative alliances, the continuity of active Balkan policy, isolation from the dependency on the West. Fourth, despite the periodical consensus between the security discourse participants an unanimity was never reached and the debate and emergence of new discursive positions continued. Fifth, the general worldview of a divided world was characteristic for almost all 20th century Russian security discourse participants.

However, by the end of 1997 several signs indicated the possibility of having again some kind of national consensus on foreign policy by the inclusion of the discourse on a "national idea." It could be argued that institutionally this consensus could only emerge at the expense of Presidential power. The years of the post-Yeltsin's presidency could indicate how this presumable contradiction would be solved. It will be shown in chapter V how the agenda of the "reluctant realists" frustrated some "Russia first" members and contributed to the emergence of the "advocates of firmness and brinkmanship." At the same time, the "national idea" concept remained underdeveloped

and finally ended up as the policy prescription of isolation. The concept of isolation was the shared perception of the “reluctant realists” and the “advocates of brinkmanship and firmness,” but the two groups attributed different content to this category. For the “reluctant realists,” this concept meant that an unnecessary confrontation was avoided while at the same time unproductive and uneven relations were avoided. For the “advocates of brinkmanship and firmness,” isolation meant, primarily, the protection of the power base of Russian cultural and civilizational uniqueness and protection from negative influences of globalization. However, in terms of public policy choices, both discursive groups considered isolation a beneficial policy prescription.

CHAPTER V

5. Unsuccessful institutionalization of "Russia first" and the emergence of flexible isolationisms (1998-2000)

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will follow the development of Russian security discourse and the according foreign policy behavior in the 1998-2000 period. The focus of this analysis will be placed on discourses developing around the "near abroad" and issues concerning the former Yugoslavia. It will be argued that during this period the main trend of debate was the fragmentation of "Russia first" into the two discursive streams of policy proposals, namely the "reluctant realists" and the "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness." It was noteworthy that both streams shared almost the same "Russia first" worldviews. During this period the link between ideas and institutions was expressed in gradual institutionalization of the isolationist foreign policy proposal. This development happened due to the incapacity of "Russia first" to long term institutionalize despite its over-all prevalence in the 1997 security discourse. "Schools of thought" performed their role of social movements and influenced state institutions through discourse. At the same time "schools of thought" acted as sets of ideas and cultural traits and transmitted 19th century theoretical heritage thus linking the 20th century isolationist concept of "island Russia" with the 19th century concept of "uniqueness" (*samobytnost*). This dual nature of

“schools of thought” and the interaction of continuity and change in Russian post-communist politics further validated the thesis’ focus on culture sensitive foreign policy analysis.

5.2 “Reluctant realists” vs. the “advocates of brinkmanship and firmness”

The failure of PM Primakov to bring longevity to a political consensus upon which his institutional and leadership ascendance was built could be explained by the shift in Russian security discourse. This shift involved a change in discursive content. It resulted in disappearance of several key “Russia first” categories such as “multi-polar world”, “great power”, and in the increased frequency of usage of terms such as “national idea”, “unity” and “common sense”. The previous stabilizing effect of “Russia first” on Russian security discourse in terms of diminishing polarization among “schools of thought” was predominantly related to the perception of where Russia was heading in its developmental path. The consensus over the developmental path was based upon rejection of notions that Russia should go toward the West or toward the East and it was temporarily solved by the perception that Russia was where it is and it should not go anywhere. The fragmentation within “Russia first” was more imminent and visible over the issues of international crisis management and the use of force in foreign politics. The use of force in foreign policy was increasingly perceived as less cost-effective resulting in a decline in advocacy for foreign policy coercion. On the other hand this did not necessarily lead to Russian compliance with western demands, instead it led to neutrality, or, to use an admittedly awkward term, to “passive opposition” toward the West. In no

way should this be understood as an approval of certain Western journalistic accounts of Russia as a "rogue state" but rather as an increased self-consciousness on the part of Russia's security discourse participants about negative effects of globalization and the demand for preservation of Russian specifics and distinctiveness through isolation. The elasticity of this isolation was going to be negotiated between the "reluctant realists" and the "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness" on a case-by-case basis.

"Reluctant realists" were those who argued that the most suitable security arrangement for Russia by which it would maximize its developmental chances was to neither ally itself with the West nor to confront the West. The perception grew that European integration processes embodied in EU and NATO policies of enlargement were quite far away from realistically considering Russia as a full-time member in the foreseeable future. The "reluctant realists" calmly stressed that Russia is too big for any of those organizations and that therefore Moscow should keep its freedom of action and not rush to become a member. However, there was no intention by this discursive stream to ignore or negate the importance of these organizations since they were still perceived as potential partners on selected issues.

The "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness" constituted another stream emerging from the "Russia first" "school of thought." Opposition to any compromise on crucial security issues that would fall short of fulfilling Russian national interest was one of the main characteristics of this discursive group. The perception that Russian military might could be used as leverage in future political confrontations oriented this discursive group to believe in the possibility of win-win scenarios in international disputes such as

the Cuban missile crisis in the early 1960s.⁴⁹⁹ Another dominant perception within this group was about the expansionist nature of the West, usually identified with the US. The US was perceived as an hegemonic power, ready to use force against those it dislikes, as in the case of the bombing of Bosnian Serb positions in the summer of 1995, but at the same time it was an hegemonic state that could be made vulnerable by having the same amount of force used against it, such as the case in the failed peacekeeping mission in Somalia. However, this discursive stream could also be individuated as the group occasionally rallying around selected issues, primarily the ones with conflict management demand, than as a permanently established alliance. The existence of "reluctant realists" and the "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness" proved that the security debate in Russia was evolving from the "Russia first" consensus and offering a variety of public policy proposals. The existence of this variety followed by the lack of consensus significantly helped the Presidency to capitalize on domestic policy imperatives. In the following section I will show how this debate influenced executive branch and profiled its public policies.

⁴⁹⁹ The brinkmanship situation in the Cuban crisis was solved by mutual withdrawals of Soviet weapons from Cuba and American weapons from Turkey.

5.3 Victory of Yeltsin's domestic policy imperatives over the CIS-related foreign policy issues: Pre-1997 period

5.3.1 Phase one: *Atlanticists'* snubbing of Central Asia

Before 1997, Russian security discourse related to CIS issues could be divided into two phases. These phases, namely 1991-1993, and 1993-1996, corresponded with the implemented foreign policy. During the first phase the issues related to the Central Asian region were deemed insignificant for Moscow while the conflict in Moldova and relations with Ukraine occupied the central stage. It should be remembered that at that time the *Atlanticists* were formulating and executing Russian foreign policy. This "school of thought" "pointedly ignored the Central Asian states" believing that "close political, economic, military and strategic relations with the countries of the region could obstruct Russia's rapid integration into Western structures."⁵⁰⁰ There were several more specific reasons for this perception and consequent behavior of the *Atlanticists*.

The main economic viewpoint of this school of thought was that terms of trade and financial operations with the Central Asian states represented a net economic loss for Russia and that this would be augmented in the future if Russia kept close ties with those economies. The main political viewpoint of the *Atlanticists*, due to the authoritarian nature of Central Asian political systems, was that close ties with them would "discredit the new Russian leadership" and strengthen leftist and nationalist advocates in Russia.⁵⁰¹

⁵⁰⁰ See Andrei Kortunov and Sergei Lounev, "Russia and Russians in Central Asia," *Ethnic Challenges beyond Borders; Chinese and Russian Perspectives of the Central Asian Conundrum* eds. Yongjin Zhang and Rouben Azizian (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), 98.

⁵⁰¹ Andrei Kortunov and Sergei Lounev, 98.

The main security viewpoint of the *Atlanticists* was that "Central Asia will always be a source of instability" and that Russia will be better off if it leaves this dangerous region.⁵⁰² Therefore, geopolitically, the *Atlanticists* believed that "a focus on Central Asia may needlessly displace ... Russia's 'return to Europe'."⁵⁰³

On the other hand, critics of the *Atlanticists* view claimed that Russia hastily abandoned Central Asia even against the will of region states' leaders. Russia's unilateral military pull-out and the cancellation of common currency in the form of the "ruble zone" created more instability in the region than it benefited Russia at home. Especially vocal critics of the *Atlanticists* were the *Neo-Eurasians*, and this critique practically generated the emergence of a rival discourse. This rival discourse was based on several viewpoints.

First, it was argued that the regional security dilemmas were going to be better served if Russian troops stayed in the region and tried to create "the integrated system of Russia's military security."⁵⁰⁴ Furthermore, it was claimed that the fact that a large, Russian-speaking minority resides in Central Asia should oblige Russia to play the active role of a regional peacekeeper instead of pulling out its troops and waiting until some extremist challenger emerged. *Neo-Eurasians* were especially worried of local hot spots being regulated by an out-of-region country or organization.⁵⁰⁵ The main economic viewpoint of the *Neo-Eurasians* was that by canceling economic ties with Central Asia, many Russian industries and enterprises would be forced out of work. At the same time, Central Asian markets would be closed to Russian goods that are otherwise non-competitive in Western markets. In the final economic analysis, *Neo-Eurasians* insisted

⁵⁰² Ibid.

⁵⁰³ Ibid., Andrei Kortunov and Sergei Lounev, 99.

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid., Andrei Kortunov and Sergei Lounev, 100.

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid.

that more integration in finance, monetary policy, and trade could lead toward the creation of "a common market" beneficial for everybody in the region, Russia included.⁵⁰⁶

5.3.2 Phase two: The return of CIS multilateralism

The reality of 1992 and 1993, characterized by a huge influx of Russian-speaking refugees from Central Asia, the emergence of local ethnic conflicts and demands from regional countries for Russian mediation in local hot-spots, as well as domestic economic pressures from negatively affected Russian industries urged Moscow to reconsider its policy vis-à-vis Central Asia. Therefore from 1993 until 1996 Moscow implemented a different approach.⁵⁰⁷ During this period "bilateral and multilateral agreements aimed at restoring severed links were signed. Russia's financial assistance to the Central Asian states started to increase. The emigration of the Russian-speaking population was discouraged and dealt with."⁵⁰⁸ This renewed focus by the Russian executive branch on multilateralism in Central Asia through the CIS mechanism has produced more than 200 signed treaties but only a few implemented ones.⁵⁰⁹ This discrepancy between words and deeds in CIS and, particularly, the durability of unresolved Central Asian territorial and

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁷ Although, some Western authors, such as Neil MacFarlane argued that the change was due to the trade off with the West over the Yugoslav civil war. The argument was that Russia received strategic concessions in the CIS region, such as revision of CFE treaty flank limits, for the approval of Western policies vis-à-vis the former Yugoslavia. See Neil MacFarlane, "Realism and Russian Strategy after the Collapse of the USSR," *Unipolar Politics; Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War* eds. Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 243.

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid., Andrei Kortunov and Sergei Lounev, 103.

⁵⁰⁹ See Andrei Kortunov and Andrei Shoumikhin, "Russia and Central Asia: Evolution of Mutual Perceptions, Policies, and Interdependence," *Ethnic Challenges beyond Borders; Chinese and Russian Perspectives of the Central Asian Conundrum* eds., Yongjin Zhang and Rouben Azizian (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), 20.

ethnic issues created another cycle within the security discourse in Russia. At the end of 1997 the CIS issues emerged less as a topic which polarized Russian strategic discourse than as an evaluative theme of lessons learned from past experiences and an account of present realities.⁵¹⁰ At the same time the Yugoslav crisis was temporarily calmed down by the November 1995 Dayton peace agreement which resulted in Russian security discourse participants giving the full attention to the CIS related issues. This facilitated the creation of consensual instead of polarizational discourse on selected topics, the CIS integration process being the most prominent example. This way the "reluctant realists" view became accepted even among the "Russia first" advocates.

5.4 Victory of Yeltsin's domestic policy imperatives over the CIS-related foreign policy issues: Post-1997 period

The assessment of five years of CIS functioning ended up being a bitter account of disintegrative processes and an even more sober understanding of the limits of Russia's influence in the region.⁵¹¹ The CIS issue no longer simply revolved around the Russian-speaking population or Russian assets (such as military installations, the Black Sea fleet, the space ship launch site Baikonur) or troops in "near abroad." It now also included an assessment and positioning vis-à-vis emerging within-the-region and out-of-region

⁵¹⁰ Similar qualification could be attributed to Russia-North-East Asian (Asia-Pacific region) relations. Although almost all academic debate participates emphasized Primakov's positive impact on Russian policy toward North-East Asia almost all agreed that many more steps are needed toward stronger integration with this region. See Vladimir I. Ivanov and Karla S. Smith eds. *Japan and Russia in Northeast Asia; Partners in the 21st Century* (Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger, 1999). Especially insightful is the article by Evgeniy V. Afanasiev (Russian Ambassador to the Republic of Korea) and Vladimir I. Ivanov (formerly Head of the Asia-Pacific Region Department of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences), "Making a Comeback in Asia," 113-121.

⁵¹¹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 50 (1998), translated from *Sodruzhestvo NG* 1 (December 1997): 1-2.

groupings of CIS countries. The increase of multilateral commitments that were excluding Russia attracted the attention of Russian security discourse participants. For example, almost all CIS countries joined the Council of Europe and expressed an active interest in reaching cooperation agreements with EU and NATO, but they also started creating sub-regional alliances to tackle more specific issues. For example, during the October 1997 session of the Council of Europe Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova created an unofficial group - GUAM - to deal jointly with the creation of an oil and transportation corridor from Central Asia to Europe.⁵¹² Along the same line leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan met in Ashkhabad, to discuss regional security and oil and gas pipelines issues.⁵¹³ Thus the prospects for Russia benefiting from being the main oil-transit country and security guarantor for the Caspian oil became very bleak.

