Unknown Evils: Revisiting the Psychopathy/Responsibility Debate with Epistemic Injustice

The callous and seemingly emotionless temperament possessed by individuals with psychopathic traits has caused them to be a source of fascination for psychologists, legal theorists, philosophers and laymen alike. Many authors have offered reconciliation for their harmful actions, contending that without the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of their action, individuals with psychopathic traits ought not be held responsible for them. In this thesis, I discuss many of these arguments, examining assertions for a mitigated attribution of both legal and moral responsibility. Additionally, I consider an unexplored aspect within the debate of psychopathy and responsibility: Miranda Fricker's concept of Epistemic Injustice. Using this concept, I contend that the current standard of holding psychopaths criminally responsible reflects pervasive patterns of injustice, and that individuals with psychopathic traits are not deserving of being held fully responsible for their criminal wrongdoings.