Nietzsche's Subjectivism about Life's Meaning

The purpose of this thesis is to demonstrate the subjective nature of Friedrich Nietzsche's account of existential meaning. I aim to emphasize that Nietzsche's account can only be properly understood by considering his subjective account of value and the limitations of knowledge and sensory perception imposed by perspectivism. I seek to illustrate that this is only possible by considering many of his works and the concepts contained therein. I first consider Nietzsche's strongly negative reaction to Arthur Schopenhauer's pessimism; next, I adopt Gilles Deleuze's interpretation of the will to power while arguing that the will to power is not as central as might be thought; and, finally, I argue that the death of God is the foundation of Nietzsche's account, as it is this concept that enables and/or necessitates the will to power, the revaluation of values, eternal return, and perspectivism.