During this period, the settlement of three hot spots in the CIS, namely, Transdniester, Abkhazia and Nagorno Karabakh became internationalized, making Russia's role and its overall significance less and less crucial. Therefore, these processes of "geopolitical pluralism" were considered by the participants of Russian security discourse to be a major blow for Russia's strategic interests and the blame for such a development was put on Moscow's leadership.⁵¹⁴ The line of criticism was that Moscow leadership missed the time and opportunity to create a workable security and economic alliance among the Soviet successor states.⁵¹⁵ "Reluctant realists" were adding that Russia did not have adequate economic incentives to offer to the regional countries. The

⁵¹² See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 41 (1997), translated from *Izvestia* 15 October 1997, 3.

⁵¹³ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 2 (1998), translated from *Izvestia* 6 January 1998, 3.

⁵¹⁴ *Sodruzhestvo NG* 1 (December 1997): 1-2.

⁵¹⁵ *Ibid.*

argument could also be raised about the security guarantees that Russia was extending to the region. Several countries, such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, were quite suspicious about the end-goal of Russian military presence on their soil, having in mind the role the Russian army played in civil wars or other crisis situations in those countries.

Other CIS countries have created more vague political sub-groupings such as the Central Asian Union, which is composed of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Thus, when it comes to collective security the leaderships of these states were more inclined to see Moscow as a threat rather than a protector. Consequently, they pursued creation of sub-regional political alliances that excluded Moscow. Still, it is an ironic coincidence that Russia had, among all the CIS countries, probably the most democratic political system despite the fact that it was perceived as an interventionist power.⁵¹⁶ Within Russian security discourse only *Atlanticists* argued that Central Asian CIS states were authoritarian and non-democratic. Therefore, they would be the only "school of thought" that could follow the liberal rhetoric of Western countries in foreign policy by giving precedence to human security ahead of state sovereignty. On the other hand, the *Atlanticists* were proponents of principles and not of *realpolitik* when it came to crisis management implementation. In contrast to, for example, what the West did during the Yugoslav crisis (1991-1999). "Russia first" proponents argued that "heavy-handed" leaders in "near abroad" provided for "genuine stability and freedom from economic

⁵¹⁶ This irony could further remind us of the belief, articulated by Woodrow Wilson, that democracies do not wage wars (or that they do not wage wars only against other democracies as Kant advocated it earlier). The fear of Russian intervention, when assessed against the post-communist reality, could show interesting record: Russian troops were nowhere, except in initial phases of Transdnister and Abkhazian conflicts, unilaterally deployed.

upheavals.”⁵¹⁷ Thus “Russia first” proponents cannot be labeled as non-democratic or perceived as “great Russian expansionists” for judging Central Asian political systems only on the basis of Russian security needs or rights given to Russian-speaking minority. It would be more consistent theoretically to perceive “Russia first” proponents as followers of the policies of South-East Asian countries where stability and economic growth were put ahead of democratic principles, the developmental path theoretically outlined in the early work of Samuel Huntington or in some later, neo-institutionalism writings.⁵¹⁸

When it comes to perceptions of ethnicity and the dangers of nationalism, Russian security discourse was detectably diverging from mainstream western scholarship. Epistemologically, contemporary western scholarship on nationalism primarily belongs to post-positivism and was, in last two decades, critical of the agency role the state played in constructing nationalism.⁵¹⁹ Within Russian academic discourse on nationalism there was a predominant viewpoint that attributed the agency in ethnic issues to ethnic consciousness (or psychology) and culture.⁵²⁰ However, it should be pointed out that the sequencing of this Russian discourse was not out of touch with the developments in western scholarship on ethnicity issues. Quite the contrary. Around the same time in

⁵¹⁷ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 43 (1998), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 28 October 1998, 9, 12.

⁵¹⁸ See Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Theda Skocpol, *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridgeshire: Cambridge University Press, 1985); while even some civil society advocates argued that economic development is precondition for self-sustainable democracy due to dangers of failed economic reforms, see Claus Offe, *Varieties of Transition: The east European and east German Experience* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1997).

⁵¹⁹ Most prominent representatives of this scholarship are John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

⁵²⁰ See Babakov Vladimir and Semenov Vitaliy, *Natsionalnoe soznanie i natsionalnaia kultura (metodologicheskie problemy)* [National Consciousness and National Culture (methodological Problems)] (Moscow: Rossiiskaia Akademia Nauk, 1996).

Europe there emerged a 'counter post-modernist' academic discourse on nationalism primarily expressed by medieval historians who argued along similar lines as Russian scholars and highlighted the relevance of culture, vernacular history and religion.⁵²¹ When it came to policy prescription, Russian scholars argued for a specific path of nation-building that post-Soviet societies should follow in order to avoid ethnic conflicts. Therefore, Russian scholars would follow more closely the economic determinism approach and argue that Central Asian states would be more stable and ethnic conflict-free if they followed the Chinese economic reform model.⁵²²

The Russian Presidency was aware of the slow pace of CIS integration and of the emerging criticism of the executive branch's inactivity in reversing this trend. In another move that was intended to show the President's commitment and expediency in solving CIS problems, Boris Berezovsky, a controversial entrepreneur and Yeltsin's main election campaign sponsor, was appointed the CIS Executive Secretary.⁵²³ This nomination followed the March 1998 sacking of PM Chernomyrdin and the appointment of Kiriyenko to the post of Russian Prime Minister. By these changes Yeltsin aimed to show his commitment to change and dislike of poor performances in domestic as well as in CIS politics and to aim for a qualitative change by appointing a more dynamic and business-like personnel. It could be also argued that, by these changes, Russian institutions became more open to new ideas and concepts. However, the pre-crisis stage of Russian economy

⁵²¹ See Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Thorlac Turville-Petre, *England the nation: Language, Literature and National Identity, 1290-1340* (Clarendon Press, 1996).

⁵²² See Alexander Salitsky and Vladimir Fisyukov, "Central Asia: Towards Ethnic Harmony Through Openness and Reform?" *Ethnic Challenges beyond Borders: Chinese and Russian Perspectives of the Central Asian Comundrum* eds. Yongjin Zhang and Rouben Azizian (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), 166-179.

⁵²³ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 15 (1998), translated from *Kommersant-Daily* 30 April 1998, 1.

during 1998 and an increased international presence in the CIS region made many of the former Soviet states reluctant to tie themselves into close relations with Russia.

The Caspian Sea oil and gas reserves were a major contesting issue among the maritime countries throughout the '90s. The potential for lucrative earnings and the presence of foreign oil companies started marginalizing the Russian role in both security and economic terms. For the first time Russian oil companies started acting against the interests of their own government, demonstrating the effects of this crisis of authority. Even attempts by the Russian government to try to apprehend the seabed issue in a bilateral way did not materialize. Therefore, it should not be surprising that the signing of the Caspian treaty on dividing the seabed between Russia and Kazakhstan was postponed a second time.⁵²⁴

It could be also argued that Moscow's security umbrella became less vital for the CIS states as their state-building period entered a more mature and stable phase. Thus, reliance on Russian military presence was diminishing especially in the countries that were able to create their own military forces. The Georgia-Russia border troops treaty was one indicator of this trend.⁵²⁵ This agreement emphasized the gradual pull-out of Russian border troops, 3,000 soldiers in total, from Georgia. According to the treaty Georgia would independently monitor and guard its own borders by the end of 1999.⁵²⁶ The increase of operational and combat capabilities of the Georgian army was directly proportional to the agreed departure of Russian troops. This pullout may also indicate Georgia's leadership dissatisfaction with the role Russian military played during the

⁵²⁴ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 26 (1998), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 27 June 1998, 1.

⁵²⁵ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 26 (1998), translated from *Sevodnya* 2 July 1998, 3.

⁵²⁶ Similar agreement on border troops pull-out was signed with Kyrgyzstan.

Abkhaz conflict. Moscow initially assisted Abkhazian rebels in supplying them with arms and volunteers (one of them being Chechen commander Shamil Basayev) from the Caucasus region. At the beginning of the '90s helping Abkhazia was used as leverage for threatening Georgia for becoming a federal state and in demonstrating to Tbilisi a need for Russian help to contain this security threat. At the same time Georgia was 'convinced' to join CIS and to let the Russian army stay on its territory. However, once Abkhazia became a possible ally of Chechnya in creating a Caucasian people's republic, Moscow switched its alliance toward the Georgian leadership. However, this border troops' pullout from Georgia was not related to the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Abkhazia. Russian troops at the Abkhaz-Georgian border, stationed there since June 1994, have a mandate from the CIS heads of state and were accompanied by the UN military observers.⁵²⁷

Countries that cultivated their own regional aspirations, such as Uzbekistan, started gradually perceiving Moscow's security umbrella as unnecessary. At the beginning of 1999 Uzbekistan officially declared that it wanted to quit its membership in the CIS collective security treaty while at the same time offering its own security umbrella to some regional countries.⁵²⁸ Some CIS countries, such as Azerbaijan, started perceiving the presence and proximity of Russian troops as a security threat.⁵²⁹ Thus it should be no surprise as to why, after the successful NATO campaign in Kosovo and increasing Russian military involvement in Chechnya, Azerbaijan offered one military

⁵²⁷ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 31 (1998), translated from *Kommersant-Daily* 4 August 1998, 3.

⁵²⁸ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 5 (1999), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 4 February 1999, 1.

⁵²⁹ In Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry's statement was said that "Azerbaijan regards Russian-Armenian military cooperation and the Russian military presence in Armenia as a threat to its security." - see *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 6 (1999), translated from *Obshchaya gazeta* 11-17 February 1999, 1, 5.

base to NATO in the summer of 1999. In balancing local rivalries in the Caucasus region, judging by military sales, Moscow started clearly favoring Armenia. Azerbaijan's bitterness in regard to Moscow's military role during the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and economic and diplomatic pressures during the Caspian seabed negotiations probably culminated at the beginning of 1999. At that time Moscow delivered to Armenia Russian state-of-the-art air-defense systems by which Erevan officially joined the CIS's Unified Air Defense System composed of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.⁵³⁰ The reality of the situation indicated that when it comes to security issues Russia does not treat CIS countries with an even hand. Explanation of such a phenomenon varied among the participants of Russian security discourse. "Russia first" proponents perceived in a positive light any Russian security arrangement in the "near abroad" while "reluctant realists" gave priority to calculations of cost-effectiveness of such involvements.

Another hot spot in the CIS where Russian troops were stationed but welcomed by the local regime was Tajikistan. Even though Russian troops in Tajikistan played a significant role in domestic political struggles their primary mandate and concern was to monitor and protect the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border. The number of mujahedin incursions from Afghanistan had grown since the end of Afghanistan's civil war. These incursions reached a climax in the summer of 1998 when Taliban troops came within a less than 20km from Tajikistan's border.⁵³¹ As the Taliban demonstrated a state-building capacity and its intention of spreading its influence across the Afghanistan borders, it became a much more formidable challenger for CIS stability than the incursions of

⁵³⁰ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 3 (1999), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 19 January 1999, 2.

⁵³¹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 32 (1998), translated from *Kommersant-Daily* 11 August 1998, 2.

mujahedin gangs across the CIS border that occurred during the early '90s. Central Asian states, Uzbekistan especially, were interested in coordinating their security efforts with Russia in containing the Taliban's threat. However, Russian foreign policy activities on this issue could be characterized as driven more by "reluctant realists" than they were guided by "Russia first" perceptions. Not only that security discourse in Russia indicated growing dissatisfaction with the reliability and 'loyalty' of Central Asian leaders and regimes but also the claim often underlined by Primakov about the need to pursue an "active and multi-directional" policy have resulted in Moscow's attempt to expand its influence even beyond the CIS borders.⁵³² Consequently Moscow started establishing "talks with moderate elements within Taliban" while in the same time it approached Iran as a potential ally in the spheres of influence chess-game against the (Saudi Arabia and Pakistan supported) Taliban.⁵³³ It was prominently reported in Russian media that the Taliban issue was not entirely about security but also about oil and gas pipelines routes.⁵³⁴ Thus, according to "reluctant realists" Russia cannot rely entirely on the goodwill of CIS leaders, since their long-term economic interests do not necessarily coincide with those of Moscow. Therefore, alternative alliances should be created since many CIS states wanted to achieve economic independence from Russia. For Russia these alternative alliances, at least on the security issues regarding Afghanistan, included the one with Iran and the United States. During the August 1998 US missile strikes on alleged terrorist strongholds in Afghanistan and Sudan, Moscow officially expressed condemnation and concern. The entire action was perceived by the Russian diplomacy as a "dangerous precedent" that undermined collective security mechanisms and the legal

⁵³² See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 17 (1998), translated from *Trud* 29 April 1998, 4.

⁵³³ *Kommersant-Daily* 11 August 1998, 2.

