

**Shaping the Youth:  
Aristotle on the Education of Desire and Emotion**

**by**

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fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of**

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## Thesis Abstract

According to Aristotle, a well brought up youth has refined pleasures and desires, including the enjoyment of virtuous actions, and properly trained emotions. I discuss Aristotle's description of how a youth comes to have these characteristics. I argue that a good upbringing produces refined pleasures by providing a conceptual understanding of the fine (*to kalon*), which includes cognitive and appetitive elements, coupled with habituation, which ultimately steers a youth's natural desires towards true honour—the honour that comes from possessing fine character traits. In terms of properly trained emotions, I assert a good upbringing yields good emotional responses by training a youth's ability to perceive situations accurately, educating his beliefs concerning his social circumstances, and shaping a youth's emotional dispositions through habituation. Here I also discuss the restraining role of shame, as an ethical pain at base actions. Additionally, I show two ways friendship can supplement a good upbringing.

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## Introduction

Aristotle offers a unique vision of education, concerned mainly with a youth's character.<sup>1</sup> During the period of education and upbringing, a youth is expected not only to learn reading, writing, and mathematics, but to develop good tastes concerning enjoyments, and good habits concerning emotions as well. The goal of this thesis is to investigate the means Aristotle provides to reach these latter two goals: pleasure refinement and emotional training.

Aristotle says that a youth who has received a good upbringing will enjoy acting virtuously. Youth, according to Aristotle, are enslaved to their desires. Each day they seek to gratify what their appetite for pleasure dictates. Nevertheless, out of this self-indulgent jumble, Aristotle thinks that with proper training a youth can emerge temperate and desiring only to act as correct reason would prescribe. How is this possible?

The emotional characteristics of the youth fare no better in his description, yet these too he says can be trained to encourage the youth to act virtuously. Quick to get angry, over confident, making and breaking friendships on a whim, the emotions of the youth are volatile, making them extremely unreliable and almost unreachable. Yet, again, Aristotle says that the youth's emotions can be so finely tuned that they will feel them at the right times, about the right things, toward the right people, for the right end, and in the right ways.

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<sup>1</sup> I use the male pronoun when referring to an individual youth because Aristotle regrettably seems to argue that females will be excluded from the development of full virtue because of their supposed limited rational capacities (*Politics* 1260a12-30 and cf. Sherman, *Fabric* 162). Females may be involved in education but the goals, I believe, would not be set as high for them as they would males.

Though he sets high goals for upbringing, Aristotle envisions potent means to reach these goals. Laws for him are meant to foster good habits in the youth, since they are formed in the spirit of virtue. The lawgiver is the man of legislative prudence (*phronesis*) who understands which actions promote virtue as well vice. As such, he can prescribe rules of conduct that prohibit base actions of all sorts and thereby encourage the development of virtuous characters in his citizens. The youth are brought up under such laws, which prevent them from performing actions that would gratify their base desires and inflame their extreme emotions. In this way, laws are a positive influence on the youth's characters, promoting good habits in regards to their passions.

Aristotle expects the educator of the youth too, whether a father or a formal guide, to understand the spirit of the laws and the means to develop a virtuous character. The educator would then use such knowledge to guide those entrusted to his care in virtuous behaviour of all sorts. He would guide them to abstain from bodily pleasures to the right extent and gratify the same pleasures in the appropriate ways. Likewise, the educator would encourage his learners to enter fearsome situations that they could handle, resisting the fear that they might feel, and to avoid those situations that are beyond their ability, in spite of their overconfidence.

Through the combination of being brought up under good laws and the guidance of a wise educator, Aristotle believes the youth can develop characters that are nearly virtuous. He believes good actions can foster good habits if repeated by a youth with the critical eye required to refine his own actions according to the ideal portrayed by his educator and various other sources. Such habits include not only reliable dispositions to act but to react—to feel emotions appropriately. Furthermore, through this habituation

process a youth would gradually develop a certain understanding of the values of the fine, allowing him to recognize the significance of the virtuous actions about which he is learning. Such recognition, Aristotle believes, means a youth can eventually be motivated to perform virtuous actions, not to gain popularity or wealth, but for their own sake. Though such a youth would not have the thorough understanding of the fine that the fully virtuous person has, he would know enough about this value to love it as well as all the good things that possess this value, thereby desiring and enjoying such things. In other words, the youth has developed refined pleasures, the enjoyment of virtuous actions.

In my thesis, I offer a detailed outline of the means to pleasure refinement and emotional training, as given by Aristotle. My project is unique in that it provides a comprehensive account of all the elements of a good upbringing needed for these goals. In Chapter 1, I discuss Aristotle's conception of pleasure, pain and emotions as well as their relationship to virtue. I thereby identify the eventual goal of a proper upbringing.

In Chapter 2, I discuss the pleasure refinement process Aristotle proposes. My premise here is that the naturally occurring tendencies and virtuous character traits in the youth can be shaped they eventually desire the fine, thereby enjoying virtuous actions in a similar way to the virtuous person. In support of this, first, I look at Aristotle's characterization of the youth to see which desires and aversions can indeed be shaped. Second, I critically examine some important commentaries on this subject in an attempt to determine the extent to which the youth will be motivated by the fine at the end of his upbringing. I discern the cognitive and appetitive elements of this motivation. Here I also conduct a detailed investigation of prudence (*phronesis*), since I believe the youth will possess this intellectual virtue to a very limited degree at this time in their development.

Last, I outline a proposed Aristotelian method of bringing about this motivation by shaping the naturally occurring desires that are characteristic of the youth, especially those concerned with honour and reputation. I trace the cultivation of temperance, a moderation of desire for reputational honours, and finally a desire for the true honours yielded by the fine.

In Chapter 3, I look at how Aristotle says emotions can be trained during upbringing. I look at two main elements needed for emotional training: belief and perceptual judgement training as well as guided habituation. Emotions are aroused by quick judgements of perceived circumstances, which are informed by beliefs about social circumstances formed over time. Thus, a youth must develop an accurate understanding of his social world and his place therein as well as the ability to correctly perceive situations that arouse the various emotions. Furthermore, a youth's emotional dispositions, or habits of being affected, must be trained or shaped through guided habituation. Shame enters the discussion here, since, when properly fostered, shame acts as an ethical pain at base actions, restraining a youth from actions that would promote extreme emotional dispositions. I argue that Aristotle believes a sense of shame, combined with guiding a youth to perform good actions, can shape a youth's emotional dispositions for the better. My discussion here draws on the insights of Chapter 2, since the developing understanding of true honours as well as the fine in a youth provides many good beliefs that will inform his perceptual judgements and thereby help incite his emotions appropriately.

In Chapter 4, I develop a unique idea of the role of friendships based on the pursuit of good pleasure in this overall pleasure refining and emotional training process.

Aristotle says that humans, as political and social animals, are not meant to live without friends, family and fellow citizens at any stage of moral development. Therefore, I propose that youth who are in the early stages of upbringing and are still motivated by their pleasures may take part in supervised group activities that mimic virtuous activities. These enjoyable group activities would cause them to associate pleasure with the activities they are imitating and in this manner accustom them to enjoy actual virtuous activities. Note that my ideas here are speculation since I have not found them explicitly mentioned in Aristotle's works. Furthermore, according to my interpretation of Aristotle's comments on good friendships, if two older youth who are motivated by the fine and find virtuous actions enjoyable form guided pleasure-based friendships around ethical pleasures, such friendships can significantly supplement their overall pleasure refinement process and emotional training. Ethical pleasure-based friendships set up a sort of cycle of friends refining their friendship and being refined in turn.

# **Chapter 1: Pleasure, Pain, Emotion and Virtue**

## **Introduction**

In *I.13* of his *Nicomachean Ethics* (hereafter *NE*), Aristotle argues that the soul of a human contains two parts, a “nonrational” part and a rational part, or the part that has reason (*logos*). The “nonrational” part is the “appetitive and generally desiring part” (1102b31). It is where emotions are found as well as the various desires for pleasure and aversions to pain. However, this part is also able to listen and ultimately be controlled by the rational part. Aristotle believes that one can bring the nonrational part under the control of reason through habitual training. Simply put, by performing similar actions enough times one’s emotions and desires as well as what one finds pleasurable and painful can be shaped, even in ways that promote virtuous action.

This chapter is devoted to understanding the nonrational part of a human as well as its relationship to virtue. Thus, in this chapter I set the foundation for our discussion of pleasure refinement and emotional training. To do so, first I look at Aristotle’s conception of pleasure and pain in the *NE* and second, drawing from the *NE* and the *Rhetoric*, I discuss how this relates to virtue in general as well as each particular virtue. Here I show the direct role pleasure and pain play in virtuous living, in Aristotle’s conception of the virtuous person, and in many of the characterizations of the individual virtues of character. I do this so we might learn the ideal according to which a youth’s pleasures and pains might be sculpted during his upbringing. Third, I outline Aristotle’s conception of emotion as found in the *Rhetoric* and the *NE* and fourth, I discuss the role of each emotion in the virtuous person’s life. Here I reveal three main components to emotion: perceptual judgement informed by beliefs, a distinct pleasure and/or pain, and a

characteristic desire or aversion. This allows for an understanding of what specifically needs to be targeted in the emotional training project I investigate in Chapter 3.

## I Pleasure and Pain

### *Their Conception*

In *X.4* of his *NE*, Aristotle argues that pleasure is “complete” (*teleios*) and completes (*teleioô*) or accompanies (*hepomai*) cognitive activities. In saying that pleasure is complete, Aristotle distinguishes pleasure from a movement and locomotion. A movement is a process and as such takes time to become complete. For example, the movement of building a home is considered incomplete until the home is finished. Likewise, any form of locomotion is incomplete until the destination is reached. Pleasure however is different. We do not speak of pleasure as a process that takes time to reach its fullness or completion. Pleasure is complete at each moment it is experienced (1174a16-19).<sup>2</sup> Thus, it is not a type of movement or locomotion.

Aristotle’s discussion of how pleasure accompanies (*hepomai*) cognitive activities is notoriously difficult to understand. In book *VII*, Aristotle seems to say that pleasure is a complete activity of some sort (1176a1). However, in book *X* Aristotle argues that pleasure, though complete, completes or accompanies any cognitive activity when the person is in “the right condition” and when their cognition is focused on the “best sort of object” (1174b20-1175a6). In this paper, I take up the latter conception. This means that every type of perception—seeing, hearing, tasting, etc.—and every sort of thought has a pleasure that accompanies it. Therefore, there are as many types of pleasures as there are

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<sup>2</sup> I use the Irwin Trans. unless otherwise noted.

types of cognition (1175a27-29).<sup>3</sup> Essentially, pleasure falls into two main categories: pleasures arising from some form of thought, such as reflection (*theoreô*), and pleasures arising from sense perception.<sup>4</sup>

Since activities vary in kind and in goodness, and pleasure completes activities, pleasures therefore vary in kind, goodness and intensity. For every kind of cognitive activity, whether touch, taste, smell, thought, contemplation, reflection, etc., there is a corresponding kind of pleasure (1175a22-29). In addition, since there are base as well as good activities, there are also base or good pleasures. The baseness or goodness of the activity determines the baseness or goodness of the pleasure (1175b25-30). Furthermore, the most intense or most enjoyable pleasures occur when one's cognitive capacity is in good condition and when the object of cognition "is the finest in the domain of that sense", because this is when that activity is said to be at its best (1174b15-17). Examples would include seeing a beautiful work of art with 20/20 vision or contemplating the virtuous action of a friend while being fully virtuous and therefore fully able to understand and appreciate the act.

I will attempt to incorporate this discussion of the goodness of pleasures with Aristotle's earlier discussion of pleasure in book *VII*. In *VII.12* Aristotle distinguishes between illusory, coincidental and unqualified pleasures, revealing further how pleasures

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<sup>3</sup> One important thing to note is that pleasure and pain are not just sensations. Perhaps it is best to think of them as Lawrence has proposed: as "enjoyments/disenjoyments" (261).

<sup>4</sup> Bostock shows that the main categories of activities are either perceiving or thinking with some exceptions (254-255). The important exceptions are the "processes" of living, performing virtuous actions, building, and writing. However, Bostock argues it is the thoughts or perceptions that accompany these processes that are pleasant and not the processes themselves (271). Likewise, this is true of any of the coincidental pleasures, a distinction I explain below.

can vary in goodness and baseness. Illusory pleasures are not actually pleasures but only appear so (1152b32-34). They come from activities undergone during sickness in order to restore one back to health. As such, they are not pleasant and actually involve pain.

Aristotle distinguishes pleasure further into what he calls coincidental and unqualified (*haplôs*) pleasures. This distinction comes from the same one present in what is good for humans. Something may be good coincidentally, meaning good for a particular person in their particular circumstances, or good without qualification (*haplôs*). Activities done to restore a person to their natural state, or a happy and therefore healthy and virtuous state (Broadie 400 and Cooper 635), are not good in an unqualified way. They are, rather, good for that particular person in their particular circumstances, trying to “restore” themselves. Aristotle identifies the pleasures that come from these kinds of activities coincidental or neutral ones (1152b35-6 and Broadie, Philosophical Introduction 20).

These include pleasures of the appetites and of the body. They have contrary pains and are capable of being enjoyed to excess (1153a1 and 1154a14-16). This means that these types of pleasures are relative: what one finds pleasant in this way, another may not (1176a10-15). Things that are good in an unqualified way are absolutely good: they are truly good for a human in an adult, healthy, virtuous state (Broadie 400). Unqualified pleasures come from activities of this sort.<sup>5</sup> I focus on the pleasures of performing virtuous activities but these pleasures also include those of study and contemplation of good things in general (1176a27-30 and 1153a1-2). Furthermore, unqualified pleasures do not have a contrary pain and do not involve appetite. We can also refer to unqualified

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<sup>5</sup> See the “Eudemian Ethics.” J. Solomon Trans. Aristotle states, “the same things are at once absolutely good and absolutely pleasant” (1235b31-2).

pleasures as ethical pleasures, since they encourage ethical activity (Broadie, *Philosophical Introduction* 20).

By combining what Aristotle says about the varying intensity of pleasures with this coincidental-unqualified distinction, I interpret Aristotle as saying that unqualified pleasures can be felt in various degrees (cf. Sherman, *Fabric* 186-188). At one extreme, the virtuous person feels them fully since there is nothing to inhibit his pleasure, such as a lack of the full understanding of what makes these pleasures good. He is therefore the measure of unqualified pleasure: what he finds pleasant is truly pleasant (1176a16-19).<sup>6</sup> However, at the other extreme, the youth who is undergoing a proper upbringing meant to start refining his pleasures may feel an inkling of unqualified pleasure when he attempts to perform an action in accord with virtue.<sup>7</sup>

To sum up, according to Aristotle's conception of pleasure in the *NE*, pleasures are complete and they complete or accompany cognitive activities, such as perception and the various forms of thought.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, the type of pleasure corresponds to the type of activity it is completing. If one is enjoying a piece of music then one is feeling

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<sup>6</sup> Also, see the *Politics*. Here Aristotle states, "the sound man is the sort of man for whom things absolutely good are good, on account of his own virtue" (1332a22-23).

<sup>7</sup> As Burnyeat says, "the young who have been well brought up ... have acquired a taste for pleasures—namely, the pleasures of noble and just actions—which others have no inkling of" (79). Cf. *NE* 1179b15-16.

<sup>8</sup> For a discussion of whether this is Aristotle's main conception of pleasure see Dow (60-71). Dow argues that Aristotle's conception of pleasure in the *NE* applies to the relationship between pleasure and pain and activities. Aristotle therefore meant to show here how pleasure and pain relate to *eudaimonia* and the life of the virtuous person. However, he asserts that Aristotle's conception of pleasure in the *Rhetoric* is his broader conception that covers all other aspects of pleasure and pain. I discuss Dow's interpretation in more detail in Section III. I do not look at the conception in the *Rhetoric* here because we are concerned with how pleasure and pain relates to virtuous actions and the virtuous life, which, as Dow states, can be determined from looking at the *NE*.

auditory pleasure. If one is enjoying performing a virtuous activity then one is feeling the pleasure of performing virtuous activities. Lastly, pleasures vary in goodness, corresponding to the goodness of the activity they complete. This gives rise to a distinction between coincidental and unqualified, or ethical, pleasures. The former are good relative to an individual in his specific circumstances while the latter are absolutely good for humans. My interpretation of ethical pleasures is that they can be felt in degrees.

## **II The Relationship of Pleasure and Pain to Virtue**

Having discussed Aristotle's conception of pleasure and pain in the *NE*, we are now in a position to look at the relationship of pleasure and pain to virtue. It is my goal to begin to see how the virtuous person feels pleasure so that we might know the ideal an educator would work towards in terms of refining the pleasures and pains of the youth. We will see that the virtuous person has moderated and directed his coincidental pleasures. Furthermore, he takes pleasure in acting virtuously—he experiences ethical pleasures—and is pained by base actions. The educator will consider these two goals in training a youth. In fact, I will argue in Chapter 2 that these two goals will be brought about by the end of a good upbringing to a limited extent. Beyond this, I look at each virtue of character mentioned in the *Eudemian Ethics* (hereafter *EE*) and the *NE* to see how they relate to pleasure and pain. I do this so that we might specifically see which pleasures and pains need to be moderated and directed in the youth in order for them to begin to develop the necessary virtuous dispositions. I show that pleasure and pain are a direct part of temperance and endurance as well as the emotional dispositions of mildness, bravery and proper indignation. Pleasure and pain do not play such a direct role

in the other virtues but only relate to them in that the virtuous person should generally feel ethical pleasure at performing them.

Before I begin, I must first discuss what it means to have a virtuous character. Aristotle argues that the virtuous person possesses the various virtuous dispositions (*hexeis*) of character and is therefore said to have a virtuous character (*EE* 1106a16-24).<sup>9</sup> The virtuous dispositions are the means between the various deficiencies and excesses in emotions and desires (1107a1-4). For example, a person with courage or bravery is predisposed to feel the mean between cowardice (too much fear) and rashness/boldness (too little fear) and likewise a temperate person desires bodily pleasure in an intermediate way between self-indulgence, or intemperance, and a deficiency in desire. There are also virtuous dispositions to act. Generosity, the disposition to give to the right people, the right amounts, at the right times, etc., is an example of this type (1120a25-26).

Aristotle describes the relationship between pleasure and pain and the virtuous dispositions in both the *EE* and the *NE* and here I attempt to reconcile these accounts. In the *EE* Aristotle says, “it is on account of pleasures and pains that we call men bad, for pursuing them or avoiding them as they should not, or those they should not” (*Woods Trans.* 1222a1-3). In the *NE*, following his discussion of how habituation can produce a virtuous disposition, Aristotle says, “we must take someone’s pleasure or pain following his actions to be a sign of his state [or disposition]” (1104b5-6). These passages illustrate two senses in which pleasure relates to virtue.

From the *EE* passage we see that in one sense Aristotle asserts that there is a practical relationship between pleasure and pain and virtue: because pleasure and pain

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<sup>9</sup> I use the J. Solomon Trans. unless otherwise noted.

influence actions, the virtuous person has learned to moderate and direct his coincidental pleasures in the right ways. Coincidental pleasure and pains affect decisions in terms of which course of action one will take (cf. *NE* 1172a22-3). For example, one's desire for food influences one to eat. One's aversion to heights prevents one from mountain climbing. Moreover, if one enjoys an activity, one is more likely to perform it (*NE* 1175a30-b3). Activities determine dispositions of character. Thus, pleasure and pain have tremendous power to influence one to develop good or bad dispositions. It is very important then for one to direct and moderate one's desires for coincidental pleasures. One should take pleasure in neutral activities in the right ways and to the right amount. It is not bad to gratify one's needs for coincidental pleasures, that is only human, but one must do so moderately so one's desires for them are kept under control.

In another sense, in the *NE* passage Aristotle states that the correct approach to pleasure and pain also characterizes the virtuous person. He has come to take pleasure in performing virtuous actions and be pained by base ones. In the *NE*, Aristotle states that one can only be said to possess a virtuous disposition when one takes pleasure in performing virtuous actions (1104b5-9). This is the unqualified, ethical pleasure I discussed earlier (and which I discuss in detail in chapter 2).<sup>10</sup> For now I will add that this means one has recognized the intrinsic value of virtuous actions and has chosen to do them for this reason, regardless of whether any external end is achieved such as victory in the case of bravery or health in the case of temperance (Sherman, *Fabric* 176). For example, the temperate person enjoys acting temperately (1104b6-7). Likewise, the generous person is not pained by giving money to someone who asks but rather enjoys

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<sup>10</sup> For a different interpretation see Curzer (especially 150-154).

giving, only feeling pain when “his spending deviates from what is fine and right” (1121a1-2). That a person takes pleasure in virtuous actions is an indication that he is virtuous. There is, therefore, a pleasure refining process that must occur in an individual’s life in order for him to develop a virtuous character. This process begins in a youth’s upbringing, for a youth too will come to have these pleasures to a limited extent. How such ethical pleasures are refined in a youth will be the focus of Chapter 2.

Beyond these two senses, the *EE* and *NE* are difficult to reconcile in terms of how much more significance Aristotle attaches to the relationship of pleasure and pain and the virtuous dispositions. In the *EE II.4*, he says, “every virtue of character has to do with pleasures and pains” (1221b38-9).<sup>11</sup> Does Aristotle therefore characterize each virtuous disposition by a unique pleasure or pain, making pleasure and pain central to his definition of each virtuous disposition? If we read the *EE* alone, we might come to this conclusion.

Before I look at Aristotle’s possible argument for this strong conclusion, I must distinguish between emotions (*pathê*), capacities (*dunamis*), and dispositions (*hexeis*), as Aristotle discusses them in the *EE*. Aristotle states that in the nonrational part of the soul there are capacities and dispositions of feelings or emotions (II.2). Emotions are defined as “anger, fear, shame, desire—in general anything which, as such, gives rise to perceptual pleasure and pain” (1220b12-15). It is difficult to understand exactly what Aristotle means by capacities but they seem to be defined as the ways in which one naturally lacks control over emotions, or the way one has a tendency to feel certain emotions based on one’s nature. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the

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<sup>11</sup> Woods Trans.

examples of capacities Aristotle lists are those that cause one to be called “irascible, insensible, amorous, bashful, shameless” (1220b16-18). But, in *II.5* of the *NE*, Aristotle defines capacities as given by nature and as those things which make us capable of experiencing emotions (1109a13-15). A capacity then, by the *EE*’s definition, means being prone to extreme ways of feeling emotions, but by the *NE*’s definition, it means simply the natural capacity or ability to feel an emotion.

Dispositions, (*hexeis*, also translated habits), are those ways in which we have “taken control” of the emotions so to speak, for good or bad. They are the ways a person experiences emotions due to the results of habitual practice concerning these emotions. These are the virtuous dispositions or vices: “bravery, temperance, cowardice or intemperance” (1220b19-20). This lines up with Aristotle’s characterization of dispositions in the *NE II.5* and *II.6* where he equates dispositions with the virtuous dispositions.<sup>12</sup>

From this understanding of emotions, capacities, and dispositions, it seems as if in the *EE* Aristotle argues for the centrality of pleasure and pain in defining each of the virtuous dispositions. Aristotle labels each item on the table of means, excesses and deficiencies in *II.3*, “states of emotions.” Furthermore, in *II.4* he says, “capacities and dispositions are defined by the emotions, and emotions are differentiated by pleasure and pain; so it follows ... that every virtue of character has to do with pleasures and pains” (1221b36-39). That Aristotle differentiates emotions by various pleasures and pains is something we will see in my discussion of the conception of emotion below. Aristotle

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<sup>12</sup> Whether Aristotle is evolving in his thought from the *EE* to the *NE* in his characterization of capacities and affections does not matter here. What I have presented is how I will understand these terms throughout my paper.

partially defines each emotion by the type of pleasure and/or pain that completes it, along with the perceptual judgement that gives rise to it. However, here it seems Aristotle defines each virtue according to a pleasure and/or pain. This seems too extreme since on the surface most of the virtues do not involve a specific emotion, pleasure or pain. Therefore, next I look at each virtue to see what Aristotle means.

### ***The Individual Virtues***

Looking at the list of virtues in the *EE*, for some virtues it is easy to see how pleasure and pain characterize them. The virtue of temperance is concerned with how one reacts to situations that would arouse bodily desires. Temperance is a very important virtue of the nonrational part of the soul since it concerns the desires for pleasures of the body, the appetites of touch and taste,<sup>13</sup> which people naturally desire in excess. A person certainly cannot be called virtuous if they are intemperate, since excessive appetites cloud their judgment, making correct reasoning about good goals and actions impossible (1140b17-21). One is intemperate if one takes pleasures of the body to excess either in enjoying things that one should not or overly indulging in things that all enjoy (1118b25-7). With regard to pains, a person goes to excess, not in withstanding pain, but in being pained to excess when deprived of pleasant things (1118b31-2). The deficiency associated with bodily desire is nameless since it seldom occurs. It entails not desiring bodily pleasures. When one is temperate, however, one does not feel intense pleasure at bodily pleasures of the necessary or neutral kind (those that are required for health and fitness), and one takes no pleasure in things that are wrong to enjoy (1119a17-9).

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<sup>13</sup> Note, the pleasure does not come from the bodily act, say of eating, but from the perception of one's desire being satisfied (Bostock 269).

Furthermore, the temperate person feels no pain when he refrains from something pleasant or when something enjoyable is not immediately present (1118b33-4). Thus, bodily pleasure and pain does characterize temperance and therefore a refinement of these pleasures and pains is significant for fostering this virtue. The same can be said of the virtue of endurance (*karteria*). Aristotle characterizes this virtue by referring to specific pains. Furthermore, a refinement of what one is pained by and what pains one will endure will be important since endurance is defined as a disposition whereby one withstands the right pains.<sup>14</sup>

We can understand the virtues involving emotions too to include pleasure and pain as part of their defining characteristics. I discuss emotion in more detail in section III and IV but I provide a brief discussion now so we can see how this works. Each emotion entails a feeling of pleasure and/or pain and therefore the disposition corresponding to that emotion directly involves pleasure and/or pain. For example, gentleness is a mean disposition between being prone to feel too much anger and too little. Aristotle defines anger as pain at a perceived slight as well as the desire for revenge (*Rhetoric* 1378a30-32). Thus, as the correct disposition related to anger, gentleness would entail feeling the right amount of pain: that is, towards the right people, at the right times, and on the right occasions. It would also entail the right amount of desire for revenge, i.e. towards the right people, at the right times, and on the right occasions (*EE* 1221a14-18). The same can be said of the other virtues that are mean dispositions between excesses and deficiencies of emotions: bravery, modesty (shame), and righteous indignation. Greatness

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<sup>14</sup> Aristotle does not say this explicitly but it can be inferred from the fact that softness, the deficiency of this virtue, entails withstanding no pain at all while imperviousness, the excess, entails withstanding all pains (1220a29-31).

of spirit (*megalopsuchia*) too may involve something like an emotion. This is difficult to understand since there is no emotion found in the *Rhetoric*, *EE*, or *NE* that would correspond with it, yet we might think of it as involving a feeling of some sort. However, Aristotle's definition of greatness of spirit involves only thought and understanding. That is, the understanding of one's status in society. So, it is hard to say how pleasure and pain would complete this virtue. In sum, pleasure and pain characterize, at least in part, the virtues that involve emotions. It is therefore necessary to moderate and direct the pleasures and/or pains that characterize emotions if one hopes to develop the corresponding virtuous dispositions.

