Consciousness, Representation, and Flexibility
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Determining whether another being is conscious first involves determining what consciousness is. In Chapter 1, I argue against the view that consciousness is unlike the rest of cognition, and in favor of a view that sees consciousness as a cognitive function like any other. In Chapter 2, I argue that most cognitivist accounts of consciousness fail in one of two ways: they are narrowly circular, or they change the subject. I suggest that one way to avoid these common routes to failure is to adopt what I refer to as the Minimal Claim - that consciousness has a representational base. In Chapter 3, I apply the work done in the two previous chapters to the issue of ascribing consciousness to beings other than ourselves, suggesting that behavioral flexibility may play an important role.
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Copyright © 2020 the author(s). Theses may be used for non-commercial research, educational, or related academic purposes only. Such uses include personal study, research, scholarship, and teaching. Theses may only be shared by linking to Carleton University Institutional Repository and no part may be used without proper attribution to the author. No part may be used for commercial purposes directly or indirectly via a for-profit platform; no adaptation or derivative works are permitted without consent from the copyright owner.
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languedoc-consciousnessrepresentationandflexibility.pdf | 2023-05-05 | Public | Download |