⁵³⁴ Ibid.

foundations of UN.⁵³⁵ However, privately, Russian officials were quite pleased that Washington joined Moscow in the struggle against the Taliban's potential expansionism and support of terrorism.⁵³⁶

Therefore, as new economic and security realities emerged in the CIS there was a growing need for the improved institutional framework that could accommodate those changes. Economic crisis in Russia forced many CIS states to start building alternative policies that were weakening CIS economic integration.⁵³⁷ While "Russia first" proponents were sharing the same critical consensus with "reluctant realists" about the slow pace of integration and cooperation among CIS countries their prescriptions were radically different. "Russia first" proponents argued for tightening of CIS institutions and creation of more bodies with supra-national empowered mandates. "Reluctant realists" were arguing for development of two-tier integration processes within the CIS namely the fast track and the slow track. They would argue that some countries were more interested in closer economic integration than other members. Therefore, the fast track countries should be free to pursue more developed integrational policies without forcing the less enthusiastic countries to join them but in the same time not ostracizing them from CIS.⁵³⁸ Furthermore, one of the proponents of this discursive group, Boris Berezovsky, the CIS executive secretary, suggested the abolition of consensus vote.⁵³⁹ In practical terms this measure would deprive Russia of some behind-the-scene leverage in the CIS but would

⁵³⁵ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 34 (1998), translated from *Kommersant-Daily* 22 August 1998, 2.

⁵³⁶ *Kommersant-Daily* 22 August 1998, 2.

⁵³⁷ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 37 (1998), translated from *Kommersant-Daily* 11 September 1998, 4.

⁵³⁸ Although the argument could be made that this policy already existed on the example of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 15 (1998), translated from *Kommersant-Daily* 29 April 1998, 2.

⁵³⁹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 37 (1998), translated from *Kommersant-Daily* 17 September 1998, 3.

definitely make organization more dynamic and practical solution driven. This proposal of Berezovsky's was also not well perceived by the Russian presidency due to its domestic consequences. For example, in the situation when Russian discourse on CIS was divided between two policy proposals, the Presidency would instead adopt an entirely different, third measure, or a mixture of both suggested proposals in order to capitalize on domestic divisions. The proposed absence of a consensus vote in the CIS would simply deprive the Presidency of its domestic final word since what the Russian Presidency proposes could end up being voted against within the CIS. In this scenario domestic critics of the Presidency would have empirical proof that the Presidency's policy was wrong so that the next time it would be more responsive to its domestic critics. It is noteworthy that on the side of CIS policy more concerned with security issues, Berezovsky advocated for the possibility of CIS enlargement having primarily in mind Iran as a prospective member.⁵⁴⁰ However, there was no indication that any discursive consensus existed that some particular country should join CIS while at the same time there was a shared perception that having an 'open door' policy in CIS would be beneficial for Russia by strengthening its "pole" of "the multi-polar world" vision. All this indicates how "reluctant realists'" worldviews became institutionalized into the foreign policy measures taken by Russian presidency vis-à-vis CIS region.

In the same time it was more and more accentuated by "reluctant realists" that Russia could not join NATO or EU not only because those organizations did not want Russia in, but because Russia "was too big for those organizations." Russian Foreign

⁵⁴⁰ *Kommersant-Daily* 17 September 1998, 3.

Minister Igor Ivanov used this “reluctant realist” perception by the end of 1998.⁵⁴¹ Thus, instead of blaming the West for such a policy the “reluctant realists” understood the ramifications of Russian power and capabilities. On the other hand “Russia first” proponents kept arguing that Western policies were to blame for Russian exclusion from Euro-Atlantic integrations. Due to Minister Ivanov’s statement it could be argued that security discourse of “reluctant realists” practically became institutionalized in the Russian executive branch by the end of 1998. Paradoxically, it happened when the most prominent member of “Russia first” Yevgeniy Primakov became Russian PM.

An interesting interplay of perceptions did happen when Russian media started presenting American dissatisfaction with Primakov being nominated to the post of PM. Americans were perceived as arguing that they did not have any friends in Russian government any more since the PM’s orientation was allegedly “anti-American.”⁵⁴² Thus, in reaction, Russian security discourse started generating perception that a ‘cold peace’ was emerging between the two former super-powers. The image of almost confrontational relations between Russia and US was reinforced by the presentation of their diplomatic disagreements over the Yugoslav Kosovo crisis and Iraq crisis. Prominent scholars, such as Sergei Rogov, director of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of the US and Canada, argued that the US did not perceive Russia as a partner any more.⁵⁴³ Therefore, the Russian security discourse participants perceived the American approach to Russian-American relations more and more as “candid realism”.

⁵⁴¹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 43 (1998), translated from *Izvestia* 28 October 1998, 1, 6.

⁵⁴² See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 44 (1998), translated from *Obshchaya gazeta* 5-11 November 1998, 6, and *Noviye Izvestia* 5 November 1998, 2.

⁵⁴³ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 45 (1998), translated from *Sevodnya* 12 November 1998, 2.

Consequently, more and more disappointments with the US policy started characterizing reactions of Russian security discourse participants regardless of their political affiliations. One example of this type of consensual perception was the unanimous condemnation by all Russian political parties of the US missile strike against Iraq in December 1998. These perceptions culminated in an institutional response demonstrating again the link between the ideas influencing institutions. The Russian executive branch followed this consensus and withdrew its ambassadors from Washington and London to Moscow "for consultations."

Clinton's 1999 State of the Union Address only reinforced the perception in Russia that Washington embarked on the policy of "neutralizing" Russia and that the era of clear partnership was over.⁵⁴⁴ The main security consequence of this perception in Russia was the alarming reaction of the military establishment. The high representative of the Russian Defense Ministry, Gen. Leonid Ivashov, director of the Chief Administration for International Military Cooperation, criticized the US for its new missile defense build-up as a potential violation of the ABM treaty.⁵⁴⁵ Albright's January 1999 visit to Moscow served as a sign of temporary relief that relations were not worsening rather than as a visible turn toward the improved Moscow-Washington links. Russian media and the following security discourse perceived this visit in the same ambiguous manner.⁵⁴⁶ Almost everybody was aware that the real showdown of Russian-American relations, the Kosovo crisis, was looming around the corner.

⁵⁴⁴ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 3 (1999), translated from *Sevodnya* 22 January 1999, 1, 3.

⁵⁴⁵ *Sevodnya* 22 January 1999, 1, 3.

⁵⁴⁶ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 4 (1999), translated from *Izvestia* 27 January 1999, 1, and *Kommersant* 26 January 1999, 1.

5.5 The Yugoslav Factor

There were several reasons why the Yugoslav crisis was important for Russian security discourse. For Russian security discourse participants the Yugoslav crisis represented a test case of future world order. They perceived that this was the precedent upon which the West is going to profile its actions in future. At the same time there was a significant Russian military contingent deployed in the former Yugoslavia, often positioned in the most dangerous areas, bringing to fore strategic and military significance of this crisis. Russian media, print and broadcast, intensely and constantly reported about this crisis making it part of Russian every day life. This crisis was practically the only multilateral crisis management, outside of the CIS perimeter, where Russia was participating as full-fledged member, thus having a strong say. Last, but not the least, the former Yugoslavia was the area of Russia's strong bilateral diplomatic activity, involving executive and legislative branches, with yearly number of visits counting in tens.⁵⁴⁷

On many occasions during 1998 and 1999, the Russian security discourse was dominated by one theme - the Kosovo crisis. Therefore, NATO enlargement, CIS security and economic issues were almost marginalized as discursive references by the resonance of the newest Yugoslav crisis in Russian foreign policy debates, print and broadcast reporting. Correspondingly the Russian executive branch was very much involved in bilateral and multilateral negotiations and activities dealing with the Yugoslav crisis.

⁵⁴⁷ In 1994-95 period Russian special envoy Vitalii Churkin, visited various capitals in the Balkans almost fifty times.

The Kosovo crisis erupted in early March 1998. Although political conflicts, civil disobedience and police repression characterized the Kosovo scene for more than a decade, the outbreak of armed conflict was a phenomenon that emerged after the signing of the Dayton peace agreement in November 1995. In the early 1996 on the Albanian side of the Kosovo political spectrum the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was created as a military contestant of Yugoslav territorial sovereignty over the province. Frustration among Kosovo Albanian politicians that they were not included in a comprehensive Balkan peace and territorial settlement in Dayton made most radical fringes believe that only by their own military rebellion could they hope for a Dayton-like legal and territorial dividends and re-arrangements. Thus the KLA decided to follow the path of military confrontation with the Yugoslav regime, ending the "peaceful resistance" strategy practiced by Ibrahim Rugova's "shadow government". During 1996 and 1997 this confrontation was primarily confined to ambush attacks on police patrols and selective killings of those Albanians who were in any way integrated into the Serbian and Yugoslav state structure in Kosovo. Robust and un-selective response of Yugoslav security forces fueled the conflict and this led to the emergence of low-intensity guerilla warfare in March 1998. The Contact Group convened rather quickly after major armed clashes in March and condemned the Yugoslav side and the use of force.

However, unlike other members of Contact Group, Moscow did not put bilateral pressure on Belgrade over the Kosovo issue. Moscow rather stated that "a more flexible approach to the Kosovo problem is a condition for Yugoslavia's full return to the world community."⁵⁴⁸ Therefore, Moscow was following the multilateral policy of the Contact

⁵⁴⁸ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 9 (1998), translated from *Kommersant-Daily* 5 March 1998, 4.

Group rather than pursuing unilateral Belgrade-friendly actions. The Contact Group's policy was to condition the full removal of sanctions against Yugoslavia in return for changes of Belgrade's domestic and regional policies. On the other hand, since 1994 official Moscow was quite often demanding the full removal of sanctions against Yugoslavia, mentioning the fact that the UN sponsored sanctions in 1992 were imposed due to Belgrade's alleged involvement in the Bosnian civil war. Moscow sustained that once the war in Bosnia was over there were no legal grounds to use sanctions any more.⁵⁴⁹ Despite its rhetoric at home, the executive branch in Moscow was still being a cooperative partner in the Contact Group and any Western perceptions that Moscow was behaving in a 'pro-Serb' way would be hard to substantiate.⁵⁵⁰ It could be argued that the 1996 ministerial change in Russian Foreign Ministry resulted in the ministry's shift toward "Russia first" worldviews so that it coincided with the dominant security discourse.⁵⁵¹ But it could be also argued that after the Serbian local election crisis in 1996-1997 and the 1998 outburst of military clashes in Kosovo, Russian security discourse vis-à-vis Yugoslavia reflected predominantly "reluctant realists" viewpoints.⁵⁵²

The primary attention of the Russian executive branch was directed toward the possible NATO intervention in Kosovo.⁵⁵³ Primakov was particularly clear in not wanting NATO troops to be involved in any of the hot spots in Europe. His argument was

⁵⁴⁹ It was also consistent with the Russian activity in UN on creating the sanctions removal mechanism that would be universal. Moscow considered protracted sanctions against states such as Iraq, Libya, Yugoslavia as a counter-productive.

⁵⁵⁰ During the course of the Yugoslav civil war Russia practically never implemented any unilateral measure that was opposite to Contact group policies. See Nebojsa Bjelakovic, "Russian Policy Toward the Yugoslav Civil War (1991-1995)," M.A. essay, Carleton University, 1995.

⁵⁵¹ One of the first foreign visits of new minister Primakov was to Belgrade in June 1996.

⁵⁵² See *FBIS-SOV* translated from *Rossiyskaia gazeta* 16 September 1998, 1,4.

⁵⁵³ See *FBIS-SOV* translated from *ITAR-TASS* 1249 GMT, 8 September 1998.

based on the fear that any intervention could become a precedent.⁵⁵⁴ This fear was shared across the Russian security discourse and it was assumed that by allowing any NATO military intervention to happen the role and relevance of the UN Security Council would disappear.⁵⁵⁵ Marginalization of the UN was commonly perceived by participants of Russian security discourse as the end of Russia's power status and the collapse of "multi-polar world" system. Such a development would practically isolate Russia from the international scene and put it back into the exclusivity of CIS. In order to avoid this scenario "reluctant realists" were willing to give many more concessions to the Western countries than "Russia first" proponents. Only the minority of those debating on foreign policy dilemmas were advocating for further polarization with regard to the West over any issue.⁵⁵⁶ Their argument was that by giving up one strategic concession the 'domino effect' erosion of Russian international power would follow.⁵⁵⁷ Milosevic's June 1998 visit to Moscow gave more reason to "reluctant realists" viewpoints than to those of "Russia first" proponents. To Russian security discourse participants it became obvious that Milosevic was not a reliable strategic partner but only an opportunistic autocrat who demands a lot and who delivers little. Therefore, the proposed policy of "reluctant realists", such as concerted effort within the Contact Group, was a better solution than the "Russia first" proposal of confrontation with the Contact Group and reliance on international law, OSCE multilateral framework and especially on the UN Security

⁵⁵⁴ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 22 (1998), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 30 May 1998, 1, 6.

⁵⁵⁵ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 23 (1998), translated from *Sevodnya* 10 June 1998, 3.

⁵⁵⁶ "Advocates of firmness and brinkmanship", usually those on extreme left and extreme right political positions, argued against ratification of the START II treaty. See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 23 (1998), translated from *Zavtra* 22 June 1998, 1, and *Sovetskaya Rossia* 2 June 1998, 1.

⁵⁵⁷ For the comprehensive overview of Russian academic community views on Kosovo see Jelica Kurjak ed. *Ruska politika na Balkanu* [Russian Policy on the Balkans] (Belgrade: IMPP, 1999).

Council veto right in any international conflict management, especially the one in the Balkans.

