This project has two purposes. The first is to evaluate Helen Steward’s libertarian account, as presented in A Metaphysics for Freedom, and assess its ability to help ground moral responsibility. The second is to provide an alternative, Hemi-Incompatibilist account of a variety of responsibility that is compatible with the denial of agent causal control.
An overview of a selection of accounts from the moral responsibility debate is provided, followed by a discussion of Helen Steward’s account specifically. I then present my Hemi-Incompatibilist account, followed by the brief
investigation of two similar views. I conclude that Helen Steward’s libertarian account does not succeed in lending support to those hoping to ground a deserts-based variety of responsibility. I show that my Hemi-Incompatibilist account grounds another variety of responsibility, responsibility qua onus, that supports normative prescriptions and proscriptions despite the denial that agents possess regulative control.