It does however get more difficult to see how the remaining virtues could directly involve pleasure and pain. Generally, the virtues that are left have to do with action rather than affection (1221a15-38). As defined in the *EE*, justice entails gaining the right amount of external goods (especially wealth and honour) for oneself: neither more, nor less, than one deserves. Liberality means saving and spending according to one's means. Truthfulness has to do with how one represents oneself in speech, not bending the truth to make one out to be better than one is and not too little to belittle oneself. Friendliness has to do with how one praises another person; it is the mean between praising too much or too little. Dignity entails not helping others too much or too little. Magnificence is like liberality but entails spending and saving large amounts of money. Lastly, "practical wisdom" (*phronesis*) seeks advantage from the right, or appropriate, sources in the right ways, according to one's status in society. This seems to be a simple treatment of the complex intellectual virtue of *phronesis* discussed in the *NE VI.5-13*. Since all of these virtues involve actions, they seem to be in a different class of virtues from those that

involve emotions. If I am correct, pleasure and/or pain do not define the virtues of action as it would the virtues involving emotions. Pleasure and/or pain only relates to these virtues in that one should enjoy performing the actions corresponding to them. I argue that we should not therefore take pleasure and pain to be central to the definition of all of the virtues in the *EE*, but rather only to those that involve emotions or desires.

This reading agrees with how Aristotle describes the relationship between pleasure and pain and the virtuous dispositions in the *NE*. Here Aristotle specifies the distinction between virtues involving actions and those involving emotions or desire. In *II.3*, Aristotle says that the virtues have to do with actions and emotions (1104b14-15 and cf. 1106b16-24). Some virtues involve avoiding excesses and deficiencies in emotions—“having these emotions at the right times, about the right things, toward the right people, for the right end, and in the right way”—and others have to do with avoiding excesses and deficiencies in actions (1106b21-24). We should note that there are less virtues mentioned in the *NE* as well. The virtues involving emotions and desires are bravery, temperance, mildness (gentleness), proper indignation (mean between envy and spite), and the virtue involving small honours (mean between desiring small honours to excess and deficiency (1225b9-10)). Beyond these, it is difficult to tell whether magnanimity (the proper attitude towards great honours) involves affection. One might argue that this virtue concerns the correct desire for great honours. However, magnanimity also seems more like a general state of being—i.e. one’s overall state when one is fully virtuous. Those virtues involving actions are generosity (mean between giving and saving small amounts of money), magnificence (mean between giving and saving large amounts of money), truthfulness, wit (mean between seeking to make others laugh and enjoy

themselves to excess or not at all), friendliness and justice (mean concerning distributing good things and bad to oneself and others (1134a1-4)). Thus, bravery, temperance, mildness, the virtue concerning small honours, and possibly magnanimity directly involve pleasure and pain, whereas the virtues of actions involve pleasure and pain in the more general way discussed above. Since Aristotle makes the distinction in the *NE* between virtues of character concerning affection and action this might explain why he takes the less extreme stance in saying that the each virtue “implies pleasure or pain” (1104b15).

In sum then, pleasure and pain are significant to the virtuous dispositions in three ways. Practically speaking, since humans naturally pursue what is pleasant and avoid what is painful it is extremely important that one learns to take pleasure and be pained in the right ways and to the right extent. Furthermore, Aristotle characterizes the virtuous person as taking unqualified, or ethical, pleasure in any action that would invoke a virtuous disposition. Lastly, the virtues that involve affection directly involve pleasure and pain, while the others involve it only in the general way of enjoying performing the corresponding actions. In Chapter 2, I will use this outline to see how such pleasures and pains are refined during a youth’s upbringing.

### **III Emotion**

To understand Aristotle’s conception of emotions I look largely to his *Rhetoric*, which contains the most information out of any of his works on emotions. We should note that the purpose of the *Rhetoric* is different in nature from that of his ethical writings. Aristotle wrote the *Rhetoric* to teach politicians and jurors how they might persuade others with their speeches. He understood the effect emotions can have on

judgments and therefore includes a thorough discussion of each emotion so that the speaker can understand how to arouse them in his audience to his advantage (1377b31-1378a28). However, I do not believe that the purpose of the *Rhetoric* should make us think less of it in terms of applying it to Aristotle's ethical writings.<sup>15</sup> After all, if Aristotle did not believe that his conception of emotion was accurate, he would not have taught it, since an inaccurate conception would not be effective in oratory. Furthermore, if one can understand how to control emotional responses in others by learning what causes them and what effects they have on judgment, it seems that one could apply this information to oneself, learning how to train one's emotions for the better. What is more, as we will see, his arguments about the emotions in the *Rhetoric* line up well with his arguments in his ethical writings. So, it seems we can trust the account in the *Rhetoric* as Aristotle's own conception of emotion. However, what we must keep in mind is that it will take careful interpretation to apply this conception to his conception of a virtuous character since this is not the focus of the *Rhetoric*.

### ***Their Context***

We must also keep in mind that Ancient Greeks conceived of emotions differently from contemporary Western society. As Konstan argues in *The Emotions of the Ancient*

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<sup>15</sup> Konstan too thinks that Aristotle's account is reliable, using the *Rhetoric* as his main source for Aristotle's conception of emotion in determining how the Ancient Greeks characterized their emotions. He argues that the type of environment where Aristotle's teachings would be used "were seen as exhibiting intensified scenarios of the way emotions operated in Greek life generally" (27). Thus, the courtroom and the assembly offered places for Aristotle to observe the emotions and come to his conclusions about them. In a related quote, "if Aristotle subsumes emotion under rhetoric, then, it is in part because their effect on judgement was for him a primary feature of emotions in the daily negotiation of social roles" (34). Jamie Dow also argues that Aristotle's account of emotions offers Aristotle's own genuine theory of emotions (see especially 47-48).

*Greeks*, Aristotle views the emotions as reactions to events that could affect one's social standing (39). The society of Ancient Greece was very competitive, making reputation as well as social status very significant (259). As a result, one had a continual concern for others' opinions and actions (31), for one viewed people as interdependent rather than independent. Therefore, people's emotions were attuned to a desire for good social status as well as the knowledge of their own vulnerability to insult and injury (259). For example, as we shall see, Aristotle defines anger as a pain at a personal slight by a person of equal or lesser status accompanied by a desire for revenge (1378a30-32). The slight meant that one was treated as if one was of no importance by an equal or an inferior and as a result one desires to make the other person feel the same, to even the score so to speak. Aristotle believes that the other emotions too are triggered by circumstances that had implications for reputation, social status, or personal safety.

### ***Their Conception***

Aristotle defines emotion as "all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgments, and are also attended by pain or pleasure" (1378a20-21). We will see that there are three main elements to emotions: the perceptual judgement that gives rise to them, the pleasure and/or pain that characterizes them and the effect the emotion has on further actions because of some desire or aversion the emotion brings about.<sup>16</sup> First, I discuss the pleasure and/or pain of emotions.

### **Pleasure and/or pain**

Emotions are distinguished and defined (at least partly) by a certain pleasure and/or pain. We have already seen that Aristotle says emotions "are attended by pain or

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<sup>16</sup> See Gottlieb (285).

pleasure.” Aristotle defines emotions similarly in the *NE* as “generally feelings attended by pleasure or pain” (Rowe Translation 1105b21-23). This definition also agrees with the *EE*, in which Aristotle refers to emotions as “in general, all that is usually followed of itself by sensuous pleasure or pain” (1220b11-14). So, pleasure and pain make up an important part of Aristotle’s conception of emotion.<sup>17</sup> Since there are as many types of pleasure as there are types of cognition (Section I), each emotion will have a specific type of pleasure or pain that accompanies it. Therefore, Aristotle shows that the type of pleasure and/or pain that completes an emotion can also distinguish it from others (*EE* 1221b36-7).

### **Pursuit or avoidance**

The result of the emotion will generally be a pursuit, because of some desire, or avoidance, because of some pain. These desires, or aversions, can significantly affect the agent’s actions because they influence his further judgements about how to act towards the person who has caused the emotion (Konstan 37). As Aristotle says, in *I.2* of the *Rhetoric*, “our judgments when we are pleased and friendly are not the same as when we are pained and hostile” (1356a14-15). People pursue pleasant things and avoid painful ones. Thus, in general, pain felt during an emotion would make one averse to the object of the emotion in some way while pleasure would make one pursue the object.<sup>18</sup> As we shall see, for many of the emotions this idea is clear. Fear, for example, involves pain at

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<sup>17</sup> Leighton argues for this as well, stating that “the pleasure or pain is part of the conception of the emotion; neither is separable from the emotion” (17).

<sup>18</sup> Leighton discusses the affect pleasure and pain will have on one’s judgments about the object of the emotion. However, I find his discussion is too general at times. He says that a pleasant emotion will cause one to focus on the matter while a painful one will cause one to avoid the matter. It is necessary to look at the emotions more specifically in order to make sense of this.

the expectance of some evil near at hand; say the wrath of an angry rival. Thus, this pain would make one avoid the object of fear. However, for other emotions the effect of pleasure or pain is more nuanced. Anger is provides a good example. Defined as a desire for revenge due to the pain of a perceived slight, we might say that the pain felt from the slight will make one averse to the person who was responsible for the slight. However, the desire for revenge will make one attentive to the person, but in such a way that one might slight him so as to even the score so to speak. So, the desires and aversions of each emotion will influence one's decisions and actions involving the object of the emotion.

In his ethical writings, it is important to note Aristotle almost exclusively focuses on pleasure, pain, desire and aversion. In other works Aristotle does discuss the fact that there will be a bodily feeling involved with some emotions but this is not his focus in the *Rhetoric* or the *NE* (*On the Soul* 1.1). In the *NE*, Aristotle is concerned only with how the parts of the soul that have reason or can listen to reason contribute to emotion, since these are controllable and are the elements of one's character (I.13). Thus, he focuses on those feelings that listen to reason, and therefore all he attributes to emotions are pleasure and pain when discussing how emotions relate to virtue. We must remember how Aristotle defines pleasure and pain before we puzzle at this apparent reduction. We are not to think of pleasure and pain in purely physical terms, as in those that make us say "ahh" or "ouch." In truth, each pleasure and pain is very distinct. Since each type of pleasure and pain arises from a distinct activity, the pain of anger, for instance, will feel very different from the pain of a stubbed toe. Furthermore, as Konstan argues, this is a result of the understanding of emotion in Classical Greece. In this time each emotion was viewed as a "reaction rather than an inner state" (31). This meant that the information relevant to

understanding an emotion came from the overall social circumstance that gave rise to the emotion. It is here where the emotion's stimuli are found and it is here where the resultant decisions and actions will occur. Hence, pleasure and pain and the corresponding desires and aversions are all Aristotle focuses on in terms of the feelings of the various emotions.

### **Perceptual judgement**

Emotions also have a cognitive element. On one interpretation, they are caused by a judgment or evaluation that leads to a belief about an event involving another person. Konstan and Fortenbaugh both hold this view. I discuss the meaning of perceptual judgement before their view. In the *NE* Aristotle refers to a perceptual discrimination when he discusses judgement (Konstan 37). The idea is that one perceives a situation and comes to a judgement of what is occurring based on the "particulars" or the features of the situation. Such a judgement has a moral dimension since our ideas about good and bad will influence how we perceive a situation (Konstan 45). The highest standard of judgement is understanding (*nous*) in the fully virtuous person, which is an element of prudence (*phronesis*, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2). *Nous* allows for one to perceive accurately the particulars of a situation and to know which particulars are salient for moral considerations (*VI.11* 1143a32-1143b15 and cf. Irwin, *Glossary – Perception* 342).

On Konstan's, as well as Fortenbaugh's, interpretation, perceptual judgement leads to a belief about the scenario, and this belief causes the emotion. As such, a specific belief is part of each emotion's definition. Both Konstan and Fortenbaugh argue, the belief that causes the emotion allows Aristotle to distinguish each emotion. Konstan

states that the judgment that causes the belief involves “an appraisal of social roles (who is or is not fit to offer insult), intentions, and consequences” (43).<sup>19</sup> For example, there is an event: say a person utters a sentence. One judges the motive of the person who uttered the sentence and realizes that it was meant to belittle oneself. Furthermore, one understands that the person is of equal or lesser social status. This evaluation causes anger towards the person. Like anger, a complex evaluation of a social event leading to a belief causes each emotion.<sup>20</sup> Holding that belief is what causes emotion, as Fortenbaugh states, allows Aristotle to make a demonstrative science of emotions. For Aristotle, to know the cause is to know the essence and vice versa (13). Thus, when you have knowledge of the cause of something, you are able to have scientific knowledge of that thing. Furthermore, when you know the efficient cause of an emotion, which essentially is whatever was responsible for something coming to be, you can distinguish between the emotions. Anger then is distinguished from the other emotions by the belief that one has been slighted. This is the efficient cause and therefore the essence of anger.

Jamie Dow, in “Aristotle’s Theory of the Emotions,” argues against this interpretation of Aristotle, defending a theory of emotions as pleasure and/or pains with intentional and representational content. Contrary to Fortenbaugh, Dow argues that emotions, for Aristotle, are really just states of pleasure, pain or both, and that these states are intentional, having an object or ‘target’, and representational, involving “the target

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<sup>19</sup> However, Gottlieb argues that what causes an emotion is a *phantasia*, which he states falls short of a full blow belief (285).

<sup>20</sup> Also see Broadie, *Philosophical Introduction* (56-57). She compares emotion to a deductive argument. Discussing the evaluation that causes anger she says, “this general evaluation functions as a premise from which the particular response follows as a conclusion” (56).

being represented in ways that give ‘grounds’ for the particular emotion experienced” (55 and 48). In other words, emotions are to be thought of as “pain [or pleasure] at X, at X’s being F” (55). So, when one is experiencing fear, say at a strong rival *S*, we would describe the cognitive state of the person as pain at *S*, at *S*’s being a source of harm. Similarly, we might describe shame, say at acting cowardly *C*: pain at *C*, at *C*’s being a source of disgrace. It is always pleasure or pain at an object or target because that object affects one in some way or gives grounds for an emotion. This denies that a certain belief *causes* a non-cognitive pleasure and/or pain and therefore makes up its definition in a causal way, as Fortenbaugh holds. The emotion itself involves a mental phenomenon as well as an appetitive one (72-73). This does not mean that thoughts cannot cause an emotion in certain cases, but such a case would entail one mental state causing another rather than a mental state causing a non-cognitive pleasure and/or pain (59). This is also not to say that a judgement is not involved in an emotion. Each emotion entails that one judges (in terms of a perceptual judgement) that a target is grounds for a pleasure or pain and therefore feels an emotion. The difference between Dow’s view and Fortenbaugh’s or Konstan’s is that the emotion is a painful or pleasurable judgement rather than including a judgement as a causal part of its definition. Thus, pity *is* the painful judgement that another is suffering undeservedly, or anger *is* the painful judgement that another has slighted oneself.<sup>21</sup> Additionally, Dow holds this means it is enough for something to appear a certain way to a person to constitute the object of an emotion (66-

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<sup>21</sup> Leighton argues this as well. One way that each emotion is related to judgment in that each emotion involves change of judgment because that judgment is a constituent of the emotion (6). In his words, “to be moved to emotion A involves making judgments A; to be moved to emotion B involves making judgments B, etc.” (5).

69 and 73). It does not have to actually be the case that a person slighted another, just that the one who feels anger perceived that he was slighted. That it appears one is being slighted by another is enough to constitute grounds (the slight) and a target (the person who apparently did the slighting) for anger, thereby bringing about anger in the one who believed they were slighted. Dow argues then, Aristotle distinguishes each emotion by a specific ground and target.

I am unable to attempt a resolution to this debate, but we can use what we have discussed for our purposes either way. The commonality that I draw from these interpretations is that a specific perceptual judgement brings about each emotion. Whether we adopt Konstan's and Fortenbaugh's view that the perceptual judgement causes the pleasure and/or pain of the emotion or Dow's view that the perceptual judgement is part of the pleasure and/or pain, it is the way one judges an event that is crucial to the arousal of the emotion. As we will see in Chapter 3, the more skilled one gets at judging the particulars of a situation, the more one's emotions will be stirred appropriately. Furthermore, I take it that the beliefs one has, especially regarding one's social circumstances, will inform one's perceptual judgements. Therefore, educating a youth's social beliefs and training a youth's ability to perceive situations accurately are crucial aspects of emotional training. Note that I adopt Dow's terms of target and grounding when discussing the specific emotions since these are helpful terms for designating whom one feels an emotion towards and the circumstances that brought the emotion about.

Before we move on, I want to make some comments concerning the conceptions of emotions we have discussed as compared to our conception of pleasure and pain. I am

not sure that Dow's conception of emotions is compatible with the conception of pleasure and pain we have drawn from the *NE*, as Dow indeed argues. In his words, "the most crucial requirement from Aristotelian passions on a theory of pleasure and pain is that they accommodate pains (and pleasures) where what is found painful or pleasant is an object with certain attributes (e.g. pain at one who suffers undeservedly) or a putative state of affairs (e.g. pain at undeserved suffering)" (60). This we do not find in the *NE*. Rather we find cognitive activities that give rise to pleasures.

To adopt Dow's interpretation we may need to use a more general conception, which he argues is found in the *Rhetoric 1.11*. Aristotle's definition of pleasure and pain here is as follows:

Pleasure is some motion [*kinêsin*] of the soul, a massive and perceptible settling down into its proper nature, and pain the opposite. If that is what pleasure is like, it is evident that what produces the aforementioned condition is pleasant, what destroys it or produces the contrary settling down is painful. (Dow's Translation 62)

Aristotle goes on to say that it is pleasant to (1) come into one's natural state (presumably the same state we discussed above—the healthy and virtuous state), (2) to do something from habit and (3) to do something while not under force. Dow's interpretation of this chapter is that pleasure is representational. He argues that pleasure *is* the perception—the representational state—that one is experiencing during the restoration of one's proper nature, even if one is mistaken in this perception (64-68). This obviously applies to the perception of (1) the restoration of one's proper nature, but Dow argues that it also applies to pleasures coming from habit and unforced action, since "they put us in a condition in which we take ourselves, sometime mistakenly, to be experiencing a restoration of our proper nature" (65). Furthermore, Dow asserts that the representational

state includes the objects or circumstances that are found pleasant: the perception of something in the world that has the features of being pleasant (68-69). Based on this view, Dow argues that sensations, thoughts, beliefs, desires, and perceptions might all constitute pleasures if their occurrences have the feature that their represented contents include the effects of some pleasant object, or the experience of pleasure, and the pleasant object itself (70). Dow calls his view the “features view” as opposed to the “activity view,” which he states, attributes to “Aristotle the view that pleasure is something the soul does ... correlative with believing and perceiving” (70). This “features view” works with Dow’s proposed theory of emotions because it meets his crucial requirement: what is found pleasant or painful is an object or a state of affairs.

To adopt Dow’s theory of emotion we would therefore need to broaden our conception of pleasure and pain. However, Konstan’s and Fortenbaugh’s conception of emotion does fit with the *NE* conception of pleasure and pain. On their reading, a belief or judgement causes the pleasure or pain of a certain emotion to arise. This seems compatible with the *NE* account of pleasure and pain. We could say that the formation of the belief or judgement about an event is the cognitive activity that gives rise to the specific feeling of pleasure or pain that characterizes the emotion. As I have said though, since each theory shares the idea that an emotion is aroused by a perceptual judgement, we can refrain from committing to either interpretation without hindering our progress.

To sum up, emotions are caused by events involving social situations. The focus is on the competitive atmosphere of Greek society where reputation and status are extremely important to the individual. Furthermore, Aristotle specifies three elements to

emotions that help characterize them: a perceptual judgement, a pleasure and/or pain, and a resultant desire or aversion.

## **IV The Relationship of Emotion to Virtue**

Now I look at the relationship of the various emotions to a virtuous person in general as well as to the various dispositions a virtuous person will possess. Drawing from the *Rhetoric* and the *NE*, overall I will show which emotions the virtuous person has, how he feels them, and which emotions he does not have. We will see that there are some emotions the virtuous person should not feel and others that he must feel in certain ways that are conducive to virtuous living. Along the way, I also give an adequate definition of each emotion, as found in the *Rhetoric*. My purpose is to set up a detailed blueprint of the ultimate goal of upbringing in terms of emotional training.<sup>22</sup> The same emotions that the virtuous person feels, with the exception of shame, will need to be trained in the youth. Furthermore, those that the virtuous person does not feel, again with the exception of shame, will need to be trained out of the youth. We will draw heavily from this blueprint in Chapter 3.<sup>23</sup> I begin with shame.

### **Shame and disgrace (*aidôs* and *aiskhunê*)**

Shame is an important emotion for our discussion, for Aristotle describes it in *IV.9* of the *NE* as praiseworthy in the young though not in the virtuous person (cf. 1108a32-33). Since shame is felt when one does base or vicious actions, the virtuous person will not provide the occasion for this emotion. Furthermore, though a virtuous

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<sup>22</sup> Note, for the sake of brevity there are certain emotions that I leave out of my discussion, such as gratitude. I do not include these because I do not see them as significant enough for my discussion of emotional training in Chapter 3.

<sup>23</sup> I discuss the emotions in the same order here as I do in Chapter 3 for ease of reference.

person may feel shame when an act of kindness has been done for him, since he has therefore been put in the position of inferiority, this is undesirable (1124b10-12). However, a disposition of shame, making a youth prone to shame (1108a32-37), is useful in the youth since it can restrain them from performing base actions. If a youth feels shame at performing a base act, this should (hopefully) discourage him from performing a similar act in the future. I will take up these elements of shame in Chapter 3, along with a more detailed discussion of its nature.

Aristotle defines shame as “pain or disturbance in regard to bad things, whether present, past, or future, which seem likely to involve us in discredit” (1183b15-16). Shame involves situations where one is caught doing something that would damage one’s own reputation in any way, or the reputation of those close to oneself, i.e. base actions (1183b18-19). Furthermore, one feels the pain of shame when one has been seen doing anything associated with vice or bestiality, whether displaying cowardice, injustice, licentiousness, greed, etc., by those whose opinions one values or by those who will tell of one’s act to those that matter (1384a27 and 1384b21-23). One would value the opinion of anyone one admires, is equal to oneself, or those lesser than oneself but who consider one to be a role model (1384a27-35 and 1385a5). Aside from shame coming from actions, one also feels shame if one does not share certain “honourable things” such as education, wealth, etc., that others have who are of equal social status (1384a9-16).

I want to note here that shame seems to involve the presence of many complex social and ethical evaluations and subsequent beliefs for a perceptual judgement to bring it about (this will be discussed further in Chapter 3). It requires a knowledge of one’s social standing as well as the standing of those in the presence of whom one would feel

shame. Furthermore, it requires ethical judgments in terms of understanding when one has done something vicious or disgraceful. All these would come to mind when one perceives that one has acted basely in front of another (the perceptual judgement). A large portion of Chapter 3 is devoted to discussing shame's role in training emotions. We will see there that shame is the counterpart to ethical pleasure. Shame is an ethical pain that deters base actions.

### ***The Emotions that Characterize Virtues***

The emotions of anger, fear and confidence are very significant for the virtuous person because they characterize two of the virtuous dispositions he must develop. As such, we will see in Chapter 3 that a training of these emotions during a youth's upbringing is essential. Bringing about the proper disposition of anger leads to the virtue of mildness, while fostering good dispositions of fear and confidence leads to the virtue of bravery. I begin with anger.

### **Anger—mildness (*orgê* and *praotês*)**

Aristotle defines anger as “a desire accompanied by pain, for a conspicuous revenge for a conspicuous slight at the hands of men who have no call to slight oneself or one's friends” (1378a30-32). One feels anger when one makes the perceptual judgement that one has been slighted by another—it is a judgement of intent. Generally, to slight someone means to treat them as if they, or what they desire, are of little importance. This is a cause for anger when the person is not justified to make the slight, meaning they are inferior or equal in social status to the person slighted (1379b11-13). One does not get angry with people who are superior (1380a31-32). Thus, the perceptual judgement that arouses anger is informed by beliefs about social status, including one's own social

standing. In turn, one desires revenge in order to defend one's social status, returning slight for slight. It is interesting that Aristotle defines anger as a pain and a desire. Dow remarks that this expresses Aristotle's view that anger is a pain within the *genus* of desire (52).

The virtuous person has controlled his anger to bring about the disposition of mildness. Mildness is the mean between the excess of irascibility and the deficiency of "inirascibility" (*NE* IV.5). Aristotle describes the mild person, "the person who is angry at the right things and toward the right people, and also in the right way, at the right time, and for the right length of time" (1125b31-33). Anger is a very powerful emotion that can drastically affect how one acts and in turn how people react to oneself. Getting angry at the wrong person or at the wrong time, etc., can have very negative consequences for oneself or others. However, anger is important for the encouragement of keeping one's social status. As Konstan remarks, anger is about social equilibrium. One has been slighted and is belittled. In response, one must avenge the slight so as to restore one's position or esteem (47). In his words, "anger is just the desire to restore the state of affairs prior to the insult by depreciating the offender in return" (55).

Since mildness is present in the virtuous person, it will therefore be incumbent upon the educator to help moderate a youth's anger so that he feels it only when appropriate, in order to develop mildness. It should be noted that this does not mean eradicating anger, as the Stoics for instance would prescribe. The virtuous person, and similarly the well brought up youth, will be encouraged by his anger to defend his honour when slighted, but only when necessary, and he will have self-control in those instances when it is not.

## **Fear and confidence—bravery (*phobos, tharsos and andreia*)**

I will discuss fear and confidence, the opposite of fear, together. Aristotle defines fear, “a pain or disturbance due to imagining some destructive or painful evil in the future” (1382a). The main concentration here is on people who are dangerous to oneself. We feel the pain of fear at those who we perceive are in a position to do us harm and are likely to do so (1382a27-1382b23). For example, we fear those who are more powerful than us and are in a state of anger, or who are known for being unjust. Perception, informed by one’s social beliefs is therefore very much the cause of fear.<sup>24</sup> We perceive a person and we judge that they are stronger than us and are likely to do us harm.<sup>25</sup> Conversely, we do not feel fear when we believe that a person cannot or will not do us harm (1382b31-33). Aristotle defines confidence, “the imaginative expectation of the nearness of what keeps us safe and the absence or remoteness of what is terrible” (1383a16-19). Again, the focus is on people. We feel confident when we have the means to prevent a rival or enemy from harming, when we have no rivals, or our rivals are not nearby. Furthermore, there are two general causes of confidence: inexperience or the means to deal with a problem due to experience (1383a27-32). Those who are inexperienced are confident out of ignorance while those who have experience and know how to meet a situation are confident because of their experience.

The virtuous person will feel fear and confidence in the appropriate ways since these emotions characterize the virtuous disposition of bravery. Aristotle defines the

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<sup>24</sup> As Konstan argues, fear involves “sophisticated social judgments” (132). It takes experience and prudence to understand when another person is in a position to do us harm.

