Massive Modularity: Why it is Wrong, and What it Can Teach us Anyway
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This thesis addresses current issues of cognitive architecture, with a focus on the family of theories known as massive modularity. This project begins with a discussion of the concept of modularity as proposed by Jerry Fodor. All of Fodor's criteria of modularity are explored in order to establish a formal definition of modularity. That definition is then used as a benchmark to determine whether the cognitive mechanisms proposed in the massive modularity theories of Leda Cosmides, John Tooby, Dan Sperber, Steven Pinker, and Peter Carruthers actually qualify as modules. After concluding that the massive modularity theories of the above authors are in fact not modular, the discussion turns to Zenon Pylyshyn's cognitive impenetrability thesis in order to demonstrate that it is extremely unlikely that there could exist any truly modular version of the massive modularity hypothesis. Finally, an alternative account of the mind is proposed in place of massive modularity.
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Copyright © 2013 the author(s). Theses may be used for non-commercial research, educational, or related academic purposes only. Such uses include personal study, research, scholarship, and teaching. Theses may only be shared by linking to Carleton University Institutional Repository and no part may be used without proper attribution to the author. No part may be used for commercial purposes directly or indirectly via a for-profit platform; no adaptation or derivative works are permitted without consent from the copyright owner.
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- 2013
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