During this visit Milosevic may have quickly realized the limits of Russian willingness to engage in the Balkans and thus he agreed to several concessions with Moscow, thus accommodating the "reluctant realists'" prescription.⁵⁵⁸ The two most important compliances by Milosevic were to begin the Serb-Albanian dialogue and to agree on an international presence in Kosovo. Americans by that time took the initiative within the Contact Group by demanding more concessions from Milosevic and were unhappy by Russia's active and successful brokerage with Belgrade. On the other hand, the Russian executive branch was quite unhappy with NATO maneuvers close to Yugoslav territory, in Albania.⁵⁵⁹ However, regardless of this dislike of NATO activities in the crisis area a majority of Russian security discourse participants preferred peaceful conflict resolution achieved through multilateral diplomatic efforts.⁵⁶⁰

The way the "reluctant realists" security discourse advocated for creation of "alternative alliances" on the CIS issues mirrored the way Russian foreign policy performed on the Yugoslav issue. In August 1998 Russian troops participated in NATO maneuvers in Albania signaling that Moscow was not in disfavor of international forces containing the Russian contingent entering Kosovo as peacekeepers.⁵⁶¹ Therefore, despite being perceived as Belgrade's close ally, Moscow did not want to back-up Milosevic's

⁵⁵⁸ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 24 (1998), translated from *Trud* 18 June 1998, 4.

⁵⁵⁹ *Trud* 18 June 1998, 4.

⁵⁶⁰ Around the same time several prominent Russian figures, such as Chernomirdin, Gen. Lebed, Tatartsan's President Shaimiyev and Berezovsky, sent an appeal to the Russian government for solving peacefully the Chechnya crisis. See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 30 (1998), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 28 July 1998, 1, 3.

⁵⁶¹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 33 (1998), translated from *Izvestia* 19 August 1998, 3.

policy, and what was more important Moscow visibly demonstrated that it wanted to cooperate with NATO.

This toning down of conflictual and polarizational viewpoints vis-à-vis security issues coincided with the emergence of the discursive category of an **"ideology of common sense"** introduced by Gen. Lebed during his victorious gubernatorial electoral campaign in Krasnoyarsk in May 1998.⁵⁶² The appeal to "common sense" in contemporary politics was particularly resonant in election discourses of "catch-all" non-ideological conservative political parties such as Silvio Berlusconi's "Forza Italia" in Italy, Mike Harris' "Progressive Conservative party" in Ontario, or Preston Manning's "Reform party" in Canada. The goal of this discourse was to achieve consensual solutions rather than to polarize the political landscape. The consequence was that this electoral tactic became a political platform and an identification and program marker for the political forces that launched it. In Russia there was a fertile soil for the emergence of "catch-all" discursive categories. The public survey results from August 1998 on the question "what idea today could unify the people, or Russian society", showed that the majority preferred broader identification denominator over irreconcilably polarized minorities that preferred typical ideologies.⁵⁶³ Thus, 35.3% of respondents preferred the idea of reviving Russia as a mighty state, a great power. 8.3 % respondents said that this idea should be socialism; 5.6% respondents said it should be democracy; 5% respondents

⁵⁶² See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 20 (1998), translated from *Itogi*, 20 (26 May 1998): 18-22.

⁵⁶³ The Bureau of Applied Sociological Research did the survey. See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 31 (1998), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 6 August 1998, 8.

said it should be communism; 4.4% respondents said it should be "ethnic Russian national distinctiveness;" while 2.5% respondents said it should be a religious idea.⁵⁶⁴

At that time, in a way, personal changes at the top of the Russian state also resembled this public and discursive inclination for the consensual solution and for the marginalization of ideologically polarized minorities. During August 1998 President Yeltsin fired Kiriyenko and unsuccessfully tried to reinstall Chernomyrdin to the post of PM. In September 1998 Russia had a new PM, Evgeniy Primakov, who was able to achieve consensus with almost all parliamentary groups.⁵⁶⁵ However, it should be mentioned that as a paradox, Primakov as a PM was able to gain support for his policies, but only at lower common denominator from the one that he as a "Russia first" proponent would prefer in the field of foreign policy. Practically speaking, this meant that the "reluctant realists'" discourse became the predominant worldview within the Russian security discourse and it was predominant in the executive branch as well. The newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov's speech at UN General Assembly reflected in a way this trend. Ivanov was responding to the increase in tensions between Yugoslavia and NATO. Belgrade was threatened with air strikes due to the Yugoslav leadership's reluctance to allow an OSCE monitoring mission to enter Kosovo. Minister Ivanov argued against the bombing saying that "force of law should prevail over the law of force".⁵⁶⁶ In a visionary manner, he predicted that the use of force against Yugoslavia could "lead to a wider war" with negative consequences for the region and Europe.⁵⁶⁷

⁵⁶⁴ *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 6 August 1998, 8.

⁵⁶⁵ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 37 (1998), translated from *Kommersant-Daily* 11 September 1998, 1.

⁵⁶⁶ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 38 (1998), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 23 September 1998, 6.

⁵⁶⁷ *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 23 September 1998, 6.

Therefore, the missing part that would otherwise characterize the "Russia first" discourse was the list of Russian coercive responses to this situation. On the other hand, despite the fact that this position of willingness to cooperate multilaterally in conflict resolutions was the main characteristic of "reluctant realists," the tone of openly blaming the West in Russian security discourse, even by the Russian executive, was set.⁵⁶⁸ This tone probably contributed to the fact that many "Russia first" proponents gave full support to the executive branch on the Kosovo issue. Domestically, support had created a discursive majority on the security issues while the minority of "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness" was temporarily marginalized. Thus, the Kosovo crisis presented an event that fragmented "Russia first" into the "reluctant realists" and the "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness."

During October 1998, as the spiraling of NATO bombing threats against Yugoslavia was increasing, the Russian security discourse became more and more anti-NATO. In less than ten days Russian security discourse shifted from the principled pledges that Russia was against the use of force in the Balkans⁵⁶⁹ toward heavily anti-NATO accusations.⁵⁷⁰ However the tone of the discourse did not confuse the "reluctant realists'" approach to the management of this crisis, which was visible on the issue of Yugoslavia joining the Russia and Belarus Union. During the October 1998 Milosevic-Holbrook shuttle diplomacy the Yugoslav side issued several statements indicating its interest in joining the Russia and Belarus Union. This was probably a part of

⁵⁶⁸ See an interview with Minister Ivanov in *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 39 (1998), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 30 September 1998, 1,6.

⁵⁶⁹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 40 (1998), translated from *Izvestia* 7 October 1998, 1.

⁵⁷⁰ Even the close-to-the-government and balanced *Izvestia* concluded that "NATO use of force without Security Council sanctions against sovereign state reflects 'NATO-centric' model of 'New European Order' that sidelines UN and Russia." See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 41 (1998), translated from *Izvestia* 13 October 1998, 2.

Yugoslavia's negotiation tactic with the US. On the Yugoslav side the main initiator of this request was Serbian Deputy PM Vojislav Seselj, leader of Radical party. His interlocutors on the other side were never Moscow's government officials but representatives of *Nationalist-Patriots* and Belarus President Lukashenka. Russian security discourse participants were skeptical about the sincerity of Yugoslav intentions, seeing in Belgrade's request only a temporary search for a security shelter and not a sincere long-term strategic commitment. Russian dailies *Sevodnya* and *Kommersant-Daily* were quite anti-Milosevic for some time and these media portrayed this Yugoslav initiative in a very critical manner, occasionally ridiculing Seselj. What is even more important as an indicator of the dominant perception of "reluctant realists" within the Russian executive branch was the flat rejection of Moscow officials of any Yugoslav membership in Russia and Belarus Union despite the fact that Seselj was invited as an official guest to the Union's Parliamentary Assembly session.⁵⁷¹ A few weeks later Seselj's appearance at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union of Belarus and Russia was ridiculed even by the pro-government *Izvestia*. The predominant perception, the one of "reluctant realists", was that the admission of Serbia to the Russia-Belarus Union was deemed unrealistic and undesirable.⁵⁷²

However, it is noteworthy that the dominant understanding in Russia was that even official Belgrade did not believe in the rapid realization of such an admission attempt, so that Russian security discourse participants in general did not develop any

⁵⁷¹ It was stated that "Russian Foreign Ministry considers idea of Yugoslavia joining union of Russia and Belarus premature." See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 42 (1998), translated from *Sevodnya* 21 October 1998, 2.

⁵⁷² See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 44 (1998), translated from *Izvestia* 4 November 1998, 1.

sentiment of bitterness vis-à-vis Belgrade.⁵⁷³ Actually, such an understanding follows the "reluctant realists" worldviews on what the state should do or attempt to do in an international arena prior to resorting to coercive measures. Therefore, it would mean that "reluctant realists" would have pursued the same attempt if they had been in the position of Yugoslav policy makers. Evidence for such a claim could be found in Russia's staunch opposition to NATO enlargement and its subsequent signing of the Russia-NATO Agreement. At the beginning of 1999 it seemed that on the Yugoslav issue the "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness" were loosing the discursive battle against the "reluctant realists". However, on some less vital Balkan issues such as the creation of the Balkan Peacekeeping Corps the criticism and rhetoric of the "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness" were adopted across the Russian political spectrum.⁵⁷⁴

In January 1999 the Kosovo crisis entered into a new phase, which forced Russia to re-assess its foreign policy in tackling these new realities. Fights between the KLA and Serbian police and military re-emerged after the October 1998 Milosevic-Holbrook agreement. In Racak village a major clash took place leaving behind almost 50 killed persons. According to the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission the Belgrade police were to blame for the killings and, what is more important, these forces were perceived as having performed deliberate killings of Albanian civilians. The outburst of anger, which erupted in Western capitals, indicated that a harsher policy toward Milosevic's Serbia was on horizon. Moscow softened the UN Security Council resolution on Racak by deleting the entire blame for the incident from the Serbian side and by insisting that both sides,

⁵⁷³ *Izvestia* 4 November 1998, 1.

⁵⁷⁴ Decision of Romania and Bulgaria to join NATO-sponsored "Balkan Peacekeeping Corps" was criticized in a harsh manner even by the Russian executive branch. See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 2 (1999), translated from *Vremya MN* 13 January 1999, 6.

Belgrade and KLA, should solve their problems by political means.⁵⁷⁵ At the same time Russia insisted that multilateral organizations such as the UN and OSCE should play the crucial role in peacefully solving the Kosovo crisis. Officials in Moscow perceived that these organizations, the OSCE in particular, were Moscow's only avenues in effectively influencing European affairs.⁵⁷⁶ On the more specific issue of the Kosovo crisis the majority of Russian security discourse participants did not have any illusions about Milosevic, but despite this the blame for the outbreak of hostilities was also put on Albanian extremists and on the war rhetoric coming from NATO. "Reluctant realists" believed that "the belligerent statements coming out of Brussels and Washington were prompting the Albanians to continue fighting and were blocking a political solution to the problem."⁵⁷⁷ This way the discourse in Russia resembled the one from October 1998, when NATO also threatened to bomb Yugoslavia over the Kosovo issue. Discourse participants were inclined to build consensus over this issue. However, it would be premature to predict that such a consensus was a sign of general political consensus in Russian society.⁵⁷⁸ It was rather a sign of shared viewpoints about the selected issue. On a variety of other issues the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been blamed for inadequate policies. Critics of Minister Ivanov argued that "Russia's unpredictability

⁵⁷⁵ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 3 (1999), translated from *Izvestia* 20 January 1999, 1.

⁵⁷⁶ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 3 (1999), translated from *Kommersant* 21 January 1999, 4.

⁵⁷⁷ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 4 (1999), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 29 January 1999, 6.

⁵⁷⁸ Famous Russian scholar Tatyana Zaslavskaya argued that Russian society was far away from any consensus about basic values, as indicated by majority of public surveys. She believed that some cultural or human idea, rather than political or economic one, could eventually integrate society. Thus, she expressed the widespread dissatisfaction with divisiveness and perceived desire for the consensus in society. See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 5 (1999), translated from *Noviye Izvestia* 27 January 1999, 4.

became a factor shaping the way most states and international organizations relate to" Russia.⁵⁷⁹

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs urged the Contact group to press for a political and multilateral solution to the Kosovo problem. Probably under strong pressure from Moscow, Milosevic agreed to participate in Contact group mediated talks with Kosovo Albanians in Rambouillet, France. The Serbian delegation was practically teamed up with Russian diplomats while the Albanian side enjoyed practically not only the sympathy but also the help of American side.⁵⁸⁰ This way the Rambouillet talks resembled the cold war Soviet-American rivalry and on occasions ended up being the negotiation between Moscow and Washington.⁵⁸¹ As this situation might have been flattering to the Russian side it also created a huge disappointment in Moscow about how much the multilateral diplomacy was shunned by American interventionism and this dictate of terms. During the first phase of Rambouillet negotiations, Yeltsin reiterated that foreign intervention in Kosovo would be something that Russia would strongly oppose.⁵⁸² Thus, the state institutions followed the development of ideas launched within the security discourse.

Rambouillet talks had two phases. The first phase was practically a diplomatic victory for Yugoslavia since the Albanian side also did not want to sign the final

⁵⁷⁹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 4 (1999), translated from *Kommersant* 23 January 1999, 2.

⁵⁸⁰ As Kosovo was part of Republic of Serbia and as Montenegrin leadership did not support Milosevic's policy in and about Kosovo at the Rambouillet talks there was practically not a Yugoslav but Serbian delegation.

⁵⁸¹ This was facilitated by the fact that Serbian and Albanian delegations have been seated in two different conference rooms and foreign diplomats were 'shuttling' between them. Thus, it could be stated that direct Serbian-Albanian talks never took place.