<sup>25</sup> See Konstan (131). He notes that fear, unlike other emotions like anger and hate, does not involve any complex moral judgments though it does have a cognitive element. One realizes that “this is harmful” and experience is needed to understand this (131).

brave person as one who “stands firm against the right things and fears the right things, for the right end, in the right way, at the right time, and is correspondingly confident” (1115b18-19). It is the mean condition between fearlessness (deficiency in fear), cowardice (excess in fear and deficiency in confidence), and rashness (excess in confidence). It is important to feel fear when appropriate because it drastically affects one’s further actions. Aristotle says, “fear sets us thinking what can be done” (1383a7-8). Fear focuses the mind on survival. This is why one must feel it towards “the right things.” The brave person has learned to limit his fear to those things that are irresistibly fearsome—namely those things that would bring about death (1115a25-35). It is important to note, therefore, that the brave person is not fearless. However, the brave person, though he fears death, will stand “intrepid in facing a fine death and the immediate dangers that bring death” (1115a34-5). Furthermore, bravery is not concerned with many circumstances that are commonly thought fearsome, such as fear of a bad reputation, poverty and sickness and especially not fear of committing vicious acts (1115a10-24). In terms of confidence, the brave person will be confident in the right circumstances as well. Aristotle does not describe these in the *NE*, but from the discussion above of the *Rhetoric*, the brave person would feel confident when experience tells him he has the resources to prevail in a dangerous situation. He would not feel confident because of ignorance. This is important since over-confidence or confidence out of ignorance expels the positive effects of fear that we have discussed. Concerning the right end, the brave person acts brave for the fine or to avoid shame (1116a12-13). These then are the elements that will be taken into account in the training of bravery in the youth since they are present in the virtuous person.

Before we move on, I want to note the unique relationship between the ethical pleasure of enjoying bravery and the feelings present in bravery itself. Aristotle says that when acting brave, one will feel pain, but overall the end aimed at is pleasant. To explain his meaning, Aristotle uses the example of a boxer. During his match, the boxer's hard work and the blows he receives from his opponent are painful. However, he perseveres so as to win the crown and glory, since this end is pleasant and worth more than the avoidance of the earlier pains. Likewise, the brave person endures the pain of "death and wounds" for both the fine and the avoidance of shame (1117b8-10). The brave person has therefore trained himself to endure pain and yet find the overall process pleasant because he focuses on the fine consequences.

### ***The Emotions Concerning the Fortune and Misfortune of Others***

There are four emotions involving one's reaction to the fortune and misfortune of others: indignation, envy, emulation and pity. Indignation, envy and emulation are distinct reactions to the prosperity of another, while pity is a reaction to the misfortune of another. We will see that it is important that the virtuous person not feel envy, but feel indignation and emulation appropriately when another receives good fortune. In addition, it is important that the virtuous person feel pity towards the right people. Thus, these emotions must be trained accordingly in the youth.

#### **Indignation (*to nemesan*)<sup>26</sup>**

Aristotle defines indignation, "pain at unmerited good fortune" (1386b10-11). The perceptual judgement that arouses indignation is that of an undeserving person receiving those things that only a good man deserves, including wealth, power, etc.

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<sup>26</sup> I adopt Konstan's translation (112).

(1387a14-16). Beliefs about the appropriateness of goods for certain people would have informed this judgement. Indeed, Aristotle believes that specific goods are appropriate to certain people with certain character traits (1387a28-32). For example, the brave man deserves fine weapons. It would therefore be unjust for a person to gain certain goods that are not appropriate to him (1386b15). Thus, one feels pain when one perceives these being distributed improperly. The virtuous person would be the best judge in such matters and would therefore feel indignation appropriately. Indignation also characterizes the virtue of proper indignation, mentioned in *II.7* of the *NE*. Aristotle defines proper indignation as a mean disposition between the base dispositions of envy and spite. I discuss envy next but for now note that this shows us how important it is for a youth to not respond in extreme ways to the prosperity of others.

### **Envy (*phthonos*)**

Envy is the only completely negative emotions for Aristotle. It is an extreme in regards to one's emotions towards the prosperity of others and therefore should not be felt by a virtuous person or a youth. Envy is defined as pain at the prosperity of others like us or equal to us (1387b21-25). The target of envy is an equal and the ground is the equal's success (Dow 58). One has perceived another gain some good and is therefore pained by this. There are no beliefs that inform this judgement regarding the merit of such goods on the part of the target or whether one needs or deserves them (Konstan 113). One simply believes, mistakenly or not, that the other person is equal to oneself, whether in birth, virtue, age, wealth, etc., and is pained by the fact that they have gained something. Furthermore, envy does not influence any further judgements in positive ways; it does not encourage one to attempt to gain such goods for oneself, as is the case

with emulation (which I discuss below). Also, envy is an extreme in relation to proper indignation because the person is deluded about their status and therefore, as Aristotle says, feels pain “when anyone does well” (1108b5-6). As such, envy is a bad emotion felt by bad people: “small-minded” men and the like (1387b31-35 and 1388a34-35). It is therefore important that an educator train a youth so that he does not feel this emotion.

### **Emulation (*zêlos*)**

Emulation is felt when others, who one believes to be equal with oneself, attain good things, but the grounds, or the reason for one’s emotional response, is the affected person’s lack of these things (1388a30-33 and Dow 58). Emulation is pain at the perceived attainment of goods that one does not possess by equals. One has acquired beliefs about the equality of the other through evaluations over time, and these inform the perceptual judgement that gave rise to the emotion. Aristotle holds that this emotion is felt by good people since it is productive in terms of further judgements and actions. It motivates one to gain similar goods for oneself (1388a34-35). As we will see in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, emulation is an important emotion for the youth to feel since it can encourage virtuous action. I now discuss pity, a reaction to the misfortune of others.

### **Pity (*eleos*)**

Aristotle defines pity as “a feeling of pain at an apparent evil, destructive or painful, which befalls one who does not deserve it, and which we might expect to befall ourselves or some friend of ours, and moreover to befall us soon” (1385b13-16). So, pity, a type of pain, occurs when we perceive another in either a painful or destructive circumstance, such as death, injury, disease, etc., or an “evil due to chance,” such as friendlessness, scarcity of friends, deformity, weakness, etc. (1386a6-12). Essentially,

one feels pity for another who has something happen to them which, if it were to happen to oneself, would cause fear (according to the definition of fear above), and one feels that this evil could realistically happen to oneself. The person pitied must not have somehow brought the evil upon herself (if she did she would deserve the evil), and she cannot be as close as a friend or family (this would bring about fear rather than pity). Aristotle does not explain the effect pity will have upon further judgements but we might speculate that it would make one desire to aid the person in need.

Pity is the appropriate response to another's misfortunes and therefore would be felt by the virtuous person towards the right people for the right reasons. Because of the experience and understanding it requires it would take a great deal of training to bring a proper sense of pity about in a youth, but this seems essential if we are right in stating that it would make one disposed to aid the object of one's pity. If felt for an undeserving person this would not doubt cause the youth to be taken advantage of or even harmed. Furthermore, we must note the extreme disposition of spite, which is related to proper indignation. Spite means that one actually enjoys seeing others suffer misfortune (1108b6-7). This seems to represent an absence of pity. Thus, an educator would be further motivated to instill a good sense of pity in a youth in order to prevent him from the disposition of spite from developing.

## ***Relational Emotions***

### **Love (to *philein*) and friendship (*philia*)**

Aristotle devotes a large portion of the *NE* to explaining the importance of friendship (*philia*) for *eudaimonia*. Indeed, in *IX.9* he explains why the virtuous person needs friends and furthermore the magnanimous man is said to have friends and will even

allow them to “determine his life” (1125a1). It is therefore clear that the virtuous person will have friends and that he will therefore feel love (*to philein*), which is the foundation and common bond of friendship. Here I discuss love and friendship briefly, but in Chapter 4 I discuss it in more detail. For now, we can note that it is very important that a youth becomes good at discerning whom he should love so that he forms good friendships.

Aristotle defines love (*to philein*),<sup>27</sup> “wishing for [a person] what you believe to be good things, not for your own sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring these things about” (1380b36-1381a1). As Aristotle states in the *NE*, wish is for an end (1113a15). Essentially, we wish for what we believe will be a good outcome; that is, what we believe is good for us. Love then is a wish for good ends for another and it is altruistic since one wishes these things without selfish motives. Furthermore, Aristotle defines friendship as a relationship where love is reciprocated (1381a1-2). These definitions of love and friendship correspond to his definitions in the *NE* (1155b31-34). So, in this section of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle is concerned with discussing both the feeling present in friendship as well as friendship itself. Love is aroused when one perceives a lovable quality in another (virtuous dispositions, pleasant qualities, etc.1381a22-b21), or when one perceives that another is disposed to treat one well (e.g.1381a12-16). Beyond this, we feel this love for those who are similar to us in terms of values, virtue, etc., those

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<sup>27</sup> Roberts uses friendly feeling while Konstan uses love (1380b35-6 and Konstan 174). Konstan’s discussion of the proper translation of the words Aristotle uses is helpful here. *Philia*, Konstan argues, should be translated friendship or a reciprocal benevolence or goodwill, while *to philein* is a unilateral form of goodwill for another (172-4). This allows Aristotle to have a term for two distinct notions: friendship and love.

who are friends of friends or have the same enemies as us, and those who we respect because of the virtue they possess.

The perceptual judgement that arouses love largely involves beliefs about the motives and character of the one we feel love towards.<sup>28</sup> If we follow Konstan who argues that we feel love at those who have a certain merit or good intention towards us, we would feel pleasure in love since these are pleasant things (cf. *Rhetoric* 2.11, especially 1371a18-22).<sup>29</sup> This would also mean that one is favourably disposed to the target of love.

### **Hate (*misos*)**

The virtuous person will not only feel love, but hatred as well. Referring to the magnanimous person, Aristotle states, “he must be open in his hatreds” (*NE* 1124b27). The youth too may develop hatred towards people and it is important that he learn to feel it only for deserving people. Aristotle compares hate to anger, since they share similar qualities, and he regards it as the opposite of love. Like anger, hate may be caused by a slight, but, as the opposite of love, it may also be caused by the perception of a vicious character in another (1382a2-4). What distinguishes hate from anger is that it is felt because one takes an individual to be part of a class that one despises, such as the class of thieves or informers (1382a4-6). Hatred comes about when one perceives that one is slighted (if this is part of hate), which entails certain evaluations of motive and social status, and when one perceives another to have a vicious character. Furthermore, one

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<sup>28</sup> Konstan’s discussion supports my generalization. As he states, the focus again is not on the feeling but the “benevolent intent or concern for the well-being of another, which manifests itself in actions,” and this is because Aristotle “typically attends, as we have seen, to the social motives and consequences of the emotions” (177).

<sup>29</sup> For a different interpretation see Dow (53-54)

perceives the person to be of a certain type or class. In this way, one comes to hate a person.

At first glance, it appears that hate does not entail any pain or pleasure (Dow entertains this view 54), but we can infer that it will involve a pleasure that will influence one's decisions and actions towards the object of hate. Aristotle makes it clear that hate is further distinguished from anger in that it does not involve any pain (1382a11). Because the person is judged to be of a certain despicable class, there is a kind of indifference felt towards them since they are thought to have little to no worth. However, it is not a stretch to compare hate to anger in that one would feel pleasure at the thought of harm coming to the person and therefore there would be a desire for such harm (Konstan 192).

To sum up, the virtuous person will not feel envy or shame, while it is good that he feel indignation, emulation, pity, love, and hate, and in the right ways, towards the right people, etc. Knowing this we can say that envy would hinder one's character development during upbringing while emulation, love, hate, pity and indignation, when properly trained, will aid in such development. Shame too, though not felt by the virtuous person, will help in the development of a youth, as we will see in Chapter 3. Note that I have also tried to indicate how each emotion fits into our general conception in order to affirm its accuracy. Having seen these distinctions as well as the definitions of each emotion, we have therefore laid the groundwork for our discussion in Chapter 3 of how these emotions might be trained in a youth.

## **Chapter 2: Pleasure Refinement**

### **Introduction**

In this chapter, I examine the pleasure refinement a youth will undergo as part of a good upbringing. I hope to determine how Aristotle envisions a youth's pleasures can be refined so that he comes to enjoy virtuous actions, the experience of ethical pleasure. Aristotle never gives a detailed description of this process but by bringing his scattered comments together from many of his works, I outline what I think to be a plausible reconstruction. I go through the following steps. First, I look at Aristotle's characterization of the youth, emphasizing their reasoning abilities as well as their natural desires and emotions. Second, I outline the goal of a proper upbringing in regards to pleasure refinement, according to Aristotle. Third, I give a more detailed description of this goal by looking at what commentators have to say on this subject. Here I argue for the importance of developing a conceptual understanding regarding virtuous actions, which includes both cognitive and appetitive elements. I also discuss *phronesis* to see whether the youth possess this intellectual virtue to any extent. Fourth, I offer a plausible reconstruction of the habituation of a youth's natural desires and virtues towards moderation of neutral pleasures (temperance) and enjoyment of ethical pleasures in order to reach the goal of enjoying virtuous actions.<sup>30</sup> My main premise here is that the youth can be steered by their naturally occurring impulses towards desiring true honour—that which comes from doing fine and virtuous actions and acquiring a fine character.

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<sup>30</sup> Note that I draw mostly from the *NE* for any discussion of virtuous dispositions in the chapter. Thus, I do not discuss the virtue of endurance, which is only found in the *EE*.

## I Aristotle's Characterization of the Youth

In this section, I establish the building blocks, so to speak, needed for pleasure refinement. If we are to understand how a youth is to be steered towards unqualified pleasures we need to know what reasoning abilities and desires they are naturally prone to so we might use these to our advantage and know what traits we need to fight against in order to remove or alter them. I begin with the reasoning of the youth. Here I determine the extent to which the youth possess reason in order to help us see whether it is possible that intellectual abilities will play a role in the youth's pleasure refinement. Then I look at the youth's characteristic desires and emotions.

Aristotle is clear in stating that the youth do not possess the ability to deliberate and therefore lack this element of reason, at least until a certain age. Many times Aristotle says that the youth do not possess any deliberative abilities. His strongest statements about this are found in the *EE II.8*. Here he compares the youth to animals in that the actions of both are not guided by reason. Animals, Aristotle holds, have no intervening reason governing their actions. They simply live by desire and compulsion. Equally, the youth do not deliberate before acting but simply obey their desires (1224a15-29). Defining choice as arising out of consideration and deliberation (1226b9), Aristotle therefore states that youth, like animals, do not have the power of choice (cf. *NE* 1240b33). Furthermore, for the majority of their upbringing the youth lack the intellectual virtue prudence (*phronesis*, which will be used for the rest of this paper), meaning they cannot decide or reason out the best course of action (*VI.8*). This is because of their lack of experience as well as their inability to reason out the best course of action.

Since the younger youth lack *phronesis*, this will have an impact on how they must be trained. Aristotle describes *phronesis* as that which “makes us achieve things that promote the end [virtue]” (1144b5-6). The person who possesses *phronesis*, due to his thorough understanding of virtue as well as his knowledge of which actions promote virtue, understands how to act virtuously, no matter what the scenario. This means that the more one has *phronesis* the more one can guide one’s actions so as to habituate oneself well and foster the virtues of character (1144b26-23-28). Since up to a certain age the youth lack both the power to deliberate as well as the experience needed for *phronesis*, it is of no use to begin by teaching the younger youth to reason out their decisions, looking at the pros and cons of an action before acting. Similarly, a youth cannot be expected to guide their own progress towards enjoying virtuous actions or having the right emotional dispositions (I discuss this below).

This is why Aristotle asserts good laws are important. Concerning laws, in *X.9* Aristotle says,

It is difficult, however, for someone to be trained correctly for virtue from his youth if he has not been brought up under correct laws. For the many, especially the young, do not find it pleasant to live in a temperate and resistant way. That is why the laws must prescribe their upbringing and practices; for they will not find these things painful when they get used to them. (1179b32-37)

Aristotle was aware that, since they govern the old and the young alike, laws and customs have the power to shape the practices of a city.<sup>31</sup> In this way, laws have power to form

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<sup>31</sup> See Bodéüs for a good discussion of the need for good laws in habituation. In his words, “in the absence of external regulation neither the many nor the young can undergo the habituation needed to acquire a taste for the good” (54). Laws create an overall “spirit” in a city that corresponds to whatever type of life the laws themselves promote. If the laws promote virtue, this will be the spirit that adult life in the city is organized under and this will translate to the education of the youth.

habits in people (cf. *Politics* 2.8). If laws are made to encourage virtuous actions and prohibit base ones, they will ultimately promote virtuous characters in the citizens (cf. *NE* 1103b1-5). This is why Aristotle says that that lawgivers should “make it their business to have an eye to the virtue and vice of their citizens” (*Politics* 1238a48-50). So, if they youth live in a city with good laws, these will encourage good habits in them.

There is also a need for good educators to train the youth. In *X.9*, Aristotle also says, “education adapted to an individual is actually better than a common education for everyone” (1180b7-8). Here he supports this by stating that individualized treatment, as it does in health matters, allows for treatment that is more suitable. There will be need for individualized guidance from a person who has acquired “legislative science,” or the ability to understand the principles behind the laws, so that he too can promote virtuous characters in the young people he educates. This is why Aristotle states, a youth’s virtue “exists only in relation to the progress of his development towards adulthood, and to whoever is his guide” (*Politics* 1260a30-32). Elsewhere, Aristotle compares the youth to the appetitive part of the soul, which does not have reason in and of itself self but only by “listening to reason as to a father” (*NE* 1103a1-5). The youth need educators to guide them in good habits. This individualized treatment is what I am most interested in and it will be the focus of my discussion.

Though for most of their lives the youth rely on their guides, it is worth asking to what extent youth possess any reasoning abilities as they come closer to the end of their upbringing. Aristotle does not describe the youth as completely lacking reason for he does not seem to completely distinguish adulthood from youth in terms of the abilities of deliberative reasoning and understanding. In other words, I do not think there is evidence

to state that all the way through upbringing the youth will lack the power of choice and will therefore lack any ability to gain (at least to a very small extent) *phronesis*.<sup>32</sup> On my interpretation, Aristotle implies the youth will eventually develop these intellectual abilities if they are receiving a good upbringing. In the *Politics*, Aristotle states that emotion, will and desire are in children from birth, while, “reason and intelligence come into their possession as they grow older” (1334b12-28). Furthermore, Aristotle says a good upbringing involves training in good judgement skills. Through listening to music and learning to perform it, though only to a certain extent since a civilized person should not become a professional (*Politics* 8.6), Aristotle argues that music can create the habit of “right judgement” in the youth (*Politics* 1340a11-17). The idea is that if the youth participate in enough “good” music they will become qualified to judge good music from bad.<sup>33</sup> In this way, Aristotle says that music contributes to *phronesis* (1339a24-25). Therefore, Aristotle clearly believes that the youth do gain reason and intelligence as they grow older and part of an education is meant to train these abilities as well. Moreover, I do not think it a stretch to say that Aristotle holds, at least near the end of a proper upbringing, a youth will have the ability to (to some extent) choose their actions in accord

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<sup>32</sup> See Sherman, *Fabric* (especially 160-161).

<sup>33</sup> Similarly, Bodéüs argues that education in music and art contribute to comprehension (*sunesis*) in the youth (Chapter 5.III). In its highest form, comprehension is an intellectual virtue that judges the results of architectonic prudence—the laws made by lawgivers who should have this type of prudence. Thus, Aristotle applies comprehension to the area of lawgiving, arguing that comprehension is needed in lawgivers in order to judge whether laws were well written or not (*NE* X.9)(Bodéüs 104). Furthermore, Bodéüs says that comprehension is useful at the practical level to know whether a law fits a given situation well (104). Thus, Bodéüs sees music and art preparing the youth for practical comprehension as well as the kind needed for lawgiving. I think that Bodéüs is on to something with his interpretation but since Aristotle states that musical education contributes to *phronesis* and not *sunesis* at 1339a24-25 I think musical education does contribute to the youth’s budding *phronesis* as well as his *sunesis*.

with reason (Sherman 175). Though for a certain period, the youth lack the ability of choice and live exclusively according to their feelings, on this reading we can say that the youth will possess some ability to deliberate and may therefore gain a small amount of *phronesis* during upbringing. I explore this possibility in Section II. Furthermore, as we will see below, in his *Rhetoric* Aristotle ascribes many emotions to the young, including anger, pity, shame, love and hate. As was shown in Chapter 1, emotions have a significant cognitive dimension since they are aroused by perceptual judgements that are informed by many beliefs about one's social circumstances. Simply put, if the youth have emotions they are able to make judgements and form beliefs about their social circumstances. This does not indicate complex judgement skills right away, but the more a youth's emotions are aroused as correct reason would prescribe, the more his ability to judge situations must be improving (on top of his emotional dispositions). Now I look at the desires and emotions of the youth.

Aristotle attributes many characteristic desires and emotions to the youth. As I briefly stated above, Aristotle characterizes the youth as guided by their desires (*EE* 1224a15-29 as well as *NE* IV.9 and VIII.3). The youth pursue what they find pleasing and avoid what they are pained by. Aristotle states that most of all, the youth are influenced by their bodily desires. These would include all bodily pleasures but the preeminent bodily desire of the youth is sexual enjoyment (*Rhetoric* 2.12). As a result, Aristotle compares the youth to the intemperate person who does not obey what correct reason would dictate but rather follows his desire alone (*EE* 1230b-2-6). This means, contrary to what occurs in the incontinent person, there is no war between reason and desire when a decision to act must be made. Up to a certain age, since the youth do not

know what is best and cannot reason out the best course of action, only desire influences their actions. Furthermore, the young have a strong desire for honour and superiority over others (*Rhetoric* 11-13). In light of what I discussed above, I will argue that these characteristics apply to the younger youth. During a good upbringing the youth gradually grow out of these characteristics and, near the end of their upbringing, will start to resemble the virtuous person.

There are also many emotions the youth naturally feel, all to extremes (*Rhetoric* 2.12). The youth easily and quickly feel anger. This is due to their concern for honour. Furthermore, the youth are over confident because of their irascibility and their hopeful nature, which is due to their inexperience of negative events. This means that they do not feel fear easily, since their anger and expectation of good events blocks this emotion. Thus, we might say that the youth are naturally brave, though in an ignorant way. Also, the youth are prone to extremes in love and hate, making friends (because of the pleasure they bring) and enemies very easily. Lastly, the youth easily pity others, whether the pity is deserved or not, and this is because of their trusting and hopeful natures.

I want to make one last remark on individualized education here. Knowing the individual's specific needs and characteristics in terms of their desires and emotions allows the educator to tailor his training to the individual. Generally we can say that not all youth will have the same desire for honour or superiority, the same propensity to be over confident or angry, etc. The educator then, will need to observe his student to see which characteristic emotions are present and which are not. But, more specifically, we can tie this passage to an earlier one in *VI.13* of the *NE*. Here Aristotle states that all of us have certain natural virtues. In his words, "each of us seems to possess his type of

character to some extent by nature; for in fact we are just, brave, prone to temperance, or have another feature, immediately from birth” (1144b4-7). This means that some youth will be more advanced than others in terms of their emotional dispositions. However, Aristotle also says here that this can be dangerous. Since the youth lack any form of *phronesis* for the majority of their youth, these natural virtues can actually be harmful to the youth possessing them or those around him (1144b8-13). Natural virtues need *phronesis* to become helpful, full virtues. Therefore, an educator must be cognizant of the particular natural virtues of the individual under his care, along with all of his other unique characteristics, if he is to properly guide and habituate him.

These are the building blocks an educator has at his disposal, especially when it comes to guiding the youth’s pleasures and pains as well as training their emotions. Since for a time the ability to deliberate is not present in the youth, they will need to be guided to act well, often contrary to their desires. However, as they near the end of their upbringing they will begin to make choices based on their limited experience and reasoning abilities. Ultimately though, it will be pleasure, pain and emotion that must be shaped in the youth. As youth naturally pursue what is pleasant and avoid what is painful, such feelings must be refined so that they find good things pleasant and base things painful. We will see that characteristic impulses can be recruited for this goal. This will be the focus of this chapter. Furthermore, since youth naturally feel certain extreme emotions, these must be moderated to encourage them to act well, which will be the focus of the next chapter.

## II Pleasure Refinement

### 1. The Goal

It will be helpful to see Aristotle's main goals of education for the youth. First, I look at the stages of education he outlines in the *Politics* to get an overview of his proposed educational system. In 7.15 and 7.17 Aristotle suggests that there are four main periods of education: up to age five, age five to seven, age seven to around fourteen or puberty, and age fourteen to twenty-one. Furthermore, he states that education must be holistic, applying to the body as well as both the appetitive and reasoning parts of the soul. As such, bodily education is for the sake of both parts of the soul and the education of a youth's appetites is for the sake of the reasoning part of the soul. Overall, the youth's appetitive part must be brought under control of correct reason, that of his educator or parent, so that it can be controlled by his own reason in adulthood and even near the end of his youth (I discuss this in the next section).<sup>34</sup>

In the first period, the youth engages in play and other activities that will imitate the kinds of activities they will pursue in adulthood. Furthermore, censorship is crucial at this age, as the youth must be kept from the company of slaves, unseemly talk, as well as debased paintings or stories. Aristotle is very vague about what happens in the second period, only stating that at this time the youth "observe lessons in whatever they will be required to learn" (*Politics* 1336b36-37). We might speculate that some mild forms of

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<sup>34</sup> I refer to what I have mentioned in the first section. Again, Aristotle states, "take the child: he is not yet fully developed, so we cannot speak of his virtue as belonging to him in relation to himself; it exists only in relation to the progress of his development towards adulthood, and to whoever is his guide" (*Politics* 1260a30-32). Since the youth lack *phronesis* for most of their upbringing, the educator of a youth supplies the correct reason in order to fill out Aristotle's definition of virtue: "the state involving correct reason" (*NE* 1144b27).

physical education will go on at this time as well as education in reading, writing and drawing (1338a13-22). The last two periods of education appear to be the main periods. Aristotle is explicit about the bodily exercise that occurs in these: from age seven to fourteen exercise should be mild and from age seventeen to twenty-one physical training should be strenuous (1338b47-51). The period in between is devoted to “learning other things” but we might speculate that mild exercise would continue in this period (1338b40-41). So, it seems the main period of education directed at both parts of the soul will be the third period as well as from age fourteen to seventeen in the fourth period. It is this main period of education that I focus on.

The goal of education is to foster habits (*ethoi*) that will encourage the development of full virtue (a virtuous character and full *phronesis*) in adult life, which allow the youth to learn the “relevant first principles” or *the beginnings*.<sup>35</sup> In *I.4* of the *NE*, Aristotle states,

In order to listen appropriately to discussion about what is fine and just, i.e. about the objects of political expertise in general, we must have been well brought up. For the starting point is *that* it is so, and if this were sufficiently clear to us—well, in that case there will be no need to know in addition *why*. But such a person either has the relevant first principles [or beginnings in the Irwin Trans], or might easily grasp them (Rowe Trans. 1095b4-9).

I interpret this passage to state that a proper upbringing yields the starting point of “that it is so”—what Burnyeat calls “the that,” which is needed to have *the beginnings* or relevant first principles (hereafter *the beginnings*). Aristotle does not state what *the beginnings* are here but it is likely that they are accepted moral beliefs needed to benefit

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<sup>35</sup> Essentially, this means bringing the natural character of the youth—all the natural virtues, emotions, desires, etc.—under the control of correct reason, thereby creating a better character in the youth that can be made fully virtuous as they develop *phronesis*.

from teaching on political and ethical matters (Irwin *Notes*, 176).<sup>36</sup> What we learn here in *I.4* is that a good upbringing is needed if one is to have *the beginnings*. A good upbringing yields refined pleasures and well-trained emotions. Without these qualities, one cannot listen to correct reason and come to have correct moral beliefs. With these, one can easily acquire such beliefs (if one does not have them already). In order to prove that Aristotle is referring to the well brought up youth here I must briefly discuss Aristotle's intended audience for his lectures. It is possible that the person who has *the beginnings* is a potential lawgiver rather than a well brought up youth.

