Grounding Responsibility: Helen Steward's Libertarianism and a Hemi-Incompatibilist Alternative
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This project has two purposes. The first is to evaluate Helen Steward’s libertarian account, as presented in A Metaphysics for Freedom, and assess its ability to help ground moral responsibility. The second is to provide an alternative, Hemi-Incompatibilist account of a variety of responsibility that is compatible with the denial of agent causal control.An overview of a selection of accounts from the moral responsibility debate is provided, followed by a discussion of Helen Steward’s account specifically. I then present my Hemi-Incompatibilist account, followed by the brief investigation of two similar views. I conclude that Helen Steward’s libertarian account does not succeed in lending support to those hoping to ground a deserts-based variety of responsibility. I show that my Hemi-Incompatibilist account grounds another variety of responsibility, responsibility qua onus, that supports normative prescriptions and proscriptions despite the denial that agents possess regulative control.
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Copyright © 2013 the author(s). Theses may be used for non-commercial research, educational, or related academic purposes only. Such uses include personal study, research, scholarship, and teaching. Theses may only be shared by linking to Carleton University Institutional Repository and no part may be used without proper attribution to the author. No part may be used for commercial purposes directly or indirectly via a for-profit platform; no adaptation or derivative works are permitted without consent from the copyright owner.
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- 2013
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renaud-groundingresponsibilityhelenstewardslibertarianism.pdf | 2023-05-04 | Public | Download |