Reference and Grammar: Reasserting Wittgenstein's Picture

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Creator: 

Tweedie, Andrew John

Date: 

2015

Abstract: 

The aim of this essay is to present a novel line of argument in support of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s view of philosophy of language. It consists in three parts. First, it explores a family of referential theories of meaning belonging to the tradition of Millian semantics – a family dubbed ‘Millian externalism.’ Second, it draws on the work of both Wittgenstein and Noam Chomsky to undermine the tenability of Millian externalism, all the while generating insights into the nature of an adequate semantic theory as it proceeds. And third, from the fact that Millian externalism fails insofar as it purports to be a scientific theory of meaning, the essay concludes that philosophy of language must give in to a theory of meaning which endorses Wittgensteinian quietism. If it refuses, then it must conform to the methodology of linguistics.

Subject: 

Philosophy

Language: 

English

Publisher: 

Carleton University

Thesis Degree Name: 

Master of Arts: 
M.A.

Thesis Degree Level: 

Master's

Thesis Degree Discipline: 

Philosophy

Parent Collection: 

Theses and Dissertations

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