I agree with Bodéüs who in *The Political Dimensions of Aristotle's Ethics* argues that the audience of Aristotle's lectures is made up of those who will partake in legislative science, that is lawmaking.<sup>37</sup> If he is right about this, Aristotle's audience

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<sup>36</sup> Irwin seems to interpret "the that" as equivalent to *the beginnings*. I interpret "the that," along with Burnyeat, as a love for the fine. On this interpretation, "the that" is not equivalent with *the beginnings* since such a love is not easily acquired. Rather, it is one outcome of a good upbringing. Furthermore, a love of the fine is a necessary element to having *the beginnings*. However, if "the that" is equivalent to *the beginnings*, this is only a terminological problem since, as we will see below, it is clear that a love of the fine is a necessary quality for having *the beginnings* that is developed during a good upbringing. This chapter discusses this love of the fine—the enjoyment of virtuous actions because they are fine.

<sup>37</sup> Bodéüs argues that Aristotle's audience would consist of those who are potential lawgivers. Such people are "essentially virtuous," and "persons of proven morality and political experience, as those must be whom he wishes to prepare for the role of lawgiver" (4-5). A large amount of his textual support for this claim comes from the prologue (*NE I*) and *X* (especially *X.9*) since both seem to describe his audience in considerable detail. In these sections, Aristotle says that he expects his audience to test what he is saying by observing the facts that they already know (1179a20-22). This meant he expected his audience to have enough experience in the actions of life (something the youth may lack 1095a4-5) and in political science (1181a10-b13). Also, the listener must have the ability of 'comprehension' (*sunesis*) if they are to benefit from his lectures and develop a firm conviction of their truth which will translate to action (1172b3-7). Lastly, Bodéüs states, "the listeners' appetites and passions must have been disciplined by habituation so that, we might say, they can effectively 'hear reason'"

consists therefore of men who have received a good upbringing *and* have extensive experience in politics (Bodéüs 3-5). Such people already have a good deal of practical *phronesis* (that concerned with their own individual actions) and legislative or architectonic *phronesis* (that concerned with the actions of people in a city) (this distinction comes from *NE VI.8*).<sup>38</sup> Thus, if the person with *the beginnings* refers to a member of Aristotle's audience, and not a well brought up youth, then such a person possesses many characteristics that are far beyond what an upbringing alone can foster.<sup>39</sup> However, if we compare this passage in *I.4* with what Aristotle says about the results of upbringing in *X.9*, I think we can come to enough certainty for our purposes to say that the one who has *the beginnings*, or can easily acquire them, is the well brought up youth.<sup>40</sup>

Other references to the qualities Aristotle expects of the well brought up youth seem to indicate that *the beginnings* too refers to the well brought up youth. In discussing the usefulness of arguments (*logoi*) in stimulating and encouraging people to become

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(x.10.1179b23-28). All of these qualities would occur only in those who have come along way in developing virtue and have a lot of political experience, enabling them to be potentially good lawgivers, which is what Aristotle hoped to help them with (hence the mention of the importance of good laws in 1179b33-1180a14, 1180b24-29, 1103b1-5, etc.)

<sup>38</sup> For a different interpretation of *VI.8* and the two types of *phronimoi*, see Lawrence (281-282).

<sup>39</sup> If the beginnings are equated with "the that," I describe this below but briefly it is a love of fine actions, then Lawrence seems to move the acquisition of this to later in life when the person has more experience to test what he has learned from his upbringing (see especially 271). However, he appears to have a different understanding of "the that" from Burnyeat, and me, since he too believes a good upbringing achieves the same result of loving fine actions (279). Whether his understanding of what this love entails is the same is uncertain.

<sup>40</sup> See Broadie *Commentary*, 267. In her words, "good upbringing provides proper starting points for ethical inquiry."

decent (*epeikes*), Aristotle says in *X.9* that these “seem to have enough influence to stimulate and encourage the civilized ones among the young people” (1179b7-8). He then describes a civilized young person as possessing “a character suitable for virtue, fond of what is fine and objecting to what is shameful” (1179b30-33). Furthermore, Aristotle says, “someone who is to be good must be finely brought up and habituated” (1180a15-16). Thus, it seems Aristotle believes arguments and teachings on “happiness and the virtues” (i.e. fine things) will benefit a well brought up youth. This seems equivalent to what he says in the passage in question: “In order to listen appropriately to discussion about what is fine and just, i.e. about the objects of political expertise in general, we must have been well brought up.” I propose then that the passage in *I.4* states that one who has *the beginnings* (or can easily acquire them) is indeed a youth who has had a good upbringing. Moreover, this is one necessary element among others for being a proper student of Aristotle’s lectures—a potential lawgiver. Indeed, more than a good upbringing and *the beginnings* are needed to be a good lawgiver. In *X.9*, Aristotle discusses that political experience and knowledge of political universals are also needed. Aristotle is not referring to these qualities in *I.4*. Therefore, in *I.4*, I argue that Aristotle is talking about one specific characteristic of his audience, which they acquired from a good upbringing. Aristotle’s audience shares the knowledge of *the beginnings* with the youth who have received a good upbringing. A well brought up youth has the *beginnings* or can easily learn them because of his good upbringing.

The two main elements I focus on that are needed to learn *the beginnings* are pleasure refinement and emotional training, as I have said above. I discuss the latter in the next chapter. In terms of pleasure refinement, if a youth is to benefit from arguments

about fine subjects, he must be fond of what is fine and objecting to what is shameful (X.9). In this chapter, I examine what Aristotle means by the former. M.F. Burnyeat interprets the passage in *I.4* in the light of other passages (especially 1098a33-b4) as pointing to a distinction between what he calls “the that” (*hoti*) and “the because” (*dioti*). I adopt this terminology though, as we will see, I diverge from his understanding of what this means. During his upbringing a youth acquires “the that,”—deep convictions about, and subsequent love for, what is fine—and in adulthood, as he further develops *phronesis*, he has the opportunity to learn the reasons *why* the things that constitute his “the that” are what they are—“the because” (71-74).<sup>41</sup> This love for what is fine is to be understood as taking pleasure in actions that are fine (i.e. virtuous actions) because they are fine.<sup>42</sup> My focus is on what this pleasure entails and how it comes about.

Pleasure and pain drastically influence actions, often making us do base actions, because one finds them enjoyable, and refrain from doing good actions, because one finds them painful (Chapter 1 Section III). Thus, Aristotle asserts, “that is why we need to have had the appropriate upbringing—right from early youth, as Plato says—to make us find enjoyment or pain in the right things; for this is correct education” (1104b10-13 and cf. X.1). We will see that the youth’s appetite for coincidental or neutral pleasures will need to be moderated and directed so that they do not desire or refrain from gratifying

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<sup>41</sup> I explain why I do not adopt his usage of loving is *just* as well as what is fine below.

<sup>42</sup> If I am wrong about attributing “the that” and the *beginnings* to a well brought up youth, there is at least strong evidence in *X.9* for this claim. A well brought up youth has a sense of shame and a notion of what is fine and [truly] pleasant (1179b11-16). Furthermore, such a youth has “a character suitable for virtue, fond of what is fine and objecting to what is shameful” (1179b30-32). To have a notion of what is fine and truly pleasant and to be fond of what is fine is to, as I will argue, have the necessary elements needed to enjoy virtuous actions for the sake of the fine.

these in extreme ways and so that they desire the appropriate things. Furthermore, the youth must learn to enjoy unqualified or ethical pleasures, to the extent that this is possible during upbringing. This means that the youth will learn to take pleasure in acting in the ways corresponding to virtue and take pain in acting basely. Here I focus on the refinement of neutral pleasures and pains as well as the acquisition of ethical pleasures, leaving the acquisition of ethical pain for the next chapter. This is because, as we will see, ethical pain at base actions actually involves the emotion of shame.

First, I want to make a note on the nature of this enjoyment of virtuous actions. I think we can distinguish two ways of enjoying virtuous actions: (1) enjoying virtuous actions as one performs them, which requires recognition of the fact that one is indeed performing a virtuous action; and (2) enjoying virtuous actions as they are performed by another, which requires recognition of the fact that another person is performing a virtuous action. I think that Aristotle is most concerned with the first type of recognition and that this is what he hopes for the youth to accomplish. My general proof for this is that when Aristotle discusses the type of pleasures a virtuous person experiences, in *II.3*, he does not mention that we know a person is virtuous because they enjoy watching others perform virtuous actions; he only states that we know a person's character by the pleasure or pain "following on *his* actions" (1104b5-6, italics mine). The only place he mentions the importance of recognizing virtuous actions performed by another is in the context of the best type of friendship—character-based friendship between two fully virtuous people (IX 9.1169b29-1170a4). Here he is not talking about this as a sign of virtue but rather as a benefit of the friendship (albeit a necessary pleasure for the virtuous person). Thus, I mostly focus on the recognition needed for the first type of enjoyment of

virtuous actions. If we ask whether the youth should be able to recognize and love the virtuous actions of others, I do not think we will find a definitive answer from Aristotle. The only thing we might do is infer that the youth will gain this ability automatically from the ability to know how to perform virtuous actions.

## **2. A Love of the Fine**

We will gradually see that “the that” is the love of the fine, which entails enjoying virtuous actions because they are fine and therefore intrinsically valuable. I distinguish between an appetitive and cognitive element to this enjoyment. In terms of the former, the fine is loved insofar as it is enjoyed for its own sake. In terms of the latter, the fine is loved insofar as it is “understood” conceptually. Surveying some of the more recent commentaries on this topic, I look at what “the that” is and then I move into a discussion about *phronesis* (the “because”) as well as the perception of universals and particulars that inform the decisions of the practical *phronimos* (the individual who has practical *phronesis*). This allows for an understanding of the love of the fine in the *phronimos* and it allows me to separate the appetitive elements of a love for the fine from the cognitive ones. Having done this I can then infer more accurately what the love of the fine means for the youth. Following this discussion, with this appetitive and cognitive understanding of the “the that” in mind I look at how it might be achieved. Looking at the general characteristics of the youth (from section I), I offer somewhat of a reconstruction of the habituation project that a youth might undergo to actually mold and shape his natural desires and pleasures to eventually desire and take pleasure in virtuous actions for the sake of the fine.

Before I begin, it will be helpful here to look at Aristotle's conception of the fine. Aristotle argues that virtuous actions are fine (*kalon*) and that they should be done for the sake of the fine. In many places, Aristotle states that the fine (*to kalon*) is the end of virtuous actions.<sup>43</sup> In one place Aristotle states, "actions in accord with the virtues ... are good and fine" (1099a21-22). In another he says, the fine is the "end aimed at by virtue" (1115b12). Supporting this he later asserts, "actions in accord with virtue are fine, and aim at the fine" (1120a23). By an end, Aristotle means the proper ordering of a life (Lawrence 263). In Gavin Lawrence's words, "in looking for the fine, one looks for a proper arrangement and attainment of human goods, of a life making sense and having a proper shape, not disfigured by ugly action" (264). Thus, Aristotle uses the fine in two senses that are related. To say something is fine is to say that it is praiseworthy or choiceworthy, but the fine is also an end that is desirable for its own sake (cf. *Rhetoric* I.9), which likely means that the fine is an intrinsic good.<sup>44</sup> So, since virtuous actions are fine they are therefore praiseworthy (sense one) and have intrinsic value (sense two).

It is important that the youth come to value virtuous actions for the sake of the fine. This is the starting point—"the that"—which Aristotle expects of a well brought up youth. I begin with M.F. Burnyeat's discussion of "the that." Burnyeat argues there are two stages involved in coming to acquire "the that." He argues for this by referring to Aristotle's discussion of how an incontinent person can do a base action while knowing what would have been the virtuous thing to do. At 1147a21-22, Aristotle says, "those who have learned something do not yet know it, though they string the words together;

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<sup>43</sup> Also, see Irwin for a discussion of the uses of *to kalon* (Glossary 329).

<sup>44</sup> See McDowell (especially 209) for a discussion of the fine.

for it must grow into them, and this takes time.” Burnyeat connects this to *II.4*, where Aristotle says we must perform virtuous actions with the full knowledge of what we are doing. The youth too must come to have convictions about what is fine—knowledge of the value of virtuous actions.<sup>45</sup>

The initial stage of having “the that” is where a youth comes to know about the fine on a superficial or surface level, only being able to “string the words” about it together. To come to this stage, a youth has been told by his educator which actions are fine (74). The actions prescribed by the laws governing the youth will also contribute to this knowledge. Burnyeat does not explain how this works, and neither does Aristotle, but we might speculate that here the educator would point out enough examples of people doing virtuous actions that the youth comes to recognize them as such. Thus, the educator might repeatedly say things like, “that was a generous act that man did. What a ‘fine’ thing for him to do. That is how you should act in such a situation.” Through being

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<sup>45</sup> Note, Burnyeat asserts that the youth will come to have convictions about what is just as well as a love for what is just, on top of what is fine. I diverge from Burnyeat on this point. General justice, as opposed to the specific virtue of justice, represents the relationship of each virtue to *eudaimonia* and in this way, justice is complete virtue. It is the organization of the virtues to promote *eudaimonia*, seemingly through the establishment of good laws (1129b20-31). According to my interpretation, the generally just person is the person of architectonic *phronesis* who understands how to make laws that will promote *eudaimonia* in others (1129b31-35 and cf. 1141b25-29). I do not think there is enough evidence for me to maintain with confidence that “the that” includes deep convictions about and subsequent enjoyment of virtuous actions for the sake of the just. In *X.9*, Aristotle only associates a notion of the fine and enjoyment of fine things with the well brought up youth. He does not mention a notion of the just. In fact, it is quite possible that to know the just aspect of virtue would mean having experience in political matters and being well on one’s way to developing architectonic *phronesis*, which is well beyond what a proper upbringing can foster. Thus, in reference to our passage about the *beginnings* in *I.4*, I think we can state with confidence that the youth will be able to listen to arguments about fine things but I cannot state with certainty that they will benefit yet from arguments about just things. Therefore, I leave out the notion of the just being present in the youth since I would not be able to defend this claim adequately here.

shown these actions the youth will be able to recognize what they entail in a simple way. Imitation may be involved here as well, since the youth may be asked to act according to what he sees being done. He can therefore speak the language of virtue: “that man did a fine thing” or “if I run away from a rival I would be acting cowardly.”<sup>46</sup> In this way, the youth comes to be able to “say the words” about virtue and the fine (cf. 1142a16-21). But, the youth’s understanding must not stop here.

The goal for the youth is to move to a second stage of knowledge about “the that” where it has “grown into” the youth or become second nature. Burnyeat argues that in order for “the that” to become firmly established in the youth habituation is needed (72-73). He draws this conclusion from Aristotle’s discussion of the ways one studies principles in the various domains of knowledge (1098b3-5). Burnyeat interprets Aristotle as saying that in ethics, one does not come to understand ethical principles by induction, deduction, etc. Rather, we develop an understanding of ethical principles “by means of some sort of habituation (*ethistos*)” (1098b4). In other words, we come to see what is fine by performing fine actions—i.e. virtuous actions—enough times that they become habit or second nature (73).<sup>47</sup> A youth therefore comes to “understand” or recognize the fine by this habituation. By being guided to perform virtuous actions, the first stage knowledge of “the that” becomes second nature and the youth firmly believes in the value of what he

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<sup>46</sup> See Sorabji (124-125).

<sup>47</sup> Also, see Bodéüs Chapter 5, II.1 for a good discussion of the type of knowledge Aristotle encourages. In his words, “actualization of such knowing is brought about by direct acquaintance with what is signified, which, when repeated, enables what is signified to become part of the knower” (102).

was told to do.<sup>48</sup> I argue below that Burnyeat is partially right, habituation is needed to acquire “the that,” but a type of induction is also needed, which I show during my discussion of *phronesis* below as well as my application of this discussion to the youth.<sup>49</sup> In what follows, I discuss Burnyeat’s interpretation of what “the that” is before I comment on his interpretation of it.

Firmly believing “the that” means loving what is fine. Looking at more from *X.9* (a section I will refer to a lot in this chapter and the next), Aristotle argues the right student for his lectures, the one for whom his arguments will benefit, is one who “loves what is fine.” Burnyeat interprets this passage in the light of *I.8* 1099a13-15: “the things that please the lovers of the fine are things pleasant by nature. Actions in accord with virtue are pleasant by nature, so that they both please lovers of the fine and are pleasant in their own right” (Irwin Trans.). The proper student is the one who has had his pleasures refined to enjoy what is fine—i.e. the performance of virtuous actions. In Burnyeat’s words, “what you love is what you enjoy or take pleasure in” (76). So, pleasure is therefore the key to understanding how “the that” becomes second nature. In one sense, one comes to love virtuous actions by performing them. This is because one comes to enjoy something that is naturally enjoyable by experiencing it over time (76). But, in another sense, one comes to love virtuous actions by learning to enjoy them properly. As Burnyeat says, this is a “hard subject” but examples can help to explain it: enjoying

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<sup>48</sup> Cf. *Politics* 7.17, 1336b15-24. When the youth have reached the age where they could drink and attend banquets, “their education will have rendered them immune to any harm that might come from” unseemly spectacles like comedies or lewd poetry. If we can link this age with the age the youth has “the that” then this suggests a very firm or stable character is present in the youth when he has “the that”.

<sup>49</sup> Compare Sorabji (124).

philosophy for the sense of power it can give or enjoying a trip abroad because one can get good photographs from it is not enjoying philosophy or traveling properly. Proper enjoyment of the virtues too is not for the power or honour they bring, but for their own sake, as intrinsically valuable, because they are fine (77-8). In Burnyeat's words, "the actions which the practice of the virtues requires could only be enjoyed if they are seen as noble [or fine] and virtuous and the agent delights in his achievement of something fine and noble" (77).

At this point then, we can understand "the that" to be a love of the fine—taking pleasure in virtuous activities for the sake of the fine. The fine is a value that makes certain things valuable in-themselves. Virtuous actions are one of these things. Burnyeat has shown that if a youth is well brought up, and therefore knows "the that," this means that he has learned that virtuous actions are valuable in this way. As a result, he loves them for this quality. Furthermore, this means the youth has risen above other reasons for valuing virtuous actions, such as the rewards he would get from his guide for performing them or the praise he might get from his friends. I agree with Burnyeat that a youth comes to enjoy virtuous actions because they are fine, but I do not think that this enjoyment comes about because a youth is motivated to do virtuous actions based on a desire for this enjoyment. There must be a deeper motivation stemming from an understanding of the fine. To show this, I press Burnyeat on his discussion of the type of pleasure we are dealing with here.

Burnyeat interprets Aristotle as saying that the youth come to a point where their unconscious desires inform their love of the fine, without any real cognitive understanding. Aristotle clearly holds that coming to enjoy virtuous actions because they

are fine through habituation of the child's pleasures and pains is a crucial aspect of a proper upbringing. However, I am not sure Burnyeat's position is accurate when it comes to the amount of cognitive understanding involved in this process. To be fair Burnyeat reminds us that desires and feelings, by their nature, have a thought component. As he says, "something is desired as noble [fine] or just, something inspires shame because it is thought of as disgraceful" (80). Nevertheless, Burnyeat says the valuing of "the that" is also in a way unreasoned in that it is not coming from the reasoned desires of one possessing *phronesis*. It would have been helpful if Burnyeat explained more precisely what he means by this distinction of unreasoned and reasoned. I can only infer that by focusing solely on habituation as the means to this valuing, Burnyeat argues for no intellectual virtues being present in the youth (1103a15-19). Also, by stating that "the learner is envisaged as a young person who lives by the feelings of the moment" (78), it seems as if he interprets Aristotle's remark about reason and intelligence in the *Politics* (that I have mentioned above) as stating that the youth will only have passion, will and desire, not reason and intelligence (see *Politics*, 1334b12-28). If I am reading Burnyeat right then, according to his interpretation the youth come out of a good upbringing only with a habituated enjoyment for the fine, which is grounded in their characters and not in their intellect.

If we agree with what Burnyeat says, that by loving Aristotle means enjoying virtuous actions because they are fine, Burnyeat cannot argue what he wants without a youth understanding to some extent what he is doing. This is because to enjoy virtuous actions, one needs to be actually performing a virtuous action. The type of pleasure corresponds to the activity one is engaged in (Chapter 1 Section 1). Thus, if one is

experiencing an ethical pleasure (i.e. enjoying virtuous actions for their own sake—for the sake of the fine) one must be engaged in a virtuous activity.<sup>50</sup> The only way to engage in a virtuous activity is to meet the requirements of *NE II.4*: (1) one knows that one is performing a virtuous activity, (2) one does so for its own sake (for the sake of the fine), and (3) one does so from a firm and stable state.<sup>51</sup> Therefore, according to these requirements, the youth must be able to know what a virtuous action is and to know what the fine is in order to perform the type of action that would give him the type of pleasure we, along with Burnyeat, are after. Furthermore, he must be doing it for the sake of the fine and from a firm and stable state, at least to some extent.

This is exactly what I see as the case. I argue that full virtue is not an all or nothing affair, and thus neither is the pleasure that comes from virtuous actions.<sup>52</sup> I think Aristotle holds that habituation gradually engenders all aspects of virtue in the youth and

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<sup>50</sup> For a similar critique of Burnyeat, see *Ethics with Aristotle*, by Broadie (122n46). However, she takes this as a reason to part from what Burnyeat says. Broadie does not see pleasure as the means to coming to believe that are virtuous actions fine. In her words, “we learn by practice that they are good, because by our practice we accept that the authority who says so means it; we also thereby learn that these things are good in a way which belongs to a world beyond the world of impulse, since their claim overrides what we feel like; and from this we know that the things which we immediately felt like doing could never be good in that way” (109). Broadie thereby seems to direct habituation to the intellect more than the appetites. The youth understands that actions are good because his educator has said so and therefore he should override his impulses and listen to his educator. I think this is to place too much on the intellect and to ignore what Aristotle says about the roles of pleasure and pain in training the youth as well as the goals of education in terms of pleasures and pains. If, as Aristotle says, “when we educate youth, we steer them by pleasure and pain” (1172a21-2), and the goal is for the youth to “find enjoyment or pain in the right things” (i.e. virtuous actions), I think we must find some middle road between the training of the appetites and the intellect. The youth must enjoy virtuous actions because they are fine, which involves both the intellect and the appetites.

<sup>51</sup> See Lawrence for a good discussion of these requirements (268-271).

<sup>52</sup> See Sherman, *Fabric* Chapter 5 Section 8 (especially 189).

by the time the youth has “the that” we can say that he has enough of the three requirements of a virtuous action to feel unqualified pleasure in the performance of virtuous actions. That the youth has a firm and stable state I think has been shown through my discussion of Burnyeat. Though the youth is certainly not unshakable—there is the chance that he will backslide into vice—Aristotle is clear in stating that the well brought up youth have the kind of habits that promote virtue and therefore have a stable character (the well brought up youth after all is characterized as having fine habits). What I want to discuss then is the extent to which the youth who has “the that” acts from knowledge of virtuous actions (rather than blind habituation) and to which he does them for the sake of the fine. To clarify the latter, to perform virtuous actions for the sake of the fine is to do them with the idea that doing so is intrinsically valuable, i.e. that even if no benefit comes to oneself from doing them one still sees them as a valuable thing to do.<sup>53</sup> This entails understanding (the nature of this understanding will be discussed below) the value of the fine. The more a youth meets these requirements, the more he can be said to be in possession of full virtue and the more unqualified pleasure he derives from performing virtuous actions.

Burnyeat is wrong to say that the youth do not have any cognitive understanding of the fine (if I am right in reading him this way). This is not to say that Burnyeat is completely wrong. As I will show in Part 3 of this section, the youth will begin by finding virtuous actions pleasant because of the rewards they bring (i.e. for ulterior motives). But, this will transition to an (limited) enjoyment of virtuous actions because

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<sup>53</sup> See Sherman (176).

they are fine, which is pleasant in an unqualified way, with the full acquisition of “the that,” which I show in the next section (Cf. Lawrence, 262-263).

In “Eudaimonism and Realism in Aristotle’s Ethics,” John McDowell takes a different interpretation from Burnyeat on this point and this is worth discussing because I think it is closer to what Aristotle says. McDowell argues:

In undergoing the moulding of character that is the topic of Book II [of the *NE*], a person acquires a way of bringing behaviour under concepts, the conceptual scheme that we can summarily capture in terms of the idea of the noble and the disgraceful. A possessor of the *that* is already beyond uncomprehending habit; he is already some distance into the realm of the intellectual excellences. He has acquired apparatus for thinking and reasoning, and he is thereby equipped for reflection; he has the material for a full-fledged possession of the *because*. (215)

According to McDowell then, when a proper upbringing has done its work, i.e. (ideally) preparing a youth to eventually learn from Aristotle’s lectures (after they have acquired the other necessary characteristics), “the that,” which the youth has acquired, is not only a habituated appetitive response. In some limited sense, the youth can actually recognize the virtuous actions when he performs them because they have some type of conceptual understanding of them as well as the fine. Furthermore, McDowell argues that a youth has already acquired the power of choice by the time he has “the that” (again in some limited sense) and can therefore reason out his choices in light of the conceptual understanding he has acquired.<sup>54</sup> In short, a youth has begun to foster the virtue of

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<sup>54</sup> Cf. Sherman, *Fabric*. In her words, “for the more mature youth whose deliberative capacities are actively developing, the choice will be reflective and subject to rational justification. It will take into account the more complex and competing factors that need to be weighed in the balance, and represent a judgement as to what is best in the light of these varied factors. Practice in action is eventually, at the later stages, practice in choice-making of this sort” (175).

intellect, *phronesis* (214-215).<sup>55</sup> I interpret McDowell as arguing for a spectrum moving from “the that” to “the because,” in contrast to a sharp distinction. The youth gradually moves from having no sense of “the because” to having “the that,” which includes elements of “the because,”<sup>56</sup> and, in adulthood, finally fully acquires “the because.” This means that full virtue admits of degrees and the youth who has “the that” is some way into having full virtue and enjoying ethical pleasures (cf. Chapter 1 Section I).

We can now unpack the love of the fine in the youth to include cognitive components as well as the appetitive ones Burnyeat has proposed. “The that,” or the love of the fine, seems to require the intellectual excellence of *phronesis* to some extent. To see how much *phronesis* the youth has in order to love the fine it will be helpful to understand further what “the because” is. In the quote above, we see that McDowell envisions “the because” as a conceptual understanding of behaviours under the headings of the fine and disgraceful (or shameful). Essentially, McDowell, who draws from Burnyeat, treats “the because” as being brought about by critical reflection on “the that,” which one has acquired through one’s upbringing. The person coming out of an upbringing has developed his reasoning and good judgement skills (cf. section I of this

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<sup>55</sup> His argument lines up with mine. Since McDowell sees the acquisition of *phronesis* as a gradual process, he sees the requirements of a virtuous action in *II.4* applying in a limited way to the youth who has “the that”. From this he argues for the power of choice being present in the youth since virtuous actions must be chosen. But, we can also say that the youth enjoy virtuous actions because they are fine (an unqualified, ethical pleasure) in a limited way.