⁵⁸² As rhetoric became quite heated Yeltsin even said that "we won't let anyone touch Kosovo". See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 7 (1999), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 19 February 1999, 1,6.

agreement. The outcome of the first phase of Rambouillet talks coincided with the US imposing sanctions on 10 Russian scientific institutes allegedly involved in helping Iran develop nuclear and missile capabilities.⁵⁸³ This was an older issue in Russian-American relations. Washington was from time to time accusing Russia of supplying missile technology to India and Iran. Accusations that Russian scientific institutes were involved in cooperation with their Iranian counterparts over the construction and maintenance of Iranian nuclear facilities were particularly serious since the US was assuming that the nuclear technology could be used in terrorist or other (possibly anti-Israel) military purposes. The Russian side was denying any involvement in developing military-related nuclear projects in Iran, citing that the Russian institutes were applying the UN Atomic Energy Organization standards. Moscow bitterly pointed out that several other countries, Canada included, were bidding for the same contracts. But the timing of Washington's accusations and the severity of the actual measures (cutting already allocated funds to those institutes) were making Russian security discourse participants quite angry.

The end of second phase of the Rambouillet talks created a bitter reaction in Russia as well. The Russian delegation at Rambouillet was not involved in drafting the documents or in amending them. The "take it or leave it" approach was forced by American side.⁵⁸⁴ This approach practically cornered the Serbian delegation in having to unconditionally accept the military annex to the already signed political agreement on Kosovo.⁵⁸⁵ This way the military annex was presented to the Serbian and Russian sides as

⁵⁸³ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 8 (1999), translated from *Izvestia* 26 February 1999, 3.

⁵⁸⁴ As an indicator that there were other options for successful conflict resolution see Johan Galtung and Carl Jacobsen, *Searching for Peace: the Road to Transcend*, (with contributions by Kai Frithjof Brand-Jacobsen and Finn Tschudi) (London, Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2000).

⁵⁸⁵ See Robert Fisk, "The Trojan horse that 'started' a 79-day war," *The Independent* 26 November 1999: "In the last days of the Paris peace talks on Yugoslavia last March, something extraordinary happened. The Serb delegation – after agreeing to a political revolution in Kosovo – was presented with a military

an ultimatum since its clauses seriously undermined Serbian territorial sovereignty over Kosovo.⁵⁸⁶ This was why practically nobody in Russia blamed the Yugoslav side for rejecting the military annex. Russian security discourse participants nearly unanimously approved the behavior of the Russian delegation at Rambouillet talks, including the temporary break-up of the Contact Group and the fact that Moscow was against the military annex and for the political document. Many commentators even ridiculed how Serbia was "demonized" by Americans predicting an outburst of war since it suited legitimacy needs of Milosevic and NATO alike.⁵⁸⁷ This last point seemed to represent at best the position of the "reluctant realists". On the other side, even the "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness" who bellicosely argued against the NATO threats could not give much credit to Milosevic's ethnic policy record in Kosovo. Thus, despite the accusations against NATO and dislike for how the Kosovo crisis was handled by Washington both the biggest groups of security discourse participants shared the viewpoint of Milosevic's significant responsibility concerning the Kosovo crisis.⁵⁸⁸

The beginning of the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia (March 24, 1999) represented international issue No. 1 in Russian security discourse for months to

appendix to the treaty, which demanded the virtual NATO occupation of all Yugoslavia. The Serbs turned it down and NATO went to war. Yet 79 days later, NATO – which had refused to contemplate a change in the military document – lost all interest in the annex and at the final dramatic meetings on the Macedonian border was content with a NATO force inside only Kosovo."

⁵⁸⁶ From Yugoslavia was demanded to grant a total immunity and freedom of action to NATO troops over its entire territory, the type of conditions that Bosnian and Macedonian governments had to agree to on earlier occasions. The consequence of such a "special status" was seen in the occasion of car accident in which Macedonian cabinet minister and drunken NATO armored vehicle crew killed his entire family at the end of September 1999. The perpetrators of this crime were simply removed from Macedonia back to Norway. Strangely enough NATO did not insist in its June 1999 agreement with Yugoslav army to obtain the same special status in Yugoslavia confining its troops only to Kosovo area.

⁵⁸⁷ Even daily *Sevodnya* was ridiculing American portrayal of Serbia as an "evil Empire" seeing in this an ideological preparation for military action. See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 11 (1999), translated from *Sevodnya* 17 March 1999, 3.

⁵⁸⁸ See Dmitri Trenin and Yekaterina Stepanova, eds. *Kosovo: The International Aspects of the Crisis* (Moscow: Gandalf Press, 1999).

come. The Russian reaction to NATO strikes was overwhelmingly critical. Leading daily newspapers argued against the war, while many politicians demanded that Russia unconditionally help Serbia.⁵⁸⁹ It was noteworthy that even among this unanimous condemnation of NATO a few voices were pointing out that Milosevic is not worth Russian-American confrontation.⁵⁹⁰ These voices actually established a rivaling level of analysis, one that focused on Milosevic as a political figure and not on Yugoslavia as security and political space. This way the Kosovo issue was presented in personality politics fashion and not as international law issue or a strategically important issue. The existence of two levels of analysis indicated the division between the "reluctant realists" and the "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness". Due to such a change in the level of analysis PM Primakov's decision to cancel his flight to Washington (while in the air) after he learned about NATO's first air strikes provoked a split reaction in Russia.⁵⁹¹ The split was between those who wanted to help Serbia despite Milosevic's poor domestic and international record and, on the other hand, those who did not want Russia to take the role of Milosevic's protector.⁵⁹²

However, at this point, even two very prominent members of the "reluctant realists" school (Vladimir Lukin and Grigory Yavlinsky) supported Primakov's

⁵⁸⁹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 12 (1999), translated from *Sevodnya* 25 March 1999, 1, 3; *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 25 March 1999, 1; *Rossiiskaya gazeta* 26 March 1999, 2.

⁵⁹⁰ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 12 (1999), translated from *Izvestia* 26 March 1999, 1.

⁵⁹¹ Dailies *Sevodnya* and *Kommersant* were critical of Primakov's decision, while *Izvestia* and *Rossiiskaya gazeta* were supportive. See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 12 (1999), translated from *Sevodnya* 25 March 1999, 1-2; *Kommersant* 24 March 1999, 1; *Izvestia* 25 March 1999, 1; *Rossiiskaya gazeta* 25 March 1999, 7.

⁵⁹² At the beginning of the Yugoslav civil war quite similar split occurred among the security discourse participants in Russia. See Jelena Guskova, *Jugoslovenska kriza i Rusija* [Yugoslav Crisis and Russia] (translated from Russian) (Belgrade: IMPP, 1996).

decision.⁵⁹³ The public unanimity in condemning NATO did not mean that Milosevic was given *carte blanche* to carry out his policies. Quite contrary, the condemnation of NATO was somewhat on an equal level with the condemnation of Milosevic or the KLA. An all-Russian public survey showed that 46.3% of the respondents blamed NATO for the war while Milosevic and KLA were blamed by 16.7% and 12.8%, respectively. Thus blame for the war was put in a balanced way on all involved participants which demonstrated quite a sophisticated understanding on the part of the Russian public about the dynamics and nature of ethnic warfare.⁵⁹⁴ Furthermore the same poll revealed that 83.4% of the Russian public preferred peaceful solution to the problem while only 2.8% wanted Russia to enter the war on the Yugoslav side. As a way out of the crisis, the public expressed perceptions that either diplomatically persuading Milosevic (26.2% of the respondents) or energizing multilateral diplomacy through the UN or the OSCE (57.2% of the respondents) could bring an end to the crisis. Therefore, there was a belief that talks with Milosevic would eventually bring an end to the war. On the other hand it could be argued that Milosevic perceived or was trying to use those peace-talk emissaries as evidence that there was substantial outside support for his policies.⁵⁹⁵ This clash of perceptions could be used as an explanation for the humiliating result of the first unofficial visit of Russian delegation, composed of politicians of liberal provenience, namely Gaidar, Nemtsov and Fyodorov, to Belgrade. Their reception was cold and with no results, although some Russian commentators argued that the whole mission was aimed toward Russian

⁵⁹³ Often presented by the Western media and some analysts, such as Brzezinski, as the most Western politician in Russia Grigory Yavlinsky harshly criticized NATO and US. He stated that "the United States would be solely to blame for igniting a war in Europe." See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 12 (1999), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 25 March 1999, 1, 3.

⁵⁹⁴ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 13 (1999), translated from *Kommersant* 31 March 1999, 3.

⁵⁹⁵ As often indicated on the pages of, by Milosevic controlled, daily *Politika*.

domestic scene in order to show that "liberals were better than communists in war-crisis situations".⁵⁹⁶

The real interlocutor, (according to Belgrade's perception) PM Primakov arrived the next day to Belgrade in an attempt to find a way out of this diplomatic stalemate. The failed UN Security Council Resolution that asked for an end to NATO air strikes caused this diplomatic stalemate.⁵⁹⁷ The Russian executive branch probably realized that multilateral arrangements were not possible anymore and quickly embarked upon shuttle diplomacy with Belgrade. It was probably believed that any results of such bilateral shuttle diplomacy were keeping alive the prospects of a diplomatic solution instead of putting all hopes for the conflicts' end into the hands of the fortunes of war. There were indications that Primakov worked on the plan for the North-South division of Kosovo, with the South being open to the presence of international forces and the North, predominantly Serb populated, being monitored by Russian troops.⁵⁹⁸ This option, as any other proposed by Russian side, did not question Yugoslav territorial sovereignty over Kosovo.

On the home front Russian diplomacy seemed to be trying to distance itself from Milosevic due to the bellicose rhetoric of "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness". This distancing was also done in order to keep Russia's credibility as an international negotiator and partner to the West. On March 31, 1999, Aleksandr Avdeyev, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, said at the meeting of the Federation Council that

⁵⁹⁶ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 13 (1999), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 31 March 1999, 1, 6.

⁵⁹⁷ This UN Security Council resolution was supported only by China, Namibia and Russia. See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 13 (1999), translated from *Kommersant* 27 March 1999, 1.

⁵⁹⁸ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 13 (1999), translated from *Rossiiskaya gazeta* 1 April 1999, 1, 7.

"responsibility for the escalation of the conflict in the Balkans lies half with NATO, which is supporting the Kosovo separatists, and half with official Belgrade, which hasn't made the proper efforts to settle the problem of interethnic relations in Kosovo."⁵⁹⁹ A few days later this statement was followed up by a remark from Boris Yeltsin, which underlined that "Russia will not allow itself to be drawn into a war."⁶⁰⁰ By using this discourse, the Russian executive branch was making clear that its position was one of "reluctant realism," meaning that, in this particular situation, Russia would try to reach a peaceful solution without using coercive measures since its goal was not to worsen its relations with the West or with Yugoslavia. On the other side of discursive spectrum the "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness", through the heated speeches of communist and nationalist politicians and high ranking generals, argued for unconditional help to Yugoslavia including military assistance.⁶⁰¹ Application of such a discourse into the policy measures would most probably bring Russia into a brinkmanship situation with the West -- the unsurpassable brink being the use of nuclear weapons.

The executive branch implemented this "reluctant realists'" position most likely in a concerted effort with Milosevic, during Russian Ambassador to Yugoslavia Yury Kotov's talk with Ibrahim Rugova on April 6, 1999.⁶⁰² These talks were probably an attempt to divide the Albanian political space into pro-KLA and anti-KLA forces and to achieve a separate political agreement on Kosovo with the latter group. Such a policy was consistent with the approach the Russian government followed in other CIS ethnic hot spots. These talks with Rugova gave the impression to Russia's security discourse

⁵⁹⁹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 13 (1999), translated from *Kommersant* 1 April 1999, 1.

⁶⁰⁰ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 14 (1999), translated from *Kommersant* 7 April 1999, 2.

⁶⁰¹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 14 (1999), translated from *Izvestia* 7 April 1999, 2.

⁶⁰² *Izvestia* 7 April 1999, 2.

participants of Yugoslav compliance and the possibility of a peacefully negotiated resolution. But since NATO was consistent in rejecting every counter-proposal coming from Yugoslavia, the foreign policy debate on how to help Yugoslavia intensified in Russia. Debates over Yugoslavia joining the Russia-Belarus Union intensified and it seemed that PM Primakov was in favor of such an arrangement at the beginning of April 1999.⁶⁰³ Public debates, street rallies, pundits' reactions and the necessity to react to the crisis constantly in 'real time' made Yeltsin appear marginalized. Therefore, in order to regain control of events Yeltsin ordered re-targeting of Russian nuclear warheads toward NATO countries, while keeping his pledge against Russia being dragged into the war.⁶⁰⁴ This way he attempted to legitimize with both discursive camps, "reluctant realists" and the "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness," respectively. The next logical step for Yeltsin was to take full control over the negotiation process with Yugoslavia and NATO, especially after it seemed that Russian diplomacy headed by Primakov had reached a dead end. Discursively and practically, Primakov seemed to have left NATO to its war fortune, in fact opting for the viewpoint of the "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness".

5.6 Russian 'new course' on Kosovo

Thus, on April 14, 1999, Yeltsin nominated Chernomyrdin as special envoy for Kosovo talks. The intention of such a move was to "bring Yeltsin back into decision

⁶⁰³ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 15 (1999), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 10 April 1999, 3.

