The Representational Base of Psychological States: Filling a Gap in Dennett's Theory
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Daniel Dennett claims that we adopt the intentional stance toward other people, by ascribing psychological attitudes to them based on their behaviour (Dennett 1987a; 1987b). Yet we often form attitudes without any observation of behaviour. He says little about the basis of this formation, leaving a gap in his account. I attempt to fill that gap. First, I investigate the intentional stance’s assumptions, arguing that Dennett’s account works only because we have certain capabilities. Second, I argue that one of our most important capabilities, the capacity to represent the world and our psychological life, is the foundation on which we form psychological attitudes. Third, I argue that the attitudes we form are idealized abstractions of this representational content. I fill the gap in Dennett’s account by claiming that our psychological attitudes are idealizations of representational content rather than patterns in behaviour, and I do so broadly within Dennett’s theory.
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Copyright © 2016 the author(s). Theses may be used for non-commercial research, educational, or related academic purposes only. Such uses include personal study, research, scholarship, and teaching. Theses may only be shared by linking to Carleton University Institutional Repository and no part may be used without proper attribution to the author. No part may be used for commercial purposes directly or indirectly via a for-profit platform; no adaptation or derivative works are permitted without consent from the copyright owner.
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- 2016
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