<sup>56</sup> The youth who has “the that” can give reasons for why he should perform virtuous actions, which he fully believes, and these are elements of “the because”. He can say, “because they are fine” (215). McDowell argues further for this by stating that if the youth are to perform actions that accord with virtue stemming from a good character (as good as they can have) then these actions must be chosen, according to Aristotle’s definition of virtuous actions in 1226b9.

Chapter). He can therefore reflect on “the that”—his “unreflective” inherited scheme of values—to see how this scheme of values “hangs together.” In this way, one comes to a clear sense of the fine—a coherent conceptual scheme of values. McDowell states that when one has achieved this, one has acquired full *phronesis*.<sup>57</sup> In his words, this is “no more than possession of the that in a reflectively adjusted form” (218).<sup>58</sup> I agree with Burnyeat and McDowell in terms of their use of the idea of concepts to describe what the *phronimos* has come to understand. To reach our goal of knowing what it means for a youth to love the fine it will be helpful to look at what these concepts are further, in order to understand what they are in practice. Otherwise this idea can create confusion since we might be misled into thinking that these concepts are abstract theoretical ones entailing some universal knowledge of the world. Thus, I now move into a discussion of *phronesis*. I start with David Charles, who has made this error of moving these concepts into a more theoretical sphere. So that we can see what *phronesis is* I think we should see what it *is not*.

### **Phronesis: grasping the because**

In his paper “Aristotle and Modern Realism,” David Charles compares the acquisition of practical knowledge to theoretical knowledge, stating there are three stages of knowledge present in the theoretical sphere that find their parallel in the ethical. In Stage I, one comes to grasp concepts (generous actions, cruel actions, etc.) by tracking similarities in perceived acts while being told that such and such a particular act falls

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<sup>57</sup> Also, see Burnyeat (74). This scheme of values means that, as Aristotle says in *I.4*, the *phronimos* has knowledge of values in an unqualified sense. This is an objective knowledge of the way the world really is (cf. Irwin *Notes* 176).

<sup>58</sup> Compare what Burnyeat says about *phronesis*. The *phronimos* forms his choices “from a reflective scheme of values organized under the heading of the good” (80).

under a certain concept. Stage I is the pre-conceptual, experiential/context dependent stage. In this stage one looks for the commonalities between particular things observed in the world in order to build concepts that unite these particulars. It is possible to be mistaken at this stage. One may develop concepts here that are not be genuine. So, for example, to come to this stage of knowledge in the theoretical sphere a child would be shown many examples of men so that he comes to understand the concept of *man*. Charles argues that to attain Stage I knowledge in the ethical sphere, through experience and the help of one's educator, one would keep track of the similarities found in particular acts and would thereby come to grasp ethical concepts. So far this does not sound all that different from Burnyeat's first stage of "the that," where one learns on a surface level about all of the virtues as well as the fine by being shown many examples of them.

Stage II is the rational, context independent stage. Here, one comes to see which concepts represent genuine kinds of things in the world (Charles 160-1). In Stage II, one comes to see that some of these concepts do indeed represent objectively true, genuine kinds in the world because one starts to see how these concepts relate to each other in a general explanatory framework. If we consider this as Charles' interpretation of "the that," "the that" becomes second nature when one believes intellectually that one's concepts are true because of their explanatory power amidst the wider framework they are found in. This is in stark contrast to Burnyeat's interpretation. For Burnyeat, "the that" becomes second nature when one loves and values the fine through habituation of

one's pleasures and pains. Burnyeat emphasizes the appetitive while Charles emphasizes the intellectual.<sup>59</sup>

In Stage III, one comes to understand the overall conceptual framework by recognizing which concepts are fundamental (the starting points), meaning they organize and unite genuine kinds. In Charles' words, "we come to realize that certain terms mark out fundamental elements in objective, reaction-independent reality" (162). Furthermore, Charles argues this is when one has *nous* in the ethical. He states that *nous* in the practical sphere entails "seeing the interconnections between the particular moral concepts (justice, generosity, friendship) and being able to locate particular cases in this wider framework" (164). The wider framework for Charles is *eudaimonia*. So, *nous* in the practical sphere means one understands the entire conceptual framework of *eudaimonia*, seeing how each virtue contributes to this overall goal as well as how each virtue relates to each other.

I discuss Charles' interpretation of *phronesis* because I think it offers a good analogy of how *phronesis* develops. However, his view raises a major difficulty.<sup>60</sup> I do

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<sup>59</sup> Though not completely. Charles states that a youth develops these concepts because of his natural virtues. In his words, "natural or trained virtue involves a way of seeing individual cases as similar analogous to the mode of apprehension of the person with experience (who has not yet acquired a skill)" (152). If he were interpreting Aristotle correctly then, appetite would have to be involved since these natural virtues are found exclusively in the character (1144b15-17). Charles unfortunately does not give more of an explanation of what he means by natural virtues allowing for conceptual development. This is a major weakness to his paper since natural virtue does not entail any intellectual virtue, such as *phronesis*, which would be required for the kind of conceptual development he describes.

<sup>60</sup> Here I focus on the problem with the parallel between theoretical and ethical knowledge. His other main problem is the role he assigns to pleasure and pain. Charles argues that the purpose of pleasure and pain, as well as desire, is to encourage virtuous actions. They do not play any role in mediating the concepts a youth acquires during upbringing. Though he is right about the former purpose of pleasure and pain, he is wrong about the latter. Aristotle clearly argues that the youth will be lovers of the fine in

not think we can parallel theoretical knowledge with ethical knowledge to the extent Charles does. Aristotle states that theoretical knowledge is scientific knowledge of “universals, things that are by necessity” (1140b30-31). Practical knowledge is different from theoretical knowledge in that it is knowledge about things that we can deliberate about, that admit of being otherwise (1140b2-3 cf. *VI.7*). Additionally, Aristotle states that practical knowledge is not a science in the strict sense, since we cannot deliberate about things that are by necessity (1140b1-2). Indeed, understanding (*nous*) in practical matters is different from the understanding that is present in theoretical science. Aristotle says, “in demonstrations understanding is about the unchanging terms that are first. In [premises] about action understanding is about the last term, the one that admits of being otherwise, and [hence] about the minor premise” (1143b1-4). Furthermore, we have already discussed that Aristotle believes we learn about ethical knowledge largely from habituation, a much different type of learning method from the induction and deduction used for theoretical knowledge. Ethical knowledge and theoretical knowledge are too distinct to parallel their acquisition in the way Charles does.

Aristotle does however seem to compare these by analogy. This is present in the quote I used above about the understanding involved in both fields. Furthermore, he says that a person who has *phronesis* possesses “both [the universal and the particular knowledge]” (1141b22-25). Thus, there are universals and particulars in both fields of

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that they have learned to enjoy virtuous actions. As I will show, this involves organizing virtuous actions under the fine and part of this conceptual understanding will include the type of enjoyment they get from performing virtuous actions, meaning it does help them distinguish virtuous actions and the fine. Also, as we will see in the next chapter, shame is crucial for the proper development of character as a pain at base actions. Shame too helps the youth distinguish base actions from fine ones.

study. To what extent, then, might we compare ethical concepts by analogy to theoretical ones, the way Aristotle seems to compare them?

### **Universals and particulars**

First, it will be helpful to ask: what is the nature of universals in the ethical sphere (or what Aristotle calls political science or *politikê epistêmê*)? Because its subject matter is human action, political science does not contain the same type of universals as theoretical science (Bodéüs 21). Rather, it largely involves universals in the form of usual (*hôs epi to polu*) truths. In Aristotle's words, in political science "we shall be satisfied to indicate the truth roughly and in outline; since our subject and our premises are things that hold good usually (but not universally)" (1094b21-23). As Irwin argues, in "Ethics as an Inexact Science," usual truths in ethics/political science<sup>61</sup> are not things that are frequently true but are sometimes not, as in "humans acquire grey hair as they age" (106). Indeed, these exist as truths that many observations of particular instances have allowed for, but usual truths are "teleological regularities," similar to truths in science such as "humans have lungs" (107). In this way, usual truths about humans have a normative component: it would be "against nature" for a human not to possess these qualities or follow these principles. To prove his point, Irwin uses the examples of external goods, justice and bravery. All of these things, Aristotle says, are *usually* good. For each of these, he cannot mean that they are good more often than not. Instead, he is saying that

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<sup>61</sup> I agree with Bodéüs who argues that there is no mention of ethical science (*êthikê epistêmê*) in Aristotle's works. The ethical discussions are all part of political science (*politikê epistêmê*), which is synonymous with practical science (*praktikê epistêmê*) (25). Irwin seems to make the error of thinking that there is an ethical science. However, this discussion is unnecessary for my purposes here since his conclusions about truths apply equally to political science.

“in favourable conditions” (i.e. when used correctly, when factors outside of one’s control favour it, etc.) these things are good for a human (109). In other words, they are unqualifiedly good (referring to our discussion in Chapter 1). The same is true of something like “virtue secures happiness.” This is very much a universal truth, but even this can admit of qualifications, or exceptions, which Aristotle lists (*NE I.10*).<sup>62</sup> Therefore, many universals in political science are notions that are true for humans in their natural condition, meaning a healthy, fully virtuous, happy person.

We should note that the ethical sphere does involve unqualified universals as well—ethical principles that have little to no exceptions (Irwin *Ethics* 111). However, these too are different from theoretical universals since only the individual with some level of *phronesis* can understand how to properly apply them. Irwin provides examples of these: “happiness is everyone’s ultimate good ... it is always better to aim at the mean than to aim at either the excess or the deficiency ... one ought always to be willing to face great danger if some important cause is at stake ... [etc.]” (111). However, even these are different in nature from the principles in the theoretical sciences. Only the fully virtuous person, or one who is nearly virtuous, will know how to properly apply these principles. For those who are not fully virtuous these admit of exceptions. This is because such people will not understand how to usefully apply these principles in an unqualified way. For example, one needs to fully understand what happiness is to know that it is one’s ultimate good, as well as to work towards it, or one could make mistakes that inhibit one’s happiness. Likewise, one needs to understand the fine to know when it is

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<sup>62</sup> Aristotle says that many major misfortunes can inhibit virtue from leading to *eudaimonia* (1100b27-30).

correct to stand firm, i.e. when the cause is fine. Thus, many unqualified truths still admit of exceptions for some humans (those that aren't fully virtuous). Nevertheless, though both usual and unqualified truths admit of exceptions they still carry normative weight. Thus, hereafter I group both together and refer to them as normative universals.

Now that we have seen the nature of universals in the ethical/political sphere, we can determine in more detail the universals that the individual person of *phronesis* (hereafter *phronimos*) looks to in making his decisions.<sup>63</sup> In their most general sense, the universals of the practical *phronimos* (as opposed to the architectonic *phronimos*) are those revealed to him by his virtuous character. Aristotle says in *VI.12*, “virtue makes the goal correct, and prudence makes the things promoting the goal [correct]” (1144a9-10). This is difficult to understand but essentially the virtuous character of the practical *phronimos* gives him a kind of intuitive knowledge of the goals he works towards and the values he follows—his universals.<sup>64</sup> Bodéüs describes this well: the practical *phronimos* “possesses the knowledge of principles because his character dispositions have permitted him to apprehend them—dispositions themselves acquired by having acted over a long time, either naturally or under the authority of his masters, according to right reason which he did not possess” (36). There are two points here. Firstly, because the practical

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<sup>63</sup> I follow Richard Bodéüs for this discussion. I use individual *phronimos* because we must keep in mind the distinction made in the *NE VI.8* between the legislative *phronimos*—i.e. the good lawgiver who is concerned with the actions of the citizens and makes laws so as to promote their virtue (cf. *X.9*)—and the individual *phronimos* who is concerned with his own actions and follows laws and universals to promote his own virtue.

<sup>64</sup> I follow Bodéüs' discussion of this sense of universals. But, from what I can tell, he leaves out the important more specific sense that Irwin draws attention to (from the discussion of usual truths above), which is much more cognitively oriented. I examine this below.

*phronimos* has a virtuous character he is not clouded by base pleasures (he is temperate) and is rather “instructed” to act well by his good pleasures. This is what Aristotle means by, “[temperance] preserves prudence” (1140b12-13), and one’s understanding of what one ought to do “is corrupted or perverted by the pleasant or painful” (1140b13-14). Secondly, Aristotle says that one understands cognitively the universals because *phronesis* allows one to clearly understand the make-up of his virtuous character. Bodéüs describes this as “a true apperception (alêthês hupolêpsis) of the end” (34). *Phronesis* permits our understanding of the virtues we have acquired and it therefore perceives the goals towards which they point. This is not to leave out that the main function of *phronesis* is to determine means to these goals in action through good deliberation. I think we can roughly equate this cognitive aspect of *phronesis* to what McDowell and Burnyeat mean by “the because”—the conceptual organization of the one’s values under the headings of the fine.

Aristotle admits, however, that there are universals that do not hold true to the extent of normative universals: many laws are universals that people follow but that can fail to apply at times. In *V.10* Aristotle says,

All law is universal, and yet there are some things about which it is not possible to make correct universal pronouncements. So in the sorts of cases in which it necessarily pronounces universally, but cannot do so and achieve correctness, law chooses what holds for the most part, in full knowledge of the error it is making. (Rowe Trans. 1137b13-18)

The context in which this explanation about the universality of the law is found is a discussion about the reasonable (Rowe Trans.) or decent (Irwin Trans.) (*epeikes*) person: the virtuous person who, because of his *phronesis*, understands what to do when the law fails to apply to a situation. There are laws that must be made about elements of human

life that are not based on the normative universals discussed above (I refer to these laws as imperfect universals). They therefore admit of more exceptions, even for the *phronimos*. Here the lawgiver makes a law that applies as universally as possible. I mention these because they are also the universals that a *phronimos* would be cognizant of in making his decisions. They are universal in that the law prescribes them for all citizens but they do admit of many exceptions.

I think, therefore, we can add the normative and imperfect universals we have discussed to the list of universals that the *phronimos* follows. It seems to me that the *phronimos* has developed his virtuous character, at least partly, by following normative universals (usual truths and unqualified truths) as well as imperfect universals (those laws that do not carry the normative weight of normative universals). In other words, throughout his development, a *phronimos* would have acquired usual truths, unqualified truths and followed laws that would guide his actions. For example, the *phronimos* would have learned that “happiness is everyone’s ultimate good” and “one ought always to be willing to face great danger if some important cause is at stake” (unqualified universals) as well as “virtue secures happiness” and “acting bravely is virtuous” (usual universals). Furthermore, he would have learned more practical normative universals like “standing firm in battle promotes bravery” or “running from an opponent inhibits bravery because it is cowardly.” On top of these, he would have learned imperfect universals in the form of laws, such as “a goat rather than two sheep should be sacrificed” or “sacrifices should be offered to Brasidas” (*NE* 1134b21-25). Furthermore, by learning when exceptions are involved to all types of universals, and learning what to do when this occurs, the

*phronimos* thereby comes to have a reliable scheme of normative universals and imperfect universals at his disposal.

The concepts possessed by a *phronimos*, on my interpretation, consist of this specific, cognitive scheme of normative and imperfect universals coupled with his virtuous dispositions that give him his intuitive values, all organized under the fine. However, as I have alluded to, his experience significantly helps him organize these (which I explain below). To sum up then, the universals for the individual *phronimos* are the ends his virtuous character points to, the normative universals he has learned and the imperfect universals he has learned.

The particulars for the *phronimos* are his experiences. These experiences are all those acquired in the habituation project he has undergone which has led to his good habits, his possession of “the that” and eventually his virtuous character. These are the many actions in accord with virtue he has performed and witnessed (Bodéüs 58). The habits gained are what form his intuitions about value. These experiences would also inform his understanding of universals (of both types). When he only has “the that,” he would know many propositions that constitute some kind of universal principles. But, he would not know which ones are normative and which are only imperfect since he would not have as many experiences to help him sort this out. The more he applies his universals and sometimes experiences exceptions, he gradually learns which universals do indeed hold true in a normative way and which do not. I think this is what McDowell meant by critically reflecting on “the that” in order to come to have “the because.” This process would lead him to a very reliable scheme of universals. All the while, he would be learning how his virtuous character lines up with these universals—that is, when his

dispositions line up with what his universals tell him to do. When he understands his universals fully in the light of their being fine and ultimately promoting *eudaimonia*, we can say that he has “the because” and he has become a full *phronimos*.

We are now in a position to spell out the analogy between the acquisition of ethical and theoretical knowledge and thereby give a full characterization of the practical *phronimos*. In the theoretical sphere, one acquires concepts in the manner of the stage model that Charles discusses and which comes from Aristotle’s *Analytics*. Here one acquires neat concepts filled with necessary truths that form a comprehensive explanatory framework about the world. However, in the ethical/political sphere things are different. In fact, I think it confuses things when we try to over-intellectualize *phronesis*. That *phronesis* allows for good decisions by drawing on the concepts one has acquired is correct but such concepts are quite different from those in the theoretical sphere. Cognitively, the concepts at the disposal of the *phronimos* are made up of normative universals, imperfect universals and exceptions to these. But, such concepts are made of appetitive elements as well: the pleasure and pain that one feels towards the actions that make-up these concepts, one’s habits, etc. So, for example, the concept of bravery would consist of cognitive aspects such as “stand firm in battle,” “don’t be over fearful,” “don’t be over confident,” etc., as well as exceptions to these, which one acquires through experience. Furthermore, it would consist of the feelings that encourage brave actions (the appetitive elements). These would include the enjoyment of accruing honour when one acts bravely, the pain one would feel if one were to act cowardly (because of the shame one would feel), and the emotional states that encourage brave actions (the means

concerning feelings of fear and confidence).<sup>65</sup> The other concepts of the virtues would be made up of similar notions. All of the concepts of the virtues would then be organized under the concepts of the fine. *Phronesis* then is the ability to clearly perceive these concepts as well as what they point to—the ends of action. Furthermore, it means one is good at knowing how to weigh them all together and act to promote these ends in the given situation. This amounts to the virtuous person’s understanding of the fine. It is *this* that he loves.

### **Applying this to the youth**

Now that we have a clear picture of what the love of the fine entails, we can draw some conclusions about how much of this applies to the youth, in an attempt to see clearly what it means for the youth to love the fine (i.e. “the that” as Burnyeat describes it). As we have said, if the youth are to enjoy virtuous actions in an unqualified way, they must have met, in a limited way, the three requirements for performing a virtuous action. What we are discussing here is the extent to which the youth can meet the knowledge requirement as well as the requirement of performing virtuous actions for the sake of the fine, knowing that “the that” seems to automatically entail the third requirement of having a stable disposition.

If the youth have a small amount of *phronesis*, it seems they will meet these two requirements. If we follow McDowell and Sherman, we can say that by the end of his upbringing, the youth will have a small amount of *phronesis*: he will have the ability to deliberate from enough of an understanding or “apperception” of the fine (though in a

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<sup>65</sup> I discuss these emotional examples in the next chapter.

limited way).<sup>66</sup> This means he will have reasons for his actions and he will choose based on these reasons.<sup>67</sup> Referring back to McDowell's idea that the youth's reasons for action is: "because it is fine", we might unpack this reasoning further.<sup>68</sup> By this point, the youth will have garnered a significant amount of general principles, though he will still be unpacking which are normative universals and which are only imperfect universals. He will also have gained some experiences, which help him with his knowledge of universals, habits of feeling emotions (I discuss these in the next chapter), pleasures and pains in the right things (the former I discuss below, the latter I discuss in the next chapter), etc., and all of these elements form his conception of the fine. Thus, the youth's reasoning would be something like "given the fact that my universals (remember, he will not know yet which ones are not normative universals, or if he does this will be very minute), experiences, habits, intuitions, desires, etc., encouraged me to act in this way, I chose to act in this way." To this extent, the youth has perceived the fine and has decided to act in ways that he thinks will promote it. Largely this reasoning is based in appetites

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<sup>66</sup> Also, see Sorabji (124-126). Much proof of the fact that the youth will have a conceptual understanding of the fine comes from the *NE X.9*, where Aristotle says the well brought up youth has a notion of the fine. Furthermore, the well brought up youth abstains from base actions because they are shameful. As we will see in Chapter 3, Section II.2, one cannot have a notion of the shameful without also having a notion of the fine. This is because the shameful ultimately serves the fine in that one avoids shameful actions because it would not be fine to do them. To have a conception of the fine

<sup>67</sup> This means he is able to form a (limited) *prohairesis*. Lawrence defines this well. An action that stems from *prohairesis* "expresses the agent's values—in the sense that it is viewed as being what is unqualifiedly best or wisest to do, as being the appropriate (*prepon*) or fine (*kalon*) way to go on, as being what he should do (*dei*)" (233-234). Though it is uncertain whether Lawrence argues that the youth are capable of this, it seems to me from what motivations he argues are present in the well brought up youth (that of the fine) that by this definition he would say they can.

<sup>68</sup> Some of this I state in outline now and fill in the details either in the rest of this chapter or the next.

but it would also be cognitive in that he has understood the concept of the fine (to an extent): the youth has become aware of his drives and he has organized these, along with his universals, experiences, etc., under the concepts of virtue and ultimately the fine. This awareness and subsequent conceptual organization allows him to make decisions to act virtuously, decisions that are motivated by the fine (though these are very limited “decisions” compared to those of the *phronimos*). The youth therefore can be said, at least to a small extent, to perform his actions with knowledge of what he is doing and for the sake of the fine. In this way, he meets the two requirements needed to perform a virtuous action (he has already met the third). Thus, the youth is able to perform virtuous actions (to a limited extent). Since he can perform virtuous actions (in a limited sense), he therefore feels the unqualified, ethical pleasures that come from performing virtuous actions (in a limited sense).

### **3. Habituation of Desire**

As we have now discussed in detail, the pleasure-refinement process that is part of a good upbringing ends in a love of the fine, meaning enjoying virtuous actions because they are fine. We have seen what this means from both appetitive and cognitive aspects and have traced in detail what it means to understand the fine, but we have left a significant gap in our explanation. We have only stated the goal without saying how this comes about. Now I outline a plausible reconstruction of this process. Though Aristotle does not explicitly mention this process, I think we can infer it from what he says in various places of his works. Essentially, I show how the natural desires of a youth might be gradually shaped to lead to an enjoyment of virtuous actions. I start with the moderation of bodily desires, creating space for the youth to listen to the reasoning of his

educator. Aristotle is clear in stating that up to a certain age the youth live by desire and emotion alone (see Section I of this chapter). In this stage of life then, the youth's overall natural appetites must be moderated by a reward and punishment system. Then I look at how the natural desire for honour and superiority of a youth might be recruited to eventually desire the honour and superiority that comes from doing fine things. With this accomplished, I believe we will have given a good account of how "the that," or the enjoyment of virtuous actions for the sake of the fine, comes about in the youth during upbringing. Another way of describing this habituation process: habituation of the natural desires of the youth transforms the natural pleasure-based motivation of the youth to that of the fine.<sup>69</sup>

Before I begin, we need to understand what it means to perform certain actions enough times that they become habit, which is generally what this habituation process entails. Aristotle says that character virtues are acquired by performing the relevant actions enough times, so that they become habit (i.e. we become just by acting justly, we become generous by acting generously, etc.) (*NE* 1103a31-b21). This does not mean though that one performs the exact same action repeatedly (Sherman, *Fabric* 178). Rather, one has an ideal as one's goal—i.e. the action a virtuous person would perform—which has been shown by one's educator, musical education, etc., and one performs actions that resemble this ideal under the guidance of one's educator. All the while, one critically assesses one's actions in order to understand how one can refine them with each new attempt (Sherman, *Fabric* 179). The learner needs to become increasingly critical throughout this process, always trying to act better, and this is possible because of the

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<sup>69</sup> On this point, see Lawrence (especially 261-262).

many elements acquired through their upbringing (those discussed in the previous section). When a youth is younger he is completely reliant on his educator to act properly but the closer a youth gets to having “the that,” because of the *phronesis* he is acquiring, the more a youth can act on his own in order to promote these habits. This is the way each good disposition is fostered in a youth during his upbringing and it is to this that I refer for each part of my discussion. But, how does this process bring about refined pleasures, i.e. an enjoyment of virtuous actions?

Aristotle gives a significant clue as to how pleasures can be refined when he states that the repeated fulfillment of an already present desire will increase that desire. Speaking of a youth (and comparing the youth to the appetitive part of humans), Aristotle says, “the repeated exercise of appetite increases the appetite he already had from birth, and if the appetites are large and intense, they actually expel rational calculation” (1119b9-13). So, when one gives in to one’s appetite enough times one’s appetite is increased and this can get so bad that one cannot reason one’s way out of appeasing one’s appetite. Furthermore, Aristotle states, “when we educate youth, we steer them by pleasure and pain” (1172a21-2). Combining these two statements, it seems the key to refining the youth’s pleasures in any way is by working with their natural pleasures, pains and desires, using these as tools for steering them towards good pleasures, pains and desires. In other words, the educator must take into account the unique natural virtues (and base tendencies) present in the youth he is instructing as well as the general characteristics of all youth so as to know what he can shape into good pleasures, pains and desires, and what he must work out of the youth or at least moderate. This steering, combined with the repetition of actions (as describe above), is the means to pleasure

refinement. Largely, this simply means that in their early stages, the youth are steered by pleasure and pain, i.e. a reward and punishment system (cf. Lawrence 261). In other words, the youth are praised or punished according to the goodness or baseness of their actions.<sup>70</sup> However, as they grow, other natural desires are used.

First, then, a good upbringing must target the appetites of the youth. From Chapter I we learned that when one is temperate one feels no intense pleasure at bodily pleasures of the necessary kind (those that are required for health and fitness), takes no pleasure in things that are wrong to enjoy, and feels no pain when one refrains from enjoying something pleasant. Recall, Aristotle argues that the youth naturally have an excessive desire for bodily pleasure, especially sexual pleasure. By extension, this means that the youth naturally feel excessive pain in the absence of bodily pleasure. In light of what I said above, if the youth are allowed to indulge these desires enough times, the desires will grow beyond control and the youth will be lost to intemperance. But, conversely, if the youth are forced to abstain from bodily pleasures to the right extent, and guided to gratify them at the right times, in the right ways, to the right extent, etc., they will develop the habit (*ethos*) of temperance (*NE* 1104a23-26).<sup>71</sup> As I stated above, this will also be accomplished guiding a youth to abstain and gratify his desires properly as well as rewarding a youth when he does temperate acts, meaning he has either refrained from wrong actions or has gratified his desires in the right ways, and punishing him when he does base acts. Furthermore, both stages of “the that” are in play here. A

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<sup>70</sup> The punishment will not be overly harsh, as Sherman, in *Fabric* has pointed out. The goal is for the youth to think for themselves, not simply do what they are told (Chapter 5 Section 3).

<sup>71</sup> Though not full temperance since full *phronesis* is not present.

youth learns about temperate actions, being able to only “say the words,” and through habituation and this is made second nature. In this way, a youth’s specific taste for bodily pleasures and pains will be shaped.

