Humean Scepticism as an Alternative in the Moral Realism and Moral Anti-Realism Debate
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Traditionally, the realism and anti-realism debate within metaphysics has been restricted to a dichotomy between realism and anti-realism. This dichotomy trickles down to more specific areas within the debate. One of these areas effected by the traditional realism and anti-realism dichotomy is moral realism and moral anti-realism. This thesis focuses on moral realism and moral anti-realism, and shows that restricting the debate to only moral realism and moral anti-realism is a false dichotomy. It does this through providing an alternative option to the two traditionally given: Humean Scepticism. The goal of this thesis is to argue that Humean Scepticism is a viable third option in the moral realism and moral anti-realism debate. This thesis demonstrates that scepticism should sometimes be taken seriously and acknowledged in some debates that it has traditionally been excluded from.
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Copyright © 2018 the author(s). Theses may be used for non-commercial research, educational, or related academic purposes only. Such uses include personal study, research, scholarship, and teaching. Theses may only be shared by linking to Carleton University Institutional Repository and no part may be used without proper attribution to the author. No part may be used for commercial purposes directly or indirectly via a for-profit platform; no adaptation or derivative works are permitted without consent from the copyright owner.
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- 2018
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crump-humeanscepticismasanalternativeinthemoral.pdf | 2023-05-05 | Public | Download |