⁶⁰⁴ *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 10 April 1999, 3.

making and to avoid the military wing to prevail."⁶⁰⁵ Chernomyrdin was clearly against anti-Western rhetoric and policy, and against the project of Yugoslavia joining the Russia-Belarus Union.⁶⁰⁶ In case Chernomyrdin's efforts proved to be unsuccessful or highly unpopular, Yeltsin could always fire him and dissociate himself from any similar pursuits. Therefore, the President was following the "reluctant realists" policy approach with Chernomyrdin's nomination but was also keeping an open door toward joining the "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness" should Chernomyrdin's effort fail. However, after only two weeks in his role of special envoy, Chernomyrdin established a relationship of trust and "a dialogue" with the G-7 countries, the US especially, and thereby managed to marginalize policy proposals of hard-liners in the West, Russia and Yugoslavia.⁶⁰⁷ It should be outlined that in this particular crisis the Western hard-liners were advocates of more vicious bombing of Yugoslavia and a ground troops invasion, while perceiving Russia in "cold war" terms of suspicion and distrust (therefore not as a partner, but as an adversary). Russian hard-liners on this issue perceived the West in "cold war" terms of distrust and confrontation and advocated for an open military assistance of Yugoslavia. Yugoslav hard-liners hoped for a revival of the "cold war type" rivalry between Russia and the US, believing this would grant them freedom of action domestically as was the case during Tito's era.

Despite the fact that Russia severed its official ties with NATO and did not participate at NATO's Washington anniversary, Moscow's government has proceeded to

⁶⁰⁵ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 15 (1999), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 15 April 1999, 1, 3.

⁶⁰⁶ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 16 (1999), translated from *Noviye Izvestia* 17 April 1999, 1-2.

⁶⁰⁷ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 17 (1999), translated from *Kommersant* 28 April 1999, 2.

participate within the G-8 framework (at this point it was an enlarged Contact Group) in searching for a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo crisis. At this point the threat of any further polarization with the West over the Kosovo crisis seemed to vanish, which represented a clear victory of the "reluctant realists'" viewpoint, showing that partnership with the West on selected issues was possible and beneficial. Automatically, such an outcome of affairs placed PM Primakov in the camp of those who lost in this crisis management effort by relying on minority viewpoints. Quite a few Russian commentators anticipated Primakov's fall by noting that "thus, it must be noted that in slightly more than seven months, Yevgeny Primakov has gone from being a powerful figure who was supposed to have united the political elite, which had been damaged by the (August 17, 1998) default - and who actually did unite it for a while - to a man against whom practically everybody seems to be playing."⁶⁰⁸ It seemed that the PM had entered into the conflict over policy implementation with the President at the worst possible time, since Primakov was backed only by a fraction of political forces and advocated a minority policy viewpoint. Apparent institutionalization of "Russia first" through the nomination of Primakov to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs and consequently to the PM post did not last long due to the changing nature of the dominant security discourse in Russia. As the split between "reluctant realists" and the "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness" represented "Russia first" fragmentation, the PM clearly became associated with the "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness". Futile efforts of Primakov to

⁶⁰⁸ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 17 (1999), translated from *Nezavisimiya gazeta* 29 April 1999, 1, 3.

institutionally implement "Russia first" and later "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness" worldviews brought about his political downfall.⁶⁰⁹

On the issue of the Yugoslav crisis, another significant development contributed to marginalization of the "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness". This development took place in the discursive field and it reflected on the implemented conflict management approach on the part of the Russian executive branch. In Russia it was possible, unlike in the West, to build up a perception and to cultivate a discourse, which advocated that both NATO and Milosevic were wrong. This perception and the discourse it engendered produced a conflict management proposal that enabled Russia to cooperate with NATO while criticizing it.⁶¹⁰ As Primakov was inapt for such a policy he was fired and replaced by Sergei Stepashin on May 12, 1999.⁶¹¹

Still, some isolated voices were presenting this situation from a different angle. The respected commentator Andranik Migranyan aimed to explain the foundation of the "reluctant realists'" strategic perceptions. He argued that its foundation originated from the period when the state leadership and "reluctant realists" wrongly perceived "the victory over the US" in the 1998 averted Iraq bombing.⁶¹² He argued that this

⁶⁰⁹ Another account of Primakov's fall was that he did not deliver thus that he was not an action-driven politician. See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 34 (1999), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 20 August 1999, 3. Primakov's preparation of criminal prosecutions against corrupted taycoons and involvement of Yeltsin circle in illicit activities further facilitated the PM's downfall.

⁶¹⁰ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 18 (1999), translated from *Kommersant* 7 May 1999, 2.

⁶¹¹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 19 (1999), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 13 May 1999, 1, 3.

⁶¹² Migranyan said that "First, they took the view that for the first time since Shevardnadze and Kozyrev embarked on a capitulationist foreign policy for the USSR and Russia, a policy that took the form of endless unilateral concessions and unconditional support for the US and Western countries, Russia was trying to formulate its own interests and to uphold those interests in a region once considered a key zone in Soviet foreign policy. Second, they believed that the US and its allies had taken these Russian interests seriously, made a choice not to quarrel with Russia, and refrained from unilateral actions in the Persian Gulf region. And finally, they interpreted the (US's) decision not to strike Iraq as an example of cooperation between equals, which guaranteed Russia the right of serious influence and partnership with the US and

misperception led "reluctant realists" to reach similar conclusions during the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. Migranyan argued that another element, that of domestic policy, decisively influenced the state policy over the Yugoslav issue. This domestic policy element was built on the rationale that any kind of help from Yeltsin to Yugoslavia would be a domestic victory for communists and nationalists, which would provoke a tide of anti-Westernism. Consequently, this tide would make Yeltsin and his team obsolete.⁶¹³

However, it seemed that Yeltsin's endorsement of the "reluctant realists'" crisis management proposal could not happen without some sort of compromise with some special groups that belonged to the "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness", namely the military. Russian military's bitterness over the government's course of action during the Kosovo crisis was immense. Therefore, the Presidency, in order to detach the army from the camp of the "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness" or at least to neutralize them as a vocal opposition, clearly proceeded along four concessions. The first concession by the Presidency to the army was to allow for the change of strategic thinking within the Russian defense doctrine. This change was opening the door for the use of "low yields" nuclear tactical missiles in conventional warfare as a countermeasure to NATO high-precision cruise missiles.⁶¹⁴ This practically meant that Russian military, as not having an adequate high-accuracy missiles would prefabricate short-range nuclear missiles into the conventional ones. The second concession came as an announcement that "Boris Yeltsin gave the green light to a new phase in the Russian "star wars"

NATO." See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 20 (1999), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 28 April 1999, 1, 6.

⁶¹³ *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 28 April 1999, 1, 6.

⁶¹⁴ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 21 (1999), translated from *Sevodnya* 6 May 1999, 1-2.

program."⁶¹⁵ But probably the most important concessions are the two remaining ones that dealt with tactical deployment and institutional subordination issues.

The third concession by Yeltsin to the Russian military was the "green light" for the rapid deployment of Russian paratroopers to Slatina airport in Kosovo.⁶¹⁶ As Chernomyrdin negotiated the agreement with EU representative Finnish President Ahtisaari and Milosevic in Belgrade at the beginning of June 1999, the end of the war was almost imminent. A few days later the Yugoslav side signed an agreement with NATO accepting the military pull-out from Kosovo. Chernomyrdin claimed that all four conditions Yeltsin had given him were incorporated into the peace plan.⁶¹⁷ Despite the criticism coming from the communist ranks,⁶¹⁸ the Russian public generally viewed Chernomyrdin's mediation in a supportive way.⁶¹⁹ This was another indicator that the viewpoints and discourse of "reluctant realists" were predominant in Russian society. According to the survey conducted by the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinion, 53% of respondents believed that the peace plan assisted by Chernomyrdin was helpful in promoting peace in the Balkans.⁶²⁰ Additionally, 64% of respondents expressed the view that Russia should work jointly with the Western countries in solving the Kosovo crisis.

Nevertheless, Chernomyrdin was severely criticized for betraying Russian interests by Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev and by the director of the Chief

⁶¹⁵ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 21 (1999), translated from *Izvestia* 22 May 1999, 3.

⁶¹⁶ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 24 (1999), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 16 June 1999, 1, 6.

⁶¹⁷ The four conditions being: end the bombing; ensure Yugoslavia's territorial integrity; establish broad autonomy for Kosovo; ensure a dominant role for the UN in any Kosovo operation. See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 23 (1999), translated from *Kommersant* 9 June 1999, 1-2.

⁶¹⁸ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 23 (1999), translated from *Vremya MN* 9 June 1999, 6.

⁶¹⁹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 23 (1999), translated from *Noviye Izvestia* 10 June 1999, 1.

⁶²⁰ *Noviye Izvestia* 10 June 1999, 1.

Administration for International Military Cooperation, Gen. Leonid Ivashov.⁶²¹ This criticism by the top army officials and the fact that NATO did not want any presence of Russian troops in Kosovo probably prompted the implementation of the decision to rapidly deploy Russian peacekeepers from Bosnia to the most vital strategic object in Kosovo, the Slatina airport. This deployment was logistically performed in cooperation with the Yugoslav army. Since this deployment came as a total surprise, the reactions to it may best indicate the high rate of approval in Russia for such a risky operation.⁶²² Almost every Russian commentator and politician was enthusiastic about the Russian troops deployment in Kosovo. Lukin and several other "reluctant realists" placed the whole action within the framework of international law by saying that it was "...an attempt, in a rather dramatic and bold form, to show that as long as the UN exists, international agreements must be complied with."⁶²³ NATO simply did not want any Russian troops in Kosovo, while by this surprising deployment the Russian army entered Kosovo prior to any international troops. But this rapid deployment could not be sustained to any long-term strategic advantage for Russia. Subsequent deployment of Russian paratroopers from Russia was blocked by the decisions of NATO-aspiring Romania and Bulgaria not to give the over flight permission to Russian military planes. This tense situation between Russia urging to send reinforcements to Kosovo and NATO rapidly deploying its own troops, was solved by direct agreement between Russia and NATO according to which more than 3,000 Russian soldiers were planned for deployment in KFOR. Russian troops did not get a sector of responsibility of their own but as an eventual concession they were

⁶²¹ *Kommersant* 9 June 1999, 1-2.

⁶²² There were several accounts by Western journalists indicating that KFOR commander Gen. Michael Jackson received the order from the NATO commander Gen. Wesley Clark to take the airport by force. The refusal of the British general saved the world of possible nuclear-power conflict.

⁶²³ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 24 (1999), translated from *Izvestia* 15 June 1999, 1, 4.

under the Russian chain of command instead of NATO's. However, Russia's initial desire to be deployed to Serb-populated areas was manipulated by NATO so that Russian soldiers ended up being located in the most troublesome areas, those known to be KLA strongholds.

Finally, the fourth concession by the Presidency to the army was the promise that the Ministry of Defense would have the institutional upper hand in all combat situations, thus eliminating the Ministry of Interior and some other interest groups as rivals. This concession was, more than anything, related to the 1999 Chechen crisis. During this crisis was visible that the army was not used as political leverage, such was the case in 1994-1996 warfare, but as the mean of achieving an end goal. During the 1999 Chechen crisis the army had available all resources it wanted and demanded, as well as the upper hand in the chain of command. The question that remains to be answered on this occasion is this: for how long will the army control all relevant decision-making during the Chechen war? Or more simply, when will the army be subjected to the domestic policy needs of Kremlin, since constitutionally this is the Kremlin's right, and furthermore, what will be the reaction of the army on such an occasion?

5.7 From the Kosovo aftermath to the emergence of Chechen warfare

Assessments of Moscow's involvement in the Kosovo crisis dominated the Russian security discourse once Milosevic agreed to NATO's terms. The assessments' common themes were satisfaction that the conflict was over and that the Russian army and Russian diplomacy were prominently participating in the crisis management. Thus,

the viewpoint of the "reluctant realists" that Russia could pursue a policy of not aligning with Milosevic while simultaneously opposing NATO bombardments was proven in practice as tenable. This viewpoint further argued that Russia successfully avoided being involved in the war and facilitated the end of the war while at the same time its role became very important. The following commentary from the newspaper *Vremya MN* provides one of the most representative evaluations of Russia's role in the Kosovo crisis from the "reluctant realists" viewpoint: "during the Balkan war, Russia made the most important choice in our country's recent history. We didn't ally ourselves with NATO, but, thank God, we didn't become its enemy either. Now, Russia and the West can become partners who may not have any reason to love each other, but have to work together if only because there's no getting away from each other."⁶²⁴

Russian PM Stepashin continued with this foreign policy course by critically assessing Milosevic's domestic policies but arguing against the announced "no-aid" Western policy toward Serbia.⁶²⁵ Russia's long-standing argument about the negative effect the embargo has had on Yugoslav citizens and society was in this way reaffirmed. Almost all security discourse participants in Russia shared this perception. The government continued with the course of not relying only on Milosevic as the interlocutor from Yugoslavia by hosting Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic in August 1999.⁶²⁶ During the August 1999 preparation of the Stability Pact, Russia unsuccessfully attempted to include Yugoslavia in the list of participants arguing that there will be

⁶²⁴ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 27 (1999), translated from *Vremya MN* 5 July 1999, 6.

⁶²⁵ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 31 (1999), translated from *Kommersant* 31 July 1999, 1.

⁶²⁶ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 31 (1999), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 3 August 1999, 6.

neither peace nor stability in the region if all countries were not included in multilateral cooperation.