Learning to desire bodily pleasures correctly plays a significant role in pleasure refinement in general. If a youth is to learn to properly enjoy virtuous actions (i.e. for the sake of the fine), he must learn that there is more to life than bodily pleasures. As Aristotle states in *I.5* of the *NE*, most people stop at a life of bodily pleasure, never seeking more. They think that this type of pleasure is *the* good and desire it over all else. Thus, these people will never experience better pleasures and will never become virtuous. Related to this, Aristotle argues that one main reason for this is that good deliberation is not possible when one is intemperate. In *VI.5*, he states that one cannot deliberate about goals and means when corrupted by pleasure or pain.<sup>72</sup> The desires of intemperance expel good reason. We can say the same about the desires and emotions of the youth.<sup>73</sup> If youth give way to their bodily desires often enough, they will foster intemperance and will not respond to the good reason of their educators (I look at emotions in the next chapter). However, if they can develop the habits needed to control these desires, they will be in a position to work on harder tasks as proposed by their teachers that will refine their pleasures further.<sup>74</sup> In short, temperance creates the space for the youth to learn to enjoy

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<sup>72</sup> See Bodéüs for a good discussion of how temperance preserves the “apperception” of the ends that one’s virtuous character reveals to one with *phronesis* (Chapter 1.4).

<sup>73</sup> Lawrence puts this well: “we learn to conform our appetites and emotions to the voice of reason, a voice that starts as one of external authority backed with physical force and sanction” (279).

<sup>74</sup> This does not need to occur all at once in order to move on to the refinement of honours I discuss below. Aristotle says in the *Politics*, the youth “do not willingly tolerate anything that is not made pleasant for them” (1340b15-16). Thus, unless the

virtuous actions because it allows them to learn about goals and motivations beyond pleasure.

The temperate youth can therefore start to learn about ethical pleasures. A major tool at the educator's disposal in accomplishing this will be the natural desires for honour and superiority over others that are present in the youth.<sup>75</sup> The youth are very concerned with their social status, wanting to look good in front of their peers. They will therefore desire naturally to act in ways that will impress others. Such a desire will be a very significant one for pleasure refinement.

Aristotle states that there are two types of honour and we can apply this distinction to how a youth should be properly guided in this area. In *I.5* of the *NE*, Aristotle asserts that the second type of life people desire to lead is the political one, with honour as its goal. However, he describes this life as superficial (*epipolaioteron*), since the honour sought here is not one that is stable (hereafter reputational honour). This is because, in his words, "it seems to depend more on those who honour than on the one honoured" (1095b25-26). The honour most seek is praise from others. A life lived with this goal in mind is not stable or self-sufficient, which are two qualities that the best life

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refinement of bodily desires is made pleasant in some way, the youth will not be successful at it. As I will show, the refinement of honours, which will not be painful in the way that refining bodily desires will be, allows for such pleasure.

<sup>75</sup> As I have discussed in Section I, Aristotle also argues in the *Politics* that musical education (i.e. listening to and playing music that imitates good character) significantly aids in a proper enjoyment of virtuous actions (8.6). By learning to enjoy the music, which is an imitation of a good character, and by hearing of virtuous actions in the poetry or seeing it in the performers who are dancing to the music, the youth learns to enjoy "good character and noble [fine] actions" (1340a16-18)(cf. Sherman, *Fabric* 181-183 for a good discussion of what musical education entailed). Also, Broadie describes how the youth come to learn about good actions, but does not say how they come to enjoy them (CH 2, which I have discussed above). I think that many strategies would be employed by the educator to encourage the love of fine actions in the youth.

should have, since such honour is easily lost. However, there is a sense in which honour is not superficial, which he describes soon after in *I.12*. Here he asks whether *eudaimonia*, the ultimate goal of human life, is praiseworthy or honourable, concluding that it is honourable. Praise is given to achievements, thus virtuous actions are praiseworthy, however true honour is reserved for those “principles” that virtuous actions are done for, *eudaimonia* being one of them as well as the fine (cf. 1097a36-b5). Relating this to the youth, we can say that they naturally desire reputational honour (i.e. the one that is dependent on others’ opinions) and that they need to be trained to desire the true kind—the one that comes from living according to the fine.

Part of this process of coming to desire true honour will involve the conceptual development described above. Aristotle describes the youth, “they are shy, accepting the rules of society in which they have been trained, and not yet believing in any other standard of honour” (*Rhetoric* 1389b28-30). I think honour would be one among the many other concepts the youth would be learning about throughout their upbringing (above we focused on virtue but honour would be just as important in filling out the concept of the fine). Thus, the youth need to learn that the honour they know and therefore desire is good to a point, but that true honour is reserved for the fine.

Furthermore, they will be taught that the virtuous actions they are learning about will bring them true honour since they are actually fine. In other words, they must learn that true honour is part of their growing concepts of the fine. What is more, they will see that virtuous actions will bring them praise, thereby appealing to their desire for superiority. Such things are taught to the youth in terms of both stages of “the that.” They will be able to say the words about honour and these will eventually become second nature. In this

way the youth will have their interest piqued about virtuous actions and their desire for honour will grow the more they understand it—in terms of aligning their normative universals, desires, pleasures, etc., under the concept of honour—as well as the fine. But, we must say how these desires and pleasures come about.

As we know, part of making a new concept second nature involves appetite training. Thus, the youth's desires and pleasures concerning honour must be refined so that they come to enjoy proper praise and desire true honour. Similar to bodily desire, the natural desires for honour and praise will be molded by habituation. Specifically, this will mean first fostering the groundwork for the virtue that is concerned with small honours (IV.4). A person who desires the types of honours that are dependent on others' praise correctly is one who desires them in the right amount and from the right sources (1125b8-12). The right amount is a mean between extreme honour loving and indifference to honour, while the right people will be those who are equal or superior. So, by guiding the youth to perform actions that will bring reputational honour and rewarding him when he does so, making sure to correct him when he overly desires honour or is seeking honour from the wrong people, over and over, the proper desire for reputational honour will be honed and brought under control. The virtue concerned with small honours will not have been fully developed, but the foundation for it will have been laid. Furthermore, at the same time the youth must also be made to understand that there is more to life than the honours he naturally desires. As Aristotle states, though the desire for them is better than the one for bodily desires, since it is a desire of the soul, it is one of the nonrational part of the soul and therefore not the desire that is part of the best life (1168b15-24). The

youth must be guided to rise above this in order to come to gratify the desires of the rational part of the soul.

The youth must learn to desire true honours. As I said above, the youth must learn to desire the honour that comes from being virtuous. Now that a youth's desire for small honours has been brought under control, he can start to understand true honours—those linked to virtue, the fine, etc. The educator will bring this about in a youth through the same sort of habituation process we have been discussing for the other steps. But, it must be noted there are two building blocks we can recruit for this goal. One is the desire for superiority. The virtuous person is most superior among men and so the desire for superiority must be sculpted to desire this. By guiding the youth to refrain from attempting to become superior over others in ways that are not conducive to virtue and to act in ways that are, as well as punishing them when they desire superiority too much or in comparison with the wrong people, their natural desire can be steered. The second is the natural desire to do fine actions over useful ones. This too should be molded. Again the youth should be guided to do truly fine actions—those that accord with virtue—and to abstain from base ones. In this way, their preference will be educated (they will understand what truly fine actions are and prefer these) as well as refined. In sum then, the desire for superiority, the preference for fine actions and the desire for honour can all be utilized and steered to habituate the youth to desire true honour.

In this fashion, I argue, the youth will come to enjoy virtuous actions for the sake of the fine. The fostering of the desire for true honour will do a great deal of work for a youth's overall pleasure refinement process, since when he comes to desire great honour he will have learned to enjoy and thereby value actions in accord with virtue, which is the

main goal of pleasure refinement we have been discussing. It is clear that early on in a youth's upbringing, the habituation will not be pleasant. For example, when the youth are learning to abstain from bodily pleasures, this will be painful to them. Furthermore, it will not be "fun" at first to perform actions in accord with virtue, as these will no doubt be hard and possibly run contrary to the youth's nature (they may not enjoy giving their resources in fostering generosity for instance). However, as stated above, Aristotle is clear in stating that the actions in accord with virtue are enjoyable to a well brought up youth, and so we must explain this. I think that the pleasure will largely result from the perception of the honour accruing to a youth, as he understands and desires this honour more and more. The more he believes in the truth of the fine nature of virtuous actions as well as the honourable nature of the fine, he will enjoy the actions on account of his desire for such honours. The abstinence from a bodily pleasure might be painful, but the perception that one is getting more honourable will itself be pleasurable. The idea here would be that the desire for the pleasure of gaining honour would outweigh the pain of abstinence that would otherwise encourage the youth to indulge himself, thereby making him pursue the virtuous way.<sup>76</sup> The same will be true of the other virtuous actions. Also, since this desire is for becoming fine the youth has now transitioned from desiring for the sake of reward to desiring for the sake of the fine. We can now say that the youth has reached come to enjoy ethical pleasures. An indication of this is that his desire is now similar to the desire of the virtuous person.<sup>77</sup> The virtuous person takes pleasure in

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<sup>76</sup> A sense of shame will encourage one to act for the sake of such honour as well (chapter 3 Section II.2 and Jimenez 166).

<sup>77</sup> In discussing self-love in *IX.8* of the *NE*, Aristotle calls those who desire honours that are dependent on the praise of others over all else self-lovers in a reproachable sense.

painful actions in nearly the same way.<sup>78</sup> Thus, in learning to desire what is truly honourable—the fine—the youth has come to enjoy virtuous actions for the sake of the fine and has therefore properly refined his pleasures. He now has a taste for unqualified, ethical pleasures.

The missing link to valuing virtuous actions is now in place: in coming to understand the relation of the virtues to the fine, and simultaneously coming to desire the fine through habituation, the youth has come to value virtuous actions for the sake of the fine. He has therefore acquired “the that”: the love of the fine, meaning the enjoyment of virtuous actions for the sake of the fine.

## Chapter Summary

The purpose of this chapter was to outline Aristotle’s proposed process of pleasure refinement, a crucial component of coming to have *the beginnings*. This pleasure refinement involved both intellectual and appetitive progress. We have split these apart in our discussion but in the life of the youth, we should note that they will likely happen in tandem. The intellectual progress was the development of *phronesis* (to a limited extent). While developing good dispositions that act as a type of universal for him, a youth learns both normative and imperfect universals, which become increasingly reliable the more he applies them and experiences exceptions to them. Furthermore, he learns to organize these universals as well as his appetitive notions (his refining desires, pleasure, pains,

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However, the person seeking the fine for himself is a self-lover in a good sense. Thus, if the youth can learn to desire the fine for himself, he has learned to desire honour in the way the virtuous person does since the fine is truly honourable.

<sup>78</sup> We see this from the example of bravery. As Aristotle states, “the brave person will find death and wounds painful, and suffer them willingly, but he will endure them because that is fine” (1117b8-10).

etc.) under the concepts of virtue and the fine and make choices based on his understanding of these concepts. The appetitive progress involved steering a youth's natural desires towards the fine and the acquisition of virtuous dispositions. Again, through habituation as well as reward and punishment, a youth comes to moderate his desire for bodily pleasure as well as his desire for reputational honours, eventually learning to desire true honours—those linked to the pursuit of the fine. Thus, through this intellectual and appetitive progress a youth comes to enjoy acting virtuously for the sake of the fine.

## **Chapter 3: Emotional Training**

### **Introduction**

In this chapter, I outline the process of emotional development that is another outcome of a good upbringing as well as a necessary element for learning *the beginnings*. The situation is the same as it was for pleasure refinement. Aristotle does not give a thorough explanation of this training, but I believe that we can paint a detailed picture by bringing together his comments on this subject found in many of his works. I therefore propose to consider two main aspects of emotional training: belief and perceptual judgement training as well as habituation, involving the development of a sense of shame. First, I look at belief and perceptual judgement training. Since each emotion is aroused by a perceptual judgement that is often informed by beliefs about one's social circumstances, part of emotional training will involve educating the beliefs of a youth regarding his social world as well as training his ability to accurately perceive situations where these beliefs are relevant. Second, I look at habituation, discussing how the guided repetition of certain actions combined with a reward and punishment system can train a youth's emotions. Here I start by looking at how proper shame is fostered and how it functions. As an ethical pain at base actions, shame is a powerful tool for moral development in that it helps prevent base actions. With this in mind I look at each of the emotions discussed in Chapter I to see how proper habituation can train the emotional dispositions of a youth for the better.

## I The Goal

The second main element needed for the possession of *the beginnings* is properly trained emotions. In other words, part of having “enjoyment or pain in the correct things” means feeling the pleasures, pains and desires of emotions in ways that are conducive to virtue (Sherman, *Fabric* 166). It is important that youth begin to feel emotions “at the right times, about the right things, toward the right people, for the right end, and in the right way” (1106b 21-24). As we discussed in Chapter II, the youth are naturally prone to a number of emotions, and all of them in an extreme way. Also recall that, in the part of the soul that does not have reason but can listen to reason (i.e. the desiring or appetitive part), there are emotions (*pathê*), capacities (*dunamis*), and dispositions (*hexeis*) (Section III of Chapter I). A recapitulation here with some more detail will be helpful.

Emotions are anger, fear, bodily desires, shame, etc. In one place Aristotle describes emotions (*pathê*) as “bodily reactions,” focusing on the characteristic expressions these cause on the face or on the rest of the body (1128b10-17). For example, he discusses the way shame makes one blush or the way fear makes one pale, and so on. However, in other places he includes the cognitive dimensions of emotions (*NE* II.5 and *Rhetoric* II.2). Furthermore, Aristotle states that emotions are “without decision” (1106a4). We might say then that a *pathê* is whatever emotion is affecting the person in the moment, with all its general characteristics. Capacities we decided might be the way emotions have gone out of control, the natural inclination of a person towards certain emotions, or simply the capability to feel an emotion. It is hard to determine exactly which description applies since Aristotle seems to associate all three ideas with capacities, depending on which work you are reading. Fortunately, Aristotle is clear

about the definition of states (Irwin Trans.) or dispositions (Rowe Trans. and the translation I use for this term) (*hexis*). Dispositions are most important to our discussion here. These are how one has taken control of an emotion so to speak, for good or for bad. They are in a sense stable since they are one's disposition to feel an emotion. As such they require decision, meaning that one can control how they are shaped to an extent (1106a4-5). This chapter is dedicated to understanding how dispositions are shaped, but for now it will suffice to say that when one feels an emotion in a certain way, if felt over and over, a disposition is formed. Furthermore, emotional dispositions characterize some of the virtues (i.e. mildness, bravery, proper indignation, etc.). In Aristotle's words, "by states [or dispositions] I mean what we have when we are well or badly off in relation to feelings" (1105b27-28). Hereafter I will refer to *pathê* as emotions and *hexis* as emotional dispositions so as to give an indication of their stability (emotional states brings to mind how one is feeling in the moment rather than how one is predisposed to feel in the moment).

Aristotle states that habituation can mold emotional dispositions. The virtues that involve emotional dispositions entail that one has trained oneself (and also one has been trained) to actually feel an emotion in a good way—to the right extent and towards the right person, etc. Conversely, the vices mean that one has been habituated to feel emotions in extreme ways, either too much or too little. This is certainly true of anger, fear, and confidence, since these have dispositions associated with them. Aristotle also assigns dispositions to indignation and shame (1108a31-b7), as these should be brought to means too (1108a31). However, Aristotle does not mention dispositions that correspond to pity, emulation, love or hate. It is uncertain then if we can talk of training

dispositions to feel these emotions properly. We can though talk about feeling these emotions towards the right people, at the right times, in the right circumstances, etc., since to err in any of these ways would not be helpful for an individual. Therefore, I will speak of these as if they had dispositions, realizing that we may be going to far with our terminology but certainly not too far in knowing that they should be trained along with the other emotions to encourage virtuous action and development.

One main job of a proper upbringing then is to develop good emotional dispositions in a youth, disposing him to feel emotions in ways that are conducive to virtue. Largely we will see that this will mean fostering the feeling of shame at base actions and affections. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, having shame is what Aristotle means by being pained by base actions; one is pained by doing base actions because one takes shame in doing them. But, we will also look at how a youth might be guided to act and feel in ways that will foster good emotional disposition. Overall, a proper upbringing will involve bringing about the emotional dispositions that the virtuous person would have, as outlined in the Chapter I, and making sure the ones not proper to a virtuous person are kept out of the youth's emotional repertoire. I begin with a look at belief and perceptual judgement training.

## **II The Means to Emotional Training**

### ***1. Belief and Perceptual Judgement Training***

It is important that a youth is educated during his upbringing to have correct beliefs about the social world around him so that his emotions are excited in the appropriate circumstances. If we recall from the first chapter, each emotion is aroused by a judgment informed by beliefs about one's social circumstances. For example, when a

person judges himself to have been slighted by someone equal or inferior to himself, he will become angry with that person. Thus, we can infer it will be important that a youth is educated about his social standing in the society he is being brought up in.<sup>79</sup> We can infer that Aristotle would have the youth learn who his superiors, equals and inferiors are, as well as how this will change as he ages. For instance, he should learn that as a youth and young adult he will be in the position of being ruled until he reaches the appropriate age when he himself can take a turn ruling, and he therefore must treat those who are older than him with the respect reserved for a ruler (*Politics* 1332b38-43).

More generally, the youth will need to learn what constitutes proper social status. Aristotle distinguishes between the good citizen and the good man. I believe the youth will be educated in this distinction and that this will inform the respect he pays to others. In the *Politics*, Aristotle defines a good citizen as one who can rule, and be ruled, well (1277a25-b16). Since there are many types of societies, there will therefore be many types of good citizens. However, the good man is distinct from the good citizen. He is the fully virtuous person described in the *NE*—the one who possesses all the character virtues as well as *phronesis* (1277b16-33). So, the youth must be taught this distinction since this will inform his notion of status as he ages. As his conceptual development occurs, as discussed in the previous chapter, and subsequently his valuing of the fine grows, he will understand more and more who is worthy of the most respect among his fellow citizens: the good citizens and good men.

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<sup>79</sup> We should note that the students Aristotle refers to when discussing a proper upbringing are those who will one day be citizens—those who give judgement and hold office in their city-state (*Politics* 1275a22-24). Aristotle is therefore not thinking that slaves, farmers, mechanical or commercial workers, etc., will receive this type of education (*Politics* 1291a40-b30)

Since each emotion is aroused by a perceptual judgement that is informed by beliefs involving people of various social standings, the proper understanding of these circumstances will inform these judgements, and thereby affect whether one has proper emotional reactions to these event.<sup>80</sup> If a youth is trained to have the right beliefs about his position in society this will allow him to be angered by the appropriate people: those who are equal or inferior to him. Conversely it will prevent him from being angered by those he should not—his superiors, especially those who are good citizens and good men. Similarly, knowing who his equals are will allow him to feel emulation, as well as the love that initiates friendships. Also, knowing who are good citizens and good men, and by extension those who are bad, will inform the youth’s hatred, pity and indignation. Since hatred is meant for those who are part of a base group of people, the youth will know who to feel this towards. Also, since pity is for those who do not deserve the evil that befalls them and indignation is for those who don’t deserve the good that has come to them, knowledge of whether a person is truly good or base will be crucial for feeling these emotions appropriately. Lastly, correct beliefs about social standing will also influence how well one feels shame, an important emotion whose role I will describe below. Recall, the youth are characterized by extremes in love, hate, anger and pity, the

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<sup>80</sup> For a similar view, see Sherman, “Emotional Agents.” In her words, “wise and discerning perception informs wise and discerning emotions” (156). However, Sherman argues a change in beliefs is all that is needed to alter emotional reactions and I disagree with this view. Since emotions involve a type of pleasure and/or pain as well, habituation will largely be needed so as to shape this element of each emotion if the overall emotion is to be trained (I discuss this below). It seems though Sherman relaxes this stance in *Fabric* (See especially Chapter 5, Section 4). Here she argues that training in judgement is essential to having correct emotional responses but she also recognizes the need for habituation of the desires, pleasures and pains that are also part of each emotion.

education of their beliefs will be crucial to training these to be more moderate and directed towards appropriate people. Also, the desire for honour in the youth will mean they will feel shame somewhat naturally and therefore correct beliefs about true honour will be essential in training this emotion.

I think Aristotle is clear in stating that more than belief education is needed for skilled perceptual judgement. The better one can perceive an event, the more in tune his emotions will be to reality and the better one's emotional dispositions, the more one's perception will be properly reinforced. In other words, perception influences emotional arousal and one's emotional dispositions influence one's perception. Stephen Leighton points out that generally, in *De Anima*, Aristotle holds there are two ways we can think of someone perceiving something—perception *per se* and perception *par accidens*.

Perception *per se* can be thought of as the perception without judgment or belief.

Perception *par accidens* is the perception in terms of how we perceive an event after a judgment has been made about the event and a belief has been formed. Perception *par accidens* happens involuntarily, immediately after the perception *per se* is made. Take for example, the hearing of a loud noise (perception *per se*). Almost automatically, one might judge and therefore believe the loud noise to be a gunshot (perception *par accidens*), though it was actually a car backfiring. Emotional dispositions can and will be set into action by the perception *par accidens* and will in turn reinforce that perception, whether it was correct or not.<sup>81</sup> Leighton's view is supported by Aristotle's brief discussion of

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<sup>81</sup> Here I differ slightly from Leighton's interpretation. He states simply that the emotion will be responsible for supporting the perception *par accidens*, thereby conflating the emotion (*pathê*) with the emotional disposition (*hexis*). As I have stated above and in

anger in the *NE*. Explaining spirit (*thumos*), which Leighton takes to be synonymous with anger, Aristotle says, “reason or appearance has shown that we are being slighted or wantonly insulted; and spirit, as though it had inferred that it is right to fight this sort of thing, is irritated at once” (1149a32-33). The idea here is that the moment a perception *par accidens* is made about an event, the emotion is aroused in the way we are disposed to feel it and to the extent that we feel it we are encouraged to believe it is the true perception. In other words, as Leighton argues, emotional dispositions cause us to make a judgment about what we perceive prematurely, without all the facts, thereby reinforcing the perceptual judgement that aroused the emotion and in turn exacerbating the feeling (12).<sup>82</sup>

On top of emotional disposition training, which will be discussed below, Leighton alerts us to the fact that training and experience will be needed for the youth to get better at judging situations. Through training, the youth must develop a skill for accurately perceiving situations so that what he perceives (*par accidens*) matches what really happened. Experience will also help in this. The more experiences a youth has with the various scenarios of virtue (i.e. fearsome situations for courage, angering situations for mildness, etc.) the more he will learn from his mistakes and develop skill at reading the particulars of a situation, though his experiences will be very limited compared to those of the fully virtuous person (Sherman, *Fabric* 191-193). The combination of training and experience thereby helps him to perceive well and this has a positive impact on the way his emotions are aroused. It will gradually allow the youth to prevent himself from being

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chapter 1, Aristotle is clear that it is the emotional disposition of a person that will influence them (either their beliefs or actions).

<sup>82</sup> Also, see Konstan (37), and Sherman, *Fabric* (170-171).

“afraid of what is frightening as though it were frightening” (1115b15-16), getting angry when he shouldn’t (1149a32-33), feeling pity towards those he shouldn’t, and feeling all of the other emotions when he shouldn’t. I now turn to the habituation of emotional dispositions, keeping the need for belief education as well as for training in perceptual judgement in mind.

## **2. Habituation**

Here I look at how the emotional dispositions can be trained through habituation. At a young age, the youth only do what is pleasant to them and abstain from what is painful and this characterization applies to emotional training as well. If the youth are to be trained to have good emotional dispositions at an early age, they must be steered at first by their natural pleasures, pains and desires to develop an enjoyment for virtuous actions. This is because, up until the point where they can begin to make choices that are not based on a desire for pleasure and aversion for pain, the youth “do not willingly tolerate anything that is not made pleasant for them” (*Politics* 1340b15-16). Thus, the reward and punishment system will be needed here to train the dispositions in younger youths, along with guided action. Furthermore, in Chapter II I discussed how a youth’s refining pleasure encourages training those emotions that characterize virtues—as the youth develops a desire for true honour, virtuous actions (including those related to emotions) will become pleasant and for the sake of the fine. Now, in this chapter, I look at the emotion of shame and discuss generally how this emotion restrains youth from doing base actions as their notions of the fine and honour develop. With this general understanding of shame in mind as well as the general pleasure refinement discussed above I then look at the specific emotions to see how they are trained. As Aristotle states,

“a state [of character] results from [the repetition of] similar activities” (1103b21-22 and cf. II.2). What we do in situations that arouse an emotion, if done over and over, will shape the emotional disposition, for good or for bad. Such repetition is to be understood in the light of the action refining process I mentioned in Chapter 2. Let us now investigate this notion in more detail as it pertains to emotions.

## **Shame**

Shame is pain at doing something that will harm one’s reputation (Chapter 1 Section IV). In the *NE*, Aristotle describes shame as a “fear of disrepute” (1128b11-12). Also, one can feel shame at the thought of doing something base in the future, at the fact that one has been caught doing a base action in the present, or at the memory of doing something base, for all these thoughts would involve fear of disrepute.

In a way shame is a naturally felt emotion. We know that the youth care deeply about their honour and reputation. Thus, if they were caught doing something that could harm their honour and bring them into disrepute it seems they would naturally feel shame. Furthermore, we might think it a common thing to be concerned about the opinion of others. Certainly, the fact that Aristotle included shame in the *Rhetoric*, which was meant to teach orators how they might arouse emotions in people to their advantage, seems to imply that Aristotle thought shame to be a natural emotion. However, what Aristotle says in the *NE X.9* seems to argue against this.

In *X.9* Aristotle compares the “many” to those who are civilized among the youths, those who have been brought up properly, stating that the former avoid base actions because of penalty while the latter avoid base actions because of a sense of shame. He states that the many “naturally obey fear, not shame; they avoid what is base

because of the penalties, not because it is disgraceful” (1179b11-12). Aristotle observes that the laws of one’s society are such that they should prohibit base actions (*NE* 1103b1-5). He therefore states that most people refrain from breaking these laws, thereby refraining from base actions, out of fear of penalty. It seems therefore that Aristotle is asserting humans naturally avoid performing base actions only out of fear of penalty. However, unlike the many, a well brought up youth avoids base actions, not because of fear of punishment, but because of a sense of shame. Keeping in mind that shame is defined as a kind of fear, we might say that a well brought up youth has therefore learned to fear the correct thing: rather than feeling fear of penalty he has learned to fear disrepute. So, Aristotle seems to be saying that shame is both naturally occurring and not naturally occurring.

On top of this, shame appears to be an emotion that should not be felt by the virtuous person. In Chapter 1 Section IV, we saw that Aristotle seems to argue that the virtuous person should not feel shame. As he says, “the feeling of shame is suitable for youth, not for every time of life ... no one ... would praise an older person for readiness to feel disgrace, since we think it wrong for him to do any action that causes a feeling of disgrace” (1128b17-23). So, shame may be an emotion that comes into being in youth and then is expected to go away when the youth gets older.

I think we can solve this puzzle in one of two ways. Either shame occurs naturally though the youth need training to feel it at base actions for the sake of the fine, or the youth need training both to have a primitive form of shame and to eventually feel it at base actions, for the sake of the fine. Furthermore, when a youth grows into adulthood and progresses further towards full virtue he will not need the emotion as he did in his

youth since he will have more self-control and *phronesis*, enabling him to make the right choices. However, on my interpretation, the shameful will never stop being a motive for avoiding base actions.

