Grounding Responsibility: Helen Steward's Libertarianism and a Hemi-Incompatibilist Alternative

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Creator: 

Renaud, Mary

Date: 

2013

Abstract: 

This project has two purposes. The first is to evaluate Helen Steward’s libertarian account, as presented in A Metaphysics for Freedom, and assess its ability to help ground moral responsibility. The second is to provide an alternative, Hemi-Incompatibilist account of a variety of responsibility that is compatible with the denial of agent causal control.

An overview of a selection of accounts from the moral responsibility debate is provided, followed by a discussion of Helen Steward’s account specifically. I then present my Hemi-Incompatibilist account, followed by the brief
investigation of two similar views. I conclude that Helen Steward’s libertarian account does not succeed in lending support to those hoping to ground a deserts-based variety of responsibility. I show that my Hemi-Incompatibilist account grounds another variety of responsibility, responsibility qua onus, that supports normative prescriptions and proscriptions despite the denial that agents possess regulative control.

Subject: 

PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION, AND THEOLOGY Philosophy

Language: 

English

Publisher: 

Carleton University

Thesis Degree Name: 

Master of Arts: 
M.A.

Thesis Degree Level: 

Master's

Thesis Degree Discipline: 

Philosophy

Parent Collection: 

Theses and Dissertations

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