In August 1999 Stepashin was fired and new PM Vladimir Putin was appointed.⁶²⁷ This change had nothing to do with foreign policy or with security discourse but was strictly related to domestic power struggles and the agony of Yeltsin's presidency. After a series of bombing attacks in Russian cities and military incursion of Chechen fighters to neighboring Dagestan PM Putin embarked on a faster and larger military campaign in Chechnya, thus giving the day on that domestic issue to the "advocates of brinkmanship and firmness". Discursively "the protection of territorial sovereignty and the fight against terrorism" were the premises of Russian military engagement in Chechnya.⁶²⁸ These two discursive premises were the same ones that almost every Russian security discourse participant had endorsed as rightful policy when they were performed by Yugoslav authorities in Kosovo. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that almost all participants of the Yugoslav security discourse were supportive of the Russian military intervention in Chechnya.

Several discursive elements characterized Russian security debates involving Chechnya. Chechen incursions in Dagestan, and subsequent bombing attacks in big Russian cities were labeled "terrorist attacks" and not ethnic or religious violence. The possibility of "spread of international terrorism" was another discursive category used to animate "near abroad" countries to ally with Russia in containing this security risk. Central Asian countries, Uzbekistan included, rallied behind Russia in offering military

⁶²⁷ Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin had quite a grip over Russian security institutions as the Secretary of the Security Council and Director of the Russian Federal Security Service. See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 32 (1999), translated from *Kommersant* 10 August 1999, 3.

⁶²⁸ In September 1999 Putin presented to Duma his "Anti-terrorist action plan to defend the state." See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 37 (1999), translated from *Kommersant* 15 September 1999, 2.

and intelligence cooperation.⁶²⁹ This cooperation was predictable especially if one keeps in mind the friendly mood and the declarations signed during the August 1999 Bishkek summit. Leaders of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan met in Bishkek but the meeting had more than a regional significance. Yeltsin argued that he was ready “to do battle with Westernizers” and in the same time “agreed” with his Chinese counterparts on the “multi-polar world” vision and necessity for strategic partnership between Russia and China. Furthermore, a declaration stating that human rights are an internal affair, quite contrary to Western universalistic stand on this issue, was signed.⁶³⁰ It could be argued that the return of “multi-polar world” vision was more related to a joint anti-American positioning with China and the creation of “alternative alliances” than as a continuity of Primakov’s concept of foreign policy. Both “reluctant realists” and the “advocates of brinkmanship and firmness” endorsed the form of Yeltsin’s remarks but the content only suited the former group since there were no outlined policy steps of rivalry with the West.

Two other discursive categories became pre-dominant in security debates over the Chechnya warfare: first, the perception that “there is no political solution” for this conflict;⁶³¹ second, that “Chechnya deserves what it is getting.”⁶³² By relying on these two categories almost all security discourse participants approved in this way the use of force. It was significant, however, that the rhetoric was unveiled in terms of the legal necessity for such an action and not in some hate language. The reliance on some sort of

⁶²⁹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 37 (1999), translated from *Izvestia* 16 September 1999, 1.

⁶³⁰ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 34 (1999), translated from *Sevodnya* 25 August 1999, 1; *Rossiiskaya gazeta* 27 August 1999, 3; *Vremya MN* 27 August 1999, 6.

⁶³¹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 39 (1999), translated from *Vremya MN* 27 September 1999, 1.

⁶³² See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 43 (1999), translated from *Vremya MN* 28 October 1999, 2.

legal arguments opened up the possibility of “reluctant realists” to join the “advocates of brinkmanship and firmness” in this action. The “reluctant realists” could conceivably be labeled as ‘soft supporters’ of the use of force in this crisis, especially with regard to the huge humanitarian concerns and the past experience of unsuccessful military campaigns against Chechnya. The Russian public reflected the prevalence of this discourse of “not having other solutions at disposition” combined with ‘soft support’ for the military intervention. Thus, only a relative majority unconditionally approved the bombing of Chechnya.⁶³³

The aftermath of Kosovo and the Chechnya warfare resulted in an overall rethinking of Russian security doctrine. In its October 1999 meeting the Security Council adopted a new version of the “General Principles of Russian Federation National Security.”⁶³⁴ This document represents direct evidence of how recent international issues changed security perceptions and how that change was reflected in Russian political institutions. The change of perceptions was based on the view that the wars in the Balkans and the Caucasus indicated that security threats could be of a military nature and that they could come from abroad (in the previous security concept the accent was on domestic threats and their non-military nature). The prescription was that those threats should be deterred by both nuclear and conventional means (in the previous concept the accent was on nuclear deterrence). The emphasis on conventional forces indicated that an increase in defense spending was to be expected as well as the favoring of military instead of police force. Another new component of national security was the emergence

⁶³³ According to the public survey conducted by the Agency for Regional Political Research 49% of Russians approved bombing of Chechnya, 36% opposed it while 15% were undecided. See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 38 (1999), translated from *Noviye Izvestia* 24 September 1999, 1.

⁶³⁴ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 40 (1999), translated from *Kommersant* 6 October 1999, 2.

of “the concept of information security.” Thus an increase of intelligence activity or the significance of this department is to be expected. One confirmation of such a trend could be the appointment of the deputy director of FSB, who was in charge of the bureau for forecasting, analysis and strategic planning, (Lt. Gen. Sergei Ivanov) to the post of Secretary of the Security Council.⁶³⁵ This concept of national security could be regarded in policy terms as closer to “reluctant realists” prescriptions while it was in its rhetoric of overall protective positioning vis-à-vis ‘foreign threats’ also close to the discourse of “the advocates of brinkmanship and firmness.”⁶³⁶ Thus changes in Russian official rhetoric and domestic security policy steps could be understood as going along the prescriptions of “the advocates of brinkmanship and firmness” while Moscow’s practical steps with the Contact Group, OSCE and UN proceeded along the policy proposals of the “reluctant realists.”⁶³⁷ As Russia came under criticism by Western countries due to its military intervention in Chechnya, the official rhetoric of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs became more and more anti-Western, almost recalling the cold-war period, but the practical steps of Russia in the international arena were not at all confrontational.⁶³⁸ However, the public opinion seemed to be quite split on policy issues, as was also the security discourse in Russia, but also quite unified in its anti-American views, again as was the security discourse in Russia. Public survey results indicated that the public was

⁶³⁵ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 46 (1999), translated from *Sevodnya* 16 November 1999, 2.

⁶³⁶ On security interests see N.P. Gusakov and N.A. Zotova, *Natsional’nyie interesy i vneshneekonomicheskaya bezopasnost’ Rossii* [National Interests and Foreign Economic Security of Russia] (Moscow: Kompania Evraziiskii region, 1998).

⁶³⁷ Although “reluctant realists,” such as the director of the Institute of the US and Canada, Sergei Rogov, pointed at limits of Russian engagement in multilateral settings. He said that OSCE is not what Russia hoped it could be so that Russia should follow two-tier strategy: Russia should not stop dealing with the West but it should not sign useless documents such as Russia-NATO Founding Act and CFE Treaty. See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 47 (1999), translated from *Moskovskiye novosti* 45 (23-29 November 1999): 5.

⁶³⁸ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 48 (1999), translated from *Izvestia* 2 December 1999, 4.

almost split on the emerging issue of how to respond to the US “star wars” program: 47% of respondents proposed that Russia should build its own defense system, while 32% of respondents suggested negotiations with Americans; 52% of respondents deemed nuclear attack on Russia quite possible while 38% considered this development quite impossible. But the overwhelming majority of 72% expressed their anti-American position when claiming that they were convinced Americans would trick Russia anyway.⁶³⁹ Yeltsin himself repeated this popular feeling during his December 1999 visit to China where he warned against the “American dictate to the world.”⁶⁴⁰

The results of the Russian December 1999 parliamentary elections and the subsequent resignation of Yeltsin, at least in the short term, did not change much in Russian policy vis-à-vis Yugoslavia and Chechnya. Russia’s policy vis-à-vis the Kosovo crisis was that the region should remain within Yugoslavia while enjoying substantial autonomy and international assistance. At the same time Russia continued to constructively participate with other Contact Group countries in concerted efforts to find a political solution for this problem. Despite the western reluctance to follow suit, Russian humanitarian aid and economic and technical cooperation with Yugoslavia continued, but never violating the international embargo. On the institutional side of foreign policy with Yugoslavia, the Russian Minister of Defense visited Belgrade (an almost traditional end-of-the-year visit) for the signing of the new military-cooperation agreement, though this did not include arms sales.⁶⁴¹ Almost at the same time Moscow

⁶³⁹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 47 (1999), translated from *Vremya MN* 17 November 1999, 3.

⁶⁴⁰ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 50 (1999), translated from *Kommersant* 10 December 1999, 1.

⁶⁴¹ See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 52 (1999), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 28 December 1999, 6.

hosted the leader of the biggest opposition party in Serbia, Vuk Draskovic, in continuity with its approach not to rely on Milosevic as the only Yugoslav interlocutor.⁶⁴² Moscow's policy toward Chechnya also kept the same direction of robust military involvement, with the army having the major say in strategic, organizational and logistical issues and with the public rallying behind the arguments of the security discourse participants.

In 1999 influential Russian academic journals did not feature a common theme except the implied, shared understanding of Russian distinctiveness and the frequent portrayal of the US in hegemonic, almost negative, tones. *International Affairs* dedicated significant attention to the regional security issues and the Kosovo crisis. The journal offered abundant criticism of NATO enlargement and subsequent handling of Kosovo crisis. There were still strong themes of 'new pragmatism' needed toward the West, practically something that resonated as a synonym for the "reluctant realists'" analytical tools. The U.S. was quite negatively portrayed while the EU was viewed in a positive manner as a cooperation-prone partner, which was a typical *Neo-Eurasian* perception. *Nash Sovremennik* substantially reduced space dedicated to politics. The expected outburst of anti-NATO and pro-Serb texts in this, judging by previous years, rather patriotic-oriented journal did not materialize. The most predominant themes were Russia and the world and Russian past. However, the identity category that was emerging was one of "island Russia" that practically opens the space for *Neo-Eurasians* and nationalists to merge completely on the issue of 'what is Russia'. This contribution to the distinctiveness issue (identity, security, development and consequently future) attributed to Russia specific and autochthon rather than Western cultural and developmental pattern.

⁶⁴² See *The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 47 (1999), translated from *Nezavisimaya gazeta* 26 November 1999, 6.

Voprosy Filosofii gave prominent attention to the issues of Russian distinctiveness by focusing on Russian traditional philosophy and Russian-specific quests into ontology and the totality of knowledge. In addition, lessons of post-modernity were debated with an emphasis on the continuity within the history of ideas and a variety of social forms. This could be understood as the philosophical foundation for eventual policy claims related to the distinctiveness debate and the justification of protecting such distinctiveness.

Svobodnaia Mysl' was preoccupied with the idea of a "third way". Within the broader theme of experiences of Russian post-communist transition two quests for the accommodation of Russian distinctiveness emerged. The first one was about the necessity of finding a third option for domestic reforms between the extremes of market and statism. The second quest was about the foreign policy dilemma of how to identify Russia with the East but not to antagonize it with the West (or how to avoid "traps" of *Westernism* and "dead-ends" of "pochvennichestvo" – ("pochvennichestvo" being here understood as *Slavophilism*). *MEMO* primarily dealt with issues of globalization in order to evaluate directions and complexities of this process. Russian post-communist transition and Russian foreign policy were analyzed primarily from the standpoint of globalization. In their concluding remarks authors were either leaning toward acknowledging either an open ended ontological complexity or Russian distinctiveness in the form of *Neo-Eurasianism*. In an ethical way this could open the space for a claim for the validity and appropriateness of protecting such distinctiveness.

5.8 Conclusion

The 1998-2000 period represented a further evolution of Russian security discourse and its fragmentation from the “Russia first” consensus into the two streams: “reluctant realists” and the “advocates of brinkmanship and firmness”. This development resulted in the failure of “Russia first” to institutionalize its public policy choices with PM Primakov’s sacking as final evidence. Consequently significant discursive categories associated with “Russia first,” such as characterization of the world as a “multi-polar world” and characterization of Russia as a “great power,” were gradually replaced with categories such as “national idea”, “unity”, and “common sense” which could facilitate future emergence of new worldviews. The debate over these emerging categories was reflective of the polemics among “reluctant realists” and the “advocates of brinkmanship and firmness” on the CIS, Yugoslav and Chechen issues. These new categories in question were practically inward-looking as they assessed the questions of ‘what is Russia’ and ‘how to analyze the world.’ Thus these categories were ontological on the issue of Russia and epistemological on the issue of the world and not coherent ontological and epistemological frameworks on Russia or the world. Precisely this ontological focus on Russia and epistemological focus on the world provides the link with the 19th century “schools of thought:” ontologically, in the 19th century scholarship, Russia was the world to discover; epistemologically, in the 19th century scholarship, the inquiry of what public policy to apply as Russia’s response to modernization and globalization development depended on analytical lenses (materialists/positivists arguing

for modernization/globalization, and idealists/post-positivists arguing against unconditional modernization/globalization).