It is hard to tell whether shame is naturally occurring. As I said, on first glance it seems Aristotle thought it was. However, what Aristotle says in *NE I.5* may indicate otherwise. In discussing the three types of lives that people tend to lead, Aristotle says, “the many, the most vulgar, would seem to conceive the good and happiness as pleasure, and hence they also like a life of gratification.” While, “the cultivated people, those active [in politics], conceive the good as honour” (1095b17-23). This may mean that shame is not a naturally occurring emotion. It could point to the fact that Aristotle is discussing youth that are “cultivated” in some sense, possibly referring to those born into freeborn families that have citizen status (those who can engage in politics) and not slaves or barbarians.<sup>83</sup> Thus, the youth he talks about in the *Rhetoric* who characteristically desire honour are those who have somehow learned to value honour over bodily pleasure because of their family origin and all that this entails for their upbringing in comparison to non-citizens. This would make sense since the *Rhetoric* is after all meant to teach an orator how he might sway the opinion of those in the jury or those who are lawmakers (i.e. citizens). On this interpretation, this desire for honour would therefore not be present in all youth but only the “cultivated” ones he refers to in the *Rhetoric*. But, regardless of whether shame occurs naturally, the type of shame that restrains base actions does not.

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<sup>83</sup> This brings up an interesting interpretational issue that I cannot investigate here. Are “the many” in *X.9* then non-citizens, i.e. those not active in politics?

In the *NE II.3*, we learn that the type of shame that restrains base actions needs cultivation to come about. Here, Aristotle contrasts the three motivations for choosing an action—the fine, the expedient, and the pleasant—with the three motivations for avoiding an action—the shameful, the harmful, and the painful (1104b31-34). He also says, about these “the good person is correct and the bad person is in error, especially about pleasure” (1104a34-35). In terms of the three objects of choice, all three constitute legitimate motivations. For example, a good person will choose things because they are pleasant in order to fulfill various practical needs. But an ultimate motivation for the virtuous person will be what is fine (I cannot get into a debate here about what the expedient means and whether it will also be an ultimate motivation). So, part of the virtuous person’s motivation may be a (correct) pleasure but he will choose to pursue this pleasure only if it is also fine to do so. As we saw in the last chapter, such a motivation does not occur naturally but takes much guidance, experience, understanding, etc., to come about. Similarly, the virtuous person will know when to avoid things for the sake of pain (say avoiding a fearsome situation that would yield unnecessary injury) but this too may be done because such an act would also be shameful. The difference with this case is that the shameful is not a motivation on par with the fine. Ultimately, one avoids the shameful because such an action would not be fine. Like the motivation for the fine, this motivation too then would not occur naturally but would require much guidance, experience, understanding, etc., for it to come about.

The type of shame that is most important for Aristotle therefore does not occur naturally in the many. If we compare *II.3* with *X.9* we can say that the many will not understand what it means to be motivated by the fine, but will always act for the sake of

pleasure (cf. *I.5*), and even on this point they will likely get things wrong. Likewise, the many will avoid actions for the sake of pain and not understand what it means to avoid actions for the sake of the shameful. However, the “civilized” youth, who has received a good upbringing, has learned to choose and avoid actions for the sake of the fine and shameful respectively.

The type of shame discussed in *II.3* and *X.9* is a motivation for the youth with a good upbringing, and not the many, because it is an ethical pain at base actions that must be refined in the youth. Shame is a fear of “disrepute” and as such it is a pain at a situation that brings about disrepute. Such situations are by and large ones where one is caught doing a base action. Furthermore, since shame is a motivation that serves the fine (we avoid shameful actions because they are not fine) we can say that shame is an ethical pain. As a youth understands the fine and is motivated by it, his shame becomes an ethical pain. We should note that this entails a shift from ultimately caring about reputational honour (the “superficial” kind) to true honour.<sup>84</sup> So, shame is the other side of the pleasure refinement discussed in Chapter 2. As a youth must learn to have ethical pleasures, he must also learn to have the ethical pain of shame.

This may be why in *IV.9* Aristotle says that shame is a good emotion for the youth to feel.<sup>85</sup> He says, “we think it right for young people to be prone to shame, since they

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<sup>84</sup> See Jimenez (especially 145-147). In her words, “fear of disrepute in Aristotle need not mean the *mere* fear of disapproval by others, but it is rather the fear of doing shameful things” (146).

<sup>85</sup> Jimenez sees two further reasons why shame is praiseworthy for the youth to feel (157-160). (1) The youth who have a sense of shame do not follow their passions as the many or the youth’s who do not have shame do, their sense of shame restrains their passions and leads them to do good actions. (2) Also, such youth are ashamed when they make a mistake and perform a base act because they failed to recognize the act as shameful. This

live by their feelings, and hence often go astray, but are restrained by shame; hence we praise young people who are prone to shame” (1128b18-21).<sup>86</sup> The more a youth develops a sense of shame at base actions the more he feels an aversion to them and therefore avoids performing them. Such a youth will still make mistakes, either because his shame failed to win the battle of emotions or because he has failed to recognize a base action as such,<sup>87</sup> but the important thing is that he feels shame when mistakes are made, and even better, at the thought of making them. As the youth grows older and develops a small amount of *phronesis* (Chapter 2 Section II.2), shame becomes less of a restraining emotion (a disposition to feel disgrace) and more of a *reason* for avoiding base actions. In other words, the more the youth comes to value and understand the fine the more he will see the shameful as a proper reason for avoidance. This I think he shares with the virtuous person since I think that *II.3* reveals how the shameful will be a reason for the virtuous person to avoid base actions, though he will no longer be prone to disgrace (cf. 1115a10-17).<sup>88</sup>

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indicates they are on the right track so to speak. (1) Shows how Jimenez would not agree with my interpretation that the youth do have a (limited) power of choice (and a limited amount of *phronesis*) by the time they have reached the end of their upbringing, though she would agree with my ascribing to them a certain understanding of the fine (167-169). Given my understanding of *phronesis* (Chapter 2 Section 2), I do not see how the youth can have enough of a cognitive understanding of the fine to be motivated by it, which Jimenez agrees with though for her shame does the work of carrying through that motivation (164-166), without a limited amount of *phronesis*.

<sup>86</sup> This passage is puzzling. In *X.9*, Aristotle contrasts “the many” who are said to live by their feelings to the “civilized ones among the young people,” while here he states that it is the youth who live by their feelings. Possibly, here he refers to youths who are at an earlier stage of development than those he mentions in *X.9*. Jimenez argues that the youth who have shame do not follow their passions in the way those who do not have shame would (see footnote 86).

<sup>87</sup> See Burnyeat (79) and Jimenez (footnote 7).

<sup>88</sup> Though see Jimenez for a different interpretation (144-145).

Now I look at how shame is trained, or how the natural fear of penalty has been shifted to one of disrepute in the youth. If we take the interpretation that shame does not occur naturally we can infer that at an early stage, when the youth are still motivated by pleasure, they will not have shame but fear of punishment—like the many. This punishment would come from the laws they live under or their educators. It will be this fear (a type of pain) that restrains them from doing base actions.

But as the youth develops, this fear of punishment can be trained into shame: a fear of disrepute (cf. Lawrence 276). As is true of the other emotions, the beliefs that inform the perceptual judgements that arouse shame must be educated. Learning about true honour will be very important for fostering a sense of shame in a youth. Once they reach a certain age,<sup>89</sup> whether naturally or because they have been brought up in family of citizens, the youth become very concerned with their reputation. As such, they will start to feel shame at base actions, if they understand that these actions will hurt their reputation. Furthermore, the same process of training the desire for true honour in a youth, which yields a taste for unqualified, ethical pleasures, will yield proper pain at base actions as well.<sup>90</sup> The more a youth learns about and values true honour, the more he will be pained at the prospect of losing this honour. In this way, his concern is for the fine and not simply reputation. In other words, his shift from the motivation of reputation has shifted to one of the fine. He will fear this while learning about “superficial,” reputational honours as well as about true ones. Also, the more the youth learns to recognize and

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<sup>89</sup> Aristotle does not say how old the youth’s are that he talks about in the *Rhetoric* but I think we can infer that they are adolescents.

<sup>90</sup> Also, see Lawrence. In his words, a love for fine actions “that comes with the practice of doing them, [also involves] a growing displeasure and disappointment with ourselves, embarrassment and shame in front of others, when we fail” (279).

perform virtuous actions, through his conceptual development and guidance in performing virtuous actions, the more he will know about base actions as well. In this way, the youth will learn to feel shame at base actions. Shame trained to this level, as a pain at base actions, is good and praiseworthy since it is an ethical type of pain.<sup>91</sup>

We can also say a little more about this habituation process. Aristotle says that the youth should develop a readiness to feel disgrace—an emotional disposition of shame (1128b17-23). He does not explicitly state how this can come about but we might speculate that it comes from guidance as well as a punishment and simultaneous reward system, until the youth becomes motivated by the fine. Both punishment and reward are involved because base actions, which can hinder character growth, as well as a proper fear felt because of the action, are associated with the feeling of shame. Take for example an event where a youth is angered at the wrong person. This action will hinder his fostering of mildness since he has been angered in an inappropriate way. Therefore, the youth must know that he was wrong to be angered in the way he was and thereby can learn more about appropriate anger. But, if the youth responds with shame after committing this act, though he will be reprimanded for the action, he will be praised for feeling shame—fear at disrepute—rather than simply fear of punishment (*NE* 1128b20). This will continue throughout the habituation project of the youth for all base actions, until the youth develops a disposition of shame, both after doing a base act and at the thought of doing one.

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<sup>91</sup> The fully virtuous person avoids base acts, not because they are simply painful but because he fully understands that they are shameful, meaning they are against the fine (1104b30-35). Likewise, the youth should avoid base actions because he knows they are shameful. This means he understands them as shameful to the extent that he can.

As I said above, shame plays an important role in Aristotle's proposed upbringing for the youth because it restrains base actions. Next, I look at how shame restrains actions. In a general way, shame restrains base actions because the youth comes to find the performance of them painful. If shame is a fear of disrepute, and it has been fostered in a well brought up youth, then it will cause a strong aversion to base actions. Shame allows for base actions to pain the youth. It is perhaps easy to understand how this would work for the virtues that are characterized by actions rather than emotions (i.e. generosity, truthfulness, friendliness, etc.). Looking at generosity, if a youth who is developing shame was being stingy with someone he ought to have been generous with, and he was caught doing this by his educator, he should feel disgrace at this. If shame is felt enough times this should prevent him from repeating that action in the future since he would be afraid to be caught again and therefore have his reputation further damaged. In this way, such actions are painful to the youth and therefore he avoids them. The same would be true for the other virtues that involve action.

We might further attempt to understand how shame works by applying this same idea of shame restraining actions to actions that are tied to extreme emotions, i.e. cowardly or rash actions (bravery), over-done revenge (mildness), licentious behaviour (temperance), etc. For the virtues that involve emotions there is a specific base action connected to them that reveals the improperly felt emotion. Shame likely works to restrain the youth from performing the base action, even though he feels the extreme emotion or at least it will reinforce the fact that he has erred when he makes mistakes, thus teaching him not to do that act again in the future. In terms of the former, I think we can envision a youth who has a sense of shame before performing a base action involving

extreme emotion as engaged in a war of emotions. The emotion and desire that tell him to do the base act would be warring against the sense of shame that tells him not to act.<sup>92</sup>

We can imagine that if the youth's sense of shame were strong enough it would win out and cause the youth to abstain from the base act.<sup>93</sup> For example, if a youth felt an extreme amount of fear in front of people whose opinions are important to him this would bring about a strong feeling of shame since he knows that to act on his fear would be cowardly and would result in disrepute. If the shame were strong enough to win out over the fear, this would prevent him from acting cowardly. But, if the shame did not win out, he would still feel shame at having done the act and hopefully this would bolster his sense of shame, helping it win the war in any similar situations that might come in the future.

As the youth comes closer to the end of his upbringing, developing his understanding of virtue and of the fine and his ability to choose actions based on a motivation of valuing the fine (his *phronesis*), as well as his ability to perform virtuous actions, it seems the youth will not need shame as a disposition to the same extent. Because the youth has now developed more of the power of choice, his sense of shame, rather than being a disposition to feel shame, will become a reason for avoiding virtuous

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<sup>92</sup> In *Fabric*, Sherman describes well how a youth will often make mistakes because of warring emotions but she does not consider shame's role in this (167).

<sup>93</sup> This is similar to what Aristotle says about the relationship between anger and fear in the *Rhetoric*. Discussing the youth he says that their "hot temper prevents fear ... we cannot feel fear so long as we are angry" (1389a26-28). A strong emotion can prevent one from feeling others. Here we are saying that shame prevents actions corresponding to extreme emotions.

actions. It will help him understand what to do in situations where his honour is at stake.<sup>94</sup>

Now I look at the work shame does with each of the emotions and, at the same time, at what other elements are needed to train these emotions. We will see that shame plays the role of restraining the negative aspects of each emotion, meaning those aspects that should be resisted since they cause base actions, in the overall habituation project by helping to prevent the youth from acting an emotion in the wrong ways (cf. Lawrence 275). It therefore does half of the work so to speak in properly training many of the emotions.

## **Of the emotions that characterize virtues**

### **Anger**

First, I look at anger and how an educator might train the emotional disposition associated with anger in a youth to pave the way for the virtue of mildness. As we discussed in Chapter I, anger is an emotion that relates to social status. When one feels that one has been treated in a way that is beneath one's status (i.e. made to feel unimportant), one feels anger. Furthermore, because of one's anger, one desires to seek revenge to correct the slight and balance out the social playing field so to speak. As was stated in Chapter II, the youth are very concerned with reputational honour and therefore easily feel anger. We must see then how this anger can be brought under control. I will discuss three main points: the shaping of the youth's ability to judge in situations where anger will come about; the shaping of the youth's shame where anger is concerned

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<sup>94</sup> We should remember that, as Sherman states, the mature youth will only be brought to the point of continence—choosing a virtuous action or abstaining from a base one even if his emotions or desires sometimes do not agree with that choice (*Fabric* 167).

(restraint from base actions involving anger); and the overall shaping of the youth's emotional disposition of anger (my discussion of each emotional disposition will include these three elements).

If a youth's anger is to be brought under control, their judgments, or perceptions (*par accidens*), that would typically arouse their anger must become trustworthy. Indeed, a youth's beliefs will be educated in the way described above so that he understands with whom he can and should be angry. But, his ability to perceive and therefore judge if a person is truly slighting him must be trained so that he can react properly in situations. Recall, mildness is defined as being "angry at the right things and toward the right people, and also in the right way, at the right time, and for the right length of time" (1125b31-33). When a youth is slighted, he must be guided to react appropriately in terms of perceiving and making the right judgments about the person who has slighted him as well as the slight itself. Also, if a slight is unwarranted or from someone to whom it is not permissible for the youth to become angry at and the youth reacts with the right amount of anger and seeks revenge in the appropriate way, he will be rewarded. Conversely, if the slight was warranted or given by a superior and if the youth reacts with too much anger or seeks revenge inappropriately, maybe beyond what the slight called for, the youth will be punished. Over time, Aristotle believes, the youth will learn to judge situations correctly so that his anger is excited at the proper times.

It seems shame will do a lot of work in controlling the youth's anger. Certainly, when he is too young to feel shame, fear of punishment will hopefully do some work to restrain actions involving extreme younger. When the youth is too young to choose for the sake of the fine but able to feel shame at loss of reputation, the goal will be that the

youth's shame will win the war against his anger when he is feeling anger at the wrong person or in the wrong amount—too long, too much, too little, etc. Here, when a youth makes mistakes and acts basely concerning anger he will be punished, so he knows he has done wrong by feeling anger in such a way, but he must also know that such actions will hurt his reputation and harm his honour. The more this is done, and the more he learns to understand and value true honour (as described in the previous chapter), the more he will feel shame at doing such actions. Note that the more his motivations are oriented around the fine (and the more he is concerned with true honour) the more his shame will be an ethical pain at base actions. All the while, shame will here prevent the base actions that can come from extreme or inappropriate anger. Also, as the youth's sense of shame develops it will be more and more finely tuned to base actions concerning anger and will therefore help him all the more to refrain from such actions. The closer the youth gets to the end of his upbringing and develops a limited amount of *phronesis*, as well as the ability to choose for the sake of the fine, his shame will act as a warning to refrain from base actions involving anger. It will constitute a significant reason for avoiding such actions. In this fashion, shame restrains a child from feeling anger towards the wrong people and even in the wrong ways.

Shame combined with the positive habituation of anger (i.e. habituation of the aspects of anger that need not be resisted) will have a direct affect on the emotional disposition of anger in the youth. Shame governs the habituation of the negative aspects of anger (i.e. those aspects of anger that should be resisted so they cannot cause an action). Shame helps the youth to win his war against inappropriate anger and thereby restrains those actions that would foster base dispositions involving anger. On top of this,

if a youth is guided to perform actions according to his anger appropriately (towards the right people and to the right extent) and praised each time he does so, this will reinforce the limiting effects of shame and promote those feelings of anger that should be acted on. His emotional disposition involving anger will thus be trained to make the youth rightly disposed to anger, fostering mildness.<sup>95</sup>

Furthermore, as the youth's desire for honour is refined in the way discussed in the previous chapter, this will also help improve the youth's emotional disposition regarding anger. Recall, a youth is undergoing a refining process whereby his concept of honour is improved and his desire is shaped to seek true honour as well as to be concerned about reputational honours in the appropriate ways. Anger is about maintaining honour and social status,<sup>96</sup> as the youth learns about true honour and learns to desire reputational honour appropriately this should help with his habituation in feeling anger appropriately. The more moderately he desires reputational honours the less likely he is to get angry at inappropriate times or towards inappropriate people. Furthermore, the more he desires true honour the more his anger will be aroused to appropriately protect this. Thus, the refining of the youth's desire for honour will affect his anger.

### **Fear and confidence**

As the youth's emotional disposition concerning anger is trained for the better, this will have an effect on his disposition associated with fear. Aristotle states that one cannot feel fear while feeling angry (*Rhetoric* 1389a28-9). Thus, since the youth are

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<sup>95</sup> This will allow for him in adulthood to understand why it is right to only feel anger in these ways so he can further train this state and fully foster the virtue of mildness.

<sup>96</sup> As Konstan says, "we might describe the social situation in which anger is triggered or allayed in Aristotle's account as informed by an acute sense of honour, with its intense regard for status, protocols of conduct, and the opinions of others" (73)

prone to anger, Aristotle argues that they do not easily feel fear, for their anger often prevents it. If this goes unchecked in the youth, he will develop the vice of rashness—the extreme state of an absence of fear. This is one reason among many why it is important for the youth’s anger to be controlled. However, the more the youth’s anger is brought under control, the more he will be opened up to the feeling of fear. When this occurs, the emotional disposition involving fear must also be habituated so that the youth does not become a coward.

Part of the habitual training needed to shape the youth’s character state towards bravery will focus on the youth’s fear. Aristotle defines the brave person, “whoever stands firm against the right things and fears the right things, for the right end, in the right way, at the right time, and is correspondingly confident, is the brave person” (1115b18-19). Bravery is a complex virtue and Aristotle is somewhat vague about how exactly the brave person will act. Concerning fear, he will stand firm against those things that are fine or noble to stand firm against (or shameful to flee from) and feel fear only at those times when it would be inhuman to be fearless. In order for the youth to foster bravery, concerning fear he must be habituated to learn when to stand firm and to only feel fear at those times when it would be impossible not to.

Training the perceptual judgements involving fear will be involved here. Through guidance and experience the youth must learn to properly perceive what is frightening for him and what is not (1115b15-16). Such training will be needed to control when the emotion is aroused.

Shame will also play a significant role in this habituation project by restraining base actions involving fear. Again, fear of punishment will function in shame’s place

when the youth is too young to feel shame. But, once old enough, shame will prevent the youth from fleeing fearful situations that he can handle, since doing this would foster a cowardly character. His shame must be trained so that when he feels fear in these situations, his shame will help him win the war against this feeling and prevent him from fleeing. Again, learning about true honour will help. As the youth learns that cowardly acts will drastically hurt his reputation, any time he flees or avoids fearsome situations because of an overwhelming feeling of fear, and he is caught doing this by those whose opinions matter to him, he will feel shame. The more the youth experiences the shame of acting cowardly and feeling inappropriate fear, the more his fear will be restrained, thereby training his emotional disposition concerning fear. Like the other emotions, when the youth grows closer to the end of his upbringing, shame will function as one significant reason among others for choosing to abstain from base actions involving fear.

On top of this, a youth must be guided to enter frightening situations that he should withstand and to avoid those he cannot so that he develops the habits of standing firm at the right times and avoiding situations he cannot handle. As Aristotle states, “if, for instance, someone avoids and is afraid of everything, standing against nothing, he becomes cowardly; if he is afraid of nothing at all and goes to face everything, he becomes rash” (1104a20-23). In other words, a youth must be guided to enter into fearsome situations he can handle, despite his fear, and prevented from entering fearsome situations he cannot handle. One result of this guidance will be an improvement on the youth’s ability to judge, or perceive correctly, these types of situations. Recall from Chapter I, fear is felt when one is in a situation where another can do one harm, meaning the person is more powerful than oneself. This means that experience and a good ability

to perceive and judge situations that would incite fear will be needed for one to be able to properly judge when one is actually in such a position. One must learn who one can defend oneself against, which comes about through the knowledge of one's strength as well as experience regarding the strength of others. Another result will be a training of a youth's positive aspects of his disposition of bravery—those that should be felt so that the youth's fear protects him from overwhelming situations. Fear is not taken out of the virtuous person's emotional repertoire. It is a useful emotion if it can make one avoid situations that are outside of one's ability to handle successfully (the other reason a frightening situation should be avoided is when it has nothing to do with the fine). The same guidance that improved the youth's ability to judge will also train the youth to feel fear at the appropriate times so that he automatically avoids overwhelming situations and therefore does not become rash.

The youth's confidence will also be trained by the same guidance. The improved ability to judge frightening situations in the youth will in turn have an impact on the youth's confidence, the other aspect of bravery. Recall, the youth are naturally hopeful in nature due to their lack of experience. In Aristotle's words, "any expectation of good makes us confident" (*Rhetoric* 1389a28). Thus, because of their hopeful nature, the youth are overconfident. This means that their hopeful nature must be lessened so that they might feel confidence appropriately.<sup>97</sup> As a youth is repeatedly forced to enter and prevented from entering different situations involving fear and confidence, this informs their hopefulness, which will allow for an improvement in their ability to correctly judge

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<sup>97</sup> This is important because Aristotle argues that an overly hopeful person is not truly confident but rather confident out of ignorance (*NE* 1117a9-15). The overly hopeful are not considered brave.

when they should be confident. Being guided in this way will train a youth's emotional disposition of confidence and prepare the youth to continue to foster this aspect of bravery in adulthood.

One last element in a youth that will help with bravery is his developing understanding of honour and the fine. Regarding bravery, the goal for the youth will be to perceive when his honour is at stake, especially his true honour. Aristotle states that the virtuous person stands firm in frightening situations because he is aiming at the fine. In other words, when the virtuous person perceives that the fine thing to do is stand firm, he will do so. This is the goal for the young person as well then. As his ability to understand and recognize the fine increases, he will know when to stand firm and when not to. Furthermore, his developing understanding and desire for true honour will also help him in acting brave. Aristotle states that the person who stands firm to win honours, i.e. praise from others (the reputational type of honour), is like the brave person but not quite, since he is not standing firm for the sake of the fine. It does not seem like a stretch to say that this describes the youth who is eager to gain reputational honour for himself. However, as the youth learns to desire true honour he will desire to act brave for this end and will become more like the virtuous person in this respect. His developing understanding of the fine and of true honour will therefore aid in the training of his emotional dispositions involving fear and confidence.

We have now seen how the emotions that characterize virtues are trained. Next, I look at how the emotions that generally aid in character development might be trained.

## **Of the emotions concerning the fortune and misfortune of others**

### **Indignation and envy**

Proper guidance will be needed to bring about the disposition of proper indignation in the youth and prevent him from feeling envy. Proper indignation means one feels indignation when another receives a good that they do not deserve. Envy is an extreme in relation to proper indignation since this is felt when anyone receives a good, regardless of whether they deserve it or not. A youth's beliefs must be educated so that he understands who is deserving of what. Also, from early on a youth will need to be guided to feel indignation appropriately—i.e. at the acquisition of goods by someone who does not deserve them or refraining from feeling indignation at the acquisition of goods by someone who does deserve them—and rewarded when he does so. Furthermore, a youth will be punished when feeling indignation at inappropriate times so that he does not develop a disposition of envy.

As a youth learns more about the fine, it seems this too will cause him to feel indignation correctly. Recall from Chapter 1, indignation involves judgements about what goods are actually deserved. To feel indignation correctly therefore means that one must accurately judge the goodness of a person in order to judge what they deserve. This can only be done when one understands what constitutes a good or virtuous person. Though it is difficult to say to what extent the youth can recognize good characters in others, since Aristotle is silent on this subject, it seems that the more they understand the fine the more they will recognize these elements in others, even if to a small degree. This ability would

no doubt help them feel indignation more appropriately.<sup>98</sup> The developing sense of shame that accompanies this understanding of the fine should also help the youth from feeling envy, if the youth learns that envy is shameful.

### **Emulation (vs. envy)**

It is important that a youth learns to feel the appropriate emotion and in the appropriate way when he is faced with an equal who has something he desires. This means the youth must learn to experience emulation and not envy. Emulation is characterized as a pain at the perceived attainment of goods that one does not possess by one's equals as well as a desire to gain similar goods for oneself (Chapter 1 Section IV). Emulation is a good emotion for the youth to feel since it will spur them on to attain good things, while envy is not since it does not lead to positive action. Since the youth are desirous of honour and superiority, they will be prone to feel one of these emotions. Due to their competitive nature, it seems likely that they will feel emulation over envy but this should not be left to chance. The youth must be guided to feel emulation over envy in the same ways we have described for the other emotions. Furthermore, when a youth

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<sup>98</sup> I am in danger of contradicting what I will argue in Chapter 4 about the pleasure-based friendships of the youth. If the youth can recognize good characters in others then can't they recognize and subsequently love another youth for their budding good character, thereby initiating an imperfect character-based friendship? I do not think that this can be supported by what Aristotle says about the youth. As I have stated, Aristotle says that the friendships of the young are only pleasure-based ones, since the youth only pursue what they find pleasurable at least up until they learn to value and be motivated by the fine. Also, even for the virtuous person it takes a lot of time to recognize the virtuous character of the other and subsequently love him for it (1158a11-18). Furthermore, character-based friendships are noted to be very rare both because of the time it takes to establish them and the small amount of people that have what it takes to develop them. Thus, stating that a youth can have enough knowledge of the fine to recognize it in others to the extent that he doesn't make as many mistakes involving pity and indignation is very different from saying that two youth can join in an imperfect character-based friendship because they recognize each other's budding virtuous characters.

perceives an equal who has come to have a good that he does not, he must be guided to act so as to attain that good. If these measures are taken the youth will learn to feel emulation over envy.

The youth must also learn to feel emulation in the proper way. Through the habituation project of pleasure refinement, as the youth learns to value the appropriate things (the fine) he will increasingly feel emulation for these in a stronger way than he will for goods that are only useful or neutrally pleasant. Before this time though, the youth will be habituated to feel emulation for the right things by being guided to do so as well as being rewarded when feeling it for good things and punished when feeling it for base things.