Visible response of Russian state institutions to the ideas originating from the security discourse, which could be traced in implemented foreign policy measures, indicated the continued link between ideas and institutions. “Russia first” was primarily outward-looking in having its focus on the ontology of the world and Russia’s active place in changing it while “reluctant realists” and the “advocates of brinkmanship and firmness” represented inward-looking “schools of thought,” being primarily oriented toward protection of Russia’s power from harmful outside influences. As the prevalence of cost-effective analysis became the intelligentsia’s dominant epistemological tool of world examination the lesson learned was that Russian international input cannot be sustained in all international events to the point of guaranteeing significant output or benefit. The scarcity of Russian international input was addressed by calls for bigger domestic “unity” since it was believed that concentrated domestic effort was the best strategy for some international gains. Thus, the argument would go that a politically unified and not divided Russia could play a more significant international role. The “unity” should be achieved around the “national idea”. Both “reluctant realists” and the “advocates of brinkmanship and firmness” shared the notion of Russian distinctiveness. As this emerged into an ontological understanding it also became a positivist ethical category. The policy prescription of such an ethical claim was to protect such distinctiveness. Therefore, the discursive change from “Russia first” toward “reluctant realists” and the “advocates of brinkmanship and firmness” reflected on security parameters of Russia by the change of direction from the issue of how Russia could act in

the world toward the issue of how much Russia should interfere with the world in order not to negatively affect her distinctiveness.

This argument suggested that the evaluation of Russian international interventions should be based upon “common sense” and this was the place where “reluctant realists” and the “advocates of brinkmanship and firmness” mostly differ. At this point in Russian security discourse the “common sense” category could practically stand as a synonym for the best affordable security strategy. The security risk calculations on the side of “reluctant realists” developed toward a selective use of force and a reduced (but cooperative) participation in international crisis management. The argument of this school of thought was that Russia cannot participate in more than a few crisis management efforts and that the use of force was beneficial only against a weaker adversary due to the poor state of the Russian army. On the other hand the security risk calculations of the “advocates of brinkmanship and firmness” developed toward the approval of total deterrence vis-à-vis and adversary accepting the participation in spiraling of international hostilities that could lead toward war. The argument of this school of thought was that nuclear forces and Russian military might guarantee that the adversary would not opt for total conflict and would instead back down or offer some compromise solution. But what is exactly “common sense” in security policy for those two schools of thought will probably be resolved on a case-by-case basis with one side making concessions to the other depending on the nature of a particular international crisis in question: the Kosovo crisis being the model of the “reluctant realists” approach and Chechen warfare being the example of the “advocates of brinkmanship and firmness” approach.

As Russian distinctiveness was perceived by both discursive groups to be the main “national idea” and as it was an inward-looking orientation, the expected security strategy could be one of ‘flexible isolationism’. This could mean that Russian foreign policy institutions will be primarily interested in CIS politics, and gradual isolationist and protective efforts rather than in international or crisis management leadership. As the nature of discourse is never definite, the further evolution and bargaining among competing discursive groups and “schools of thought” will show the elasticity of such an isolationism in coming years.

CONCLUSION

This thesis offered an understanding of how during the 1990-1999 period Russian foreign policy experienced significant changes resulting in a shift from the “Cooperation with the West” agenda toward the more assertive “Russia first” agenda and ending the decade with the “reluctant realists” quasi-isolationists agenda.

The main argument of this thesis was that the inter-connectedness of ideas and institutions might be used as an explanation for the change in foreign policy behavior. The basic departing point of the inquiry was built on Philip Lawrence’s approach to the unity between participants and debate. This approach was implemented with reference to the issue of how the change in reality-defining assumptions could be found in the existing political elite discourses – text and speech. The argument posited that subsequent changes of those assumptions resulted in changing policy prescriptions. The Russian example indicated that there is a strong link among participants and debate, since the former either created the discourse that validated existing state policy or created the foundation for different policy prescriptions. Specific of Russia was that such a process was possible due to the dual ontological nature of “schools of thought” – as social movements and as sets of ideas. This approach also represents the link between behaviorist scholarship (in attributing the role of agency to the elite) and post-modern

scholarship (in using the discourse as the medium of change and discourse analysis as the research method).

The analysis of Russian security discourse further demonstrated that there was a continuous debate among political elites and that this debate was primarily related to foreign policy founding issues, or the “core foreign policy beliefs” of security, identity and prosperity, as defined in the work of Chittick, Billingsley and Travis. Competing perceptions on these issues were presented by different political groupings. The significant marker for the Russian case was the nature of those discursive groupings: these groupings were called “schools of thought” because they did not follow political parties’ affiliation lines but rather the lines of ideas and thinking. Thus, the monitoring of “schools of thought,” as indicated in the works of Andrei Tsygankov, proved to be a better indicator of competing concepts of Russian national interest and security concerns than focusing solely on the state institutions or major political parties.

Another finding of the search for interconnectedness among ideas and institutions was that the evolution of Russian post-communist security discourse indicated that its departing point was not from zero. The rich heritage of the Russian 19th century “schools of thought”, Gorbachev’s perestroika and Western social science scholarship represented fertile ground for the growth and emergence of coherent 20th century “schools of thought”. A special emphasis in this thesis was placed on the Russian 19th century heritage of ideas due to its partial neglect in contemporary analysis of Russian foreign policy. Discourse analysis indicated that ideas put forward by the 19th century “schools of thought” had a strong influence

on the foreign policy debate and security thinking and public policy choices in contemporary Russia.

At the time of the USSR's break-up it was obvious that the *Democratic forces*' discourse dominated both the political scene and state institutions. The worldview expressed by this "school of thought" depicted the international scene as one divided into democratic and totalitarian spheres, while the Russian national security concerns were subordinated to the multilateral cooperative efforts of a universalistic vision of common good. The *Atlanticists* foreign policy agenda of "Cooperation with the West" was an institutional expression of such a predominant discourse. Alternative discourses of the *Nationalists* and the *Neo-Eurasians* emerged and started their 'march on institutions' by offering worldviews of a multi-polar world and a center-periphery world. As the "schools of thought" presented a vibrant interchange rather than staunch fundamentalism, the emerging situations of concessions and rapprochements were quite common within the Russian foreign policy and security discourse. As *Nationalists* and *Neo-Eurasians* clearly compromised on the worldview issue in favor of a multi-polar world vision, so the *Atlanticists*, *Nationalists* and *Neo-Eurasians* did on the issue of Russia's developmental path by jointly arguing for a path of renewal. They chose this over two other options, namely, merging/uniting with the West or insisting on the rebirth of Russia. On the issue of identity, the shift was achieved through the *Atlanticists* insistence on democracy and freedom and the *Nationalists* meta-historical concept toward the merger of nationhood and statehood categories through the *National-Patriots* agenda of inclusivism. The issue of prosperity

experienced a shift from the *Atlanticist* focus on the individual to the *National-Patriots* prioritization of the state as provider and guarantor of prosperity. As the basic understandings of *Atlanticists* foreign policy were discursively changed, so the actual policies started changing as well. Thus, the changed discursive content became predominant and, consequently, it influenced state institutions by becoming a discourse of institutions and resulting in the change of foreign policy behavior. An indicator of how new discourse has influenced institutions could be seen in the change of discourse of the executive branch and the implementation of new policy measures that became so characteristic after Primakov became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. These policies and the dominant discourse that existed at the time were known as the “Russia first” agenda. The downfall of Primakov coincided with another discourse shift, visible in the fragmentation of “Russia first” into the “reluctant realists” and the “advocates of firmness and brinkmanship.” The Kosovo crisis was quite instrumental in the disintegration of “Russia first” and the subsequent formal adoption of the “reluctant realists” foreign policy proposals. “Reluctant realists” shared the perception that the erosion of power deprived Russia of the capacity to play a larger international role or to be an equal partner with the West. This school of thought prescribed that partial isolation could be a beneficial policy, as it would empower Russia towards a future return to the international scene as an equal player. The institutional predominance of “reluctant realists” on the issue of the former Yugoslavia was matched with the equal institutional predominance of the “advocates of firmness and brinkmanship” on the issue of Chechnya. The post-Yeltsin dynamic of institutional cohabitation of

these two discourses will probably result in a further evolution of Russian security and foreign policy discourse accompanied by the emergence of new “schools of thought.”

As I indicated earlier the following graphical description of how changes in Russian foreign policy behavior occurred in the last ten years could be used as a practical tool:

Events=>Debates=>Redefinition of national interest=>Change in foreign policy behavior

This study demonstrated that the focus on the second stage of this process, namely on the phase of Debates, could help our understanding of domestic reasoning for (and proposed alternatives to) desired foreign policy changes. This focus on the Debates phase puts forward the question of the relationship between power and the significance of discourse. In the example of Russia, this question could be formulated as: how one can explain the phenomenon of the existence of similar policy prescriptions despite different perceptions? For example, on several occasions *Nationalists* and *Neo-Eurasians* had different perceptions on the issues of security, identity and prosperity but quite similar policy prescriptions, especially on the issues of the former Yugoslavia and the “near abroad.” My finding was that shared discursive categories among those who debated foreign policy facilitated the emergence of alliances – otherwise we would have difficulty in explaining how such a diverse political figures and movements sided together. The sharing of discursive categories was twofold and it encompassed similar intellectual roots and shared reality-defining assumptions or worldviews. When describing the

phenomenon of similar intellectual roots, the most important issue that emerged was the relevance of links between the 19th and 20th century “schools of thought.” As mentioned in chapter I, there is a need for an original Russian typology of “schools of thought,” otherwise, the Western frameworks would not be able to entirely cover and describe nuances and specifics of Russian discourse. The link between the 19th and 20th century “schools of thought” was visible on several accounts: existence of a synthetic worldview (concept inaugurated by the 19th century thinker Alexander Radishchev); use of synthetic categories; the intra- and inter- linkages among the competing “schools of thought,” practically complementing and not necessarily annihilating each other; the preference for the “third way” of Russian development when addressing the globalisation question; the Russian distinctiveness issue, based primarily on the concept of cultural-historical types (mostly developed by the 19th century *Pan-Slavist* thinker Nicholas Danilevsky); the concept of a divided world and a divided Russian identity (a concept developed by the 19th century thinker Leontyev); and the ontological and epistemological heritage of German idealism and dialectics.

From those common intellectual roots the shared reality-defining assumptions or worldviews could be detected. The main reality-defining assumptions, as mentioned before, were answers to questions about identity, security, and prosperity. The discourse analysis demonstrated that the underlying issues of Russian security discourse throughout the ‘90s resembled those of the 19th century: the aim to situate its identity on the East-West scale; the aim to situate its security paradigm on the isolation-integration scale vis-à-vis the West; the aim to

situate its prosperity on the individual-collective scale. Furthermore, the search for an understanding of particular shifts in Russian foreign policy demonstrated that those shifts were actually periods where new discursive consensus was achieved. Those periods came about through the shared reality-defining assumptions or worldviews. For example, the aim of situating Russian identity oscillated from the perception of Russia heading toward a Western pattern in the view of the *Atlanticists*, toward Russia being East and West in “Russia first” (*Neo-Eurasianism*), to Russia being perceived as neither East nor West (“island Russia”) by the “reluctant realists” and the “advocates of firmness and brinkmanship”. The aim to situate a prosperity paradigm oscillated from the *Atlanticists*’ exclusive emphasis on individual, toward the almost exclusive emphasis on the state in “Russia first,” to the somewhat more balanced position of the “reluctant realists” who placed an equal emphasis on the roles of the state and the individual. Consequently, the aim to situate a security paradigm oscillated from the *Atlanticists*’ “Cooperation with the West” toward the assertive “Russia first” agenda and ending the decade with the isolationist limited partnership with the West of “reluctant realists.” The thesis demonstrated that the Yugoslav civil war and ‘near abroad’ issues were the most influential events that shaped Russian security discourse and decisively contributed, as reference points, to the creation of reality-defining assumptions or worldviews.

From the ontological view, the agency in this thesis was placed on political elites and this represents a clearly behaviorist position. But the more complete answer to what forms the ontological foundation in my work is actually the

discourse itself. Initially, this might look like an eclectic mixture of behaviorism and post-positivism, of empiricism and narrative. In relaying in my thesis on Campbell's work I aimed to reconcile this apparent inconsistency by arguing that narrative/ideas are practice. Thus, by keeping the primarily behaviorist approaches of the FPA as a useful starting point, and supplementing them with a more heuristic approach of discourse analysis, a better understanding of political phenomena was achieved. The epistemology in my thesis was the consequence of such a dual ontological choice so that my methodology rested on public surveys, content analysis of texts and speeches and contextualization of actual foreign policy practices. This approach also followed the prescriptions of the "second generation" of FPA scholarship: to complement FPA approaches that focus on decision making (thus on the elites) with those that focus on foreign policy context (discourse in my work). This dual focus created an opportunity to merge comparative politics (by focusing on domestic political processes and phenomena) with international relations, and it resulted in the interdisciplinary nature of this study. Furthermore, the study represented a culturally sensitive FPA by focusing on specific Russian theoretical thinking regarding national interests and security dilemmas. There was significant FPA scholarship that was culturally sensitive but it rarely focused on specific conceptual and theoretical thinking of the country in question. In this way my study makes a contribution that fills that particular gap.

In an attempt to reconcile the relevance of universal and country (case) specific research tools and findings of this study, I mentioned Bakhtin in my introduction. His work symbolizes the ongoing quest between the universal and the

particular. For some, his approach symbolized universality, while for others, he represented the paramount of national thinking. Bakhtin himself acknowledged the dual nature of our main medium of existence – language (text and speech). This duality was represented both in his notions of dialogism and mutual outsidership. So if I have to decide clearly where to situate the significance of my study on the scale of general-specific I would rather believe in the interconnectedness of the social sciences than in clear-cut divisions that advocate that some methods and findings are of general or specific relevance. This way my study could be a valid contribution to East European studies as it could, with few accommodations, be implemented as a FPA method to some other non-Russian case studies.

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