### **Pity**

Pity is a pain at the perception of an undeserved evil befalling another. Since the youth are prone to feeling pity, even if it is not warranted, the youth must be habituated, in a similar way to the other emotions, so as to improve his ability to judge when exactly a good or evil is undeserved and to feel pity to the appropriate amount. I should note that it does not seem that this will include the use of shame, since it seems odd to say that feeling pity for the wrong person is shameful. Again, the more a youth learns of the fine, the more his perception of who deserves what will improve, which will no doubt improve his disposition to feel pity appropriately (if we can talk of pity having a disposition).

## **Of the relational emotions**

### **Proper love and hate**

Love and hate are very important emotions since they determine whom one makes friends and enemies with. Therefore, the youth will need to learn who is deserving of

their love and hate. The type of friendship a youth enters into will be shaped and will in turn shape the character of each youth involved (I discuss this in Chapter 4). It is therefore important that a youth is guided to enter into friendships with youth that are also undergoing a good upbringing. This means that the love of the youth must be trained. Similarly, a youth must come to understand who is deserving of hate—those who are a base type of person, whether thieves, or liars, etc. These two emotions can be trained in the same way as the others. Guided habituation, including the use of shame, will allow the youth to judge well whom he should love and hate and it will also properly shape the dispositions of love and hate (Not in the sense that Dow uses (53-54), but as trained dispositions to love properly, if we can refer to such things). The goal would be for a youth to feel shame at the thought of loving or hating undeserving people and to be disposed to feel love or hate for deserving people, meaning his ability to judge who these people are must improve and so must his dispositions concerning these emotions. Furthermore, the more the youth understands and values the fine, the more he will understand who is deserving of his love and hate.<sup>99</sup>

By outlining the appropriate belief training and habituation then, we have now seen how the emotional dispositions of a youth can be trained for the better. As the beliefs of a youth are educated so that he understands his place in his social world and as he develops a skill for judging situations properly, his emotions will increasingly be triggered at the proper times. Furthermore, through guided habituation, especially involving the training of shame, a youth's emotional dispositions themselves are trained

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<sup>99</sup> Again, I am not saying that the youth will develop their ability to love correctly enough so that they can enter into character-based friendships, for the same reasons mentioned earlier.

to be aroused at the appropriate times and to the appropriate extents. Thus, anger, fear and confidence (the emotional dispositions that characterize virtues), as well as emulation, pity, indignation, love, and hate (the emotional dispositions that generally aid in virtuous living, though indignation corresponds to a virtue as well) can be trained in this way to foster fine habits in the youth to encourage virtuous living into adulthood.

## **Chapter Summary**

In this chapter I have outlined a plausible reconstruction of the emotional training that is part of a good upbringing, as drawn from Aristotle's various comments on the subject. I have looked at two main elements of habituation: belief and perceptual judgement training as well as habituation. Since emotions are aroused by a perceptual judgment the ability to judge well must be fostered. Thus, instruction of the beliefs about a youth's social world and his position therein will be needed as well as training to enable the youth to perceive and judge situations accurately. Furthermore, what we have called the emotional dispositions must be habituated through guidance and a reward and punishment system. Shame, we learned, also plays a key role in this habituation process, preventing the negative aspects of many of the emotions. Shame helps prevent the base actions that emotions can cause and thereby contributes to the development of good emotional dispositions. We also noted that the overall conceptual education the youth is undergoing, involving virtue, the fine, as well as true honour, would help with emotional training since it will inform the youth's shame as well as many other aspects of the youth's emotions. Through these elements, proper emotional dispositions are formed in the youth during a good upbringing.

## **Chapter 4: The Friendships of the Youth**

### **Introduction**

We have discussed the pleasure refinement and emotional training that are part of a proper upbringing but our discussion would be incomplete if we did not examine friendship's role in these elements of a good upbringing. Aristotle reminds us that a human is a "naturally political [animal]," not meant for solitude but in need of friends, family and fellow citizens to live a happy and virtuous life (1097b9-12 and cf. IX.9). Thus, I believe that friendship will have a significant role in a good upbringing.

In this chapter, drawing on what Aristotle says about friendship in various places of the *NE*, I discuss friendship's potential role in refining pleasure and pain and training emotions. Essentially, I interpret friendship to serve a supplemental role, similar to musical education. I go through the following steps in my discussion. First, I look at Aristotle's conception of friendship and second, I reveal how friendships might help in pleasure refinement during a youth's upbringing, both in the early stages, when a youth's motivation is pleasure, and the later stages, when a youth's motivation is the fine. Through supervised group activities that mimic virtuous activities, pleasure driven youth can become disposed to enjoy virtuous actions. Note this idea is pure speculation, being Aristotelian in spirit but not explicitly mentioned by Aristotle himself. Furthermore, friendships formed around ethical pleasures can positively shape the pleasures and emotional dispositions of the more mature youth who are motivated by the fine by setting up a kind of cycle. Herein, a youth and his friend, whose pleasures are being increasingly refined through their upbringing, positively mold their naturally formed pleasure-based

friendship, which in turn molds the two youth for the better.

## I Aristotle's Conception of Friendship

Aristotle's preliminary definition of friendship is a mutual awareness of "reciprocated goodwill" (1156b34). True friendship therefore has three significant qualities. First, in true friendship each friend wishes the other well for his own sake, meaning there is no instrumental treatment of each other.<sup>100</sup> Secondly, there is reciprocal goodwill. Thirdly, both are aware of this goodwill.<sup>101</sup> In other words, it is not enough that two people have goodwill towards each other but do nothing to let each other know about this.

In *IX.4* of the *NE*, Aristotle expands on this definition and begins to reveal how only the virtuous person can engage in a complete form of friendship. Aristotle argues that complete friendship mirrors the good person's relationship with himself. He asserts that friendship and the relationship a virtuous person has with himself share the same components, such as enjoying each other's company, wishing the unqualified pleasure of the awareness of living as a virtuous person, sharing in one another's joys and sorrows, sharing goals and values, etc. For this reason, Aristotle asserts that complete friendship stems from the virtuous person's self-love (1166b27-9), and it is in this sense that

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<sup>100</sup> As Cooper points out, friendship understood in this preliminary sense can be present in a wide range of relationships, whether familial, political, civic, business, etc. (621).

<sup>101</sup> See *Philosophical Introduction* by Sarah Broadie. Here she includes four components, the three that I include as well as "the good will on both sides is founded on one of the three lovable qualities" (58). I discuss this last point below.

Aristotle calls a friend another self (1166a31).<sup>102</sup> The relationship present in complete friendship is so similar to the virtuous person's relationship with himself that he loves the friend as himself.<sup>103</sup> This amounts to the conclusion that without this type of self-love, one cannot engage in complete friendship and therefore only the virtuous person can be a true friend.

With this standard in mind, Aristotle considers three relationships that are commonly considered friendship—utility-based, pleasure-based, and character-based relationships. He concludes that character-based relationships are the complete form of friendships, while the others are considered friendships only insofar as they resemble character-based ones (1157a31-3). He comes to this conclusion by comparing the three lovable. In *VIII.2* and *VIII.3*, Aristotle argues that there are three objects of love—what is useful, what is pleasant, and what is good. As such, there are three types of friendship, each corresponding to one of the three objects of love (1156a8-9). In utility-based friendships, each friend is loved because he is useful in some way for the other, while in pleasure-based friendships, each friend is loved for the pleasure he brings the other.<sup>104</sup> In

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<sup>102</sup> I have found Whiting's discussion of this helpful. She argues that a virtuous person loves himself because of the good he possesses (291). In other words, the virtuous person loves himself insofar as he possesses the virtuous dispositions as these make up the character he values. Likewise, the virtuous person loves the good in his friend in an impartial way (293). Since a full virtuous disposition is an objective thing, not varying in nature with each individual, it is in this way that the friend is loved as another self.

<sup>103</sup> I have purposely kept my discussion of self-love, and the friend as another self, simple. It is worth noting though that true self-love will not be selfish in nature. Julia Annas makes this clear in asserting that the virtuous person will wish unqualified goods for himself, such as the development of virtuous dispositions, and these can only be attained if one seeks these goods for their own sake and not for personal gain (258-60). Actually, to act in a self-interested way negates an otherwise virtuous act.

<sup>104</sup> Cooper rightly points out that in utility-based and pleasure-based friendships each individual only conceives of the other as possessing the relevant object of love. There is

character-based friendships, each friend loves the other for his good and virtuous character. These friendships fulfill all of the criteria discussed above and are therefore termed the “complete” or primary type of friendship (1156b7 and 1157a33). The other two types of friendships fulfill some but not all of the criteria and are therefore not complete.

## **II Friendship’s Role in Pleasure-Refinement and Emotional Training**

Having seen Aristotle’s conception of friendship I now look at how friendship might aid in the pleasure refinement of the youth who are young and motivated by reward and punishment—i.e. those who are still motivated by pleasure.

### ***Friendships in Early Youth***

Here I speculate that the youth who are motivated by pleasure can benefit from a sort of guided club, similar to modern day Boy Scouts, where an educator supervises a group of youth in activities that would contribute to character growth.<sup>105</sup> These youth are too young to form lasting friendships. As Aristotle says,

The cause of friendship between young people seems to be pleasure. For their lives are guided by their feelings, and they pursue above all what is pleasant for themselves and what is at hand . . . hence they are quick to become friends and quick to stop; for their friendship shifts with [what they find pleasant], and the change in such pleasure is quick. (1156a32-b1)

Nevertheless, such youth might benefit from group activities that are supervised by an educator. Such activities would likely take place at the gymnasium, which was meant for

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always a possibility of being mistaken in this (626). However, this possibility is higher in utility-based friendships than pleasure-based. This underscores the need for intimacy in long lasting friendships.

<sup>105</sup> I am indebted to Professor Gregory MacIsaac of Carleton University for this idea.

overall education, especially physical education (OCD “gymnasium”). Through the educator’s guidance, this group would take part in activities that mimic virtuous ones in some way. They might learn to wrestle or about the proper way to fight a battle. Since these activities resemble virtuous ones, if made to be pleasant, the youth will learn to associate the pleasure of the group activity with the virtuous activities they are imitating. To illustrate further, we can compare this idea to the way musical education encourages an enjoyment of ethical pleasures.

In the *Politics* 8.5, Aristotle argues that music can be recruited as a stimulus to the enjoyment of virtuous actions in the youth. Essentially, Aristotle argues: (1) music actually imitates virtuous actions and the virtues of character. (2) If we have the habit of feeling pleasure in the presence of the imitation then we will enjoy the original as well. (3) The other types of art do not imitate character traits or dispositions. Therefore, music alone, in comparison to the other arts, encourages the enjoyment of ethical pleasures in the youth. By participating in music that imitates virtues often enough, while feeling pleasure at the experience, a youth can learn to take pleasure in actual virtuous actions (1339b42-1340b20). This is largely because the young naturally find music pleasant. So, if the youth can be guided to listen to, and take part in, music enough times so that they take pleasure in songs that imitate virtuous actions, they will come to take pleasure in the actual virtuous actions. Coupled with the habituation process already going on during a youth’s upbringing, this will have significant impact on the pleasures of the young.

The group activities we are discussing would work in a similar manner to music in refining the pleasures of the youth. If done right, these groups of “friends” who are performing activities that imitate virtuous activities would be pleasant to the youth

involved. Thus, similar to the way music makes virtuous actions pleasant, the natural pleasantness of the group activities should help to make the youth disposed to enjoy the actual virtuous activities they are imitating.

I think we can say that emulation will play a role here as well. Aristotle states, when younger, a “youth is eager for superiority over others” (*Rhetoric* 1389a13). Therefore, competition between youth will naturally arise in these groups. This competition can be utilized to promote good actions because of emulation, as long as the youth are learning to feel emulation over envy. Since the group performs good activities, when one youth does particularly well at the activity, and is praised for this, the others will desire such praise as well due to their competitive nature. If they are guided to feel emulation over envy here, this emulation will spur them on to perform similar actions that will warrant similar praise.

Supervised groups that perform good activities then would seem to provide a powerful supplement to the overall pleasure refinement the youth are undergoing. This has been only speculation though since I have not found an example of these groups in Aristotle’s writings, though they likely existed at his time. But, the idea is certainly Aristotelian in spirit. Having discussed the beneficial “friendships” of the youth who are motivated by pleasure, I now discuss the beneficial pleasure-based friendships of the more mature youth who are motivated by the fine.

## ***Friendships in Later Youth***

The friendships of the youth at any age, according to Aristotle, are pleasure-based ones (*NE* 1156a35-1156b4).<sup>106</sup> What is interesting is that Aristotle states these can very much resemble character-based friendships. In pleasure-based friendships, the youth are more likely to be generous with each other (1158a18-28), less liable to disputes (1162b14-15), and will desire to spend time together (1156b5-7). In fact, it is arguable that even in these types of friendships each individual will have a degree of goodwill for the sake of the other, though of a different kind than the type present in complete friendship.<sup>107</sup> Indeed, often the pleasure-based friendships of the youth are formed because each brings some type of neutral pleasure to the other (neutral pleasures are discussed in Chapter 1 Section I). But, since pleasure-based friendships are natural for the youth and they resemble character-based friendships, which are crucial for the virtuous person, could they be used to supplement the overall pleasure refinement project of older youths who are motivated by the fine if they are formed around ethical pleasures such as those that accompany virtuous actions?<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> In the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle goes so far as to say that the youth “have not yet come to value their friends or anything else by their usefulness to themselves” (1389b1-2).

<sup>107</sup> Cooper argues that pleasure-based friendships cannot be wholly self-centered but rather include a mutual wishing goods for the friend’s own sake, which is the same as that present in character-based friendships (629-643). It is just that one wishes goods for his friend in a constrained way, bound by the foundation of the friendship which distinguishes this type of goodwill from the type present in character friendships. A pleasure-based friend cannot wish for goods for his friend that will take away the pleasure the friendship is based on. However, as Pakaluk shows, Cooper’s argument is inconsistent with Aristotle’s view that there are particular kinds of goodwill present in the three types of friendship, with character-based friendship possessing the most complete kind of goodwill (Pakaluk 476). Rather, Pakaluk argues that natural friendliness in humans brings a degree of goodwill to each friendship.

<sup>108</sup> As Whiting points out, Aristotle allows that a pleasure-based friendship can evolve into a character-based one, if the friends “have become fond of one another’s characters”

Here it might be argued that pleasure-based friendships cannot be based on anything beyond neutral pleasures and that any friendship based on something more is a character-based friendship of some sort. I do not see evidence for this in what Aristotle says about the youth and about friendships in general. First, Aristotle only says that pleasure-based friendships are based on the love of the pleasant (1155b20-19). He does not distinguish between ethical and neutral pleasures here, leaving it open to interpretation that one can love a friend because of the ethical pleasures he brings. Second, I do not think Aristotle would allow for the possibility of character-based friendships during youth, given the difficulty of forming them. As I have said, even for the virtuous person it takes a lot of time to recognize the virtuous character of another and subsequently love him for it (1158a11-18). I think that a youth can however easily form a friendship that brings the pleasures of two people learning about and pursuing virtue. We can imagine many reasons for this. For example, the developing sense of honour in a youth would mean that he would enjoy the praise given from his friend when he performs a virtuous action in his friend's presence and would refrain from doing base actions because he does not want to lose his honour. So, if two youth who are near the end of their upbringing and who are motivated by the fine are to engage in a good form of friendship, it seems their only option is an ethical pleasure-based one (i.e. one that is based on ethical pleasures).

To support this I first look more at what Aristotle says about pleasure-based friendships between two youth. Since Aristotle asserts pleasure-based friendships shift

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(286). It seems to me that pleasure-based friendships that are formed around the developing taste for ethical pleasures in two youth could very well be one type of situation where this occurs.

with what each friend finds pleasant, as two youth's pleasures are increasingly refined it seems possible that they will have a positive shaping effect on their friendships and that this friendship could therefore be recruited to aid in a youth's proper upbringing. In his words, as youth "grow up [what they find] pleasant changes too ... for their friendship shifts with [what they find] pleasant" (1156a35-1156b4). As we have seen above, he is arguing here that this is why the friendships of the youth do not last because the majority of the youth are ruled by their passions. But, I argue that we can apply this to two youth who have developed good habits, a limited amount of *phronesis*, and are motivated by the fine, if they form a pleasure-based friendship around ethical pleasures (perhaps through their guidance of their educators or parents). This would mean that their friendships become increasingly better as their understanding of virtue and their enjoyment of virtuous actions increase. If this is the case then their friendships can be used to help further refine their pleasures.<sup>109</sup>

Aristotle indeed supports this idea by arguing that friendships are actually shaped by the goals of the individuals involved and that they are refined or degraded by the activities done by the friends to achieve this end (1172a1-14). Friendships are formed with a goal in mind, and that goal defines the type of friendship that has been formed. As Aristotle says, "whatever someone [regards] as his being, or the end for which he chooses to be alive, that is the activity he wishes to pursue in his friend's company" (1172a1-4). If the friends enjoy hunting or playing games, that is what they will do together and some friendships are formed around one such specific activity. The same would be true of

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<sup>109</sup> Burnyeat hints at this when he concludes that a proper upbringing will include a habituation and education in right relationships with others (82).

people who desire to be virtuous: their friendship would be formed around their shared desire to grow in virtue and they would want to perform such actions when they meet. Furthermore, Aristotle considers a friendship based on the pursuit of virtue decent or good and he argues that the goodness of the friendship will increase “the more often they meet” because they will be doing good actions together (1172a11-12). It seems that these notions of the goodness of the friendship, increasing if the friendship is formed around a good goal, could apply to the ethical pleasure-based friendships of youth that I have proposed. If two youth could form a friendship around the enjoyment of virtuous actions through the guidance of their educators or parents, and be encouraged to keep these friendships, their friendship would indeed increase in goodness “the more often they meet.” The friends’ shared activities would refine their pleasure-based friendship into an increasingly good friendship.

In turn, this refining friendship would have the power to mold each youth involved. Early on in his discussion of friendship, Aristotle asserts, “the young need friends to keep them from error” (1155a13-14). Also, later Aristotle says friendships have the power to mold people (1172a12-14). If we combine these two statements, I believe we can infer that friendships have the power to greatly assist in the refinement of pleasure and the training of emotion in the youth. Aristotle argues, in a good friendship, each friend “seem[s] to become still better from their activities and their mutual correction. For each molds the other in what they approve of” (1172a11-13). Youth who are learning to have ethical pleasures and good emotional dispositions will help to correct and mold each other through their friendship.

The sense of shame each youth is developing will play a role here. Ethical pleasure-based friendships will provide an ideal arena for shame to function as a restraint of base actions, thereby improving the youth's characters. Since youth value their reputation and honour, they will naturally desire to maintain these with their friends (*Rhetoric* 1389a11-14). Thus, if a youth is caught doing a base act by his friend he will feel great shame in this, preventing him from doing such acts in the future. This will be true as the youth are learning to moderate their desire for reputational honour and, even more, true honour (Chapter 2 Section II.3). Also, we can imagine that the more each youth understands virtue and fine actions, the more they will know when a base action has been committed. Thus, the shame brought about by mistakenly performing base actions in front of a friend will increase in potency as the fine increasingly motivates each youth.

Note that this will apply to the training of each of the emotions we discussed where shame plays a part. Ethical pleasure-based friendships will greatly assist in the training of anger, fear, love, hate, and the weeding out of envy. For example, if one gets angry at the wrong type of person or to an extreme in front of a friend, he will feel shame, since both youth know that this is a base action due to their upbringing, and will not want to do such a thing again. The same would be true if one youth was caught in a cowardly action or other actions that are caused by inappropriate emotions.

In terms of encouraging good actions and character growth, when one sees the other doing something good he will praise him, augmenting the enjoyment he feels in doing this action and, furthermore, emulation will encourage each friend to perform the acts they witness. As each youth develops more of a desire for true honour and are

motivated by the fine their emulation will encourage each of them to perform the fine actions they see performed by their friend in order to gain the same honour. In this fashion, emulation will encourage good actions in the friendship, helping the friendship stimulate character growth.

This cycle of friends improving their ethical pleasure-based friendship and in turn being improved will continue until the end of their upbringing and possibly even into adulthood until their friendship transforms into a character-based one. In this way, ethical pleasure-based friendships greatly supplement the habituation project each youth is involved in.

## **Chapter Summary**

The friendships of the youth, when overseen by their educators, play a crucial supplemental role in the process of pleasure refinement. For the youth who are younger and motivated by pleasure, groups that are formed by the youth's educators to perform activities that mimic virtuous actions can aid significantly in the youth's pleasure refinement. Furthermore, for youth who are older and motivated by the fine rather than pleasure, ethical pleasure-based friendships can supplement their pleasure refinement process and emotional training. If this occurs, a cycle will be established involving the two friends molding their friendship for the better and in turn being molded for the better by their friendship.

## **Conclusion: The Need for a Good Upbringing**

We have now explored Aristotle's goals for the youth in terms of pleasure refinement and emotional training. According to my interpretation, Aristotle believes a youth who undergoes a proper upbringing can acquire a nearly virtuous character. Such a youth enjoys ethical pleasures—he enjoys virtuous actions because they are fine—and experiences ethical pains—he is pained by base actions because they are shameful and therefore not fine. I have argued that this is possible because of the limited amount of *phronesis* a youth has developed near the end of his upbringing, allowing him to recognize and understand the value of the fine and make choices based on his understanding, as well as the guided habituation he has undergone. The well brought up youth also (at least often) experiences emotions towards the right people, at the right times, and in the right ways—i.e. in the way right reason prescribes. In short, a youth who has received a proper upbringing has acquired what is needed to learn *the beginnings*.

My inquiry has triggered some interesting questions about moral development in adulthood. I am interested in what Aristotle says about moral development after an upbringing is completed. In *X.9* of the *NE* he says, “presumably, however, it is not enough if [people] get the correct upbringing and attention when they are young; rather, they must continue the same practices and be habituated to them when they become men” (1180a1-4). Aristotle goes on to say that this is why laws that address the practices of adults are needed to promote the acquisition of virtue. But, presumably the adult who has had a good upbringing knows which actions are good to perform in order to develop full

virtue and can therefore guide his own moral development. To what extent then is moral development in adulthood a project of self-care as opposed to habituation under the law? Furthermore, given my discussion of friendship, I am interested in looking at the role of friendship in moral development during adulthood. Can my proposed ethical pleasure-based friendships continue to help adults develop full virtue? When would such a friendship transform into a character-based one?

By way of conclusion, I would like now to discuss briefly how crucial Aristotle believes the upbringing we have discussed is for an individual's overall moral development. Speaking of a proper upbringing, Aristotle uses very strong words to assert its importance. He says, in a passage we have seen before, if one hopes to be a student of political questions, one must be brought up in fine habits, since "someone who is well brought up has the beginnings or can easily acquire them" (1095b5-9). Similarly, he states, if one hopes to listen to arguments on virtue, happiness, and other significant topics, and benefit from such arguments, one needs to be "finely brought up and habituated," as well as "fond of what is fine and objecting to what is shameful" (1180a15-16 and 1179b30-32). A proper upbringing will give one the means to understand and benefit from further teaching on the subjects of political science (*politikê epistêmê*)—notions like the fine, virtue, and *eudaimonia*. So, we know that a proper upbringing is needed for one to be teachable in this way.

A proper upbringing is also required because it promotes temperance and general control over emotions. It ensures that a youth does not repeatedly give way to his desires and thereby increase their intensity. Furthermore, it gives one understanding of the fine to

know how to properly satisfy one's appetites and not give way to base activities. In this way, a proper upbringing prevents intemperance.

Aristotle states that the consequences of not mastering one's desires and emotions are grave indeed. He says,

If then, [the child or the appetitive part] is not obedient and subordinate to its rulers, it will go astray. For when someone lacks understanding, his desire for the pleasant is insatiable and seeks indiscriminate satisfaction. The [repeated] active exercise of appetite increases the appetite he already had from birth, and if the appetites are large and intense, they actually expel rational calculation. That is why appetites must be moderate and few, and never contrary to reason. This is the condition we call obedient and temperate. (1119b7-14)

Without guidance, a youth would naturally indiscriminately gratify his desires and over time, this would lead to the disposition of intemperance. Such a disposition will be a major hindrance on any moral development in adulthood because the intemperate person does not care for the correct reasons for action that ought to be considered in rational calculation. This is why later Aristotle refers to the intemperate person as "incurable" (1150b33). It seems impossible to lead him out of his vicious state towards correct reason and the life of virtue.

The same is true of all vices if firmly established. Aristotle warns that a person is:

Sick willingly, by living incontinently and disobeying the doctors, if that was how it happened. At that time then, he was free not to be sick, though no longer free once he has let himself go, just as it was up to someone to throw a stone, since the principle was up to him, though he can no longer take it back once has thrown it. Similarly, then, the person who is [now] unjust or intemperate was originally free not to acquire this character, so that he has it willingly, though once he has acquired the character, he is no longer free not to have it [now]. (1114a15-23)

If a person performs enough actions that promote a vicious disposition, thereby forming the disposition, he is no longer free to decide what dispositions he will form. His character trait has been determined and he cannot easily reverse this (if at all). Likewise,

the actions performed during youth promote character dispositions, whether good or bad, and these are very difficult to change. This is why Aristotle cautions, “it is not unimportant, then, to acquire one sort of habit or another, right from our youth. On the contrary, it is very important, indeed all-important” (1103b22-25).

The above passage from *III.4* also seems to imply though that one’s character is not permanently set in one’s youth. Certainly, it seems the well brought up youth is free to decide what type of character he will have in adulthood. He has the power of choice as well as dispositions that listen to what reason prescribes. Though, we might say it would be difficult for him to reverse his good habits and go against his sense of shame, it is within his power to choose base actions and develop base dispositions in place of his good ones. Furthermore, we can imagine the outcome for another type of person who has received a moderately good upbringing. He would at most be incontinent by the end of his upbringing. This person would therefore be free in a limited sense to choose what type of character he will have in adulthood. He would have picked up a small amount of understanding about the fine as well as virtuous actions but his affections would not have not been trained well enough, meaning in adulthood he cannot do what he knows he should. This person is curable and therefore reasonably free to become good, provided he has help (1150b30-1151a3). He is curable because he recognizes his vicious actions and desires to change and therefore would respond to guidance. However, a youth who has had a bad upbringing, never learning about what is fine or being guided to control his appetites, would, we can reasonably infer, develop intemperance and general viciousness. The extreme emotional and appetitive characteristics that Aristotle attributes to the youth seem to necessarily lead to this outcome. A youth who comes into adulthood this way I

do not think we can count as free to change in adulthood. He does not even “recognize that he is vicious” and therefore sees no need to change (1150b36-7).

Given the necessity of intemperance and viciousness if one does not receive a good upbringing, we can conclude that the upbringing we have discussed, in terms of pleasure refinement and emotional training, is crucial to an individual’s overall moral development. If one hopes to develop full virtue in adulthood, one needs to recognize the values of the fine and subsequently enjoy virtuous actions for their own sake. Furthermore, full virtue requires that one’s emotions are aroused as correct reason would prescribe so that one is not carried away by one’s feelings. A good upbringing can provide these things. Aristotle is not speaking in hyperbole then when he says that the upbringing we have described is all-important.

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